Motion of the ICC to Affirm — Dixie Carriers, Inc. v. United States
Supreme Court brief1956
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puPREME C* COURT. Us es AUG LL 185
- No. 233,
_ Inthe Supreme Gourt ofthe Wnited States
Bice OCTOBER TERM, 1955 _ | ee
| a5 - :
Drxre Carriers, INC.,, ET AL., APPELLANTS —
? vs.
e rd @
UNITED STaTes or AMERICA, INTERSTATE. Com MERCE 7
| ComMMISSION, a
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT —
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
en = : : Ry ss
.
MOTION OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMIS- ae
‘SION TO AFFIRM |
Pd:
INDEX
; : . Page
Statement in NI 8 944 Ce ahead os Neen ieee aa |
Argument —. re | bf be 4
_Argumen Fi : sk |
| | TABLE OF CASES © - ,” -
Bituminous Coal to Saitaihian: 163, Too. + 5
Board of Trade of Troy, Ala. v. A.M. Ry., 6 2 pre 1 5
Carr v. Yokohama Specie Bank Ltd., 200 F. 2d 251 if $.
Denver & R.G.W. R. Co. vy. Union Pacifie R. Co., 2877 1c. 611 9, 11
' Interstate’ Commerce Commission v. Mechling, 330 U.S. 567...) 4;6,7
Schilling v. Schwitzer-Clmmins Co., 142 F. 2d 82... -. a... °° 8
. Texas & Pacific Ry. v. 1.C.C., 162 US -197— Bia toe ; 5
Thompson v. United States, 343 US. 549, ete roe 10
United States v. Baltimore & O. R.R. Co., 231 U. S. 274 : | i
United States v. Capital Transit Co., 338 U.S. 286 pe se
United States v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 343 U. 5. 562. a 10.
Statutes: . ee = “ek
PS st Pee roe |
40 U.S.C., Section 3(4)) . ss. e ry pune : eee
.. 49U.S.C., Seetion 15(3) SOC SETS Serene eer eee |
Rania Section 307(d) ee ee ee elec rade Coan aoe
tig
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_StheSopene Court of the id sins
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No. 93333
Dixitk CARRIERS, INc., ET AL. , APPELLANTS ©
Us.
-
Unirep ‘STATES ¢ OF ’ Asie A, INTERSTATE Com tenc FE
Si COMMISSION, ET AL.
%
=_—
MOTION TO AFFIRM th
Pursuant-to Rule 16, paragraph (c), of the Re-
~ vised Rules yf the Supreme: Court of the United. _
‘States, the Interstate Gommerce Commission moves
that the judgment of the District Court be affirmed.
This is a-direct appeal from the final judgment
. entered February 16, 1955, by a- specially consti-
tuted three-judge District Court converter pur-
snant to 28 U.S.C. 2284, dismissing appellants’
coniplaint seeking to set aside an order of the Inter-
state Commerce. Commission. Notice of Appeal
was filed on May ‘1%, 1955,.and the appeal papers
were rec ‘eived on July 13, 1955.
STATEMENT |
Appellants filed a complaint with the C ommis-
sion. on December 13, 1950, alleging that the refusal:
of certain railroads (defendants before the Com-
mission and intervening defendants herein) to-es- .
tablish and maintain reasonable through routes and
joint rates with appellants on’ sulphur from Gal-
veston, Tex., to Danville, Il., is in violation of Sec-
tions 1 and 307(d) of the Interstate Commerce Act,
and that said railroads are maintaining ‘rates and
- charges whith are discriminatory against appel-
7,
ging Crore.
6
giving the Commission’ definite powers (which
theretofore had been uncertain) over divisions of
rates, it set forth in paragraph (6) of the present
section certain standards or criteria by which the
- Commission Was to be governed in preseribing just,
reasonable and equitable divisions. A search of the |
Act does not reveal similar provisions governing
- the-Commission’s prescription of other eharacters
of rates. In view of the foregoing, it is submitted
that the decisions ofthe’ Commission and the Dis-
trict Court are not contrary to the decision in the
satis ease as contended by appellants.
In regard: to appellants’ contention that the
‘District Court did not pass upon the question of
: discrimination under Section 3(4) of the Act, or-on
the question of whether a division of a joint rate
is a rate within the meaning of paragraph 4, it is:
; submitted that the conrt below did consider these
questions. eae?
- The Court specifieally found at page 33 of the’
opinion (129 F. Supp. 28) that:
- When the whole record is oa ee in the
light of all the provisions of the Act and the —
many cases construing ‘same, we think plain-
tiffs have. not po" n their claim to be meri-
torious.
This finding or conclusion i is sdsquate. We know
| of no rule or law or decision-of the courts requiring
that a different kind of finding or conclusion should
be made or stated. |
?
7
Furthermore, in regard to appellants’ conten-
ion that the Court below did not pass on the ques-
ion of whether a division of a joint rate is a rate
rithin te meaning: of paragraph (4) of Section
it is pointed eut that 'this question was not spe-
ifically raised in the complaint before the Com-
nission.. In any event it will be seen from the deci-
ion of the Commission that counsel for appellant’
vaived the question.” Therefore,. since:that, ques-
ion was not raised in the complaint and was
vaived at oral argument, the Court would have
een justified in giving no consideration .to it.
Tnited Statés v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 231
1S. 274, 297). However, instead of ignoring this °
ssue the Court passed upon it by-making the find-
ng heretofore quoted that upon the record as a
vhole ‘ Plaintiffs have not shown their claim:to be
neritorious”’ (p. 33), and that the Vechling case
‘is not controlling here.’’ (p. 35.)
Even assuming that all the issues raised by ap-
2 The Commission stated in its report* on reconsideration,
91 1.C.C: 422, 423, that: @
At the oral argument counsel for complainants agreed
that one way the alleged discrimination could be removed
would be by the use of $2.26 as a proportional rate for
the. services of the defendants operating! from East St.
Louis to Danville, which is the amount received by them
‘as a. division of the joint barge-rail rate of $6.66 from
Port Sulphur to Danville. He stated, however, that, he
did not believe that hat was one of the issues of their
complaint. This belief appears to be correct. The com-
plaint in this respect is directed against the alleged dis-
crimination in favor of rail lines serving Galvestqn and
not Port Sulphur, and, what. the rail lines receive as their
share of the rate frotn Pert Sulphur is not helpful here.
8
" pellants may not-have been discussed in the Court's
opinion, nevertheless this would be. similar to a
court saying | as this Court said in United States .,
C ‘apital Transit C 0., 3388 U.S, 286, 291:
We have cxmmiined other contentions urged
in support of the District Court’s judgments
and find that all are without merit. ° _
In Schilling v. Schwitzer-( Aummins Co., 142 F..
2d 82, 84, the Court said:
*** While.counsel may be disappointed that
findings do not discuss propositions sincerely -
contended for, that, atone, does not make them
‘inadequate or suggest that such propositions
_ Were not understood by the court.
We, therefore e, submit that it is not necessary
that the trial court. make findings asserting ‘the
- negative of each issue of fact raised. As the Court
said in Carr v. Yokohaia Specie Bank, Limited,
200 F. 2d 251, 255:
* * * Nor‘is it necessary that the trial court
make tindings asserting the negative of each
issue of fact raised. It.is sufficient if the spe-
cial affirmative facts found by the court, cone
strued as a whole, negative each rejected con-
tention. The ultimate test as to the adequacy
of. findings will always be wliether’ they are
safficiently comprehensive and pertinent to.
the issyes to provide a basis for decision and.
9
whether they are ‘supported by the evidenée.
* * * Sy
Finally, we should like to say a word in regard
to appellants’ contention, that. the Commission’ g,
finding in Denver & R.GW. Roo. v. Union Pa-
cific R. Co., 287 LCL. 611, that the failure of the
Union Paeitie to intere ‘hange traffic with the Rie
Grande over through routes and at. joint rates, ,
|
while makingQ&such intere hange with the Bamber- \——,
ger, subjected the Rio’ Grande to discrimination in
violation of Section 3(4) of the Act. This finding,
was approved by the three- judge court, District of
Nebraska, in Union. Pacific ¢ ‘om pany, et” @..%:'
United States, ct al?
That case is distingnishable, The Siueuen there.
were depriv ed of the right to route their shipments
via the Rio Grande except at the higher « combina-
tion rates whie h were substantialiy in excess of the
joint rates.
In the-instant case appellants alleged that the
failure and refusal of the railroads to establish
through routes and_ joint harge-rail ‘rates on sul-
phur from Galveston, Texas, to’Danville, IL, via
Kast St. Louis, Il., is in violation Sus wenn land
307(d) of the ‘Act and was diserimi latory against
the water carriers in violation of Section 3(4).
They requested the Commission to establish-such
Case not vet reported, opinion filed Octoher 22, 1954,
-appeal pending before this ‘ourt in Nos: 417, HIS and 149. In
another suit -heard before the three-judge court, District of
Colorado, Civil No. 4492, the same order Was set aside in
so far as it denied relief to plaintiff. Case not yet reported.
10, F _ ne
through routes and joint rates, with reasonable
differentials wider the all-rail rates.’ |
@e Asa matter of fdet in the instant vase ihe all
rail rate on sulphur from Galveston to Danville,
via East St. Louis, HL. of $9.184 per ton, is higher
than the present combination harge-rail. rate of:
$8.27 hy 91.4 ceists, and the evidence shows: that the
rate over the all-rail route is already on ‘a tepressed
basis (291 1.C.C, 422, 423: Tr. 39-40). |
Attention issealled to the fact that insofar as the
instant pase i is concerned, Section 34) of the Act
‘deals shlely with *‘rates, fares and charges,”’ and
no metition i is made therein of through routes. This
Court held i in Thompson v. U nited States, 343 U.S
49, 558, that the existence or non-existence of a
through: ‘route does not depend on the applicable |
rates; and that the establishment of joint. rates is
an entirely. separate and distinct matter from the
3 establishment of through routes. l'nited States v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 343 U.S. 562 at page 573.
Since a through route must be established he fore
Opinion filed January 13, 1955. Notice of appeal to this |
Court filed Tune 22, 1955.
* Division 8 of the C ominission found that the ost: phichoneet’
of the through routes and joint rates sought had not been
shown to be‘necessary or desirable: in the publie interest: and
> that a Sectigh 314) violation had‘not been shewn (287 LOC.”
403, 407). “<The entire Commission, on reconsideration, art
proved this finding: (291 1.C.C. 422, 425) and. found also that
the record affords no support for finding that “the present -
combination barge-rail rate 91.4 cents lower than the present
all-rail rate, is unreasonable for the through .service «offered
thereunder”: (p. 423) “It further found that there was no
evidence affording a‘basis for a conelusion that the proposed
difference Y! $1.514 between the present all-rai rate from
4
\
ony
11
*
a joint rate comtd be prese wribed and no | thréugh |
harge-rail route exists, the Commission could tot
prescribe a through route, because, as: it found,
there was ne showing ° from the evidence that. |
through routes wer? neg essary. or desirable in the
ease. Each case’ must stand-on its own facts, and
the Cotumission in the instant ¢ ase found from the
facts that a violation of See tion 3(4) had not been
- shown. On different facts and under different cir-
‘cumstances, it found there was a Violation of Sec-
tion 3(4) in the Union Pacifie case.
For the’ foregoing reasons, it is evident that this °
appeal presents no substantial questi
therefore, respectfuliy submitted that the judg-
ment of the District Court isitersy he affirmed.
_ Respectfully submitted, © ea
Samven R. Howetn,
Acting General Counsel,
Fnterstate Commerce Commission,
| Ww ashington 25, D.C.
JULY, 1950.9 - | 3
7
Galvesten: (whieh appellants sought), or any y other partic ular
differeniial, is required to remove the alleged discrimination
against the barge lines. The record shows that no-shipper ap-
peared. or evidencéd any interest in the rate sought, and that
the rate over the all-rail route was, in fact, on a depressed
basis, The Commission then stated that it could not find that
‘the publie interest requires the establishment of the joint
barge- rail rate sought. ([bid.)
‘Section 1513) contains the following applicable provision:
- The Commission may, and it shall whenever deemed
“by it to doe necessary or desirable in the. public interest,
. . O 3 7 nn
te
public interest.” “i is thus believed clear that the
instant case is ‘different from the 1 nion Pivrfie -— -
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Samuel R. Howell, counsel for appellee Inter-
state Commerce e Commission, and a member of the
Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States,
hereby certify, that on ‘the lith day of August, 1955,
‘T serv ed copies ‘of the foregoing Motion tt Affirm
. Ou the parties to this proceeding ‘as follows:
1. On appellants, by mailing copies in duly
_ addressed envelopes, with air-mail postage
prepaid, to its attofiieys of record, as follows:
Nuel | ;
Belnap, Esq., . |
One North La Salle Street,
~ Chieage, UL 3
Kenneth McAuliffe, Esq.,
233 Broadway,
New York 7, N.Y.
and with first-class postage prepaid to:
Donald Macleay, Esq.,
1625 K St., N.W.,
Washington 6, D. C.
¢
2. On the United States’ of America, by -
mailing .copies in duly addressed envelope
-with first-class postage prepaid to:
Honorable Simon E. Sobeloff,
Solicitor General of the United States,
Department of Justice,
Washington 25, WD. C.
tive without complaint, establish through reutes * * *
and joint rates * * *.
Section 307 (d} contains an identical prov ision.
after full he ‘aring upon complaint or “upon its own intia-
13.
3. On the intervening. railroad defendants,
by mailing copies in duly addressed enyelopes,
with air-mail postage prepaid, to their attor-. .
neys of record, as follows:
John A. Daily, Esq.,
1225 La Salle Street Station,
Chicago 5, Ll.
2almer (. Hutchenson, Jr., Esq.,
Rooni 1720 Niels Esperson Bldg.,
Houston, Texas.
This, the 11th day of August, 1955.
SAMUEL R. Howe ut.
: me : ;
. ° a , .
- > . : ,
a : >
Cou S SOVENNMENT PRINTING Office ‘555 4Sbses me
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