Brief for the Appellant — American Federation of Labor v. Watson

“|G

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITE

OCTOBER TERM, 1945

“Ft

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR, METAL)

TRADES DEPARTMENT, A. F. OF L.; FLORIDA

STATE FEDERATION OF LABOR, ET AL.

: Appellants,

; VS.

J. TOM WATSON, as Atronxey GENERAL OF [HE STATE OF

FiLorima, Er Ax.

{PPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNTTED STATES FOR

THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Joseru A. Paoway,

Y Herperr S. Trarciuer,

Kiwarp J. Brows,

Epwin C. Corrre,

J. Dress Panne,

Par Wujraker,

Tom Wariraker,

svl for Appellants.

-

Varn

(

INDEX

Sunsect Ispex

Brief for appellants

Opinion below

Jurisdiction

Constitutional and statutory provisions involved

Statement of the case

Specification of errors to be urged

Argument ee

I. The District Court has jurisdiction as a

special three-judge court under Sectien

. 880 of Title 28, U.S.C.

AT, Ttlis unnecessary in this ease to allege that

the matter-in controversy exceeds 33,000

in value, but even if it were necessary;

there are sufficient allegations to that effet:

“A. It is unnecessary in this case to ale’

lege that the matter in’ contro-

— ¥ersy exceeds $3,000 in Value

B. The pleadings of the complaint

clearly indicate that the matter

in controversy exceeds’ $3,000) in

value ,

Ill. The pleadings indicate sufficient inmedi-

ate irreparable injury to warrant invok-

ing the jurisdiction of the court below as

a court of equity

Conclusion

TabLe or Cases Crrep

~~ Beard v. Hapkinsville, 95 Ky. 239, 24S. W. S72,

23 L. RL A. 402 .

City of Tampav. Tampa Water Works Co. (Fla.), 3

Boe eaT

Cor v. McNutt, 12 Fed. Supp. 355

Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399

a /

14

d Ete,

il INDEX

Page

Denver v. New York Trust Co., 187 Fed. 890 12

Douglas v. Jeannette, 68'S. Ct. 877 : 14, 31, 36

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 12

Gaiser v. Buck, 203 Ind. 9, 179 N. K. 1, 82 A. L. R.

(ile nme veod Light Co. v. “Mutual Light Co., 239 ULS.

121, 126 mal)

Hague v. C10, 307 U.S. 496 14

Kemp v. Division 241, 255 I. 21: 3,99 NX. E. 389 2

Lummus v. Miami Beach Congregational Church

(Fla.), 195 Sou. 607 3s

Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 12

Norton v. Taxing District, 129 U.S. 479 os

Phillips v. United States et al., 312 U.S. 246 1"

‘Powers Mere. Co. v. Olson, 7 Fed. Supp. 865 i

State v. Warner, 165 Mo. 399 3s

Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 10,11

~ Stevens v. Griffith, 111 U.S. 348 e "93

Thompson vy. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 20

Wallace Corp. v. National Labor Relations” Board,

68 S. Ct. 238 32

~ Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 31-3

- Whitman v. National Bank, 17640. 8S. 559 38

. Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 255 12

Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 452, 64°Pae_ 692,

69 Pae. 77 | ‘ 3s

STATUTES Cirep

Judicial Code: I .

Sections 238 and 266, as amended by Act of Feb- ee

ruary 15, 1925, ¢ 209, See. 1 (48 Stat. 938) 7

(U. S. Code Ann., Title 28, Sees. B45 and

380). . :

National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. ag oo

Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (29 U.S.C. 102) ”

Untied States Code Ann-.: |

Title 8, See. 430 > 7

Title 28, See. 41(1) 7

Title 28, See. 41(14) 7

Title 28, See. 380 s

%

- INDEX

: MISCELLANEOUS

11 Amer. Juris. 689

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Form 2

Final Report of the Industrial Comission, H.

Docket No. 380, 57th-Cong., First Sess., Vol. NIX,

pp. 815-817 ; ,

<=

Page

38

Ww

4)

x

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1945

No. 448

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR; METAL

“TRADES DEPARTMENT, A. F. OF L.;) FLORIDA

STATE FEDBRATION OF LABOR, ET AL,

Appellants,

vs. ;

J. TOM WATSON, as Arrorney GENERAL OF THE STATE OF

Fiona, Br Ax.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS

Opinion Below

The opinion of the special three-judge District Court for

the Southern District of Florida is reported in 60 F.Supp.

1010, and is also found in the Record at pages 206-218,

Jurisdiction

Appellants, in support of the jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court of the United States to review the above entitled

case on appeal, respectfully show:

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of he United

States on this appeal is invoked under Sections 238 and

le

»)

266 of the Judicial Code-as amended by the Act of Feb-

ruary 13, 1925, ¢. 299, Section 1 (48 Stat. 938) (Cnited

States Code Ann., Title 28, Sections 345 and Ss). Thie

final decree of the three-judge District Court was entered

June 11, 1945. Application for appeal herein was ‘pre-

sented on the 11th day of August, 1945.

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved

The law of the State of Florida, involved in this appe!

and the validity of which has been upheld by the thre -

judge District Court as not being violative of any law of

the United States, is an amendment to Svetion 12 of the

Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of the State of

Florida, submitted to the: people ef the State of Florida

for ratification by House Joint Resolution No. 15 of the

1943 regular session of the Legislature of the State of

Florida, and ratified by the people of the State of Florida

on thé 7th day of November, 1944. The amendment reads

as follows: a 3

‘Section 12. No person shall be subject to be twice

put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor compelled

in any criminal case to be a napa against himself,

nor be. deprived of life, liberty, or property withent

~ due process of law; nor shall savas property be taken

without just compensation. The right of persdis to

work shall not be denied or abridged on account of

membership er non-membership im any labor unian or

labor organization; provided, that this clause shall not

be construed to deny or abridge the right of employees

by and through a labor organization or labor union

to bargain collectively with their employer.’ > (Itahes

supplied. )

Only the italicized portion of the abov e amendment is in-

volved in these proceedings.

2

»

: Statement of the Case

On November 7, 1944, the State ef Klori@a- duly adopted

the foregoingw amendment to its Constitution, the admitted

purpose of whigh amendment was to outlaw existing and

future agreements relating to union security, that is, union-

shop (commonly termed **closed-shop’") agreements, main-

tenance-of-inembership agreements, or any other agree-

ment Which requires membership in a labor organization

asa condition of employment. a

Following public and private threats by the Attorney

General of the State, warning labor organizations and em-

plavers against continuing or entering inte Union-seenrity

agreements under penalty of civil and criminal piroseention

(Which threats were followed prior to the hearings belew by

‘te aetnal institution of numerous actions secking to revoke

Ahe charters of corporations continming to observe their

existing union-security agreements, and which threats ae-

tually resulted in the cancellation by at least one employer,

and threats to eancel by other employers, of such agree-

ments, prior to the hearings below), the appellants herein

commenced a proceeding in the District Court of the United

States for the Southern District of Florida, Tampa Divi-

sion, under Section 3S0 of Title 28 ULS.C. (Pudicial Code

266 as amended) te enjoin the Attorney General and other

law enforcement officials from enforcing thedaw in question

on the ereunds that such law was contrary to and deprived

of rights under the Constitution and Laws of the United

States. ,

The appellants (plaintiffs below) are the American Fed.

eration of Labor, Thé Florida Staté Federation of Labor

and various national and local labor organizations operat-

ing in the State of Florida who are parties to or are desir-

ous of entering Into union-security agreements. Other ap-

pellants are individual. employee members of such organiza-

4

tions and three Florida employers who are parties to sue)

agreements (RV 4-8). The respondents (defendants be-

low) are the Attorney General and other offieials of the

State of Florida charged with enforcement of the law

in question.(R. 27), together with various employer parties

to such agreements who were named as nominal defendants

(R. 17). ?

The complaint, filed in Tampa, Florida, on February {thi,

1945, alleged the existence of various union-security agree-

ments voluntarily arrived at in the course of collective bar-

gaining, to which agreements various of the appellant-

were parties (R. 17-25). The complaint asserted the fm-

dispensability of such union-security agreements to the

union appellants and their members as a means of achiev.

ing job security, equality of bargaining power, protection

of working standards and otherwise of furthering the trade

union movement, and to the employer appellants as a means

of stabilizing and improving labor relations (R. 11-13, 16).

The complaint and supplemental pleadings below set forth

the acts of the defendants in threatening to terminate said

agreements, in preventing the making of such agreements

(R. 32-36; R. 838), and the actaal bringing of proceedings

to terminate such agreements (R. 55-57; R. 8&1), and also

threats of employers who are parties to union-security

agreements immediately to cancel, and actual-cancellation

of, such agreements because of the threats of the Attorney

General and his agents (R. 58-60), all of which was allewed

to bring about.imminent disruption to plaintiffs’ organiza

tion, disturbance to production, and loss of benefits and

protections. It was alleged that the law in question wa-

(1) an impairment of and obstruction to the right of werk.

ing people to assemble into and function through labor or-

ganizations, protected under the ‘First Amendment as a

civil right, (2) an arbitrary, unreasonable and diserimina-

|

rr

~~

tory exercise by the State of its police power, unlawfully

depriving appellants of existing and future contract riglits

protected under Article 1, Section 10 of the United States

Constitution and the Fourteenth Ame ndment thereto, and

(3) in condlaes with the laws and policies of the United

States as expressed in the National Labor Relations Act

and the Norris-La@uardia Act, and thus in violation of

Article VI of the United States Constitution (R. 2-31).

The complaint prayed for a temporary and perm anent in

junction (R. 37).

The defendants and the Attorney General entered mo.

tions to dismiss. Plaintiffs applied to the District Court

for a temporary restraining order (R. 55) whieh, after,

notice (R. 66) and hearing, was granted by the District

Court (R276), which Court caused a three-judge. court,

consisting of Cireuit Judge Waller and) District) Judges

Barker and DeVane, to beassembled (R. 54). Atter notice

of hearing on plaintiffs’ application for an. interlocutory

injunetion (R. 78), briefs wore submitted, and, the ease was

argued before the three-judge Court on the 24th day, of

May, 1945, the Court considering the case upon the plead-

ings: under the defendants’ motion to dismiss. On June 11,

1945, the Court entered an order dissolving the temporary .

restraining order and dismissing the complaint CR. 218),

and in connection therewith, made the following findings of

tact ‘and conclusions of law @R. 205): :

‘Findings of Fact

1. No*faets are put in issue by any answer filed in this

alse, |

All allegations of fact, as distinguished from conclu-

sions of law, contained in the complaint are admitted by the

motion of the Attorney General to dismiss, and no factual

issues necessary to a decision in this cause are involved.

2e

6

Conclusions of Law

1. The District Court of the United States has jurisdic.

tion of the controversy under Section 41(1) of Title 2s,

U.S.C. A.

. The District Court of the United Necins has jurisdic.

tion of the controversy under Section 41 (14) of Title 2s

and 43 of Title &, U.S. C. A.

3 A Three-Judge Court has jurisdiction under Section

380 of Title 28, U.S.C. A,

4. The amendment to Article 12 of the Declaration of

‘Rights of the State of Florida is not in violation of any

provision of the Federal Constitution.

®, Said amendment to said Constitution is an appropri

ate exercise of the police power of the State of Florida.

6. It doesgnot appear ou the face of the amendment or

on the face of the complaint that said amendment collides

with any statute of the United States, regulating labor tu

Interstate Commerce, but without deciding that no situa.

tions could arise which would result in conflict between

Federai statutes and the said constitutional amendment,

we find that such situations are not exhibited herein and

that no case is made out for the granting of and injunetion

against the defendants or either of them, even if it be con

ceded that a-Three-Judge Court has the authority to enjoin

corporate or individual defendants who are not officers of

the State nor charged with the enforcement or execution

of the-constitutional amendment in question.

7. Whether or not the allegations of the complaint ap-

propriately allege irreparable injury is not necessary to a

decision. |

The conclusiors of the C sch are more fully set, forth in

the opinion attached hereto.’ tou

¢g

-

‘

' Thereafter, on August 11, 1945, appellants petitianed for

(R. 219) and by order were allowed an appeal CR. pes) to

this Court, which appeal was duly taken and resulted Yu aun

order by-t Brunt dated November 13; 1945, noting prob -\

able jurisdiction but limiting arguinents **to the question™

‘of the jurisdiction of the District Court under Section POG \

of the Judicial Code as amended (28 U.S.C. 380), and its :

jurisdiction as a court of equity.” (R.228). Ss

Khon eal ee nt

Specification of Errors to Be Urged

Under the limitation inyposed by this Court by its said

order of November 13, 1945, in respect to the questiyns to be

presented to this Court, no specific error can be absigned

to the Court below, that Court having found (R. ob) that.

it has jurisdiction of the controversy under Scetion 41(1)

of Title 28, U.S. C. A. and under Sections 411 14) of Title

28 and 43 of Title 8, U.S.C. A., and as a three-judge court

under Seetion 380 of Tithe 28, U.S. C2 AL, and that Court

having further found that it was not necessary to a decision

in the ease to determine **whether or not the allegation of

the Complaint appropriately alleged irreparable injury,”

or, in other words, whether that Court had jurisdiction as a-

court of equity.

a

ARGUMENT

As heretofore noted, the argument herein is jimited to

the jurisdictional issues, and this: brief will not attempt to:

diseuss in any way the merits of the controversy. For &

summary of appellants’ principal argument in respect to

‘such merits, this Court is respectfuily referred to appel-

lants’ printed Statement as to Jurisdiction herein (pages 6

8

through 10). The questions in this case, as limited by order

of this Court, are taken to include:

I. Whether the Court below has jurisdiction as a

three-judge court under Section 380 of Title 28, U.S. C.;

Il. Whether there is any necessity to allege that the

matter in controversy exceeded. $3,000 in value, and, if

so, Whether there are sufficient allegations to that ef-

fect; and

Il. Whether the pleadings set forth sufficient. im

mediate and irreparable injury to warrant exercise of

the jurisdiction of the Court below as a court of equity.

Since the case was heard by the Court below on motion

to dismiss, and since that Court found specifically that ** no

facts are put in issue by any answer filed in this case,”’ and

‘*no factual issues necessary to a decision in this case are

involved’? (R. 205)§ the allegations contained in’the plead-

ings and supporting affidavits filed by plaintiffs below musi

be looked to to see if sufficient is alleged to warrant. the

Court below taking jurisdiction as a special three-judge

Court, and to see if sufficient facts are set forth warranting

the Distriet Court to take jurisdiction as a court of equity.

l

The District Court has jurisdiction as a special three-

judge court under Section 380 of Title 28, U. C. C.

Section 380 of Title 28 of the Judicial Code states as

follows: . %

“ss ;

‘*No interlocutory injunction suspending or restrain-

ing the enfércement, operation or execution of any

statute of a State by restraining the action of any

officer of such State in the enforcement or execution of

such statute * * * shall be issued or granted by

9-

any justice of the Supreme Court, or by any District

Court of the United States, or by any judge thereof,

or by any Cireuit judge acting as District judge, npon

the grounds of the unconstitutionality of sich statute,

unless the application for the same shall be pre ‘sented

toa justice of the Supreme Court of the United States,

or toa Cireuit or District judge, and shall-be heard and

determined by three judges, of whom at least one-slmall

be a justice of the Supreme Court or a Circuit judge,

and the other two may be either Cireuit’ or District

judges, and unless a majority of said three judges shall

concur in granting such application.”

The complaint herein shows that the Legislature of the

State of Florida at its 1948 regular session duly adopted

and passed a Joint Resolution proposing and submitting

for ratification the amendment involved in this case, and

that on. November 7, 1944, said amendment was ratified by

the people of the State of Florida by a vote of 147,860 for

to 122.770 against, and thereupon immediately became ef-

fective and operative as a law of the State of Flerida and

as an amendment to the Constitution of the State of Florida’

(R. 27-28). “The complaint then alleged that the said baw

Was in violation of and deprived of rights granted under (1)

the First Amendment as protected against Invaston by

the State by the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) Article, 1,

Section 10, of the Constitutiogof the United States, provid.

ing that no State shall make laws impairiyg the obligations

of contracts, (3) Article VI of the U died States Constitu-

tion prov iding that the laws of the U nite’ States shall he

the supreme law of the land, and (4) the Fourteenth Amend-

ment protecting as a property right the right freely to con

tract, and prohibiting denial of the equal protection of the

liws (R. 29-31). Finally, the complaint alleged that the

defendant Attofney General and other law enforcement

officials of the State of Florida, under color Gt said vn.

constitutional taw, were seeking to enforce said unconstitu-

10

e

tional law as against said plaintiffs to plaintiffs’ irreparable

injury (R. 32-36). Plaintiffs sought a temporary and final

injunction. obs

Since appellants are seeking to restrain preliminarily

and permanently: the enforcement and operation of the

Florida constitutional amendment by.various law enforcing:

officials of the State. upon the ground of the unconstitu-

tionality of such amendment under the Constitution of the

United States, it would appear that the requirements of

Section 380 have been fully met (Sterling v. Constantin, 287

U.S. 378) if aState constitutional amendment can be con-

sidered to be included within the term ‘statute’? as used

in Section 380. ;

Appellants have assumed that a constitutional amend:

ment of State-wide application is embraced under the term

‘*statute’’ as used in Section 380, and have sought tem-

porary and final relief before a three-judge court, in reliance

upon the case of Phillips v. United States, et al., 312 UL S..

246. That case involved an. action Drought by fhe United

‘States of America and others againdt Phillips, Governor

of the’State of Oklahoma, to restrain interference by the

Governor, acting under general authority of the constity-

‘tion. and various statutes of the State, with the com-

pletion of a dam on the Grand River in Oklahoma’ An

interlocutory injunction was granted and vacated, the Su-

prenie Court finding that the complaint as filed did not

impugn the validity of any law of Oklahoma. However, in

the course of its discussion relating to the jurisdiction of i

three-judge court, this Court laid down the rule which

governs such jurisdiction in the following words:

“To bring this procedural device into play—to dis-

locate the normal operations of. the system of lower

tederal courts and thereafter to come directly to this

Court—requires a suit which seeks to interpose the

Constitution against enforcement of a state policy,

whether such policy is defined in a state constitution or

11

> ~

in an ordinary statute or through the delegated legisla-

tion of an ‘administrative board or conunission.” The

crux of the business is procedural protection against

wn improvident state-wide doom by a federal court

ofa state’s legislative policy. This was the aim of

Congress and this is the reconciling principle of the

‘ases,”

An earlier’ case decided by the United States Supreme

Court is also in point on the question here involved. /u

Sterling, Gorerner of Texas, et al. ve Constantin, of ali.

supra, a proceeding was had before a three-judge. court,

which Court granted -an interlocutory injunction against

Fy defendant, Ross S. Sterling, as Governor, and others,

~ who were acting under authority of the. State constitution

and statutes, restraining them from enforcing certain mil*-

tary or executive orders regulating or restricting the pre

duction of oi] from complainants’ wells. t his pprivd etn

sai: one 4 04 As,

ae etieg

“As the validity of decisions of the State Const itu

tion and Statutes, if they could-be deemed ty authorize

the action of the Governor, was challenged, the applica

tion for injunction was properly heard by thee Judges.

Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern, Rh. Co., 2e2 U.S.

10; 518. Ct. 8; 75.1. Bd. 135.7"

See also Cox v. McNutt, 12 Fed. Supp. 355; Powers Mere.

Co, v. Olson, 7 Fed. Supp. 865.

Counsel for respondents herein place principal reliance

for their assertion that a three-judge court as such lias no

jurisdiction upon the faet that Section S80 jses the word

‘statute’? and makes no reference to “State constitutional

amendment’. Such an assertion, however, overlooks the

fact that it was the obvious object of Congress in enacting

Section 380 to prevent undue interference by a Federal

District Court with state-wide policy of a sovertgn State,

and that accordingly it would be a clear subversion of Con

- : 12 ;

gressional intent to prohibit the issuing of injunctions by a

single district judge against, enforcement of State-wide

legislative policy, while at the same time permitting such

injunctions against enforcement of State constituth nal

poliey. This was the 1 reasoning used by the court below in

sustaiping its jurisdiction as a three judge court (R. 211):

“We doubt not that the stafufe ought to have oii

hibited a single -judge from eujoining action under

state constitution, for it seems incongruous that a

single judge should be able to enjoin action under 3

constitutional. provision but that he eould not do <o

under a state statute.”’

Further, the assertion of counsel for respondents for-

vets the all-inclusive meaning of the word ** statute’* ascribed

to the term when used by Congress relative to Supretnice

Court appeliate jurisdiction. In Sterens v. Griffith, 111

U.S. 348, this Court, relying upon Williams v. Braffy, W2

U.S. 255, stated as follows:

“ Any enactment to which’ a State gives the force of

law, whether it has gone through the usual staxes .

of legislative proceedings or been adopted in other

modes of expressing the will of the State,ds a statute of

the State within the meaning of the Acts of Congre--

touching our appellate jurisdiction.”

And it is relevant to observe that constitutional restric.

tions on improper interference by the **State’* with existing

contract rights, or other constitutionally protected right-.

applies to such interference by State ‘Constitution or |)

initiative of the people as well as by a law pasted by a

State Legislature. Mississippi d& M.R. Co. v. McClane. 19

Wall. 511; Denver v. New York Trust Co... 187 Fed. so:

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. 8.339. ay.

It ix respectfully submitted that the foregoing con-

siderations impel the conclusion that the word **statute’* a<

13 . ya

used in Section 380 of Title 28 of the Judicial ¢ ‘ode inelude~

any rule preseribed by power of the State and expressing

the will of the State throughout its borders, regardless

of whether that rule is established by act of the State

Legislature at a regular or special session, or ly the people

ef the State in a State-wide referendum. Any other con

struction would nullify the purfiose of Section 380 to prevent

possible unduly considered abrogation of State polie) v by the

action of a single district judge.

41

~-

It is unnecessary in this case to allege that the matter

in controversy exceeds $3,000 in value, but even if it were

necessary, there are sufficient allegations to that effect.

\ IP Is UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE To ALLEGE THAT THE

MATTER IN CONTROVERSY EXCEEDS $3,000 IN VALUE

Paragraph 2 of the complaint alleges specitically that

“This suit arises under the Constitution and Laws

of the United States and is brought to redress and pre

vent the deprivation, under color of flaw of the State

of Florida, of rights, privileges and immunities <«

cured under the Constitution and Laws of the United”

States, including Article 1, Section 10, Article VA, and

the First and Fourteenth Amendments to such Cou

stifution, ands Title 20, Sections 151-66 of the U.S.

Code, all as héreinatter more fully appears. This

Court kas jurisdiction under Title 28, Section 41, <ub-.

sections 1 and 14, U.S.C. A.; also under Tithe 8. See-

tion 45) of the U.S. Code, and Title 2s, Section 3S,

~ TSA. A. all as hereitiafter more fully appears.”

Not ouly do appellants allege that the present Suit was

brought under the Civil Rights Act, but) th? complaint

clearly seis forth an infringement of its provisions. A.

heretofore seen, the substance of the compl: vint is that the

3e

14

Attorney General of Florida and other State law enforce

ment officials, proceeding under color and purported au

thority of an unconstitutional amendment, seek to deprive

plaintiffs of civil and property rights secured to therm

under the First Amendment, under the Fourteenth Amend.

ment, under Section 10 of Article 1 and under Article V1,

of the United States Constitution. yon

It has been determined by this € owt in Hague \ vo CTO,

307 U.S. 496, and in Douglas v. Jedunette, 63 S. Ct. 877,

that ‘the District Courts of the Vnited States are eivei

jurisdiction by 28 U. S.C, Section 41(14) over suits

brought under the Civil Rights Act without the allegation

or proof of any jurisdictional amount”? where civil or prop.

erty rights are threatened under color of allegedly un.

coustitutional State law. The Court below found no trouble

in finding that it had jurisdiction under Section 43 of Title

S and Section 41(14) of Title 28, U. S.C. (R. 219).

Bb. THE PLEADINGS OF THE COMPLAINT CLEARLY INDICATE

THAT THE MATTER IN CONTROVERSY. EXCEEDS $3,000 1)

VALUE,

The Court below like wise found that, under the pleadine-~

hefore it, it had jurisdiction under Section 41(1) of Title 2s

(R. 209) giving jurisdiction to district courts in cases aris

ing under the Constitution or Laws of the United States

“where the matter in controversy exceeds $3,000. The alle

cations as to property damage in excess of $3,000. (alse

relevant to the question of whether there exists sufficient

irreparable injury) areas follows;

“19 A principal purpose sought to be achieved by

the. members of labor associations, including members

of plaintiff associations and the individual plaintitts

herein, in the exercise of their rights of assembly,

speech, press and petition, as hereinbefore alleged, ix to

secure economic security through the entering into by

labor associations of which they are members of sneh

- uniom shop or union security agreements. The secur

‘

15

ing of such agreementsds a necessar vy and indispe nag

concomitant of the assemblage of working people, i

cluding the members of plaintiff associations and the

individual plaintiffs herein, into labor organizations,

and the right of labor associations, including plaintitl

associptions, to maintain and obtain such agreements,

constitutes a necessary and indispensable element of

their proper functioning and for the fulfilhment of their

purposes, as heretofore set forth.

"20. Such union shop or union security agreements

and the right to enter into them: constitute valuable

property and civil rights in plaintiffs, for the follow

ing additional reasons: The union shop or union seeur

itv agreement constitutes the most effective menns of

obtaining and securing for plaintiff labor organizations,

their members, and the individual plaintiffs herein ;

(1) Job security and protection from employer dis.

crimination by removal of motives to discharge or de-

mote because of union activity.

(2) Equality of bargaining power, With consequent

betterment of working conditions by insuring labor a

united front in the contest for a fair share of the joint

products of capital and labor.

(3) Protection of working standards by preventing

cut-throat wage competition by non-union employees,

(4) Mquality of sacrifice by insuring that all) whe

enjoy union wages and working conditions, achieved

through years of struggle and deprivation, Share in the

costs of such benefits as members of the union rather

thanas-free riders,’

(5) An inereased measure of union responsibility

for their obligations under collective bargaining agree.

ments by providing a means of imposing dise ‘pln: uy

action,

» (6) Elimination of jurisdictional strife by safeguard.

ing against raids and other disruptive tactics of rival

labor organizations, and | -

(7) Eabor-management cooper, ation by eliminating /

the suspicion and‘ hostility which often characterizes

Saas

16 ,

the initial stages of employer recognition, thereby tre

ing union energies and resources for constructive co

operation rather than defensive sparring.

“21. Labor organizations, including plaintiff labor

organizations, have for many years in the past ani

have at the present time large numbers of union shop

or Union seeurity agreements with various employers

iia darge number of trades and industries throne:

the United States and in the State of Florida. Lathe:

organizations affiliated with plaintiff, Florida State

Federation of Labor, and including the plaintit® babe:

organizations herein, have approximately 5000 union

. shop or union security agreements embracing approxi

mately 100,000 employees of various emplovers iy

Florida. Such agreements are with employers on

vaved in non-agricultural industries, trades and ser,

ives. Some of these agreements are for one-year pe

riods with automatic renewal clauses for additional

year periods. Some of these agreements are for a

period of vears up to five years, some for the duratio

oF the present war, and others are about to expire i’

the near future. Such agreements have proved and

are proving usefnl and necessary in the accomplish

nents of the purposes as enumerated in paragrapls

14 through 19 hereef." In addition, many labor Ar

ganizations in Florida, affiliated with the plaintiff,

American Federation of Labor, or the plaintiff, Florida

State Federation of Labor, including many of the

plaintiff labor organizations, are seeking and desire

to obtain additional union shop or unien security agree

nents with employers in-various industries and trades

and services throughout the State of Florida.’ ¢R.

11-18.) |

27. All of the foregoing activities enumerated in

the preceding paragraphs of this complaint, and. in

particular the obtaining and maintaining of agree

°

‘The phrase “paragraphs 74 through 19 hereof," wherever it: appes< ’

“wee Jn the complaint, was amended fo read “payagraphs 14 thrn 20 hercot™

(KR. 40). ‘

2

ra oa

. on

4

/ a .

17

ments containing union shop or union security pro

Visions, as carried on by labor organizations and

their members and by the plaintiff labor orenniza

tions in the present action and individuals repre

sented by such plaintiff labor organizations and in

dividual plaintiffs herein, constitute the only effective

means possessed by organized labor to accomplish

economic security and otherwise deter the practices of

employers which are destructive of public poliev and

of the interest of wage earners generally and of mem.

bers of labor organizations and of plaintiff labor or

ganizations herein, and said activities are Indispensable

concomitants of the right oGanplovees to organize inte

Jabor organizations and to bargain collectively with

employers and otherwise to advance their mutual in-

terests and welfare,

“28. The plaintiff employers in this ease and other

eniplovers similarly situated have an interest in the

maintaining and obtaining of collective bareainine

agreements with labor organizations containing pre

Visions requiring membership in a labor organization

as a condition of employment or other provisions re-

lating to union security in that such provisions in cal

lective bargaining agreements with labor organization=

have resulted and result in stability of employment re

lationships, the promotion of harmony and cooperation

as hetween employer and emplovees, the elimination

of strife and discord both within the plant and as be

tween rival labor organizations, the avatlability of suf

ficient skilled, competent and experienced artisans of

the particnlar crafts, the stabilization of eueplovers”

compensation by the pre-determination of applicable

Wace rates, the establishnfent of an effective: menns

of increasing production.”’ (R. 16.)

“39. The contracts hereinabove specifically men:

tioved, and in particular the union shop provisions

thereof, constitute valuable property rights toe) the

plaintiff unions and their members and-the individnal

plaintiffs, as well as to plaintiff, MeCloskey & Com:

pany, and plaintiff. Tampa Florida Brewery, Ine. such

7

18 |

value being in excess of Three Thousand Dollars ex

clusive of interest and costs. Under and by virtue of

such agreements and the union security provision-

thereof, such plaintiffs have realized and are realizing

many benefits and advantages, including those enumer

ated in paragraphs 14 through 19, supra.

“40. The plaintiff, R. J. Gould, doing business a-

the Gould Welding & Erecting Company, employs ‘ay.

proximately 42 employees, all of whom are member-

in their respective crafts of plaintiffs, United Brother

hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; Brick

layers, Masons and Plasterers International Union of

America, and International Brotherhood of Kiectrica!

Workers, and all of which enplovees have duly desic

nated suéh organizations as their exclusive representa

tives ‘for all purposes of colleetive bargaining. The

said plaintiff, R. J. Gould, and the said labor organiza

tions have been since December, 1944, and still are,

in the process of negotiating a collective bargainine:

agreement covering. wages, hours and working condi.

tions of the employees employed by. said Company.

Although such plaintiff and sueh plaintit® labor of

ganizations are desirous of entering into a union shen

agreement, they were and are being prevented frou

so doing by reason of the said Anti-Labor Amend

ment, as hereinafter more specifically deseribed.2*

25.)

The verified Motion for temporary restraining order re

cites the filing of seven quo warranto proceedings by tlic

Attorney General against various corporations havin

union-security contracts, including four corporations hay

ing contracts with various of appellant organizations, which

proceedings seek to cancel the corporate charter of such

corporations unless the corporations refuse to abide by th:

union-security provisions of their contracts with the par

: ticular labor organizations (R. 55).

; 19

Finally, the uncontested affidavit filed by Gierm McClung

in support of the application for interlocutory injunction:

—sets forth as follows (R. 80):

oe * * that if this antitabor Amendment is nade

effective it will cause an immediate decline and de-

crease in the memberslip of plaintiff organizations

and the dues collected from said organizations, which

decrease will be far in excess of $3,000.00 and. will

thereby render the plaintiff organizations financially

unable to meet their obligations on the balance of the

purchase price, or to cortinue to defray the expense |

-necessary for the continued maintenance of their prop-

erties, thereby jeopardizing their ownership. of, as

well as their financial ability to continue to defray the

necessary maintenance of their properties, which would

‘ause them to sustain a loss greatly in excess of

£3, 000.00, Deponent further states that if said anti-

labor Amendment is made operative by court) pro-

ceedings, civil or criminal, it will cause such a chaotic

° condition in the ranks of labor and a loss of faith in

the plaintiff union organizations as will result) ina.

decimation of their membership to such extent that—

the less of dues now payable to said local plaintiff

organizations as well as the national plaintiff organiza-

tions, grea itly in excess of $3,000.00,""

It is submitted that the foregoing alleg: itions showing

possible joss to plaintiffs of considerable membership,

with consequent loss of revenue, showing impairment of

ability to function and to carry out the objectives and pur-

poses of the plaintiff organizations, showing loss of valu-

able existing and future contract rights, and, indeed, nay, .

ing a threat to the very existence of the plaintiff organiza

tions if the Amendment .in question “is made eaaics or

enforced against either party, together with the specific

allegation that the matter in controversy exceeds %3,000,°

y,

engl

c

“See Form 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

20

constitute ample allegations as to the amount in controvers\

The jurisdictional ameunt required by the Judicial Code

has been held_to be present if the future value of the con-

tinuing exeTcise of the right sought to be exercised or the

future avoidance of the burde.: sought to be avoided may -

be estimated as in excess of $3,000.) Glenwood Light Co.

v. Mutual Light Co., 239 US. 121, 126; Thompson vy.

Thompson, 226 U.S. 551.

The allegation that the very existence of plaintiff or-

‘ganizations will be threatened is not an idle one. The

United States Industrial Commission, set up by the 57th

Congress to report on industrial relations, expressly de-

fended the union shop on the ground that the logical result

of the non-union shop was destruction of the union In

Kemp vy. Division 241, 355 TIL. 213, 99 NE. 389, the Supreme

Court of Illinois, in denying an injunction against a strike

for a closed shop, held that ‘‘to deny them the right to de-

termine whether their, best interests required that they

- should be associated in their work only with members of

* their organization would imperil their very existence."*

a

The pleadings indicate sufficient immediate irreparable

injury to warrant invoking the jurisdiction of the court

below as.a court of equity.

The eee idings show as follows:

Foliowing the allegations contained in paraetanlie 14,

20, 27 and 28 of the complaint, set forth in connection with

Point II above, indicating the purpose, necessity and in-

*The Final Report of the Industritt Commission, H. Doeket No. 380.

Sith Copgress, First Session, Vol. XIX, pp. 815-817. °

ie

=

21 °

an

dispensability of union-shop agreements, the complaint al-

leges as follows:

“40, The plaintiff, R. J. Gould, doing business as

the Gould Welding & Erecting Company, employs ap-

proximate 42 employees, all of whom are members

in their respective crafts of plaintiffs, United Brother-

hood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; Brick-

lavers, Masons and: Plasterers International Union of

America, and International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, and all of which employees have duly desig:

nated such organizations as their exclusive representa

tives for all purposes of collective bargaining. The

said plaintiff, R. J. Gould, and the said labor organiza-

tions have been since December, 1944, and still are,

in the precess of fiegotiating a collective bargaining

aereement covering wages, Lours and working condi

tions of the employees employed by said Company.

Although such plaintiff and such plaintiff labor or- .

eanizations are desirous of entering into a union-shop

agreement, they were and are being prevented from so

doing by reason of the said Anti-Labor Amendment, as

hertinatter more specifically described.” (Re 2a)

“41. Plaintiff labor organizations are diveolved iM

numerous. other sitnations similar: te te csituation

above described with respect to plaintiff R20, Gould,

in the State of Florida.’ (R..26.) os

“40 The defendants, J. Tom Watson, as Attorney

General. of the State of Florida, Millard Caldwell.

is Governer of the State of Florida, J. Rex Farrior,

as State's Attorney of Hillsborough County, Florida, /

and Thaeh Culbreath, as Sheriff of Tlillsboroueh

County, Florida, and each of them, goutend that plain

tiffs, by observing the provisions of their existing col

lective bargaining agreements and the jrevisieis of .

existing constitutions and by-laws relating to union

security and requiring membership in a labor organ-

ization as a condition of employment, violate said

‘AntiLabor Amendment,’ and further conten) that

said ‘ AnticlLabor Amendment’ prohibits plaint#ffs from

22

©.

entering into or renewing collective bargaining agreve-

ments containing any such provisions.

“$50. It %6 the intent and purpose of such defendants

to force’ plaintiffs to comply with said illegal law

and to enforce compliance against said plaintitt- by

civil and criminal proceedings, and to prevent plain

tiffs ‘from realizing the benefits ‘and advantages of

their existing contracts and from entering into similar

‘ contracts in the future. Such defendants threaten to

and will, unless enjoined by this Court, file criminal

and civil complaints against and wiil prosecute the

plaintiff labor organizations and the plaintiff employ

ers, their officers and agents, and the individual plain

tiffs herein, if they continue to observe the proviston-

of existing collective bargaining agreements relating

to union security. or if they attempt to observe the

provisions of existing constitutions and by-laws of

plaintiff labor organizations referring to union se

curity or if they enter into or renew collective bargait-

ing agreements containing provisions relating to union

security or providing that membership in the er saniza

tion shall be a condition of employment. The acts of

such defendants, under yal of the alleged law, wil!

work an irreparable injury/and damage to labor nuit

and their members, and to employers, and p: tic uber ls

these plaintiffs, by reason of the loss of present and

prospective bene fits derived and to be derived fre.

such contraéts, as more particularly hereinbefore a!

levedy’and will.result in interminable litigation and

multiplicity of prosecutions and legal proceedings and

will cause widespread: disruption’ to employment ry

lations and a considerable interference with: produc

tion. Such threatened acts of defe ndants will further.

substantially interfere with, impair and destroy oper

ations of the businesses of plaintiff employers gud of

other employers similarly situated throughout the

State, and will cause and result in the disorganization

and disintegration of plaintiff labor organizations and

others similarly situated. |

#1

=~.

i

—"

23

‘51. Specifically, the defendant Attorney General,

J. Tom Watson; has threatened to institute immediate

proceedings in quo warranto against the defendant,

Tampa Shipbuilding Company, the defendant, St.

Johns River Shipbuilding Company, the defendant,

National Container Corporation, the plaintiff, MeClos-

key & Company, the plaintiff, Tampa Florida Brewery,

Ine., and other employer corporations with whom

plaintiff labor organizations new have collective bar

gaining agreements containing union shop provisions,

secking to annul and cancel the corporate franclise

under which said’ corporations are now funetioning

by grant or privilege from the State of Florida te de

business in Florida unless said corporations iniunedi-

ately desist from observing the provisions of sueh

existing collective bargaining agreements requirine

membership in plaintiff labor organizations as a con.

dition of employment. Said defendant, J. Tom Wat

son, has prepared and will, unless restrained by this

Court, immediately file said proceedings in quo war

ranto against said employers. The refusal or faiinre

of any of such emplovers to enforce said provisions

in said contracts relating to union security in) said

existing collective bargaining agreements will eause

immediate and irreparable i injury and damage to plain

tiff labor organizations who are parties to such exist-

Ing agreements, and will cause immediate and irrepa

rable injury and damage to pl: iintitt, MeCloske vt Com:

pany, and plaintiff, Tampa Florida Brewery, Ine. as

well as other employers vsiinilarly situated, in that

the benefits and advantages under such agreements

Will be lost and Aisruption te production vill inevitably

result if there is any failure to continve!to observe

the union security provisions.of its existing collective

a agreement,

Further, said defendant, J Tom W: atson, las

—aredktened the plaintiff labor organizations, their of

ficers and ggents and the individual plaintiffs herein

and otfier laber organizations and offieers of labor

organizations throughout the State of Florida who are

e

24

situated similar to plaintiff organizations with tninied:

ate criminal prosecutions under Section S33.01 of the

Florida Statutes, 194), providing for fine and tniypri-

onment for any persons conspiring to Violate any law

of the State of Florida, unless such plaintiff sou

others give up their existing agreements. in respect

to union security and unless they refrain from enter

ing into or renewing any such agreements,.and = <sid

J. Tom Watson, as Attarney General, is giving effer

to said threats at the present time in the followin:

manner: He has publicly, through the press of Flo:

ida, as the head of all law enforcement agencie~ i)

this State, issued_orders to all proseenting attorneys.

sheriffs, constable and other law enforcement offer r-

in the State'to institute immediately prosecution -

court against all persons, including these: plaintit?..

who are violating psaid *Anti-Labor Amendment’ |)

recognizing or entéring into collective bargain.

agreements with provisions as hereinabove set out, and

said offcers are now preparing such eriminal proceed

ings to be instituted against plaintiffs and all eee

persons similarly sjtuated to plaintiffs who are not

abiding by said *‘Anti-Labor Amendment.’ and th

said J. Tom Watson is himself preparing warrants

Which will be immediately issued and served upon so!

such persons, including plaintiffs, who are refusing 1

comply with said *Anti-Laber Amendment... Sov!

threats have resulted and wiil result, unless restrained.

in loss of personal, civil and property rights bw plan

tiffs, ancluding the benefits of assemblage. liberty. o°

contract, and the advantages and benefits of existing

and recognized contracts, and in loss of present and

prospective. members by plaintiff laber organization-.

and such-threats ‘imperil the security of plaintiff faber

organizations and the security of their members.

“53. The said J. ‘Tom Watson, as Attorney General,

nas also, through the press of Florida, threatened 1

prosecnte All persons, including the plaintiffs te 1] ‘

cause, Who execute or renew any collective bargaining

agreement containing a provjsion requiring member

29

. » \

ship ina union as a condition of employment zby reason

of said threats said plaintiff, JR, Gould. bias been

prevented trom entering into collective “bargaining

agreements containing union security provisions, al-

though anxious and willing so to do. but unless he is.

permitted to enter into such contracts he will suffer

irreparable damage and inSury from less of benefit.

and advantages. under such contracts by reason of

threatened concerted action by his employees for fail:

ure to enter inte such agreement. Further, in respect

to said plaintiff J. R. Gould. he has suffered and i-

suffering irreparable injmry and damage hy reason

of his inability to enter into a union shop agreement

hecuuse of said threats of said) deferidant, Jo- Torn

Watson, as Attorney General of Florida, due to the

fact that he is and has been unable ty seenre sufficient

skilled labor properly to condnet chis business. and

unless said defendant, J. Toni Watson. as Attorney

General of Florida, is restrained from enforcing said.

invalid law he will continue te suffer irreparable dan.

ave ond injury. Unless this Honorable Court enjoins

and restrains said J. Tony Watson. a- Attorney Gen

eral, and other defendant law enforcement officials,

from enforcing said law, the plaintiff. berein will be

immediately subjected to criminal proseentions and

injunction suits, and wholesale proseention<, and in

Junction suits will be instituted against other persons

in the State of Florida similarly situated to plaintiffs.

All of such suits are in the course of preparcat hom at

this time and will be immediately filed. and. there will

efesult a great multiplicity of law suits.

“34. Enforcement of the said *Anti-Labor Amend

ment’ by the said defendant prosecuting officials will

deprive the plaintiff labor organizations of the benefits.

“advantages and privilegs of mutnal asseciation and

assembly and of the mutual obligations heretofore

assumed by members of such plaintiff organizition~

in such. mutual association and /assemblye. It would

deprive sneh plaintiff labor organizations and all the Zi P

members of such plaintiffs of the benefits, rights, privi-

9°

leges and immunities heretofore received and now

possessed under contracts made by and with plaiutil

labor organizations and by and among the members

thereof, and will prevent such plaintitls and all mien

bers of such plaintiffs from engaging in all of the a

tivities hereinbefore set forth and from securing tiv

benefits, objectives and purposes of their mutual

sociation and assembly as heréinabove set forth, and

will irreparably injure and eventually destroy) the

_ plaintiff Labor organizations. The acts of said de

fendants as. threatened and intended aforesaid will

interfere with and prevent and cause a cessation aud

denial of collective bargaining relations between the

plaintiff labor organizations and employers and inter

~ fere with and prevent the renewal and continuance of

contracts and agreements now in effect between the

said plaintiffs and employers and others, ineludine

contracts which by their terms-provide for automatic

renewal. The filing of criminal complaints against or

the prosecuting of one or more of plaintiffs, or-ane or

more members or officers of plaintiff unincorporated

associations will, during the pendency of such prose

eution, ‘work all of the said irreparable injury and

damage to all of the plaintiffs arid al! of the members

of the plaintiff unincorporated associations and all

of the members of labor unions im the State of Flor:

ida.”’ (R. 3e- 36. )

In addition, in respect to the question of irreparable

injury, the motion for restraining order filed with the Dis

trict Court on March 17, 1945, contains the following swort

allegations, uncontested by any of the defendants :

‘*Now come plaintiffs in the above cause, by thici

undersigned attorneys, and respectfully show | unto

the court that since the filing of the bill of complaint

in the above cause, the defendant, J. Tom Watson.

as Attorney General of the State of Florida, has filed

in the Cireuit Court of Bay County, Florida, a quo

warranto. proceeding against J.-A. Jones Construction

27

Company® a corporation, and has filed in the Cirenit

Court of Duval County a similar proceeding against

the St. Johns River Shipbuilding Company, a corpora-

tion, and also filed in the same court a similar proceed:

ing against National Container Corporation, and tiled

in the same court a similar proceeding against Merrili-

Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Company, a corporation,

and also filed in the Cireuit Court of Dade County,

Florida, a similar proceeding against Miami Ship build.

ing Company, a corporation, and has alse filed in the

Circuit Court of Hillsborough County, Florida, a simi-

lar proceeding against .the Tampa Shipbuilding Com:

pany, and also filed in the same court a similar pro-

ceeding against A. Santaella & Co.. Inc. Salvador

Rodriguez, Inc., Corrall-Wodiska Y Ca... Wa Roberts

& Son, Ine.; Cuesta, Rey-& Co., Grandiaz, Annis & Co.,

Inc., Morgan Cigar Company, Ine., and Jose Arrange

& Co., and has also applied to the Supreme Court of

Florida for a writ of quo warranto- against the Dade

County Roofing Company, wherein he is seeking to

have immediately made effective the State Constita_

tional Amendment here under attack, whieh said.

Amendment is, in facet, illegal and void and of no et

fect, alloof which respondents in said) State court

cases, With the possible exception of St. Jobus River

Shipbuilding Company, are co-operating with the pe-

titioner thereing J. Tom Watson, as Attorney General

as aforesaid, and therewill not be any bona fide de.’

fetise made in said suits, or most of them, but that

satel proceedings will zo practically undefended, and

that “the suits, or most of them, in fact, have the co

operative assistance of respondentsin- having the

prayers Contained in the petitions filed by the Attornes

CGieneral syataine “land granted, to the effect that the

( ‘oustitutipnal Amendment here under attack is legal

and \walid/ and the closed shop provisions pi the con

tracts invalidated : ci he A aoe)

* ‘ * * . oF

| that the invalidation of said provisions

of said cqntracts in said proceedings brought by the

‘

‘ Pa

co

r

4

Attorney General in the State courts will cause eho

and confusion among the employees, not only those «

braced in the contracts. of ¥aid respondents 400 said

cases, but thousands of other employees of other cor

panies which have similar union contracts in the State

of Florida, and who are either plaintiffs in this cause

or are represented by the plaintiffs; that unless en

joined and restrained by this Honorable Court, the

plaintiffs’ contract and property rights sought to be

preserved in this proceeding will be immedtately i»

paired and destroved, and as a result, utter confusion

created in the ranks of plaintiffs, as well as labor

generally in the State of Florida; * * *°? (R. 57.)

* * . * : * * *

‘Plaintiffs further show unto the court that dn co

nection with the State court suit brought by the At-

torney General against said National Container Cor

poration, the said National Container Corporation bias

already served notice by letter upon plaintiffs in this

cause, and other interested unions represented by the

plaintiffs as a class, since the institution of thi suit.

that itis going to disregard the closed shop provision,

of the existing contract, copy of said° letter being at

tached hereto, marked Exhibit ‘A’ and made a part

nereor * * °° 48. SB.)

Exhibit **A’’, attached to such motion to disraiss, after

referring to the union-shop contract between the defeud:an'

National Container Corporation and various of the plain

tiff corporations and to the Amendment involved in this

‘ase, states as follows: .

‘*By reason of the adoption of this amendment, and

its inclusion in the Constitution of Florida, it is our

duty to suspend the operation of the clause in your cou

tract above referred to and we-aecordingly give vou

notice of the suspension of this clause in your contract.

**You are, of course, aware that quo Warranto pro

ceedings have been instituted against us under thi-

‘amendment, copies of writs and complaints have been

29

furnished to you, and that otlier suits have been brought

for the purpose of establishing the validity of the abeve

referred to constitutional amendment. ‘This notice of

suspension, theretore, will be in foree until suele time

_asa Court of Last Resort shall determine the constitu

tionality of this amendiment, :

Yours very truly, National ontainer Corpora

tion, by Samuel Kipuis, President.’* OR. GO.)

The affidavit filed by Glenn MeClang in behalf of plain

tiffs in their application for an interlocutory injumetion

further states as follows: Mie: We

soe 8 * that defendant, JeTom Watson. since the

filing of this suit has instituted seven que wiarrante

proceedings in various state coffee ot Florida, seeking

to make effective said auti-labor Amendment, and at

the tine of the granting of pre moa restraiing or.

-~ in this cause, the said defendanty1. Tom: Watson,

Attorney General of the State of Fhorida, had pre-

abel and was on the verge of filing a larse number

of similar proceedings against other emplovers: dee

ponent files herewith certified copies of said seven suits

so instituted by defendant J. Tom Watson im said

state courts, andomakes the same part of this atlidavit:

that the said defendant, J. Tom Watson. dias been

quoted in the press of the State continually since the

adoption of said anti-labor Amendment as threatenine

labor and labor unions, as well as employees and en

ployers with criminal and civil proceedings if they

continue to recognize in any way the closed shop

provisions in existing contracts; or enter inte any ex

tension or renewals, or any new coutracts containine

sald provision, and the said J. Tom Watson was pre

paring to file not only a vast nuniber of other civil

proceedings at the time of the granting of the pre

liminary restraining order by this court, but was ue

preparing to make effective his threats published. i

the press of the state to institute criminal piucostiea

by instituting a large number of criminal eases aeninst

plaintiff unions aud the members tQgreety, as well as

30.

employers who have entered into contracts with plain

tiff anions and their members, recognizing the closed

shop provision of their contract. Deponent attache

hereto some of the clippings from some of the papers

of this state, quoting the said defendant, J. Tom Wat

son, and makes the same a part of this affidavit, aud

these clippings are but illustrative of the said threats

showing the contemplated action of the said 4. ‘Tor

Watson not only as threatening to take criminal and

civil action against plaintiff unions and their member,

as well as employers under contract with them recoe

nizing the closed shop provision, but that the said

J. Tom Watson was actually taking steps to put into

effect all of said threats at the time of the granting

of the preliminary restraining order by this Honoralle

Court; that the filing of said guultiplicity of criminal

and eivil suits by the said J.) Tom Watson agains!

plaintiff unions and the members thereof, and employ

ers under contract with plaintiff unions who continne

to recognize the closed shop provisions, will deprive

these plaintiffs of their civil and property rights, and

‘ause them to suffer irreparable injury impossible o!

money admeasurement, and the filing of said miu

tiplicity of suits, criminal and: civil,-will practically

destroy and have the effect of undermining and jeo)-

ardizing the very continued existence of plaintiff labor

unions, and will cause both the labor unions and the

members thereof, as well as the employers to suiter

irreparable injury and that the same will be done aud

accomplished by the said defendant, J. Tom Watson,

unless enjoined by this Honorable Court..°° (ReST.)

A sample of the newspaper clippings attached is a-

follows:

‘*Tallahassee, Jan. 10, (AP)—Attorney General Tor

Watson today called on Florida workers and employers

to recognize the anti-closed shop Amendment as part

of the fundamental law ‘until some superior authori’,

-has assumed, or issued, a contrary order or directive.”

‘*He said both employers and ..iploves. now have

\

31

a constitutional duty to say to any group that the right

to work in Florida cannot be t*denied or abridged he-

‘ause OP Wembership or non-membership in any union.”

**We must dest} S now, in takine courses of

least resistance demanded by either emplover, bar-

gaining agent, busin ~ o¥ent, or growp of employees

and must refuse to subject ourselves to liability for the

violation for constitutional rights, or punishment for

infractions of criminal law.” *? (R.S83.))

The foregoing allegations, together with thos. allow

tions quoted in connection with Ateument EL, soyra. con

prise the essential allegations upon the basis of which it

must be determined whether the Court below had jurisdic-

tion as a court of equity.

It ix fully recognized that, in order to invoke the equitable

jurisdiction of a Federal district court, the injury. te

property or civil rights threatened by State action must

appear to be not only irreparable, but to be ‘thoth creat

and immediate’*’—that equitable relief ‘twill be withheld

if sought on slight or inconsequential grounds.) Deawglas

v. Jeannette, supra; Watsou vo Buck, 313 US. 387. That

the threatened injury to appellants, as labor oregianizations

and as members of labor orghnizations on the one fiatid, and

as employers on the other, is (1) irreparable, (2) great, and

(3) immediate, is, it is respeetfully submitted, anyly indi-

eated by the allegations above set ferth.

(1) The injury to appellants is frreparadl because no.

judgment for money daniages could possibly compensate

appellant labor organizations for the loss of protection and

security which willdbe océasioned if they are deprived

of the benefit of union-seeurify provisiens under existing

and future collective bargaining agreements. Indeed, the

coniplaint alleges that the very existence of plaintiff labor

Organizations is threatened by loss of such provisions under

the Amendment. Similarly, no ‘monetary award would: be

32

sufficient to compensate the employer appellants for the lo-

of stability in their relationships with their employees, th)

loss of a source for skilled and experienced help, and thy

loss of a means of achieving harmony and cooperation within

their plant which enforcement of the Amendment world

entail.

(2) The injury to appellant labor organizations that will

result if the Amendment is enforced is great because, a-

shown by the pleadings, loss of existing and future contract -

provisions for union security means loss of membership,

loss of equality of bargaining power, loss of protections

against cutthroat wage competition and against empriover

practices which are contrary to the interests ef wage earn.

ers—means ultimate destruction of appellant organizations.

Mr. Justice Jackson, in the recent case of Wallace Corpora-

tion v. National Labor Relations Board, 68S. Ct. 238, quite

aptly stated that ‘* A closed shop is the ultimate goal of most

union endeavor.’” Surely, loss of the one tried and tested

means of obtaining for its members job security, equality of

bargaining power and protection of working standards and

other benefits set forth in paragraphs 20 and 27 of the com

plaint iS one which is net slight or inconsequential. Not

only will existing protections and benefits be nullified, hat

the right of labor organizations to seek such protections

and benefits for their members in future negotiation: and

after organization has been extended will be permanently

denied. The inconvenience, money loss, or even sacrifice

of liberty through imprisonment, which might be occasioned

individuals by possible criminal proceedings will be as

nothing comparedto the blow inflicted upon the entire labor

movement in the State of Florida were the Amendiment to

be made operative. It is concerning the loss of protections

and benefits obtainable only under union-security agree-

ments that appellant labor organizations complain—an

nat

injury far beyond that incidental to a eriminal prosecution,

and far beyond that which will be suffered through depletion

of finances. Assuredly, no case could be presented to this

Court by any labor organization involving threatened. in-

jury which is *tgreater’’ than that involved in the present

case;, the ability to achieve union securiiy through’ the

processes of collective bargaining, denied by the Amened-

nent In question, goes to the very existence of labor organi,

zations, to their reason for being, to their ability te fune-

tion in the interests of their members.

(3) Finally, that loss off the benetits and protections of

existing and future union-security agreements is daaned:-

odtely threatened by the actions of the Attorney General is

demonstrated as follows:

The pleadings above set forth show that the Attorney

General has made actual threats to begin ereat numbers of

criminal prosecutions and civil suits for enforcement against

employers and labor organizations continuing to observe

or to enter into union-security agreements, and to com.

mence such prosceutions in the immediate future. The plead

ings further show that the manner in whieh such threats

were made waspgaleulated to reach all persons who rend

the newspapers of listen to the radio. Such threats thus

cave adi. cen ise lic notice to all ‘iach rs and to all

selves to civil s ncoulibtin ae suits for demaees ‘sift as

continne to observe union-seeurity agreements or enter into

such agreements in the future. The nature of these threats

Was such as to give reasonable certainty not ouly that the

Attorney General intended to carry them out, but. that

humerous employers with whom appellant dabor oreaniza-

tions have existing union- “security agreements on the one

hand would thereby be coerced inte refusing to observe such

aereements, and on the other that other employers about to

.

ot

enter into or renew such agreements would, because of <1!)

threats, refuse to do so, all to appellant labor organiza.

tions’ great injury and with consequences, infer alia, such as

those set forth above in paragraph 51 of the complaint.

In Watson v. Buck, supra, it was held in respect to the

sufficiency of threats of prosecution by law enforcement

officers that:

**A general statement that an officer stands ready ts

p@rform his duty falls far short of such a threat a-

would warrant the intervention of equity.”’

This Court indicated, however, in language applicable

to the present case, as follows:

‘For such a general statement is not the equivalert

of a threat that pros€cutions are to be begun so immedi.

ately, in such numbers, and in such manner as to indi-

cate the virtual certainty of that extraordinary injury

which alone justifies equitable suspension of proceed-

ings in¢riminal courts. The imminence and immediacy

of proposed enforcement, the nature ef the threats

actually made and the exceptional and irreparable in-

jury which complainants would sustain if those threats

were carried out are among the vital allegations whicli

must be shown to exist before restraint of criminal

proceedings is justified.”’

2. The pleadings above set forth show further that the

Attorney General has made good his threats of enforcement

by the actual bringing of seven proceedings ia qiv war-

ranto against seven eyployers (including four with whom

carious of appellant labor organizations have union-security

agreements), seeking to withdraw the right of such employ-

ers to do business in the State if-such employers continued

to observe existing union-security agreements. Such action

not only indicatés conclusively that the threats of the At

torney General were not lightly made, but affords great

and compelling stimulus to employers throughout the State

30

‘to abrogate their union-security agreements with appellant

labor organizations forthwith. Indeed, the immediate et-

fect of the bringing of such suits on at least one employer

with whom several of appellant labor organizations have a

union-security agreement was to bring about the very result

which appellants seek to avoid through these proceedings.

Defendant National Container Corporation, immediately

after being served with notice of the bringing of the quo

warranto action against it, served notice of the cancellation

of its eXisting contract. Are appellants to be obliged to

await further cancellations before asking the aid of a court

of equity to protect their numerous agreements? In view

of the repeated public threats of the Attorney General te

bring criminal or civil prosecutions against each allewed

Violator, and in view of the fact that the Attorney General

had actually brought a number of such proceedings, it ean

hardly be said that appellants are afforded an adequate

remedy by intervening ia each of these proceedings and all

others that might, as threatened, be instituted in the im-

mediate future, or by defending each of innumerable pos-

sible criminal prosecutions against thenisely es as such prose-

eutions arise. Even though adequate legal counsel were

available in sufficient numbers, and even though appellants

had sufficient funds to finance such interventions and such

defeuses, what is appellants’ Geme sds aeaiist the imminent.

and wholesale re petition by other emplovers of ‘the ac tion

taken by defendant National Container Corporation ?

The pleadings disclose another situation which, with equal

urgeney, calls for equitable relief. The appellant, J. Gould

Welding & Wreeking Co., and various appellant labor or-

xanizatiens are presently constrained from entering inte a

collective bargaining agreement providing for union secur-

ity by reason of the threats of the Attorney General, al-

thouegh both such parties are desirous of entering into such

an agreement’(R. 25). Numerous similar situations exist

36

in the StateJat the present time, and have been in existence

from the time of the Attorney General's threats to enforce

the Amendment (R. 26). As set forth in the complaint, such

situations coutinue to result in damage to both employer

and labor organizations—the employer through an inability

to secure sufficient skilled labor properly to conduct his

business, the labor organization through the loss of the

protection and benefits that would otherWise accrue to it.

No injury could be more continuous, and no damage more

immediate than exists in the situation where the-employer

is obligedto refuse to enter into or to renew union-security

-agreements solely because of the existence of the Amend-

ment and the threats of the Attorney General to enforce it.

In such cases, since no court can compel agreement to any

term of a contract, the only possible remedy through

court action is the obtaining of an injunction restraining en-

forcement of the Amendment in question. In the absence of

any such restraint,-appellants are losing and. will continue

to lose the protections and benefits of innumerable agree-

ments that might otheravise be theirs.

There is a final ground for invoeation of the powers of

the District Court asa court of equity, and that is the pre-

vention of a multiplicity of civil suits at law. The applicable

principle is set forth in Douglas v. Jeannette; supra:

“In general the jurisdiction of equity to avoid imul-

tiplicity of civil suits at law is restricted to those cases

where there would otlerwise be some necessity for the

maintenance of numerous suits between the same, par-

ties involving the same issues of law or fact... It does

not ordinarily extend to cases where there are numerous

parties and the issues between them and the adverse

party—here the state—are not necessarily identical.”

Exaniination of the seven quo warranto proceedings made

a part of the pleadings before the Distriet Court (R. 61,

97, 102, 107, 114, 120 and 173) indicates that the issues im

37

‘ those proceedings as between the labor organizations (whe,

as the pleadings show, would be obliged to interyene te

protect their rights) and the State would be idenfical, as

they would be in the remaining approximately five hundred

cases, involving the app@lant labor organizations herein

and the State, that would have to brought in order to reach

ali of the appellants’ agreements presently in existence

(R. 18). |

It is respectfully submitted that appellant labor organ-

izations, as well as appellant employers, threatened as they

are with numerous criminal prosecutions and numerous .

civil suits for damages, faced, in so far as appellant labor

organizations are concerned, with the immediate possibility

of wholesale cancellations of existing Wnlon-security agree

ments, and presently prevented both from renewing ex

pired agreemenis and from entering into new agreements,

all with immediately disastrous consequences, have no al

ternative but to appeal to a court of equity for relief,

“"Since the law in question is alleged to deprive of rights

guaranteed under the United States Constitution, and

since it is the action of the state, law enforcement efficials

Which appellants seek to enjoin, appellants have turned to

the Federal Courts under Section 380 of Tithe 28 of the

United States Code.

Before concluding this brief, an additional point may

require brief discussion. A-query ayas raised by the Court

below (but. not by the Attorney General or other defend

ants) as to whether the Amendment in question was oper

ative in the absence of enforcement or enabling leeistation

(R. 218). This raises the question of whether appellants

are in apy way damaged.

The general rule is that a constitutional provision is

self-executing if it supplies a sufficignt rule by means of

Which the right which it grants may be enjoyed and pro-

‘

38 i ae

tected, or the duty which it imposes may be enrorced, wit,

out the aid of legislative enactment. Daris vo Burke. 179

U.S. 399; Whitman v. National Bank, 176 U.S. 559. Soo

also City of Tampa v. Tampa Water Works Co, (Fla.). 4

Son. 631: Lummus ¥. Miami Beach Conaregational Chur

(Fla.), 195 Sou. 607. The omission of any express pro

“vision for enforcing a right or liability is net neces-arily

an indication that it was not intended to be self-executine.

Under the maxim ‘‘ubi jus ibi remedium’’, the common law

will furnish an appropriate rémedy. Waiitman vo Natioued

Bank, supra; Gaiser v. Buck, 203 Ind. 9, 179 XN. BL 1, 82

ALL. R. 1348: State v. Warner, 165 Mo. 399, 65 S. W. Ds4.:

The presumption is that all provisions of a State con istit

tion are self-executing. Winchester y. Howard, 1: lf Cal.

432, 64 Pae. GOL, 69 Pac. 77, 1 Amer. Juris. G89. do pai

ticulary. prolibitery provisions in a constitution are self-

eXEE utitig ‘to the<extent that anything done in violation of

thein ls ‘void Norton v. Taxing District, 129 U.S. 47%;

Be ora ». Hagtifes lle, 0 Ky. 239, 24S. W. 872, 25 L. R.A.

402. : :.

The ecnstituttoaat Aine ndiment involved in this case very

_Specifieally provides that “the right of persons to work

shall not, lie slonied ef abridged on account of members ~hij

or hon- membership i in any labor union.*” The Amendment

is clearly prohibitive. If valid, surely no enabling legi-la-

tion is necessary to prevent private individuals from agree

ing among themselves that membership in the union shal!

be a condilion of employment any more thar enabling

would be necessary to prevent the State from

legislati

taking private property without: just compensation, pro-

hibited in another portion of this same Amendment.

Whether any particular sections of existing state eriminal

statutes are available to the Attorney General for enfore-

ing the Amendment criminally is imunaterial if in fact the

Amendment is self-exeeuting as contended by both apse iL

lants and re sponde nts here inh. J

Conclusion: 2

It is respectfully submitted that the Court below has

. Jurisdiction under Section 380 of Tithe 28 of the Judie ial

Code, as amended, and has jurisdiction as a court of « “puity,

and it-is respectfully requested that this Court proceed

toa determination efthe validity under the United States

Coustitution of the Hlorida Ame nine nt abrogating union-

secur ity agreements. , ‘

oe

Respectfully submitted,

Joseru A. Papwar,

Henpert S. Tuareuen,

7G Bowen Badding,

Washington 5, D.C.;

Mowano J. Brows,

1200 1. ith Sthat, NOW.

Vv dshington 5, DO C.;

Kowin C. Correr,,.

‘ Law Kachanae Baildina,

Jacksonville 2, gninges

J. Dress Pannxens, y

206 Brotherhood Budding,

Harréshbura, P, wisulrunia:

Par Wuaitaken,

. Tom Wurtraker,

* Tampa Gas Building,

‘ Tampa, Florida;

Counsel for Appellants,