Brief for the Appellant — Thomas v. Collins

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1944

No. 14

R. J. THOMAS, Appellant,

VS.

H. W. COLLINS, Sheriff of Travis County, Texas

Appeal From the Supreme Court of the State of Texas

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ON REARGUMENT

Lee PRESSMAN,

Martin RAPHAEL,

Washington, D. C.

ERNEST GoopMAN,

Detroit, Michigan.

ARTHUR MANDELL,

HerMaAn WRIGHT,

Houston, Texas.

Attorneys for Appellant.

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CR EE sched tgmnnatnd aoe rcaenarnenmeien

Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Involved ___.. 2

CEPR bee TO Sp alla SD sO ee es OLN Se Oa

Questions Presented... Rineie a ee a oy

Argument:

I. A Constitutional Distinction Between Appellant's Speech and

His Solicitation of O'Sullivan May Not Be Validly Made.

~

A. The Organizing Process__.......---.-.-------------

B. No constitutional line can be drawn between addressing

the audience at large and O'Sullivan, an individual 9

C. A constitutional distinction may not be drawn between

the speech and solicitation in terms of their content... — 1]

li The Coun's Question... on et hams

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

ee Cases

a Page

Abram v. United States. 250 a. & 636... ert erie Be

Anderson v. United States, 318 U.S, 350 SURE CRRA |

Bridges v. California, 314 U. §. 252 ; eto ee

J. 1. Case Co. v. NL.R.B.. 321 U..§.-332__/ Lente ac Orr tne dy FP

Cooper Company v. Los Angeles Building Trades. et al, 15 Labor

Relations Reporter 46, decided Aug. 21, 1944 (Cal. Sup.

Cr.) . aS Mae Sa a 23, 24

Ex Parte Texas, 315 U.S. 8 ; Sia O NTE MD 9 |

Gompers v. United States, 283 U.S. 604 ___ rere

Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 14

Hague v. C1.O., 307 U.S. 496 25

Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U. S. 103 21, 23

Lovell v. Grifin, 316 U. §, 452 23

Martin v. City of Struthers. 399 U. S. 141 13

, ge : , - ~ 9

Matter of Me wines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. I, enforced in 87 F. (2d)

$65 (C. C. A. 8) 5

Matter of Alma Mills. 24 N.L.R.B. 9: 10 5

Matter of Donnell, Garment Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 5

Matter of Goodyear Tire €? Rubber Co., 21 N.L.R.B. 30), 315-

3 oe

362, enforced in this respect in 129 F. (2d) 450 (C.C. A.

Matter of Mexia Textile Sills, 11 N.L.R.B. 1167, erforced in

110 F. (2d) 565 (CC. A. 5) 5

Matter of Republic Steel C: tp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 240, enforced in

107 F. (2d) 472 (C.C. A. 3) Risacccancceercd

Missouri v. Dockery. 19] U.S. 165 =e Peele Lae sh

Mooney v. Holohan, 294U. S. 103 i er clea

Near v. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697 ES Big ay Seale al a

N.L.R.B. vy. Jones €2 Lauchlin Steel Corp., IO1U.S. j

Nystel v. Thomas, 42 8. W. (2d) 168, 172 (Tex.)

we

Jr. ‘se nn

P kv. Williams, 322U.S. 4 18, 25

R v. Texas, 193 U.S. 504 s

Neer mire ry ¥. C altte ria. os 13. S. 384, wars 14.

CO BD mB mee me ee Ky ee

— ame

rnful v. Alabama, 310 U. S. SS, 97

U.S. v. Carolene Pr ducts, 304 U.S. 144 lt

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. §. 287 21

Vakus v. United States, 64 Sup. Cr. 660) 24

il

, ar

Miscellaneous

]

Adams, ed., History of Cooperation in the United States (Balti

rsscacn: Bihan! NC I ONT FEN A A Ee

Baldwin & Randall, Civi! Liberties and Industrial Conflict

Brooks, When Labor Organizes (New Haven, 1938) _

Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New York, 1910)

Chafee, Free Speech in the Unitec’ States (Cambridge, 1941)

“Collateral Attacks Upon Labor Injunctions,” 47 Yale L. J. 1136

Curti, American Peace Crusade (Durham, N. C., 1929).

Curti, The Growth of American Thought (New York, 1943)

deTocqueville, Democracy in America (New York, 1900)

Dodd, Some State Legislatures Go To War—On Labor Unions—

Fitch, The Causes of Industrial Unresi (New York, 1924)

Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York, 1930)

Handbook of Trade Union Methods (New York, 1937). pp. 3-7

Hardman, ed., American Labor Dynamics (New York, 1928).

pp. 114-115

Hicks. The Populist Revolt (Minneapolis, 1931)

Hines, American Communities and Cooperative Colonies (Chi-

cago, 1908,

Hobbs, Phe Antislavery Impulse (New York, 1935)

I) Labor Relations Reporter 76 (1942)

Levinson, Labor on the March (New York, 1938). pp. 189,

241-242, 251 _. Wee Ne a

Macdonald, Labor Problems and the American Scene (New

York, 1938) ,

McCrea, The Hur-ane Movement (New York. 1910)

McMaster, History of the People of the United States (Nev

York, 1895)

Vol. I 15

Vol. \I a. ,

Myrdal, 4n American Dilemma (New York, 1944), Vol. H

Nevins, The Emergence of Modern America (New York, 1927)

Noyes, History of American Socialism: (Philadelphia, 1876)

Oberholtzer, History of the United States Since the Civil War

(New York, 1926), Vi if, Ill

Ordinance of the City of Athens, Tennessee (1944)

Ordinance of the City of Blytheville, Arkansas. (1944)

Ordinance of the City of Milledgeville, Georgia (1944)

Ordinance of the City of Newnan, Georgia (1944)

1

Pa pe

Owens, 4 Study of Recent Labor Legislation, 38 I. L. Rev.

309 (1944) SOR sp

Pope, Millhands and Werackars ‘ice Heer. 1942)

Post, Popular Free Thought in America (New York, 1943)

~- sages le.

Report of R. J. Thomas, “dutomobile Unionism, 1940-1941"

(Buffalo, 1941) ;

Schlesinger, Nex Viesepoints in Dacsinon History ‘ioe Tak

1926)

Schlesinger, The Rise of the City—1878-1898 (New York,

1933) : SDI AE ren DR AS Seow a 5.

Seidman, The Needle Trades (New York, 1942). 2-

S. Rep. 398, part 5, 78th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1694

Stewart, The National Cisil Service Reform League (Austin,

168,, 1929}

Van Tyne, The Causes of the War of isis (Boston,

1° j??)

Vorse, Labor's Nex Millio ns | New York: 1938), pp. 138-139

Walsh, C es Rac foe Uniontsm in Action Seid York, 1937),

pp. 6%-

Wevforth, TE of Labor (Silene 1917). pp. 16-17.

27-29

Zabler, Eastern Workingmen and National Land Policy (New

\4ye

we wr

‘4e

at

2

—_

——

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1944

No. 14

R. J. THOMAS, Appellant,

VS.

H. W. COLLINS, Sheriff of Travis County, Texas

Appeal From the Supreme Court of the State of Texas

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT ON REARGUMENT

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of the State of Texas

(R. 318-327) is reported at 141 Tex. §91, 174 S. W. (2d)

S5&. No written opinion was issued by the State District

Court; its order adjudging Appellant in contempt appears

in the Record at R. 308-309.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Sections

344(a) znd S61(a) of the Judicial Code.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional and statutory provisions involved are

set forth in our Brief in No. 569, October Term, 1943,

pp. 2-5.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant R. J. Thomas, president of the Internationa!

Union, Uniged Automobile, Aircraft and Agriculturaklm-

plernent Workers of America, one of the vice presidente a7?

the Congress of Industrial Organizations, was invited by

the Oil Workers International Union, Local 1002, C.1.0.,

to address a mass meeting to be held on September 23,

1943, in the City of Pelly, Texas, for the purpose of organ-

izing the employes of the Humble Oil Company (R. 5

2-23, 33, 279). On September 22, 1943, on complaint of

the Attorney Generalain the §3rd District Court in Austin,

Travis County, a distance of 167 miles from where Appei-

lant was staying at Houston, a temporary restrataing order

was issued by that court, ev parte, to restrain Appellant

from soliciting members in the Oil Workers Internationa!

Union or any other labor organization athhated with the

C.1.O. without tirst obtaiming an organizer's card “as re-

quired by law” (R. 291-295, 315-317). The order was

served on Appellant at Houston, on September 3%, 1943,

approximately tive hours prior to the meeting (R. 35). At

the meeting, Appellant, without having apphed for o:

obtained an organizer's card (R. 10, 3§-37), delivered

speech in which he discussed the advantages of union mem-

bership and solicited the audience at large and one em-

plove, Pat O'Sullivan, by name to join the Oil Worker;

International Union (R. 4-5, 41, 279-290).

At the close of the meeting, Appellant as well as two

other speakers were arrested for soliciting members to joi

the Oil Workers International Union without tirst obtain-

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pI ae as required by the Texas statute (R. 42).

Aftef further proceedings’ the district judge found Appel-

lant guilty of contempt of court for violation of the re-

straining order and rejected Appellant’s contention that

the Texas statute was unconstitutional (R. 299-302,

308-309).

Appellant, having been remanded to the custody of the

Sheriff of Travis County, Texas, filed a petition for writ of

habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Texas, renewing

his contention that the statute was unconstitutional (R.

312-314). On October 20, 1943, the Supreme Court of

the State of Texas orally denied a Motion of the State to

dismiss the application for the writ, grounded upon the

contention that Appellant was without standing to attack

the statute because he had violated the restraining order,

and on October 27, 1943, the court entered its opinion and

judgment, sustaining the constitutionality of the statute,

denying Appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus and

remanding Appellant to the custody of the Sheriff of Travis

County (R. 318-326). On November 24, 1943, the court be-

low demed Appellant’s motion for rehearing (R. 327-366).

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

After hearing argument of this case in the October Term,

1943, this Court restored this case to the docket and as-

signed it for rearzument this Term. Counsel were re-

quested to discuss in their briefs the following questions :

“1. Does the Texas Act by judicial or administrative

construction) require a registration or license betor

making the speech made by Thomas—if it) had

omitted the O'Sullivan. solicitation

Did the injunction forbid the speech (; Wt fren

(Sullivan's solicitation) and is the order of con-

tempt based in whole or in part on such speech? Tt

te

See f,- 06 Briel X\ Sea ‘,.7

4

not, is the speech used as an aggravation of the

ottense? If neither, what is the purpose and ettect

of its recital in the papers and orders in this pro-

ceeding ?

3. Assuming the speech to be immune and assuming the

words addressed to O'Sullivan to be a violation of

a valid prohibition of solicitation, what is the ettect

on its constitutional validity of including both in one

injunction ?

4. Assuming the injunction invalid as applied to the

speech, what was the duty of Thomas in respect

to obedience so long as it was not set aside?

‘5. Is the application of Section 5 consistent with the

provisions of the National Labor Relations Act?

“6. Assuming that petitioner had @ constitutional right

to make a general argument and solicitation to the

entire assembty of workers, should the State punish

him in a single penalty because he picked Gut onc

member of the assembly and addressed a solicita-

tion to him by name ?”

Before discussing these questions, we discuss the nature

of the distinction between the speech and the O’Sullivan

solicitation.

I. A CONSTITUTIONAL DISTINCTION BE-

TWEEN APPELLANT’S SPEECH AND HIS

SOLICITATION OF O’SULLIV AN MAY NOT

BE VALIDLY MADE.

The questions which the Court has requested Appellant

to discuss seem, with two exceptions, to invite exploration

of a distinction between Appellant’s speech to and solici-

* Questic ns No. 4 and 5. The lat — uestion deals with the relations

set ved lewistaty m to the Nat iL at > Rela ations \ t We } nit

) orp ‘ } re pnonse ¢t ’ then

ss F

5

tation of his audience at large and his solicitation of O’Sul-

livan. We do not believe that such a distinction may be

validly drawn, constitutionally or otherwise. The nature

of the organizer’s work and of the organizational process

makes it clear that such a distinction is not a meaningful

one in a consideration of the extent to which his activities

enjoy constitutional protection.

A. The Organizing Process’

The conventional! pattern of organizing a piant is shaped

by two basic considerations. First, the value of a union

must be brought home to an ever-widening circle of em-

ploves through intensive discussion and_ proselytizing.

Second, this process must be set in motion without invok-

ing hostile countermeasures and must mature rapidly

enough to become immune to such countermeasures. ‘The

organizer must not only promote acceptance of the union

but, if he is to succeed, must do so discreetly and under

conditions often difficult and hazardous.

After obtaining a list of prospects from those in the plant

already sympathetic with the union, the organizer visits

such prospects in their homes in the evening. ‘To each of

Ay : :

The description of the organizing process which appears in the text does not. «

irse, exhaust the various methods used in organizing employees. However. we

cueve wt to be an accurate account of a common pattern. It 1s ba ed upon %

lowing sources: Handbook ot Trade Union Methods (New York, 1937). pp. 5-7

Vorse. Labor's Nese Millions (New York, 1938), pp. 138-139; Hardman. ed... dmer-

in Labor Dynamics (New York, 1928), pp. 114-115; Levinson, Labor on the Marci

New York, 1938), pp. 189, 241-242. 251; Walsh, ClO—Industria! TE nionism in

fection (New York, 1937), pp. 69-70; Weyforth, Orgamizalality of Labor ( Baltimore.

1917), pp. 16-17, 27-29: Brooks, When Labor Organizes (New Haven. 1938), pp. 1-6:

Report of R. J. Thomas, “Automobile Unionism, 1940-1941," (Buffalo, 141). p. 9

Pope, Millhands and Preachers (New Haven, 1942), pp. 239-241: Macdonald

Labor Problems and the Amencan Scene (New York, 1938), pp. 476-477; Fitch,

The Causes of Industrial Unrest (New York, 1924), p. 177; Seidman, The Needls

Trades (New York. 1942). p. 186. For examples of the manner in which the or

ng process described in the text operates in practice, see Matter of Donnelly

Garment Co, 53 NLRB. 241. 245; Matter of Goodyear Tire © Rubher Co, 21

N.L.R.B. 306, 315-362. enforced in this respect in 129 F. (2d) 450 (C.C.A. §

Vatter ot Mexta Teatile Mills, 11. N.L:R.B. 1167, enforced in 110 F. (2d) 545

(CCA. 53): Matter of Agwilines, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced in 87 F. (2d) 14

C.C.A. 5): Matter of Republic Steel Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 219, 240, enforced in 107

F (2d) 47? (CCA. 3): Matter of dima Mills, 24 N.L.R.B. 1. 9-10

MICRO CARD2

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these workers individually he tells the story of the union,

describes conditions in the industry as a whole, compares

the wae scale at the plant which he js seeking to organize

with those in plants already organized. He answers ques-

tions as to the purposes and methods of the unioft, assures

those who fear empioyer reprisal that they will be protected.

and seeks to refute objections to the organization. Upon

making it as clear as possible to each prospect that collective

bargaining is more effective than individual! bargaining, he

seeks to have his prospect sign a pledge card or member-

ship application,

The organizer then arranges to meet with those who

have manifested an interest in the organization <i 1 who

form the spearhead of the organizing campaign. The or-

ganizer again discusses with these individuals the union’s

provram and advantages. These leading spirits perform

the work of spreading the word of the union to their fellow

workers and persuading them to sign up. This work is

conducted so as to conceal from the employer, as far as it

is possible, the existence of an organizing drive. For this

reason the advanced union men conduct their activity dis-

creetly, speaking to the men at their homes or away from

the presence of their supervisors. Similarly, the organizer

himself remains in the background in order not to attract

attention to himself or those employes working with him.

and thus generate an employer countermovement at atime

when the organization is least alle to resist it.

After the organizer and those acting with him have con-

vinced a sufficient number of employes that a union is de-

sirable, a temporary chairman is ele ted and _a Jocal begins

to take shape. As the movement emerges organizationally,

the discussions which gave rise to it become more wide-

spread) The homes of workers, their cars, the plant vard,

locker rooms, and vicinage become theatres of a continuing

debate on the merits of unionism. Moreover, the debate

Bi CO ey

7

broadens in scope, for the emerging public character of the

drive sets in motion concrete countermeasures which cre-

ate new fssues. The organizer and union leaders may be

required, for cxampie, to explain why an announced wage

increase does not render the union superfluous, to reply to

the formation of a company-sponsosed rival organization’

or to answer personal attacks.

A point is thereby reached when the issues in the cam-

paign are stabilized—all the reasons for joining or not join-

ing the union which have emerged during the drive have

been presented to the employes individually. At the same

time the growth in the local’s collective strength has made

it safe to issue mass public appeals to those who have not

responded to the individual appeals. Acting as an organi-

zation, it proceeds to recapitulate in a public dramatic way

the arguments formerly addressed to individuais. In order

to reach a large audience with the union’s message, the or-

ganizer (who may have temporarily left the scene in order

to initiate the organizational process elsewhere) may resort

to the use of leaflets, sound trucks or mass meetings. Groups

in the community whose support has been won in the cause*

of the campaign, such as public officials, teachers and min-

isters, are called upon to bring home the union’s messace to

the employes. Officials of the union or those of other

unions fraternally interested in it repeat that message at a

public rally, such as the one at which Appellant spoke (R.

279-290). In short, the union exhausts the resources avail-

able to it in order to win over the reluctant or the unde-

cided.

This entire process, from the initial furtive door to door

individual appeal to the final mass campaign, depends

upon basically the same technique of persuasion and dis-

cussion. No meaningful line of distinction, constitutional

or otherwise, can be drawn at the point where persuasion

and discussion terminate and solicitation begins. Ivery

Ss

argument in favor of acceptance of the union’s position

upon the broad and vital concerns which constitute the

subject matter of its functioning is a solicitation to join it.

Because unionism invoives a deep-going alteration in

the worker’s relationship to his job, it cannot be marketed

like tooth-paste or vacuum cleaners, but must-be discussed

in terms of the basic public issues which it presents. A

union campaign is a continuing and fluid debate and not a

cinematographic series of offers and acceptances. Such dis-

cussions are an inherent aspect of the process of solicita-

tion because employes are rarely made aware of the merits

of unions through the press and other organs of opinion.

Solicitation, then, of “memberships in a labor union or

members for a labor union,” to use the language of the

statute, is a process of educating employes, of making them

aware of the desirability of joining with their fellows, of

overcoming prejudices and stereotypes which stand in the

way of such action. We believe, for reasons already dis-

cussed at tength in our Brief in No. 569, that the challenged

legislation unconstitutionally interferes with this educa-

tional process.

Solicitation of membership is forwarded by the presenta-

tion of ideas in the classic constitutional sense. The desir-

ability of collective action, the discussion of legislation and

of the advantages of labor unions fall indisputably within

the area of free speech. An organizing campaign is a “free

trade in ideas” where the “best test of truth 1s the power of

the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the

market.” .’hramsv.U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630. These ideas

do not lost constitutional standing because they are ad-

dressed to the welfare of employes, because they “trench

to the point of estate.”

We turn new to a consideration of the thesis that Ap-

pellant’s constitutional rights turn upon the size of his

audience.

9

B. No Constitutional Line Can Be Drawn Between

Addressing the Audience at Large and O'Sullivan,

an Individual

It should be borne in mind that the sole difference be-

tween Appellant’s speech to the audience at large and his

solicitation of O’Sullivan is one of numbers. At the con-

clusion of his address to the audience Thomas said (R.

290):

“Therefore as Vice-President of the C.1.O. and as a

union man, | earnestly ask those of you who are not now

members of the Oil Workers International Union to join

now. I selicit you to become a member of a union ot

‘your fellow workers and théfeby join hands with labor

throughout this country in all industries.

‘

» The subsequent “solicitation” was addressed to O’Sul-

livan alone and used his name. It seems too plain for

argument that in considering the scope of Appellant’s

right to speak and in his speech to solicit his audience to

join a specified union, it is constitutionally of no sig-

nificance that the right is exercised in a large audience o:

distributively through individual solicitations. Speech can-

not be constitutionally free only when the name of. its

hearer remains unspoken but not when he is addressed by

name, ner may constitutional rights be conjured away by

a process of division.

If this Court were to hold that the O’Sullivan solicita-

tion may stand constitutionally on a different footing from

Appellant’s speech, it would in effect strip the organiza-

tional process of protection from state interference pre-

cisely at the point when it most requires it. It is at the

early stages of organization when the process is a prey to

every hostile force in the community that this Court would

cripple it with an additional restraint. This is so because

ihis is piecisely the phase of organization which is con-

ducted on a personal, individual, door-to-door basis. At

10

the very time when the organizer is seeking to avoid the

mistake of publicity which might make him a victim of tar

and feathers, broken bones or a police frame-up,’ his group

of employe aides victims of discharge, and his plans for

furthering the union movement vulnerable to a strategic

exercise of the employer's economic power, he is required

to submit to the State’s prior restraint. At the point where

the organizer’s conduct and other civil rights, such as the

right to hold a meeting, are curtailed and he depends al-

most exclusively on his right to speak to individuals the

Court would permit that right also to be forfeited. On the

other hand, when the union movement is effective and

where its collective strength renders it immune to reprisal

so that a public meeting is possible, then and only then

would the organizer’s speech become free. We believe

that the Constitution is broad enough to protect from state

interference not only speech at a large public meeting par-

ticipated in by dignitaries, but also the initial persona! ap-

peals in workers’ homes and outside the plant gates, the

slow, hazardous organizing work which precedes and

makes possible the speeches and rallies.

Similarly, the delays necessarily occasioned by the leg-

isiation (see our Brief in No. 569, pp. 49-57) would strike

with a peculiarly effective thrust if the initial organizing

process were deciared subject to it. Personal solicitation

uniquely characterizes the stage of the organizational proc-

ess at which the organizer’s access to the employes must be

quick and easy. It is at this stage that the union move-

ment is subjected to strategically-timed employer attacks.

The organizer may be called upen suddenly to rally the

workers and to prevent the dissipation of a union move-

ment still insufhcienitly developed to survive attacks with-

out expert guidance. A spontaneous response by workers

to mass discharges may require the immediate presence of

J ; SP AAS 1

See the cases and materials cited in our Brief in No. 569. at p. 4

11

an organizer to guide an inchoate union movement. km-

ployes may be quickly herded by supervisors into a rival or-

ganization launched by their employer. But if the Texas

statute is valid, before the organizer is free to handle such

urgent situations, he must seek a license from the Secre-

tary of State and cool his heels while the union movement

collapses or is discredited.

Moreover, it is at the stage of individual solicitation that

the line between the organizer and his organizing group in

terms of who is paid and who is unpaid is vague and

amorphous. During the early stages of the organizing

campaign all of those sympathetic with the union seek to

forward the drive by soliciting their friends and shop-

mates. If these workers were to be reimbursed by the

union for the time spent in soliciting individuals, they too

would be brought within the statute and compelled to reg-

ister before urging their friends to join the union.

Should this Court announce that the right to solicit

members for labor organizations were dependent upon the

size of the audience solicited, it would not only fashion a

distinction which has no rational basis, but would/in effect

permit a right to lose constitutional significance at the

precise point where its unencumbered exercise 1s indis-

pensable to reach and change the minds of men.

C. A Constitutional Distinction May Not Be Drawn

Between the Speech and Solicitation in Terms of

Their Content

The line between O’Sullivan, an individual, and the re-

mainder of the audience, a large number of individuals,

fades as soon as it is drawn. May the speech and the

solicitation support any other constitutionally valid dis-

tinction? Fvenif it were assumed that the speech itself did

not contain the solicitation at its conclusion, quoted above

(supra, p. 9), no constitutional distinction between the

‘12

speech and the O'Sullivan solictation could be drawn.

We do not believe that for constitutional purposes advo-

cacy in behalf of a specitied labor union may be separated

from a request to join it. Appellant’s speech, apart from

its explicit solicitation at the close, is, we submit, an in-

disputable appeal, request and solicitation io join the Oil

Workers International Union. .

Thus, he announced at the outset of his speech (R. 281)

that he would describe the benefits of C.1.O. unions, and

* that he intended * ‘to ask thern to join the Oil Workers In-

ternational Union.” He stated that the purpose of organ-

izing the oil industry was to raise the standard of living of

the employes, to give them effective voice in the affairs of

yvovernment, to increase production, that oil workers had

joined the union for the same reason that doctors and

lawyers had organized. He stressed the importance of af-

tiation with the C.1.0., elaborated the grievances which

were the concern of the union (R. 283), the improved con-

ditions which it offered, the character of the employer in-

terests opposed to the union (id.), the contributions of

unions to war production, the relationship of the wage

structure of one industry to that of another,and the im-

portance of united action (R. 283-290): All of this was

spoken at an organizing rally sponsored by prominent

union organizers (R. 279).

If. language has meaning, each member of Appellant’s

audience was solicited in the most urgent and unmistak-

able way to join the Oil Workers Union. It is true, as we

have assumed for purposes of this discussion, that the for-

mula, “I solicit you to join the Oil Workers International

Union” is absent from Appellant’s speech. However, if

such a formula were substituted for the speech, its invita-

tion to jom, its directive thrust, would be far less urgent.

Hence, since the Constitution deals with realities and

_e

sete ode

13

not abstractions, if the statute 1s unconstiutional in its

application to the speech, its validity is not saved by con-

nning it to the solicitation. Any other view would elevate

the ritualism of a verbal formula to the level of a consii-

tutional distinction which clear and simple meaning denies.

Trade unionism is not a compendium of abstract prin-

ciples but a program of group action. Moreover, it is a

program which presents to workingmen and women con-

crete, vital, irreconcilable choices. To suggest that this

program may be forwarded and constitutionally protected

so longas allegiance is enlisted but not when athliation 1s

sought, so long as sympathy is promoted but not member-

ship, would be to allow the right of free speech to func-

tion in a vacuum. Free speech would not be the precious

right it is if the constitutional shield were withdrawn from

it at the point where it confronts men with a practical

choice in the realm of conduct. Cf. dbrams v. United

States, 250 U. S. 616, 630. In the context of labor rela-

tions, the distinction between advocacy and solicitation is

not one of kind and, indeed, scarcely one of degree. It 1s

assuredly a distinction without constitutional dimension.

If the right to speak in behalf of a union 1s to be freely ex-

ercised, it must include the right to solicit membership

therein. Fair exercise of the former right necessarily in-

volves the latter.

Moreover, the living content of the right which such a

distinction would protect is vague and indefinite. Would

an organizer be required to register if he urged the merits

of a particular union, but not if he praised unions gen-

*Gompers v. United States, 283 U.S. 604, 610

* See J. 1. Case Co. v. N.E.R.B., 321 U. S, 332.

Compare the Ticht to proselytize as an aspect of religious freedom. Martin v

City of Struthers, 399 U.S. 141. This is not to suggest that the right to proselytize

mstitutionally indistinguishable from the right to solicit. Each civil right func-~

s constitetionally through forms appropriate to its purpose and history. Cf.

mpers v. United’ States, 283 U.S. 604, 610. We do contend. however, that pur-

e and history link solicitation afd speech as intimately as proselytization and the

tice of religion a

14

erally? Would he be required to register if he voiced a

broad appeal to support the union’s organizing drive but

was careful not to particularize the manner in which such

support was to be forthcoming, if he praised the union’s

achievements and the advantages of members‘ but at no

time requested his audience to join? Would speech other-

wise constitutionally protected beceme subject to the

state’s restraint because uttered during an organizing cam-

paign? Would the same be true if uttered during a cam-

paign to obtain designation as a coilective bargaining rep-

resentative? Would an unregistered organizer be placed

in default under the statute if he urged that his hearers

make the X plant a umon plant or Y town a union town?

Would union literature, otherwise immune, subject its

issuer to the statute because it was subscribed with the

name anu address of the union? Would the great body ot

union campaign literature which deals with specitic issues

of wages, hours and working conditions, which offers a

bread-and-butter inducement to join but no specific invi-

tation, constitute solicitation of membership within the

meaning of the statute?

In short, whether the statute is interpreted, on the one

hand, as placing a taboo only on the formula, “I solicit

you to join the X union” or, on the other hand, as includ-

ing within its scope speech reasonably calculated to induce

ten to become members of a union, it cannot be constitu-

tionally sustained. Cf. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S

359, 369: Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258-259.

The verb “to solicit,” which is used in the challenged

statute, asks profound constitutional questions in the area

of free speech. This is so even where the conduct solicited

is criminal. The ob;ect of the solicitation restrained b\

the State of Texas is not criminal conduct but the forima-

ig ifec free Nersecr mm fh

the Usted States (Cambridee: 1941), pp. 23. 44

46.49° §1-82. 115. 145. 152-153. 171

—

ROE Sens

~

ee meh!

eee

bel REF ey Re

15

tion of labor organizations. This Court and Congress have

made clear that formation of labor organizations is to be

encouraged in the public interest, that the right to form

them “is a fundamental right.” N.L.R.B. v. Jones &

Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1. The formation of labor

unions is not only a basic federal right, but it is one which

has plain constitutional status.

The process of group formation in the public interest, of

which the organization of trade unions is perhaps the most

Vigorous example of our time, is the fulfillment of «'emoc-

racy. It is the exercise to the fullest extent of ther ui of

freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of petition

and freedom of assembly. In the formation of a labor or-

ganization the exercise of these rights are directed in an

integrated way to winning the minds of men to the accept-

ance of the idea of collective rather than individual dispo-

sition of problems arising out of the employment relation-

ship. Solicitation of members for a labor organization is

an aspect of that integrated exercise of liberties involved in

group formation. When such solicitation is undertaken

by a paid organizer, it remains an exercise of constitutional

liberty and is not suddenly converted into a commercial

transaction or an exchange of goods for money. The chal-

lenged legislation interferes with “the essential attributes

of that liberty.” Traditionally in the United States groups

forrned in the public interest have nourished and renewed

the roots of our democracy.” The processes whereby such

* See the Government’: Brief amicus curiac

* Near v. Minnesora, 283 U.S. 697, 708

'The unique contributions of voluntary associations, other than political partie

the formation and strengthening of democratic processes and institutions in the

United States has been the subject of frequent comment. On the significance of

in American iife. see Schlesinger. The Rise of the City—I1878-1898 (New

York. 1933). pp. 409-410; Bryce. The American Commonzealth (New York. 1910),

p. 294; de Tocqueville. Demacracy in Amenca (New York, 1900), pp. 114-118. On

the vital role played by voluntary groups in the foundine of the American repul

ee Van Tyne. The Causes of the War of Independence (Boston, 1922). pp. 373

374-376, 427-428 (Committees of Correspondence)

On the contributions of groups and voluntary associations in particular fields, sec

Ra € Relat

SiSis The datislavery Impulse (Mew Vork. 1933): McMaster. Mitor

16

vroups are formed should be jealously kept free of re-

straint. Compare U.S. v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S.

144, 152. This is particularly urgent where formation ot

labor organizations is involved, since such organizations

exist and function for the express purpose of exercising

constitutional rights (Brief, pp. 21-26).

Il. THE COURT'S QUESTIONS.

Question No. 1

Does the Texas Act by judicial or administrative con-

struction require a registration or license before making

the speech made by Thomas—if it had omitted the O’Sulli-

van solicitation?

At the outset it should be pointed out that the Act on its

face makes no distinction between soliciting a single indi-

vidual by name and soliciting an audience at large. Sec-

tion 5 of the Act merely states that the organizer must

the People ot the United States (New York. 1895). Vol. I, p. 21: Myrdal. f

{mencan Dilemma (New York, 1944), Vol. IL pp 810-857.

Peace Movements

Curts, fmerican Peace Crusade (Durham. N. C. 1929): Schiesinver. 7)

Rise of the City (New York, 1933). pp. 365.364,

Hinds, American Communities and Cooperat:ze Colomtes (Chicago. 1908

Noyes, History of Amepitan Socialism: (Philadelphia. 1870): Adams, «

History Cooperation st iachy or Bei es, Vol. VI, j Hopk Studies 3

Historical ard Political Science (Ba! . 1888

Women's Right

Schiesinver, WA Viry , nm American H ’ New York, 192

126-14),

Public Schools and Adult Educar

Curti. Tae Gr Imerican Thoweht (New York. 1943 ;

596-597, P Popular Feee Thought in dmer New York, 1943 x7

Land Reform and Colonization

Zahier, Eastern Workingmen and National Land Policy (New York. 1941

McMaster, of. cit., Vo! VI p. 109;

Agricultural Associations

Oberholtzer, 4 History of the United States Since the Cronl War (New Y

1926). Vol. HI. p; edie — The Pooulise Revolt (Minneapolis. 1971

Humenitarian and Related Mov

Fish. Rise of tae Common ‘V. » (New Yo 1927) mp 289.240): Sy,

The National C: Ser Retorm Lease “abt Tex. ‘192 9): Nevins. 1

Emerzence 0° Mo lern pF Rips a (New \ irk. oh ». 334: McCrea. 7

Humane Movement (New York. 1910)

17

obtain a license “before soliciting any members for his

organization.” The fact that no restrictive limitation dis-

tincuishing the speech from the solicitation is present in

the statute seems evident from Section 2(c) of the statute.

This Section defines organizer to mean “any person who

tor a pecuniary or financial consideration solicits member-

ships in a labor union or members for a labor unior.”

The sole clue which the record affords with respéct to

the administrative construction of the statute is contained

in the position of the Attorney General’s office at various

staves of the litigation. This, we believe, is of some signifi-

cance since the Attorney General is the attorney for the

administrative offices of government (R. 78; cf. Ex parte

I'exas, 315 U.S. 8). :

In the state’s petition for injunction the Attorney Gen-

eral set forth as the basis for an injunction (R. 292) :

“That the defendant is scheduled to speak at a mass

meeting to be held at the City Hall in Pelly, Harris

County, Texas, on Thursday night, September 23, 1943,

and that at said meeting the defendant will solicit mem-

berships in a labor union and members for a labor union.

. The detendant has publicly announced the inten-

tion of addressing said mass meeting and soliciting those

Present...”

“The plaintitt further shows that there is not suficient

time before defendant makes the threatened speech for

a notice to be served on him. . .” [Italics supplied. ]

in the State’s Motion for contempt, it was urged by the

Attorney General as ground for holding Appellant in con-

tempt (R. 297-298):

“At said time and place said R. J. Thomas in viola-

uion of the Court's order did openly and publicly solicit

an audience of approximately zoo persons . . . to then

and there join and become members of said Oj! Workers

~ International Union.”

. the acts of R. J. Thomas above alleged were in

18

open and Hagrant vivlation ot the order of chis court

and the writ issued pursuant thereto.

It seems clear from the above statements that the At-

torney General is of the view that the statute does in fact

require “a registration or license before making the speech

made by Thomas,” even if Thomas had omitted the O’Sul-

livan solicitation. It is fair therefore to assume that the

Secretary of State will administer the statute pursuant to

such interpretation.

Moreover, the district court so construed the statute in

issuing its injunction as to include the mass solicitation.

(R. 294, 304.) It thus described Appellant’s violation of

the injunction (R. 318):

“Thereafter the relator, who was a paid‘representa-

tive of the union, violated the terms of the injunction

by soliciting members for said union...” [Italics sup-

plied. ]

in view of the fact that the Attorney General in his Briet

submitted to the court below had stated that one of the

grounds of the contempt was the O’Sullivan solicitation, 1t

seems correct to say that this was not “a casual and uncon-

sidered use of the plural.” Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S.

4, 23.

We therefore submit that Question No. 1 must be an-

swered in the affirmative. Any suggestion that the scope

of ‘the statute is confined to the O'Sullivan solicitation finds

no ‘support in the proceedings which plainly reflect the

judgment “of the state as a whole” that the statute forbids

the speech. Cf. Rippey v. Texas, 193 U.S. 504, 509; Mis

sourt Vv. Dockery, 191 U.S. 165, 171.

Question No. 2

Did the injunction forbid the speech (apart from O’Su!!:-

van's solicitation) and is the order of contempt based in

5

19

whole or in part on such speech? If not, is the speech used

as an aggravation of the offense? If neitner, what is the

purpose and effect of its recital in the Papers and orders in

this proceeding?

‘

1. Did the injunction forbid the speech?

The petition which gave rise to the injunction alleged in

support of its issuance (R. 292) that,

“.. . defendant is scheduled to speak at a mass meeting

to be held at the City Hall in Pelly, Harris County, on

Thursday night, September 23, 1943, and that at said

meeting the detendant‘will solicit memberships in a labor

union and members for a labor union... The defend-

ant has publicly announced his intention of addressing

said mass meeting. :

The basis upon which the Attorney General went to the

trial court for an injunction was therefore clearly the

“threatened speech” which Thomas proposed to deliver.

Upon this allegation in the State’s petition the court

cranted an injunction in the following language (R. 294):

“It is therefore, Ordered, Adjudged and decreed that

R. J. Thomas be and is hereby restrained and enjoined

trom soliciting memberships in Local Union No. ‘11>

of the O.W.LU., and members for Local Union No.

1oo2 of the O.W.LU. and from soliciting members in

any other labor union affliated with the C.L.O. while

said defendant is in Texas without. first obtaining an

organizer's card as required by law.”

it seems plain that the iniunction was not contined io

the individual solicitation but included the speech. This is

clear not only from the face of the injunction but the allega-

tions of the petition:

“The writ should be construed-in the light of the alle-

Kations of the petition, the subject matter of the suit.

and the objects therein sought.” Nystel Vv. Thomas, 42

S.W. (2d) 168,172 (Tex.).

20

2. Is the order of contempt based in whole or in part on

such speech?

The answer to this question must necessarily be an

attirmative one. The petition for injunction based itse!!

upon the speech (supra, p. 19). The State’s Motion for

contempt (R. 297) alleges not only the O’Sullivan solicita-

tion but also, in a separately numbered paragraph, the

public solicitation “of an audience of approximately 300

persons .. . all employees of the Humble Oil & Refining

Company’s plant at Bay Town” as an “open and flagrant

violation of an order of” the court.

~ Evidence adduced at the contempt hearing to show Ap-

pellant’s violation of the order included a verbatim copy

of the speech, and only incidentally the direct solicitation

of O'Sullivan (R. 4-5, 279-290). While the order of con-

tempt does not specifically find the speech to be an act ot

contempt, any suggestion that the speech formed no bas's

for it can only be an afterthought, for the speech unites:

and forms the dominant content of the petition for injunc-

tion, the Motion for contempt and the evidence offered a:

the contempt hearing. See Vystel v. Thomas, supra.

Question No. 3

Assuming the speech to be immune and assuming the

words addressed to O'Sullivan to be a violation of a valid

prohibition of solicitation, what is the effect on its const:

tutional validity of including both in one injunction?

We believe that the answer to this question must be th.’

both the statute and the injunction are unconstitution«

The speech and the solicitation derive from precisely @!

same section and sentence in the statute. Since the statu’

has been authoritatively construed to restrain both (sup

pp. 16-19), the statute cannot now be redrafted to addr:

itself to a field of conduct which is narrower than tha’

21

which its authors contemplated. Nor is this an academic

consideration, for it would manifestly require a precise

' draftsmanship and a clearly articulated intent to ditferen-

tiate speech which is constitutionally protected from a so-

licitation emerging from it which ts not. Compare Jones

v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, reversing 316 U.S. 584;

Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97; Stromberg v. Call-

fornia, 283 U. S. 359, 368; Williams v. North Carolina,

317 U.S. 287, 292.

The injunction is in terms of and exhausts te statute.

They both must be given a like construction, and since the

statute is unconstitutional, the injunction is not saved be-

cause as an abstract matter it contains a restraint which

might be validly issued should the legislature deem it wise

to do so.

Moreover, whether or not the Court’s assumption (s%-

tra) leaves standing a restraint which may be fairly at-

tributable to the legislative purpose, it is plain that the

injunction itself may not now be validly confined to a non-

Federal subject matter. Since the entire proceeding em-

braced both the speech and solicitation and there 1s now

no way of knowing whether the injunction would have

issued, and indeed, whether the Attorney General would

have sought it in the first instance, if he had not assumed

that the speech were enjoinable under the Constitution, the

injunction must in its entirety be held unconstitutional.

\ny other view gives standing to the State’s afterthoughts

and countenances a serious impairment of Appellant’s con-

stitutional rights. See cases cited, supra.

Question No. 4

Assuming the injunction invalid as applied to . .e speech,

what was the duty of Thomas in respect to obedience so

’

long as it Was not set aside?

22

The circumstances under which the injunction was

issued and violated throw some light upon the propriety

of Appellant’s conduct with respect to the injunction Ap-

pellant had been invited by the Oil Workers Internationa!

Union, Local 1002, to address a meeting on the evening

of September 23, 1943, at the City of Pelly, Texas (R. 5,

279). The meeting was conducted as part of a campaign

to organize the employes of the Humble Oil Company,

located in the adjoining community of Baytown (R. 5,

279). The focus of this erganizing campaign, conducted in

the teeth of strong company resistance,’ was a proceeding

then pending before the National Labor Relations Board

for an election (R. 33-34). To further this campaign,

Appeilant accepted the invitation to speak and journeyed

from his home in Detroit, Michigan, for that purpose (R.

22-23, 33).

On September 22, shortly after Appeilant arrived at

Houston, the Attorney Genera! of Texas, upon the basis

of newspaper accounts that Appellant was scheduled to

speak at the meeting the following day, filed a complaint

in the §3rd District Court in Austin, Travis County, a dis-

tance of 167 miles from Houston, Harris County, seekinz

a temporary restraining order and temporary and perma-

nent injunction to restrain Appellant from soligting mem-

bers in any C.1.O. union without first obtaining an organ-

izers card (R. 291-294). Judge Gardner of the Travis

County District Court issued, ex parte, a temporary re-

straining order enjoining Appellant while in the State of

Texas from soliciting members in the Oil Workers Inter-

national Union or any other labor organization without

first obtaining an organizer’s card and also issued an order

that Appellant appear before him on September 25, 1943.

Sce Matter Hurftiic O48 Retimne Co, 16 NLRB 112. 1N4-1TS. 116-134

2 as! ‘ 113 | é (CASS Varser ot Hamble O Rev

Co, 48 NLRB IIS 140 F. (23) 777 (CCA. 5): Matter

Oil ff R ( NLRB. Pe, 120 7

a

23

two days after the scheduled meeting, to show cause why

a temporary injunction should not issue (R. 294~-295, 315-

317). The temporary restraining order and the order to

show cause were served on Appellant approximately five

hours prior to the scheduled meeting (R. 35).

Appellant decided to deliver his speech as planned not

only because of his conviction that both the Constitution

and the National Labor Relations Act protected his right

to make it, but also because preparations for the meeting

had already been made and the Attorney General had

taken the position that an earlier action to enjoin enforce-

ment ofthe statute was improperly brought (R. 36, 48-72,

75-78).

We believe that under these circumstances Appellant

properly refused to be muzzled (compare Lovel/ v. Griffin,

316 U.S. 452, 453; Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103,

reversing 216 U; S. 584) and that only a mechanical appli-

cation of the doctrine restricting collateral attack upon in-

junctions would place Appellant in default.” We must

remember that we are dealing with labor relations which

have a highly perishable status quo. If Appellant were re-

quired to abide by the injunction and to test his constitu-

tional rights by direct appeal, the occasion for their exer-

cise would have entirely disappeared. Compare Frank-

furter and Greene, The Labor Injunction (New York,

1930), Appendix IT.

Insofar as the Court’s question with respect to Appellant’s

duties under the injunction is directed to his status to raise

the constitutional issues involved here, it need only be

pointed out that the Supreme Court of Texas refused to hold

that Appellant had lost his right to urge the unconstitution-

alitv of the Act because he had violated an injunction.

Compare Cooper Company v. Los Anzeles Building Trades

Tt e rigid 4t . 9 a Wise » ° . field. ec Os

Attacks Upon Labor Injunctions,” 47 Yale L, J. 113

24

Council, et al, 1§ Labor Relations Reporter 46, decided

August 21, 1944 (Cal. Sup. Ct.) Although the Attorney

Genera! urged upon that court that Appellant’s contuma-

ciousness deprived him of standing to raise the constitu-

tionai question if a Motion to dismiss the application for

writ of habeas corpus, the court overruled such Motion.

Since restrictions upon collateral attacks upon injunction:

as applied to judgments of courts in the same judicial sys-

tem reflect a pragmatic local view of the needs of an order!y

system of administering justice, we submit that the jud2-

ment of the Supreme Court of Texas in this respect should

be followed. Since that court did not think that Appe!-

lant was disabled to raise the constitutional question in-

volved in this proceeding, we need not consider the conse-

quences of his contumaciousness under other circum-

stances. See Yakus v. United States, 64 8. Ct. 660.

Question No. 6

Assuming that petitioner had a constitutional right t

make a general argument and solicitation to the entire as-

sembly of. workers, should the State punish him in a single

penalty because he picked out one member of the assemb!\

and addressed a solicitation to him by name?

This question has already been fully treated (supra

pp. 4-16). It is suthcient to repeat here that constitutiona’

rights to free ypeech cannot be made to turn upon whethe:

the hearer 1s addressed by name or the number of hearer: }

addressed.

the Mor a ind the Order everruline the Met

25

CONCLUSION

The organizer, made familiar by years of horrendous

propaganda as the “outside agitator,” has in the past been

a favored target of the lawless state. Access to the minds

ot ernployes has been, frequently and in many areas, de-

nied him or granted by the state upon such terms as to.

make it valueless. The process of keeping alive and ex-°

panding such access is one which functions through the -

constitutional guarantees. Few groups have suffered the

invasion of such guarantees more consistently than trade

union organizers.

The challenged legislation is not an isolated phenome-

non. Itis a part of a body of legislation, greatly influenced

by wartime emotions, which seeks to revive in new forms

the historic attacks upon organizers and trade unions, to

burden and cripple the constitutional mechanisms of ac-

cess.”

Appellant’s objection to the challenged legislation is

neither formal nor abstract. The statute, while clothed in

the ill-fitting garb of an occupational registration to pre-

vent fraud (compare Pollock v. Willams, 332 U.S. 4),

virtually suppresses a right. This is so both because it

destroys anonymity, which is vital to its exercise, and

enmeshes it with a-delay fatal to its effectiveness. These

are grave social and constitutional consequences not merely

in the negative sense that a section of the market place of

ideas has been blacked out, but also in the positive sense

"See. for example. Hague v. CI.O., 307 U. S. 496: Anderson v. United State

IS U.S. 350: Bridges v. Calttorma, 314 U. §. 252: cf. Mooney v. Holohan, 294

S. 103: see also, the cases and materials cited in our Brief in No. 569, at p. 47

od Baldwin and Randall Crod Liberties end Industrial Contict (Cambridve. 1938)

\s the materials cited in our Brief in No». 569 indicate. organizers in Texas experience

nusual difhoulties in their efforts to maintain access to the industrial populat

The campaten of terror axainst the organizers and leaders of the O:! Workers Int

nal Union attamed such proportions in that State that the Union wa

celled to obtain an injunction on February 25. 1942, restraining the Chief of P

ef the Citv of Port Arthur and his subordinates from inter alia, “illegaliv arrests

26

that Congress has stated that the spread of such ideas

should be fostered. Finally, by its grave injury to the right

of organizers to speak, the challenged legislation sterilizes

other civil rights which are exercised in the formation and

functioning of labor organizations.”

Respectfully submitted,

Lee PressMAN,

Martin RAPHAEL,

Washington, D. C.

I-RNEST GoopMAN,

Detroit, Michigan.

ArtrHuR MANDELL,

Herman WRIGHT,

Houston, Texas.

September, 1944. Attorneys for Appellant.

The rece ca statutes a rdinances purporting to regulate labor ur

seems bye t ; amentally ant ion | Pose The Ca

Jateely riginated in areaa where labor unions are weak and ir potent or where t

reanized anti-unionismm of powerful employer groups has captured contr eve

Cxisiative ma hinery Ser ) id. D>. ¢2... uprd. ar d (Ciwens 4 Stu dy Re ere

Labor Legislation, 38 I). I v 309 (1944 In a recent report, the Senate Com-

ttee on Education and Labo- (S. Rep. 398, part 3, 78th Cong: 2nd Sess., p. 1694

varned Na

\ r exulatory measures anu and } be ex ‘ ‘

ec iberate care! y make sure tha t er ree tir

it tere ‘ Teanizec anti-unionism ts not loisting uj Cxisiat I ‘

estroy e the richts abor that are ft amet. t a € t ni

We t gutsh between reculat in the pul interest and im ¢ nior

infi-union emp a4 uu i! tence W re ¢ 7? pu aware

© x eed d ne of snti-union « ve who ct back

t this tvpe . law

It ur further ¢ i tia if ini eCMmpicve er Ww €

ears, refuse to acces ally the principle indust len acy 1\ ‘

“ ci uC eck to ackle the nehts al thr wh ¥ it

re ate abs m activ cs the } abl: tere l 4 } 1 but ‘ ai ta

for-these-who feel consteained by a-national law that é from coe by «

€ he right f emp.oyees to organize a burgat tive »

great Tia tor c rigi s of iabx ry and rial t i

The past Ce C as witnessed the march of r tvra .

| « H variab! companiment as bee € by we

cre tia ta alike to replace free trace “ ¢

abor f t t | State edict the right abor the ex

fr ¢ i AN arying patte those v \ L esita g t

( fra fta 1 res atior ice k

t r

As this case is being considered a new wave of identically-worded ordinar

eared in widely separated cities and towns furporting ¢t license and rex

‘ rérs t ; desiened to halt organization entirely. See. for exar

Ordinance of City of Newnan, Georgia (1944); Ordinance of Cits of ythev:

Arkansas 1944 fJrdinancer ¢ City f Athens Tenne SEC ] 944) Jeger +>