Opinion — The Hamilton

Ee

THE HAMILTON.!

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND

CIRCUIT.

No. 71. Argued October 24, 1907.—Decided December 23, 1907.

Until Congress acts on the subject, a State may legislate in regard to the

duties and liabilities of its citizens and corporations while on the high

seas and not within the territory of any other sovereign.

Where a fund is being distributed in a proceeding to limit the liability of

the owners of a vessel, all claims to which the admiralty does not deny

existence must be recognized, whether admiralty liens or not.

The statute of Delaware giving damages for death caused by tort is a valid

exercise of the legislative power of the State, and extends to the case of

a citizen of that State wrongfully killed while on the high seas in a vessel

1 Docket title, Old Dominion Steamship Company, owner of the Steam-

ship Hamilton, v. Gilmore.

ROAST DEPICT LIAR EE OLN AOE MINERAL P SPORT te ee ee neces

THE HAMILTON. 399

207 U.S. Argument for Petitioner.

belonging to a Delaware corporation by the negligence of another vessel

also belonging to a Delaware corporation. A claim against the owner

of one of the vessels in fault can be enforced in a proceeding in admiralty

brought by such owner to limit its liability.

When both vessels in collision are in fault the representatives of a seaman

on one of the vessels, killed without contributory negligence on his part,

may, in a proceeding to limit liability, where an action is given by the

state statute against the owner of the other vessel, recover full damages,

and are not limited to damages recoverable under the maritime law

against the seaman’s own vessel for death or injury caused by negligence

of the master thereof or his fellow servants thereon. Neither the seaman’s

contract with the owners of the vessel he is on, nor the negligence of his

own vessel, nor any provision of the Harter Act affects the claim against

the other vessel.

146 Fed. Rep. 724, affirmed.

Tue facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Harrington Putnam, with whom Mr. Henry E. Mattison

was on the brief, for petitioner:

The Delaware statute does not apply to a claim for death on

the high seas arising from tort, in proceedings in admiralty.

In the relation which springs out of tort, there is no basis

for saying that the parties have impliedly consented to be bound

by the law of any particular State. As a consequence their

rights and liabilities are to be determined by the general prin-

ciples of maritime law as administered in our admiralty courts.

If the Hamilton had belonged in one State, the Saginaw in

another and the deceased in still another State, the law of any

particular State could not more than another have precedence

and a controlling influence. On the contrary, there is no pre-

sumption that the relations of the parties are to be fixed by

the laws of any one State when an injury accrues on the high

seas through a pure marine tort. Rundell v. Compagnie Gén-

érale, 94 Fed. Rep. 366; aff'd 100 Fed. Rep. 655.

The origin of the fiction that a merchant ship may be re-

garded as a floating portion of a country, or, as the doctrine

is sometimes expressed, that it is a continuation or prolonga-

tion of the National territory, is as recent as 1752. Modern

writers treat this fiction as having only a limited application.

Hall on International Law, Oxford, 1904, pp. 249, 250.

400 OCTOBER TERM, 1907.

Argument for Petitioner. 207 U.S.

The doctrine of “territoriality” is rather a limit on rights

of search and protection against aggression than one that con-

fers new rights of action for tort. Walker, Science of Inter-

national Law, pp. 130, 131.

Independent of precedent, it is plain that the liability for

wrongs, and especially for causing death, is to be determined

in admiralty by the court administering the law of the forum.

No State can extend its laws over the ocean. The Federal laws

alone, and the maritime jurisprudence administered by the

Federal courts must decide the liability for wrongs committed

outside of territorial waters.

The doctrine that merchant ships are part of the territory,

if applicable to collisions, would also govern salvage on the

high seas. Such attempts to impose foreign laws have often

been made, but have never been successful in the United States

courts. The Edam, 13 Fed. Rep. 135, 139.

The territorial fiction depends on contracts, because pub-

licists recognize that it is only when the crew are on board that

the doctrine of territoriality applies. Once the contracting

members of the ship’s company leave the vessel the fiction

vanishes. Woolsey, International Law (6th ed.), p. 72.

Statutes providing for the survivorship of rights of action,

and recovery in case of loss of life, have been enacted in vary-

ing forms, not only by the States of the Union, but also by

foreign countries, with which the United States has intimate

relations—especially by England and the Canadian provinces.

The system of law on the continent of Europe in some form

also gives a recovery for loss of life. Yet in no case have the

courts of Great Britain or the United States regarded the law

of the flag upon the high seas as authorizing such a recovery

in the admiralty courts. Even in Canada the admiralty has

no jurisdiction for loss of life. Monaghan v. Horn, 7 Du Val

(Supreme Court, Canada), 409.

The same rule was reached in England (notwithstanding

Lord Campbell’s Act) that admiralty has no jurisdiction for

loss of life. The Vera Cruz, 10 App. Cas. 59 (1884).

THE HAMILTON.

207 U S. Argument for Respondents.

in the admiralty

courts of the United States, will be governed by the law of the

Cases of tort arising upon the high seas,

eral maritime law as administered in

forum, which is the gen

these courts. The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24; The Belgenland, 114

U. 8. 355; The Brantjord City, 29 Fed. Rep. 373.

Next to the natural justice of its principles, the highest value

of maritime law consists in its uniformity and general accept-

ance. We are not dealing with municipal law nor with gen-

eral commercial law not maritime, both of which are prescribed

and administered concurrently by the state and Federal legis-

latures and courts, but we have to deal with that which relates

exclusively to the maritime law and the admiralty jurisdiction.

That law is not subject to the change or modification of state

legislatures.

Indeed, one of the controlling reasons for conferring on the

general government the exclusive jurisdiction of all admiralty

and maritime causes was to secure the great benefits which

must inevitably result from uniformity in the maritime law.

A State cannot, therefore, destroy the symmetry of that law

by creating maritime rights or conferring jurisdiction in any

particular upon an admiralty court. The Manhasset, 18 Fed.

Rep. 918, 923; Welsh v. The North Cambria, 40 Fed. Rep. 655,

656; The Lyndhurst, 48 Fed. Rep. 839, 841; Workman v. The

Mayor &c., 179 U. S. 552, 558.

The surviving members of the crew of the Saginaw cannot

maintain their claim for its full face, but the Hamilton remains

answerable for only half of all such losses. The Osceola, 189

U. 8. 158, 175; The City of New York, 25 Fed. Rep. 151; The

Queen, 40 Fed. Rep. 694; Stahl v. The Niagara, 77 Fed. Rep.

329, 336.

Mr. J. Parker Kirlin and Mr. George Whitefield Betts, with

whom Mr. John M. Woolsey and Mr. Howard M. Long were

on the brief, for respondents:

Since Congress has not legislate

ject, the statute of the State of Delaware, as

VOL. ccvi1—26

d with reference to the sub-

a sovereign State,

402 OCTOBER TERM, 1907.

Opinion of the Court. 207 U.S.

allowing damages for death is binding and effective on its

vessels when on the high seas. The Lottowanna, 21 Wall. 558,

580; The Glide, 167 U.S. 606; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236;

Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299; Steamboat Co. v.

Chase, 16 Wall. 522; Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99.

The Hamilton and Saginaw, for the purposes of this pro-

ceeding, were parts of the territory of the State of Delaware,

and subject to its laws. Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572;

Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610; The Lamington, 87 Fed. Rep. 752.

There has been no negligence shown on the part of the mem-

bers of the crew of the Saginaw. It was proper, therefore, to

allow the full amount of their claims. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302;

The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240, 243, 260. See also The

Juniata, 93 U.S. 337; The North Star, 106.U. S. 17, 22; The

Chattahoochee, 173 U.S. 540, 549; The New York, 175 U. S.

187; Ex parte Union Steamboat Co., 178 U. S. 317; The Cone-

maugh, 189 U.S. 363.

Mr. Justice Hours delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a proceeding for the limitation of liability of the steam-

ship Hamilton in respect of a collision on the high seas with

the steamship Saginaw, in which the Saginaw was sunk and

her chief mate and some of her crew and passengers were

drowned. It is found, and not disputed, that both vessels were

to blame. Both vessels belonged to corporations of the State.

of Delaware. A statute of that State, after enacting that

actions for injuries to the person shall not abate by reason of

the plaintiff’s death, provides that “whenever death shall be

occasioned by unlawful violence or negligence, and no suit be

brought by the party injured to recover damages during his

or her life, the widow or widower of any such deceased person,

or if there be no widow or widower, the personal representa-

tives may maintain an action for and recover damages for the

death and loss thus occasioned.” Act of January 26, 1866,

chap. 31, p. 28, vol. 13, Part 1, Delaware Laws, as amended

THE HAMILTON,

207 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

by act of March 9, 1901, chap. 210, p. 500, vol. 22, Delaware

Laws. On the strength of this statute the representatives of

a passenger and of three of the crew filed claims, and the claims

were allowed by the District Court (see 134 Fed. Rep. 95; 139

Fed. Rep. 906), and afterwards by the Circuit Court of Appeals;

146 Fed. Rep. 724; 77 C. C. A. 150. A certiorari was granted

by this court to settle the question, as stated by the petitioner,

whether the Delaware statute applies to a claim for death on

the high seas, arising purely from tort, in proceedings in ad-

miralty. Incidentally the right of representatives of the crew

of the Saginaw to recover their claims in full against the Ham-

ilton also has been discussed.

Apart from the subordination of the State of Delaware to

the Constitution of the United States there is no doubt that it

would have had power to make its statute applicable to this

case. When so applied, the statute governs the reciprocal lia-

bilities of two corporations, existing only by virtue of the laws

of Delaware, and permanently within its jurisdiction, for the

consequenes of conduct set in motion by them there, operating

outside the ve.titory of the State, it is true, but within no other

territorial jurisdiction. If confined to corporations, the State

would have power to enforce its law to the extent of their

property in every case. Buf the same authority would exist

as to citizens domiciled within the State, even when personally

on the high seas, and not only could be enforced by the State

in case of their return, which their domicil by its very meaning

promised, but in proper cases would be recognized in other

jurisdictions by the courts of other States. In short, the bare

fact of the parties being outside the territory in a place belong-

ing to no other sovereign would not limit the authority of the

State, as accepted by civilized theory. No one doubts the

power of England or France to govern their own ships upon the

high seas.

The first question, then, is narrowed to whether there is

anything in the structure of the National Government and

under the Constitution of the United States that takes away

404 OCTOBER TERM, 1907.

Opinion of the Court. 207 U.S.

or qualifies the authority that otherwise Delaware would pos-

sess—a question that seems to have been considered doubt-

ful in Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. 8.

527, 558. It has two branches: First, whether the state law

is valid for any purpose, and, next, whether, if valid, it will

be applied in the admiralty. We will take them up in order.

The power of Congress to legislate upon the subject has been

derived both from the power to regulate commerce and from

the clause in the Constitution extending the judicial power to

“all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.” Art. 3,

§2; 130 U. S. 557. The doubt in this case arises as to the

power of the States where Congress has remained silent.

That doubt, however, cannot be serious. The grant of ad-

miralty jurisdiction, followed and construed by the Judiciary

Act of 1789, “saving to suitors in all cases the right of a com-

mon law remedy where the common law is competent to give

it,” Rev. Stats. § 563, cl. 8, leaves open the common law juris-

diction of the state courts over torts committed at sea. This,

we believe, always has been admitted. Martin v. Hunter, 1

Wheat. 304, 337; The Hine v. Trevor, 4 Wall. 555, 571; Leon v.

Galceran, 11 Wall. 185; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S.

240, 262. And as the state courts in their decisions would fol-

low their own notions about the law and might change them

from time to time, it would be strange if the State might not

make changes by its other mouthpiece, the legislature. The

same argument that deduces the legislative power of Congress

from the jurisdiction of the National courts, tends to establish

the legislative power of the State where Congress has not acted.

Accordingly, it has been held that a statute giving damages

for death caused by a tort might be enforced in a state court,

although the tort was committed at sea. American Steam-

boat Co. v. Chase, 16 Wall. 522. So far as the objection to the

state law is founded on the admiralty clause in the Constitu-

tion, it would seem not to matter whether the accident hap-

pened near shore or in mid-ocean, notwithstanding some

expressions of doubt, The same conclusion was reached in Mc-

THE HAMILTON. 405

207 U. 8. Opinion of the Court.

Donald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546, where the death occurred on

the high seas. Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, reinforces Chase’s

case, and answers any argument based on the power of Congress

over commerce, as to which we hardly need refer also to Cooley

v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299, Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall.

236; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. 8. 572, and Hemer Ramsdell

Transportation Co. v. La Compagnie Générale Transatlantique,

182 U. S. 406, concerning state pilotage laws.

The jurisdiction commonly expressed in the formula that a

vessel at sea is regarded as part of the territory of the State,

was held, upon much consideration, to belong to Massachusetts,

so far as to give preference to a judicial assignment in insol-

vency of such a vessel over an attachment levied immediately

upon her arrival at New York, in Crapo v. Kelly, 16 Wall. 610.

That decision was regarded as necessitating the conclusion

reached in McDonald v. Mallory, supra. Other instances of

state regulation are mentioned in The City of Norwalk, 55 Fed.

Rep. 98, 106; but without further recapitulation of the au-

thorities, we are of opinion that the statute is valid. See

Workman v. New York, 179 U. S. 552, 563. We should add,

what has been assumed thus far, as it had to be assumed in

order to raise the question discussed, that we construe the

statute as intended to govern all cases which it is competent

to govern, or at least not to be confined to deaths occasioned

on land. McDonald v. Mallory, 77 N. Y. 546. If it touches

any case at sea, it controls this. See The Belgenland, 114 U.S.

355, 370. Whether it is to be taken to offer a similar liability

of Delaware owners to foreign subjects, Mulhall v. Fallon, 176

Massachusetts, 266, need not be determined now.

We pass to the other branch of the first question: whether

the state law, being valid, will be applied in the admiralty.

Being valid, it created an obligatio, a personal liability of the

owner of the Hamilton to the claimants. Slater v. Mexican

National R. R. Co., 194 U. 8. 120, 126. This, of course, the

admiralty would not disregard, but would respect the right

when brought before it in any legitimate way. Ex parte Mc-

OCTOBER TERM, 1907.

Opinion of the Court. 207 U.S.

Niel, 13 Wall. 236, 243. It might not give a proceeding in rem,

since the statute does not purport to create a lien, It might

give a proceeding in personam. The Corsair, 145 U. 8. 335, 347.

If it gave the latter, the result would not be, as suggested, to

create different laws for different districts. The liability would

be recognized in all, Nor would there be produced any lamen-

table lack of uniformity. Courts constantly enforce rights

arising from and depending upon other laws than those gov-

erning the local transactions of the jurisdiction in which they

sit. But we are not concerned with these considerations. In

this case the statutes of the United States have enabled the

owner to transfer its liability to a fund and to the exclusive

jurisdiction of the admiralty, and it has done so. That fund

is being distributed. In such circumstances all claims to which

the admiralty does not deny existence must be recognized,

whether admiralty liens or not. This is not only a general

principle, Andrews v. Wall, 3 How. 568, 573; The J. E. Rumbell,

148 U.S. 1, 15; Admiralty Rule, 43; Cargo Ex Galam, 2 Moore

P. C. (N. 8.) 216, 236, but is the result of the statute, which

provides for, as well as limits the liability, and allows it to be

proved against the fund. The Albert Dumois, 177 U. S. 240,

260. See Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 563.

The second question concerns the right of the representatives

of the crew to recover their claims in full. There is a faint sug-

gestion that the mate of the Saginaw was negligent, but on

this point we shall not go behind the findings below. The main

objection is that the statute allows a recovery beyond the

maintenance and support which were declared in The Osceola,

189 U.S. 158, 175, to be the limit of a seaman’s rights against

his own vessel when injured by the negligence of the master

or a fellow-servant on his ship. But the question here regards

the liability of the Hamilton, another vessel. The contract be-

tween the seaman and the owners of the Saginaw does not affect

the case. Erie R. R. Co. v. Erie Transportation Co., 204 U. 8.

220, 226. Neither does the Harter Act, even if its terms could

be extended to personal injuries and loss of life. The Chatta-

HE HAMILTON. 407

207 U.S. Statement of the Case.

hoochee, 173 U.S. 540. Neither does the negligence of the Sagi-

naw. The Atlas, 93 U.S. 302.

We are of opinion that all the claimants are entitled to the

full benefits of a statute “granting the right to relief where

otherwise it could not be administered by a maritime court.”

Workman v. New York, 179 U.S. 552, 63.

Decree affirmed.