Reply for petitioner — Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & MacHine Workers

Supreme Court brief1961

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| s<vdas 8. BABWAIN!,

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Jn the Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1960 |

il -

(NITED STATES ‘OF AMERICA- AND ‘ATOMIC ENERGY

COMMISSION, PETITIONEEBS

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF. ELECTRICAL, RapIO aND

MACHINE Workers, AFL-CIO, et Au. °°

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

' ARCHIBALD COX,

s _ Solicitor General,

WILLIAM H. ORRICK, SJr.,

Assistant Attorney General,

DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN,

Assistant to the Solicitor General,

MORTON HOLLANDER,

‘ ; Attorney,

Department of Justice, Washington 25, D.C.

NEIL D. NAIDEN,

General Counsel,

COURTS OULAHAN, ;

Deputy Géneral Counsel, . ee

LIONEL KESTENBAUM,

* Attorney, f ar

Atomic Energy Commiaston, Washington 25, D.C

St ee

yo INDEX

‘ Arguinent:,

I. The propriety of the issuance a the orig-

inal construction permit in 1956 is

irrelevant to the only issue before the

court, namely, the validity of the 1959

amended construction permit

II. ‘The Commission's findings ssattstied the

regulations _ — — -

’

HII. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 saihion

iZeS Regulation 50.35 and the Comniis-

Sion’s two-step licensing procedure.

TV. Respondents’ assertions as to the safety

hazards of atomic, reactors generally

-and of the PRD@ reactor in particular

are contrary to the facts

* * V. The Commission’s findings on the safety

7 of the site are adequate

Conclusion_-— | |

Appendix A ; ;

Appendix B es

Appendix C

CITATIONS

Cases:

Bowles v. Seminole Rock ('o., 325 U.S: 410.

Federal Broadcasting System v. Federal Com-

munications Commission, 225 Fk. 2d 560,

certiorari denied, 350 U.S. 923... *

Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325 U.S. 697

(1)

‘ ~

HPQ C1 1 . — J >

Page

bee |

46)

Statutes and Regulations:

Atomie Energy Act of 1954, S Stat. O19, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. 2011: |

Page

Section 103 _- 20, 24

Seetion 104_- 20, 21, 22, 24; 25

-Seciion 104(b)___. uae 19, 21

Section 104(d).....\-.--:,..--4.--- 21,31

Section 105 _ _ - ; ; 24

Section 161__- 19

Section 182_ 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 33, 34, 35, 36

Section 182(a)_.. -. 2”, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27

Section IS2{b)___ “4, 24

io Section 182(¢) = 24 ogi

Section 1S2(d)_. : rae 24

Section 184... -) | 24

Section 185__ > - : 19,

20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32. 37 |

Section I86__ ge oe

Section sy... ; 20, 24, 35

Atomic Ene rev Regulations 0c F.R.): eae

Seetion 20_ _- ' Se 42

section 50.34. al oe a

“eetion 50.35 . Pein SS

"dy 14, 18, 16, 17, 19, 25, 26, 29, 32,39

. Section 50.40.22 15, 16:17

Section 50.57 (Cum. Supp. 1961)__ _- “19

| Proposed Section 100.11 (b), 26 F.R. 1235 47

Miscellaneous: | 1

Aceident Facts, 1960 ed., National Safety °

Council, Chicago, fll., p. 26 eee 44°

AEC Press Release D-72, Mareh 30, 1961 2 - - 44

+ Argonne National Laboratory Summary

Status of Fast Breeder Reacter Program,

dated December 1, 1960. .—__. Aaeae 45,

100 Cong. Ree. 12014, 3 Leg. Hist. 3759. 35,3435

“>

Miscellaneous Continued » :

Estep, Radiation Lujuries anil Statistics: The

Need for a New Approach to Injury Litiga-

tion, 59 Mich. L. Rev. 259 |

25 Ked. Reg. 1225. _ -

26 Fed. Reg. 1224___-

Hearings before Joint Committee on Atceinic

Energy on Governmental Inde sunity for

Private Licensees and AEC Contractors

Against Reactor Hazards, S4th _Cong,, 2d

Sess., pp. 62- 63

Hearings Be fore the’ Joint’ Committee on

Atomie Energy on ‘8. 3323 and H.R. S862,

“S3rd Cong., 2d Sess., pp.° 119-120; 2 Leg.

Hist. 1753

—— on Development, Growth and State

of the Atomie Energy Industry, hefore the

Joint Committee on Atomie Energy, 87th

Cong., Ist Sess., p. 10300) - pares

Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, A Study

of AEC Procedures and Organization in

the Licensing of Reactor Peeilities, 85th

36, 37

’ Cong., Ist Sess. (Joint Commuttee Print .

1957):

Pp. 6, 96, 107-108 _

Pp. 136-155

Joint Cominittee on Atomic Energy, Imprev-

ing the AEC Regulatory: Process, “Sth

Cong., Ist) Mess. (Joint Comittee Print

- 1961): “i .

Vol. 1:

Pp. 447-448

Vol 2) pid Se

_IVv

Miscellaneous—Continued ce

— Bureau of Standards Handbooks:

andbook 59 (1954, Supp. 1958)______-

Handbook 69 (1959). = _. pope

- New York Times, , April 7 7, 1961, p. 12. ee

PRDC's Eighth Quarterly Technical Report, ,

Prgeeannt TM, Boe ee oe.

S. 3323, 1 Leg. Hist. 181, ag ue oN.

S. 3690, 1 Leg. Hist. 645; 718__. 22-8. aot

Sn the Supreme Court of the Bnited States

‘ Oc TOBER TERM, 1960 ©

7 No. 454

COMMISSION, PETITIONERS

| ve |

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF Exrecrricar, RApio AND

MacHINE Workers, AFL-C1O, Ev AL.

APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT: OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

’

‘ &

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

rye eS 2 ° ieee . i r

Mie central issne in this case is whether the pro-

cedure followed by the Atomie Energy Commission

with the PRDC: Reactor’ accords with. the .Atomic

Energy Act of 1954. -'Phe Commission. held’ a hearing

on the PRDC application for a license to construct

and operate the Fermi -reactor and found (R. 708):

reasonable assurance in the record, for the

purposes:of this provisional. construction per-

mit, that a utilization faéilitv of the general

type. proposed in the PRDC’ Applieation , and

amendme nts thereto ean be constrneted and

(14) |

‘Univep Srares-or .AMERICA AND ATOMIC: ENERGY

OX WRIT OF GERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT: OF -

to protect the public health and safety: in connection ©

operated ‘at the location without undue risk to

the health and safety of the publie.

The Commission thereupon issued a provisional con-

struction permit. It also announeed that it would

not issue a license to operate unless. it was demon-

strated at a further hearing that the reactor as

finally designed would be operated without danger.

to the health and ; saféty of the public (R. 712, 718-

719). : ,

In our opinion this oR conforms exactly to

the Commission’s’ regulations and its consistent prac-

tice in other cases’ involving large ‘developmental re-

actors. Consequently, our main brief is chiefly con-

cerned with the interpretation of the Atomie Knergy

Act. . ian

Respondents have introduced a diffuse variety of

additional questions, Although the only order under

review is the order dated May 26, 1959, continuing

the construction permit, as amended, they attack the

-original provisional construction ‘permit issued Au- .

gust 4, 1956. It is now necessary, therefore, to give

the Court a brief account of that aspect of the pro-

éeeding. See pp. 3-7, infra. ;

Respondents also argue that the Commission’s find-

ings in this case do not conform to its own regula- —

‘tions... The argument ~ .based partly aipon conten-

tions concerning the meaning of the regulations and

partly upon respondents’ interpretation of the Com-

mission's findings, which waries from = time to time

throughout its briefs Since the meaning of the fiid-

ings must be established before’ one can determine

whether the findings éariforn to-the regulations and

the sti atute, We shay abso “dis wins this ISSUC before.

turning back to the central qitestion in the case. See

“pp. 7-19, dufra. |

Finally, since respondent’8 appended to their brief

(a list of so-called “accidents” at atomic’ reactors, we

shall discuss: the extraordinarily high safety record.

"of this field of activity. See pp. 41-45, infea.

THE PROPRIETY OF THE ISSUANCE. OF THE ORIGINAL

CONSTRUCTION PERMIT IN 1956 IS IRRELEVANT TO THE

ONLY ISSUE REFORE THE COURT, NAMELY, THE VALIDITY

OF THE 1959 AMENDED CONSTRUCTION PERMIT

The PRDC application was filed on January 6,

1956. Under the Act and regulations at that time,

the Commission was. authorized to issue provisional

constretion permits without a hearing provided that

it gave ‘any protestants an opportunity to be heard

-Uupom request filed within 30 days after issuance.

The Commission referred the application to the Ad-

visory Cunmitteé on Reactor Safeguards. - The Com-

mittee reported (R. 587-593) that there was imsuf-

ficient- information available at that time to give

assurance that the PRDC reactor could be operated at

the site without’ publie hazard and that it was doubt-

ful whether.even an accelerated program of research

"and development would give the assurance before the

scheduled completion of the reactor in the summer of

1959. The Commission conducted further investiga-

tions and on August 4, 1956, granted a provisional

construction permit CR. 516-523). Commissioner

Murray -dissented.

eer om, . . 4 .

‘There was sharp criticism of this, procedure from

the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy

and. in Congress, both because: the Commission had

‘Sassued a construction permit without a hearme and

also beeause it had acted in-the face-of a discour: aging

ACRS. report.” The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was

subsequently amended to require a hearing before the

issuance of eoustruction permits, to provide A statue

tory basis for tlie, Advisory Committee's activities,

and to require that itt report be made public. The

handling of the PRDC Applieation at this stage and

especially the alleged’ suppression “ef the ACRS re-

port * became ‘an item in the political contest over the -

A full explanation of the considerations that led the Coni-

mission to issue the original permit, including its analysis of

the ACRS repor:, is contained ina #56 letter from the Com-

mission to the Joint Committee on Atomic “Energy, set. forth

at pages 136-155 of A Study of AF C Procedures and Organi-

zation in the Livensing of Reactor Facilities. Sith Cong., Ist

oe: Sess. (Joint Committee Print 1957).

“ae Respondegts state (Br. 17, n. 15) that the PRDC project

has not, since the 1957 legislatian, been seferred to the Advi-

sory Committee. While no formal reference is required until

‘application is made for an operating,license (Section, 182(b)},

the Advisory Committee has beei regularly reviewing the

PRDC project to date, and its stibeommittee has had periodic

meetings with thé AEC -staff and PRDC personnel. /mprar-

ing the AF¢ Regilatory Process, Sith Cong., Ist Sess. ( Joint

Committee Print 1961), Vol. 2, pp. 177-179. A> formal

‘repost will be rendered by the ‘Advisory. Committee prior to

the hearing upon an application for an operating license.

* The Commission’s uniform policy, until the 1957 legislation,

was to consider such communications from the ACRS as in-

ternal documents protected by executi¥e privilege. See /m-

proving the AEC Regulatory Process, supra, Vol. 1, pp. a4i-*

448,

<«. -. oe

‘nomination of Cormiuissioaer Strauss ti be Secretary

of Commerce, .

Three points concerning this mitial phase of the

PRDC proceeding should be clearly understood... ,

. The original provisional construction permit is

not before this Court. After the original phase was

completed, the AC RS report was release d, and a full

hearfng -was . held. The Commission made specific —

findings concerring the safety of the Fermi reactor

upon: new and -more*complete evidence. Not even

Respondents argue that any mistakes in the original

issuance of the provisional constriction permit in-

validated the order under ‘teview. .And /whatever

may be the merits of that e arlier cor troversy, it in-

volved no violation-of the. statute.

2 The report of the Advisory Committee on Re-

it Safeguards castS no’ doubt upon’ the Commis-

sion’s finding that there is reascnable assurance’ that -

a reactor ofthe general type proposed in the PRDC

applieation: can be constracted and opetated safely.

at Lagoona Beach. More than two years had inter-

vened between the ACRS report and the Commission’s

findings after the hearing. During this period atomic

science and engineering were developing with great

rapiditv. The completion date for the -LRDC_ re-

“actor had been set back, thus allowing more time for

_ research and development. The Chairman of the

» Advisor Vv Committee on Reactor Safeguards testified.

at the hearing that although there was not then suf-

‘ficient proof of its safety to permjt a re tor of Be

tvpe proposed to be opér ated at Lagoona Beac h,>

was “very probable that the necessary information

will be obtained?’ (R. 674). Dr. Harvey, Brooks, an

ACRS member, testified paw there was reasonable as-

surance that such information would be available in

time to meet the PRDC time schedule and that

would furnish “the -necessary assurance “that the

PRDC reactor ¢an be operated at a site such as that

proposed without undue ‘hazard to the health ‘and

safety of the public.””. Other ACRS members testi- -

fied. to stibstantially the same effect: (R. 674-75).-

3. The Congressional criticism of the handling of

the PRDC case which is cited by respondents does

not. refer to the issues involyed in the present CAS

but to. the proc ‘edure followed in the issuance. of the

original provisional construction permit. ‘Thus, the

material under the heading * Pertinent amendments

to the Act after issuance of originalvonstruction per-

mit’? (Resp. Br. 15-17) is rélevant, at most, only to

the issuance of the original permit, and has nothing :

to do with the issues before, the Court. Similarly, the

colloquy between Senator ‘Anderson and Commis-

‘sioners Wilson ‘and Olson (Resp. Br. 55-56), in which

the Commission’s handling of the Fermi project was

criticized, related to the eriginal issuance of the per-

mit in 1956, not to the permit here under review. THis

is ‘also true of the cited Congressional criticism “a

the Commission’s failure to make public the ACRS |

report (Resp. Br. 61-62), and the statements by Sen-

ator Anderson .and Representative. Holifield ¢riti¢is-

ing the Commission for not having held a hearing be-

fore issuing the permit (Resp. Br. 5, n. 53 61-63). >

a”

e = - —_

oe. 4

In short, .all of the Congressional criticism that re-

spondents stress so heavily related to an issue not

involved in this case—the issuance of the original |

permit in 1956. The only issue before the Court is

the.validity of the amended constriction permit issued

*in 1959, and that depends woon what was done in

issuing it, not upon what happened in the earlier

proceedings. involving the superseded permit. Cf.

Inland Empire Council vy. Millis, 325 U.S. 697, 706- °

fF 6 710; Federal Broadcasting System _v. Federal Com-

munications Commission, 225 F. 2d°560, 563, 564-

) 565 (CLA. D.C.), certiorari denied, 350 US. 923.

cr 65 (CLA. D.C.), cert | 1, 350 U.S. 923 ¥

THE COMMISSION'S .FINDINGS SA'FISFIED THE .

REGULATIONS so =

o . 3

Respondents’ argument that the Commission's find-

ings satisfy. neither the regulations nor the statute

rests upon shifting grounds. Af~ time& they seem

to acknowledge thar the findings relate to both. the

construction and operation of ‘the reactor but eon-

tend that the findings are denigrated by the Com-

: Mission’s statement that the findings were, made for

the purposes of issuing a construction permit (see.

Hrigf for Respondents, pp. T1-12; 14-15, 52, 70-71, ——

75, 78-79). At other times they -seem to argue that

the findings relate only to the construction and not

to the operation of the reactor, and, for thiis reason,

full to satisfy the regulations (see Brief for Re-

<pondents, ‘pp. 46-49, 57, 59, 60-61, 72, 78, 80). On

still other cceeasions the argument is tipparently based

bon a contention coneerning the Meaning of the

. )

<s . . %

—

regulations themselves (see Brief for Respondents.

pp. 49-50, 53-54, 56, 60, 81).

We deal with these points seriatim.

. The controlling regulation’ is Regulation 50.35,

under Which the Commission was proceeding because

PRDC was not in a position to supply all the’ tech-

nical infprmation required to complete the applica

tion. The pertinent sentence of Regulatfon 50:35 |

provides— 7

_ * * * Tf the Commission is satisfied that it has

information sufficient to provide reasonable as-

surance that a facility of the general type pro-

posed can be constructed and operated at the

proposed Jocation without undue risk to the

health. and safety of the public and that the

omitted inférmation will be supplied, it may

process the application and issue a construc-

-tion permit on a provisional basis without the

* omitted information subjeet to its later pro-

duction and an evaluation by the Commission

that the final design provides reasonable _as-

. surance that the health and safety of the pub-

lic awill not he endangered. a5

“After weighing the evidence on the safety of fast

ipo reactors, the Corfimission, found (Finding 18,

.706)— | | . wg

(a) It lias not heen positively ‘established

_ that a fast breeder reactor [of the PRDC type]

ean be operated without a- credible possibility

of releasing significant quantities of fission

- oducts to the environment;

(b) There is reasonable assurance that the-

oretical and experimental inyestigatious * * *

will establish definitively, prior to the sched-

Q .

uled completion date of the PRDC reactor,

Whether ort not the reactor proposed \ by

Applicant can be so aperated ;' .

‘dence will establish’ that the reactor proposed

by Applicayt can be se operated.

These three findings properly focus attention upon

what the Commission did, and did not, find in the

proceedings leading to the order eontinuing the

PRDC construction permit. The Comniission’s safety

standards are very high. In order to issue an op-

erating license the Commission would have had to.

find that the PRDC fast breeder reactor, as finally

designed, could be operated without a credible pos-

sibility. of releasing significant quantities of fission

products to the atmosphere. The Commission did.

= make this finding beeause the proof which fur-

ther research and experimentation was expected to

‘develop before the completion of the PRDC reactor

was not available at the’time of the hearing. The’

Commission did find that there was reasonable as- .

surance that this proof would be available before | .

the operation was licensed (Finding 21, R. 707; Find-

ing 31, R.-710). Indeed, the Commission plainly

announéed that it would not issue an operating li-

cense unless the proof became available (Finding 37,

R. 712; R. 676, 679-680, 718-719). y

The Commission thén went on to disguss the La-

coona Beach site and found that if the expected preof

concerning the safety of the reactor became available,

~ Lagoona Beach would be a safe loeation (Finding a.

R. 707-768). .

, | 10

The Commission then pulled these two groups .of

spe together into its final conclusion (Finding 22;

- 108)— a ;

The Comnelasiat finds reasonable assurance in

the yecord, for the purposes of: this provisional

construction permit, that a utilization facility

-of the general type proposed in the PRDC

Application and amendments thereto can be_

constructed and operated at the location with-

out undue risk to the health and safety of the

public. a

This finding follows the very ers of Regulatior

90.35 with two exceptions: (a) the parenthetical

phrase ‘“‘for the purposes of this provisional . con-

struction permit” is “not in the regulation; and (b)

- the regulation does not include the specific refer-

ence to the PRDC Application.

(a) The phrase quoted above does not denigrate |

or qualify the finding that there was reasonable as-

surance that a reactor of the general type proposed

could be constiucted -and operated at the location.

without undue risk to the public health and. safety.

The argument that. the parenthetical phrase deni-

grates the finding ignores both the acknowledged issue

before the Commission and the thrust and focus of

its entire opinion and findings. Admittedly, the issue

was properly: framed in terms of Regulation 50.35 in-

_the notice of hearing (R. 576, 578). The issue ‘is also ;

stated in those terms in.a portion of the opinion re- =

jecting respondents’ legal arguments (R. 645-646).

The facts are found in ‘those terms in the opinion (R.

676-677). They are again stated in proper terms in

dealing, first, with the inherent safety of the reactor

(R. 706), and, second, with its location (R. 707-708).

But then, the respondents say, when the Commission

pulled these admittedly proper findings together into

the ultimate finding, it suddenly disregarded the regu-

lation and its own prior findings, changed its meaning

and, although it used the very language of Regulation

50.35, except for the parenthetical phrase, found some-

thing different than what the regulation contemplated.

This is patent nonsense, The phrase modifies the

verb *finds.”’ awespondents had been arguing to the .

Commissron ‘that it was prejudging. the question

whether a License to operate should issne, Respondents

were also contending that the evidence would not sup-

port the kind of safety fi:ding required for a license.

iy stating explicitly the limited purpose for which the

finding was made the Commission pre&rved respond-

ents’ ‘rights, warned PRDC, and reemphasized the lim-

ited character of the question before it,

(b) Respondents erroneously assert that we seek to

.distinguish between an initial finding of safety with

respect to a reactor of the general type proposed: and

a finding of safety with respect to the operation: of

the proposed reactor and from this false premise they

apparently argue that the Commission's faidings are

insufficient under Regulation 50.35 because the Act

Mequires a finding as to the opefating safety of the

‘proposed reactor. ; aaa

So far as compliance with the regulations is in

volved, the short. answer is that. Regulation D385 re-

quires a safety finding concerning “a facility of the

“ : 2 a

general type proposed.’’ The Commiss#on made the —

finding with respect to “a utilization facility of the

general type ‘proposed in the PRDC Application”

(R. 708). The correspondence is exact. os

More fundamentally, the fallacy in respondents’

argument is that it is a play upon words. In one

sense the PRDC application related te a specifie ré-

actor—sa_ reactor, to be built at Lagoona Beach int

accordance with ¢értain speci ifications. In. another

sense ,eVery reference to the reactor described in the .

PRDC application covered only a general type be-

cause the details of the design had not been frozen

and some had not even been tentatively described.

So long as the final design remained open, a reference

to the PRDC reactor would be specific in the sense

that it referred: to one identifiable Iroject with ecer-

tain specifieations but it would deseribe only a class

or type of reactor within the definition of which the -

final design would fall. Phrases like general type de-

pend upon relative specificity and must be construed

with reference to the subject matter.’

The words ** facility of the vene ‘ral type proposed”

havé been used in the foregoing sense in every’Com-

mission proceeding involving a major developmental

reactor (see pp. 13-14, 49-61, tufra). The phrases

facility of the general type proposed”’ and “final de-

sign” draw. the contrast between the. incomple te ‘in-

formation available When an application may be filed

and a construction permit is issued; and the nsinute

specification of every deta which must be evaluated

hefore issting a license to operate. — The deseription in.

an application for a reactor at a specific location de-

scribes only a general type of ‘reactor. soe long as a

number of final designs might be developed* within:

“the seope of the application. This process is. still

going forward. in the PRDC proceeding. ©

The Commission has consistently granted | provi-

sional construction permits for developmental power

reactors under Regulation 50.35. on the basis of find-

ings of rensonable assurance of the operating safety

of ‘the general type of reactor proposed. In each of

the eight other instances in which, up to the time of

the decision here under review, the Commission has

issued a provisional construction permit for a devel-

opmental power reactor, it did so upon the same find-

ings it made. here, namely, reasonable asstirarice that

a reactor of -the propesed type could beusafely con-

structed arid operated at the proposed site. In none

of them was the safety finding made in terms of the

particular reactor to be constructed. ‘In all of them,

as in the instant case, the Commission -provided, in

accordance with Regulation 50.35, that operating au-

thority would not be granted unless it found,- upon.

completion of construction, that the final design pro-

Vides reasonable assurance that publie health and

safety will not be endangered by operation. We have

set out, -in Appendix A, infra, pp. 49-61, excerpts

from ‘the. construction permits and Commission deci-

As we pomted ont in our main brief (pp. 57-69), it is.im-

material that in\this ease the Commissien made the findine,

“for the png of this) provisional construction permit.”

That, however? is the. sole basis upon which respondents at

tempt to distinguish, the settled) @Monmiission practice (Resp.

Dr. Tx. TO), ° : ‘ !

59222 61 ¢

“~

)

sions in each of the other power reactor cases, which

show that safety findings have unjformly been made in -

the terms of: Section 50.35 and, in a majority of the.

cases (ingluding this one), specific? unresolved prob-

lems have been identified. In addition, there have

been numerous other imstances of non-power reactors

(where the safety -problefiis generally are not as-diffi-

cult to solve as in developmental. power facilities) in

which the Commission, in, authorizing construction, has

e xpressly made findings with respect to a reactor of thé

general type proposed ard has prev ided that an op-

erating license would not issue until safety problems

had been successfully resolved." :

Even if Regulation 90.35 were far less cles ar than it

is, this ‘settled administrative interpretation, by the

Commission of its own regulation would be entitled 4

to opp: weight.”” Bowles v. Seminole Rock

C'o., 325 US. 410, 414. ae

| Respondents point (Bi. 53-56) to a proposed revi-

sion of Regulation 50.35, published for publie com-

ment in February 1960, which would have changed

the standard for granting provisional construction

permits to “reasonable: assurance that the proposed

location is suitablé from a safety Standpoint for a

facility. of the size (power level in the case of ‘re-

actors) and general design eonce pt proposed, that the

applicant has identified any major featurestor com-

ponents on which further research and development

‘E.g.. Westinghouse Electrie Cos (Westinghouse Testing Re-.

actor), CPTR-1, July 3.1957: Georgia Tnstituté of Teehnol-

ogy, CPRR-A7, June 15, 1960; University of Virginia, CPRR=

rd; September 13, 1950, ‘

‘work is needed to determine their acceptability from

a-safety standpoint, and that the applicant: will ¢on-

duct a research and development program which will

- investigate the unresolved safety questions” (25 Fed.

Reg. 1225). But that) revision, which admittedly

would have changed the standards: presently em-

bodied in Regulation’ 50.35, was never adopted; and

its mere proposal casts no doubt upon the validity

‘of the existing standards under which this permit was

issued. ih. | . | .

2.*At a number of ‘points respondents argue that

the Commission’s safety findings are insufficient be-.

cause they relate only to the construction of the

PRDC reactor (Brief for Respondents, pp. 57, 59,

72, 78, 80)... The opinion and férmal findings, how-

ever, discuss. the safety of both construction and éper-

ation (R. 676-677, 706, 708). They are focused upon

the safety pf operation (R. 669-677, 706). A mere

| reading of the opinion and findings is enough to dis-

pose of raspondents’ argument upon this point.

3. Respotidents’ remaining: argument to the ‘effect

that: the Commission’s findings do not ‘comply .with

its own regulations is based upon Regulation 50.40,

Which appears at pages 135-136 of our main brief. It

is headed ‘Commo Standards”’ and lists the “eon-

siderations’? \by which “the Commission will be

euided’’ in determining whether a license should be

issued: (a) the processes to be performed, the operat-

ing procedures and technical specifications provide

-regsonable assurance that the applicant will comply

with the Commission's’ regulations and “that the

health and safety of the publie will net be endan- .

‘16

gered’; (b) the applicant is technically and finan-

cially qualified to engage in the proposed activities, ©

and (¢) the issuance of the permit ‘will not. * * * be

inimical to the comnion defense and security or to the

health and safety of the public.”* Respondents point

to a passage in the opinion (R. 644) stating that at

the construction permit stage of the proceeding these

considerations were to be applied to whe. \..s being '

licensed—the construction—and then go on to argue \

that the Commission should have applied them to.

what was not then being licensed—actual operation.

‘The argument has two fatal defects. .

a. The Commission’s opinion and findings, taken as

a whole, show that the Commission did-in fact guide

itself by each of the considerations listed in Regula-

tion 50.40, including the probable safety of opera-

tions. Seetion 50.40 does not require any specific

finding about safety .of operations at any specific

stage in the proceedings leading to a license to oper-

ate. It leaves the Commission free to * give such

weight to.the several considerations.as it deems ap-

propriate to the particular phase of the proceedings.

Section 50.35 is the provision which specifies what

findings shall be made, and when they shall be

made, in a case involying a provisional construction

permit. As shown above, the Commission’ s safety find-

_ Ings fully satisfy that section. .

b. The Commission’s interpretation of Regulation

90.40 is consistent with the words and supported by -

Commission practice. Regulations 90.35 and 50.40 are

obviously intended to be consistent and Regulation

00.35, being the more specific, is the controlling pro-

vision With respect to construction permits. The een-

eral Seetion 50.40: covers licenses for different kinds

of activities and the very concept of common stand-

ards means that the standards will be ‘applied to the

thing for which permission is sought—in this éase the

construction of a reactor.

This interpretation of Section 50.40 of the regula-

tions is supported by the Commission’s practice in

other cases. We have set forth in Appendix B, infra,

-pp. 62-65, pertinent excerpts from the construction -

permits ind Commission decisions for each of the nine

other licensed power reactors showing the Commis-

sion’s finding under Section 50.40. In none of them

Was any safety finding made, in the terms of Section

50.40(a); in all of them the safety findings were made

in terms of Section 50.35. Thus, the Commission

obviously views Section 5@:35, and not Section 50.40

fa), as governing the issuance of a provi isional con-

struction permit. The Commission deemed Section

50.40(b), relating to the applicant’ s technical and

financial qualifications, applicable in all eases, al-

though there are variations in the findings made there- |

under. Some of the findings relate to qualification

co construct and to operate, others only to construct.

Seven of thepermits (including. the amended PRDC

- permit) are supported by findings under Section |

0.40(¢) that the issuance of the construction permit

would not be inimical to the commoy defense and secule

rity and to the public health and safety, the remaining.

‘three did not, make any finding thereunde 4. Each of

the construction permits for these reactors was ex-

plicitly. subject to the later production of omitted

, ae

technical information, vette be evaluated by the Com-

Mission, showing that ‘‘the final design provides rea-

‘Sonable assurance that the health and safety of the.

public will ‘not be endangered.” For example,

granting the construction permit for the Yankee re-

actor at Rowe, Massachusetts, the Commission said—

The construction permit must be provisional

at this stage of the proceeding principally be-

pause Yankee has not completed: the design of

‘the reactor and certain features of the proposed

“facility present unresolved questions which

might affect its safe opexation. -* * * * [T]he

experimental: program outlined in the appliea-

tion will probably produce .the information

needed to resolve these, questions prior to con-:

sideration of: final design and operating pro-

cedures and conversion of the constructior

permit toa leerise. | ,

For other illustrations see pp. 49-65, infra.

Respondents’ assertion that a. different procedure

was followed in the PRDC case rests upon the use of

the sparenthetical phrase “for the purposes of this

“provisional construction permit” in Finding 22. “As

we have shown above,,this phrase does not denigrate

or qualify the finding (see pp. 10-11; supra). No one

can conscientiously deny’ that the Commission . has

always followed the tayo-step procedure in the cases

involying developmental power reactors, making a

. finding before it issued the provisional construction

‘permit of the probability that a safe final design

would he developed and. reserving a ‘decision upon, the

safety of the final design until the hearings ite: the

issuance of a license, A definitive finding on operat-

ing safety of the final design has been made at the

a * ; a

»°

“tque-of the construction permit issuance only in cases

invoting small reactors which are practically pro-

duction-line items and as to which there are then ne

unresolved safety problems.

.* fmnymteo

Nise

Ill

THE ATOMIC ENERGY ACT OF 1954 AUTHORIZES REGUL re

TION 50.35 AND -THE COMMISSION'S TWO-STEP. LICENS-

ING PROCEDERE: 4

We turn now to the central issué—whether Regula-

tion 50.35 andthe two-step procedure followed by the

Commission are authorized by the Atomic Energy Act

of 1954. In our main brief, we showed that the regu-

lation and practice are authorized by Section 104(b),

which governs the issuance of licenses, arid by the

broad rule-making pewer granted by: Section 161 to

prescribe | regulations necessary “to, —— health.

‘or to minimize danger to life or prope tty.” We also

showed that Section 185. foreshadows the two-step

procedure? : :

1. Respondents contend, however, that the substan-

tive standard for the issuance of construction permits

Is contained in Section 182; and that this section’ re-

quires the Commission, before authvrizing construe-

tion, to make a definitive finding as to. the operating

safety of the proposed reactor, - This argument 1s

‘Fhe second step of this procedure—the issuance of the

operating. license—itself may involve several steps... Thus, Reg-

ulation 50.57 (10 C-F.R.-50.57, Cum. Supp. 1961) authorizes the

issuance of a provisional operating license where “it appears de-

sirable to obtainsactual or further operating experience before

issuance of an operpting license for the full term, up to forty

(40) years, requested in the application.”

fallacious in three respects: (a) Section 182 does not

'.preseribe the substantive standards governing the

granting of licenses, but only thie content and form of

license applications and related procedures. (b) The

provisions @f Section 182 upon. which respondents

rely apply only to operating licenses, and not to con-

~ struction permits. (ec) In any event, the Commis-

sion’s findings in this case do satisfy the standards of

Section 182, if applicable..

a. As pointed out in our main brief (pp. 38-39),

the Commission’s reactor licensing authority is’ con-—

tained in Sections 103 and 104, in the «chapter of, the

Act éntitled ‘‘Atomie Energy Licenses’*; and it is

those sections, rather than Sections 182 or 185, that

define the substantive standards: for licensing. The

latter sections are in the chapter faptioned “Judicial

Review and Administrative.Procedure.’’ Section 182,

captioned ‘License Applitations,” merely specifies

what information all applications for a license must

contain and in what form (182(a)), and sets out cer-

tain procedures to be followed. Section 185 pvovides

for the issuance of construetion permits, and in-

dicates the circumstances in which, upon completion

of construction, the Commission is to issue an operat-

ing license. .

‘In the case of “applications for licenses to operate

_ production or utiization facilities’’ “(such as_ the

PRDC reactor here involved), Section 182(a) ‘states

the requirements. for the contents of applications in

greater detail than for other licenses. It requires

such applicant to submit specified technical material

21.

cand such--other information as:the Commission. may

deen necessary “to enable it to find-that the utilization

or production of special nuclear material * * * will.

provide adequate protection to the healfh and safety

of the public.” While this provision requires the

furnishing of information: upon which the Commis-

sion makes findings with respect to public health and

safety, the Commission’s duty to make such. findings

flows not from Section 182(a) but-from the substan-

tive provisions governing the issuance of licenses. It

is to the latter provisions, therefore, that’ ome must

look to ageertain what findings the Commission must

make and when if must make them, At the very

most, the references to findings in Section 182(a) may

throw light on the meaning of the previsions which

deal with the isfuanée of licenses and pe rts; it cas

not control them.

The standards for the licensing of all research and

development reactor facilities, including» authority

both to construct and to operate, are contained in See-

tion 104.) Seetion 104(b) authorizes the Commission:

to issue licenses for developmental power reactor fa-

cilities, and provides that in ‘issuing licenses under

- this. subsection’? the Commission shall impose “such

regulations.and terms of lieense as will permit the

Commission to fulfill its obligations * * * to

the health and safety of the public.” Section 104(d)

prohibits the issuance of a license if,in the Commis:

protect

sion’s opinion, such issuance ‘would: bes inimical to

* * * the health and safety of the public.”

_ The statutory question in this case, theréfore, is not,

“cas respondents phrase it, whether Section 182 rather

than Section 185 prescribes, the standards for the: is-

suance of construction permits, but whether the find-

ings made by the Commission in tue first ste ‘p of its

two-step licensing procedure satisfy the requirements -

of Section 104. We submit that they clearly do.

Congress has given the Commission the broadest dis-

cretion to adopt what procedures it deems appropriate

“to protect the health and safety of the public.” The

provisional construction permit system, allowing con-

struction based on findiags of reasonable assurance .

that the type of reactor proposed can be safely -built

-and operated: at the site and that remaining safety.

problems ‘can be resolved, followed by a definitive

- safety determination before operation is authorized,

fully achieves such protection. See our main brief,

pp. 36-66: . i a

Ifycontrary to.our view, Section 182(a) should be

read to prescribe substantive safety standaads, still the

standards would apply only to licenses to operate, not to

licenses to construct. The first sentence of this section

provides: “Each application for a license hereunder

shall be in writing and shall specifically state’ such in-

formation as the Commission * * *

* * &

may determine to

be necessary to dee “ide

plithut es the ¢ ‘ommiission may deem appropriate for

the license."” The second sentence, which is the only’

one referring to findings om public, health and safety,

provides that, ‘In connection with applications for

lreenses do operate production or utilization facilities,

* % x#°°

the applicant shall state

‘eee J

qualifications of the ap-

(emphasis added), fol-

Jowe do by a specification of certain additional informa-

‘tion to be furnighed. Language could hardly be plainer

to indicate that the requirements of the second sentence

of Section 182 are applicable ohly to /icenses to operate

production or utilization fae ‘ilities, and not to lice Tises

to construct them. Had Congress intended the sec ‘ond:

sentente to be applicable to licenses to construct, it

would either not have limited it to “licenses to oper-

ate,’’ or else it would have specifi¢ally provided for

‘such broader’ applicabilify—as it did: in Section, 185,

which provides for construction permits for “appli-

cants for lfeenses to construct or modify production

or utilization facilities.”

A further indicatioh that the second sentence of

Section 182 applies only to licenses to ope rate, and

not to licenses to construct, is that-it requires the sub-

mision of information to enable the Commission to

find that “the utilization or production of special

nuclear miuterial’’ will provide adequate protection —

public héalth and safety. “[U]tilization or pro-

duction of special nuclear material” in a reactor takes _

place. in connectidn with its operation, not its

construction, = oe

eRespoudents argue: (Br. 36), however, that the

second sentence of Section 182 must apply to construe-

tion permits because the last sentence, of Section 185

states that [forall other purposes of this Act , a con-

_struetion permit is deemed to be a ‘license: *?* There

are two answers: ea |

lirst, many of the provisions of the. Act apply to

ieerses generally. Other’ provisions apply to specific

kinds of licenses. The broadest effeet whieh the last

sentence of Section 185 can sensible be given is te

“make a construction permit the equivalent of a license

-for the purpose of those provisions which are applica-

ble to lieenses renera lv (¢.9., Section 105, 104, 105,

IS2(b), 182(e), 182(d), 184, 186, 189), Plainly, the

sentence does not make the permit the equivalent of any

particular kind of license, or@f every particular kind

of license, And since the sbeand sentence of Section

182(a) applies only to licenses to operate, it is not ap-

plicablé to licenses generally, and therefore not appliea-

ble toa construction permit,

Second, respondents’ argument ignores the fact that

a construction permit is made the equivalent of a b-

cense only “[f]lor all other purposes ef this Act.”

(Emphasis added.) This must mean purposes ether

than those of Section 185. It follows that the con-

struction permit is not2a license for the purpose of

determining whether Scetion 185 incorporates by ref-

erence any substantive st: indards contained in Section

182 or autlrizes the Commission to issue a permit

with Jess complete information than Section 182 would

require: for the: purpose of issuing an operating’ |i-,

Cense, Obviously, -Seetion 185 answers this question

by stipulating ‘that the Commission may. proceed to

‘issue a permit in the absenee of the complete

information. , , phe

fespondents ‘stress (Br. 33-34). that Section 185

pon completion of construe-

nit and the satisfaction of

merely provides that,

tion pursuant to the pe

certain conditions, the Comnvssion shall issue a *'li-

cense,” but does not specify that it he a liecnse “to

\ ss

operate. © But, in the context of this case, ‘it could «

m nothing else. In other situations, the leense to

be issued upon completion of construetion may be

license to sell; to transfer, or te export... The sig-

nificant fact is that Section 185 distinguishes between

| the imifial. stage of construction pursuant to a con-

struction permit, and Wie subsequent stage of opera-

‘hon, sale, transfer or export pursuant to a second, .

and different, license. It» thus supports the Com-

IMisSLOn's regulation (850.35) providing for different

‘safety findings at the two stages of licensing. See

-our main brief, pp. 49-52. ae

~ Respondents also. point out (Br. 31-32) that the

second sentence of Section 182(a) specifies, among

the information to be furnished in connection with

“applications for operating licenses, **the place of the

-use,”’ and that this information ordinarily is needed

te describe the facility to be constructed. From this

they argue that the second sentence of Section 182-

eONOTS: licenses to coustruet. But the fact that in-

‘ormation which the statute requires te be submitted

in an applieation for an operating. license may also

we ouseful in connection Vv ith a construction permit

dees not establish that a sta itory requrement which

is limited in. terms to “ligenses to operate”? should

he construed to apply to construction permits, and

there is nothing. inconsistent in’ the Commission's

requiring the same, information:to be supplied in an

i pplication for a construction permit as the statute

requites for an ope rating lic emse. © ar ‘

This conelusion is borne out by the Commission's

reculadons governing the submussion of imformation

& a

in license applications. The Commission. has impie-

mented Seétion 182 (a) by prescribing, in Regulation

50.34, the detailed technical information pertinent. to’

health and safety that must be meluded in all apph-

cations: for reactor licenses. If the nature of the

“proposed reactor is such that complete information

‘an be submitted at the construction permit. stage

(as is true today for many research reactors), then.

the: applicant can obtain a nonprovisional permit.

‘e., the: Commission makes the ‘definitive safety find-

ings when it authorizes construction. In such a ease,

an operating license will ordinarily be issued upon

completion of, construction merely upon a showing

that the construction as been carried out in ac-

cordance with the permit. |

Where, however, “because of the nature of a

proposed project, an applicant is not in a positidn

to supply initially [te., in the applieation for the

construction permit]. all of the technical information

otherwise required’’. by See tion 50.34 for a definitive

safety determination, Regulation 50.35 provides for

the issuance of a’ coustruction permit ‘ton a pro-

visional basis’? upon findings of reasonable assurance

(le that a ‘facility of the general type proposed”

ean be safely constructed and operated at the pro-

posed site, and (2)*that ‘‘the omitted: information

will he supplied’? (that is, that. the applicant . will

be able to establish, prior to operation, the safety of

the final design).

Thus, the Commissieu’s regul: tions prov ide bor the

submission, of the maximum’available safety, informa-

tion in an application for a construction pe mit, and

ie a 7

authorize: the granting of a provisional construciuon

permit onty where, because of the nature of a pro-

posed project,” all information necessary for a detini-

_ tive safety determination carnot be then supplied,

¢ In any event, ‘if Section 182(a) does provide

standards governing the issuance of construction per-

mits, we submit that the Commission's -safety | find-

ings inthis case met those standards.

Section 182(i) merely requires the submission of

such information as the Commission may require

“to find that the utilization or production of special

nuclear material will * **

provide adequate prto-

tection. to the health and safety of the public.” Here’

the, Commission’s ultimate finding that a reactor of

the general type proposed in the PRDC appkeation

can be safely constructed and operated at the-loca-

tion without undue risk to public health and safety

(Fdg. 22, R. 708) rested’ on subsidiary findings of

reasonahle assurance. that, prior to authorizing op-

eration, it ean be established that “the proposed

reactor” is inherently safe and that ‘‘no eredible ac-

cident can release significant quantities of fission

products into the atmosphere” (Fdgs. 21, 18, R. 707-

708, 706). In other: words, the Commission found.

reasonable assurance that it will be .deronstrated

that this reactor can’ be safely operated. ;

These subsidiary. findings would not have, been.

sufficient to authérize operation,.since various health

and safety problems still remain to be resolved. But

a finding of future safe operation, made at the time

‘constriction is authorized and ‘several years prior

to operation, may, be based upon less completé and

. 28

definite information than the definitiyg, safety evalu-

ation to be made at the tithe that operation is au-

thorized. As the Commission stated (R. 679, em-

phasis’ in original), ‘The degree of ‘reasonable as-

surance’ with respect to safety that satisfies us in.this

case for purpeses of the provisional construetion

permit would not be the same as we would require

in considering the issuance of the ‘operating license.”

-The Commission thus ‘here found, in substance,

that ‘‘the utilization * * * of special nuclear ma-

terial” (in the operation of the,.reactor) “will pro-

vide adequate protection to the health and safety of

the ,ublie,” since it found (Fdg. 18, R. 706, em-

phasis in original) reasonable assurance that it will

be demonstrated “that thé reactor proposed by Ap-

plicant” ‘‘ean be operated without a credible possi-

bility. of releasing significant quantities of fission préod-

ucts [in]to the environment.’”’ And the Commission

has explicitly provided in the construction permit ’

that it will not grant an ‘operating license unless: it:

“has found that the final design provides reason-

able assurance that the health and safety of the public

will not be endangered by operation of the facility

in accordance with the specified —e, (R. 718;

see, also, R. 679-680 412).

2. We hie eG cor main brief (pp.°37, 39-52)

that Section 185 sanctions the: Commission’s settled

practice, pursuant to its regulations, of granting a

provisional construction permit on findings of rea-

sonable assurance of safe cperation of the particular.

type of reactor proposed, subject toa definitive safety

determination after construction and. preliminary

t@ting is completed but before an operating license

is issued. We pointed out (ibid )-that Section 185

provides a) that a construction permit is to be

granted “if the application is otherwise acceptable

tou the Commission,” and (2) that (a) upon com-

pletion of construction, (b) the filing “of any ‘addi-

tional iniformation needed to , bring~ the original

‘pplication up to’date, (¢) upon finding that the

facility has been-constiucted ‘and will operate” in

conformity with the amended application “and in

conformity with the provisions of this Act and ‘of

the niles and regulations of the Commission,’’, and

(d) in the absence of any good’ cause being shown

to. the Commission why the granting of a license

would not be in accordance with the Act, the Commis-

* Respondents distort our position when they state (Br. 35)

that we construe Section 185 as providing “no statutory safety

“andards for, and no limit on. the Commission’s discretion in

regard to, the .issuance of construction permits.” Our point is |

that the broad language in Section 185 governing the issuance

of construction permits leaves it to the Commission’s disere-

tion to select an appropriate method for meeting the* basic

statutory standard in Section 104 that ali licenses must pro-

vide adequate protection, to public health and safety. In

Regulation 50.35 the Commission has provided that an appli-

cant for construction authority, who is unable initially to sup-_

ply ak the technical information necessary for @ definitive

safety evaluation (as in this‘case), maybe granted a construe- \

_ tion permit upon a provisional basis. But such authority is

issued only’ upon finding reasonable assurance that a facility

of the proposed type can be safely built and operated, .and

that the information necessary for an ultimae finding of

operating safety of the particular reactor will ‘be supplied. |

This procedure fully satisfies the standards of Section 104 of

adequately: protecting the pd\blic health and safety. See our

main brief, pp. 49-52.* / . - ij

£92233 --61——3 . ,

sion shall issue a_ license. We cone 0.)

that the latter two criteria—operatinn i in watny

with the Actgand the rules and regulations, and the,

“good cause” requirement—were. intended to assure

that the statutory criteria for safe operation would

‘be met ‘before an operating license is -issued.

» Respondents —— (Br. 36-39), however, that.

the “good eause’’ prevision gives the Commission the

right to refuse an operating license for safe y reasons

only if “some objector” raises the Soe ald that the

third requirement (construction and operation in ac-

cordance with the Act and rules: and reculations)

requires only a finding “that the terms of the con-

struction permit have been ecarricd out”, (Br. 37,

cantina in original). Since one of the “terms” of

_ every provisional. construction permit, including this

‘ one (R. 718-719), is that all unresolved safety prob-

lems be satisfactorily resolved, respondents’ argu-

ment falls of its own weigl®. Furthermore, the re-

quireme nt of; completion of construction in accord-—

ance with the permit is only one*of -two standards mm

the thir® condition. The Act requires the Comnis-

sion to find that the facHity has heén constructed and

will operate not only in conformity with the applica-

tion, but also’ “in Conformity with the provisions of

this Act and of the [Commission ’s] rules and regula-

tions.”” Oper ation in conformity with the Act neces-

sarily means operation consistent with the public

health and safety’ protection standards that the Act.

contains. Thus, Section 185 requires the Commis-

sion, before granting an operating license, .to find

not only that the construction permit has been com-—

*«

built will not be “inimical to * * * the health and

safety of the public’: (See tion 104 ( d)). -The good

cause provision furgher confirms ‘the view that the

Commission, before Prauting an operating. license,

must find that oper ition will be saf e, since it permits

other persons (including ‘membe: 3 of the Commis-

bring to the Commission’s attention any adverse > facts

hearing upor@operating s safety.

In this: case, the Commission explicitly stated in the

cense Will not be issued “unless eee the Commis-

pubhe will not be endangered by operation. of the

facility in accordance with the specified procedures”

» 718) ; and that, upon completion of construction

in accordance with -the permit, an ope rating license

sion of additional proceedings, if they be necess ary

operation” (R. 719): See also Finding” 37, which

states (R. 712, emphasis in original) : ,

Proceedings for a license to operate the pro-

posed PRDC plant shall be held at a time later

to be determined, after the completion of con-

struction. In that proceeding the safety and

financial considerations’ of -the PRDC project

~~ will-be in issue, and we shall ‘ again consider

whether the PRDC plant” can be operated with

_ _ reasonable assurance for the protection of the

peeing health and safety of the public,

sion’s staff or intervenors such as respondents) to,

amended: construction permit that an, operating li- |

-sloni Siw found that the final design provides reason- |

able assurance that the health and safety of the

will issue only “upon .a further finding, after conclu-’

or appropriate, of reasonable assurance of safety of -

“plied with, but alee that operation | of the reactor as”

In short, the Commission has m: ide it explicit that

it ‘will. not rant. an operating license for the PRDC

reactor unless it finds that he reactor can be operated

safely.. As the Commission emphasized. in “its opin-

_ion (R. 646-647, emphasis adde@) : “There can be no

doubt that public safety is the first, last, and a per-

manent consideration in any decision on the issuance ,

of a construction permit or a iicense to ‘operate a‘nu-

clear facility’ Section 185 plainly authorizes -the

Commission to refuse an operating license unless it

finds that the reactor ean be safely operated, even

if construction has been done in full accord with the

. design presented at the construction permit stage;

-and Regulation 50.35 provides for a definitive safety

determination prior to the grant of an operating li-

a ee a construction permit is’ issued on a

provisional basis. ;

~ The Commission’s provisional construction permit

procedure,. based tipon a' finding of operating safety

of the. general type of reactor propoged when con-

struction is authorized, subject to a further definitive

safety evaluation of the proposed final reactor design

before operation is permitted, provides much

‘vreater protection to the public health and safety

than respondents’ suggestion that all definitive safety

findings should be made when the construction ‘per-

mit ‘is issued since the Commission must issue an

operating license as long as* construction is carried |

out in accordance with the permit. For under the

-Commission’s _ two-step, . procedure the Commission

makes its final definitive safety determination on the’ fF

basis of the latest scientifie knowledge and experience

available, including that developed during the

construction period.” Respondents, however, would

require the Commission to base its determination of

ultimate operating safetyggpon information available

when construction Is arR thorized, which may be

several years before operation begins. We submit

that the strong Congressional concern for safety re-

peatedly m ianifested in the Act is clearly furthered by

the Ceieialaaleai! s settled practice. -

3. Neither of the two items of legislative history

that respondents cite (Br. 39-44) supports their ©

_argument that Section 182 applies to construction

permits. |

a. The first item—a colloquy between Senator Hum-

phrey and Senator Hickenlooper during which the

latter stated that a. license and construction permit

are. equivalent—did not relate to safety matters at.

all, but to whether the various procedures (such as

notice, appellate review and licensing. preferences)

applicable to the issuance of operating licenses would

also be applicable to the issuance of construction per-

mits. See our-main brief, pp. 57-61. The proposed

- ameridment of Senator Humphrey, which he. subse-

queiitly withdrew upon being informed that amend-

ments alréady made to the bill covered the. problem,

was that ‘‘no construction permits shall be issued

by’ the Commission until after the completion of the

procedures established by y section 182 for the consid-

eration of applications for licenses under this act’’

— (100 Cong. Ree. 12014, 3 Leg. Hist: 3759, emphasis

added).

The.*‘procedures”’ of Section 182 to which this pro-

_ posed amendment related were:the giving of notice of:

license applications and the grant.to various public

bodies of preferred consideration: in licensing, not

any “precedures’’ with respect to the kind of safety

findings the Commission must make in issuing .con-

struction permits. This is shown not only by the legis-

lative history cited in our main brief, but by the fol-

lowing italicized statement that was omitted from re-.

spondents’ quotation (Br. 42) from the Senate debate

(100 Cong. Ree, 12014, 3 Leg. Hist. °7 — a

Mr. Humpurey. * * *

In other words, as I understand, under the

bill a construction permit cannot be interpreted

in any other way than being equal to or a part

of the licensing procedure. Is that correct?

Mr. HickeNLoorer. The Senator is correct.

The staff has worked on this matter. ‘An.

amendment was offered on, I believe, July 16,

to section .189, having to do with hearings or

judicial review, anf that section was tied up

_ with other sagtions of the bill. A, license and

'-a construction permit are equivalent. They are

the, same thing, ‘and one cannot operate until

the other is granted. |

The same is true with reference to hearings.

Thérefore, we believe, and we assure the Sen-

ator, .that the amendment ‘is not essential to

the problem which he is attenipting to reach.

Mr. Humpnurey. Let me ask the chairman of

the committee if subsection b of section 182,

which applies to license applications, also ap-

plies to construction permits? Subsection b

reads: |

Sey FS

: 30

b. The Commission shall not issue any license

for a utilization or production facility for the

~. generation of commercial power under section

103, until if has given notice in writing to such

regulatory agency as may have jurisdiction over

the mate: and services of the preposed activity,

and Qntil it has published notice of such appli-

cation once each week for 4 consecutiv : weeks

in the Federal Register, and until 4 weeh ‘s after

‘the last notice. ert

Mr. HicKENLQOPER. The sovliae fa The

answer to the Senator’s question is “Yes”

Mr. Humpurey. Jn other. words, the’ revised

sections on judicial review and on hearings

and the revised section 182 on license applica-

tion all apply directly to construction permits?

Mr. HickENLooper. Yes.

Mr. Humpnrey. With that statement, Mr.

President, I withdraw my amendment. The

‘only purpose of the amendment was to clarify

that section. I am graieful to the chairman

for having done it before the amendment was

considered.

The notice requirement referred to in the foregoing

italicized statement (now in Section 182(c)) was

_ one of the procedural revisions designed to give

greater rights for public bodies which Senator Hum-

phrey and other opponents of the draft bill, were

able to obtain on the floor of the Senate. It—like the

rest of the statements during the debate upon which

Respondents rely—had no reference to safety find-

ings, and it affords no support. for respondent’s con-

clusion that ‘Congress, by making the procedural pro-

visions of Section 182 and Section 189 applicable to

construction pe rmits, also made applicable the ope pate

ne safety” findings referredto-in-Seetion 182,

° b. The second item cited (Br. 39-40) is a tolloquy

from hearings in 1954 involving the testimony of an

industry witness, Mr. McQuillen. It appears that Mr.

slcQuillen was coneerned, (1) with the administrative .

burden on an applicant where his proposed activities -

would, under the bill, require allegedly up to nine

different licenses and (2) with what he viewed as.

the failure of the bill to provide that licensees ‘‘would

have the assurance that when they had the facility

finished in accordance with each of their require-

‘ments they would be able to run, it.”? Chairman

Cole’s comment, cit@d by’ respondents, that “un? .

doubtedly”’ the bill as drawn ‘‘would be so operated”’

does not seem, as respondents contend, to have. been

directed to the second poiit, but rather to the first.’

7 Respondents reach their-conclusion by omitting to quote that

portion of the colloquy which, because it immediately precedes

Chairman Cole’s interjection, was apparently. the statement —

to which he was directing his attention. This was a statement

by Representative Hinshaw:

Representative Hinsuaw. That seems to me to be: rea- °

sonable, that you should put all the conditions into 1-license

that can be put into 1 license. That would be fair enough.

Chairman Cote. Would you mind my interruption? Why,

cannot that: be done under the terms of the bill as it is now?

Mr. McQuitten. I think it undoubtedly would be so

operated.

Chairman. Cote, Of course it would.

[Hearings Before The Joint .Committee on Atomic Energy

on S. 3323 and H.R. —_ 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 119, 2 Leg.

‘Hist. 1758.] \

The problem particularly referred to ‘e Representative Hin-

shaw was subsequently cleared up by a committee amendment

which added Section™461(h) to the bill, authorizing the Com-

PRATT ORAL CR 8nd FG SE ERE TD EOL ST Oe Tay OEE lt

Ps °

to the estan pola i the eaathuden respondents craw —

‘would fot follow, The next statement of the witnéss,

in response to Representative Cele’s statement, was:

“But the terms "of. the construction-permit seetion

would need a little amendment, I think,. to- make

‘construction and license at the -— of that upon con- .

strnetion as ‘required fit together’ * (Hearings, fr. 7,

supra).. In other words, the industry. witness himself

recognized that. Section 185 as drafted would not

automatically insure an operating license merely be-

cause construction was carried out in accordance with

the terms of the permit.

4, Respondents challenge (Br. 58-64) our dailies

(Main Br. 62-66) that Congress has acquiesced in the

Commission’s two-step provisional construction permit

procedure, on the ground that the Commission alleg-

edly never informed Congress that it grants such per-

mits upon finding reasonable assurance of safe opera-

tion of the general type of reactor proposed, and

defers a definitive safety finding of the final design

until the reactor has been construed-and is to. be

licensed to operate. The argument takes: various

forms. Thus, they contend (Br.°59) that the Com-

mission never informed Congress that its regulations

construction would not endanger public ‘health and

Mission to: aida in a sittgle application one or more of the

activities for which a license is réquired by this Act” and to

“edmbine in a single license one or more of such acffyities”.

Compare S. 3323, 1 Leg. Hist. 181, 234, with S. a? Teg.

Hist. 645, 718. * | er

‘

~ on construction permits require only "a finding that

~ 38

safety. The Commission hasénever taken that view,

It did not take that view in the present case. Here,

as in all other provisional construction permit cases,

the Commission aeted on the basis of findings of rea-

sonable assurance that a reactor 6f the proposed type’

_-could be safely constructed and operated at the: ‘pro-

posed site (R. 676-77, 706, 708). <a |

Respondents _also « contend (Br. 60) that the Commis-

sion in this case departed from its practice in other

provisional construction permit eases (of which Con-

gress was aware), beeause here the safety findings were

made “‘for the purposes of this provisional construction

permit.”’ The argument is entitled to-‘no more weight

in this context than it is elsewhere (seé supra, pp. 10-11,

18, and our main brief, pp. 67-69). Respondents also

refer (Br. 60-64) to Congressional criticism of the is-

suance of the original PRDC permit in’ 1956. That

point, however, has no relevance to the issue before

‘this Court: the validity of the amended permit issued

‘n 1959. See supra, pp. 3-7. And it was -the pro-

cedure followed ‘in issuing such amended permit that ‘

_ the Commission brought to the attention of Congress.

If, despite the material set forth in our main brief

(pp. 62-66), there were. any: doubt as to whethér the

Commission had informed,Congress as’ to the basis |

upon which it issues provisional construction permits,

such doubt is dispelled by the very Commission state-

ment that respondents quote at page 60 of their brief.

The Commission there advised the Joint Committee. -

that—. K

The Commission staff reviews these reports as

they are submitted, holds informal meetings .

. , ; re~.

with the applicant, discusses the safety aspects

of the reactor with its advisers (ACRS,), con-

siders the progress of the developmental pro- |

grams Which are heing carried out by the ap-

plieant, and finally arrives at a point when it

believes that there is reasonable assurance that.

the unresolved safety problems can be resolved

in a way that will make it possible for the ap-

plicant to operate the proposed reactor at the

proposed site without. undue risk to the health,

safety, and property of the public. At this junc-

ture, the Commission may issue a conditional

construction permit. [Emphasis added]

If respondents’ claim 1s that the Commission’s re-

porting to Congress was -insufficient to show ac-

quiescence by the latter because the Commission never

_ specifically used the precise terminology of Regula-

tion 50.35 (“a facility of the general type proposed”’),

the short answer?is. that it did. On May 15, 1956, the

then general manager of the Commission advised the

Joint Committee (Hearings Before the: Joint Com- —

mittee -on Atomic Energy. on Governmental Indem-_

‘- nity for Private ‘Licensees and AEC Contractors.

against Reactor Hazards, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pp.

62-63, emphasis added) :

** * We havé established —_ procedures.

whereby the applicant may submit the results

of his hazard evaluation step by step as a series

of preliminary hazard summary reports. At

such a time as we are satisfied that we have

information sufficient to provide reasunable as-

surance that a facility of the general type pro-—

posed can be constructed and operated’ at

‘proposed location without undue risk to. the

health and safety of the public, we can issue

a construction -permit for the facility. Such a

permit is, of course, conditional and will not

‘- eonvert to a license to operate until the com-

- plete hazard summary report has been sub-—

‘ mitted, and we have made a finding based

thereon that the final design of -the specific

facility provides reasonable assurance that the

- health and safety of the public will not be en-

dangered by operation of the reactor in eacivel

-. ance with specified procedures. _

. This is the type of construction permit that

we will probably have tq issue for all of the

power demonstration reactors, and even for

many of the research, testing, and medical re-

actors,‘ for the next few yéars.

The foregoing statement is an exact description

of the proceduré followed by the Commission in this

very case.

The two Jvint Committee staff studies of the Com-

mission’s regulatory, program have’ similarly shown

full knowledge of, ® basis upon which the Commis-

sion issues provisional construction permits. Joint,

- Committee on Atomic Energy, A Study of AEC Pro-

cedures and Organization in the Licensing of Reactor

Facilities, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (Joint Committee

Print 1957), pp. 6, 96, 107-108; Joint Committee on

Atomic Energy, Improving the AEC Reguiatory

Process, 87th Cong., Ist Sess. (Joint Committee Print

1961), Vol. 1, p. 31, Vol. 2, p. 154. Moreover, the |

Commission sends copies of all construction permits -

and its decisions thereon to the Joint Committee.

: Al

cee | TV

_- RESPONDENTS? ASSERTIONS AS TO THE SAFETY HAZARDS

OF ATOMIC REACTORS GENERALLY AND OF THE PRDC

RE ACTOR ” PARTICULAR ARE CONTRARY TO THE: FACTS ©

Respotidents make numerous unsupported and un- |

warranted statements, with respect to the operating -

safety hazards of atomic: reactors generally and the

PRDC reactor in. particular. For example, ‘after >

noting--the ‘ government’s statement in its brief ‘that

there had been only one fatal reactor accident in this

country, on January 3, 1961, they state (Br. 15).

that ‘‘many. reactor accidents’ have occurred, some

causing serious injuries to. reactor personnel and un-

determined. injuries to the surrounding population.”’

In support of this-statement, they cite a four-page

“List of Reported Atomic Reactor Accidents’ con-

tained in the appendix to their brief, pp. 105-108).: We: -

have set forth in Appendix C, infra, pp. 66-91, a de-

tailed description .and explanation of each of the al-

leged “‘accidents’’ in the United States, and of those

elsewhere for which information is‘ ‘available, pre-

pared by the Commission’ s Division of Licensing and

Regulation. : .

This material shows that, cantrary ‘to respondents’

statement, reactors have indeed been eperated in the

‘United States with a ‘‘remarkable- safety . record”’

(R. 879). Of the 22. “accidents”, in this country:

cited by respondents, only one (to which we pre-

viously referred) involved any fatalities, and that one

enna, "ar the death of three operators inside the

reactor building. Three resulted. in overexposure of

Pisa

operating employees to radiation, with no ‘reported.

injuries. Several others caused a temporary increase

in radiation levels in the facilities which, however,

did not result in overexposure of any persons.” -The

remaining 13 “accidents” involved only various dif-

ficulties in operation, ranging from corrosion of a

component, requiring, replacement, to damage to the

reactor. - ¥hile these may have necessitated cleanup

and maintenance work, they did not, present hazard

to operating personnel or to the public. None of the’

incidents involved any person not employed in the

+ reactor itself.

We recognize, of course, that an atomic reactor ac-

. . . c < . ! . .

cidgewt, if it sould oceur, might cause serious public

* anfury. But it is precisely because of this danger that |

“such extraordinary safety precautions are taken in

industry. The Commission’s elaborate health and

’ safety program is based upon a full recosnition of the

dangers and, also, of the means available to prevent

any injurious consequences. Atomic reactors may

yet be a mystery to the average layman. But there

is a wealth of ‘scientific information which teaches.

that this new source of’ controlled eriergy can be, and’

® Part 20 of the Comntfission’s regulations prescribes the ap-

plicable radiation exposure limits—permissible radiation levels

-and concentrations of radioactive material for persons in re-

stricted ‘frehs, i.e, employees in atomic energy facilities, and

_ for tnrestricted areas accessible to the publig. These limits, |

based in part upon long-term experience with X-rays and

radium, provide ‘substantial margins of safety to permit con-

tinuous exposure without deleterious effects. The Commis-

sion’s regulations conform to the Recommendations of the -

National Committee on Radiation Protection, National Bureau

of Standards Handbooks 59 (1954, Supp. 1958), 69 (1959).

43 as a

is being, safely utilized for beneficial ends. Statijes

show, as one well-knewn commentator in the atomie *

energy field (Professor Estep of the University of

Michigan Law School) ree éntly stated (Estep, Radi-.

~ ation Injuries and” Statistics: The Need for a New

AppPach to Injury Litigation, 59 Mich, li. Rev. 259,

260) that:

An amazing safety record has been achieved by

the nuclear industry so far and» enough is’

known. about radiation safety to support an

argument that it is safer to handle radiation

than many other types of material which in-

dustrialized countries have _ using for’

decades, * * *.-

While accident statistics are not available for those

“engaged in the operation of atomic reactors as such, ;

the. Commission, has statistics showing, the accident

rate in. its own installations. For the year 1960, this -

was 1.68. disabling injuries per millitn man*hours

worked. This is far below the National Safety Coit,

cil’s industry-wide average for 1959 (the latest figures

available) of 6.47 ‘injuries per million man-hours

worked: Only. one: industry reported by th¢ National

Safety Council had’.a lower rate than the Commis-

sion’s instAllations: communications, with .96 injuries.

The Commission’s’ aceident rate is lower then that

in such industries as aircraft manufacturing (2.01),

chemicals (3. 32), ; textiles (4.34), printing and pub-

lishing (5.52), tobacco (6.50), pulp and paper (7.44),

meat. packing (8.20), and air transport .(15.32). In

terms of days lost per million man-hours worked, the

Commission’s 1960 reeérd of 198 is far below the

we re

_—_

; industry-wide average of 754, and is bettered by only

four industries. (communications, wholesale and retail

trade, electrical equipment, and storage and ware- -

housing). ‘Accident Facts, 1960 edjtion; published by

the National Safety Council, Chicago, IIl., p. 26; AEC

Press Release D-72, March 30, 1961.

. Sir John Cockroft, a prominent British physicist to

whose statements respondents refer (Br. 7, n._7),°

recently stated that the working force of more than

30,000 persons in Great Britain’s atomie power in-

dustry has suffered no ill effects from radiation.

_* New York Times, April 7, 1961, p. 12. 2

With respectso the safety hazards of this partic ‘ular

reactor, respondents, citing a recent. motion filed by

PRDC with the Commission requesting an extension

of time for completion of construction, state (Br. 9)

, that PRDC has not yet solved its bownig problem,

, the danger that fuel elements may bend toward

ne other, causing nuclear instabilities. That motion

itself; however, and other public documents filed by

PRDC, indicate that it believes that the bowing prob-

lem has been solved.” Moreover, the experiments that

* Respondents r@fer (Br. 7, n. 7) to a statement by Sir John

that an accident in Britain’s Windscale reactor in 1957 released

more radio-activity than is released during an explosion of an

atomic bemb of the irhing fe -In the Windscale acci”

dent, a release and dispersal of fission products’ into

the atmosphefe resulted not from an explosion, but from a fire

in the graphite moderator (which PRDC will not have) and

from the absence of gas-taght containment (which PRDC will:

have). There were no reported injuries from the Windscale

accident. See infra, pp.,83-84.

*PRDC’s Eighth Quarterly Technical Report, dated Sep-

tember 10, 1960; PRDC Application for Extension of Construc-

_ tion Permit, dated’ October 28, 1960.

45 Co

have been conducied since the decision in this case at

the Commission’s Experimental Breeder Reactor N Oo.

1 have apparently confirmed that the problem is sol-

uble, as the Commission anticipated (R. 672, 704).”

In any-event, the Commission has made it clear that

PRDC will not receive -a license to operate until it

has demonstrated that the bowing problem has bgen

solved (R. 676, 712 , 718-719).

Respondents also’ refer (Br. 8, n. 8) to a regent

statement in a periodical that the maximum credible

accident”’ for the PRDEC reactor has not been defined.

The Commission stated in fhis case that it requires

applicarits to identify the worst accident deemed

credible, so that the. Commission can evaluate it-and

determine “whether the worst aecident deemed cred-

ible ean have: hazar dous consequences to the publie,’”

and that PRDC had. “not yet t done so (R. 678-679).

The Commission made it explicit, however, that it.

would not issue an operating license until this evalua-

tion had been made and it is shown that the reactor

can be safely ‘operated. While the maximum “cred-

ible aceident” may hot have yet been determined, this

: does not mean that there are no knewn limits to a

possible accident in theagPRDC reactor. Indeed, Dr.’

Bethe discussed “ineredible accidents’? and the sate-

guards against them (R. 765-767).

" Argonne National ‘Laboratory Shimmaty Status of Fast,

Breeder Reactor Program, dated December 1, 1960. This

technical report, filed by the AEC Staff, and the PRDC report

cited in the preceding. footnote, have been incorporated .in the

public record of this’ proceeding. and served upon all parties,

pursuant to Commission Order ia sages |

592233614,

‘THE COMMISSION ’s FINDING S ON THE SAFETY OF THE

SITE ARE ADEQUATE *

Respondents make no attempt to dotena the riling

below (R. 964) that #the Commission’s safety find-

ings are deficient in an additional respect,’’ namely,

that although “Congress intended no reactor should,

v ithout compelling reasons, be located where it will

expose so large a population to the possibility of a

nuclear disaster * *,* [i]t does not appear that the

Commission found compelling reasons or saw that

such reasons were necessary.’ ~ Instead, they argue

| (Br. 87) that all the court realiy meant was that “the

most compelling reasons are not a substitute for suffi-

- cient safety findings concerning the reactor iiself.’’ ”

Their discussion of this issue is primarilyzan attack

upon ‘the sufficiency of the Commission’ s findings as

to the safety of this particular sité. . :

Respondents contend that the Commission did not

“relate * * * the site problem to population density”’

(Br. 83). ‘Binding 19 (R. 707), however, expressly

states the population distribution within various dis-

tances from the site, ranging from one to thirty

‘miles, and recognizes that during the summer months

the population, within five miles. would be increased

due to vacationing transients and people visiting

beaches. The Commission’s ultimate finding (R. 708)

of reasonable assurance that df reactor of this type

“an be constructed and operated “at the loeation’’

. 13 Respondents’ further contention (Br. 87) that the ruling

is dictum is refuted by the opinion itself.

47.

without undue risk to public health and safety was.

thus made in-the light of the population density in

the area. There is mo basis for respondents’ conten-

ings, merely because it did not repeat the. language

of the finding in the initial decision that referred to

“the population density around the site” (R. 614)..

tion (Br. 85) that the Commission ‘actually rejected ts

“population “ density’? in making its safety find-

Respondents also refer (Br. 88-90) to the Commis- |

' sion’s proposed tegulations on Reactor Site Criteria,

published on February 11, 1961, 26 F.R. 1224, and

suggest that the Commission has ““belatedly’® changed

its policy to consider -population densities near re-

actor sites. On the contrary, as the Commission ex-

plained in recént Congressional hearings, and as the

regulations themselves indicate, the published cri-

-teria do not represent a departure from prior prac-

tice, but are a publication and crystallization of the

criteria which the Commission has regularly applied

to reactor location. Hearings on Development, .

Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry, »

before the Joint Committee on Atomic Enérgy, 87th

Cong., Ist Sess., p: 103 (stenographie transcript).

Indeed, respondents themselves concede (Br. 89).

that the location of the PRDC reactor would be ac-

ceptable under the published criteria. This can be.

shown from the proposed regulations. Sample figures

are presented for appropriate distances from popu-_

lation centers, given according to reactor power level,

which can be utilized as an “initial estimate’’ for a

-particular reactor. (10 C.F.R. 100.11(b), 26 E.R.

1225.) The figures vary from 0.7 miles fora reactor

‘of 10 thermal megawatts, 6 miles for a reactor of 300

thermal megawatts (the size of PRDC), and up to

17.7 miles for.a reactor of 1500 thermal megawatts.

The PRDC reactor, however, will be located 25 miles

from Toledo and 30 miles from Detroit. Even under

the Commission’ s qualifications that distances may

have to be greater from very large cities, and for re-

actors with noveMdesign features (which respondents

stress), there is no reason to doubt that the PRDC site |

is well within the proposed standards. .

ee eee

. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for those set forth

in our main brief, the judgment of the court of ap-

peals should be reversed.

Respectfully inbinsiteed.

ARCHIBALD Cox,

Solicitor General.

WituismM H..Orrick, Jr.,

Assistant Attorney General.

: DANIEL M. FRIEDMAN, -

v Assistant to the Solicitor General.

Morton HOo.ianper,

io : Attorney. .

Nem. D. Naren, 2

General Counsel,

. Courts OULAHAN,

Deputy General Counsel,

LIONEL. KESTENBAUM,

_ Attorney;

Atomic Energs y Commission.

Apru, 1961. ‘on

APPENDIX A

Excerpts From Construction Permits Issvep FOR

PoweER ReEactoRS AND ACCOMPANYING COMMISSION

Decisions RELATED TO. Sarety Fixpincs UNDER

SecTION: 50.35 OF BHE CoMMISSION’s, REGULATIONS ,

‘1. Consolidated. Edison. Company of New York, :

Ine., Construction Permit No. CPPR-1 issued May 4,

» 1956:

“The Atomic Energy Commission — the ©

‘Commission’) has found that: * * *

‘‘E. Consolidated has submitted sufficient ‘nition

tion’ to provide reasonable assurance that a ‘utiliza-

tion facility of the general type proposed by Con-

solidated ean be constructed and operated at the

proposed location without undue risk to the health

and safety of the pyplic and that additional informa-

tion required to comiplete its application — be

supplied. ;

* * 7 * _ *

“(4) This permit is subject to submittal by _

solidated to the Commission (by. proposed amend-.

ment, of the application).of the complete, final Haz-

ards Summary Report (portiens—ef-whieh may be

submitted and evaluated from time tostime) and a

finding, by the Commission that the final design pro-

vides reasonable assurance that the health and safety

of the publie will not be endangered by operation of

the reactor in accordance with the specified pro-

~ cedures.”

2. Commonwealth Edison Company, Construction —

Permit No. CPPR-2, issued May 4, 1956:

(30)

The ‘Aelenie Energy Commission (hereinafter the

‘Commission’) has found that: * * *

“CE) Commonwealth has submitted sufficient infor-

mation to provide reasonable assurance that a utiliza-

tion facility of the general type proposed by’ Common-

wealth can be constructed and operated. at the proposed

location without. undue risk to the health and safety

of the public and that additiona! information required

to complete its application will be supplied.

* * , * * *, *

“(4) kn peek is subject to submittal by Com-

monwealth to. the Commissien (by .proposed amend-

ment of -the application) of the complete, final Haz-

ards Summary Report (portions of which may be

submitted and evaluated from time to time) and a

finding by the Commission that the final design, pro-_

vides reasonable assurance that the health and safety |

of the-publie will not. be endangered by operation of

the menceor in accordance with the specified | proce-

dures.”’

3. General Electric Compéiny, Construction Permit

. No. CPPR-3, issued May 14, 1956 =

“The Atomie Energy Sintec wir (hereinafter the .

‘Commission’) has found that: * * *

“KE. GE has. submitted sufficient - information to,

provide reasonable assurance that a utilization facil-

ity of the general type proposed by GE ean be con-

structed and operated at the pr oposed location with-

- out undue risk to the health and safety of the public

and that additional information required to complete °

its application will bé supplied.

* * . . oe | . *.

“(4). This permit is subject to stibmittal by GE to—

-the Commission (b¥ proposed amendment of the ap-

plication) ‘of the complete, final Hazards Summary

Report (portions of. which may he submitted and

maluated from time to time) and ; i finding by the

Commission that the final design as reasonable

assurances that the health and. safety of the public

will not he endangered by operation of the reactor in

accordance with the specified procedures.” oo

4. Power Reactor Development Company, Con-

struction Permit. No. CPPR-4, as amended, is set -

forth at R. 715, the Commission’s decision at R. 636.

5. Yankee Atomic Electrie Com pany, Construction

Permit No. CPPR-5, issued November 4, .1957:

“EK. The applicant may proceed’ to design and eon-

struct the proposed reactor without further authori-

zation in accordance with the application and amend-

ments thereto. However, this does not constitute

final approval of any technical specification of the

reactor. Before the license is issued to eperate the

facility, the Commission must finally approve all tech-

‘nical specifications. If the ‘applicant desires final

approval. of any particular technical specification

prior to the issuance of the license to operate, he may

request that the Commission grant specifie approval

of any technical specification by appropriate amend-

ment to this permit. :

“This permit is previsional to ‘the extent that :

license authorizing pperation.of the reaetor will et

he issued hy the Commission unless Yankee has sub-

mitted to the Commissign’ (by proposed amendment

‘to the application) the*Complete, final Hazards Sum-

mary Report (portions of: which may be submitted

and evaluated from time to time) and the Commis-

‘sion has found that thé final design provides: reason-

directing issuance of the permit, stated :

able assurance that the hea!th and safety of the publie

will not be endangered by operation of the reactor in

accordance with the speciffed procedures.’

The Commission’ s Order dated October 31, 1957,

“Ir Is Fou nD THat: * * *

‘“‘D. There is sufficient information: to prov ide rea-

sonable assurance that a reactor of the general type

_ proposed can be constructed and eperated at the pro-

posed location without undue risk to the health and

safety of the publie; and that additional information

required to complete the application will be supplied.

‘‘The Commission belieyes that the applicant has

identified the subjects which should be further inves-_

tigated and that the plans described for earrying out

these investigations: will produce the information

wlfich will be needed prior to consideration of final

design and operating -procedures and, conversion of

this construction permit to’a license.”’

~The Commission’s accompany ing Memorandum of

Opinion stated: .

“The reactor will be a pressurised water, re actor

generally similar to the pressurized water reactor

(PWR) now nearing completion at Shippingport,

Pennsylvania. .Considerable information and. expe-

rience -have been acquired from the design and opera-

tion of pressurized’ water reactors by the Commission

and the Department of Defense. Additional infor-

mation and experience will be gained from continued

operation of these reactors; and frem the design and ,

operation of other pressurized water reactors, prior

to completion of the Yankee. reactor. The aceumv- .

lated ‘experience and information now. available .as to

such reactors, together with the information eon-

tained in the application, warrant the conclusion that

there is at the present time reasonable assurance that

a facility of the type proposed by Yankee can be con-|

structed and operated at the proposed location with-

out undue risk to the health and’safety of the public.

Accordingly, we have decided to authorize issuance of

a construction permit to’ Yankee on a_ provisional

basis pursuant to Section 50.35 of our regulations.

a ae

eo.

—.

53 f 4

“The construction permit must be provisional at

this stage of the proceeding pr incipally because Yan-

kee has*not completed the design of the reactor and

certain features of the proposed facility present un-

resolved questions which might affect its safe opera-

tion? ‘These features have been identified and dis-

cussed in the testimony furnished at the hearing by .

Dr. Clifford K. Beck, Chief of the Hazards Evalua-

-. tion Branch and in the report of the Advisory Com-

mittee on Reactor Safeguards.* - We agree with Dr.

Beck and the Advisory Committee that the experi-

mental program outlined in the application will prob-

ably produce the. information needed to resolve these

questions prior to consideration of finak design and.

operating procedures and conversion of the construc-

tion permit to a license.’’

6. Saxton Nuclear Reswiiisaiin Corporation, Con-

struction Permit No. oe issued February 11,

1960: .

es ih "* D. The aaitials may proceed to design

and construct the facility described in the application

and amendments. thereto without further authoriza-

tion: However, this does not constitute tinal approval

of any technical specification of the facility as distin-

guished from the general design concept proposed.

“Before the license is issued to operate the facility, the

Commission must finally approve all teehnical speci-

fications. If the applicant desires final approval of

‘any particular technical specification prior to the is-

suance of the license to operate, he may request that

the Commission. grant specifie approval of any tech-—

*“As identified in the testimony of Dr. Beck and in the re-

port of the Advisory Committee on Reactor -Safeguards, these

quest yr include :

“i. The addition of neutron absorbers ;

“2. Intentional design inte the reactor of nucleate boil-

ing; and ;

“3, Large plutonium build-up. * | (« ‘ommission’s foot note.)

7 54 soe

nical specification by appropriate amendment te this

peimit. on °

2. "This permit is proy yisional -to, the. extent.that a

license authorizing operation of the facility will not

be issued by the Commissign unless Saxton Nuclear

Experimental Corporation has submitted to the Com-

mission (by amendment to the application) the com-

plete, Final Hazards Summary Report (portions of

which may be submitted and evaluated from time to.

time) and the Commission has found that the firtal

design provides reasonable assurance that the health

and safety of.the public will iret be endangered by

operation of the fagility in accordance with the spec-

‘ified procedures.” , é

The Hearing Examiner’s Intermediate Decision,

issued January 21, 1960: *

“Coneéptual design «nd design criteria for the ma-

jor components of. thé facility: have. been developed

in considerable detail in Saxton’s application and in

testimony: at the hearings. Although detailed ‘engi-

neering design of*the Saxton reactor is not complete,

the information provided, as:partly summarized here-

after, supports the conclusion that there is reasonable |

assurance that the Saxton reactor can be satisfactorily

designed and safely. operated. After all e1 ngineering

details of the plant have been settled, Saxton will sub-

mit additional information to the Commission as an

amendment to its application for construction permit,

in the form of a‘final hazards summary report, which |

information will be considered at the hearing on the

operating license.

* : * * *- *

*The decisions of hearing examiners, cited in Appendices. A-

and B, became-final decisions of the Commission in the absence of

exceptions by the sims or review by the Commission.on its own

motion. ; ‘

’

“4. Sufficient information has been presented to pro-

vide reasonable assurance that a nuclear reactor of

' the general type described in the application and Pre-

liminary Hazards Summary Report can be constructed

and operated at the proposed location without endan-

gering the health and safety of the public.

* * * | es: oe

“6. There. is reasonable assurance that. technical

information omitted from, and required to complete,

the afSplication will be supplied.’”. -

7. Carolinas-Virginia Nuclear, Power Associates,

Inc., Construction Permit No. CPPR-=7, issued May

4, 1960: |

oe This permit itisiens the sainitioned to con-

struct the facility in accordance with the application

and amendments thereto heretofore filed in this’ " pro-

ceeding without further authorization.

“D. If the applicant desires Commission approval

of any particular technical specification: (such as the

use.of Zirealoy for pressure tubes), prior to consider-

ation of a license to operate, it may request that the

Cémmission grant specifie approval of any, tethnical

specification by appropriate amendment to. this

permit.

“KE. This permit is ptovisional to the extent that a

license authorizing operation of the facility will not

he issued by the Commission until evidence has. been

adduced by Carolinas Virginia Nuclear Power Associ-

ates, Ine. concerning: the tests performed of all .de- .

signs and components of this proposed utilization

facility, including, among others, specially designed ~

use of heavy water, the U-pressure tubes, and their.

use of Zirealoy, and a basis Has thereby been estab-

’ lished as-to all components when operated as a unit,

that. there is adequate protection to the health and

safety. of the poe as.required by the Atomic Energy

_ 56

Act, as amended, and by the rules and regulations

of the Commission.”’ >

The Hearing Examiner’ s Intermediate Decision,

issued: April 12, 1960:

‘‘The final design of the reactor has not been com-_.

pleted; but criteria for its major components have

_ been developed in considerable detail in the evidence

produced in this proceeding. Present analyses and

calculations from these preliminary design param-

eters indicate that no _ particularly unfavorable

safety. characteristics will arise from the nuclear,

thermal, or hydraulic features of the reactor. The

‘research and development program now being con-

ducted by CVNPA, supplemented by the experience

of ‘similar reactors operating earlier than the reactor,

affords reasonable assurance that the presently un-

resolved safety questions concerning its unproved fea-

tures can be answered. and thus assure that the

reactor can be satisfactorly designed and safely oper- -

ated. The final design criteria will evolve from the

full-seale critical experiments which will begin in the

spring of 1960. After all of the engineering details

of the nuclear plant have been settled, CVNPA will

submit additional information to the Commission as

an amendment to its License Application in the form

of a final hazards simmary report.

' “As will be provided hereinafter, in view of the

untested character, of certain components, and new

design. problems involved in this nuclear reactor, -

conditions will.be attached to this construction permit °

requiring proof by tests of the adequacy and safety

of the pressure U-tubes,“specially designed for the

use’ of heavy water and the zircaloy clad fuel elements,

before this construction permit may be converted to

an operating license. This evidence will be addi-

_ tional to that presented as the basis for opinions that

‘the completed project has been constructed in accord-

“ 57

anee with the specifications of this. construction per-

“mit and will provide reasonable assurance that the

health and safety of the public will not be endan-

gered by its operation.

+ * * . * *.

**3. There is sufficient information to provide rea-

‘sonable assurance that the utilization facility of the

general type proposed in the application, as Amended,

by CVNPA can be constructed at the location speci-

fied therein without endangering and _ will: provide

adequate protection to the health and wore of the

publie. ,

“4. There ds reasonable assurance that the techni-

eal information omitted from and required to com-

plete the application, inéluding particularly that

related to the special designed use of heavy water,

the U-pressure tubes, ‘and the use of zirealoy clad-

ding of the fuel elements, will be supplied.”’

. 8. Northern States Power Company, Construction

Permit’ No. CPPR-8, issued May 12, 1960:

“C. This permit authorizes the applicant to con-

struct the facility in accordance. with the application

and amendments thereto heretofore filed in this pro-

ceeding without further authorization.

“D. If the applicant desires Commission. approval.

of any particular technical specification (such as the

design details of the various components and special

design features, including the nuclear superheater,

the. aluminum alloy fuel elements, and -circulation

control system), prior to consideration of -a license

to operate, it may request that the Commission grant

specifie approval of any ‘technical specification by

appropriate amendment to this permit.

“EF. This permit is provisional to. the extent that

a license authorizing operation of the facility will not

be issued by.the Commission until the proposed re-

search and development program has bee ‘n completed

7 58 ,

> | Z 8

-and evidence has been adduced ‘by’ Northern ‘States

Power Company and it has been found by’ the Cor

mission, that the Northern States Power Company’s

proposed nuclear utilization facility, incliding ameng

other components which must be proven acceptable

hy tests described in the Intermediate Decision dated

April 21, 1960, the novel features respecting the fuel

_ elements in the boiler region of the core, the ineor-

poration of a superheater with unproven types of

fuel elements as an integral part ef the basic reactor.

core, and the proposal that a variable rate of primar -..

coolant recirculation be utilized for Controlling the’

power level of the core, has been constructed and can

we operated with adequate protection to and without —

eadangering the health and safety of the publie in ac-_

cordance with the requirements.of the Atomi¢ Energy

Act, as amended, and by the Rules and Regulations

of the. Comniissien.” : |

The Hearmg Examiner’ s Fnserinndiite Deci ision,

issued April 21, 1960:

“As stated, the proposed facility is a boiling water

reactor having several n&& features and unique char-

acteristics . with which there has been no previous ex-

perience in any other reactor of a size comparable to

that proposed by NSP. These are the use of alumi-

num alloy as a cladding for fuel.in the boiler core, the

use of ‘cermet fuel of the type proposed to be used and

the superheater core, and the variable rate of primary

coolant recirculation proposed to be used for control-

ling the power level of the core. *

* . ad ® * *.

‘For the purposes of an operating license, both

NSP and the Staff are agreed that further analysis

.and research and development explorations must be

-eonducted before a judgment can be made: that the

superheater, the altiminum cladding, and the recireu-

lation rate of the primary coolant can be safely 1 incor-

porated into this particular reactor.

‘* * * am

“3. There is sufficient information available to pro-

vide reasonable assurance that the utilization facility

of the general type proposed in the application, as

ate | by NSP can be constructed and operated at

the location specified therein without endangeri ing and

will provide adequate protection to, the health and

safety of the public. : “ane |

“4. Thére is reasonable assurance” that, in accor-

‘dance with (1) research and development programs

outlined in the evidence, (2) the tests proposed to be

undertaken of the components, and (3) the availabil-

ity of proven features to be incorporated in the reac-

tor should necessity therefore require, the technical

information omitted: from the application will be sup-

pled, including particularly that related to fuel ele-

we ments to be utilized in the boiler region of the core,

the nuclear. superheater and its fuel elements proposed

to be incorporated as an integral part of the basic

reactor core, and the controls of the 1 variable rate of

primary coolant recireulation.”’ ;

9. Consumers Power Company, Construction Per-

mit No, CPPR-9, issued May 31; 1960:

-“C. This permit authorizes the applicant to con-

strict the facility in accordance with the application

‘and amendments thereto heretofore filed in this pro-

ceeding without further authorization.

5“T). If the applicant desires Commission: approval

+ of any particular technical specification, prior to con-

sideration ofa license to operate, it may request that

“the Commission gragt specific approval of any tech-

nical specification by appropriate en to this

permit.

: maximum. specifi: power densities proposed can be

. ° :

. “Ki. This permit is: provisional to the extent that a,

license authorizing operation of the facility will not be

issued by the Commission unless Consumers Power

Company has -submitted ‘to the Commission (hy

amendment to the applicationy the complete Final

- Hazards Summary Report (portions of which may be

submitted and evaluated from time to time) and the

Commission has found that the final: design provides

reasonable assurance that the health and safety of: the

public will not be endangered’ by operation of the

facility in accordance with the specified. procedures.

The Hearing Examiner’s aa Decision, q

issued May 6; 1960: ;

‘*The determination of the existence of .y-asonable

assurance that the utilization facility can be con-

structed and operated at the proposed site without

undue risk to the health and safety of the public is

limited by the present récord to the conventional type

of boiling water reactor with a. power density of 30

kilowatts per liter.. Many details of the design of

Consumers’: project remain to be conipleted. The Staff

of the Commission has expressed ‘the view that while |

it is believed that experiments will develop satisfac- |

‘tory designs, it. remains to be demonstrated that the fF

safely achieved, .and that clarification must be pro- .

vided on.the need for in-core instrumentation which

may appear to be necessary as: performance parame-

‘ters are better understood. The adequacy of the con-

trol rod drive mechanisms may warrant re-examina-

tion at a later stage inthe design calculations.

Pe ene. * * . *

. “3. There is sufficient information available-to pro-

vide reasonable assurance that the utilization facility

of the general type proposed in the application by ©

Consumers can be constructed and operated at the

location specified without endangering and will pro-

' ‘vide adequate protection to the health and safety. of

the public. 6

“4. There is reasonable assurance that, in aceord-

ance With the research and- development programs

‘outlined in the evidence and the availability of alter-

nate proven features to be incorporated in the reactor

should necessity therefore require, the technical infor--

mation omitted from the application will be supplied.”

10. Pacific Gas & Electric ('0., Construction Permit

No. CPPR-10, issued November 9, 1960: | ;

“C, This permit authorizes the. permittee to con- |

struct the facility in ‘accordance with its application,

as amended, and as described i hearing record

in this proceeding, without furf uthorization.

“DT. If the permittee desires Commission approval

of any particular technical specification or modifica-

tion, pyior to consideration of a license to operate, it

may request that the Commission grant specific ap-

proval thereof, by appropriate. cmenement to this

permit.”’ .

The Hearing Examiner’s dititiaialinte Decision, is-

sued October 17, 1960:

“Tssue (1) The applicant has submitted sufficient ©

information to provide reasonable assurance that a

utilization facility of the general type proposed in the °

application can be constructed and operated at the -

proposed location without undue risk to the héalth and

safety of.the public;

“‘Tssue (2) There is reasonable assurance that the

technical information omitted from and required to

complete the application will be supplied. sd

‘The ftirther finding with respect to “the nuclear :

power reactor facility which is proposéd” and the res-

ervation on certain safety questions, were discnssed i in

our main brief, p. 44, fn. 12. eee

592283 e1——5-

“APPENDIX B-

Excerpts From ConstTRUCTION PERMITS ISSUED FOR -

Power REACTORS AND ACCOMPANYING CoM MISSION

Decisions. RELATED TO o SEctIoN 50.40 or THE Reau-

LATIONS ‘

1. Consolidated Edison Company of Mew York,

Inc., Construction Permit No. CPPR-1:

“C. Consolidated is financially qualified to assume

responsibility for the payment of Commission charges

for the special nuclear material to be turnished by

‘ the Commission, to uadertake and carry out the pro-

posed use of the material for a reasonable period of —

time, and to- construct and operate the reactor in

~aceordance with the regulations contained in Title 10,

Chapter 1, C.F.R.

ae | Consolidated and the Babeock & Ww ileox Com-

pany, the contractor selected -by Consolidated to de-

sign and construct said reactor, are technically quali-

fied to design and construct the reactor.’

2. Commonwealth Edison Company, Construction

‘Permit No. CPPR-2: oe

.“C, Commonwealth is finakgially qualified to as-

sume responsibility for the payment of Commicsion

charges for the special nuclear material to be fur-

nished by the Commission, to.undertake and carry

out the, proposed use of the. material for a reason-

able peried of time, an@ to construct and operate the

reaetor.in accordanee with the regulations contained

in Title 10, Chapter 1, C.F.R.

<i Commonwealth’ and General Electric Company,

the contractor selected by Commonwealth to design

and construct said reactor, are technically qualified

to design and construct the reactor.”

(@ 8 8 83

3. General Electrie Company, a Permit

No, CPPR-3: . ’

“C, GE is financially ae to ‘construct and »

operate the reactor in accordance with the regula-

tions contained in Title 10, Chapter 1, C.F.R.; to

assume financial. responsibility for the payment of

Comniission charges for special nuclear material and

to undeftake and carry out the proposed use of such

material for a reasonable period of time.

“D. GE is technically qualified to design and con-

struct: the reactor.”

_ 4. Power Reactor. Development Company, Con-

struction Permit No. CPPR-4,.as amended is set

ey at R. 715, the Commission’s decision at R. 630.

. Yankee Atomic Electric Company, Construction

Permit No. CPPR-5. _

The Commission Order, Octobér 31, 1957, states:

“C. Yankee-and its contractors; Westinghouse Elee- |

trie Corporation and Stone & Webster Engineering

Corporation, are technically qualified to design and

construet the proposed. reactor, —

* , * * ae x

“KE. The issuance of a construction permit to

. Yankee will not be inimical to the common defense

and security or to the health and safety of the publie”

6. Saxton Nuclear Experimental Corporation, Con-

struction Permit-No.‘CPPR-6.

The Hearing Examiner’s Intermediate Decision

states: .

“3. Westinghouse Electric oraceuin techni-

cally qualified to design and construct the reactor, and

accordingly, Saxton has provided for adequate tech-

nical qualifications to design and construct the pro-

- posed aaa i

* * * oe *

a 64

“5, Saxton is financially qualified to ‘design and

construct the proposed facility. ; .

* ae * * 4 * *

“7, The,issuance of a construction permit to Saxton

will not be inimical to the common defense and secu-

rity or to the health and safety of the public.’’

7. Carolinas Virginia Nuclear Power Associates, |

Inc., Construction Permit No, CPPR-7. .

The Hearing Examiner’s Intermediate Decision

states: - &

“5. CVNPA, Westinghouse, and Ste & Webster,

collectively, are technically qualified design and

construct the proposed utilization facil

“6. CVNPA is financially qualified’ to engage in

the proposed activities in accordance with the Atomic

_ Energy Act, as amended, and the rules and regulations

of the Commission. |

- “7, The issuance of the proposed construction per-

mit to CVNPA, substantially in the form attached to

the Notice of Hearing issued herein, as modified by the

order hereinafter. made, will not be inimical to the

common defense and security or to the health and

safety of the public.”

8. Northern States Power Company, Construction

Permit No. CPPR-8. :

The —— Examiner’ 's Intermediate Deeision

“i NSP and Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Com-

pany, collectively are technically qualified to design,

construct, and operate the a eel utilization

facility.

“6. NSP is financially qualified, and as supple-

mented by contributions from associated electric utili-

application in accordance with the Atomic Energy

bo = = >

‘Ae t, as amended, and the’ Rules and Re —— of -

ne c ‘ommission. |

. The issuanee-of. the proposed construction per-

mit to NSP, substantially in the form attaehed to the |

Notice of Hearing issued herein, as modified by thé

‘Order hereinafter made, will not he inimieal te the

common deferise and security or to the, health and

safety of the pubhie.’ ou

% Consumer Power Company, Construction Pernnit

No. CPPR-9.

The es Examiner's Inte wrinédiate. Decision

sti a Ss

. Consumcrs, General Electric iggy ir and

Rote Corporation, collectively, are tec ‘hnically

qualified to design, construct, and operate the il

posed utilization facility.

“6. Consumers is financially qualified and able to

engage in the aetivities proposed in its application in

accordance with the Atomic Energy Act, as amended,’

and the Rules and Regulations of the Commission.

“7. The issuance of the construction permit in sub-_

stantially the form attached hereto will not be inimical

to the common defense and security, nor to the health.

and safety of the public.”

‘10. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, Construction

Permit No. CPPR-10. ;

The Hearing Examiner’s Intermediate Decision

states: . *

“Tssue (3) The applicant, collectively with ave al

Electric Company and Bechtel Corporation as here-

in proposed, is technically queued to design and con-

struct the proposed facility;

‘Issue. (4) The applicant is financially qualified to

engyge in the proposed activities; and

“Tssue ¢5)° Construction of the reactor will not be

inimical to the common defense and security or to the

health and safety of the public.’”

>»

APPENDIX €

AnaLysis oF ResrponpENTS’ List oF ALLEGED RrEAcToR

ACCIDENTS, PREPARED BY AEC Division oF Lic ENSING |.

A ND Recu LATION

* as

be P %*

Re RE ACTORS IN TuiE UNITED STATES

A. Accidents Causing Death or Obse rved Injury to

. Operating Personnel - ,

1. Reactor: SL-1, National Reactér Testing Sta-

tion, Arco, Idaho, boiling water reactor, used for

power production, prototypé for low-power plant at a

remote site.

Date: January 3, 1961.

Nature of Incident: Reactor ‘exeursion occurred

during shutdown for maintenance. Control rods were

disconnected from drives and nuclear instrumentation

was not in use. Some of the control rods ere ejected

from the core. °

Radiation level: Over 1000 ‘ities in the reactor

building. ‘

Injurtes:* 3 fatalities, the operating ‘personne! in

the reactor building.

Evaluation: Evaluation. of this aecident is still in

progress. It appears that ‘maintenance procedures

were partially at fault and that the reactivity condi-

tion of the reactor was not adequately known or un-

derstood at the time of the incident. Although the |

reactor was not housed in ’a containment. building,

offsite contamination was low, despite the very exten-

sive contamination inside the reactor building. No

-significant radioactive..material was released ‘beyond |

the reactor area.

-*. “Injuries” in this’ analysis refers to clinically observed or

reported injuries. |

; (66)

LB. Accidents Causing Radiation Overes posure to Op.

— Personnel Without. Observed Injury

. Reactor: General Electric Test Reactor (GETR 3 ;

r aoe California, pressurized water reactor,

- used for materials testing.

Date: March 10, 1960. : ;

Nature of Incident: A technician preparing a

GETR fuel element for transfer from the storage

pool to the Materials Lahetapory inhaled tracer

amounts-of radioiodine, |

Radiation level: 48 rads to the hy roid. (Other

employees received doses to the thyroid of from: 1.8

to 7 rem).

Injuries: iii :

. Evaluation: This was not a reactor accident. Its

connection with the GETR consists only in that the

fuel element from which the iodine was released had

previously been used in the reactor. There were no

perceptible injurious consequences. Such conse-

quences can be caused only by radiation exposure

to the thyroid many times greater than these. -

3. Reactor: Materials Testing Reactor (MTR), Na-

tional Reactor Testing Station, Arco, Idaho, water- -

cooled and -moderated reactor with highly enriched

plate fuel, used for materials irradiation and testing

purposes. |

Date: July 23, 1956. : ey .

Nature of. Incident: Eight men were working on the.

top of the reactor near the reactor tank opening

(which was uncovered), the reactor being shut down |

for refueling and maintenance. The water level in

the reactor tank was lowered during the shutdown —

period to facilitate insertion and removal of experi-.

ments in the reactor. The men were exposed when a

“ radioactive reactor component was placed in a posi-

68 1

tion where it Was notGdequately shielded hecause ot

the lowered water level. :

Radiation Level: External doses at top of reactor

were as follows: 21 r, 6.2 r, 3.9 r, G1 or, 10.6 r, 2.9 r,

2.6 r, and 2.5 r.

Injuries: The men sere placed tile T - routine med-

ical observation, but no illness or other radiation-

induced effects, were observed. on

Evaluation> This incident was caused by inadequate

radiation monitoring and questionable Juaimtenance

procedures. , No radioactive material was_ released

from the reactor, and the reactor was not affected by.

the incident. No effect on persons other than those

whose action was responsible for the unsafe-radiation

condition were affected or. could have been affected.

Full-time radiation monitoring service has since been °

provided at the reactor tank opening to prevent any

such future exposures. |

4. Reactor: Chigago Pile, Argotinie National Labo-.

ratory, Illinois.

Date: June 1952.

Nature of Incident: Manual withdrawal of a con-

trol rod from a reactor caused an accidental super-

criticality. When the: eontrol rod . -was released, the

reactor was shut down. : : ‘

Radiation Levels: Personnel exposures. for the four

persons standing ‘on or near the reactor were 190 remy -

160 rem, 70 rem, and 12 rem.

Injuries: The four persons exposed were hospital! :

ized for observation and no injuries or symptoms of

radiation illness were noted. ;

Evaluation: This reactor is an experimental facility

at a National Laboratory, and has a considerable de-

; 69

cree of flexibility. The above accident was‘caused by

the operators’ fathrre to drain the -reactor of water.

before the control red was withdrawn. Criticality in

the drained reactor would have been impossible.’ Tn-

clided in the protective measures taken after the

accident was the absolute prevention of access to the

room when the reactor was not drained of water.

C. Other Accidents and Operating Difficulties

5. Reactor: Dresden Nuclear Power Station: (Com-

monwealth Edison Co.), Dresden, Tllinvis, boiling. wa-

ter reactor, used for powex production as central sta-

tion, : ; :

Date: November 15, 1960. *

Nature of Incident: One ef. the 80 control .rods

failed to. follow its drive mechanism upon a rod with-

drawal, rod was then driven into core and locked in

place. Subsequent’ examination, after shutdown of

reactor, revealed that index tube in drive had frac-

tured, and disclosed surface cracks in some drive:

components made of 17-PH steel.

. : Radiation level: None.

‘Injuries: None. .

Evaluation: ‘The situation resulted from stress _

corrosion of the steel used in the shaft of the drive

mechanism. No accident occurred and no hazard ex-

isted.” All otber. drive mechanisms perfermed ‘satis-

factorily and appropriate precautions were taken with

the*failed drive. The,drive. mechanisms have been

-- modified, by use of different materials, different heat

. treatment and fabrication controls, to reduce suscep-

. Z : ’

ae 1

tibility to stress ¢errosion and eliminate further op-

erational difficulties. ;

6. Reactor: Westinghouse Test Reactor (WTR),

Waltz Mill, Pennsylvania, pressurized water reactor,

used for high-flux materials irradiation,

Date: April 3, 1960,

Nature of Incident: Fuel element had a small (about

one-half square incli) area in which bond between

- fuel and clad was defective. A hot spot developed,

the fuel swelled and led to coolant flow restriction

and subsequent fuel element failure. |

Radiation level: 46 r per hr. in the reactor head

tank. No one was exposed to this, however, —

Injuries: None. No exposures: to employees or

others.above permissible limits.

Evaluation: Although this incident was: a serious

nuisance and produced large quantities of low-level

waste, no hazard was involved. The reactor system

was, designed in anticipation of possible fuel element

failure (the normal practice in high-power reactor

design) and no significant activity escaped the facility.

- Remedial actions inchide more ‘careful inspection of

the fuel elements before their insertion into the reac-

tor and. the installation of addittonal waste holdup

tankage and a larger waste’ evaporator to facilitate

cleanup after any future incidents of this type.

7. Reactor: Homogeneous ‘Reactor Experiment No.

2 (HRE-2), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak

Ridge, “Tennessee ; aqueous homogeneous reactor used

for experimental and developmental purposes.

Date: February 1960:

Nature of Incident: Corrosion of the barrier be-

tween the core and*blanket regions caused an addi- |

tional hole. in this barrier. A similar hole which

oceurred about .two years previously had not been

repaired, and since that time, the reactor had been

oe ere

71.

operating: with fuel solution in both: the core and

the blanket regions: Thus no substantial change in the

condition of the reactor was preduced by this new

leak. | .

Radiation Level: Now.

Injuries: None..

Evaluation: This was not an ace ident. ‘One of the

principal purposes of the facility is the testing of

compatibility of materials, and leaks such as this are

vot considered ineidents or even unexpected events,

hut rather constitute experimental results. No radio-

active material was released when this second hole

was produced, ;

8. Reactor: Sodium Reactor Experiment (SRF),

Santa Susana, California, sodium-cooled, graphite-

moderated reactor used: for experimental _ and devel-

opmental purposes. |

Date: July 24, 1959.

Nature of I neident: Decomposition products of or-

ganie impurities in the coolant caused . overheating

and melting of fuel. The core was. extensively dam-

aged but no .significant amount of radioactive ma-

terial was released. .

Radiation Level: None.

Injuries: None.

Evaluation: One of the primary purposes of this

facility is the investigation of the compatibility of ma-

terials for- use in such a facility, and an incident such

as this is not totally unanticipated. There are ap-

propriate safety procedures and no hazard resulted.

9. Reactor: Situation referred to under “ANP” ac-

tually occurred in Heat Transfer Reactor Experiment

No.. 3 (HTRE-3) at National Reactor Testing Sta-

tion, Arco, Idaho, gas-cooled, solid-moderated reactor,

used for experimental purposes for aircraft propul-:

ston ene

> the blanket region in.addition to the core.’ No -fuel

‘leased from the reactor. ; is

. bunker.

‘of a nuclear propulsion plant, releases of radioactive

to others existed as a consequence.of this release.

Pig |

- Date: November 18, 1958.

Nature of Incident: Radioactive material was re-

Radiatign Level: O8-per cent 6f, the site Was con-

taminated.. No persons were exposed™ahd no evacu-

ntion of personnel was necessary, sinée._ facility _

operations are carried out remotely froma shtelded

Injuries: None. .

valuation: This reactor is an experimental facility

designed and located so that in experimental testing

material to the atmosphere may be permitted to occur ,

safely. Thus, no hazard to operating personnel or.

10. Reactér: Homogeneous Reactor Experiment No.

‘2 (HR#-2), Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak

Ridge, Tennessee, aqueous homogeneous reactor, used

for experimental and developmental purposes. —-

Date: April 4;1958. es

Nature@pf Incident: Corrosion of the barrier be-

tween core and blanket regions ef the reaetor pro-

duced a hole in this barrier. Liquid fuel thus filled

or radioactive material escaped from the reactor,

and operation was continued with fuel in both regions.

Radiation Levei: None. , » *

Injuries: None. | is

‘Evaladtion: This was not an accident. One of the

principal putposes of this fa¢ilitY’ is the testing of

inaterials compatibility and jeaks such as this are not

unexpected, and constitute useful experimental re-

sulfs. (See Itera 7.) |

11.. Reactor: Godiva, Los Alamos Scientific Lahovi-

“tory, New Mexico; bare, fast. critical assembly, used

ror hasie fast reactor studies.

* 7

Date: February 12, 1957. a .

, Nature. of Incident: A yemotely operated fission-

able material assembly produced.a neutron exeursion

greater than’ intended, resulting in damage to -the

“_usse mbly. *'Total energy of the excursion was 1.2 x

10" fissions or about one kilowatt heur,

Radiatiow Level: None, at the point of neatest ap-

proach to the facility (about one-quarter of a mile

from the assembly). ;

Injuries: None.

Evaluation: This facility is an experiment. re

for the purpose of intentionally prodiicing neutron

bursts and is constructed and operated in a manner .

much different than a normal reactar plant. It is

unshielded, Because of the experimental nature of

~ the f facility, all persons are éxcluded from its vieinit

and it is. remotely controlled from a safe Males,

one-quarter mile away. Although the particular neu-

ron burst cited here was larger than was intended,

and was severe enough to violently disassemble the |

system. and shut down the assembly, no hazard to any

re rsons existed. . .

‘12. Reactor: Kinetic Experiment on Ww ater Boilers

(KEWB). Santa Susana, California; aqueous homo-

geneous reactor (water boiler), used for burst experi+_

ments in aqueous homogeneous reactors. . |

. Date: January 4, 1957. .

Nature of I neident: A small quantity of volatile ra-

-dioactive material was released into the reactor room

by leakage from around a valve stem when the valve

Was operated. This resulted from failure of a vaewum

pump which normally maintained a negativ’ pressure

on the gas sampling line in which the valve was lo-

‘ated. ~The building was evacuated until activity

levels returned to normal background ‘(less than one

dey) .

Radiation Level: Above normally-accepted levels

for continuous indefinite breathing. Building was

vacated in about 10 seconds, and no dose of any sig-

nificance was received by personnel., (No. detectable

external dose, internal dose Tess than 50 mr, no activ-

ity detectable by urinalysis.)

Injurics: Nore.

Evaluation: The equipment that failed Was a part

of the auxiliary plumbyig system and not an integral

part of the reactor system., Required cleanup effort

was comparable to that which might be required rou-

tinely in a radioisotope laboratory.’ As already noted,

monitoring « procedures adequately detected the con-

tamination and evacuation was completed without

difficulty, so that there was no hazard to personnel] or,

others,

13. Reactor: Howmogeucous Reactor Experiment No.

(HRE-2), ‘Oak Ridge National “Laboratory, Oak .

Ridge, Tennessee; aqeous homogeneous reactor, used %

for development and experimental Parposes.

Nature of Incident: Microscopic cracking ¢: aused by

stress corrosion was discovered in the helium leak de-

tector systém and in some of the flanges to which the

system’s tubing is connected. The condition’ was dis--

covered during preliminary non-nuc ‘le ar checkout tests

of the plant.

Radiation Level: None.

Injuries: None. — | |

Evaluation: This was nut a reactor incident. No

nuclear materials were involved in, the plant, which

had not yet been fueled for operation. Corrosion was

caused by chloride ion contamination of the stainless

steel leak-detection tubing, as a result of inadequate.

cleaning and inspection of this auxiliary system tub-

ing. (Extreme eare had-‘been taken to ‘exclude all

chlorides from the components of the reactor system:

itself, but less care was apparently exercised with re-

spect to the auxiliary tubing.) This defect was dis-

covered during noui-nuclear checkout of the system

‘‘pnlumbing.’’ The purpose of such checkout is to dis-

close any such system defects before nuclear fuel is

‘jnstalled in thé plant. The discovery: of the stress

corrosion condition caused a delay of many monfhis in

the startif of the HRE-2, but no safety problems

were involved.

14. Reactor: Seawolf Submarine (S2G), interme-

diate, sodium-cooled reactor, used for naval propul-

sion, experimental. fe” fe

Date: September 6, 1956. pes :

Nature of Incident: Several leaks were detected in

superheater and steam generator tubes over a period

of time. These tubes are of double-walled construe-

tion with a barrier of- non-radivactive NaK in the

annulus between the walls, and proved very difficult to

maintain 100% leaktight.

Radiation Level: None.

Injuriés: None. oe

Evaluation: Materials problems such as this are not

uncommon in experimental and development systems.

Leaks had developed in the land-based prototype for

the reactor (S1G), and their occurrence in the actual

ship reactor was not totally unexpected. In order to

stop the leaks, ‘it was necessary to’ block off the af-

fected tubes, resulting in a decrease in the maximum

power and speed attainable by the ship. Since the

leaks were internal and steam contamination was pro-

tected against by means of the intermediate NaK_bar-

rier, no que ion of radiation or radioactive material

was ipvoived. The ineident was a signifieanf.opera-

tional nuisance and development probicm, but no

safety problem Was presented.

15. Reactor: Experimental Breeder Vidasee No, 1

(KBR-1), National Reactor Testin:; Station, ‘Arco

Idaho, fast breeder, sodium cooled reactor, used for

experimental fast reactor studies.

Date: November 29, 1955. , |

Nature of Incident: While the reactor was under-

going a series of scheduled experiments, rapid power

surges were intentionally introduced and fuel temper-

“atures. were intentionally forced above their nortial

limits. Automatie protective instrumentation and

shutdown devices were disconnected in ofder to per-

mit the power surge tests. without auteomatie shut-

‘down. During the last test of the series, the reactor

overheated rapidly and extensive fuel melting ov-

curred before the operator eguid initiate manual shut-

down. —

Radiation Level: None.

Injuries: None. .

Evaliation: The EBR-1 is. an experime ntal re-

actov located in a remote site in .erder that Gt can he

opel rated under ‘extreme conditions and in’ an ab-

normal manner without producing -a safety hazard.

When the meltdown occurred, the tests being per-

forméd, involved the introduction of deliberate and

severe abnormali‘ies, with normal automatic protec-

tive equipment disconnected, and the possibility of

damage to the ‘reactor under such conditions was

clearly realized. The damage which did occur’ wes

thus more an experimental result than a reactor in-

¢ident, and resulted in no adverse consequences from

the safety standpoint.

16. Reactor: One of the Sentood Protiation Reac-

tors, Hanford, Washington, graphite moderated.

water covled reactor, used for plutonium production.

Date: November 1, 1955.

ay *

Rip o

Naturé of Inctdent: A ruptured fuel slug was forei-

Ply loosed and then flushed from its tube by a high

, pressure water ‘stream. A flash of flame occurred as

the slug came out of the tube-at the rear of the re-'

actor. The back of the reactor required decontamina-

tion. Seme of the surrounding area on the site was

slightly contaminated.

Radiahoun Level: Unknewn (ow in occupied

locations). : : een he!

Injuries: None, :

Evaluation: The. inecide nt necessitated a dete mi-

nation. effort, but thére Was no actual or potential ef- |

fect on operation of the reactor, and no potential

propagation of the fuel slug failure. to other tubes of

the reactor. Fuel slug failures are provided for in the

design of the reactor and plant equipment. Monitor-

ing instrumentation is in continuous use for the

detection of plugging or reduction of coolant flow in

the reactor tubes, and equipment is available for

removal of failed fiiel slugs from the tubes without

> = :

hazard to plant personnel or others. The plant is so

located that the release of fission produc ts associated -

with. fuel failures such as this do not constitute an

sare contamination problem or ‘hazard. .

. Reactor: Raleigh Research Reactor (North

pre State College), Raleigh, N.C., aqueous ho-

mogeneous ‘(water boiler) reactor, used for Univer-

sity researeh and training.” « 2

Pate: May 1955. @ ; .

Nature of Fnewdent: The stainless steel vore of the

renetor developed a leak, allowing fuel solution to

ieak into the surrounding chamber and into the cool-

ing. water, .

Radiation eo None.

Injuries: None.

592233- 61-6 ; :

es by : © : ;

Evaluation: ‘This failure is typical of the materials -

problems that have been associated with this and-other

solution-type" reactors. Reactors «wf this type are

designed so that a core tank leak will not permit fuel

solution containing radioactive material to escape.

from the reactor system, _thus protecting ‘against

hazard if Jeaks such as this do oceur,

18. Reacter: Mate? rials Testing Reactor (MTR),

National Reactor Testing Station; Are, Idaho; water

moderated and cooled reactor with highly enriched

plate fuél, used for materials. irradiation and testing

purposes. |

Date: June 1954.

Nature of Incident: Bulging of some fuel plates was

discovered. This caused contact between plates and

overheating in a few localized spots, Some fission

products were released te the coolant. ;

‘Radiation Levels: Up to 3 rvhr on contact at some

‘points in the cooling system. .

Tn juries: None. = — Ry ee j

Evaluation: The inereased ‘radiation levels of the .

cooling system caused some short-term operating prob-

lems, because the allowable working time for mainte-

nance of the cooling system was redueéd. During

normal oper: ation, the system is well shielded and no

_ problem was produced by the incident. Onee the

source of activity had been removed, maintenance tire -

limitations were able te be relaxed. Fuel elements

- were modified to prevent a recurrence of this incident.

_No. hazard to operating personnel or others existed as

a result of this incident. .

19. Reactor: Godiva, Los Alamos Seientifie Labora

tory, New Mexico, bare, fast, critical assembly, nee

for hasie fast reactor studies: :

Date: February 3, 1954. :

Nature of TIneident: The reactor was made exces-

sively supereritieal during a study of the properties

of supercritical bursts. This: study imvolved above-

normal burst magnitudes. An error in preparation

for the experiment caused this particular burst to be

vreater than expected, by abou! a factor of three. Phe

total eriergy generated in the bufst was approximately

one-half ef one kilowatt-hour (6 x 10% fissiows ).

° ‘Radiation Levels: None, at the point of nearest ap-

proach to the fae ility.

Injuries: None.- | .

—Evatvation: “Ag indicated. in item 11,. this experi-

mental facility is operated remotely to assure safety

of personnel under normal conditions and also under

the abnormal conditions of an aceident. The only.

adverse effect of the experiment was damage to the

assembly, to the extent of #600, and time lost in re-

pair of the ASSE “nbly before the next burst.

20. Reactor: Clementine, Los Adamos Scientifie Lab-

oratory, New Mexico, plutonium-fuckea, fast, rier

cury-cooled reactor, used for basic fast reactor studies.

_ Date: Prior to dismantling of reactor in December

1957.

. Nature of Incidtnt: One of the fuel elements firiled,

rtleasing: plutonium into the mereury coolant: Since

the résearch and development studies lipon the reactor.

had Been completed, it was shut down and late Y

dismantled. |

Radiation Levels: None known. This f@lure is not

of a type whieh would be expected to release a signifi-

cant amount of radivactive niaterial. :

Inj jurtes: None. ,

Evaluation: This was not a reac tor aceigent. The

facility was of a very early fast reactor design and

was constructed for developmental purposes. Materi-

als failures of this type cited here.are not unexpected

or unprepared for in-such facilities, Since the re-

actor’s planned objectives had been fulfilled at the

time of the failure, it was decided not to clean up the .

coolant and resume peraien, but to dismantle the

reactor. ;

“91. Reactor: One of fhe reactors at cLos Alitnnios: Ser

-entifie Laboratory, New Mexico.

Date: December 1949. ;

‘Nature of Incident: Supereriticality oce urred in the

ene tor, caused by manual testing of control ‘rod

in a a ; * :

Radiation Levd: One employee was exposed to 2.5r

(not abeve permissible level in effeet at that time).

Injurtes: None. |

Evaluation: The meident oecurréd in an. experi-

mental facility at a remote site. It was caused by

inannal eontrel red testing. Such testing is charac-

teristi¢ only of the early stave éf reactor development

at the time of the incident { L449) and is not practiced

today.

29 Reactor: X- 10 Reactor, Oak Ridge National

Laboratory, Onk Ridge, Tennessee, graphite -moder-

ated, air cooled reactor used for research and isotope

production. . |

Date: 1947-1948,

Nature of Incident: Fuel elements of the type in use

during this period éxperierncea failures at a low rate.

Qn two occastons, one in 1947 and one in 1948, such

failure went undetected antil the fuel element jacket

had swelled enough to restrict cooling air flow in one

echannel2 This eaused overheating and failure of other

elements in the channel. In each instance, the channe!

was damaged in removal of the elements and_ its’

further use was abandoned. There are 1248. channels

in the reactor of which 821 are fueled.

Radsation Levels: None.

fujuriess None,

— Evaluation: From the standpoint of hazard, this was

hot a reactor accident. The reactor operates at a low

power level and contains many. thousands of fuel ele-_

ments, so that the quantity of. fission produets ‘con-

tained in each element is very small. Furthermore,

the restriction of air flow caused in an ineident sueh as

this serves to block the normal’ path of release of any —

radioaetive material which might escape from a failed:

fuel element. While the incident affected operating

efficiency, there Was no danger t any employee or

member of the public.

HI. REACTORS IN ®OREIGN COUNTRIES*

‘A. Accidents Causing Death or Observed Injury to

Ope rating Personnel

93. Reactor: Critica assembly at the Boris-Kidrich |

Institute, Yugoslavia; natural uranium, heavy water

moderated, . critical assembly, used for Peasearch

piirposes. .

Date: October 18, 1958.

Nature of Ineiden’. Accidental criticality caused

by uneontrolled pumping of heavy water into theoun-

~ shieided tank of the critical assembly.

Radia: om Leve?: The average exposure to personne!

located at distances varying frojn 10 ft. to 25 ft. from

the reactor is reported to haveSeen 49 rems of thermal

neutrons, 223 rems of epithermal neutrons, 116 rems

of fast neutrons, and 295 rems.of gamma -radiation.

Injuries: One person died a@s a result of over-

exposure. Five persons received severe overdoses of

radiation but have been reported Yecovering after

receiving medical treatment.

Fv aluation: The facility was a zero-power critical

assembly, used for research. It was unshielded and

*The analysis of foreign - incidents listed lL respondents is

based solely upon published reports and statements.

the procedure for starting up was to pump the moder-

ator, heavy water, into the reactor tank. This°is a

major operation and should have been properly: scked-

uled and properly controlled. The severe accident

reported came about because (1) there was a, failure

to control and schedule the pumping, which should not

have been undertaken with persons near the unshielded

assembly; (2) the monitoring, seram and other safety

systems had been turned off. ° .

B. Accidents C ausing Radiation Overesrposure to Op-

erating Personnel Without Observed Injury :

24. Reactor: NRU, Chalk River, Canada, natrral

urantum reactor heavy water moderated-and cooled,

used for plutonium production, research and mate-

rials testing.

Date: May 23, 1958.

Nature of Incident: The incident which triggered

the chain of events leading to mere serious difficulties

was in itseif minor. The reactor went threugh an au-

tumatie shutdown initiated by an excessive rise-of-

power. This rise-of-power may have been caused by

a phenomenon known as water logging of failed fuel

elements. It was decided to remove three damaged fuel

elements.. During this phase of operations, one of the

three damaged’ fuel elements jammed after .being-

raised part way into the carrier flask and was with-

out cooling for 10 minutes. The resulting. overheat-

ing Amd oxidation caused a3 ft. long piece to fall out

of the earrier flask when it, was being moved ov er to-.

wards the storaze area, and to burn/in the open air of

the reactor room. before being extinguished with wet

sand. ee S: :

Radiation Level: Reported radiation in the reactor

room after the first incident was 100-1000 mr/hr.

However, after the second incident, the radiation

fields were probably m excess of 1000 r/hr.

Injuries: Eighteen employees: were exposed to radi-

ation as a result of this incident. Of these exposed,

during the ineidert, none reéeived exposure higher

than’5.3 roentgens. During the eamup and removal

of debris, the highest*e ‘xpostre received was about 6

roentgens. . None of these 18 individuals showed any

evidence of: injury.

Evaluation: ‘The initial incide nt was a minor one,

‘Contamination of ‘the reactor room and expostre .of

personnel resulted from the attempt to move the high-

ly radioactive damaged fuel element without assuring

that the.transfer operations could be performed prop- -

erly. : 4 ;

natural uranium, graphite — air cooled. re-

actor, used for phuitonitum pixposes.

Date: Octoher 10, 1957.

Nature of Incident: During a spec ‘ial annealing op-

eratton (Wigner release) of the graphite pile, there

was a failure of fuel cladding, which led to exposure

of the uraniunt fuel, oxidation and thén to fire in the.

combustible mass of graphite and uranium metal.

Radioactivity was released out the stack (through a

filter), dispersed to the atmosphere and ‘caused con-

tamination in the vicinity.

Radiation Level: Not given.

Injuries: Fourteen workers had exposures over the

“normal 3.0 r for a 13-week period, the highest expo-

-sure being 4.66 r. “No. injuries reported from such

exposures or from nearby contamination.

Evaluation: This-incident took place during a spe-

‘cial plant operation’ undertaken to release energy

stored in graphite by effects of irradiation. This

phenomenon of a graphite pile, and:the necessity, for

‘such’ operation, was discovered earlier (see item 41).

« It was reported that this incident occurred bee: wise

tne operator failed to take sufficient time to perform

‘the Wigner release and there were inadequacies in the

operator’s training and the written procedures. This

reactor is cooled by blowing air through the pile econ-

sisting of fuel elements and graphite slabs and ex-

‘ hausting the air out of the.stack. Hence, this reactor

type does not exhibit the gas-tight plant containment

_ usually -associated with power reactor installations.

‘As a result, the radioactive material: was released to.

the atmosphere. ‘he incident necessitated extensive

repair and deeontamination. However, there were no —

excessive exposures to radiation and no injury ¢on-

* sequences detected or reported.

C. Other Accidents and Operating Difficulties

26. Reactor: G-2, Marcoule, France, natural’ ura-

nium reactor, graphite moderated, CO: cooled, used

for plutonium production.

Date: July 6,1960.

. Nature of Incident: There was a ‘mechanical rupture

of a joint between the loading mechanism and a fuel

canal, As a result, a small quantity.of CO: gas under

operating pressure of 220 psi escaped into the reactor

hall.

Radiation Level: Not reported. It was stated by a

spokesman for Le Commissariat 4 1’Energie Atomique

that the escaping gases were only slightly radioactive.

Injuries: None reported. |

Evaluation: Mechanical failure of a component led .

-to escape of small amount of radioactivity int tic

reactor hall, which was immédiately detected by the

monitoring instruméntation. The reactor was shut

down, pressure reduced to stop the leak. and appro-

priate maintenance work undertaken. No hazard to

health and safety of operating personnel was pre-

sented. |

27. Reactor: Research Reactor, Berlin, Germany,

aqueous homogeneous reactor, light water moderated

and couled, used for research purposes.

_ Date: Mare 1960. —

Nature of Incident: A welded metal ‘piece came

loose inside the catalyst chamber and impeded the flow

of gas, ; :

Radialion Level: None. There Was no escape of ra-

‘dioactivity outside the reactor.

Injuries: None reported.

Evaluation: Water decomposes under radiation to

hydrogen and oxygen, and this reactor was equipped

with a loop through which these non-radioactive gases

were drawn, introduced into a catalyst chamber and -

-returned to the reactor vessel as water. The failure

of a component of. that chamber did not present any

safety problem. :

28. Ievactor: J Japanese Research Reactor #1, Tokai

Mura, aqueous liémogeneous reactor, light water mod-

erated and cooled, used for research pares

Date: December 8, 1959.

Nature of I ncident: Officials at the reactor plant

‘stated that a minor incident occurred which resulted

in radioactive contamination of the reactor section,

and that the radioactivity was completely contained

in the reactur section. Insufficient- information is

available to us to give further details or permit of any

evaluation. |

29. Reactor: AGN-211, Basel, Switzerland, solid

-homogeneous reactor, polyethylene’ moderated, —

water cooled, used for research purposes.

Date: November 10, 1959.

Nature “of Incident: ‘Failure of the polyethylene -

matrix around the fuel.

Radiation Level: Radioactivity level of the reactor

Water inereased to a maximum of 3 x 10° microcuries

per em’ after 114 hrs. of operation at 100 watts. No

increase in radiation in areas accéssible to indivicuals.

_ Injuries: No, overexposure or injuries reported.

_ Evaluation: In this small research reactor, the fuel’

is dispersed as grains ina polyethylene matrix im-:

_mersed. the reactor water. Due to a failure of the

bonding between some of the fuel grains and the:

matrix, small quantities of gas escaped into the re-

actor water. The leak stopped upon reduction .of

power to 950 watts. This difficulty had no adverse

consequences for the health and safety of personnel. |

30. Reactor: EL-2, Saclay, France, natural

uranium, heavy water moderated, CO: cooled reactor,

used for research and isotope: production.

Date: Fehruary 16, 1959. |

Nature of Incident: Overheating of fuel element

r9 resulted’ in rupture of cladding and the escape of

‘adioactivity into the CO: stream.

Radiation Level: It is reported that there’ was no

trace of radioactive contamination outside the reactor

into the reactor room proper.

Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported.

Byaluation: A breach in the ititegrity Of the cladding

in a fuel element caused escape of fission products

_into the coolant, a minor operating difficulty. The

moniforing system is equipped to detéct such escape.

In each of such reported incidents at Saclay, the diffi-

culty-was immediately detected. Thereafter, the reac-

tor was shut down and appropriate maintenance work

done to locate and replace any defective fuel element,

and clean up the coolant gas where necessary. In

some eases. the repair work was apparently time- —

consuming. and expensive: However, there was no

threat to the health and safety of the Fs ian

personnel at fhy time. ;

?.. Reactor: EL-2, Saclay, France, nawrrar’

uranium, heavy water moderated, CO: eooled reactor,

used for research and isotope production.

Date: December 27, 1958.

_' Nature of Incident: Failure of the c itil of a fuel

element resulting in escape of radioactivity into the

‘CO: stream.

Radiation Level: Certain components in the closed’ -

CO: system indicated 4 times the maximum permissible

— devel. $

Injuries: No overexposure or injuries oe

_ Evaluation: Same as in item 30.

32. Reactor: Calder’ Hail, Calder Hall, ‘Suskind

natural uranjum reactor, graphite moderated, CO:

cooled, used for power production.

Date: June 28, 1958.

Nature of Incident: ‘There was a mec ‘hanical failure

of .a steam turbine. :

Radiation Level: None.

— Injuries: None. | Bo

Evaluation: The failure of the steam turbine led‘to

a shutdown of the reactor, since the latter was pro-.

ducing steam for the turbine. The incident, how-

ever, was a mechanical failure in the turbine which

had nothing to do with the nuclear installations of

‘tthe plant. ;

33.. Reactor: F1:-8, Saclay, France » slightly enric hed

urgnium reactor, heavy water cooled and, moderated,

- used for iniaeel and materials festing. |

Date: April 13, 1958.

Nature of Incident: Aluminum channel in which.a

fuel-element was situated broke-and fefl as result of

_. vibration and lack of support. This intérrupted the —

to overheating and rupture of the fuel element.

‘Radiation Level: Nw contamination of the reactor

room, established by analysis of the air as well as

check of the personnel. Any radioactivity which es-

‘aped from the fuel slug was confined to the primary

coolant and the closed helium. gas systems.’

Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported.

Kraluation: The release of radioactivity into the:

coolant by this mechanical. failure of a component

was promptly detected. The situation is similar to

‘that evaluated in item 30.

34. Reactor: SAPHIR, Wiire nlingen, Switzer Wand.

pool type reactor, 20% enric ‘hed uranium, light Water

eooled and moderated, used for research Purposes.

Nature of Incident~ No incident of any kind is re-

ported at the referenee given in respondents’ brief.

. Reactor: EL-2, Saclay, Fronee, natural: ura-

nium, heavy water moderated, CO: cooled reactor,

use? for research and isotope production. -

Date: November 26, 1957.

Nature of Incident: Overheating of an aliminum

clad uranium slug because of insufficient. cooling water

flow, hele in’ él: idding released radioactivity into cocl-

ing water.

Radiation, Level: No inerease ofthe radiation level: .

Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported.

= aluatidn: Same as item 30,

Reactor: G-1, Mareoule, France, nataral uran-

a graphite iqderated, air-cooled reactor, used for

_ power produetion demonstration and plutoniun pro,

duction. ;

Date: October 26, 1956. ; ucts

Nature of Incident: The failure of the canning ex-

posed an uranium slug with subsequent oxidation and

dispersion of. fission products inte the reacter’s cool-

ing air. P

Radiation Level: Wt was reported that the maxi-

mum coneentration of radioactive material in the air.

was 5 x 10°* microctries‘em’ for a few minutes at

the base of the stack. It is nefed, however that the-

ieasurements of the activity in the air by th stations

ontside theesite always remained well under the max-

imggm permissible lint. |

Injuries: It was reported that personnel were not

exposed to radiation above permissible limits and-no

INjUTIOUS CoNseqiences were noted.

Evalaation: The faihire of fuel eanninge released a

small qnantity of radioactive fission products into the

coolant. This was promptly detected by monitoring |

Wistrumentation. The reactor was shut down and ap-

prapriate action taken. The report stated that a mi-

ner aceident of this order is not rungenene either for

the personnel or for the reactor,

37. Reactor: -J EE P, Kieller, Norway, natural

‘uranium, heavy water modersted and cooled reactor,

‘used for research piirposss.

Date: February, 1954.

_ Nature of: Incident: The incident occurred in a

‘channel of the reactor used for irradiation purpe-es.

The aluminum canning im an irradiation channel

failed, expesing an uranium slug, with subsequent

oxidation. .

* Radiation Level: Not given, but. required evacua-

ion of reactor hall. .The-report stated that radio-

active dust spread into the «reactor hail when the

’ irradiation channel was opened, personnel were evacu-

ated and had to don protective ciothing and masks

hefore reentering the building.

Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported. -

Fvaluation: «This incident did not involve the

reaetor fuel elements or any defect in the operation

of the reactor itself. The. failure occurred in a can

‘ as

placed in the reactor to be irradiated for experimenta!

purposes. It was apparently due to careless ex-

perimental’ procedures, and necessitated approprrate

mamMtenance and decontamination.

38. Reactor: Windscale #1, Windscale, England,

natural uranium, graphite moderated, air cooled reac-

tor, used for plutonium production. |

Nature of Incident: No incident is-reported im the

reference given in respondents’ brief.

39; Reactor: Russian heavy water research: reactor

‘-(HWRR), slightly ‘enriched uranium reactor, heavy

water moderated and cooled, used for research

purposes.

Date: 1958.

Nature of Incident: Failure. of the cladding of an

uranium rod, releasing radivactivity into the rez actly

vessel.

Radiation Level: The presen nee of fissivs products. in

the reactor’s helium blanket was re ported.

Injuries: No overexposure or injuries reported.

Evaluation: As reported, the initial incident was a

failure of fuel cladding, a minor difficulty which was

decected and which led to appropriate routine ‘deas-

ures to replace the fuel element. The subsequent

falling of the element and damage to the reactor tank,

necessitated a difficult repair job. However, such re-

pairs-ean be done safely and no injury or overex-

posure is reported. :

40. Reactor: NRX, Chalk River, Canada, natural

uranium, heavy water moderated, light water cooled

reactor, used for research purposes.

Date: December 13, 1952.

Nature of Tneident: During an experiment, a power

surge. oceurred because’ of mechanical failure of the

safety shutdown system, resulting in melting of part

of the fuel reds.

A : ni

Radiation Lével: Not given. Plant personnel were

required to evacuate the site. |

Injuric sr No overe Xposure or other tv pe of Injuries

reported. At times during the repair work it! Decrmne

necessary to allow individuals to take a thirteen-week

dosage (3.9 roenfeen) iv a matter of a day or two and

subsequently bar thet. froii the radioactive area for.

ape riod of 15 weeks. .

Etaluction: This accident tools place during R pe-

riod of experimental work with the reactor and was

probably associated with special, experimental eondi-

tions. It was a serious accident in terms of the exten-

sive repair and decontamination work required in the

reactor building and the reactor vessel. No adverse

health and safety consequences were noted to operat-

= hi “rsonnel and there was no danger to the public.

. Re actor: Windseale #1, Windseale, Eneland,

ni bate urantum, graphite moderated, air cooled reac-

tor, used for plutonium production.

Date: Se ‘pte mber 1952.

Nature of Incident: Unexper éd release of energy

accummilated in the graphite blocks, manifested as an

Jncrease in the temperature of the graphite pile.

Radiation Level: Not reported. ier

Injuries.. No overexposure or injuries reported.

Evaluation: This was an unexpected minor oceur-

rence which’ did not result in any officially reported

_ercotherwi- + known consequences to. the health’ and

safety of the personnel or the publie. It alerted ‘the

plant management to the “Wigner effect,’ the aceu-

mulation ef energy in -granhite subject. to irradiation,

and Jed to the develop.cent of procedures or periodic

deliberate releases of Wi Igner energy. See item 25,

US GOVERNMEN? PRINTING OFFICE. 1961

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.