Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Slade v. Georgia (No. 07-1365)

Supreme

p em hg: U.S.

a»

nc 071365 APR 28 2008

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Iu The

Supreme Court of the United States

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.,

Petitioner,

STATE OF GEORGIA,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Georgia Court Of Appeals

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TODD M. JOHNSON,

Counsel of Record

JOHNSON LAW, P.C.

P.O. Box 48

Cohutta, GA 30710

(706) 694-4298

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964

OK CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2851

i

iL. QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

_ When the State of Georgia requires claims of

ineffectiveness be brought at the earliest possible

opportunity or be lost and yet denies remand for proof

of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness does it violate the

Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution?

ITl.

li

Il. TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW..... i

TABLE OF CONTENTS .................ccccseceees i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................... iv

oe Be 6 Se ne 1

BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OF THIS

NIMH hacia eos us Gan ihevsaaisiaseeavieesssincnes 1

A. Date of Orders to Be Reviewed ........... 1

B. Jurisdictional Basis For Review ......... 1

_ CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STAT-

SF ENED MERI ou incon cesvecvessoveescaccovesovees 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................... 3

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS ...... 4

TREATMENT OF THE ISSUES BELOW... 9

ARGUMENT AS TO THE NECESSITY

II shesinisscseks ivcexicececcoi panes maveruntines 10

A. When the State of Georgia requires

claims of ineffectiveness be brought

at the earliest possible opportunity or

be lost and yet denies remand for

proof of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

does it violate the Sixth and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution? ....................:c2c00 10

i. The Georgia Rule Denies the Right

To Counsel and Violates The Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution ............ 10

ili

Il. TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

ii. Petitioner Made An Adequate

Showing of Performance Problems

and Harm to Require Remand ....... 13

Mees OI cies cceincaticcgecciensenteatecrechinv ees 14

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court

Case No. 05-CR-331 Final Disposition 16

Py FO kin App. 13

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court

Case No. 05-CR-227 Nolle Prosequi, 16 Feb-

ruary PR iixcibvisss ip cacnndenkshabsusigredbupestaabikient® App. 16

Slade i. State, Denial of Certiorari, Ga. Sup.Ct.

Case No. S07C1895 28 January 2008........... App. 18

Slade v. State, Ct.App. A07A0734 Brief Ex-

I sis Sciaiid sstiecsicnccecaencieiisamcksbeneesiaeeseaubines App. 19

|

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court

Case No. 05-CR-331 Accusation 5 October

State\v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court Case

No: 05-CR-227 Indictment 20 July 2005....... App. 30

lv

‘Ill. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

FEDERAL CASES

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123

S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003)............ 10, 11, 14

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104

S.Ct. 20562, 80 L.B.2d 674 (1984)..........0cccceccececces.s 11

STATE CASES

Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A. 2d 726 (2002).......... 12

Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 642 S.E.2d 668

1 5 SORES NSE tare tit teh at rate Ae RPG toe een a! 10

FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AND STATUTE

Sixth Amendment to the United States Consti-

OS RESERVOIR ARE OO ARO EE Cte mn, 20, 42,34

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

5 SRO TAR Ge Peitioe rarer mao pe ae 2,10, 14

- gid 7 Say > | \: SR e na Reasiemee etre nan imer Carine fre oe kk 1

STATE STATUTES

a ns iGbbdaadcacaueo ese 2

Ir ae 23

Sas MINE Ts vhccon nia iccetsnisirvticrasounceuupnaeannsonapiaas 2,3

1

IV. OPINIONS BELOW

OFFICIAL REPORTS

|

Slade v. State, Ct.App. A07A0734 31 July 2007.....App. 1

Slade v. State, Order Granting Reconsideration

DS 11) 4 een App. 10

Slade v. State, Order Granting Motion to With-

draw by trial counsel 31 January 2007 ......... App. 12

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court

Case No. 05-CR-331 Final Disposition 16

February PI si siceckiaidbsnuncbiotinsdickertabeackocn App. 13

State v. Slade, Murray County Superior Court

Case No. 05-CR-227 Nolle Prosequi, 16 Feb-

ney ai shksdadsasconcknecasccncssisekosnnidecnemeccnanais App. 16

Slade vu. State, Denial of Certiorari, Ga. Sup.Ct.

Case No. S07C1895 28 January 2008........... App. 18

V. BASIS FOR JURISDICTION OF THIS

COURT

A. Date of Orders +» be Reviewed

On July 31, 2007, the seorgia Court of Appeals

affirmed Petitioner’s conviction on the two issues

presented in this petition. On January 28, 2008, the

Georgia Supreme Court denied petitioner a writ of

certiorari on the two issues.

B. Jurisdictional Basis For Review

Under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. $1257, this

Court has jurisdiction to review the final order of a

2

lower state court when certiorari is denied by the

state’s court of last resort.

Vi. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STAT-

UTES AND RULES

This Petition involves the Sixth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution, the

Georgia child hearsay statute, O.C.G.A. §24-3-16,

Georgia sodomy and aggravated sodomy provisions

0.C.G.A. §16-6-2, the Georgia child molestation and

aggravated child molestation provisions, O.C.G.A.

§16-6-4. —

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution states in pertinent part, “In all criminal

prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right .. . to

have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides in pertinent part, “... No State

shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges and immunities of citizens of the United

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws.”

O.C.G.A. §16-6-2 states in relevant part: “(a)(1)

A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or

she performs or submits to any sexual act involving

the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus

of another. (2) A person commits the offense of

3

aggravated sodomy when he or she commits sodomy

with force and against the will of the other person or

when he or she commits sodomy with a person who is

less than ten years of age. . . .”

0.C.G.A. §16-6-4 states in part, “(a) A person

commits the offense of child molestation when he or

_ she does anything immoral or indecent to or in the

presence of or with any child under the age of 16

years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual

desires of either the child or the person.” and “(c) A

person commits the offense of aggravated child mo-

lestation which act physically injures the child or

involves an act of sodomy.”

O0.C.G.A. §24-3-16 “A statement made by a child

under the age of 14 years describing any act of sexual

contact or physical abuse performed with or on the

child by another or performed with or on another in

the'presence of the child is admissible in evidence by

the testimony of the person or persons to whom made

if the child is available to testify in the proceedings

and| the court finds that the circumstances of the

statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.”

Vil. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The State indicted Petitioner on two counts of

child molestation. (App. 30, 31) A nolle prosequi was

entered on that indictment on the date Petitioner was

sentenced on the accusation this Petition concerns.

(App. 16)

4

The State’s Accusation charged Petitioner with

three counts of aggravated sodomy, two counts of

aggravated child molestation, and two counts of child

molestation. Petitioner waived indictment. (App. 23)

Petitioner was appointed Jerry Wayne “foncus as his

trial counsel.

At trial, the State’s similar transaction motion

was heard as to evidence from a 1997 allegation, which

had been dead docketed against Petitioner (involving

Grady Lavon Slade III, Petitioner’s son). (T-5) Peti-

tioner’s trial counsel objected that because the case

was rejected for prosecution, it could not now serve as

a credible similar transaction. (T-12) The trial court

then ruled that the 1997 allegations were ecm

as similar transactions.

Petitioner was tried before a jury on the 14th and

15th days of February, 2006. The jury convicted

Petitioner on all seven counts. (T-228) The Court

merged counts and sentenced on Counts One, Two,

Five and Six. Petitioner was sentenced to thirty years

to serve on Counts One and Two and twenty years on

counts Five and Six, all such time to run concurrent.

(App. 13-15)

Petitioner’s trial counsel timely filed his notice of

appeal, but withdrew before filing a brief. (App. 12)

VIII. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

Petitioner’s trial counsel indicated he had official

objection to the use of child hearsay, but he understood

5

that the trial court would allow the use, the decla-

rants being present. (T-18) State Victim Witness

coordinator, Brenda Hoffmeyer was called to testify

about a conversation she undertook with RRF, the

alleged victim in the case. Hoffmeyer testified repeat-

edly with no objection by Petitioner’s trial counsel

that she told RRF to tell the truth. (T-36, 1-25; T-37, 1-

7,8; T-38, 1-4) Hoffmeyer testified that RRF told her

about threats and aggravated sodomy by Petitioner,

and then she stated with no objection by Petitioner's

attorney as follows:

b

“Are you telling the truth? and he said, ‘yes.

And I said, ‘Why didn’t you tell this when

you were interviewed, when you did your

videotape?’ and he looked at me and he said,

‘I was so scared.’ And I said, ‘Why are you

telling me this now?’ And he said, ‘because I

trust you.’” (T-39)

The State then called Petitioners wife, Billie

Slade. On cross examination, Petitioner’s trial coun-

sel asked her about RRF’s medication. The State

objected to questions about medication. (T-76) Peti-

tioner’s trial counsel indicated that he intended to

provide evidence illustrating RRF’s mood swings and

thought disorders, and ultimately calling into ques-

tion’ the credibility of RRF. (T-78) The trial court

sustained the State objection to relevancy (without an

expert). (T-78)

Billie Slade testified that when RRF was placed

with his other grandmother, Christine Forrest,

his mannerism changed towards everybody. (T-78)

es

Buna

Pore *

6

A custody case had been going on from 2002 through

2005. (T-195) Petitioner asked in what respect it

changed, and the State objected to bringing in spe-

cific instances of conduct. The trial court sustained

the State’s objection prior to argument of Petitioner’s

trial counsel. (T-78)

The State introduced testimony by Department

of Family and Children Services (DFCS) worker

Becky Haley as to the protocol of the investigation of

alleged sexual crimes, and she produced a 1997 video

tape of the interview done with Petitioner’s son,

Grady Slade, III, the State’s similar transaction

claim. (T-106) Petitioner’s son was born October 2,

1986, and was 19 years of age at trial. (T-118) The

video tape of the 1997 interview was moved for intro-

duction as State’s exhibit number two. Petitioner’s

trial counsel stated “No Objection” and the videotape

was introduced and played for the jury. (T-107) RRF

was placed in Petitioner’s home after the 1997 allega-

tion after a DFCS review. (T-155, 156)

Crystal Slade, mother of Grady Slade, III then

testified in response to State questioning “Do you

recall the words he used?” Crystal Slade replied, “He

just said that he was touching him.” On further

questioning, “He did tell me that he had fondled him

and at that point that’s when I[ had called the police.”

(T-125) and “... that he had masturbated him”

(T-128)

7

Crystal Slade continued as follows:

“He [Petitioner’s son] began pulling out his

eyelashes, constantly pulling his hair out,

cutting his self, punching his self, choking

his self even in class. I had to put him in pri-

vate school. The teachers couldn’t handle

him in public school. Soiling his pants. He

would hold his self until he would use the

bathroom on his self.” (T-129)

She clarified that Petitioner’s son’s hospitalization for

suicide attempts and the problem conduct was all

after he made the disclosures. (T-129) Petitioner’s

trial counsel did not object to Crystal Slade’s hearsay

characterizations or move to strike the testimony.

| Only later at trial did the adult Grady Slade, III

testify. (T-137-148) Having described the similar

transaction acts alleged (T-139-142), he testified “Yes,

those things I could remember, they did not come off

the tape.” (T-148)

iChristine Forrest, RRF’s grandmother, testified

she ,had had custody of RRF for four years. (T-151)

She| testified that RRF told her “Papaw Grady hurts

me”, and he didn’t want to visit. (T-152) Ms. Forrest

testified that the only thing she told RRF was to tell

the truth. (T-183)

Christine Forrest knew about the previous alle-

gations against Petitioner. (T-166) For two years she

and ‘Petitioner and his wife had shared custody of

RRF. half time. (T-155, 156) Petitioner and his wife

had icustody of RRF’s brother Zanthias. (T-165)

8

Following a second hearing, physical custody was

placed with Christine Forrest with every other week-

end visitation with RRF for Petitioner and his wife.

(T-155, 156) After the second hearing, when Forrest

regained full custody, Forrest received all of the

Social Security payment for RRF and his sister.

(T-159) Her attorney wouldn’t use the prior allega-

tions against Petitioner in the custody hearing.

. (T-167, 168) RRF had never talked with her about

allegations of oral sex. (T-168-169) He told her, “I

don’t want to talk about it” every time. (T-153) Peti-

tioner testified that RRF was always “very quiet and

to his self” (T-199)

RRF had not related any sexual contact apart

from a touching or fondling in his videotaped inter-

view at the Greenhouse, leading to the initial indict-

ment (T-39), and his only other testimony — not

through Brenda Hoffmeyer or his mother — and by

direct examination takes place from pages 181

through 185 as follows:

VEO. 6 BO ie Ee es SO. SR:

I'm nine.... June, the 6th.... Ninety-six.

1996.... Christine.... Yes.... Yeah....

78... . NG: so ee. . Seek... . YOR. .

Yeah. ... Yeah.... Yeah.... Yes....No....

Because this happened, because he’s really

not my papaw.... Because this happened,

because he’s really not my papaw....

7 cae SS cs es Bs

ss Ee ee Os ee Se

7 ss ee ck a ee

Yes.... Yes. ... Point. (T-181-185)

9

Petitioner took the stand and denied the 1997

transaction as reported by his adult son. (T-191) In

addition, Petitioner testified that he never molested

RRF. (T-193) He testified that he waived indictment

because he didn’t have anything to hide. (T-194) He

testified that he and his wife had once received half of

the Social Security funds for RRF (T-200) Petitioner

denied that he stated to his ex-wife Crystal Slade

that he was homosexual. (T-200) Petitioner testified

that eight individuals stayed at his home in the .

relevant time period from December 2004 through

July 2005. (T-196) Finally, he agreed with prior

testimony from Jennifer Norris and Christine Forrest

that RRF was not visiting for large periods during the

six-month period at issue. (T-198, 157, 172, 173)

Ix. TREATMENT OF THE ISSUES BELOW

|The Georgia Court of Appeals, in its reconsidered

opinion, found that Petitioners trial counsel aban-

doned his cross examination of a key witness on

RRF’s bias. (App. 5, 6) The Georgia Court of Appeals

found Petitioner’s trial counsel’s objection as to child

hearsay testimony was too general to be used to stop

hearsay played later for his adult son where Peti-

tioner’s trial counsel did not make contemporaneous

objection. (App. 3) In addition, it determined that the

requirement in the child hearsay statute to only allow

it when the “child” is present applied to the 19-year-

old adult, making objection unnecessary. (App. 3, 4)

10

Finally the Georgia Court of Appeals citing

Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 697, 642 S.E.2d 668

(2007) found that it could determine from the record

that it did not need to remand for a hearing on the

‘ineffectiveness claim. Petitioner had argued generally

and specifically as to ineffectiveness. (App. 19-22) The

Appeals Court found that no true “bolstering” was

allowed and that the trial attorney did not need to

object to child hearsay treatment for the adult wit-

ness, and it denied the remand. (App. 8, 9) 3

X. ARGUMENT AS TO THE NECESSITY OF

REVIEW

A. When the State of Georgia requires

claims of ineffectiveness be brought

at the earliest possible opportunity or

be lost and yet denies remand for

proof of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness

does it violate the Sixth and Four-

teenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution?

i. The Georgia Rule Denies the Right

To Counsel and Violates The Sixth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution

Recently in Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S.

500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003) this

Court noted the difficulty in reviewing ineffectiveness

claims on direct review absent evidentiary hearings,

as follows:

11

“When an ineffective-assistance claim is ©

brought on direct appeal, appellate counsel

and the court must proceed on a trial record

not developed precisely for the object of liti-

gating or preserving the claim and thus often

incomplete or inadequate for this purpose.

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668 (1984), a defendant claiming ineffective

counsel must show that counsel’s actions

were not supported by a reasonable strategy

and that the error was prejudicial. The evi-

dence introduced at trial, however, will be

devoted to issues of guilt or innocence, and

the resulting record in many cases will not

disclose the facts necessary to decide either

prong of the Strickland analysis.”

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. at 505.

“On direct appeal it puts counsel into an

awkward position vis-a-vis trial counsel. Ap-

pellate counsel often need trial counsel’s as-

sistance in becoming familiar with a lengthy

record on a short deadline, but trial counsel

will be unwilling to help appellate counsel

familiarize himself with a record for the pur-

pose of understanding how it reflects trial

counsel’s own incompetence.”

Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. at 506.

The Court opined that “ ... few such claims will

be capable of resolution on direct appeal and thus few

will benefit from earlier resolution.” Massaro uv.

United States, 538 U.S. at 507.

12

Georgia is one of only a handful of state jurisdic-

tions which impose an absolute rule. Commonwealth v.

Grant, 813 A. 2d 726, 738 (2002) at n.11 The Supreme

Court of Pennsylvania opinion referred to by the

Court held that “a claim raising trial counsel ineffec-

tiveness will no longer be considered waived because

new counsel on direct appeal did not raise a claim

related to prior counsel’s ineffectiveness.” Common-

wealth v. Grant, 813 A. 2d at 738.

Due to the Georgia Rule, Petitioner now forfeits

his federal right to have post-conviction relief in order

to satisfy the Georgia scheme which makes short

shrift of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel under

the United States Constitution. Unlike citizens in

those states which allow appellate attorneys to delay

a resolution of the ineffectiveness claim in a more fact

intensive environment, Petitioner is forced to use only

such proof afforded by the transcript.

Petitioner urges this Court to take certiorari to

determine if Petitioner is denied the privileges of a

citizen and Due Process in the denial of an adequate

structure to present his ineffectiveness claim as well

as Equal Protection in the fact he will likely lose

other post-conviction remedies by his appeal when

other similarly situated citizens will not be forced to

forfeit the expression of their Sixth Amendment right

in direct appeal.

13

ii. Petitioner’ Made An Adequate

Showing of Performance Problems

and Harm to Require Remand.

Petitioner’s trial attorney waived objection to the

most harmful evidence. Although prior to this case,

Georgia had never allowed 19-year-old adults to be

benefited by the Georgia child hearsay statute, Peti-

tioner’ s attorney declined to object to the admission of

a harmful videotape and live witness hearsay: about

Grady Slade, III. (T-107)

The Court of Appeals noted that Petitioner’s trial

attorney waived his right to cross examine concerning |

the victim’s bias (App. 6), a critical area of question-

ing. It appears that Petitioner’s trial attorney just

didn’t have a plan to get the evidence introduced, and

that his lack of preparation severely damaged the

defense.

In addition, Petitioner’s trial attorney was cut

short in his cross about the alleged victim’s mood

swings and thought disorders because he had not

properly set up the testimony. (T-78) The live testi-

mony of RRF is recounted above as almost entirely

composed of yes answers to leading questions of the

District Attorney. Though the child’s stories had been

inconsistent at best, Petitioner’s trial attorney did

nothing to limit the State from having the child admit

the story the state preferred. Trial counsel never

made objection.

The Georgia Court of Appeals found numerous

waivers from Petitioner’s attorney, but based its

14

decision on remand only on its novel interpretation of

the Child Hearsay statute application to adults and

its determination that repetitive claims that the child

was told to tell the truth did not bolster the child’s .

statements. (App. 9) _

Without a remand to discover the extent of choice

or haphazard in the omission and commission listed -

above, Petitioner will be unable to adequately prove

ineffectiveness, much as this Court set out in Mas-

saro v. United States. Petitioner has made a facial

showing of harm and inadequate performance. He

asks this Court to allow him a chance to prove his

ineffectiveness claim.

XI. CONCLUSION

Petitioner is forced by Georgia Law to make his

initial proof of ineffectiveness on the transcript. He

shows that such a proof has been determined by this

Court to be inevitably inadequate. To give him the

Sixth Amendment rights enjoyed by citizens in the

vast majority of states, he asks this Court to find

the Georgia rule a violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment and grant Petitioner a remand on all

issues of ineffectiveness.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHNSON Law, P.C.

TopDD M. JOHNSON, State Bar #395651

P.O. Box 48

Cohutta, GA 30710

(706) 694-4298

App. l

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia

FIRST DIVISION

ANDREWS, P. J.,

ELLINGTON and ADAMS, JJ.

July 31, 2007

A07A0734. SLADE v. THE STATE.

ADAMS, Judge.

Grady Levon Slade, Jr. was convicted by a jury of

three counts of aggravated sodomy, two counts of

aggravated child molestation, and two counts of child

molestation arising out of various acts involving R. R.

F.; his wife’s grandson. After the trial judge merged

three of the counts for sentencing purposes, Slade

was sentenced to a total of thirty years to serve. Slade

now appeals his conviction on a number of eviden-

tiary grounds and on the ground that he received

ineffective assistance of counsel.

1. At trial, the State presented similar transac-

tion evidence of earlier incidents of reported abuse

involving Slade’s son, when the son was around ten

years old. Slade was never prosecuted in connection

with those incidents. The State presented testimony

from the son, the son’s mother and Becky Haley, a

child protective services worker, concerning the

reported abuse. The State also showed the jury a

videotaped interview with the son when he was ten

years old. At the time of the trial, Slade’s son was 19

years old. Slade contends that the mother’s testimony

and the videotape were inadmissible hearsay. He

argues that the admission of such evidence was error

App. 2°

because the Child Hearsay Statute, OCGA § 24-3-16,

should not apply where a former child victim is an

adult at the time of trial. But Slade raised no con-

temporaneous objection to this evidence, and thus

failed to preserve this argument for appeal. Nelson uv.

State, 279 Ga. App. 859, 864(1)(b) (632 SE2d 749)

(2006).

We acknowledge that Slade’s attorney made some

reference to an objection to child hearsay before the

trial began. The State announced in a pretrial motion

hearing that it intended to rely upon the Child Hear-

say Statute but noted that “the child” was available

and present at the hearing. It is unclear from this

statement whether the prosecutor was referring to

the child victim, Slade’s 19-year-old son, or both.

Slade’s attorney replied,

We would be objecting officially for the record

but we understand that because the child is

present, the court would overrule that objec-

tion, typically allow the testimony to be en-

tered. As long as the child is, in fact, — or

does, in fact, remain available, we don’t an-

ticipate that would be a problem. It’s my un-

derstanding the child will be called. If not,

we will be requesting that the court call the

child.

But it is well settled that

a general objection is too vague and indefi-

nite to present any question for decision

either by the trial court or by the appellate

courts. To preserve a ground for error, the

App. 3

objecting party must state the specific

ground upon which the objection is based;

the objecting party must do more than

merely state that he objects.

(Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Maxwell v. State,

267 Ga. App. 227, 229(2) (699 SE2d 228) (2004). No

reference was ever made to an objection based upon

the age of Slade’s son, and we do not view his attor-

ney’s generalized pre-trial objection as sufficient to

notify the trial court of the legal ground at issue here

“so that its applicability could be measured and error

avoided.” Id. In any event, Slade’s attorney sought no

ruling from the court on such an objection.

Even if Slade’s attorney had objected to the

evidence, however, we find no error. “The trial court

has broad discretion in determining the admissibility

of ‘child hearsay evidence, and we will reverse a trial

court's ruling on the admissibility of statements

under OCGA § 24-3-16 only if the trial court abused

its) discretion.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.)

Phillips v. State, 284 Ga. App. 224, 227(1)(b) (644

SE2d 153) (2007). And this Court has held that “i]t is

plain from the face of that statute that the age of the

child at the time the witness testifies is irrelevant as

long as the child’s statement about which the witness

testifies was made while the child was under 14 years

of age. ” Greer v. State, 201 Ga. App. 775, 776(4) (412

SE2d 843) (1991) (statute applied to statements by

seven-year-old victim who was fifteen at time of trial).

See also Darden v. State, 206 Ga. App. 400, 401(1)

(425 SE2d 409) (1992) (statute applied to statements

App. 4

of 13-year-old victim, who was 14 at trial). Compare

Foster v. State, 216 Ga. App. 26, 28(2) (453 SE2d 482)

(1994) (Child Hearsay Statute applies to child whose

chronological age, not mental age, was under 14 years

at time of statement). Slade’s son was ten at the time

he made the statements at issue, and thus they fall

within the provisions of the Child Hearsay Statute.

We see no reason to alter the application of the stat-

ute in this case simply because the witness was 19

years old at the time of trial.

2. Slade next asserts that the trial court abused

its discretion in excluding evidence about the de-

meanor of R. R. F., the victim in this case, during the

time of his reported incidents of abuse. “The defen-

dant in a child molestation case is entitled to a thor-

ough and sifting cross-examination of the State’s

witnesses. However, the scope of cross-examination is

within the sound discretion of the trial court and will

not cause reversal unless the discretion is abused.”

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) In re M.G., 239

Ga. App. 787, 788 (521 SE2d 918) (1999).

Slade’s wife, Billie Slade, testified that her

grandson R. R. F.’s_ behavior and mannerisms

changed “towards everybody” at that time, especially

when he came from his other grandmother’s house.

But when Slade’s trial counsel asked her what she

noticed with respect to the changes, the State ob-

jected stating, “I would object, your honor. He’s going

App. 5

into specific instances of conduct. That would be

improper.” The trial court sustained the objection.

Slade contends that this ruling denied him the

right to thoroughly cross-examine Billie Slade be-

cause he was unable to question her further about the

changes in R. R. F.’s behavior. He asserts on appeal

that this deprived him of his right to test the child’s

credibility or to explore the possibility that the child

could have been influenced by others, presumably

the child’s other grandmother, into making the

allegations. But the State is correct that Slade never

argued these issues to the trial court in response

to the objection. Instead, he continued his cross-

examination of Billie Slade on other issues. The trial

court, therefore, never had the opportunity to con-

sider these arguments in ruling upon the objection.

Accordingly, we must agree with the State that

Slade abandoned this argument at trial and acqui-

esced in the trial court’s ruling. While there was no

requirement that Slade make a formal exception to

the ruling, he was required to voice his position with

_ The exact basis for this objection is unclear from the

record, as evidenced by the fact that the State has asserted

differing grounds on appeal to support it. In its original appel-

late brief, the State asserted that it had objected to the rele-

vance of the evidence solicited, because the victim’s mannerisms

and specific instances of conduct toward “everybody” were not

relevant. In its motion for reconsideration, the State apparently

is asserting that its objection was supportable to the extent that

the! question sought to solicit evidence of specific instances of

bad character in order to impeach the victim.

App. 6

regard to the ruling after it was made in order to

preserve the issue for appeal. Plaza Properties v.

Prime Business Investments, 273 Ga. 97, 102 (538

SE2d 51) (2000); Stone v. State, 177 Ga. App. 750,

752(4) (341 SE2d 280) (1986). By arguing the issue on

the record, both the trial court and this Court would

have had the opportunity to consider whether the

evidence he sought with his questioning was admissi-

ble. Instead, we are left with a record that does not

clearly state what evidence was sought or what

evidence was excluded.’

Although we agree with Slade that he would

have been entitled to explore the issue of potential

bias or improper influence, he failed to inform the

trial court that he was seeking such evidence through

the line of questioning at issue. Thus while it cer-

tainly would have been error for a trial court to

prevent a defendant from seeking relevant evidence

of bias, no such error occurs where, as here, a defen-

dant acquiesces in the trial court’s ruling or abandons

an argument at trial. McGee v. State, 205 Ga. App.

722, 724(5) (423 SE2d 666) (1992); Jordan v. State,

172 Ga. App. 96, 97(2) (322 SE2d 106) (1984).

3. Slade also contends that the trial court abused

its discretion in limiting his cross-examination of

* We note, however, that the trial court could have properly

sustained an objection to any attempt by Slade to elicit specific

instances of misconduct in order to impeach the victim, as the

State contends. See Curtis v. State, 282 Ga. App. 322, 326(3)a)

(638 SE2d 773) (2006).

App. 7

Becky Haley, the child protective services worker

involved with his son’s case. Slade attempted to

question Haley about whether in deciding to place a

child in a particular home, the Department of Family

and Children Services considered the criminal back-

ground of those residing in the home. The State

objected to the question on the ground of relevancy.

Slade’s attorney explained that he wanted to show

that DFACS allowed R. R. F. to be placed in Slade’s

home even though he had previously been charged

with child molestation. He argued the evidence went

to the issue of Slade’s credibility because the State

had determined that he was an appropriate individ-

ual to host children in his home. After an extensive

discussion, the trial court sustained the State’s objec-

tion stating that DFACS’ placement procedures and

decisions had no relevance to the issue of whether

Slade had committed the crimes charged.

“The admission or exclusion of evidence which is

objected to on the ground of relevancy lies within the

sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will

not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse

of discretion.” Brown v. State, 280 Ga. App. -884,

887(1), 635 SE2d 240 (2006). We find no abuse of

discretion. While this line of questioning may have

addressed the actions of DFACS employees, it had no

bearing on the issue of whether Slade committed the

acts of which he was accused.

4, Slede also argues that a remand is necessary

to develop a record on his claim that his trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance in the trial below. But

App. 8

“it is not necessary to remand an appeal when the

appellate court can determine from the record

whether the appellant has satisfied the test to estab-

lish ineffective assistance of counsel.” (Citations

omitted.) Hunter v. State, 281 Ga. 693, 697(7) (642

SE2d 668) (2007). Under this test, Slade “must prove

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that

this deficient performance prejudiced the defense;

that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that

the outcome of the proceedings would have been

different, but for counsel’s deficiency.” (Punctuation

and footnotes omitted.) Lawson v. State, 280 Ga. App.

870, 872(2) (635 SE2d 259) (2006).

Slade asserts that his trial counsel was ineffec-

tive in failing to object to (1) the use of child hearsay

in connection with the similar transaction involving

Slade’s son and (2) purported bolstering by two wit-

nesses who testified that they told the victim to tell

the truth. We have already determined in Division 1

that no error occurred in the use of child hearsay in

connection with the incidents involving Slade’s son, so

a remand is not necessary in connection with that

argument.

With regard to the second argument, Slade

contends that his trial counsel should have objected

when the child advocate and R. R. F.’s other grand-

mother testified that they told the child to tell the

truth. Slade is correct that “under no circumstance

may a witness’s credibility be bolstered by the opinion

of another, even an expert, as to whether the witness is

telling the truth.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.)

App. 9

Berman v. State, 279 Ga. App. 867, 870(3) (632 SE2d

757) (2006). But the statements at issue merely

consisted of the witnesses’ instructions to the victim

regarding the need to tell the truth. Such statements

do not constitute an opinion by the witnesses as to

whether the victim was, in fact, truthful. Berman v.

State, 279 Ga. App. at 870(3). Accordingly, no remand

is necessary to address Slade’s claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel.

Judgment affirmed. Andrews, P. J., and Elling-

ton, J., concur.

App. 10

Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, JUL 31 2007

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A07A0734. SLADE v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the motion for reconsidera-

tion filed on behalf of the appellee in the above styled

case, said motion is hereby granted, and it is ordered

that the opinion of this court issued on and the judg-

ment entered on July 9, 2007, be hereby vacated and

that the opinion be withdrawn from the files. It is

further ordered that the opinion attached hereto be

substituted for the original opinion issued on July 9,

2007, and judgment shall issue accordingly.

It is further ordered that the April term of this

court be extended “‘relative to this case to enable

parties to file a motion for [reconsideration]. OCGA

§(§) 15-2-4(, 15-3-2).’ Haygood v. City of Doraville, 256

Ga. 566, 567 (350 SE2d 766) (1986).” Stuckey uv.

Richardson, 188 Ga. App. 147, 149(4) (372 SE2d 458)

(1988).

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true ex-

tract from the minutes of the Court of

Appeals of Georgia.

App. 11

Witness my signature and the seal of

said court hereto affixed the day and

year last above written.

Clerk.

/s/ William L. Martin, III

App. 12

Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, JANUARY 17, 2007

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A07A0734.

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR. v. THE STATE.

Upon consideration of the Motion to Withdraw as

Counsel filed in this case, it is ordered that it be

hereby granted. The Clerk of this Court is ordered

and directed to remove the name of JERRY WAYNE

MONCUS as attorney of record for the appellant.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta

I certify that the above is a true ex-

tract from the minutes of the Court of

Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of

said court hereto affixed the day and

year last above written.

Clerk.

/s/ William L. Martin, III

EG Ee

App. 13

IN THE FINAL DISPOSITION

SUPERIOR COURT ;

OF MURRAY COUNTY —

THE STATE

OF GEORGIA

vs

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

CRIMINAL

ACTION NO. —_(05-CR-331

OFFENSES CT. 1 & 2: AGGRAVATED |

SODOMY - F, CT. 3.& 4:

AGGRAVATED CHILD

MOLESTATION - F, CT. 5

& 6; CHILD MOLESTA-

TION - F, CT. 7: AGGRA-

VATED SODOMY - F

FEBRUARY TERM, 2006

(Filed Feb. 16, 2006)

|PLEA:

NEGOTIATED x | JURY

GUILTY ON NON-JURY

COUNTS)

NOLO CONTENDERE

| ON COUNT(S)

[ ]TO LESSER INCLUDED

OFFENSE(S)

ON COUNT(S)

App. 14

x | VERDICT: OTHER DISPOSITION:

x |GUILTY ON NOLLE PROSEQUI

COUNTS 1,2,3,4,5,6,7 ORDER ON COUNTS)

[ _]NOT GUILTY | |DEAD DOCKET

ON COUNT\S) ORDER ON COUNTS)

| ]GUILTY OF oe

INCLUDED

OFFENSE(S) OF

ON COUNT\S)

DEFENDANT WAS ADVISED OF HIS/HER RIGHT

TO HAVE THIS SENTENCE REVIEWED BY THE

SUPERIOR COURTS SENTENCE REVIEW PANEL.

[ x | FELONY | J]MISDEMEANOR

SENTENCE SENTENCE

WHEREAS, the above-named defendant has been

found guilty of the above-state offense, WHERE-

UPON, it is ordered and adjudged by the Court that

the said defendant is hereby sentenced to confine-

ment for a period of

CT. 1: THIRTY (30) YEARS TO SERVE

CT. 2: THIRTY (30) YEARS TO SERVE CON-

CURRENT WITH COUNT 1

CT. 3: MERGES WITH COUNT 1 FOR SEN-

TENCING PURPOSES

CT. 4: MERGES WITH COUNT 2 FOR SEN-

TENCING PURPOSES

CT. 5: TWENTY (20) YEARS TO SERVE CON-

CURRENT WITH COUNT I

App. 15

CT. 6: TWENTY (20) YEARS TO SERVE CON-

CURRENT WITH COUNT 1

CT.7: MERGES WITH COUNT 2 FOR SEN-

TENCING PURPOSES

In the State Penal System or such other institution as

the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of

Corrections or Court may direct, to be computed as

provided by law.

THIS OFFENSE CONSTITUTES A SERIOUS VIO-

LENT FELONY AND THE DEFENDANT IS HEREBY

SENTENCED PURSUANT TO 0O.C.G.A. 17-10-6.1

So ordered this 15th day of FEBRUARY, 2006.

/s/ Jack Partain

JACK PARTAIN, J.S.C.C.C.

App. 16

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MURRAY COUNTY

STATE OF GEORGIA

STATE OF GEORGIA : Indictment No: 05-CR-227

vs

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR. : CHILD MOLESTATION (2)

MOTION TO ENTER A NOLLE PROSEQUI

(Filed Feb. 16, 2006)

COMES NOW the State of Georgia and moves

this Court to enter a Nolle Prosequi in the above-

styled case. The defendant was re-accused and tried

on accusation no. 05-CR-331.

This the 16 day of February, 2006.

/s/ Steve Spencer

STEVE SPENCER ..

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

CONASAUGA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

CONSENT

After having heard and considered the Motion of

the State to enter a Nolle Prosequi in the above-

styled case, the Court hereby grants consent.

This the 16th day of FEB, 2006.

/s/ Jack Partain

JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT

CONASAUGA JUDICIAL CIRCUIT

App. 17

ce: JERRY MONCUS

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

App. 18

SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF GEORGIA

CLERK’S OFFICE

ATLANTA

Date: January 28, 2008

Todd Mitchell Johnson

JOHNSON LAW, P.-C.

P. O. Box 48

Cohutta, GA 30710

Case No. S07C1895

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR. v. THE STATE

COURT OF APPEALS CASE NO. A07A0734

The Supreme Court today denied the petition for

certiorari in this case.

All the Justices concur.

Therese S. Barnes, Clerk

App. 19

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF GEORGIA

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

Appellant

ve Case No. A07A0734

THE STATE,

Appellee

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Respectfully Submitted: Appellant:

Todd M. Johnson Grady L. Slade, Jr.

State Bar #395651 GDC #1209673

Johnson Law, P.C. Phillips State Prison

P.O. Box 48 2989 W. Rock Quarry Road

Cohutta, GA 30710 Buford, GA 30519

(708) 694-4298 (770) 932-4500

(706) 694-3173 facsimile

* ** *

4. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective

and ®emand Is Required for Hearing.

The standard for assessing whether trial counsel

rendered constitutionally effective assistance is set

out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104

App. 20

SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 (1984), and adopted in Smith

v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 325 SE2d 362 (1985).

Under Strickland, a criminal defendant must

show both that his counsel’s performance was defi-

cient, and but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,

there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of

the trial would have been different. “A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694.

“Both the performance and prejudice components

of the ineffectiveness inquiry are mixed questions of

law and fact.” Lajara v. State, 263 Ga. 438, 440, 435

S.E.2d 600 91993), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at

698.

Here, the Appellant was denied an opportunity to

develop the errors of his trial counsel and their effect

upon his trial more fully in hearing and Appellant’s

trial counsel was unable.as a witness to raise those

errors under the cannons of ethics. Under Smith uv.

State, 255 Ga. 654, 656, 341 S.E.2d 5 (1986), remand

is appropriate where a facial showing of ineffective-

ness is made.

b. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Was Ineffective.

i. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Failed to Ob-

ject To Bolstering.

Appellant’s trial counsel failed to make one

objection to Brenda Hoffmeyer or Christine Forrest

App. 21

talking about how they told R. to tell the truth or that

R. said he was telling the truth. Hoffmeyer, an ex-

perienced employee of the District Attorney’s office is

a paid professional witness who took great liberties

by bolstering the story allegedly brought out of R.

Here, we anticipate that Appellant’s trial counsel will

testify that upon reading the transcript he was struck

with how many times the bolstering occurred without

challenge. He is a fine trial attorney, but he agrees he

dropped the ball.

ii. Appellant’s Trial Counsel Failed to

Make Specific Objection to Use of

Child Hearsay with an Adult.

_ Although one general objection was made (T-18),

when the prosecution attempted to admit the hearsay

videotape of Appellant’s adult son, State Exhibit 2,

Appellant’s trial attorney stated, “No Objection”.

Here, the use of the child hearsay statute was vio-

lated by the State with a fully capable adult. Should

this Court find that Appellant’s trial counsel failed to

preserve the error associated with child hearsay

statements of adult Grady Lavon Slade, III, Appel-

lant will show that his counsel did not perform up to

the| standard one would expect of a lawyer defending

child molestation charges.

Whether adequate time for preparation was

allowed in this case must rest upon its unique factual

situation. “The recurring theme of opinions concern-

ing ‘this problem has been that undue haste in the

App. 22

administration of justice is as much condemned as

unnecessary delay ..” Lowrance v. State, 183 Ga.

App. 421, 359 S.E.2d 196 (1987). Appellant shows

that his case was not properly prepared to his detri-

ment and he urges a reversal.

Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 (1984), and a Smith

v. Francis, 253 Ga. 782, 325 SE2d 362 (1985), appel-

lant will show ineffectiveness and sufficient prejudice

for reversal of his case. He urges the court to grant

him a remand for a new trial hearing on ineffective-

ness.

App. 23

ACCUSATION

WITNESSES

_ NO. 05-CR-331 Brett Morrison, MCSO.

Murray Superior Court |) GRapy LAVON SLADE

August Term, 2005. |p WAIVE MY RIGHT

THE STATE OF TO INDICTMENT BY

GEORGIA GRAND JURY AND

vs. WISH TO PROCEED BY

GRADY LAVON ACCUSATION THIS 5th

SLADE, JR. DAY OF OCTOBER, 2005.

Cts. 1,2:AGGRAVATED |/s/ Grady Slade, Jr.

SODOMY - F GRADY LAVON

Cts. 3, 4: AGGRAVATED SLADE, JR.

CHILD

M OLESTATION — F /s/_ Jerry W. Moncus

: JERRY MONCUS,

Cts. 5,6 : CHILD

cm 7 ATTORNEY FOR

xe DEFENDANT

Ct. 7: AGGRAVATED

SODOMY - F

|

The Defendant,

GRADY LAVON

SLADE, JR., waives

formal arraignment, and

pleads

Not Guilty

October 5th, 2005

! Date

/s/ Grady Slade Jr.

Defendant

/s/ Jerry W. Moncus

Defendant’s Attorney

(Filed Oct. 5, 2005)

App. 24

/s/ Jerry W. Moncus

KERMIT MCMANUS,

District Attorney

STATE OF GEORGIA, MURRAY COUNTY

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAID COUNTY

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the

County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR

- with the offense of

AGGRAVATED SODOMY

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation

of 0.C.G.A. §16-6-2(a) commit the offense of Aggra-

vated Sodomy, when he did perform a sexual act

involving the mouth of the accused and the sex or-

gans of another person, to wit: R.R.F., R.R.F. being a

person less than ten years of age at the time the

described act of Sodomy was committed with him, by

placing his mouth into contact with the sex organs of

R.R.F., contrary to the laws of said State, the good

order, peace and dignity thereof,

App. 25

COUNT 2

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the

County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR

with the offense of

AGGRAVATED SODOMY

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation

of 0.C.G.A. §16-6-2(a) commit the offense of Aggra-

vated Sodomy, when he did perform and submit to a

sexual act involvir g the sex organs of the accused and

the mouth of another person, to wit: R.R.F., R.R.F.

being a person less than ten years of age at the time

the'described ect of Sodor.y was committed with him,

by placing his penis into contact with and into said

child’s mouth, contrary to the laws of said State, the

good order, peace and dignity thereof.

COUNT 3

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the

County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse

App. 26

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR

with the offense of

AGGRAVATED CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation

of O.C.G.A. §16-6-4(c) commit the offense of Aggra-

vated Child Molestation, when he did perform an

immoral and indecent act which did involve an act of

sodomy to, with, and in the presence of R.R.F., a child

under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing his

mouth into contact with said child’s penis, with intent

to arouse and satisfy the sexual] desires of said ac-

cused and child, contrary to the laws of said State,

the good order, peace and dignity thereof.

COUNT 4

in the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the

County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR

with the offense of

AGGRAVATED CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation

of O0.C.G.A. §16-6-4(c) commit the offense of Aggra-

vated Child Molestation, when he did perform an

immoral and indecent act which did involve an act of

App. 27

sodomy to, with and in the presence of R.R.F., a child

under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing his

penis into contact with and into said child’s mouth,

with intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of

said accused, contrary to the laws of said State, the

good order, peace and dignity thereof.

COUNT 5

Ini the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the

County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR

with the offease of

CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violation

of 0.C.G.A. §16-6-4(a) commit the offense of Child

Molestation, when he did an immoral and indecent

act 'to, with and in the presence of R.R.F., a child

under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing his

hand into contact with R.R.F.’s penis, with intent to

arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused,

contrary to the laws of said State, the good order,

peace and dignity thereof.

App. 28

COUNT 6

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the

County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR

with the offense of

CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, the exact date being unknown, in violation of

O.C.G.A. § 16-6-4(a) commit the offense of Child

Molestation, when he did an immoral and indecent

act to, with and in the presence of R.R.F., a child

under the age of sixteen (16) years, by taking said

child’s hand pulling it towards and placing it into

contact with the accused’s penis, with intent to arouse

and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused, con-

trary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace

and dignity thereof.

COUNT 7

In the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, the undersigned District Attorney for the

County and State aforesaid, does hereby charge and

accuse

App. 29

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

with the offense of

AGGRAVATED SODOMY

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, the exact date being unknown, did in violat’on

of | 0. C.G.A. §16-6-4(a) commit the offense of Aggra-

vated Sodomy, when he did perform a sexual act

involving the sex organs of the accused and the

mouth of another person, to-wit: R.R.F., by pushing

R.R.F’s head onto the accused’s penis, causing his

mouth to come into contact with the accused’s penis,

said act being done with force and against the will of

said person, contrary to the laws of said State, the

good order, peace and dignity thereof.

App. 30

SPECIAL WITNESSES

PRESENTMENT .

NO. 05-CR-227 Brett Morrison, MCSO,

Murray Superior Court | Christine Forrest 3

February Term, 2005. |9473 Old Highway 411,

THE STATE OF Chatsworth, Ga.

gore at Laura News, DFCS,

GRADY LAVON (Filed Jul. 20, 2005)

SLADE, JR.

2, Cts. CHILD

MOLESTATION — F

True BILL

/s/ Norris Kilgore Foreman

The Defendant,

GRADY LAVON SLADE,

JR., waives formal

arraignment, and pleads

Date

Defendant

aie Defendant’s Attorney

KERMIT MCMANUS,

District Attorney

i ae Cee SOR RD ime: ad tT i tbe aelh WD a Shak A ak Go ORT ES ns be oe oP OI ak a a ie tn ey.

: sites ae : : ; ane phe ee Ue a me sk

App. 31

STATE OF GEORGIA, MURRAY COUNTY 4

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SAID COUNTY q

THE GRAND JURORS SELECTED, CHOSEN AND

SWORN FOR THE COUNTY OF MURRAY, TO-WIT:

Norris Allen Kilgore, Foreman

Johnny Elrod L.H. Hipp a

Richard Leon Hall Frank Walker 4

Lanell Charles Silvers Lisa K. Hudson ‘a

Mitchell Long Mark Terry Hensley

Albert Jay Green | Juanita Aline Parker

Kevin-ClaudeBeliew Absent TR-Perter Absent

Hubert Buddy Bagley, Jr Barbara B. Brookshire

Marsha Denise Parker John T. Mitchem a

Bruce G. Coulter Stephen D. Hahn a

Janice B. Durocher Bobby Steven Peden

Mary Nell Calfee Emma Jean Long

In 'the name and on the behalf of the citizens of

Georgia, charge and accuse

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR

with the offense of

CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, did an immoral and indecent act upon the

person of R.R.F., a child under the age of sixteen (16)

years, by placing his hand on the penis of R.R.F., with

intent to arouse and satisfy the sexual desires of said

accused, contrary to the laws of said State, the good

order, peace and dignity thereof.

App. 32

COUNT 2

AND THE GRAND JURORS, aforesaid, in the name

and on the behalf of the citizens of Georgia, charge

and accuse 7

GRADY LAVON SLADE, JR.

with the offense of

CHILD MOLESTATION

for that the said accused in the County of Murray and

_the State of Georgia on or before the 11th day of July,

2005, did an immoral and indecent act with R.R.F., a

child under the age of sixteen (16) years, by placing

the hand of R.R.F. on his penis, with intent to arouse

and satisfy the sexual desires of said accused, con-

trary to the laws of said State, the good order, peace

and dignity thereof.