Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Konan v. Sengel (No. 07-1498)

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Supreme C

p ee a U.S.

(\) 071498 DEC 6 - 2007

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE UNITED STATES

No.

Raymond W. Konan,

Petitioner

Vv.

Noel D. Sengel,

Stephen H. Ratliff,

Karen A. Gould,

Barbara S. Lanier, and

Stephen M. Hall,

Respondents

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To U. S. Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit

PETITION FOR

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Respectfully requested:

Raymond W. Konan, pro se

438 Lexingdale Drive

Orlando, FL 32828

571-331-9700, 407-277-0650

mediatorkonan@bellsouth.net

A. Questions Presented for Review

1. Dismissal Based on Prior Complaint

Shall a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision of

case dismissal that is obviously decided on an

earher terminated complaint, instead of the

operative replacement Amended Complaint, be

allowed to stand, or shall it be corrected?

. Court of Appeals Decided on Prior Complaint

And New Law Point Not Addressed by Parties

Shall a Circuit Court of Appeals summary dismissai

of all claims against all defendants on a point of

law that was not addressed by the parties,

referencing a prior terminated complaint, instead

of the replacement Amended Complaint, be allowed

to stand, or does sound judicial discretion require

remanding to give the parties an opportunity to

address these issues?

- Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Applied

for “No Jurisdiction”

Is the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals correct or in

error when it applies the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

and rules that the United States District Court has

no jurisdiction to hear Appellant attorney’s civil

rights claims against five state officials who were

involved in the revocation of his law license, each

sued 1n individual capacity, per Title 42 United

States Code, Section 1983?

B. PARTIES

Appellant

Raymond W. Konan, an individual Virginia attorney,

who had his law license revoked, and who is suing

five individuals involved for violating his U.S.

Constitutional rights to equal protection and due

process of law.

Appellees

Noel D. Sengel, an individual, who acted as a

prosecuting state bar counsel.

Stephen H. Ratliff, an individual, who acted as

Virginia State Bar Subcommittee Chairman.

Karen A. Gould, an individual, who acted as a Bar

Disciplinary Board Chairperson. |

Barbara S. Lanier, an individual, who acted as a

Clerk of the Bar’s disciplinary System.

Stephen M. Hall, an individual, who acted as a

representing attorney for the Virginia State Bar.

C. TABLE OF CONTENTS &

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Table of Contents

A. Questions Presented for Review, p. (i)

B. Parties, p. (1)

C. Table of Contents, p. (iii)

Table of Authorities, p. (vi)

D. Reports or Opinions and Orders, p. 1

E. Basis for Jurisdiction in U.S. Supreme Court, p. 2

F. Constitutional Provision & Statutes, p. 3

G. Statement of the Case, p. 4

H. Argument, Reasons to Allow Writ of Certiorari, p. 6

Conclusion, p. 21

I. Appendix, p. 23

Complaint, Opinions, and Orders

1. Judgment dated July 6, 2007, of Fourth Circuit of

Appeals, affirming dismissal of petitioner Konan’s

claims against all defendants, citing the Rooker-

Feldman Doctrine, ruling there was no jurisdiction in

ili

the U.S. District Court. (Mistakenly shows Justices

of Virginia Supreme Court as defendants. They were

not.) p. 25

. U.S. District Court Order of September 14, 2006,

granting dismissal of Konan’s equal protection

claims, but denying dismissal of his claims of due

process violations by the five defendants. p. 30

. U.S. District Court Memorandum Opinion,

Sept. 14, 2006, explaining partial dismissal of

Konan’s claims. p. 31.

. U.S. District Court Memorandum Opinion of

November 7, 2006, dismissing due process violations

claims against the five individual defendants on a

rationale of equitable estoppel. p. 38.

. Fourth Circuit’s Denial of Petition for Rehearing,

dated Sept. 7, 2007. (Mistakenly shows Justices of

Virginia Supreme Court as defendants. They were

not.) p. 45.

. Amended Complaint of June 20, 2006, claiming five

individuals acting under color of state law violated

attorney Konan’s U.S. Constitutional rights to due

process of law and equal protection of law, and

claiming compensation, under 42 USC 1988. p. 50.

Opinion of February 13, 2004, of Virgnia Supreme

Court upholding the law license revocation of the

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (cited as basis

for an equitable estoppel dismissal of all due process

claims by the U.S. District Court). p. 83.

Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution, p. 47

Federal Statutes

United States Code, Title 42, Sec. 1983, p. 47.

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1254, p. 48.

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1331, p. 47.

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1343, p. 48.

Table of Cited Authorities

Amendment XIV to United States Constitution, p. 47.

U.S. Supreme Court Cases

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983), p. 6, 8, 10, 14, 21, 22.

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.,

544 U.S. 280 (2005), p. 10, 13.

Lance, et al. v. Dennis, No. 05-555, 546 U.S. (2006),

p. 10, 11, 13.

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923),

p. 6, 8, 10, 14, 21, 22.

Cases from Circuit Courts of Appeal, p. 11-13.

Adkins v. Rumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456 (4th Cir., 2006)

Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324 (6th Cir., 2007)

Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 Fed. 3d 1129, 1138

(10th Cir. 2006)

Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d 665 (7th Cir., 2006)

Dale v. Moore, 121 F. 3d 624, 626 (11% Cir. 1997)

Davani v. Virginia Dept of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 718

(4th Cir. 2006)

Davison v. Gov. of Puerto Rico, Firefighters Corps.,

471 F.3d 220 (1st Cir., 2006)

Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919 (8th Cir, 2005)

In re Ford Motor Co., 471 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir, 2006)

Gary v. Geils, 82 Fed. 3d 1362, 1365 (7 Cir. 1996)

In re Harbin, No. ___ —-F3d.__s (9th Cir, 2007)

Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609

(9th Cir, 2007)

Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 ¥.3d 77

(2nd Cir, 2005)

Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304 (7th Cir, 2006)

Lowe v. Hearst Communications, Inc.,

F3d.___ (5th. Cir., 2007)

Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir., 2007)

McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir., 2007)

Mitskovski v. Buffalo, Ft Erie, Bridge Auth,

435 F.3d 127 (2nd Cir., 2006)

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927 (8th Cir., 2005)

Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir., 2005)

Skit Int'l, Ltd v. DAC Technologies of Ark. Inc.

F3d.___ (8th Cir., 2007)

Smith v. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,

484 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir., 2007)Thomas v, Eby, 481

F.3d 434 (6th Cir., 2007)

Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113 (1st Cir., 2006)

Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments ITI,

449 F.3d 542 (8rd Cir., 2006)

Turner v. Secretary Housing & Urban Devel.,

449 F.3d 536 (8rd Cir., 2006)

Wolfe v. George, F3d.___ (9th Cir., 2007)

U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment,

p.47

U.S. Federal Statutes

28 United States Code 1254, 1331, and 1343, p.47, 49.

42 United States Code Sec. 1983, p.47.

D. Complaint, Opinions, and Orders

Provided Verbatim in Appendix

Judgment dated July 6, 2007, of Fourth Circuit of

Appeals, affirming dismissal of petitioner Konan’s

claims against all defendants, citing the Rooker-

Feldman Doctrine, ruling there was no jurisdiction

in the U.S. District Court. (Mistakenly shows

Justices of Virginia Supreme Court as defendants.

They were not.) p. 25.

. U.S. District Court Order of September 14, 2006,

granting dismissal of Konan’s equal protection

claims, but denying dismissal of his claims of due

process violations by the five defendants. p. 30.

. U.S. District Court Memorandum Opinion, Sept. 14,

2006, explaining partial dismissal of Konan’s

claims. p. 31.

. U.S. District Court Memorandum Opinion of

November 7, 2006, dismissing due process violations

claims against the five individual defendants on a

rationale of equitable estoppel. p. 38.

. Fourth Circuit’s Denial of Petition for Rehearing,

dated Sept. 7, 2007. (Mistakenly shows Justices of

Virginia Supreme Court as defendants. They were

not.) p. 45.

6. Amended Complaint of June 20, 2006, claiming five

individuals acting under color of state law violated

attorney Konan’s U.S. Constitutional rights to due

process of law and equal protection of law, and

claiming compensation, under 42 USC 1983.

p. 50.

7. Opinion of February 13, 2004, of Virgnia Supreme

Court upholding the law license revocation of the

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board, cited as basis

for an equitable estoppel dismissal of due process

claims by the U.S. District Court. p. 83.

E. U.S. Supreme Court Jurisdiction

1. The judgment of the Fourth Circuit that is

questioned was dated July 6, 2007. The petition for

rehearing was denied September 7, 2007. No cross

petition is expected. This petitioner was given

another 60 days, until April 15, 2008, to correct and

refile this Petition for Certiorari.

2. U.S. District Court jurisdiction is provided by 42

U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1254, 1331,

and 1343.

3. The United States Code provides that appeals from

the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal shall be decided by

this United States Supreme Court. Specifically, 28

USC Sec. 1254 reads in pertinent part:

“Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by

the Supreme Court by the following methods:

By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition

of any party...” Full text at p. 48.

4. All other parties have been served through their

attorney, Assistant Attorney General Mike F. Melis,

Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia

23219.

F. Constitutional Provisions and Statutes

Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution p. 47.

Title 42 United States Code, Section 1983 p. 47.

G. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Attorney Raymond Konan was hired by a U.S.-based

Pakistani newspaper and by a Russian journalist who

worked for Izvestia newspaper to represent them in

suits brought by reputed criminals from those countries

who were suing them for defamation. After those

claims were dismissed by consent orders, the attorneys

for the two alleged criminals filed bar complaints

against attorney Konan. They were taken up by Bar

Counsel Noel D. Sengel. Prosecuting bar counsel

Noel D. Sengel signed the name of the State Bar

Subcommittee chair “Stephen H. Ratliff,” on the

charges of attorney misconduct that she wrote up and

that she certified as from the Subcommittee, reportedly

with Subcommittee Chair approval. Disciplinary

System Clerk Barbara S. Lanier set up a hearing

with the Disciplinary Board. The Board decided to

revoke attorney Konan’s license to practice law on June

27, 2003.

Two weeks later, Disciplinary Board Chairperson

Karen A. Gould signed what she called a

“memorandum order” that criticized attorney Konan’s

character and competence to practice law and ordering

the revocation of attorney Konan’s license to practice

law in Virginia. Attorney Konan appealed to the

Virginia Supreme Court, but it upheld the revocation.

After briefs were filed, attorney Konan learned that the

charges against him had not come from the

jurisdiction-giving Bar Subcommittee, but from Bar

Counsel Sengel. At the State Supreme Court hearing,

attorney Stephen M. Hall, from the state attorn

general’s office, representing the state bar, provided

hearsay testimony that there always was a written

authorization from the Subcommittee when Bar

Counsel signed charges in the name of the

Subcommittee, but it could not be found in time.

Attorney Konan challenged the Board’s revocation

order as without jurisdiction, without clear and

convincing evidence of attorney wrong-doing, and as

abuse of discretion.

The State Supreme Court declined to hear due

process issues.

After confirming a) that the “charges of misconduct”

came from bar counsel without authorization from the

Subcommittee, b) that the chairman allowed it, c)

that the‘memorandum order” of law license revocation

issued in the name of the Disciplinary Board contained

many ‘aise statements of fact and suggestions of law,

and d) that it came from only one member of the

Board, not from the Board as a body, attorney Konan

filed claims against the individual defendants for

violating his civil rights by their individual derelictions

of duty.

That original U.S. District Court complaint of

February, 2006, under 42 USC Sec. 1983, first included

the justices of the state supreme court. In June, 2006,

attorney Konan filed an Amended Complaint (p. 50)

that replaced the original complaint, terminating it,

and removing all of the justices as defendants. U.S.

District Court jurisdiction is provided by 28 USC 1254,

1331, and 1343. The Amended Complaint was the only

operative complaint in the U.S. District Court, as the

Court’s Docket Sheet shows.

The District Court dismissed attorney Konan’s

claims of denial of equal protection of law as

insufficient to state a claim, and then later summarily

dismissed all claims of denial of due process on a

rationale of collateral estoppel. That completed

dismissal of all of attorney Konan’s claims against all

five of the individual defendants whom he had claimed

wronged him.

Attorney Konan appealed those dismissals to the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Fourth Circuit,

focusing on the original terminated complaint, instead

of the replacement Amended Complaint, cited the

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, and upheld the District

Court’s dismissals on its modified rationale that the

U.S. District Court had no jurisdiction.

Attorney Raymond Konan here petitions for a writ of

certiorari.

ARGUMENT, REASONS FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI

1. Dismissal Was Based on Prior Complaint

That Was Replaced.

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision of

case dismissal is obviously decided by mistake on

an earlier terminated complaint, instead of the

operative replacement Amended Complaint. That

is clearly shown by the style of the case shown on

the per curiam unpublished Judgment of July 6,

2007, in the Appendix, p. 25. It shows Justices of

the Supreme Court of Virginia as defendants. They

were named defendants only in the original

complaint filed on February 13, 2006. They were

not in the replacement Amended Complaint filed on

June 20, 2006, the operative pending complaint.

The same error of focus on the wrong, superseded

complaint is also evidenced by these other

documents of the Fourth Circuit that all show,

incorrectly, that justices were defendants, when

they were not: Denial of Petition for Rehearing and

Mandate. Copies of the documents are in the

Appendix, p. 23.

This egregious error by the Fourth Circuit Court

of Appeals effectively denies due process of law. It

should not be allowed to stand. How can a party’s

claims be fairly considered when the the wrong

claims — obsolete claims -- are reviewed, instead of

the correct pending claims? Remand can remedy

this egregious error. This case should be remanded

for consideration of the correct Amended Complaint,

in which none of the jive named defendants is a

justice of any court. In no way does the Amended

Complaint seek a federal court review of any state

court decision or any state action. That is clear

from the text of the Amended Complaint (in

Appendix, p. 50.

Granting the requested Writ of Certiorari will

permit the appropriate correction and provide for a

fair review in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.

Denial of certiorari will leave injustice and a gross

embarrassment for the Fourth Circuit Court of

Appeals and for our American legal system. It could

have the very negative result of reduced respect for

our courts.

2. Court of Appeals Decided on New Points

Not Addressed by Parties

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed

all claims against all defendants on a point of law

that was not addressed by the parties, with no prior

notice to them before its dismissal. Thus, the

parties had no opportunity to argue their case on

the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, which thE parties,

and the Virginia State Attorney General, as the

defendants’ attorney, did not deem relevant, and

which they did not brief or argue. With no notice,

and with no input from the parties or their

attorneys, the per curiam opinion of the Fourth

Circuit applied that new point of law as the basis for

its summary dismissal of all of attorney Konan’s

claims against all five of the individual Defendants.

(Without party input, the Fourth Circuit got it

completely wrong.)

Sound judicial discretion requires that the parties

be given an opportunity to address the new issue

raised for the first time in and by the Court of

Appeals panel, namely the Rooker-Feldman

Doctrine. Indeed, due process of law in this case

would seem to require it.

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

Means “No Jurisdiction?”

This Appellant attorney submits that the Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals is in error when it cites the

Rooker —Feldman Doctrine and rules that the

United States District Court has no jurisdiction to

hear any of this petitioner attorney’s claims. They

are against individual! state officials for their

violations of attorney Konan’s civil rights. Konan

sued each of the five defendants in their individual

capacity, per Title 42 United States Code, Section

1983, for individually violating his United States

Constitutional rights. Those rights are for Equal

Protection of Law and Due Process of Law,

guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution.

The United States Code, 42 USC Sec. 1983,

clearly provides a cause of action:

“Every person who, under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or

usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to

be subjected, any citizen of the United States

...tothe deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in

equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress...”

42 USC 1983, full text at p. 47.

Attorney Konan notes that each of the individual

defendants actei in different times, in different

ways, all under the color of state law, but contrary

to the law and contrary to their oificial duties.

Those derelictions of duties by the individuals are at

issue, not state decisions. The year before attorney

Konan’s complaint, this United States Supreme

Court clearly limited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

This Supreme Court stated it is confined to

“cases brought by state-court losers

complaining of injuries caused by state-court

judgments rendered before the district court

proceeding commenced and inviting district

court review and rejection of those

judgments.”

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic

Industries Corp.,

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not apply

here because there had been no prior litigatica

between these parties, and no state court action or

decision is challenged or sought to be reviewed. The

parties, the Virginia Attorney General’s Office, and

the U.S. District Court had all agreed on that. The

Amended Complaint of June 20, 2006, is clear on

this point.

In Lance, et al. v. Dennis, further guidance was

provided by this U.S. Supreme Court:

“Neither Rooker nor Feldman elaborated a

rationale for a wide-reaching bar on the

jurisdiction of lower federal courts, and our

cases since Feldman have tended to emphasize

the narrowness of the Rooker-Feldman rule.”

This Supreme Court went on in that same

opinion to repeat a warning that the lower courts

have sometimes extended Rooker-Felaman too far --

“far beyond the contours of the Rooker and

Feldman cases, overriding Congress’ conferra!

of federal-court jurisdiction concurrent with

jurisdiction exercised by state courts...”

Lance, et al. v. Dennis, 546 U.S. (2006).

The Fourth Circuit opinion here under review is

in conflict with at least three decisions of the United

States Supreme Court and a prior correct decision of

the Fourth Circuit, itself, Davani v. Dennis, 546

U.S. (2006). It conflicts with all ten of the other

United States Circuit Courts of Appeals. For

example, see the following decisions, arranged by

Circuits, from First Circuit Court of Appeals

through to the Eleventh:

Torromeo v. Town of Fremont, 438 F.3d 113 (1st

Cir., 2006)

Davison v. Gov. of Puerto Rico, Firefighters Corps.,

471 F.3d 220 (1st Cir., 2006)

Mitskouski v. Buffalo, Ft Erie, Bridge Auth, 435 F.3d

127 (2nd Cir., 2006)

McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir., 2007)

Turner vu. Crawford Square Apartments III, 449 F.3d

542 (8rd Cir., 2006)

Turner v. Secretary Housing & Urban Devel., 449

F.3d 536 (3rd Cir., 2006)

Davani v. Virginia Dept. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712

(4th Cir., 2006)

Adkins v. Kkumsfeld, 464 F.3d 456 (4th Cir., 2006)

Lowe v. Hearst Communications, Inc., F3d.

(5th. Cir., 2007)

Abbott v. Michigan, 474 F.3d 324 (6th Cir., 2007)

Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434 (6th Cir., 2007)

Burke v. Johnston, 452 F.3d 665 (7th Cir., 2006)

Jones v. Brennan, 465 F.3d 304 (7th Cir., 2006)

Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927 (8th Cir., 2005)

Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919 (8th Cir., 2005)

Skit Intl, Ltd v. DAC Technologies of Ark. Jnc.

F3d.___ (8th Cir., 2007)

Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d

609 (9th Cir., 2007)

In re Harbin, No. F3d.__ (9th Cir., 2007)

Wolfe v. George, F3d.__—« (9th Cir., 2007)

Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir.,

2007)

Smith v. U.S. Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit,

484 F.3d 1281 (10th Cir., 2007)

Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067 (11th Cir., 2005)

In re Ford Motor Co., 471 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir.,

2006)

The Fourth Circuit has conspicuously, and

mistakenly, stepped out of line from this U.S.

Supreme Court’s clarification in Exxon Mobil, Id,

and Lance, et al. v. Dennis, Id. It has ruled in

conflict with all ten other Circuits. This egregious

error needs correction. Because this case involves a

practicing lawyer, a state-wide attorney disciplinary

system, and the states’ management and regulation

of the practice of law, ipso facto, it poses questions of

exceptional importance to the judicial system and to

our country.

In order to preserve our United States

Constitutional rights, no one should be allowed to

violate them with impunity.

No one shall stand above the law and above

accountability for violations of Constitutional rights

— not even governmental employees acting under

color of law.

This case involves allegations of abuse of

authority by public officials who, under color of law,

violate the law and take away Constitutional rights.

It also involves a Circuit Court of Appeal that has

reviewed the wrong complaint and misapplied the

law in this case of an attorney seeking damages for

violations of his rights to equal protection and due

process of law. He is not seeking review of the

Disciplinary Board’s law license revocation, or of the

Virginia Supreme Court decision that upheld it.

The damages relief sought in the Amended

Complaint will not change those decisions or alter

their results.

One Circuit may not disregard the law that has

been succinctly clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court

and followed by all of the other Circuit Courts of

Appeal throughout the country. Indeed, our U.S.

Constitutional rights are already infringed, if we

cannot know that we have access to the courts to

redress their violations.

As the Appellant attorney’s Amended Complaint

clearly spells out, this case involves disguise and

deception that allegedly defeated a fair hearing in

both a state bar disciplinary proceeding and in

court. That individual conduct must be reviewable if

due process is to be preserved. Equal protection of

law requires it.

This importance is magnified when it is a

disciplinary system for lawyers that is involved,

because lawyers are among the most influential of

our leaders. We are law makers and judges of law.

We lawyers are the front-line protectors of civil

rights and personal liberties.

Issues with Different Defendants

The Fourth Circuit dismissed all claims against

all Defendants citing the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

and ruling that there was no jurisdiction in the U.S —

District Court for any of them. In a broad-brush

sweep, it seems to conclude that all of them were

somehow covered by prior State Court decisions.

They were not. None of them were. The Amended

Complaint clearly so states.

Perhaps the clearest example is the claim in the

Amended Complaint of defamation against one

member of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary

Board, for individually writing and issuing an

unauthorized and defamatory “memorandum order”

in the name of the Disciplinary Board, but without

the Board acting as a body, and without authority.

These facts did not emerge until long after the

Disciplinary Board’s and Virginia court’s license

revocation actions. Appellant attorney’s request for

damages under 42 USC Sec. 1983 in no way affects

or can affect any state court decision or action.

Those matters are different and completely

separate. See Amended Complaint, paras. 77-82 in

Appendix at p. 50.

Another of Appellant attorney Konan’s claims in

his Amended Complaint that could not possibly have

been dealt with before by any state court or its

agencies is the claim against Stephen Hall. The

Amended Complaint in paras. 83-92 summarize

claims of wrongs by attorney Stephen Hall, not in

getting Mr. Konan’s law license revoked, but in

preventing a fair hearing in the Virginia Supreme

Court. The facts of Hall’s violations of attorney

Konan’s U.S. Constitutional rights to equal

protection and due process were not revealed until

after the briefs had already been filed in the

Virginia Supreme Court. There was no judicial

review of his actions by the Virginia Supreme Court,

or by other state court or body. Accordingly, there

can be no issue of federal courts affecting state court

decisions. There is no Rooker-Feldman issue.

Similarly, none of the claims against the other

defendants require any overruling or any contra-

diction of any decision of any state court or other

state body. The granting of compensation relief as

requested with respect to all of the five defendants

in the Amended Complaint would effect no change

in the decisions or actions of the state court or any

state body.

With respect to the claims against defendant

Stephen Ratliff, the chairman of a State Bar

Subcommittee, the facts of the allegations were

learned only after the Disciplinary Board decision of

law license revocation, and after briefs had already

been filed for the Virginia Supreme Court review. It

follows, ipso facto, that there was no prior

adjudication of these issues by the Disciplinary

Board or by the court. The later facts that were

learned are these that form the basis for attorney

Konan’s claim against defendant Ratliff as spelled

out in the Amended Complaint:

a. He purported to act individually with the

power of the Bar Subcommittee, when the

Subcommittee can act only in quorum, as he

knew or should have known.

b. He allowed a bar counsel to sign his name on

her charges of attorney misconduct,

making her charges look like charges from

his Subcommittee, but the Subcommittee

members never even saw the charges sent

in their name.

c. He allowed a bar counsel to certify her

charges as from the Bar Subcommittee in

the name of the Subcommittee, when the

members of the Subcommittee never even

saw them.

Ratliff knew that Disciplinary Board

jurisdiction depended on a quorum of his

Subcommittee making charges of attorney

misconduct and certifying them to the

State Bar Disciplinary Board, but he

allowed the cases to proceed without any

such actions by his Subcommittee.

These issues were not briefed for the

Disciplinary Board or for the State

Supreme Court, because they were

disguised and not discovered until after

the Disciplinary Board Hearing and after

the briefs had been filed for the State

Supreme Court.

No state court or body has ruled on these

allegations against this defendant.

No state court or body action or decision is

challenged by these claims, and none will

be affected by the granting of the relief

sought, money damages for the alleged

violations of due process and equal

protection of law.

See Amended Complaint paras. 3, 5, and 6,

46-54, and 105-112, in Appendix, starting at p. 59.

With respect to defendant Noel Sengel, the facts

of her wrongful actions had been disguised and were

not discovered until after the Disciplinary Board

hearing and after the briefs had been filed in the

state supreme court review of the Board decision of

law license revocation. It follows that they were not

at issue in the Board proceedings. They were not for

decision in state court review. What are these

later-discovered wrongs for which attorney Konan

claims damages under 42 USC 1983?

a. Bar counsel knew that proper charges of

attorney misconduct for Disciplinary

Board review and action had to come from

the jurisdiction-giving Bar Subcommittee.

Bar counsel wrote up her own charges of

misconduct against the Appellant

attorney.

Without the Subcommittee acting on them,

she sent them to the Disciplinary Board as

coming from the Subcommittee.

Without any written authorization, she forged

the name of the Subcommittee chairman

on her charges and put then on

Subcommittee letterhead to make them

look like Subcommittee charges.

Without any proper authority from the

committee, she, herself, “certified” her

charges as Subcommittee charges, but the

Subcommittee members had not even seen

them.

Later, she prepared a misleading affidavit for

the State Supreme Court justices that

dec...ved them, influencing their decision

to let the law license revocation stand.

There has been no prior litigation with

Appellant attorney and this bar counsel as

parties.

h. The subject claims against her do not

question, challenge, or seek to change any

state court or body decision or action.

None of the relief requested — money damages for

civil rights violations --would change in any way any

state decision or action. They will remain exactly as

before.

See Amended Complaint paras. 3, 5, 6, 25-45, and

97-104, in Appendix starting at p. 50.

With respect to defendant Noel Sengel, the facts

of her wrongful actions had been disguised and were

not discovered until after the Disciplinary Board

hearing and after the briefs had been filed in the

state supreme court review of the Board decision of

law license revocation. It follows that they were not

at issue in the Board proceedings. They were not for

decision in state court review. What are these

later-discovered wrongs for which attorney Konan

claims damages under 42 USC 1983?

a. Bar counsel knew that proper charges of

attorney misconduct for Disciplinary

Board review and action had to come from

the jurisdiction-giving Bar Subcommittee.

b. Bar counsel wrote up her own charges of

misconduct against the Appellant

attorney.

c. Without the Subcommittee acting on them,

she sent them to the Disciplinary Board as

coming from the Subcommittee.

d. Without any written authorization, she forged

the name of the Subcommittee chairman

on her charges and put then on

Subcommittee letterhead to make them

look like Subcommittee charges.

e. Without anv proper authority from the

committee, she, herself, “certified” her

charges as Subcommittee charges, but the

Subcommittee members had not even seen

them.

f. Later, she prepared a misleading affidavit for

the State Supreme Court justices that

deceived them, influencing their decision

to let the law license revocation stand.

g. There has been no prior litigation with

Appellant attorney and this bar counsel as

parties.

h. The subject claims against her do not

question, challenge, or seek to change any

state court or body decision or action.

i. None of the relief requested — money damages

for civil rights violations --would change in

any way any state decision or action. They

will remain exactly as before.

See Amended Complaint paras. 3, 5, 6, 25-45, and

97-104, in Appendix, starting at p. 50.

Certainly, a U.S. District Court cannot reverse

the revocation of attorney Konan’s law license, but it

can grant all or some of the relief requested in the

Amended Complaint: "compensation for lost

income,” “expenses in dealing with Bar Counsel’s

improper ‘charges’,” money damages, and “attorney

fees.” That is the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

Once the errors of the Fourth Circuit (looking at

the wrong complaint and applying law that does not

fit) are corrected, attorney Konan’s claims can be

correctly considered on their merits. Then, at least

some of the well-documented injustices might be

righted or remedied.

CONCLUSION

This Petition for Certiorari should be granted,

so this case can be remanded in order that:

a. The Fourth Circuit can consider the correct

Amended Complaint, not the terminated

one which it reviewed.

b. The parties can address what the Fourth

Circuit ruled sua sponte was the decisive

issue, Rooker-Feldman, but which the

parties had not addressed below or in the

Circuit Court of Appeals.

c. The error in application of the Rooker-

Feldman Doctrine to summarily dismiss

ali claims against all defendants can be

corrected, so the merits of the individual

claims will control.

d-Appellant attorney can have his day in couré

and a fair chance to make his claims,

needed for due process and for equal

protection of law.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine does not deprive

the U.S. District Court of jurisdiction over tirese

kinds of claims. Oviously, confusion continues. Let

it be clarified now for all time with crystal clarity.

Accordingly, this case should be remanded for

further proceedings as may be appropriate.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully requested,

Raymond W. Konan, pro se

438 Lexingdale Drive

Orlando, FL 32828

Tel. 571-331-9700

I. APPENDIX

Complaint, Opinions, and Orders

8. wuudgment dated July 6, 2007, of Fourth Circuit of

Appeals, affirming dismissal of petitioner Konan’s

claims against all defendants, citing the Rooker-

Feldman Doctrine, ruling there was no jurisdiction

in the U.S. District Court. (Mistakenly shows

Justices of Virginia Supreme Court as defendants.

They were not.) __ p. 25.

. U.S. District Court Order of September 14, 2006,

grant ing dismissai of Konan’s equal protection

claims, but denying dismissal of his claims of due

process violations by the five defendants. p. 30.

10.U.S. District Court Memorandum Opinion,

Sept. 14, 2006, explaining partial dismissal of

Konan’s claims. p. 31.

11.U.S. District Court Memorandum Opinion of

November 7, 2006, dismissing due process violations

claims against the five individual defendants on a

rationale of equitable estoppel. p. 38.

12. Fourth Circuit’s Denial of Petition for Rehearing,

dated Sept. 7, 2007. (Mistakenly shows Justices of

Virginia Supreme Court as defendants. They were

not.) p. 45.

13. Amended Complaint of June 20, 2006, claiming five

individuals acting under color of state law violated

attorney Konan’s U.S. Constitutional rights to due

process of law and equal protection of law, and

claiming compensation, under 42 USC 1983. p. 50.

14. Opinion of February 13, 2004, of Virginia Supreme

Court upholding the law lcense revocation of the

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board (cited as

basis for an equitable estoppel dismissa! of all due

process claims by the U.S. District Court). p.83.

Fourteenth Amendment to U.S. Constitution, p.47.

Federal Statutes

United States Code, Title 42, Sec. 1983, p. 47.

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1254, p. 48.

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1331, p. 47.

United States Code, Title 28, Sec. 1343, p. 48.

JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No: 06-2308, 1:06-cv-00175-JCC

Filed: July 6, 2007

Raymond W. Konan

Plaintiff — Appellant

Noel D. Sengel, Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar;

Stephen H. Ratliff, Chair-Designate District

Subcommittee, Virginia State Bar; Karen A. Gould,

Chairperson, Disciplinary Board Virginia State Bar;

Barbara Sayers Lanier, Clerk of Disciplinary System,

Virginia State Bar; Stephen M. Hall, Assistant Attorney

General, Commonwealth of Virginia

Defendants — Appellees

and

Elizabeth B. Lacy; Leroy Roundtree Hassell; Barbara

Milano Keenan; Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.; Donald

Lemons; G. Steven Agee; Cynthia D. Kinser, Justices

Of Supreme Court of Virginia

Defendants

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia at Alexandria

In accordance with the written opinion of this Court filed

this day, the Court affirms as modified the judgment of

the District Court.

A certified copy of this judgment will be provided to the

District Court upon issuance of the mandate. The

judgment will take effect upon issuance of the mandate.

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

CLERK

UNPUBLISHED

UNTIED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTH CIRCUIT NO: 06-2308

Raymond W. Konan,

Plaintiff — Appellant

versus

Noel D. Sengel, Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar;

Stephen H. Ratliff, Chair-Designate District

Subcommittee, Virginia State Bar; Karen A. Gould,

Chairperson, Disciplinary Board Virginia State Bar;

Barbara Sayers Lanier, Clerk of Disciplinary System,

Virginia State Bar; Stephen M. Hall, Assistant Attorney

General, Commonwealth of Virginia

Defendants — Appellees

And

Elizabeth B. Lacy; Leroy Roundtree Hasse!l; Barbara

Milano Keenan; Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.; Donald

Lemons; G. Steven agree; Cynthia D. Kinser, Justices

Of Supreme Court of Virginia

Defendants

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C.

Cacheris, Senior District Judge. (1:06-cv-00175-JCC)

Submitted: April 18, 2007 Decided: July 6, 2007

Before WILKINSON, GREGORY, and SHEDD, CIRCUIT

JUDGES.

Affirmed as modified by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Raymond W. Konan, Appellant Pro Se. Mike F. Melis,

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA,

Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this

circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Raymond W. Konan appeals from the district court’s

order dismissing his 42 U.S.C 1983 (2000) complaint. The

district court dismissed Konan’s complaint on the grounds

that Konan failed to adequately state a claim for violation

of the Equal Protection clause and that his Due Process

claim was barred by collateral estoppel. After having

reviewed the record, we find that, pursuant to the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine, the district court did not have subject

matter jurisdiction over Konan’s claims.

Konan’s claims seek redress for injuries caused by his

disbarment by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board,

an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of

Virginia. See Va. Code Ann. 54.1-3910 (Michie 2005).

While the Disciplinary Board is not itself a state court, the

form of the proceeding is not determinative under Rooker-

Feldman; rather, it is the nature, character, and effect of

the proceedings themselves that is controlling. Feldman,

460 U. S. at 482. In Feldman, the Supreme Court took

note of the judicial nature of state bar disciplinary

proceedings. Id. at 482 n. 15 (citing Middlesex County

Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423

(1982)).

See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U. S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Feldman Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413 (1923). The Rooker Feldman doctrine is confined

to “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of

injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before

the district court proceedings commenced and inviting

district court review and rejection of those judgments.”

Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. 544 U. S.

280, 284 (2005); see also Davani v. Virginia Dep’t of

Transp. 434 F.3d 712, 718 (4 Cir. 2006).

Additionally, this court has held that the disciplinary

board of a state bar can be considered as part of the

“system of state courts” and that their judicial decisions

are not subject to review by the federal courts. See

Allstate Ins. Co. v. West Virginia State Bar, 233 F. 3d 813,

817-18 (4 Cir. 2000) (holding Rooker-Feldman doctrine

deprived district court of jurisdiction to review decision of

West Virginia State Bar).

The Virginia State Bar is, by statue, an arm of the

Supreme Court of Virginia, and its decisions are judicial in

nature. See Allstate, 233 F. 3d at 817; see also Supreme

Court of Virginia Rule Pt. 6, Sec. IV, para. 13 (procedure

for disciplining and disbarring attorneys). In this case,

while Konan challenges the procedures of the Bar’s

Disciplinary Board, the decision by the Board was upheld

by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the appropriate court to

review such challenges. Because the Board’s function is

judicial in nature, we hold that its rulings are subject to

the Rooker- Feldman Doctrine and, therefore, not

reviewable by a federal district court. Accordingly, we

modify the district court’s dismissal to show that the case

was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and affirm the

dismissal as modified. We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

Filed September 14 2006

Raymond W. Konan,

Plaintiff

Noel D. Sengel, ESQ,

Stephen H. Ratliff, ESQ,

Karen A. Gould, ESQ,

Barbara M. Hall, ESQ,

Defendants

ORDER

For the reasons’ stated in the accompanying

Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby ordered that:

(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss alleged violation of

equal protection is GRANTED;

(2) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss alleged violation of due

process is hereby DENIED;

(3) Defendants shall file an Answer within ten (10) days

of the entry of this Order; and

(4) The clerk of the court shall forward copies of this

order to all counsel of record.

September 14th, 2006 __/s/ Judge Cacheris

Alexandria, Virginia U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THIS

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Alexandria Division

Filed September 14, 2006

Raymond W, Konan,

Plaintiff

Noel D. Sengel, ESQ,

Stephen H. Ratliff, ESQ,

Karen A. Gould, ESQ,

Barbera Sayers Lanier,

Stephen M. Hall, ESQ,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss. For the following reasons, the Court will

grant Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss with regard to the

equal protection claims, and deny Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss with regard to the due _ process. claims.

Furthermore, the defenses of collateral estoppel and

qualified immunity are not available.

I, Background

Plaintiff, Raymond W. Konan, has brought this

action against Defendants, Noel D. Sengel, Esq., Stephen

H. Ratliff, Esq., Karen A. Gould, esq., Barbara Sayers

Lanier, and Stephen M. Hall, Esq., alleging the taking of

property and liberty in violation of Due Process and Equal

Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the

United States Constitution. The action arises from the

revocation of Plaintiff's state license to practice law and the

subsequent proceedings resulting in disbarment. Plaintiff

brought an action against the defendants in their

individual capacities.

The factual basis for this action, as alleged by

Konan, is as follows: Plaintiff was a licensed member of the

Virginia State Bar, and his license was revoked upon action

by the Virginia State Bur, and his license was revoked upon

action by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board on

June 27, 2003. Defendants Sengel, Ratliff, Lanier, and

Hall were agents or employees of the Virginia State Bar

during the proceedings against Plaintiff. Ms. Sengel, a

Senior Bar Counsel in the Alexandria, VA office of the

Virginia State Bar (“VSB”), drafted the initial charges

against Plaintiff based on complaints by counsel involved in

litigation with Konan. Based on these charges, disciplinary

proceedings were intitited against Konan. During and

prior to these proceedings, Sengel falsified signatures and

certifications, acted without committee deliberation, and

withheld exculpatory evidence from Mr. Konan in bad faith.

Sengel has recently acted to obstruct Plaintiff's readmission

to the Virginia Bar.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ratliff, an attorney

who served as chair of a VSB subcommittee tasked with

certifying disciplinary charges, failed to deliberate with his

committee as required and allowed Ms. Senge! to deliberate

with his committee as required and allowed Ms. Sengel to

forge his name. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant

Lanier opened a misconduct file without the necessary

charges and certification, and assisted Sengel. Plaintiff

also alleged that defendant Karen Gould signed an order of

revocation without a full and independent evaluation of the

evidence, or a majority vote of the Board, and issued

defamatory statements against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff appealed the revocation of his license to the

Supreme Court of Virginia, which held a hearing on the

Matter January 14, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that during this

hearing, Defendant Hall, who represented the VSB,

withheld exculpatory evidence from both Plaintiff and the

Virginia Supreme Court in bad faith, and provided

inadmissible hearsay testimony.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged due

process and equal protection violations against each

defendant, individually. Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b)

(6). This motion is currently before the Court.

II. Standard of Review

A rule 12 (b) ( 6) motion to dismiss tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint (See Randall v. United States,

30 F. 3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994)), and should be denied

unless “ it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can

prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would

entitle him to relief.” De Sole v. United States, 947 F. 2d

1169, 1177 (4% Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see also

Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, “the material

allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted.”

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421, (1969) (citations

omitted). Moreover, “the complaint is to be liberally

construed in favor of plaintiff.” Jd. In addition, a motion to

dismiss must be assessed in light of rule 8’s liberal pleading

standards, which require only “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

III. Analysis

Plaintiff has alleged no facts, which if proven true,

would support an equal protection claim. A claim under

the Equal Protection Clause requires a demonstration by

the plaintiff that as a result of intentional and purposeful

discrimination, he has been treated differently than others

similarly situated. Morrison v. Garraghty, 239 F. 3d 648,

654 (4% Cir. 2001); Waters v. Bass, 304 F. Supp. 2d 802, 819

(E.D. Va. 2004). Plaintiff has alleged no facts showing

discrimination or treatment that is different from others

who are similarly situated. Plaintiff has offered only

conclusory statements that equal protection was violated,

or irrelevant facts that allege a degree of malice, but fail to

show discrimination. For the reasons stated, Plaintiff has

failed to state an equal protection claim for which relief can

be granted, and the defendants’ motion will be granted with

respect to this claim.

B. Plaintiff's Alleged Violations of Due Process

Plaintiff has properly alleged facts, which if proven

true, could result in relief for violation of due process

violation. The Constitution dictates that no individual

shall be deprived of liberty or property without due process

of law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV. Three factors are

considered to determine if due process has been afforded to

an liudividual: 1) the private interests affected; 2) the risk of

erroneous deprivation through the procedures used; and 3)

probable value of additional or substitute procedures.

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). In using

these factors to determine whether a procedural due

process violation occurred, courts must consult the “entire

panoply of predeprivation and postdeprivation provided by

the state.“ Tri-County Paving, Inc. v. Ashe County, 281 F.

3d 430, 436 (4 Cir. 2002).

Plaintiff was deprived of a property incerest in his

license to practice law, and a liberty interest in his ability

to pursue his chosen profession. Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972). Defendants argue that

nonetheless, due process was provided because notice was

given, hearings were held in which Plaintiff participated,

and an appeal was granted prior to the deprivation of his

license.

However, Plaintiff has alleged forgeries of procedural

documents, failure of committees to follow mandated

procedures, withholding and concealment of exculpatory

evidence, and obstruction of readmission. Plaintiff also

alleges a number of procedural violations violative of VSB

rules of procedure. These facts, if proven true, may show

significant deficiencies in the procedures used as well as

erroneous deprivation amounting to a due process violation.

As the defendants argue, if the state grants more

procedural rights than the Constitutions would other wise

require, the violations of state promulgated rules

themselves do not necessarily amount to constitutional

violations. Riccio v. County of Fairfax, Virginia, 907 F. 2d

1459, 1466 (4% Cir. 1990). However, whether the violation

of 2 state promulgated rule amounts to a constitutional

violation is a question of fact, fn 1, and nothing in Riccio

suggests that the state and constitutional due process rules

are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, Plaintiff has pled a

number of allegations in addition to violations of state

promulgated procedural rules which, if proven true, could

amount to a violation of due _ process. Therefore,

Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be denied with respect to

the due process claims.

1. The issve on appeal in Riccio was a summary judgment

ruling on the due prccess issue, not a motion to dismiss for failure to

state aclaim. The court found that, based on the facts presented, Riccio

had been given sufficient notice and procedural due process to satisfy

th~ United States Consittution. The Court held that “(a)lleged

violations of due process .. . are to be measured against a federal

standard of what process is due, even when those state-created

procedures exceed the process otherwise guaranteed by the

Constitution.” Jd. At 14&9.

Qualified Immunity

Defendants are not entiiled to a dismissal pursuant

to Fed. R. 12 (b) (6) based on qualified immunity.

Government officials are not entitied to the defense of

qualified immunity if: (1) the allegations underlying the

claim, if true, substantiate the violation of a federal

statutory or constitutiona!: right; and (2) this violation was

of a “clearly established” right “ of which a reasonable

person would have known.” See Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.

3d 355, 365 (4t Cir. 2003) (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U. S.

730, 736). As stated previously, Plaintiff has alleged facts

that could amount to a violation of due process, a clearly

established constitutional right. For this reason, courts

have denied qualified immunity with respect to allegations

of withholding exculpatory evidence (see Manning v. Miller,

355 F. 3d 1028, 1032-33 (7the Cir. 2004)), as well as

allegations of improperly preparing charges and misconduct

(see Kalina vu. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 122-25 (1997)), all of

which Plaintiff has alleged in this case. Consequently,

Defendants’ motion should be denied with respect to this

defense.

IV. Collateral Estoppel

Plaintiffs claims are not barred by collateral

estoppel, because the constitutional issues in questions

have not been litigated by the parties in a prior proceeding.

Prior proceedings have only addressed the disbarment

appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, and the Parties to

those proceedings were Plaintiff and the Virginia State Bar,

not the named defendants. Therefore, the defendants’

motion that ciaims are barred by collateral estoppel will be

denied.

V. Conclusicn

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion will be

granted with respect to the alleged violation of equai

protection, and denied in respect to the alleged violations of

due process. Furthermore, the defenses of collateral

estoppel and qualified immunity are not available. An

appropriate order will issue.

September 14, 2006

Alexandria, Virginia Is/ Judge Caciieris

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

In The

United States District Court for the Eastern District

of Virginia

Alexandria Division

Filed November 7 2006

Raymond W. Konan,

Plaintiff

Vv. 1:06cv175 (JCC)

Noel D. Sengel, ESQ,

Stephen H. Ratliff, ESQ,

Karen A. Gould, ESQ,

Barbara Sayers Lanier,

Stephen M. Hall, ESQ,

Defendants

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This matter comes before the Court of Defendants’

motion to reconsider in light of the Supreme Court of

Virginia’s February 13, 2004 Order, now presented to the

court. For the following reasons, the Court will grant

Defendants’ motion, and upon reconsideration will grant

Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. Background

Plaintiff, Raymond W. Konan, has brought this action

against Defendants, Noel D. Sengel, Esq., Stephen h.

Ratliff, Esq., Karen A. Gould, Esg., Barbara Sayers Lanier,

and Stephen M. Hall, Esq., alleging the taking of property

and liberty in violation of due process and equal protection

clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. The action arises from the revocation of

Plaintiff's state license to practice law and the subsequent

proceedings resulting in disbarment. Plaintiff brought an

action against Defendants in their individual capacities.

The factual basis for this action, as alleged by Konan, is

as follows: Plaintiff was a licensed member of the Virginia

State Bar, and his license was revoked by action of the

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board on June 27, 2003.

Defendants Sengel, Ratliff, Lanier, and Hall were agents or

employees of the Virginia State Bar during the proceedings

against Plaintiff. Ms. Sengel, a Senior Bar Counsel in the

Alexandria office of the Virginia State Bar (“VSB”), drafted

the initial charges against Plaintiff based on complaints by

counsel involved in litigation with Konan. Based on these

charges, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against

Konan. During and prior to these proceedings, Plaintiff

alleges that Sengel falsified signatures and certifications,

acted without committee deliberation, and withheld

exculpatory evidence from Mr. Konan in bad faith. Plaintiff

further alleges that Sengel recently acted to obstruct

Plaintiffs re-admission to the Virginia Bar.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Rathff, an attorney

who served as chair of a VSB subcommittee tasked with

certifying disciplinary charges, failed to deliberate with his

committee as required and allowed Ms. Sengel to forge his

name. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant Lanier

opened a misconduct file without the necessary charges and

certification, and assisted Sengel. Plaintiff also alleged

that Defendant Karen Gould signed an order of revocation

without a full and independent evaluation of t’ 2 evidence

or a majority vote of the Board, and issued defamatory

statements against Plaintiff.

Plaintiff appealed the revocation of his license to the

Supreme Court of Virginia, which held a hearing on the

matter January 14, 2004. Plaintiff alleges that during this

hearing, , Defendant Hall, who represented the VSB,

withheld exculpatory evidence from both Plaintiff and the

Virginia Supreme Court in bad faith, and provided

inadmissible hearsay testimony.

In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged due

process and equal protection violations against each

defendant, individually. Defendants filed a motion to

dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)

(6), but did not include the Supreme Court of Virginia’s

February 14, 2004 Order (“SCV Order”) for the court’s

consideration. On September 16, 2006, this Court granted

Defendants’ motion with respect io Plaintiffs equal

protection claims, but denied the motion with respect to the

due process claims. On September 28, 2006, Defendants

filed a motion to reconsider, and submitted the SCV Order

to the Court for consideration. Defendants now ask the

Court to reconsider its prior ruling on the motion to dismiss

Plaintiffs due process claims in light of the Order. This

motion is currently before the Court.

II. Standard of Review

Rule 60(b) allows a Court to modify an order on

grounds of mistake, inadvertence, excusable neglect, or for

any other reason justifying relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).

The decision to grant relief under Rule 60(b) is within the

sound discretion of the trial court. Transportation, Inc. v.

Mayflower Services, Inc., 769 F. 2d 952, 954 (4th Cir. 1994).

A Rule 12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss tests the legal

sufficiency of the complaint (See Randall v. United States,

30 F.3d 518, 522 (4th Cir. 1994)), and should be denied

unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove

no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle

him to relief.” De Sole v. United States, 947 F. 2d 1169,

1177 (4% Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see also Conley v.

Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, “the material

allegations of the complaint are taken as admitted.”

Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 441,421 (1969) (citations

omitted). Moreover, “ the complaint is to be liberally

construed in favor of plaintiff.” Id. In addition, a motion to

dismiss must be assessed in light of Rule 8’s liberal

pleading standards, which require only “ a short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.

III. Analysis

in the September 16, 2006 Memorandum opinion, this

Court declined to dismiss Plaintiffs due process claim,

because Plaintiff had alleged facts amounting to a due

process violation, fn 1,

1. Plaintiff alleged forgeries of procedural documents, failure of

committees to follow mandated procedures, withholding and

concealment of exculpatory evidence, and obstruction of readmission,

along with a number of procedural violations and alleged deprivations

in the procedures.

and Defendants failed to show “by a preponderance of the

evidence that the claim or issue should be precluded by the

prior judgment.” See e.g., Bates v. Devers, 202 S.E. 2d 917,

921,(Va. 1947). Because Defendants did not provide the

SCV Order for consideration, this Court concluded that

Defendants had not met their burden in establishing that

the same issues had been litigated by identical parties or

those in privity. Because the factual allegations were not

collaterally esstopped, this Court declined to dismiss the

Complaint, which pled a number of issues that could

amount to a violation of due process if proven true. See

September 14, 2006 Memorandum Opinion at 3.

Defendants now submit the Supreme Court of Virginia’s

Order for this Court’s consideration to avoid the re-

litigation of issues already decided and affirmed by the

Supreme Court of Virginia. Defendants further raise the

public policy concerns of granting disbarred attorneys a

federal forum to collaterally attack final state court rulings.

When a plaintiff fails to introduce a_ pertinent

document as part of his complaint, defendants may attach

the document to a motion to dismiss and the Court may

consider that document under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure without converting the motion to one for

summary judgment. Gasner v. County of Dinwiddie, 162

F.R.D 280, 282 (E.D. Va. 1995). While Defendants should

have provided this order to the Court prior to the

September Memorandum Opinion, this Court is

nonetheless compelled to examine it now in order to avoid

permitting the re-litigation of issues that have aireudy been

decided and affirmed. Upon review of the SCV Order, this

Court finds sufficient grounds to reconsider its prior rulings

on collateral estoppel and qualified immunity.

A. Final Judgment of Factual Allegations Comprising

Plaintiffs Due Process Claim was Rendered in the SCV

Order

Collateral estoppel precludes parties or their privies

from a prior action from re-litigating any issues of fact

decided and essential to final and valid judgment in the

prior action. Bates v. Dever, 202 S.E. 2d 917, 921 (Va.

1974). Privity generally involves a party “so identical in

interest with another that he represents the same legal

right.” Nero v. Ferris, 284 S.E.2d 828, 831 (Va. 1981). As

noted, the burden of persuasion is on the movant for

collateral estoppel to show “by a preponderance of the

evidence that the claim or issue should be precluded by the

prior judgment.” 7d. at 921.

Review of the SCV Order reveals that the factual

allegations comprising Plaintiffs due process claim were

address by the Supreme Court of Virginia which found

them essential to final judgment. The SCV Order

specifically addressed Plaintiffs allegations of forgery and

lack of jurisdiction. First, the Supreme Court considered

and found merit to the various charges against Plaintiff

initiated by Ms. Sengel on behalf of the VSB. (Def.’s Mot.

Ex. A at 4-6). Second, the Supreme Court found no error

regarding the signature and certification of charges,

holding that “the certification from the District Committee

substantially complied with the procedures set forth in the

Rules and vested the Board with jurisdiction.” (Def.‘s Mot.

Ex. A at 4). Third, the Supreme Court found no problem

with the specificity of the charges, holding that the Board

was justified in hearing the charges, and Ms. Sengel

followed appropriate procedures in prosecuting them. (Def.

‘s Mot. Ex. A at 2-5). Finally the Supreme Court affirmed

the prior ruling, holding that clear and convincing evidence

on the record supported plaintiffs disbarment, and that no

procedural violations occurred. (Def.’s Mot. Ex. A. at 2-3).

Defendants motion for reconsideration and the SCV order

both solidify the argument for privity between the parties

and the Commonwealth as well. Each party named to the

suit was an agent of the Commonwealth during the

proceedings against Plaintiff, and none were found to be

acting outside their scope of authority.

B. _.DUE PROCESS CLAIMS

Review of the SCV Order dispels any allegations that

Plaintiff was not afforded due process of law. The Due

Process Clause requires that no citizen shall be deprived of

a night without notice and opportunity to be heard.

Cleveland Board of Education v. Loundermill, 470 U. S.

532, 546 (1946). Plaintiff Konan was given notice and

opportunity to be heard on more than one occasion. The

SCV Order establishes firmly that the Supreme Court

conducted a review of the entire record prior to issuing its

ruling, and that this was the final review in a series of

hearings on Plaintiffs disbarment. (Def. “s Mot. Ex. A at

5). Furthermore, the factual allegations that would

comprise a due process claim mentioned above were

previously litigated and finally decided by the Supreme

Court of Virginia. As the SCV

Order makes clear, Plaintiff was given notice and

opportunity to be heard, and no errors or flaws were found

in the underlying proceedings. Accordingly Plaintiffs due

process claims against Noel Sengel (Count [), Stephen

Raliff (Count IT), Barbara Lanier (Count II]), Karen Gould

(Count IV), and Stephen Hall (Count IV) will be dismissed.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to

reconsider will be granted, and upon reconsideration

Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be granted. An

appropriate order will issue.

November 7, 2006

Alexandria, Virginia /s/ Judge Cacheris

U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Case: 06-2308 Document: 35 Date filed 09/07/2007

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

Raymond W. Konan,

Plaintiff — Appellant

Versus

Noel D. Sengel, Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar;

Stephen H. Ratliff, Chair-Designate District

Subcommittee, Virginia State Bar; Karen A. Gould,

Chairperson, Disciplinary Board Virginia State Bar;

Barbara Sayers Lanier, Clerk of Disciplinary System,

Virginia State Bar; Stephen M. Hall, Assistant Attorney

General, Commonwealth of Virginia

Defendants — Appellees

and

Elizabeth B. Lacy; Leroy Roundtree Hassell; Barbara

Milano Keenan; Lawrence L. Koontz, Jr.; Donald

Lemons; G. Steven agree; Cynthia D. Kinser,

Justices Of Supreme Court of Virginia

Defendants

On petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc

The appellant’s petition for rehearing and rehearing en

banc was submitted to this Court. As no member of this

Court or the panel requested a poll on the petition for

rehearing en banc, and as the panel considered the petition

for rehearing and is of the opinion that it should be denied,

It is ordered that the petition for rehearing and

rehearing en banc is denied.

Entered for a panel composed of Judge Wilkinson,

Judge Gregory, and Judge Shedd.

For the Court,

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk

Sept. 7, 2007

MANDATE

The judgment of this Court, entered 7/6/07, takes effect

this date. A certified copy of this Court’s judgment and

a copy of its decision are issued to the district court and

constitute the mandate of this court.

/s/ Patricia S Connor

CLERK

14th Amendment to U.S. Constitution

1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and

subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges

or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

42 U.S.C. 1983. Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statue, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or

the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and

laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,

suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except

that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an

act or omission taken in sucn officer’s judicial capacity,

injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory

decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a statue of the District of Columbia.

28 U.S.C. 1331. Federal question

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all

civil actions under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the

United States.

28 U.S.C. 1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari;

certified questions

Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the

Supreme Court by the following methods:

(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any

party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition

of judgment or decree;

(2) By certification at any time by a court of appeals of any

question of law in any civil or criminal case as to which

instructions are desired, and upon such certification the

Supreme Court may give binding instructions or require

the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire

matter in controversy.

28 U.S.C. 1343. Civil rights and elective franchise

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction

of any civil action authorized by law to be

commenced by any person:

(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or

property, because of the deprivation of any

right or privilege of a citizen of the United

States, by any act done in furtherance of any

conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title

42;

(2) To recover damages from any person who fails

to prevent or to aid in preventing any wrongs

mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42 which he

had knowledge were about to occur and power

to prevent;

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any

State law, statute, oridance, regulation,

custom or usage, of any right, privilege or

immunity secured by the Constitution of the

United States or by any Act of Congress

providing for equal rights of citizens or of all

persons within the jurisdiction of the United

States;

(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or

other relief under any Act of Congress

pru-"ding for the _ protection of civil rights,

including the right to vote.

(b) For purposes of this section —

(1) the District of Columbia shall be considered to

be a State; and

(2) any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to

the District of Columbia shall be considered to

be a statue of the District of Columbia.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Raymond W. Konan

438 Lexingdale Drive

Orlando, Fl 32828

Plaintiff,

Noei D. Sengel, Esq

Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar (VSB)

100 N. Pitt Street, #310

Alexandria, VA 22314-3133

Stephen H. Ratliff, Esq.

“Chair-Designate”

District Subcommittee

Virginia State Bar (VSB)

10511 Judicial Drive

Fairfax, VA 22030-5172

Karen A. Gould, Esq.

Chaiperson, Disciplinary Board

McSweeney, Crump Lawfirm

P.O. Box 1463

Richmond, VA 23218

Barbara Sayers Lanier

Clerk of Disciplinary System

Virginia State Bar

107 East Main Street, #1500

Richmond, BA 23219-2800

Stephen M. Hall, Esq.

Assistant Attorney General

Commonwealth of Virginia

900 E. Main Street

Richmond, VA 232219

AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR VIOLATIONS OF U.S

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Re: REVOKED LAW LICENSE

June 20, 2006

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff complains that the Defendants have taken and

withhold the property of his Virginia law license through

actions, enter color of state law, but contrary to their

official duties and beyond Virginia law, in selective

discrimination, basea on mistakes of fact and errors of law,

resulting in violations of Due Process and Equal Protection

of Law guaranteed by the United States Constitution. In

publications, Defendants wrongly claim dishonesty, bad

character, and Plaintiffs inability and ineligibility to

practice law. Now, in failing to recognize and correct their

wrongful actions, done without jurisdiction, commenced

and concluded in deception, Defendants are preventing

Plaintiff attorney from being reinstated in the Virginia Bar.

Plaintiff seeks compensation and corrective actions

pursuant to his rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the United

States Constitution.

JURISDICTION

This court has jurisdiction over this claim of

unconstitutional actions under color of state law

depriving Plaintiff attorney of his property in his law

license, causing revocation of other bar memberships

denying Plaintiff attorney the liberty to practice his

chosen profession--law. 42 U.S.C. 1983, 28 U.S.C. 1331,

and 28 U.S.C. 1343. This case presents issues of both

federal law (42 USC 1988) and the U.S. Constitution,

~amely Due Process and Equal Protection of Law as

guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment.

The United States Supreme Court has ruled that

admission to a stave bar “ is justiciable” per U.S.

Constitution, Article III Sec. 2.

The Virginia Supreme Court, hampered by deception at

the beginning and at the end of disciplinary

proceedings in Virginia, failed to grant any remedy on

the narrower issue of invalid law license revocation

that Plaintiff brought there with only the Virginia

State Bar as the defendant, and before the full facts of

deception were revealed.

The United States Supreme Court did not have time to

review that narrower state court issue so it did not

grant a petition for certiorari. There has been no court

review for remedies provided by 42 U.S.C. 1983 for

violations of Due Process and Equal Protection. This

U.S. Court’s jurisdiction has recently been clarified and

affirmed by the United States Supreme Court’s and our

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Davani v. Virginia

Dept. of Transportation, 434 F. 3d 712 (4b Cir, 2006)

decided on January 17, 2006, applying the decisions in

Exxon Mobile Corp. et al v. Saudi Basic Industries

Corp, No. 03-1696, 544 U.S ___ (2005), and Lanee, et

al. v. Dennis, No. 05-555, decided February 21, 2006.

This is the first action against any of the named

individual Defendants, all sued in their individual

capacities for acting outside of their jurisdiction, duties,

and authority, violating Plaintiffs property interest in

his law license, violating the fundamental liberty to

practice one’s profession, while defaming Plaintiff with

falsehoods, ruining his good name, and destroying

scores of client contracts for legal representation, and

still refusing to correct their wrongful actions.

The U.S. Constitutional issues raised among the

parties in this action have not been addressed or

decided by any other court, not with respect to these

parties, or any other party. This will be the first

judicial review of the alleged United States

Constitutional violations of these Defendants. This is

the first adjudication of these claims for relief.

PARTIES

Plaintiff Raymond W. Konan is an attorney, whose

license to practice law in Virginia (Bar License No.

38366) was revoked by the Virginia State Bar (VSB)

Disciplinary Board on June 27, 2003. He claims

remedies under 42 U.S.C. 1983.

Defendant Noel Sengel is a Senior Bar Counsel in the

Alexandria, Virginia, Office of the Virginia State Bar

(VSB). She drafted charges against Plaintiff attorney

Konan, based on allegations of two opposing counsel

who were representing reputed foreign criminals who

sued Plaintiff Konan’s newspaper clients, and then Ms.

Sengel certified those charges as charges of a VSB

subcommittee. She prosecuted those charges in the

VSB Disciplinary Hearing that resulted, seeking, and

obtaining a revocation of Plaintiffs license to practice

law in Virginia.

Defendant Stephen H. Ratliff is an attorney in Fairfax,

Virginia, who apparently served as chair of a Virginia

State Bar (VSB) subcommittee that had the authority

to make and certify charges of misconduct for hearings

in the VSB Disciplinary Board. He reportedly gave an

“okay’ to Bar Counsel Sengel to sign his name on the

charges she drafted and certified as VSB subcommittee

action.

. Defendant Barbara Sayers Lanier is the clerk of the

Virginia State Bar (VSB) Disciplinary System. She

opened the disciplinary case on the charges from Bar

Counsel, she arranged for the hearing of the

Disciplinary Board that revoked Plaintiff's law license,

and directed the publication of a Memorandum Order of

law license revocation that attacks Plaintiff's honesty

and fitness to practice law.

. Defendant Karen A. Gould is an attorney in Richmond,

Virginia, who served as the chair person for the VSB

Disciplinary Board that revoked Plaintiff attorney’s law

license of June 27, 2003. She signed a Memorandum

Order of license revocation that has been widely

published which attacks Plaintiffs honesty and fitness

to practice iaw.

. Defendant Stephen Hall is an attorney working in the

office of the State Attorney General. He represented

the Virginia State Bar when Plaintiff appealed his law

license revocation to the Supreme Court of Virginia,

and he alsvu provided hearsay testimony at that court’s

hearing on January 14, 2004.

. These parties have not been parties together in any

prior litigation. These federal claims have not been

litigated before in any other forum.

PARTIES IN INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY

14. The individuals named as Defendants in the style of

this case are all sued in their individual capacities,

although identified with their official state positions,

for convenience, and to indicate that they acted under

color of state law.

. Plaintiff claims that the Defendants individually and

collectively acted outside of their prescribed official

duties, without jurisdiction and without authority, and

they individually and collectively violated well-

established U.S. Constitutional rights.

Plaintiffs Claim

. Plaintiff Raymond W. Konan, an attorney, whose

license to practice law in Virginia (Bar License No.

38366) was revoked by the Virginia State Bar

Disciplinary Board on June 27, 2003, brings this

complaint against the named Defendants, who all

played a part of the revocation and the keeping of

Plaintiff in a position of ineligibility to get his license

back, or even to be eligible to reapply for admission to

the Virginia State Bar—all in violation of Virginia law

and violating the United State Constitution,

particularly Due Process and Equal Protection of Law,

as provided in the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.

Constitution. The Defendants’ individual violations of

duty, state law, and the U.S. Constitution are described

below.

. Plaintiff complains that all of the Defendants are

responsible for the publication of false and defamatory

information about Plaintiff from the disciplinary

proceedings that were started and ended with

deception, conducted without jurisdiction and without

due process, denying Plaintiff equal protection of law,

which publication is full of false facts and errors of law.

. That continuing defamation by publication in paper

dissemination and on the internet attacks Plaintiff's

honesty, integrity, character, and fitness to practice

law. It is hurting his standing in the community. It

steals his good name. It greatly limits his employment,

even in areas outside the practice of law. It needs to be

corrected.

. The following facts show that there has been a near

total disregard for the Rules of the Virginia State Bar

Disciplinary System, Virginia law, and U.S.

Constitution from the bottom all the way up to the top

of the Disciplinary System.

. The revocation of his law license stopped Plaintiff from

practicing law, his chosen profession, for which he

spent 9 years in some of the nation’s most demanding

universities (University of California, Berkeley, Johns

Hopkins, and Cornell) acquiring his academic

credentials, and after 33 years of professional life and

public service.

. The revocation of Plaintiff's law license stopped him

from earning his living by the practice of law. When

Plaintiff's income dropped below what was needed to

pay his two mortgages and his condo fees for his home

and office, he had to sell them and relocate to a lower-

cost area.

. The revocation of Plaintiff's law license immediately

ended the contracts for legal representation that

Plaintiff had with scores of clients, who had chosen

Plaintiff as their advocate. Some of them lost their

claims and cases, because they could not find another

attorney to represent them. Their fundamental rights

to legal representation were harmed.

23. Plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia to

have the revocation of law license declared invalid, but

there was deception in that supreme court proceeding:

First, from Bar Counsel Sengel’s false certification of

charges of misconduct, Second, from Assistant Attorney

General Stephen Hall’s brief that was full of errors ot

facts and law, Third, Bar Counsel Sengel’s misleading

affidavit of December 30, 2003, suggesting proper

authorization for her charges of misconduct, and

Fourth, deception from Stephen Hall of the Attorney

General’s Office, representing the Virginia State Bar,

when he gave false hearsay testimony that there was a

proper authorization for Bar Counsel to sign her

charges (signing another’s name) as actions of a proper

VSB committee. Those descriptions misled the state

justices into errors that side-tracked a narrower state

remedy from state court.

. Plaintiff claims that the actions and inactions of the

Defendants show either total disregard for the law and

complete incompetence, or deliberate illegal acts, in

violation of Due Process and Equal Protection. Either

Plaintiff was singled out for unfair and discriminatory

treatment in violation of equal protection of law, or the

Virginia State Bar Disciplinary System is a lawless

system operated outside of the Virginia State and

United States Constitutions.

WRONGS OF DEFENDANT BAR COUNSEL

NOEL SENGEL

. Defendant Bar Counsel Noel Sengel induced the

Defendant VSB Disciplinary System Clerk Lanier to

wrongly require Plaintiff to answer Bar Counsel’s

vague “charges” of attorney misconduct (VSB Docket

Numbers 00-052-3465 and 001-052-0361) that did not

provide a “clear and concise” statement of charges,

which the VSB Disciplinary Board Rules of Procedure

expressly required.

. Defendant Bar Counsel Sengel induced that Clerk to

wrongly require Plaintiff to answer “charges” of

misconduct that came from Bar Counsel, herself, when

the clerk of the disciplinary system knew or should

have known that Bar Counsel had no authority to make

and certify charges to the Disciplinary Board, because

that was beyond her duties, authority, and proper role.

. Defendant Bar Counsel induced the Clerk to require

Plaintiff to answer “charges” that did not come from the

only source that could give jurisdiction to the

Disciplinary Board, namely a proper district committee

of the Virginia State Bar.

. Defendant Bar Counsel made her “charges” appear to

be charges from a proper jurisdiction-giving district

subcommittee by putting them under the letterhead of

the subcommittee, not her or her office’s letterhead.

. Defendant Bar Counsel sought to conceal the fact that

the “charges” only came from her, not the proper

subcommittee, by signing not her own name, but the

name of the chair designate of a VSB subcommittee, “

Stephen H. Ratliff’ under the Fifth District committee

name, and above the typed name “Stephen H. Ratliff.”

. Bar Counsel Sengel labeled her charges with the word

“CERTIFICATION,” but it was only she who prepared

and signed the “CERTIFICATION” while she knew

that under the applicable Rules, only the subcommittee

could make or certify charges of misconduct to give the

Disciplinary Board jurisdiction.

. Bar Counsel, herself, then had her “charges” with her

“certification” of them sent directly to the clerk of the

disciplinary system, knowing that they were disguised

to make it appear to be charges and certification from

the jurisdiction-giving VSB subcommittee, when they

were not. (Subcommittee acts only in quorum.)

. Defendant Bar Counsel knew from years of experience

that a Disciplinary Board Hearing would result in the

normal course from her conveyed “charges” and

“certification” and it did.

. Bar Counsel Sengel pressed forward at the Disciplinary

Board Hearing and asked for the Board to revoke

Plaintiff's law license, and her request was granted.

. Bar Counsel has stated that she got an approval from

one member of the subcommittee (some 14 months

after a purported subcommittee meeting, for which

there is no record) giving her “permission” to sign the

name of the subcommittee chair designate on her

“charges” and her “certifications.”

. All the while, Bar Counsel knew that the rules clearly

stated that the subcommittee can act only in quorum

with all three members deliberating together. She had

no indication that the members had so deliberated, or

so acted, on her “charges and certification.” She knew

or should have know that the members never

deliberated on her “charges’ and “certification,” which

they never even saw.

. In her vague “charges” and in the VSB Disciplinary

Board Hearing, Defendant Bar counsel Sengel seemed

to suggest that the following were violations of law,

proper procedure, or standards of conduct (but none

were, in fact):

A. Filing a lawsuit, as the client requested,

stating facts as received and believed that met

each requirement of each count included.

. Filing a motion to reconsider after a judge

summarily dismissed the claims with no

evidentiary hearing, and no explanation, when

the claims met legal requirements, and all

alleged facts stated were to be taken as true,

not untrue, for purposes of considering

summary dismissal.

. Conveying a client’s confidential offer of

settlement, which the courts and Virginia law

encourage, that included counsel in a proposed

release of liability (like the insurance company

release do).

. Conveying a confidential offer of settlement,

which the opposing counsel says he deemed

too high and said he felt it was “extortion,“

when it was only 2 per cent of what his client

was Claiming.

. Filing a motion to obtain the name of a court

reporter hired by opposing counsel for a trial,

so the client could order a copy of the trial

transcript, after opposing counsel repeatedly

and improperly refused to divulge the name,

when Virginia Supreme Court Rules state

anyone can get a transcript.

. Requesting attorney fees for a client who was

dismissed from a case on the last work day

vefore trial, within the 21 days time of

continuing judicial authority of the matter.

. Making a motion for permission to file an

amicus curiae, friend of court, brief in a case of

the number- one-most-wanted criminal from

Russia suing Izvestia newspaper in Arlington

County Court, when the defendant newspaper

was unrepresented and not present, and the

Supreme Court Rules and Virginia court

practice welcome such friends of court.

Being ruled in contempt by a Circuit Court

judge for not fully and very quickly paying in

less than 30 days sanctions in a judgment,

when no due date was stated, and payments

were being made at more than 25% per month.

I. Writing a letter to opposing counsel requesting

payment on a valid and clerk-certified order of

the court awarding attorney fees as the client

requested, and as the judge explained were

justified.

Defendant Bar Counsel used these as phony bases for

law license revocation, when none of these actions of the

Plaintiff can fairly be deemed violations of law, proper

procedure, or standards of conduct. Defendant Bar

Counsel knew or should have known that.

37. Bar Counsel Sengel also deliberately and

systematically withheld exculpatory evidence that

she had a duty to report to Plaintiff when requested.

Instead of reporting the exculpatory information, she

falsely denied knowing any. Plaintiff was prejudiced

by Bar Counsel’s withholding exculpatory evidence

that contradicted her suggested ethical lapses by

Plaintiff.

38. Bar Counsel was motivated by malice, spite, anda

desire to retaliate against Plaintiff for questioning

her positions and procedures in earlier controversies

involving Plaintiff and her. That, more than facts

and law, dominated her actions.

39. Despite her knowledge of and her creation of all of

these flaws and violations of Virginia law and

Plaintiffs rights, Defendant Bar Counsel requested

the Disciplinary Board to revoke Plaintiff's license to

practice law in Virginia, and the Board complied.

40. Defendant Sengel may have drafted or assisted in

the drafting of the libelous Memorandum Order of

license revocation (dated July 10, 2003) after she

knew or should have known that it reported action

taken without jurisdiction, reflected errors of fact

and of law, and that the license revocation was

obtained without jurisdiction by her deception.

.The Memorandum Order followed in the normal

course from Bar Counsel’s manipulation in the

Disciplinary Board. That defamatory Memorandum

Order impugned Plaintiff's honesty, morality,

character, and fitness to practice law with ill-based

conclusions from an unfair Hearing, without

jurisdiction, and Defendant Bar Counsel knew that,

or she should have known that.

42.This was the culmination of Defendant Bar Counsel’s

campaign of harassment directed selectively against

Plaintiff, driven by spite and malice that lasted for

years, and involved other ill-based accusations. Her

conduct was arbitrary and capricious, callous and

wanton. It shocked the conscience and is repugnant

to any fair-minded member of the community.

43. It appears that no Virginia Bar Counsel before or

after had sought any attorney’s disbarment with

such a paucity of charges of attorney wrong-doing

and with so much deception. Her actions were

discriminatory actions against Plaintiff.

44. Although she did all of these things under the color

of her official position, they were contrary to her

duties, outside her authority, and contrary to

Virginia law, due process and equal protection of

law. Ms. Sengel acted in disregard for law and with

complete incompetence, or she deliberately violated

Plaintiffs Constitutional rights.

. Defendant Bar Counsel Sengel caused the damages

from Plaintiff's loss of his law license, including lost

income, public humiliation, loss of reputation,

mental anguish, attorney fees and costs in defending

against her charges and seeking the federal claim

remedies of this action. She is obstructing Plaintiffs

readmission to the Virginia Bar.

Wrongs of Defendant VSB Subcommittee Chair

Stephen Ratliff

46. Defendant VSB subcommittee chair Stephen Ratliff

did not deliberate in a group of three subcommittee

members on Bar Counsel’s “charges” of Plaintiff

attorney misconduct, or on her “certification” of her

charges.

47.Neither Mr., Ratliff, nor his committee, created any

official document or record that indicates that any

such deliberation or any meeting ever took place.

48.At most, Defendant Ratliff may have given an oral

“okay” to Bar Counsel Noel Sengel to sign his name

on charges against Plaintiff that she, herself,

prepared, and she, herself, signed to certify.”

49.Stephen Ratliff knew, or should have known, that an

oral “okay” has not sufficient for someone else to sign

his name on an official document of such importance

to the Bar, to Plaintiff, and to many attorney’s

clients who could have their contracts for legal

representation abruptly terminated by the

Disciplinary Board.

50. Mr. Ratliff knew that his Virginia Staite Bar

subcommittee could take action only in a quorum,

with all three members deliberating together, as per

clearly stated Supreme Court and Disciplinary

Rules.

51. If Mr. Ratliff did give some kind of an “okay” for Bar

Counsel’s charges or certification, he knew that it

was without authority because he knew that his

subcommittee could only take action with all three

members deliberating together and that never

happened on Bar Counsel’s charges and her

certification of charges in this case.

52.Mr. Ratliff knew or should have known that neither

he, nor his subcommittee, had the power to delegate

to Bar Counsel the authority of his subcommittee to

make or certify charges of attorney misconduct,

because there was no such delegation authority.

53. Mr. Ratliff, as an experienced attorney, could see

that Bar Counsel’s prepared “charges” were vague on

their face, not “clear and concise” charges that the

Rules required.

54. Defendant Stephen Ratliff acted in total disregard

for the law and with complete incompetence, or he

knowingly joined Bar Counsel Sengel in deliberate

violations of official VSB duties, the law, and

Plaintiffs legal and U.S. Constitutional rights, which

any reasonable person in his position would know.

Wrongs of VSB Disciplinary System Clerk

Barbara Sayers Lanier

55. VSB Disciplinary System clerk Barbara Sayers

Lanier opened a misconduct file on Plaintiff based on

Defendant Bar Counsel Sengel’s “charges” that were

received directly from Bar Counsel.

56. VSB Clerk Lanier knew that she had no authority to

do so, because she knew that the VSB Disciplinary

Board Rules of Procedure that regulated her work

did not authorize or permit it.

57.Clerk Lanier opened a misconduct file of Plaintiff

without the needed charges of misconduct and

certification from the subcommittee that the Rules

required.

58. Clerk Lanier knew the applicable rules, but she

ignored them.

59. Clerk Lanier had no record of any kind from the

subcommittee, itself.

60. Clerk Lanier sent to Plaintiff the “charges” of

attorney misconduct that she received from Bar

Counsel Sengel, without checking to see if they were

clear and concise, as clearly and expressly required

by the disciplinary rules.

61.Clerk Lanier knew that only “clear and concise”

charges were authorized by the rules, but she

ignored the rules in sending Bar Counsel’s vague

charges to Plaintiff.

62.On the basis of the “charges” from Bar Counsel, and

with nothing from the VSB subcommittee, itself,

defendant Clerk Lanier proceeded to arrange for a

disciplinary Hearing. She required Plaintiff to

attend or be subject to a default.

63.She did those things in her role as the VSB Clerk of

the Disciplinary System.

64. Plaintiff informed Clerk Lanier that there were

problems witn charges from Bar Counsel before the

Disciplinary Board Hearing, but she sought no

clarification or other correction.

65. Plaintiff explained to Clerk Lanier that there were

problems with the Disciplinary Board proceedings

after the Hearing, but she sought no correction or

remedy.

66. Defendant Clerk Lanier proceeded to arrange or

authorize the publication of the Memorandum Order

of law license revocation, dated July 10, 2003.

67.Clerk Lanier knew that it criticized Plaintiffs

honesty and character, and that it concluded that

Plaintiff was unfit to practice law in Virginia.

68. Clerk Lanier did not check to see if the conclusions of

the Disciplinary Board were supported by clear and

convincing evidence in the record.

69. These facts show that either Clerk Lanier was

completely incompetent and recklessly disregarding

the Rules, the law, and Plaintiffs rights, or she was

knowingly an accomplice to Bar Counsel Sengel’s

deception and wrongful acts, violating due process

and equal protection. She is responsible for the

damages Plaintiff has suffered and is suffering from

being deprived of his law license property, his liberty

to practice his profession, and his good name and

reputation, all taken from him by her and others.

Wrongs of Disciplinary Board Chair

Karen Gould

70. Defendant Karen Gould, acting as the Chair and

spokesperson of the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary

Board, commenced the Disciplinary Hearing on the

charges that were prepared by Defendant Bar

Counsel, without requiring that the charges be a

“clear and concise” statement of alleged misconduct.

71.Ms. Gould knew that “clear and concise” charges

were required by the disciplinary Rules.

72. Defendant Gould commenced a disciplinary hearing

on the “charges,” without requiring that they come

from the VSB subcommittee was authorized to make

them and to certify them for the Disciplinary Board.

73. Defendant Gould, as chair of the disciplinary

Hearing, did not state a summary of the alleged

misconduct, the nature and purpose of the hearing,

the procedures to be followed during the hearing and

the dispositions available to the board following the

hearing, while knowing that the Rules required it.

74. Defendant Gould allowed the application of res

judicata to indicate misconduct by the Plaintiff. She

led or permitted the Board members to conclude that

attorney misconduct had already been determined

for her proceedings by others in other forums. Res

judicata was applied to make clear and convincing

evidence unneeded. She determined that a careful

review of the actual evidence in support or against

was not unnecessary. She and the Board refused

Plaintiff's pleas to the contrary.

75. Defendant Gould, issued a brief order revoking

Plaintiffs license to practice law in Virginia on June

27, 2003, at the end of the Disciplinary Hearing.

76. Before doing so, Ms. Gould did not check to be sure

that the Board had jurisdiction over the matter by a

proper certification of charges of misconduct from a

VSB subcommittee.

77. Defendant Gould signed an order of law license

revocation without a full independent evaluation of

the evidence in the exhibits and arguments

presented.

78. Defendant Gould unilaterally signed and issued a

detailed Memorandum Order of law license

revocation on July 10, 2003, without first getting a

majority of the members of the Board to sign onto it,

or to see it and vote on it.

79. Defendant Gould’s Memorandum Order contains a

number of misstatements of facts and errors of law.

It was recklessly and carelessly composed.

80. Defendant Gould knew that her signed revocation

Order would be publicized. She knew that her

Memorandum Order would be published in print and

on the internet in the normal course, as an expected

result of her actions. She knew it would damage

Plaintiff.

81.These facts indicate that Defendant Board Chair

Gould’s actions were taken with reckless disregard to

applicable law and were plainly incompetent, or they

were knowing violations of her VSB duties, the law,

and Plaintiffs legal and U.S. Constitutional rights,

which any reasonable person in her position would

know.

82. Defendant Gould knew that what she wrote about

Plaintiff would defame him. She knew that it would

herm his reputation among his peers, his friends,

anc the community, because it attacked his honesty,

character, and fitness to practice law, and it even

included reference to criminal conduct. Her actions

make her responsible for the resulting damages to

Plaintiff, including loss of license, loss of income,

public humiliation, loss of good standing in the

community, mental anguish, and costs of and

expenses of the earlier proceedings and this action

for damages and remedies.

Wrongs of Defendant

Assistant Attorney General Stephen Hall

.Defendant Assistant Attorney General Stephen Hall

(AG Hall), acting as counsel to the Virginia state

Bar, requested, under color of state law, that the

Supreme Court of Virginia uphold the Disciplinary

Board’s revocation of Plaintiffs license to practice

law, when he knew or should have known that many

of his statements of fact and law were completely

false.

.In his VSB representation, Mr. Stephen Hall

withheld exculpatory evidence from Plaintiff and

from the Virginia Supreme Court.

85. Defendant AG Hall stated that the “charges” from

Bar Counsel Sengel were “clear and concise,” when

any lawyer can see that they were not. No conduct

reported in the “charges” of Bar Counsel was

identified as challenged or questioned as misconduct.

None was identified as violating any rules of

professional conduct.

86.In his Supreme Court brief, AG Hall stated

repeatedly that Plaintiff went judge shopping, going

to another judge to get a different result after one

judge had ruled. There was no support in the record

for the repeated distortion. He refused to correct it.

87.AG Hall contended that Bar Counsel Sengel’s

“charges” came from the VSB subcommittee in a

proper way, when the record contained no support for

that. The facts are opposite. They were Bar

Counsel’s charges, with only a Bar Counsel

“certification,” with Bar Counsel having signed

someone else’s name to them, with no power of

attorney.

88.AG Hall told the Virginia Supreme Court in the oral

argument of January 14, 2004, in Plaintiff's appeal,

that there was always a written authorization from

the VSB subcommittee for Bar Counsel to sign

“charges” in their name and on behalf of the

subcommittee, although the official record showed

none, and no one could find any in this case. That

late, hearsay report to the justices was false. That

false report influenced the justices’ finding of “no

error’ in the Disciplinary Board’s decision. That

obstructed even the narrow state remedy sought is

state court.

89.AG Hall argued that the “charges” had been handled

properly by the subcommittee, when the record

showed that they had not acted at all on them.

90.AG Hall argued in the Virginia Supreme Court that

91.

the Disciplinary Board had followed proper

procedures, when the facts and the record shoed

otherwise.

AG Hall had sufficient information for him to know

that the Disciplinary Board had proceeded without

jurisdiction over Plaintiff's matters, making its

ruling null and void. If he did not have it on January

14, 2004, he has that knowledge now, but there are

still no corrections forthcoming from the Attorney

General’s Office.

92.The facts show that AG Hall’s described actions

were, at best, in reckless disregard for the law and

plainly incompetent, or they were knowing violations

of his official duties, the law, and Plaintiffs legal and

Constitutional rights. Any reasonable person in his

position would know that. His actions were

arbitrary and capricious, callous and wanton,

representing a gross abuse of power, repugnant to

any reasonable member of the community.

93.Mr. Hall bears and shares the responsibility for the

damages suffered by Plaintiff from his law license

revocation and the related defamation in the

Memorandum Order, which continues uncorrected.

Errors of Virginia Supreme Court Justices

. Plaintiff appealed the law license revocation to the

Virginia Supreme Court in 2003. In that forum,

Plaintiff explained the false facts and flawed

procedures of the Disciplinary Board proceedings,

conducted without jurisdiction, because jurisdiction

comes only from a certification of charges from a VSB

district subcommittee.

95. Deceived by the misrepresentations of Defendant Bar

Counsel and by Defendant Assistant Attorney

General Stephen Hall, as described above, instead of

correcting the license-revocation action of the

Disciplinary Board, the named justices (or one of

them acting in the names of all) found “no error’ in

the Disciplinary Board’s proceedings.

96. They were led to believe, falsely, that Bar Counsel’s

charges and Bar Counsel’s certification of her

charges were proper actions of the subcommittee.

Failing to see that error, the Virginia justices gave

no remedy.

.U. S. District Court review of alleged

unconstitutional actions in a state bar disciplinary

case may be preferable to state court action, in any

case, because the state court has almost a parent-

child relationship with the attorney disciplinary

system it has created, and which it monitors, with

obvious conflict of interest concerns.

COUNT I. DEFENDANT NOEL SENGEL’S

VIOLATIONS

98.All of the above paragraphs, with special emphasis

on paragraph 25-45, are incorporated in this Court [,

Defendant Noel Sengle’s Violations.

99.The stated facts show that Defendant Bar Counsel

acted outside her duties and norma! functions as Bar

Counsel, usurping the role of the VSB subcommittee,

without authority to do so, then proceeding to

request and get plaintiffs law license revoked in a

Disciplinary Board Hearing that she knew, or should

have known, had no jurisdiction, had not followed its

own rules, and had not provided Due Process or

Equal Protection of law.

. Her vague “charges” of attorney misconduct identified

no act or omission as a violation. They were confusing

to Plaintiff and to the Disciplinary Board. They did not

meet legal requirements for fair notice, not the legal

requirements of rules of the Disciplinary System, and

not state and U.S. Constitutional requirements of Due

Process and Equal Protection.

. Practicing deception, she disguised her charges as those

of a VSB subcommittee, by signing not her own name,

but forging the name of the subcommittee chair.

. She continued her deception in the Supreme Court of

Virginia by providing a misleading Affidavit that

suggested that she had subcommittee authorization,

when she did not. She may also have been a party to

the misrepresentations to the Supreme Court that were

presented in writing and orally by Assistant Attorney

General Stephen Hall.

. In the Disciplinary Board Hearing she presented

numerous actions of Plaintiff as improper, when they

were not, which she knew or should have known.

. With no clear and convincing evidence of any serious

wrong-doing, which the Disciplinary Rules required,

she dominated and manipulated the disciplinary

system to deprive Plaintiff of his license, his livelihood,

and his good name and reputation.

. She singled out plaintiff for vindictive, discriminatory

treatment. She then proceeded in an arbitrary and

capricious manner, recklessly disregarding her duties

and the law, grossly abusing her power, and violating

Plaintiff's U.S. Constitutional rights to due process and

equal protection. More that anyone, she is responsible

and hable to Plaintiff for the damages that he suffered

in lost income, costs and attorney fees, loss of standing

in the community, public humiliation, mental aguish

and emotional] distress, and she should pay punitive

damages, as well, because her actions need to be

punished, and others need to be deterred from such

illegal conduct that shocks the conscience and is

repugnant to any reasonable member of the

community.

COUNT Il. DEFENDANT STEPHEN RATLIFF’S

VIOLATIONS

106. All of the above paragraphs, with special emphasis on

107.

108.

paragraphs 46-54, are incorporated in this Count II,

Defendant Stephen Ratliffs Violations. They show that

Mr. Ratliff acted under color of state law, but outside of

his authority and outside of the law, with respect to

Bar Counsel’s “charges” against Plaintiff.

The stated facts show that Defendant Stephen Ratliff

acted in disregard for the disciplinary rules and rules of

law and with complete incompetence, or he was

knowingly complicit in Bar Counsel Sengel’s deception

about her charges and certification being the

subcommittee’s. That deprived Plaintiff of a Grand

Jury type review of allegations before they were filed,

and before Plaintiff had to answer them. A good review

by the members of the subcommittee would have or

could have reduced the vague insinuations of Bar

Counsel’s “charges” and clarified them to a clear and

concise charge, to which Plaintiff was entitled.

A cover up by suggesting a delegation of his

committee’s functions to Bar Counsel cannot work,

because that would be an improper by-pass of a due

process safeguard, and there was no delegation

authority had by the subcommittee. It was Mr. Ratliff's

duty to know that, and to proceed accordingly. He

knowingly ignored the rules.

109. Mr. Ratliff may have personally approved of Bar

Counsel’s vague “charges” of attorney misconduct, but

they were not approved by his committee, and they did

not conform to the requirements of the disciplinary

rules.

. By permitting and supporting Bar Counsel’s usurpation

and deception, Mr. Ratliff bears responsibility for the

U. S. Constitutional violations that resulted, and he is

liable for the very extensive damages to Plaintiff that

followed.

. Mr. Ratliff may also share responsibility for Bar

Counsel’s deceptive Affidavit of December 30, 2003,

that appears to have misled the Virginia Supreme

Court into thinking that the subcommittee had

approved Bar Counsel’s charges and authorized them

for certification to the Disciplinary Board. That side-

tracked an earlier remedy that could have come from

the Virginia Supreme Court, greatly reducing the

damages in this Federal claim for violations of

Constitutional rights.

Accordingly, Mr. Ratliff is responsible for the continued

deprivation caused to Plaintiff by the withholding of his

law license, and for the damages from the defamation

that continues along with it, as expected, in the normal

course that his actions set, or let a vindictive Bar

Counsel set.

Mr. Ratliff is responsible and liable to Plaintiff for the

damages he suffered in lost income, costs and attorney

fees, loss of standing in the community, public

humiliation, mental anguish, and he should pay

punitive damages, as well, because his actions need to

be punished, and others need to be deterred from such

arbitrary and capricious conduct that is callous and

wanton, violating fundamental rights, and repugnant

to any decent member of the community.

113.

114.

115.

116.

COUNT III. DEFENDANT BARBARA SAYERS

LANIER’S VIOLATIONS

All of the above paragraphs, with special emphasis on

paragraphs 55-62, are incorporated in this Count III,

Defendant Barbara Sayers Lanier’s Violations. They

show that Disciplinary System Clerk Lanier acted

under color of state law, but outside of her authority

and outside of the law, with respect to Bar Counsel’s

improper charges against Plaintiff.

The stated facts show that Defendant Clerk Lanier was

grossly negligent as to her duties and the law, and

incompetent, at best, or that she acted in knowing

complicity with the improper actions and deception of

Noel Sengel and Stephen Ratliff.

Clerk Lanier acted outside her duties and normal

functions, opening the way for an ill-based law license

revocation without due process and in violation of equal

protection of law. Before opening a case against an

attorney, it was her duty to make sure that the

Disciplinary Rules were followed, and their

preconditions, especially with respect to jurisdiction,

were met, but she did not.

Her actions, too, deprived Plaintiff of a Grand Jury

type review of allegations before they were used as the

basis for Disciplinary Hearing—That would have or

rae

could have reduced or clarified the vague charges from

Bar Counsel Sengel.

Although Plaintiff notified her both before and after the

Hearing of problems with it, clerk Lanier took no

corrective actions. She too, was supposed to embody a

safeguard of due process and nondiscrimination, but by

negligence or by design, she put her guard down,

opening the door to disciplinary action without

jurisdiction and without due process.

. By arranging the Disciplinary Board Hearing, without

a proper foundation, and requiring Plaintiff to answer

the vague and phony charges of Bar Counsel, Clerk

Lanier shares in the responsibility for the U.S.

Constitutional violations and the damages to Plaintiff

that followed.

. She was either incompetent and recklessly

disregarding the law, or she was knowingly violating

Virginia law and Plaintiffs rights under the United

States Constitution to due process of law and equa)

protection of law.

. Accordingly, Clerk Lanier is responsible for the

continued deprivation caused to Plaintiff by the

withholding of his law license, and for damages from

the defamation publication that went with it, and

which she, herself, arranged or directed.

. Ms. Lanter is responsible and liable to Plaintiff for the

damages he suffered in lost income, costs and attorney

fees, loss of standing in the community, public

humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress,

and she should pay punitive damages, as well, because

her actions that hurt so many so severely need to be

punished, and others need to be deterred from such

arbitrary and capricious conduct that is callous and

wanton, violating fundamental rights, and repugnant

to any decent member of the community.

COUNT IV. DEFENDANT KAREN GOULD’S

VIOLATIONS

122. All of the above paragraphs, wit. special emphasis on

paragraph 70-82, are incorporated in this Count IV,

Defendant Karen Gould’s Violations. They show that

Disciplinary Board Chair Gould acted under color of

state law, but outside of her authority and outside of

the law, with respect to Bar Counsel’s improper charges

against Plaintiff, violating Plaintiffs U.S.

Constitutional rights to Due Process and Equal

Protection of Law.

. The stated facts show that Defendant Karen Gould was

disregarding the law and was incompetent, or that she

acted in knowing complicity with the improper actions

and deception of Noel Sengel and Stephen Ratliff, and

perhaps Barbara Lanier.

. Karen Gould acted outside of her duties and normal

functions, disregarding well-established and clear

disciplinary rules, and opening the way for an ill-based

law license revocation, without due process and in

violation of equal protection of law.

. Before starting a disciplinary Board Hearing, it was

her duty to make sure that the disciplinary rules were

followed, and their preconditions, especially with

respect to jurisdiction, were met, but she did not. She

commenced a Hearing without clear and concise

charges, without charges from the committee that could

make and certify them, and without jurisdiction.

. Karen Gould’s actions in the course of the Hearing, as

the chair person, also deprived Plaintiff of due process.

. Although the board was to find violations only on the

basis of clear and convincing evidence, Defendant

Gould agreed to false application of res judicata, for

which there was no sound basis. That led to a law

license revocation without the required evidence to

support it.

. In her Memorandum Order of License revocation, dated

July 10, 2003, Ms. Gould made many errors of fact and

law, and she failed to get the other Disciplinary Board

members to join with her in that order, depriving it of

Disciplinary Board authority. It was her own

unauthorized action of defamation of Plaintiff.

129. That Memorandum Order attacked Plaintiffs honesty,

character and fitness to practice law with no good basis

in fact, law, or Disciplinary Board authority.

130. Karen Gould was both incompetent and recklessly

disregarding the law or she was knowingly violating

Plaintiffs rights under Virginia law and the United

States Constitution.

131. Accordingly, Ms. Gould is responsible for the continued

deprivation caused to Plaintiff by the withholding of his

law license, and for the damages from the on going

publication of defamation that goes with it, and which

she, herself, created.

132. Ms. Gould is responsible and liable to Plaintiff for

the damages he suffered in lost income, costs and attorney

fees, loss of standing in the community, public

humiliation, mental anguish ana emotional distress,

and she should pay punitive damages, as well, because

her actions that hurt so many so severely need to be

punished, and others need to be deterred from such

arbitrary and capricious conduct that is callous and

wanton, violating fundamental rights, and repugnant

to any decent member of the community.

COUNT V. DEFENDANT STEPHEN HALL’S

VIOLATIONS

133. All of the above paragraphs, with special emphasis on

paragraphs 83-92, are incorporated in this Count V,

Defendant Stephen Hall’s Violations. They show that

Assistant Attorney General Hall acted under color of

state law, but outside of his duties and outside of the

law, with respect to Bar Counsel’s improper charges

against Plaintiff, and error-filled disciplinary hearing,

without jurisdiction.

. In knowingly supporting those wrongful actions, giving

false pleadings and false testimony to bolster them,

this Defendant, too, violated Plaintiff's U.S.

Constitutional rights to Due Process and Equal

Protection of law.

. The stated facts show that defendant Stephen Hall was

incompetent and disregarding the law, or he acted in

knowing complicit with the improper actions and

deception of Ms. Noel Sengel and Mr. Stephen Ratliff,

and perhaps of Ms. Lanier and Karen Gould.

. Mr. Hall’s misrepresentations to the Supreme Court of

Virginia resulted in the court’s failure to provide the

narrow state remedy plaintiff sought there.

. That has resulted in long-term withholding of

Plaintiffs law license, and long-term published

defamation of plaintiff, prepared from the vague and

phony charges of misconduct from Bar Counsel, and as

signed by Karen Gould in her Memorandum Order,

without jurisdiction, and without disciplinary board

authority.

. Stephen Hall is responsible and liable to Plaintiff for

the damages he suffered in lost income, costs and

attorney fees, loss of standing in the community, public

humiliation, mental anguish and emotional distress,

and she should pay punitive damages, as well, because

her actions that hurt so many so severely need to be

punished, and others need to be deterred from such

arbitrary and capricious conduct that is callous and

wanton, violating fundamental rights, and repugnant

to any decent member of the community.

DEMAND FOR JUDGEMENT

. For Defendants’ violations of Plaintiffs U.S.

Constitution rights to Due Process and Equal

Protection of Law, and the libelous publication of an

improper and ill-based revocation of law license, that

attacked Plaintiffs character, honesty, and fitness to

practice his profession, and that was damaging to

Plaintiffs professional standing, his standing with his

friends, and his good name in the community, Plaintiff

requests judgment in his favor against the defendants,

jointly and severally.

CLAIM FOR RELIEF

. Plaintiff requests a Declaratory Judgment that the

defendants violated his right to Due Process and Equal

Protection of Law in their roles in his law license

revocation and in the publication of defamation that

went with it.

. Plaintiff requests readmission to the Virginia State

Bar.

. Plaintiff claims compensation for lost income of $5000-

$7000 per month from the time his license was revoked

on June 27, 2003 until his readmission.

. Plaintiff claims his costs and expenses in dealing with

Bar Counsel’s improper “charges” of misconduct,

totaling about $5500.

. For damage to his reputation from the publication of

the baseless findings of misconduct and improper

license revocation, Plaintiff seeks $600,000 in damages.

. Plaintiff claims double the amounts of compensatory

damages in punitive damages to punish and deter such

arbitrary and capricious, callous and cavalier,

violations of U.S. Constitutional rights to property and

liberty to practice one’s profession.

. Plaintiff seeks his attorney fees and cost for this acton,

as authorized by 42 U.S.C. 1983, and as provided by

the Civil rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42

U.S.C. 1988, because taking and denying Plaintiff's law

license and publishing defamation about it was without

jurisdiction and in violation of Due Process and Equal

Protection of law.

So respectfully claimed,

/S/ R. Wm. Konan

Raymond W. Konan

Plaintiff, pro se

June 20, 2006

VERIFICATION OF COMPLAINT

Plaintiff Raymond W. Konan, proceeding pro se, verifies

that he prepared the forgoing Amended Complaint and he

has read this Amended Complaint, and that it represents

true facts, and correct statements of law, to the best of his

knowledge and belief, after inquiry.

/S/ R. Wm. Konan

Raymond W. Konan

Plaintiff, pro se

Cell 571-331-9700

Email: mediatorkonan@bellsouth.net

June 20, 2006

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Friday the 13 day of

February, 2004.

Raymond William Konan,

Appellant,

against Record No. 032298

VSB Docket Nos. 00-052-3465

And 01-052-0361

Virginia State Bar,

Appellee.

Upon appeal of right from an order entered

by the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board.

Upon consideration of the record, briefs, and

argument by the Appellant, in proper person, and by

counsel for the appellee, the Court is of opinion there is no

error in the order of Virginia State Bar Disciplinary Board

(“the Board’) revoking Raymond W. Konan’s (“Konan”)

license to practice law in this Commonwealth.

The record shows that the Board entered its written

opinion revoking Konan’s license to practice on July 10,

2003, with the revocation effective as of June 27, 2003, the

date of its summary order. Konan timely mailed his notice

of appeal containing assignments of error, within the thirty

day time period required by the Rules of Court, Pt. 6, IV,

Para. 13 (@J) (2). However, in his opening brief to this

Court, Konan asserted new assignments of error 1, 2, 4, and

7 which were not stated with reasonable certainty in the

notice of appeal. Accordingly, these new assignments of

error are not timely and cannot be considered on appeal.

Rules of Court, Pt. 6, IV, Para. 13(H) (2). (“This action

within the time prescribed is jurisdictional.”); see e.g., Delk

v. Virginia State Bar, 233 Va. 187, 190, 355 S.E. 2d 558,

560 (1987). The Court will address appellant’s remaining

assignments of error.

In reviewing the Board’s decision, the Court conducts

an independent examination of the entire record. El-Amin

v. Virginia State Bar, 257 Va. 608, 612, 514 S.E.2d 163,

165 (1999); Meyers v. Virginia State Bar, 226 Va. 630, 632,

312 S. E.2d 286, 287 (1984). The Court considers the

evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the Bar, the

prevailing party in the Board proceeding. El-Amin, 257 Va.

At 612, 514 S.E. 2d at 165; Gunter v. Virginia State Bar,

238 Va. 617, 619, 385 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1989). The Court

gives the Board’s factual findings substantial weight and

views them as prima facie correct. El-Amin, 257 Va. at

612,514 S.E.2d at 165; Myers, 226 Va. at 632, 3125S.E.

2d at 287.

With regard to assignment of error 3, Konan

contends that the Board’s findings were not supported by

clear and convincing evidence. However, the record

establishes that Konan violated the Disciplinary Rules and

the Rules of Professional Conduct on numerous occasions

by engaging in conduct designed to mislead, deceive, and

defraud the trial court. Furthermore, there is clear and

convincing evidence in the record that Konan violated

rules concerning competency, misconduct, diligence,

communication, and representing clients within the bounds

of the law. There was more than sufficient credible

evidence in the record to support the Board’s findings.

With regard to assignment of error number 6, Konan

alleges the Board failed to follow the appropriate

procedures and thus its actions and the resulting sanction

Were ultra vires and beyond the scope of its authority.

Specifically, Konan asserts that because Noel Sengel

(“Sengel”), senior assistant bar counsel for the Virginia

Staie bar (“Bar”) and »secutor in the action against

Konan, signed the certiuucation of charges of misconduct

from the District Comm ittee on the Chairman’s behalf, the

Board did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case. Konan

did not raise this issue before the Board or in his opening

brief, but by a later filed Motion to Vacate Revocation.

While subject matter jurisdiction can be raised for the first

time on appeal, the Court finds Konan’s assertion to be

without merit.

Although the Rules of Court provide for the

certification of charges of attorney misconduct to the Board,

see Rules Pt. 6, IV, Para. 13 (G) (1) (b), the Rules do not

specify the method of certification by the District

Committee to the Board. Sengel submitted an affidavit to

this Court stating she “drafted the certification at the

Subcommittee’s direction,” and sent a copy to the chairman

of the subcommittee for his approval and signature. Once

approved, the chairman authorized Sengel to sign the

certification form on his behalf, which Sengel did, noting

her own initials below the signature line to indicate who

had actually signed it. Konan did not make an objection to

this Court’s consideration of Sengel’s affidavit.

Part 6, IV, Para. 13 (E) (1) of the Rules provides that

“substantial compliance with the provisions hereof shall be

sufficient, and no Charge of Misconduct shall be dismissed

on the sole ground that any such provision has not been

strictly complied with.” Since the Rules provide no specific

method by which certification is to be made, and as the

signature for certification was authorized in this case, the

certification from the District Committee substantially

complied with the procedures set forth in the Rules and

vested the Board with jurisdiction over the matter.

In addition to his argument that the Board was

without jurisdiction, Konan also avers through assignment

of error 6 that the Board revoked his license without

making the requisite determination that Konan’s

“continued practice of law constitutes an imminent danger

to the public.” However, such a finding is only required by

the Rules when expedited hearing is sought by Bar counsel

or a District Committee chairperson. See Rules Part 6, IV,

Para, 13 (I) (1) (b) (1); Part 6, IV, Para. 13(B) (5) (a) (6).

The charges against Konan were not adjudicated pursuant

to the expedited hearing process and thus an “imminent

threat” determination was not required.

In assignment of error 5, Konan contends that

revocation of his license to practice law was an abuse of

discretion by the Board and not proportional to any acts of

misconduct he may have committed. The record shows that

Konan had been sanctioned over $20,000 for multiple

actions taken before the trial court. In addition, Konan was

held in contempt of court for failing to pay the sanctions.

Based on the charges certified by the District Committee,

the Board found that Konan had violated, inter alai; DR

7-102 (A) (2), (3), and (5) and analogous Rule 3.1

(Representing a Client within the Bounds of the Law); DR

1-102 (A) (3) and (4) and analogous Rule 8.4 (committing

deliberately wrongful act and engaging in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud,_deceit—or—misrepresentation reflecting

adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law); and DR 6-

101 and analogous Rules 1.1, 1.3. and 1.4 (competence and

promptness).

When discussing Konan’s violations the Board

explained:

The facts discussed above are examples of the

conduct engaged in by Mr. Konan. There was additional

testimony and documentary evidence of similar behavior.

It was the totality of the evidence, as established by the

testimony and the documentary evidence, that persuaded

the Board that Mr. Konan had engaged in a pattern and

practice of ill founded and vexatious litigation, and that he

did not consider himself bound by any duty of truthfulness.

He played fast and loose with the truth in his factual

representations to the court, as in his legal pleadings,

irrespective of whether they were based in law or fact.

When determining the appropriate sanction, the

Board considered Konan’s lack of remorse, his prior receipt

of both public and private reprimands, and his failure to

amend his behavior. The Board found Konan “was a danger

to the integrity of the legal system in Virginia.” Given the

Board’s thorough documentation of Konan’s violations of

the Disciplinary Rules and the Rules of Professional

Conduct as well as our independent review of the entire

record, the Court finds the Board’s decision to revoke

Konan’s license was not an abuse of discretion.

For the reasons set forth above, all of Konan’s

motions are denied and the order of the Disciplinary Board

is affirmed. The appellant shall pay to the appellee thirty

dollars damages.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.