Amicus Curiae Brief — Stephenson v. Dow Chemical Co (No. 08-461)
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Supreme Court, U.S
\S No. 08- NOV 7 ~ 2008
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the Anited States
DANIEL RAYMOND STEPHENSON, ET AL.,
Petitioners,
wf
DOW CHEMICAL COMPANY,
MONSANTO COMPANY, ET AL..,
Respondents.
¢
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Second Circuit
®
BRIEF OF VETERANS GROUPS AS AMICI CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
+
LEILA H. WATSON
Counsel of Record
CorY WATSON CROWDER & DEGARIS
2131 Magnolia Ave. S.
Birmingham, AL 35205
(205) 328-2200
November 7, 2008
Counsel for Amici Curiae
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUEHORD TUS csnceseccciicsecesvavssevexessues iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIALE .............ss00eeceeseees 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...00..... ce eeeseeeeeees 3
PAP INE ocsnvciscevaveineweys eebicncencneremmanenD 5
I. PUBLIC POLICY WOULD NOT ADVO-
II.
CATE THE EXPANSION OF THE DE-
FENSE TO PROVIDE IMMUNITY TO
THE CHEMICAL COMPANIES IN THIS
A. Boyle’s rationale for the government
contractor defense recognizes the need
to protect the government’s discretion-
ary function while also encouraging
manufacturers to share their knowl-
edge of known dangers...................0000008
B. The Second Circuit’s application of
Boyle frustrates the government’s dis-
cretionary TCtiOR sa...
C. Public policy demands full disclosure
by government contractors....................
IN A CASE OF THIS MAGNITUDE, THE
COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE SEC-
OND CIRCUITS DECISION, WHICH
GREATLY EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF
THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR
DEST Ral W GIs x nnsn vrs easnscsevinssonteyentonesaieaeneaenanee
1
TABLE OF CONTENTS -— Continued
Page
A. Boyle does not require a showing that
the knowledge withheld by the con-
tractor would have made a difference
to the government in its decision-
PORTA PEOCUES on ic cer eessvesstvermeneem 10
B. The Second Circuit disregarded factual
PE ns sedecccicnncunenaeeneee 11
C. Boyle does not address defects result-
ing from a manufacturing process that
was neither compelled nor specified in
ND UIE isc sicscisscecevicvererseaepeserenmaees 12
il. THE CHEMICAL COMPANIES, RATHER
THAN THE INJURED VETERANS,
THE GOVERNMENT, OR TAXPAYERS,
SHOULD BEAR THE COST OF HARM
THAT WAS PREVENTABLE ...................... 13
A. Manufacturers are in the best position
to prevent these injuries ...............::0006 14
B. Parties withholding information and
causing injury should bear the costs of
PE SII oosciicsecci erica 16
IV. PUBLIC POLICY IS TO PROTECT OUR
TROOPS TO THE BEST OF OUR ABIL-
ITY FROM UNNECESSARY OR PRE-
EEE PPR RAds BRIRARIME » cisccicevsvivescnscsasieerstensecones 18
oo. & Ea 6), iiusitae ies isavaeaee 19
APPENDIX
Ee PEMNNCE CLEPUNG 50.0 ccnsencecvncesovernesnsmeican App. 1
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
FEDERAL CASES
Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S.
ee lata bisynisanevecsiataiesculectunstoncaienaeeeierets passim
In re “Agent Orange,” 517 F. 3d 76 (2nd Cir.
A ea RS RODENT ar RS OTE OE ETRE RoR Or Ea 9,10, 11, 12
United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797
| ae anes era E ORIEN SITE NOUR Ns te Re SDF 6
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Beh, The Government Contractor Defense:
When Do Governmental Interests Justify Ex-
cusing A Manufacturer’s Liability for Defec-
tive Products? 28 SETON HALL 430 (1997) .............. 14
Budget of the United States Government,
Fiscal Year 2008, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/budget/fy2008/pd f/budget/defense. pdf............ 15
Defense News, List of Top Military Contractors
http://www.defensenews.con//static/features/
top100/charts/rank_2007.php?c=FEA&s=TIC ...... 15
Dow Chemical Company 2007 10-K and
Stock Holder Summary, http://www.dow.com/
PublishedLiterature/dh_010b/0901b8038010
bafe.pdf?filepath=financial/pdfs/noreg/161-
00696. pdf &from Page=GetDoc........... eee eeeeeeeeees 15
1V
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary of Law. Merriam-
Webster, Inc. http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/discretion (accessed: October 24,
Monsanto 2007 Annual Report, http://www.
monsanto.com/pdf/pubs/2007/2007Annual
NG iii ciccutiniin crn cnaemanieceonr tenes
Veteran’s Affairs Vietnam Veterans Fact Sheet,
http://www. vba.va.gov/bln/21/Milsvc/Docs/VN
CS EE EERE DOE OL II ENO RTE ee
Page
IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE'
Amici are 32 military and veterans service or-
ganizations, collectively representing more than 7
million members. Amici join together in urging this
court to grant certiorari for two compelling reasons.
First, Vietnam War veterans suffering from fatal
diseases caused by privately manufactured chemicals
should at minimum be accorded the same rights as
ordinary Americans to sue the manufacturers of those
exact same chemicals who happened to be exposed
during domestic use in the U.S. Secondly, and even
more importantly, the Second Circuit’s drastic expan-
sion of the government contractor defense threatens
the health and safety of all servicemen who must
necessarily rely on products manufactured by con-
tractors to protect this country and who, therefore,
have a right to expect that those products will be
manufactured as safely as is possible.
Amici, urging this court to accept certiorari,
include the following chartered veterans service
organizations: 1) The American Legion, 36 U.S.C
§217, et seq., with nearly 3 million members;
’ All counsel of record received notice of amici’s intention to
file this brief at least ten days before this brief was due. The
parties have consented to the filing of this brief. Amici state that
no portion of this brief was authored by counsel for the parties
and that no person or entity other than amici or their counsel
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission
of this brief.
* See Appendix for a detailed description of Amici.
2
2) The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States,
§2301, et seg., with 1.7 million members; 3) The
Disabled American Veterans, §50301, et seq., with 1.4
million members; 4) The Vietnam Veterans of Amer-
ica, §2305, et seg., with 50,000 members; 5) The
Catholic War Veterans of the United States, §401, et
seq., with 30,000 members; 6) The American Ex-
Prisoners of War, §209, et seq., with 27,000 members;
7) The Blinded Veterans of America, §1701, et seq.,
with 10,200 members; 8) The Paralyzed Veterans of
America, §1701, et seq., with 20,500 members; 9) The
Reserve Officers Association, §1901 et seq.; 10) The
Marine Corps League, §1401, et seq.; 11) The Italian
American War Veterans of the U.S.A., §1001, et seq.,
with 10,000 members; and 12) The Military Chap-
lains Association §1403, et seq.
Amici also include the following unchartered
organizations: 1) The Air Force Association, with
125,000 members; 2) The Air Force Sergeants Asso-
ciation, with 130,000 members; 3) The Air Force
Women Officers Associated; 4) The Association of
the United States Army; 5) The Chief Warrant and
Warrant Officers Association, United States Coast
Guard; 6) The Enlisted Association of the National
Guard of the United States with 414,000 members; 7)
The Fleet Reserve Association; 8) The Jewish War
Veterans of the United States of America; 9) The
Marine Corps Reserve Association; 10) The Military
Officers Association of America, with 370,000 mem-
bers; 11) The National Association for Uniformed
Services, with 200,000 members; 12) The National
Guard Association of the United States, with 45,000
3
members; 13) The National Order of Battlefield
Commissions; 14) The Naval Enlisted Reserve Asso-
ciation; 15) The Navy League of the United States;
16) The Naval Reserve Association; 17) The Non-
Commissioned Officers Association; 18) The United
States Army Warrant Officers Association; 19) The
Veterans of the Vietnam War, Inc.; and 20) The Re-
serve Enlisted Association.
¢
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Public policy demands that the Second Circuit’s
decision in this case be reviewed. That decision
ignores the government’s need to provide our military
with equipment that is not unnecessarily defective.
The defendant chemical companies hid information
from the government regarding the dangerous nature
of dioxin, the manufacturing process used that re-
sulted in unnecessarily high levels of dioxin, and the
numerous illnesses to their workers they knew to be
caused by dioxin. Thus they should not benefit from
the government contractor defense — a defense which
public policy demands sharing knowledge of known
dangers before contractors may benefit from it.
In this case, the exceptionally high levels of toxic
dioxin, a byproduct of Agent Orange, were not the
result of the government’s instruction, design or
specification. Dioxin, which has caused so many
health problems to veterans who were exposed to
Agent Orange in Vietnam, was created as a conse-
quence of the manufacturing process chosen by the
4
defendant chemical companies, not by the govern-
ment. The government did not require the chemical
companies to utilize a manufacturing process that
created dioxin and did not compel the chemical com-
panies to create a defective or unreasonably danger-
ous product. Therefore, the public policy behind the
government contractor defense would not be harmed
or threatened by the rejection of that defense in this
case.
Conversely, other compelling public policies are
trampled by the improper application of the govern-
ment contractor defense here. Public policy strongly
encourages the protection of our military by providing
the troops with the best and the safest equipment
possible to serve our country. The record has been
made clear in this litigation that the chemical com-
panies had the ability to make Agent Orange without
detectible levels of dioxin as a byproduct, by using
less dangerous processes, such as the Boehringer
process — but they chose not to. In addition, public
policy favors holding the party in the best position to
prevent the harm responsible for injuries. The chemi-
cal companies had much greater knowledge than did
the government about the manufacturing processes
which resulted in the creation of dioxin. Moreover,
when harm occurs, public policy requires the culpable
party to bear the cost. In this case, the government
not only paid the chemical companies for the Agent
Orange they manufactured, but also for the medical
care and benefits owed to Vietnam veterans injured
from the unnecessary exposure to dioxin. As a result,
Cn
the public has been forced to pay over and over again
for the harm caused by the chemical companies.
Moreover our Vietnam veterans have no recourse for
their damages. Such a result flies in the face of public
policy.
Should the decision of the Second Circuit be
allowed to stand, private contractors will be encour-
aged to keep from the government knowledge they
possess regarding important safety issues — including
safer alternative manufacturing processes never
contemplated, much less required, by the contract
specifications. Moreover, contractors will use this
holding as a license to ignore opportunities to evalu-
ate safer processes and to learn about potential
defects in the products they supply to the govern-
ment. In either event, there is a substantial risk of
our military being provided unnecessarily dangerous
or defective products that impede the troops’ ability to
get the government’s work done.
.
ARGUMENT
I. PUBLIC POLICY WOULD NOT ADVOCATE
THE EXPANSION OF THE DEFENSE TO
PROVIDE IMMUNITY TO THE CHEMICAL
COMPANIES IN THIS CASE.
The government contractor defense is not statu-
tory, but a creation of the Court, born out of public
policy considerations that a contractor, who simply
does what the government tells him to do, should not
6
be exposed to state-law tort liability for doing so. In
Boyle, this Court set forth 3 requirements for a gov-
ernment contractor to take advantage of the immu-
nity provided by the government contractor defense:
(1) that the United States approved reasonably
precise specifications; (2) the equipment conformed to
those specifications; and (3) the supplier warned the
United States about the dangers in the use of the
equipment that were known to the supplier but not to
the United States. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988).
A. Boyle’s rationale for the government
contractor defense recognizes’ the
need to protect the government’s dis-
cretionary function while also encour-
aging manufacturers to share their
knowledge of known dangers.
This Court imposed the first two requirements of
Boyle in order not to frustrate the government’s
discretionary function. /d., 487 U.S. at 512. In doing
so, this Court considered that there would be a finan-
cial burden associated with holding government
contractors liable that would ultimately be passed
through to the federal government. Boyle, 487 U.S. at
511. Additionally, consideration was given to whether
allowing suits against government contractors would
result in “second guessing” the government’s discre-
tionary function through litigation. Jd. citing, United
States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984).
Added to these was the third requirement. Its ra-
tionale was to prevent giving manufacturers “an
7
incentive to withhold knowledge of risks.” Boyle, 487
U.S. at 512.
All of these concerns are best served by not
allowing the government contractor defense to im-
munize the chemical companies in this case. The
government’s discretionary function is not impeded
by holding contractors liable where they hid known
information of dangers from the government, because
the government was never able to exercise its discre-
tionary authority in the first place. Furthermore, by
allowing the manufacturers to hide behind the gov-
ernment contractor defense, when they withheld
information of a known safer manufacturing process
and intentionally withheld the health hazards associ-
ated with exposure to dioxin, flies in the face of Boyle
and public policy.
B. The Second Circuit’s application of
Boyle frustrates the government’s dis-
cretionary function.
A fair and just reading of Boyle would require
contractors to share their knowledge of safer manu-
facturing processes for the herbicides ordered by the
government. One purpose of the government contrac-
tor defense is to keep the government’s discretionary
function from being frustrated. Jd. 487 U.S. at 511.
“Discretion” implies the government has a choice in
8
its decision-making process.’ By hiding information of
safer available processes for manufacturing Agent
Orange without dangerously high or even detectable
levels of the toxic byproduct dioxin from the govern-
ment, the chemical companies denied the government
an opportunity to approve their selected method.
With this information, the government would have
been able to truly use its discretionary authority to
make an informed decision regarding not only
whether to use Agent Orange, but also which method
should be used to manufacture that product. State
tort claims against the chemical companies do not
frustrate the government’s discretionary authority,
but the chemical companies’ withholding information
from the government surely does.
In Boyle, this Court said, “second guessing” the
government's. discretionary function should _ be
avoided. Jd. However, a second look is mandated in
this case because the chemical companies, as the
Second Circuit acknowledged, failed to provide all
information known to them regarding known defects
in the products they were selling to the government.
The Second Circuit’s ruling improperly grants blan-
ket immunity based on a faulty interpretation of
Boyle. If left standing, this ruling sends the wrong
* Discretion: power of free decision or latitude of choice
within certain bounds imposed by law. Dictionary.com. Merriam-
Webster’s Dictionary of Law. Merriam-Webster, Inc. http://
dictionary.reference.com/browse/discretion (accessed: October 24,
2008).
9
message to government contractors and is contrary to
the public policy considerations of protecting our
troops.
C. Public policy demands full disclosure
by government contractors.
The Second Circuit held that the government
determined that the herbicides it was receiving were
“safe” and that such a determination is equivalent to
approving reasonably precise specifications about
that danger. In re “Agent Orange,” 517 F. 3d 76, 97
(2nd Cir. 2008). It is not. Here, as the Second Circuit
admits, the government did not have full knowledge
of the catastrophic and systemic health dangers
associated with the unspecified dioxin. More impor-
tantly, the government was unaware that the unrea-
sonable dangers of exposing troops to toxic dioxin
could have been reasonably avoided by the use of an
alternative manufacturing process. This further
ignores the fact that while the government was
determining that the product was “safe,” the defen-
dant chemical companies were busy hiding informa-
tion from the government regarding the health
problems they knew were occurring in their own
workers from exposure to the dioxin byproduct. The
relevant inquiry should be whether the government
was given knowledge of the danger and the opportu-
nity to consider approving another plausible manu-
facturing process that would have _ drastically
alleviated the danger. The evidence proves it was not.
It is illogical to determine something is “safe” without
10
knowledge of the specific dangers and the way to
avoid those dangers.
Il. IN A CASE OF THIS MAGNITUDE, THE
COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE SECOND
CIRCUIT’S DECISION, WHICH GREATLY
EXPANDS THE SCOPE OF THE GOV-
ERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE.
The Second Circuit’s decision expands the gov-
ernment contractor defense by requiring a showing by
the injured party that the knowledge withheld by the
contractor would have made a difference to the gov-
ernment in its decision-making process. Agent Orange,
517 F.3d at 97-98. If the government contractor
defense is to be expanded from Boyle’s requirements,
it should be this Court that articulates the new
standard.
A. Boyle does not require a showing that
the knowledge withheld by the con-
tractor would have made a difference
to the government in its decision-
making process.
In deciding to immunize the chemical companies
in this case, the Second Circuit stated that, even if
health and safety evidence was proven to be hidden,
the plaintiff has the burden of proof at the summary
judgment stage to demonstrate that the evidence
shows that the information withheld from the gov-
ernment is of “the type that would have an impact on
11
the military’s discretionary decision.” The Second
Circuit thereby admitted it was adding an additional
requirement to the defense. Agent Orange, 517 F. 3d
at 97. Nowhere in Boyle did this Court require an
injured party to show that the withheld information
would have had an impact on the military discretion-
ary decision or, conversely, for a plaintiff to show that
admittedly hidden health and safety information
would have had an impact on the military discretion-
ary decision.
B. The Second Circuit disregarded factual
disputes.
Even though the Second Circuit acknowledged
the presence of factual issues left to be resolved as it
considered the three Boyle requirements, the court
ultimately ignored those disputes and took it upon
itself to determine that defective manufacturing
processes and safer alternative methods do not rise to
the level of danger that must be disclosed to the
government. Agent Orange, 517 F. 3d at 97, 101-102.
The Second Circuit’s analysis extends far beyond
what is required by Boyle, and, in this case, results in
the court taking the place of the jury to decide impor-
tant factual disputes. Moreover, it defies logic to
reason that, had the government been fully informed
by the chemical companies of a safer manufacturing
process that would result in an equally effective
Agent Orange defoliant, it would still have chosen
Agent Orange made with a less safe process that
produced dangerously high levels of dioxin. Certainly,
12
such a determination must at least be made by a
finder of fact, not an appellate court.
C. Boyle does not address defects result-
ing from a manufacturing process that
was neither compelled nor specified in
the contract.
The government contractor defense as articulated
in Boyle does not fit well with the peculiar facts of
this case. Boyle sets forth the manner in which a
court must evaluate a state court product liability
claim by comparing the contract at issue with the
alleged defect. This case involves a defective manu-
facturing process that was chosen not by the govern-
ment, but by the chemical companies; and, more
importantly, one that could have been avoided. The
record shows that the chemical companies had supe-
rior knowledge regarding the manufacturing process.
The Second Circuit even acknowledged that there
existed a factual dispute as to whether the chemical
companies could have honored their contractual
obligations using the safer manufacturing process,
but wrongly disregarded that dispute. Agent Orange,
517 F. 3d at 93.
As such, Agent Orange became unreasonably
dangerous as a direct result of the defective manufac-
turing process chosen by the chemical companies. This
case centers on a defective manufacturing process
and not a design defect. A design defect is a defect
inherent in the design of the product. It has nothing
13
to so with the ultimate process to manufacture that
design. Here, there is no issue as to the chemicals or
design chosen. The issue is defendants chose not to
use safer manufacturing methods, including the
Boehringer method. Applying Boyle, which addresses
design defect claims, is inadequate to analyze the
problems created by the defendants’s failure to use
safer methods. Under the Second Circuit's reasoning,
the chemical companies are now off the hook, even
though the government never was given the opportu-
nity to exercise discretion over the manufacturing
process.
lil. THE CHEMICAL COMPANIES, RATHER
THAN INJURED VETERANS, THE GOV-
ERNMENT, OR TAXPAYERS, SHOULD
BEAR THE COST OF HARM THAT WAS
PREVENTABLE.
Sick or the loved ones of now deceased Vietnam
veterans should not be relying exclusively on the
government to pay for the errors of the defendant
companies. This is especially true since those compa-
nies did not share valuable health and safety infor-
mation which could have prevented serious injuries
and death and were paid substantial sums of money
under the contracts. When these Vietnam veterans
sustained injuries and deadly diseases, the govern-
ment paid again — this time with VA benefits and
healthcare expenses. As of March 2000, there were
approximately 7,520 Vietnam veterans receiving
compensation through the Department of Veterans
14
Affairs for Agent Orange related injuries without any
fund or assistance from those companies that manu-
factured the deadly product.’
It is the purpose of our tort system to allow
injured parties to recover when the acts or omissions
of another causes them harm. It is a fundamental
principle “that risk should be borne by those with the
best ability to manage risk by safeguarding against
injury or bearings its cost.” As stated above, the
chemical companies here were in the best position to
safeguard against injury. And for that reason, they
should have to bear the cost.
A. Manufacturers are in the best position
to prevent these injuries.
Government contractors are clearly in a better
position to prevent defects in the products they pro-
duce. The chemical companies had been manufactur-
ing herbicides for decades before the Vietnam War.
These companies should not be allowed to check all
their resources and knowledge at the door when they
* http://www.vba.va.gov/bln/21/Milsve/Docs'VN Facts.doc, citing
6. “Agent Orange: Statistical Update,” March 2000, VA Office of
Public Affairs, Media Relations Office (80-F). This number does
not include the children of Vietnam Veterans who receive
benefits for their injuries due to the use of Agent Orange.
> Hazel Glenn Beh, The Government Contractor Defense:
When Do Governmental Interests Justify Excusing A Manufac-
turer's Liability for Defective Products? 28 SETON HALL 430, 448,
n.103 (1997).
15
work for the government. The chemical companies
have the skill, technology, and financial ability to
ensure that the products they manufacture are effec-
tive, safe and meet the specifications as set forth by
the government.
The Department of Defense has spent $100
billion on procurement contracts in 2008.° The manu-
facturers bidding on these contracts are major corpo-
rate entities, not small-time players. In 2006, the top
ten defense contracting companies produced revenues
over $193.7 billion purely from defense contracts and
their total combined revenues — defense contracting
and other sources of revenues — were over $331.4
billion.’ Although not in the top ten defense contract-
ing companies, the defendants here are hardly lack-
ing in resources: Monsanto reported $8.6 billion in
net sales for 2007, while Dow Chemical reported
$53.5 billion for the same period.” These are industry
leaders who set standards for the rest to follow.
* Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year
2008, http://www. whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/budget/
defense. pdf.
" Defense News, List of Top Military Contractors, http://www.
defensenews.com/static/features/top100/charts/rank_2007.php?c
=FEA&s=TI1C.
* Monsanto 2007 Annual Report, http://*www.monsanto.
com/pdf/pubs/2007/2007AnnualReport.pdf; The Dow Chemical
Company 2007 10-K and Stock Holder Summary, http://www.
dow.com/PublishedLiterature/dh_010b/0901b8038010bafe. pdf?file
path=financial/pdfs/noreg/161-00696 pdf&fromPage=GetDoc.
16
Manufacturers should not be encouraged to
withhold safety information when they are manufac-
turing products for use by the government and profit
in the process. Yet, that is precisely what the Second
Circuit’s ruling allows. It is unfitting that these
manufacturers should profit from providing unneces-
sarily defective and highly dangerous herbicides that
cause systemic injuries to our Vietnam veterans when
they went to great lengths to hide health and safety
dangers from the government.
The government contractor defense only requires
that contractors inform the government of all defects
and dangers they are aware of. Boyle 487 U.S. at 512.
This is not a burdensome duty. Such disclosures
would not require any significant additional work as
contractors seek to comply with the terms of a gov-
ernment contract. They are not being asked to make
design changes. They are not being asked to manu-
facture perfect products. Nor are they being asked to
test products and determine all possible defects. They
are simply being asked to responsibly inform the
government of information that could prevent harm
and may implicate the safety of the material that the
government is planning to purchase.
B. Parties withholding information and
causing injury should bear the costs of
those injuries.
Manufacturers that fail in their responsibility to
prevent harm should, as the culpable party, bear the
17
costs of those harms. In this case, the burden should
not fall to the government to pay for injured Vietnam
veterans. Nor should the injured veterans be left
without recourse where neither they nor the govern-
ment were responsible for the harm. Yet, under the
Second Circuit’s ruling, this is precisely the case.
Receiving government healthcare or veterans’
benefits does not have the same affect as being able
to bring a lawsuit against a party that caused one
harm. First and most importantly, such lawsuits
ensure that the culpable party pays for its wrongful
actions and/or omissions. In this case, the chemical
companies who willfully neglected their obligation to
inform the government of a safer manufacturing
process should have to answer for their failures.
Second, only a tort action provides the ability to
validate the victim’s belief that he or she was harmed
by another while also instilling confidence that a
remedy can be found by participating in the judicial
system. Our Vietnam veterans deserve the opportu-
nity to have their day in court against the chemical
companies that could have prevented the illnesses
from which they now suffer. Third, tort liability sets
standards by which others know how to act. In this
case manufacturers and contractors would be encour-
aged to be open and honest with the government
about their knowledge and their capabilities to oper-
ate to the best of their ability.
As the Second Circuit has applied the govern-
ment contractor defense, the culpable parties remain
18
completely immune from having to provide compen-
sation to either the injured Vietnam veterans or the
federal government. This does not embody the stan-
dards considered important to continuing the legiti-
macy of our tort system.
IV. PUBLIC POLICY SHOULD BE TO PRO-
TECT OUR TROOPS TO THE BEST OF
OUR ABILITY FROM UNNECESSARY OR
PREVENTABLE HARM.
Human life is the greatest resource our military
has. It is not in the government’s interest to procure
defective products that cause serious illnesses where
a safer alternative method to manufacture a product
is available. The government invests a large portion
of its budget in the defense of our country. For 2008,
the Department of Defense’s budget is estimated to be
$560 billion with over $100 billion of that allocated
for military personnel. The government has an inter-
est in procuring the best personnel, best resources,
and best equipment for the personnel that protect our
country. The Second Circuit wrongly permits the
manufacturers of products rather than the govern-
ment to determine in the first instance what health
risks may be acceptable for these men and women.
This is wrong. The government should be provided all
known health and safety information in order for it to
determine how best to protect our troops.
As to Vietnam veterans, the government should
certainly not have a greater interest in providing
19
immunity to contractors than in protecting our Viet-
nam veterans from harm. Products manufactured by
government contractors are not a greater or more
important resource than these troops. Although
inury and even death are risks every soldier faces,
those risks should not come from an unnecessarily
defective, extremely toxic product, whose dangers
have been hidden from the government.
°
CONCLUSION
The Second Circuit’s application of the govern-
m2nt contractor defense unduly expands the govern-
m2nt contractor defense beyond its intended scope.
The policy reasons for the government contractor
defense — the interest in protecting both the govern-
ment’s discretionary functions and our military —
stould be of paramount importance to any reviewing
court. Amici urge this Court to grant the petition for
wit of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
LitILA H. WATSON
Counsel of Record
CorY WATSON CROWDER & DEGaRIS
2°31 Magnolia Ave. S.
Brmingham, AL 35205
(205) 328-2200
November 7, 2008
Counsel for Amici Curiae
App. 1
APPENDIX
AMICI CURIAE
Congressionally Chartered Organizations
The American Legion, chartered by Congress
in 1919 as a patriotic war-time veterans organization,
is devoted to mutual helpfulness. it is a not-for-profit
community-service organization with nearly 3 million
members, men and women, in nearly 15,000
American Legion posts worldwide.
The Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United
States (VFW) is a federally chartered corporation
with 1.7 million members, over 525,000 of whom
served in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam Conflict.
The organization is dedicated to assuring that veter-
ans are provided the compensation and care earned
by their service, perpetuating the memory of their
sacrifices and furthering the institutions of American
freedoms. Annually, VFW members and its Auxiliary
contribute more than 13 million hours of volunteer-
ism in the community.
Disabled American Veterans (DAV) is a feder-
ally chartered corporation with over 1.4 million
members that focuses on building better lives for
disabled veterans and their families. DAV accom-
plishes this goal by providing free assistance to
veterans in obtaining benefits and services earned
through their military service.
The Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA) is a
federally chartered non-profit corporation dedicated
App. 2
to promoting and supporting the full range of issues
important to Vietnam veterans, creating a new iden-
tity for a generation of veterans and changing public
perception of Vietnam veterans. The VVA has over
50,000 individual members in 46 states and 630 local
chapters. One of the VVA’s special programs is sup-
porting the next generation of America’s war veter-
ans.
Catholic War Veterans was founded in 1935
with the objective of making the entire nation acutely
aware of the struggle and needs of many veterans,
their widows and children. It is also the responsibility
of the 30,000 Catholic War Veterans members to help
protect, preserve and defend the Constitution of the
United States and the laws of our government.
The American Ex-Prisoners of War Organi-
zation is a national organization for American citi-
zens who were captured by the enemy. At the present
time, the American Ex-Prisoners of War has over 300
Chapters and State Departments, representing over
27,000 members. Founded April 14, 1942, the organi-
zation has existed for the purpose of helping others.
Its motto is “We exist to help those who cannot help
themselves.”
The Blinded Veterans Association (BVA) is an
organization of blinded veterans helping blinded
veterans through service programs, regional groups,
resources, and advocacy before the legislative and
executive branches of government.
App. 3
Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) is a
congressionally chartered veteran’s organization
dedicated to the needs of veterans with spinal cord
injuries or diseases. The PVA works to maximize the
quality of life for its members and all people with
spinal cord injuries or diseases as a leading advocate
for health care, research, education, veterans’ benefits
and rights, accessibility and the removal of architec-
tural barriers, sports programs, and disability rights.
The Reserve Officers Association (ROA) was
founded in 1922, and chartered by Congress in 1950.
Its mission is to support and promote the develop-
ment and execution of a military policy for the United
States that will provide adequate National Security.
The Marine Corps League, is the only federally
chartered United States Marine Corps — related
veterans organization. Its members join together in
camaraderie and fellowship for the purpose of
preserving the traditions and promoting the interests
of the United States Marine Corps, banding together
those who are now serving in the United States
Marine Corps and those who have been honorably
discharged from that service that they may effectively
promote the ideals of American freedom and
democracy, voluntarily aiding and_ rendering
assistance to all Marines and former Marines and to
their widows and orphans; and to perpetuate the
history of the United States Marine Corps and by
fitting acts to observe the anniversaries of historical
occasions of particular interest to Marines.
App. 4
The Italian American War Veterans of the
U.S.A. is a congressionally chartered organization
with 10,000 members. Its purpose and objectives
include aiding and assisting veterans and their
families; upholding and maintaining the honor and
integrity of the United States, and to preserve and
defend it from her enemies; upholding and maintain-
ing true allegiance to the government of the United
States and fidelity to the Constitution; and promoting
patriotism,” and advancing the civic welfare.
The Military Chaplains Association, formed
in 1925, is a professional support and Veterans Ser-
vice Organization dedicated to the religious freedom
and spiritual welfare of the Armed Services Members,
Veterans, their families and their survivors.
Unchartered Organizations
The Air Force Association (AFA) is an inde-
pendent, non-profit, civilian education organization
with more than 125,000 members which promotes
public understanding of aerospace power and the
pivotal role it plays in the security of the nation. The
AFA’s mission is to educate the public about the
critical role of aerospace power in the defense cf our
nation; advocate aerospace power and a strong na-
tional defense; and support the United States Air
Force and the Air Force Family and aerospace educa-
tion.
The Air Force Sergeants Association (AFSA)
includes all enlisted grades of Air Force Active Duty,
App. 5
ANG and AFRC, retired, veteran and family mem-
bers. With nearly 130,000 members, the AFSA lobbies
to inform Congress of the sacrifices those who wear
and have worn the uniform (and their families) make
on a daily basis for the protection of the American
way-of-life.
The Air Force Women Officers Associated
(AFWOA) was formed in 1975 by a group of retired
Air Force women officers. The AFWOA’s purpose
includes promoting recognition of contributions made
by women while serving in the United States Armed
Forces, supporting education of women currently
enrolled in United States Air Force education/
training programs and to recognize significant
achicvements of women of the United States Armed
Forces.
The Association of the United States Army
(AUSA) is a private, non-profit educational organiza-
tion that supports America’s Army — Active, National
Guard, Reserve, Civilians, Retirees and family mem-
bers. AUSA Chapters worldwide support America’s
Army.
The Chief Warrant and Warrant Officers
Association, United States Coast Guard (CWOA),
established in 1929, represents United States Coast
Guard warrant and chief warrant officers (active,
reserve and retired) to Congress, the White House,
and the Department of Homeland Security Addition-
ally, the association communicates with the Coast
App. 6
Guard leadership on matters of concern to Coast
Guard chief warrant officers.
The Enlisted Association of the National
Guard of the United States (EANGUS) was
formally organized in 1972 with the goal of increasing
the voice of enlisted persons in the National Guard. It
is a non-profit organization comprising over 414,000
soldiers, airmen, and their families and is dedicated
to promoting the status, welfare and professionalism
of enlisted members of the National Guard
The Fleet Reserve Association (FRA) is a
Congressionally chartered, non-profit organization
that represents the interests of the Sea Service
community before the United States Congress. The
Association’s membership comprises of current and
former enlisted members of the United States Navy,
Marine Corps, an. Coast Guard. The FRA is dedi-
cated to serving the interests of current and former
enlisted Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard per-
sonnel.
The Jewish War Veterans of the United
States of America, a nonpartisan organization, was
founded in 1896. Its mission includes: fostering and
perpetuating true Americanism; combating whatever
tends to impair the efficiency and permanency of our
free institutions; and encouraging the doctrine of
universal liberty, equal rights, and full justice to all
men and women.
The Marine Corps Reserve Association
(MRCA) represents and advocates for members of the
App. 7
Marine Corps Reserve and their families. The MRCA
provides support for the men and women of the
United States Marine Forces Reserve, in part by
working on matters concerning benefits for Reserve
Marines and their families.
The Military Officers Association of America
(MOAA) is the nation’s largest association of military
officers and operates as an independent, non-profit,
politically non-partisan organization. With about
370,000 members from every branch of service —
including active duty, National Guard, Reserve,
retired, former officers, and their families — it repre-
sents the interests of military officers at every stage
of their careers.
The National Association for Uniformed
Services (NAUS) was founded in 1968. With nearly
200,000 members and supporters, NAUS fights to
protect and enhance the earned benefits of uniformed
servicemembers, retirees, veterans, and their families
and survivors, while preserving a strong national
defense.
The National Guard Association of the
United States (NGAUS) is a nonpartisan organiza-
tion representing nearly 45,000 current and former
Army and Air National Guard officers. Formed in
1878, NGAUS is focused on procuring better equip-
ment, standardized training and a more combat-
ready force.
The National Order of Battlefield Commis-
sions is a non-profit organization of members of the
App. 8
Armed Forces of the United States of America who, in
actual combat, demonstrated exceptional qualities of
leadership. Their aims include voicing concerns for
the protection of our cherished American ideals and
way of life.
The Naval Enlisted Reserve Association
(NERA) was founded in 1957. NERA supports thou-
sands of Sea Service Reservists and works hard in the
interest of National Security.
The Navy League of the United States was
founded in 1902 with the encouragement of President
Theodore Roosevelt. A civilian organization, its objec-
tives include fostering and maintaining an interest in
a strong Navy, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, and
Merchant Marine as integral parts of a sound na-
tional defense and to improve understanding and
appreciation of those who wear the uniforms of our
armed forces and to better the conditions under which
they live and serve.
The Naval Reserve Association is a non-profit,
non-partisan, and non-sectarian organization, founded
in 1954 to speak for the officers of the Navy, the
Naval Reserve, and Naval Reserve. Its purposes
include promoting the interests of officers of the
Department of the Navy and the Naval Reserve to the
advantage of the country’s welfare and security and
supporting the military and naval policies of the
United States to the end that the national defense
and national security be developed and strengthened
App. 9
through the means of an adequate naval establish-
ment including a well-trained and readily available
Naval Reserve.
The Non-Commissioned Officers Association
(NCOA) works daily to enhance and maintain the
quality of life for noncommissioned and petty officers
in all branches of the Armed Forces, National Guard
and Reserves. The Association, founded in 1960, is a
leader on Capitol Hill.
The United States Army Warrant Officers
Association (USAWOA) is a not-for-profit associa-
tion. As part of its goals, the USAWOA strives to:
foster a spirit of patriotism and devotion to duty
among members, commensurate with the high ideals
of the Army; recommend programs for the improve-
ment of the Army; and promote the technical and
social welfare of its members.
The Veterans of the Vietnam War, Inc.,
(VVnW), is a non-profit corporation founded in 1978
to seek help for and to further the cause of all veter-
ans. VVnW was born out of a need to have the service
and special needs of Vietnam War Veterans recog-
nized and acknowledged. Together with the Veterans
Coalition, VVnW strive through their many pro-
grams to maintain, improve, preserve and defend the
quality of life of all veterans and their families.
The Reserve Enlisted Association’s (REA)
mission is to be an advocate for the enlisted men and
women of the United States Military Reserve Compo-
nents in support of National Security and Homeland
App. 10
Defense, with emphasis on the readiness, training,
and quality of life issues affecting their welfare and
that of their families and survivors. The REA is the
only Joint Reserve association representing enlisted
reservists — all ranks from all five branches.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.