Brief for the National Labor Relations Board — National Labor Relations Board v. White Swan Co.

Supreme Court brief1941

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INDEX :

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PD MOT 36 cncesdssconaarddb ves aaweseéawnhaawaeow aire .

PN coo nccliccundehnecesacusiecs 4acnaunaswek ESPs 1

Dn SOeeeee GOUUNOE . eco cena ccc sck des nccdcobnascckocetusee 2

| Statute involved..........-..-------------+-----+2-6----- 2

BE INR cians ne cud neccoucsessogheeesessens in gota ein AS

Summary of argument--_----.- joensen eee ecenne pa wbedwouds 5

Argument:

I. By reason of its collection, servicing and delivery of

eS garments which pass to and from its plant in interstate

ia commerce, the company is substantially engaged in

¥ such commerce and is, therefore, subject to the Act-- 8

94 II. If the questions certified are not answered in the affirma-

i: tive, the certificate should be dismissed without an-

ewer to the questions... .--. ....:.2.522252 Hl. eee 20

——-Gonclusion== === <<5es ewe wee bec ee nn deena 26

BEGOUEER Beccaccccnntvcccdbchencsqonvousstlaahubossaee 27

MONEE Tha 6nd nhac dndisncndga cong eoenseduskuaaeeaee . 29

CITATIONS

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Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. 8. 470__......-------- 10

Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,

BOG Ws Ms BOT vn kcevedbdvevandanssennbncscarinaededde 5,9

4 Consumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board,

ee: $19: F. (Od). FIO oss So asti acd ew dee ieee del ee 23

Be Ellis v. Inman, Poulsen & ‘Co., 181 Fed. 182__.-------.-- 20

ce Fehr Baking Co. v. Bakers Union, 20 F. Supp. 003 0652522 20°

Graver v. Faurot, 162 U. 8. 435.....-.--./-.------.2---- 21

Hertz v- Weeduian, S18- GU. BMG oo eee wa 21,

Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. 8. 457... _-- 10

In the Matter of Steubenville, etc. vere Co., 64 I. C. C.,

"Sil accguccussammstncanpisccauapsancetaspacpheunen 21

In the Matter of The City of Bristol ¥ v. Virginian Railway Co. 2

BB Ts SX Ge aicebasvcsvioscccuvesnecunusabeuceke 21

Jewel-La Salle Realty Co. v. Buck, 283 U. 8. 202. ........ 21

Kansas City Western Rail 0. v. McAdow, 240 U.8. 51. 20

Lawden v. N. W. National Bank, 298 U..8. 160... ---- pee 21

National Labor Relations Board v. A. S. Abell Co., 97 F.

(2d) Gh cv cidccvacksdecaontadsanwae ; pte «---<- 23 t

293399—41——1 Mrh Rey > PF yp ys

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II

Cases—Continued. ‘fei Page

National Labor Relations Board v. Bradford Dyéing Ass'n,

SI MP ote na odimawsbunitpapanbamian wenn 6,9

‘ Rr National Labor Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U. 8.

= tection tecenddenace apenitinge 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 24

. Nationai Labor Relations Board v. Hopwood Retinning Co.,

2 a eed Sata Sp ceusdaboccescncéecesecoesces 10

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel

CE ey Biss. ebb oseeccoccesobetenaces 5, 6, 9, 16, 23

a Nat#onal Labor Relations Board v. National New York 3

“ \ Packing & Shipping Co., Inc., 96 F. (@d) @B..........- 10

Nee National Labor Relations Board v. Newport News Ship-

: ° building & Dry Dock Co., 308 U. 8. 241, modifying and

alles eg, 108 D. GB C8 ...n<.ccccccqeooocecosyeees 23

National Labor Relctions Board v. Norfolk Shipbuilding & rae!

Dry Dock Corp., 109 F. (2d) 128................-..--

# National Labor Relations Board v. Sunshine Mining Co.,

ot . 110 F.-(2d) 780, certiorari denied, January 13, 1941,

Sh Ss GE I dabcq~aivenccopucoedeveseedsbaccnc 23

Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor Relations

RATER ole 5, 6, 9, 16

Balan Tie Bie Gs Bt Go ivciccncecccccucencncesnee 7, 21

Bochits & faiead Co. @, Uaed Bates 241 U. 8. 344. 20°

Southern Colorado Power Co. v. National Labor Relations

+ RY Os eo lilo d. alin oretdd mt ciamenadawets 23 4

United States y. Sorrelle, 287 U. 8. 435........-...------ 6

United States v. Worley, 281 U. 8. 389__..........-.---. 21

Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. National Labor Relations

Be is Ee Eee dbdtcdbcacdcbnewnasdenpanena 23

Wilshire Oil-Co vy Ine. v. United States, 295 U. 8. 100...._- 21

Statutes: "

Fair Labor Standards Act of 1933, c. 676, 52 Stat. 1060,

e af <P op Sao ei maces hala

Se Se in indctesoucectnwedccdboscnatenctan 20

—_ National Labor Relations Act, c. "372, 49 Stat. 449, 29

: U. 8. C., Supp. V, Sec. 151, et seg.: ‘

SOI ash dilicll cxiytnleecnipsibidtibinabinnaiibepihdiipainminecna sion oeeoine 29

TES EM Re ANE SCALE PI POAT SO il 29

IRN hadi lasik acta hie dilcenlb dca tmepiahcalimnadistialidiaiin 29

Miscellaneous: r

Annual Report to the Securities & Exchange Commission of

P * Consolidal@f’ Laundries Corporation, April 27, 1940... -.. 18

Cincinnati Enquirer, September 30, 1937, December 27, .

- Se iiakdikkdeltkénatddiimiemundcitmadabiicdokdewssenl 19

Cincinnati Post, Kentucky Edition, September 28 and 29,

‘ Pi bisdé inipacpandviidetadtbadigecciacnshinednoen 19

Documentary \ History, Amsigouated Clothing Workers of

; America: 1936-1938; 1988-1940..............-..---- 19

(meager: ’ History of an Indusiry, in Laundry Age, June 1939_...---- 17

%

1 .

U. 8. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

Census of Manufactures: 1931, Power Laundries, Dry

-~ Cleaning, and Redyeing Establishments (1933)_..........

U. 8. Department of Labor, Women’s Bureau, A Survey of

Laundries and their Women Workers in 23 Cities, Bull.

BO. Oe Ce tcctidscitsisclbotsicieavekiaewed a i

U. 8. rtment of mn Women’s Dasema, Factors

Affecting Wages in Power Laundries, Bulletin No. 143

Gp scmncuivetivowans oubersiccaddbies SC uiibianinn Setents

19,

Miscellaneous—Continued. Page

House Report No. 1147, 74th Cong., Ist Sess......2...-- 14

I a al il 17, 18

Laundry Age Yearbook, 1938---- -- DE AE Rar EA ee ae eae 18

Laundry Workers International Union in Convention, Den-

ver, Colatado, May 15, 1939__._._.-------.-.-...-.--

" New York Times; September 15, 1937_.......----------- 20

New York World-Telegram, September 13 and‘ 14, 1937-... °20

Report of the Executive Council of the American Pederation

of Labor to the Siztieth Annual Convention, November 18, P

3060........ EOLA RPL IO LY Sano se REE Set AE IE aI ae 19

Senate Report No. 573, 74th Cong., Ist Sess._....._____- 13, 14

The Power Laundry is a _— Industry, in Laundry Age,

BE Fe dh titinicinthitivn tile Disitpihicmtasucinaok baad bomen

United Front Stops Strikes, ia Scala pone January 1938_. 18

U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review,

January and February 1938................-.--.-.... ‘19

U. 8. Department.of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

Biennial Census: 1935, Power Laundries (1937)... -.-- 16, 17

U. 8. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,

Biennial Ce@sus: 1935, Cleaning and Dyeing Establish-

ments, Rug Cleaning Establishments (1937) ....,.....-. 17

U.8. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Cen-

sus of Business, 1935, Service Establishments (1937), Vol. II. 17

U. 8S. Department of Commerce, Buregu of the Census,

Fifteenth Census of the United States, Metropolitan Dis-

trict, Population, and Area, 1932.........-.-...------ 17

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AN

nthe Suprime aurtofthe Waited States

OctToBER TERM, 1940

: No. 529

NATIONAL sper RELATIONS BoarRpD

y.@

Waite Swan CoMPANY |

ON CERTIFICATE FROM THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT

COURT, OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES

_ OPINION BELOW »

The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

order of the National Labor Relations Board are |

not yet reported in permanent form; they. are

presently available in advance sheet form (19...

N. L. R. B., No. 12) and are reproduced. in Appen-

dix A, me} pp. 27-28. 3 ts

| JURISDICTION «= : ea

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The certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals’ _ a le

was filed in this Court on October 28, 1940. The

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POSSE SP PLES Gy PME F BMNE PP COR GYR PITT BID i PI cy A roe aR co

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jurisdiction of this Court rests upon -Section wf

of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act o

| February:13, 1925.

QUESTIONS CERTIFIED.

aiet © Should the National Labor Relations Act be _

interpreted as having application to a business

of purely local character, such as a laundry, merely

“ _+ because such business is located in a eity on a

state. line and derives a substantial portion of its

_Incoine from business which involves collections or

deliveries of articles in a state other than‘that |

in which the business is located ?”’

__ “2. Where a local business, such as a laundry, is

— located in a city on a state line, and is riot en-

gaged in interstate commerce, except insofar as it

may collect articles to be serviced and may make

deliveries to customers living a¢ross the state line,

is such byginess, by reason of such collections and

deliveries, deemed engaged in ‘commerce’ within

the meaning of Subsection 6 of Section 2 of the

Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 29 U. 8. & A. 152

(6), so that an unfair labor practice on its part

. would be an unfair labor practice ‘affecting com-

merce’ within the ‘meaning of Subsection 7 of

said-section (29 U.S. C. A. 152 (7)) and Sub-

section dig of Section 10, +9 U.S. C..A. 160 (a) ?”

\ STATUTE INVOLVED

The pertinent provisions®f the National Labou

‘Relations. Act are set forth in — B, ie.

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- | STATEMENT. '

The National is Relations Board petitioned |

the court below for enforcement of an order |

against the White Swan Company, a West Vir-

ginia corporation, to cease and desist from. cer- : .

tain unfair labor },ractices and to offer reinstate- ,

ment with back pay to certain, employees found —

to have been discharged for union activity. The

court below states in its certificate (p. 1) that the _

findings of the Board with respect to the unfair :

labor practices and discriminatory discharges are. |

sustained by s stantial evidence, and expresses . rofe _

doubt only as to the jurisdiction of thé Board. |

The facts set forth in the certificate (pp. 1-2) may

be summarized as #llows:

The Company operates a combined laundry and

dry cleaning establishment in the city of Wheel- | |

ing, West Virginia. It collects and delivers gar-

ments for its customers, and in this connection

maintains a fleet of delivery trucks. Three‘of the

delivery. routes from its plant are m Ohio, the 3

remaining eleven being in West Virginia. A ra-

dius of fifteen miles is the practical limit for a

laundry or dry cleaning business in this territory.

Approximately 18/percent of the Company’s

1938 gross income Was derived irom the servicing |

of garments for customers residing in Ohio: about

12.93 percent with respect to garments trans- de

ported’ to ‘and from ‘the Company’s plant in its a8,

"own trucks, and shout. 5 percent with respect to He ||

ara Re scatter!

garments which persons not in its employ collected

in Ohio, brought to its plant for servicing and then

delivered in .Ohio. (hus, the Company’s 1938 .

- gross.income was $128,792.96, of which $23,088.43 *

was attributable to its Optic business.

In the operation of its plant, the Company uses

various supplies, consisting of soap, bluing, bleach,

solvent, coal, water, paper, tape, and padding.

During 1938, it expended $38,333.15 for such sup-

plies, of which $10,810.90 was allocable to: sup-

plies obtained from without West Virginia. _

The court below states that the Company’s pur-

chase of supplies from without the state is not

sufficient to gonfer jurisdiction upon the Board

(p. 1). But |

it recognizes that the collection and -

delivery of garment@ across state lines does con-.-

stitute interstate commerce,and it seeks the in- °

struction of this_Court only upon whether Con-

gress intended the Board to have jurisdiction with

respect to such interstate commerce, which it de-

scribes as “‘local’’ in character .

Upon certification, the Solicitor General filed a

motion in the court below, asking that the certifi-

cate be amended.- He pointed out that the Board,

in its findings (pp. 27-28, infra), had rested its ju-

risdiction ypon the out-of-state purchases as we

as upon the Company’s activities with respect to

its Ohio customers, and contended that it was inap-

1The certificate inadvertently ‘states the amount to be

$28,088.43 (p. #,

=

—

propriate for the court to segregate the constituent

elements supporting the Board’ s jurisdiction. He

therefore requested the court below to amend, its

certificate, so as to place before this Court the en-

tire basis upon which the Board rested its juris-

diction (see note 13, p. 24, infra). The court de-

. nied the motion, but at the same time reaffirmed its

previous conclusion that the Company’s income

from collections and deliveries beyond the state is

‘“substantial’’ and stated that-it merely wished to

be instructed as to whether jurisdiction can be sup-

ported by such activities (Certificate, pp. 5-6).”

SUMMARY 0F ARGUMENT

\ =

I

The Company is directly and ‘substantially en-

gaged in interstate commerce by reason of its col-

‘lection, servicing, and delivery of garments which

pass to and from i its plant in such commerce? The

Circuit Court of “Appeals Aid not doubt, and it is

clear, that the Act may be constitutionally applied

to the Company. National Labor Relations Board

v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 341 U. S. 1;

Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. Vv. wakes Labor

Relations Board, 303 U. S. 453; Consolidated Edi-

- son Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 305

U.S. 197; National Labor Relations Board v. Fain-

2The order of the court denying amendment_of the

~ eertificate has been printed and is annexed to the certificate

(pp. 5-6).

293299—41——2,

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blatt, 306 U. S. 601; National Labor Relations

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Board v. Bradford Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U. S. 318.

The only question raised is whether the Act should

be limited in application to less than its apparent

and permissible scope for the supposed reason that

Congress did not intend it to apply to a business

described by the court as “purely local’’ in nature.

United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S. 435, 446. But

the Act on its face evidences a legislative purpose

to exercise the full power of Congress under the

commerce clause. Fainblatt.case, supra: The leg- ©

islative history confirms this intent. And there is

no basis for an inference that Congress intended

to exclude from the Act substantial interstate com- .

merce merely because it is carried on within a lim-

ite! area. | P

.The fear expressed by the court below, that if

the Board’s jurisdiction is sustained in this case,

the Act may be applied to many ‘“‘businesses of

purely local character,’ is groundless. The

Board does_not-apply the Act to entire industries

but to partictlgr employers. Each case must be

determined as it\arises. Jones & Laughlin case,

supra; Santa Cruz case, supra. ,

Nor is the Company’s business ‘‘purely local.’’

The Company is directly engaged ‘in interstate .

commerce. The fact that it constitutes a unit of

the power laundry and cleaning and dyeing busi-

ness does not lend it ‘‘local character’’ for .pur- .

poses of the National Labor Relations Act:, That

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a industry, presumably, oceasions large amounts of .

commerce among the several States, which com-

merce is subject to disruption by industrial strife.

There is 2 indication that Congress intended to.

exclude that commerce from the protection af-

se aan interstate commerce generally. -

IT

Because of the unusual posture of this case, if ©

the questions certified are not answered in the

affirmative, the certificate should be dismissed

without answer to the questions. The questions

certified “are not raised by the case made

* * #99 Seim v. Hurd, 232 U.' 8. 420, 427.

The Board based its jurisdiction upon, the aggre-

gate effect of unfair labor practices upon (a) the

commerce involved in the Company’s receipt of

materials and supplies and (b) the “commerce. in-

volved in the Company’s collection, servicing, and

delivery of garments. The questions certified con-

fine this Court’s consideration to the effect upon

the second type of commerce alone. _ :

- The Cireuit Courts of Appeals have uniformly

held that the threat of obstruction to incoming

commerce supports the Board’s jurisdiction. And

the volume of such commerce in this case far

exceeds ‘‘that tv which courts would apply the ~

maxim de minimis.’ Fainblatt case, supra. More-

over the’application of the Act should depend upon

whether the aggregate effect of an industrial dis-

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‘pute upon all the interstate commerce in which

the Company is engaged would be_ substantial. .

That is the basis upon whieh the Board considered

and disposed of the question. The Circuit Court |

of Appeals should not be permitted to require

consideration of the-issue by this Court upon a

different basis from that upon which the Act was

applied by the administrative agency. Pi)

An affirmative answer to the questions certified —

wij] be appropriate, procedurally, since. such, an

answer would dispose of the entire controversy. ©

But a negative answer would not be appropriate

since it would leave open the question presented

concerning the application of the Act. ‘

ARGUMENT

I

BY REASON OF ITS COLLECTION, SERVICING AND DELIv-

ERY OF GARMENTS WHICH PASS TO AND FROM ITS

PLANT IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, THE COMPANY IS

. SUBSTANTIALLY ENGAGED, IN SUCH COMMERCE AND

18, THEREFORE, SUBJECT TO THE ACT

About 18 per cent of the Company’s gross reve-

nue, or some $24,000 per year, i¢ derived from |

servicing operations perfotmed upon garments

which-are hrought to its piant in interstate com-

merce and which, after being serviced, are rede-

livered in such commerce to the owners. More

- than two-thirds of the continuous interstate trans-

portation which this business involves is accom-

- tors who collect the articles in Ohio, bring them

to the plant in West Virginia, and later redeliver

them in Ohio. This substantial flow of interstate

commerce to and from the Company’s plant is

occasioned only by the plant’s existence and will

continue only while its operations do.

The court below correctly recognized that’ “‘the

collection and delivery of garments. across state .

lines, as above desdribed, constitutes interstate

commerce’? (p. 2). And it noted further that

such interstate business in this case’ is: “‘substan-

tial’? in amount (pp. 3, 5). It suggests not ‘the

slightest doubt that»Congress has power t@ confer

jurisdiction upon the Board in these circumstances.

Nor could any such doubt be entertained, since *

the stoppage of the Company’s operations through

industrial strife would result in the interruption

of a ‘“‘substantial’’ amount of interstate com-

merce, which: Congress may undertake to protect

* by removing the threat of such interruption at.

the outset. N ational Labor Relations Board v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel ‘Corp. ., 301. U. 8. 1, 41-43;

Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 303 U. 8. 453, 464-465; Con-

solidated Edison‘ Co. v. National Labor Relations —

Board, 305 U. S. 197, 221-222 ; National Labor

Relations Board v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 604—

605 ; National Labor Relations Board v. Bradford,

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mainder is carried on by independent route opera- .

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Dyeing Ass’n, 310 U: 8. 318, 326." And since the

volume. of the Company’s commerce is, as the.

~ eourt below conceded, “‘substaritial,”’ it is plainly

“more than that to which courts would apply

the maxim de minimis.’’ Fainblatt cage, supra,

p. 607. } | era ial

‘ Thus, this case reduces itself to a narrow com-

pass. No quegtion is here presented as. to the

scope of Congressional power under the commerce ~

clause. The sole question is as to whether €on-

gress has exercised that-power so as to give the

Board jurisdiction, i. e., whether, as a matter of

statutory construction, Congress-intended the Na-

tional Labor Relations Act to apply in ‘the -°

situation here presented. The court below

recognizes that (p. 2) ‘‘the letter of the

National Labor Relations Act’ may, vover such

collections and deliveries*in interstate commerce

as are here involved,’ but nevertheless queries “

whether the Act sliould not be construed to ex- ..

clude such interstate commerce. It refers to

United States v. Sorrells, 287 U.S; 435, 446, which

suggests the propriety of: judicial relaxation of

the literal application of a statute ‘where such an

application would plainly run counter to the

legislative purpose. Cf. Holy Trinity Church v.

United States, 143 U. S. 457; but ef. Ciminetti v.

“'§ See also, National Labor Relations Board v. ooh B

Retinning Co., Inc., 98 F. (2d) 97 (C. C. A. 2d) ; National

Labor lations Board v. National New York Packing &

Shipping Co., Inc., 86 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 2d).

: 3.

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United States, 242 U. 8. 470. By describing the

business here involved as “‘local,” the court seems

to indicate that there ma be room for judicial con-

struction, eliminating from the scope of the Act

that which is literally covered thereby and which

is plainly within the géompetence of Congress.

We respectfully submit that not only is there

no occasion to go behind the plain language of the

statute, as was done in such exceptional situations

as the Sorrells case, but that even if such an exam-

ination be pressed, it will conclusively appear that

the- -intention of Congress accords with the lan-

guage employed. <

The broad’sweep of the provisions in Section

_ 2 (6) and (7) of the Act (infra, p. 29), indi-

eates a Congressio

to all interstate’ commerce.

whatever for supposing that

withhold such protection from inte

of a substantial nature merely becauNe it is con-

ducted within a limited geographical ‘area. In-

deed, the commerce here under review, involving

as it does continuous movement across the state

line, is interstate commerce.in its primary and

most elementary sense, and it therefore seems im-

possible to believe that Congress intended to ex-

clude such activities from the Act without mak-

ing its purpose explicit. As this Court has held

in the Fainblatt case (306 U.S. at 607), “the Act

on its face *. * * evidences the intention of

te commerce

°

e to-afford protection

—o

12 +

Congress to exercise whatever power is constitu-

tionally given to it to regulate commerce * * *.”’

'. + Even were the question of legislative intent still

open, however, there is no color of -aythority or

-reasc 1 for an inference that Congress intended to

exclude from frotection against the injurious ef-

fects of industrial strife interstate commerce of a

_ substantial nature merely because it: is carried on

within a restricted area, a factor which does not

diminish the national interest in the uniobstructed. -

flow of such commerce. It is clear that Congress

sought to relieve all interstate commerce of the

burdens caused by labor disputes, not merely por-

tions thereof selected. without reference to any just

conception of the national interest. Unléss the

limited geographic aspect of the business yenders

the Company’s commerce unsubstantial or de-

prives it entirely of the nature of interstate com-

merce, which it plainly and concededly does not in

this case, there can be no doubt of the legislative

intent. ¥ ae

Further, it is apparent tat an enterprise whose

interstate operations are carried qn within a rela- .

tively,small area, may never engaged in,

or cause others to conduct, inte e commerce

which far exceeds, by every standard, the materials -

and products crossing state lines to or from a

manufacturing or processing plant of the type to

which this Court has held the Act applicable. The

interpretation which the Circuit Court of Ap--

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— RE Wiraadeeeties . - RS EGE IS PONS Roe REELS a? Paihia Re CELI si MND DNS PLES EADS ees

| ee oe | |

peals suggests, iatistoit: Aocnbiicin an inference Vee

that Congress intended to protect commerce from

the lesser burden but not from the ‘greater, to

grant this Company immunity from the Act while —

subjecting to it smaller businessés engaged to a

lesser extent in interstate commerce.

a plain that the general aie

sional pufpose is in accord with the .braad lan-

guage of the statute, and in view of the unambig-

uous declaration in the Fainblatt ease as to the

scope of the matte, it would seem that a more de-

tailed inquirf into the legislative intent, should be

foreclosed. But even if the legislative history be

explored, it will be found’ to confirm the result ¥

rather than to cast doubt ppon it.

The reports of both the Senate and House com-

mittees which considered the bill that ultimately —

becamexthe National Labor Relations Act, shed.

considerable light upon the intent of. Congress.

They disclose with ‘unmistakable clarity that the

Act was intended to afford protection to all com- ; |

merce within the ambit of congressional power. a van. :

The Senate committee unambiguously states (S.

_ Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 18): »

Cases under the antitrust laws, cited for

the proposition that the Federal Govern-.

‘ mant eannot deal with the employer-em-

ployee relationship, are not in point. They

turned not on any question of constitutional

limitations, but upon statutory construction

of the ‘extent of equity jurisdiction over [

293398—41——-3

‘ . Sa.

BSR rad PO ASSES Be Sr 4

é ‘ :

° \ y

Sor ‘ ; : =

14-

labor activities under the antitrust laws.

But the Federal Government. has power to

prevent burdens upon interstate commerce

that reach beyond the intent of those laws ©

in regard to labor disputes, and it is in-

tended in this bill to exercise the full con-

stitutional power of Congress to prevent

the described unfair labor, practices, which

have no extenuating social values operating *

in their favor. [ Italics supplied. ]

Again, at p. 19 of the same report, the committee ©

declares: | | :

While this bill of course does not intend to

go beyond the constitutional power of Con- .

gress, as that power may be marked out by

the courts, it seeks the full limit of that

power in preventing these unfair labor

practices. Ye Sia

-The House committee similarly made it clear

it understood the scope of the Act to be coexten-

sive with the power of Congress under the Consti-

‘tution (H. Rep. No. 1147, 74th Cong., lat ee,

p. 7):

‘These’ prohibitions, and the substantive

rights, are made applicable, to the extent of

Congress’ power under the commerce clause,

to employers and employees irrespective of

whether the mdustry in question is subject

to a code of fair competition.

In these circumstances, it would seem idle to

eontend that an exception should be-grafted upon

the plain language of the statute which is rich in

«

o DG LPR ALTO LORS. IEEE OPER IS LIN, NTE TE i te IR EA OR ET I RS ONT IR Rte

te

15_

legislative history showing that such an exception

was not intended. We therefore respectfully sub-

mit that the cohclusion reached by. this Court imthe

Fainblatt ease as to scope of the Act calls for no

limitation and should be followed here.

In the certificate the court states that the ques-

tions certified concern a ‘‘business of a local

character, ‘stich as a laundry” and expresses the ~

fear that an affirmative answer to the questions

will:result in application of the Act to ‘‘a great

variety of businesses of purely local character

* * #9 (py, 2). This approach, we believe, re-

veals a fundamental misapprehension concerning

Pe. . ga of the issue presented. The question

showid not be viewed as if it arose from or in-

_ volved application of the Act to an entire indus-

try or to all businesses of a particular type. In

each case the Board applies the Act to a partic-

ular enterprise and the question before the court

is whether the relation between that enterprise —

‘ and interstate commerce is such as to support °

the Board’s jurisdiction. The business of an_

employer who is directly and substagtially en-

gaged in interstate commerce may not be de-

scribed as a ‘‘purely local’’ business, and there

is noesound basis for an apprehension that sus-

taining the Board’s jurisdiction over his enter-

-prise will bring within the compass of the Act

other employers who are engaged in the game

industry or similar industries: but whose busi-

* .

Pea siete CISL USE Eee Lee FUERTE ET TE cee TEA TE ne A CS Cea ete aa crea stacare iia Ga Di. ’

es Te eT te ee ONE ins

ar ey

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- - ‘x ’ ~ /

a OS Serge aE SRY FE RUA GEN Ne aA BO PaaeaS ‘ REET YET OLE IONE toy RE a nie

ds Ja cae |

ee i

. Messes are in truth Pa BaNS ‘local?’ ‘The requisite '

“close and intimate” relation to commerce “is

left by the statute to be determined as individual

cases arise.” National Labor Relations Board v.

Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. ., 301: U. S. 1, 32.

The process of decision ‘‘in maintaining the bal-

; ance of the constitutional grants and limitations”

6 | ~ th is necessarily a ‘‘eradual Se of inclusion and

exclusion.”” Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. Na-

tional Labor Relations Board, 303 U. S. 453, 467.

“And what is reasonably clear in a particular

application is not to be overborne by the simple

and familiar dialectic of suggesting doubtful and

Beso extreme cases” (tbid.). .

: ~~ But even if the industry as a whole be examined, -

it will appear that it gives rise to-a_substantial

amount of interstate commeree and that neither the

industry as a whole nor the business of this Com-

pany can be characterized as “‘purely local,’’ as was

done by the court below. - The familiar hand laundry

~ of former years has been largely replaced by estab-

lishments of considerable magnitude engaged in

power laundering and the cleaning and dyeing of

garments.‘ While we have found no available sta-

_ tistics concerning the amount of commerce to which

these large servicing units give rise, some indica-

* During the year 1929 about 6,800 “power” laundries fur-

nished employment to more than 233,000 employees and:

received a gross income in excess of $541,000,000, while’

over 5,000 cleaning and dyeing ectablishments employed

: some 60,000 persons and had receipts totaling over $201,-

000,000. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census;

Biennial Census: 1935, Power Laundries (1937), p. 4, and

<

nD, A? Re Lor eat es ey ine ee ae SOR, sng onan t yor es ct

Sy ee pee SSS OS SO SFE SRE ae

aN Fete Son ae ne Roe? roe

iz

17, ae

’ _s ee

tion is afforded by the fact that duripg 1935, some

*y ,267 power laundries doing a business in excess of

$128,000,000 operated in 23 metropolitan areas in

the United States which comprise territéry in moré

than one state.° Presumably, the amount of in-

Cleaning and Dyeing Establishments, Rug Cleaning Estab-

-lishments (1937), p. 3. These figures concern only establish-

_ ments doing a gross business in excess of $5,000 per year.

They also exclude the considerable number of such estab-

“lishments which failed to file reports with the Bureau of

the Census. “According to the Department of Commerce,

the laundry industry in 1935 ranked sixth in total number

of workers and thirty-first in sales volume wlien compared

with 300 other industries included in the census survey.”

The Power Lg@mdry is a Major Industry, in Laundry Age

(April )y P. 54.

The iftividual units of the industry are large, the aver- -

age receipts per unit being almost $80,000 in 1929 and 1,485-

. establishments reporting receipts in excess of $100,000 dur-

ing that year. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau cf

the Census, Census of Manufactures: 1931, Power Laun-

dries, Drycleaning and Redyeing Establishments (1933),

p. 9. During 1935, the receipts of 983 establishmer‘s totalled °

$203,000,000 and the 6,470 power laundries which reported

did a gross business of $369,452,459 as compared with the

$42,073,000 business done by 16,826 hand laundries. U.S.

Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Biennial

Census: 1935, Power Laundries (1937), pp. 4, 12, and\Cen-

sus of Business, 1935, Service. Establishments (1937), vol.

II, p. 1. The increase in the amount of capital required

for an efficient plant, has led to consolidations and the

establishment of large chains, increasing the size of the av-

erage unit. U.S. Department of Labor, Women’s Bureau,

“A Survey of Laundries and Their Women Workers in 23

Cities,” Bulletin No, 78 (1930), pp. 3-4; History of an

Industry, in Laundry Age (June 1989), pp. 6-7.

'U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Biennial

Census :_1935, Power Laundries (1937), pp. 7-9; see U. S.

Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census), Fifteenth

Census of the United States, Metropolitan Districts, Popu- '

i ia

¢ ad We t

*-.

. ; , /

" e . :

REE LIS A NPN LEY OILS OLY OOS AID AE EE RSE EE, NES OOS OETA ot HITE

. .

. : e

oe :

18

terstate commerce so occasioned is great, and by

reason of the nature of the business constitutes

a regular and continuous flow of commerce among

the states. A negative answer to ‘he questions

- herein would remove from the scope of the Act

this considerable amount of interstate commerce,

with respect to which Congress undoubtedly had

power to legislate.

Extensively organized on both the employers’

and employees’ side into nation-wide associations °

and trade unions,’ the laundry and dry cleaning

industry has a long history of frequen} and bit-

~~ lation and Area, 1932, passim. These multi-sttte metro-

politan areas constitute more than one-fourth of all the

metropolitan areas in the United S as defined by the

Bureau of Census (ibid.). In the New York area one of

the largest laundry and dry-cleaning establishments serves

customers in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey

within its 35-mile service area. Annual Report to Securities

and Exchange Commission of Consolidated Laundries Cor-

poration, April 27, 1940.

* 2,300 power laundries in the United States and Canada,

handling 80 percent, of the industry’s entire volume, are

members of The American Institute of Laundering (Zaun-

dry Age, October 1939, p. 3; Lawndry Age Yearbook, 1938,

p.. 131)... The Laundryowners’ National Association repre-

sented the industry in develapipg the N. R. A. code and

was said ‘to embrace 82 percent of the power-laundry busi-

ness in the country. United States Department of Labor,

Women’s Bureau, Factors Affecting Wages in Power Laun-

dries, Bulletin No. 143, 1936, p. 10. United action in dealing

with labor is common. Laundry Age, the leading national

trade journal, has “repeatedly pled for a united front by

laundry owners wherever they are threatened by unreason-

able demands from the unions.” United Front Stops

Strikes, in Laundry Age (January 1938), pp. 96-97.

‘The two national unions in the laundry industry—the

Laundry Workers’ International Union, affiliated with the

19

terly contested strikes, some interstate in scope."

There is no infication that Congress intended, for

some reason that is not readily apparent, to per-

mit a large and important portion of the nation’s

trade to remain subject to interruption by mdus-

trial strife arising from practices which the Act

proscribes. Where Congress has intended an

even less extensive exemption of this nature, it

has plainly so stated. See e. g., the Fair Labor

American Federation of Labor, and the Laundry Workers

Joint Board (Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America),

affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations—

have .a combined membership of about 70,000 workers,

almost one-third of all laundry employees. See Laundry

Workers’. International: Union in Convention, Denver,

Colorado, May 15, 1939; Réport of the Executive Coun-

cil of the American Federation of Labor to the Siztieth

Annual Convention, November 18, 1940, and Documentary

History, Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America: 1936-

1938, p. 35; id., 1938-1940, pp. 89-91.

*To cite but a few instances, in the greater Cincinnati

metropolitan area, which includes North Kentucky, 2,000

laundry and dry-cleaning employees in 19 plants and 6

branches, struck for 13 weeks beginning September 28, 1937.

The dispute was settled by a contract signed by 35 com-

panies, including 5- Kentucky firms. Cincinnati Post, Ken-

tucky Edition, Sept. 28 and 29, 1937, and Cincinnati En-

quirer, Sept. 30, 1937, December 27, 1987. Of 12 interstate

strikes in progress in October 1937 this was the second larg-

est. See U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor

Review, February 1938, p. 440. In the New, York metropoli-

‘tan area, a strike called in September 1937, originally di-

rected against three large dry-cleaning chains comprising

95 stores in New York and affecting about 6,000 workers,

spread to the New Jersey plants in which the actual serv-

icing of the garments was done. This strike was the largest

_/ of 15 interstate strikes in progress at the time.. See U. S.

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, January

8

ed.

<3

CELLONE ST PE;

‘greater part of whose * * * servicing is in intrastate

_

3 ogi me

RP LEIS SEPT FT NOLIN LL NE LIE EERE NS RIE BO Be Se a ‘

20

Standards Act: of 1938, Sec. 13 (a) 2.’ And stat-

utes containing no such exemption but, on the con- |

trary, purporting to exercise the federal power —

‘over commerce generally, have not been held to

exclude certain portions of such commerce merely

because those portions were carried on wholly

within areas 6f relatively small size. Kansas City

Western Ry. Co. v. McAdow, 240 U.S. 51 (Employ-

ers’ Liability Act); Spokane & Inland R. Co. v.

United States, 241 U. S. 344 (Safety Appliance

Act) ; Ellis v. Inman, Poulsen & Co., 131 Fed. 182 »

(C. C. A. 9th) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act); Fehr

Baking Co. v. Bakers Union, 20 F. Supp. a

(W. D. La.) (same).” “par os.

OC eee gee ns

IF THE QUESTIONS CERTIFIED ARE NOT ANSWERED IN

THE AFFIRMATIVE, THE CERTIFICATE SHOULD BE —

DISMISSED WITHOUT ANSWER TO THE*QUESTIONS _—

In the event that the Court determines that

the probable effect of industrial strife upon thee .

interstate commerce in garments serviced by the

ns ® »

1988, p. 176; V. ¥. World’ Telegram, September 13 and 14,

1937, and New York Times, September 15, 1937. More.re-

cently (March 14, 1940), a strike stopped completely the

operations of a laundry and dry-cleaning company having

its plant in New Jersey and 103 stores in New York. Seo

Paterson Call and Newark Call during this period.

* Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U..S. C., Supp. V,

Sec. 213 (a) (2). That section provides that the wage-and-

hour provisions of the statute shall not apply tq “any em-

ployee engaged in any .* * * service establishment, the

commerce * * *,”

” See, also, the following decisions of the Interstate Com-

merce Commission involving the conduct of interstate trans-

Mek Ag ae apart Uta e aoe CA ae ee i fg fee eer « eee SY en bs ’ . . 7487

=e Ie Ge EB SS ON Farah tastes CN A ase Le Bh oe IIE Oe TREY Hey ead 5 5 SOA & A be -

Ry tes hah toms Pees Ne) : toe we SB Gite ts Staal Vea gh S Rig ae eins Crh de. NS ON Foie ae Mert i) deere .

A oe

| @ :

_.. Company does not. alone savennt ipittiastion of

~ the Act, we submit. that the questions-certified

should not be answered but ‘that the certificate

should be dismissed. The questions, as\put, do

not comprehend all of the relevant facts upon

which the Board concluded that the Company’ 8

unfair labor practices tend to lead to labor dis-

‘ putes: affecting substantial interstate commerce; .

the questions, therefore, “are not raised by the

| case made * * * Seim.v. Hurd, 232 U.S.

420, 427. [ef United, States v. Worley, 281 U. 8.

339, 340; Graver v. Faurot, 162 U. 8. 435, 437;

Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co. v. Buck; 283 'T, 8. 202,

209 ;-Wilshire Oil*Co.; Inc., v..United States, 295

U.S. 100, 102-103 ; Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S.

205, 211; Lowden v. N. W. National Bank, 298

U.S. 160.

In determining the substantiality of the effect

upon interstatd comniercée: which would be pro-

duced by a stoppage of the Company’s operations,

the Board could plainly consider the aggregate

effect upon all such commerce which would be

directly obstructed. - The Board found that this

commerce bad of two types: (a) commerce in

- purchasing materials and supplies; and (b) com-

merce involved in the Company’ s collection, serv-

leing, and delivery of garments. The sum effect

upon commerce of both kinds constituted ed sin-

portation within relatively small areas: Jn the Matter “0

Steubenville, etc., Traction Co., 64 1. C. C. 517 (Motor Car-

rier Act of 1935) ; In the Matter of City of Bristol v. Vir-

ginian Ry. Co., 15 I. C. C. 453 (Interstate Commerce Act).

{

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TASOEN=

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‘

gle basis of the Board’s ju isdiction. Conceiv-

ably, the Board may have be ieved that the effect

upon either type of commerce was not in itself _

substantial, but that the aggregate effect was such _

as to warrant or require a conclusion that the ju-

risdictional prerequisites were satisfied in this case.

The question before the Circuit Court of Ap-

peals as to application of the Act, therefore, con-

cerned a business whose stoppage would produce

i the total effect upon interstate commerce which

the Board’s findings reflect. But the court, while

- reciting in the certificate (p. 1) the facts concern-

ing the Company’s receipt of materials and ~

supplies, has certified questions which confine con-

sideration by this Court to the effect of an inter-

ruption of the Company’s business upon the

commerce involved only in its collection, servicing,

» and delivery of garments. The questions in terms

relate to an enterprise whose only connectior with -

interstate commerce purports to be that which is

stated in the questions. >

The Circuit Courts of pone for the Sixth,

.Ninth nd Tenth Circuits, as well as the court be-

low, have held that the threat of obst ruction to inter-

@ state commerce in materials and supplies arising

(from labor disputes in the state of destination

uestion 1 inquires whether the Act applies “merely he-

cause” of the location of the business and its servicing 0

articles collected in or delivered to points in other States.

Question 2 is as to a business “not engaged in interstate

commerce, except insofar as it may collect articles to be

serviced and may make deliveries to customers living across.

the state line * * *” (Certificate, p. 3).

- warrants application of the Act.* [There are no-

contrary decisions. The ‘‘familiar-principle” in- .

voked by the Court in National Labor Relations.

“Board vy. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. 8.

1, 31-82, that obstructions to interstate commerce.

are within the reach of. the Congressional power,

would seem to recognize no distinction between ef-

fects upon incoming or outgoing commerce, or ef- |

fects upon both. The Circuit Court of Appeals in

_ this case excluded the reeggnized effects of the Com:

pany’s unfair labor practices upon its, incoming

commerce from consideration by this vate on the

bare ground that ‘‘the volume of. the te

‘Commerce thus involved is not sufficient, in our

‘opinion, to bring the business’ within the jurisdic-

—+tion of the Board” (Certificate, p. 1).

“™ «

We believe that the volume of commerce in sup-

plies—-$10,810 during 1938, or 28% of the Com- »

pany’s total purchases of supplies during that.

Oo

% Newport Neu Shipbuilding & Dry Dock ‘Co. v. Na-

tional Labor Relations Board, 101 F. (2d) 841, 843 (C. C. A.

4), modified and affirmed, 308 U. S. 241; National Labor

“Relations Board v. A. 8. Abell Co., 97 F. (2d) 951, 955

(C. C. A. 4); National Labor Relations Board v. Yorfolk

year (Certificate,. Pp. 1)—comprises commesee of an

Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp., 109 F. (2d) 128, 129 (C. C-

A. 4); Virginia Electric & Power Cov. v. National Labor

‘Relations Board, 115 F. (2d) 414, 416 (©. C. A. 4).; Con-

sumers Power Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 113

F. (2d) 38, 40-41 (C. C. A. 6); National Labor Relations

Board v. Sunshine Mining Co., 110 F. (2d) 780, 784

(C. C. A. 9), certiorari denied, No. 352, this Term, J

ary 13, 1941; Southern Colorado Power Co. Vv. National

Labor Relations Board, 111 F. (2d) 539, 543 (C. C. A. 10).

/ Pp ET GQ ORE LEO LE AISA AOSD CIE OIEVE cal OGG |

24

amount substantially ‘“‘more than that to which

courts would apply the maxim de minimis.”” Fain-

-_blatt case, 306 U. 8. at 607. The significant fact,

however, is that there is no need for the effect

upon incoming commerce to be substantial in itself

in order for it to be relevant to a determination

whether the Company is subject to the Act... The

effect upon incoming cémmerce is one element

making up on aggregate efféct; the decisive ques-

tion is whether the aggregate effect is substanfial,

not whether. each ¢ of the component effects in itself

satisfies that test. The Circuit Court of Appeals

rejected the view.that the Board might base its

conclusion that the Agt did or did not. apply upon

the total effect of a stoppage of operations upon

interstate commerce; in its order denying the

Board’s motion to amend the certificate, the court

stated that (Certificate, p. 6)— |

The case is not one of aggregating different

elements upon which a finding of jurisdic-

tion might be based ;. but m4 determining |

_ whether one of the elem pis tends _ te fur-

nish dny-basis of jurisdi tion.” :

18 In the motion to amend the certificate, the Solicitor Geri

eral suggested that the following question -was appropriate” .

for certification : “Does the National Labor Relations Act ap-

ply to a laundry and cleaning and‘ dyeing establishment

which, during 1938, the year concerning which evidence 4vas -

adduced, received $10,810.90 worth of materials and supplies

_ in gnterstate commerce, out of fotal purchases of this kind |

amounting to $38,333. %, and, of its gross income of $128;=-

752.96 during that year, derived! $28,088.43 from the ‘serv-

icing of garments collected from and delivered to points in - -

a State other. than that in whith the p!ant i is — ”

: /t

PSE IES A Pt AM EERE III PR G0

eee

~

25 Vy

It would have been quite possible for the Board ~ ce -)-

to consider the case as involving two separate — | ,

questions whether the Company is subject to the

Act by reason (a) of its interstate purch and

- (b) of its servicing of garments collected and

delivered in other States. We submit, however,

that where the Board has viewed as a single issue ~

whether the effects upon interstate commerce of “an

labér dispute in a particular business are such in

the: aggregate a as té bring the business within the

“ Act, and this view is proper under the Act, the

Circuit Court of Appeals should not be permitted,

upon a patently unsound ground, to require con- —

ideration of the issue by this Court upon a dif-

ay ies basis from that upon which tne Act was

applied by the administrative agency. ;

It should be observed that it would be appro-

| priate, procedurally, for the Court to answer the ?

4 certified questions in the affirmative, for such an-_ - ;

_ swers would Be dispositive of the controversy. On

~ the other hand, if: negative answers should be

given, there would still be left open the question

whether both types of activity in the aggregate

_ furnish a basis for the Board’s jurisdiction, not- ‘

: withstanding that neither alone may be sufiigat : a

-=for that purpose. ‘Aud since the Board rested its — | ae

* jurisdiction upon both grounds taken together, , ;

‘ - pather than alternatively, it. would seem inappr :

4 for this Court to decide that one of th Ee

grounds, standing aldne, is insufficient. Aceord- rerine © a

OPI LOTT ELEY ONE IO IIS LIME FG

i een | :

ry ; 26

‘| ' ingly, we respectfully submit that the questions

| certified can and should be answered in the affirma- .

tive, but that, because of the unusual posture of

| ‘this case, if affirmative answers cannot be giver,

the certificate should be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

It is respectfully submitted that the questions

certified by the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit should be answered in the affirma-

tive, but that, if such answers may not be -re-

turned, the certificate .should be dismissed witb-

: out answer to the questions. -

| ~° / Francis Bippie,

i / Solicitor General. |

ARNOLD Raum;-

J Special Assistant to the Attorney General. r

Rosert B. Warts, .

N f General Counsel,

LAURENCE A, Knapp, - |

| Associate General Counsel, .

* Mortimer B. Wotr, | }

Hua D. SHEa, Apia

Attorneys, -

National Labor Relations Board.* .

FEsRuARY 1941.

Re ee an ee eet een mene en een a enter cet AT et hc eee

SAT ER Ue Rie FEIT HL RAIS INE SE ENR FOE NTS I OND a gd ae Oe hi

.

SI ’ ol

APPENDIX A

The Board’s findings of facts and conclusions of

law concerning the applicability of the Act to the

Company’s business are as follows (19 N. L. R. B.,

No. 112):

* FINDINGS OF FACT

1; THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT °

White Swan Company is a West Virginia

corporation having its office and plant at

Wheeling, West Virginia. It operates .a

combined laundry and dry cleaning-estab- *

lishment. The essential supplies and equip-

re _mifent used by the respondent in its opera-

; tions are soap, bluing, bleach, cleaning sol--:

vent, coal, water, salt, paper, tape, and .

_ padding. During 1938 the respondent pur- —

. chased supplies and materials costing §38,-

- 333.15. Approximately 28.2 percent, or : |

$10,810.90 by value, of its supplies and 1

- equipment were shipped to the respondent’s ae

plant from tae outside the State of West ‘*

Virginia. The respondent’s’ gross income .

during the same period was $128,752.96. itt,

The respondent transports garments inits . . a

trucks from customers in Ohio to the re-’ Jas ‘

‘ spendent’s plant in West Virginia to be .

i serviced. After they are serviced, the re-

spontient delivers the garments in its trucks

to the customers in Ohio. Approximately ee |

12.93 percent of the respondent’s gross in- 1

: ns

* These findings are based in part on a stipulation of facts. 28

om) | & ... 7 Pee HH

i 2

.

ye inser ea

SERN TE LELRE LE LE A REELING ENS

28

come for 1938 was derived from the servic-

ing of garments which were collected from

and. delivered to customers in Ohio, in the

manner described above: In _ addition

thereto, approximately 5 percent of its gross

# income during 1938 was derived from the ©

servicing of garments which persons not in

the respondent’s employ collected in Ohio, |

brought to the respondent’s plant for serv-

icing, and delivered to persons in Ohio after

the garments were serviced. The total in-

come from work involving interstate ship-

ments during 1938 was $23,088.43.

* * * * *

IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

UPON COMMERCE

We find that the activities of the respond-

ent set forth in Section III above, occurring

______ in connection with the operations of the re-

spondent described in Section I above, have

a close, intimate, and substantial relation to

trade, traffic, and commerce among the sev-

eral Sta nd tend to’ lead to labor disputes

burdening™and obstructing commerce and

the free flow of commerce.

" CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

* d * ~.* * % *

4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices

are unfair labor practices affecting com-

merce, within the meaning of Section 2 (6)

and (7 ) of the ae

~ y

sah ige Fea gee OR aT Oe OM TCE TT Te Tee eT - ' . . .

BT TRE te IE SG eae rg gmap rN ergata aR RS aR ARIES

APPENDIX B

The pertinent provisions of the N ational Labor

Relations Act (Act of July 5, 1935, ¢. 372, 49‘Stat.

449; 29 U.S. C., Supp. V, Sec. 151, et seq.) are as

follows: + .

_ Sec. 2. When used in this Act—

oe * _* ee *

(6) The term ‘‘commerce”’ means trade, ,

traffic, conimerce, transportatien, or com-

- munication among the several States, or be-

tween the District of Columbia or any

Territory of the United States and any

State or other Territory, or between any

foreign country and any State, Territory, or

the District of Columbia, or within the Dis-

trict of Columbia or any Territory, or be-

tween points in the same State but through

other State or any Territory or the

District of Columbia or any foreign coyntry.

_< (7) The term ‘“‘affecting commerce’’

means in commerce, or burdening or ob-

structing commerce or the free flow of com-

- merce, or having led or tending to lead to a

labor dispute burdening or obstructing com-

merce or the free flow of commerce. .

* * * ye — * ho *

Sec. 10 (a) The Board is empowered, as

hereinafter provided, to prevent any person

from engaging in any unfair labor practice

(listed in section 8) affecting commerce.

This powér shall be exclusive, and shail not

be affected by any other means. of adjust-

' ment or prevention that has been or may be

established by agreement, code, law, or

otherwise. pi :

)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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