Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Chaplain v. Charlotte Timber Co.

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 2000

LINDA G. CHAPLAIN, petitioner

Wa

CHARLOTTE TIMBER CO., INC., Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AND REQUEST FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

AT RICHMOND

"ETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AND REQUEST FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL

Linda G. Chaplain, pro se

1225 Tanager Trail

Virginia Beach, Virginia 23451

757-491-9130

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Supreme Court of Virginia erred in not

granting review of the Circuit Court of Prince Edward

County’s Orders where Linda G. Chaplain’s common law

nghts, including “clean hands” doctrine protected by the

United States Constitution, have been violated?

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE

COURT BELOW

The caption of the case in this Court contains the names

of all parties to the proceedings in the Supreme Court of ;

Virginia at Richmond. |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented for review i

List of Parties to the Proceedings in the |

Court Below il |

Table of Authorities lil

Opinions Below l -

Statement of Jurisdiction 2

Constitutional Provisions

and Statutes Involved 2

Statement of Case 3

4

|

Reasons for Granting Writ

Conclusion

INDEX OF APPENDICES

Appendix A. Decision of Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, July 13, 1999

Partition 15

Appendix B. Decision of Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, August 3, 1999

Denying Review---- 22

Appendix C. Decision of Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, November 18, 1994

Allowing Chaplain to intervene 23

Appendix D. Decision of Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, November 18, 1994

Appointing J. Warren Tomlin, Esquire as

Co-Special Commissioner: 25

Appendix E. Decision of Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, November 18,1994

Revised Decree of sale

Appendix F. Decision of Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, July 28, 1994

Decree of Sale---

Appendix G. Decision of Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, September 1, 1995

Allowing Charlotte Timber to intervene---------

Appendix H. Decision of the Supreme

Court of Virginia, March 6, 2000

Denying review

Appendix I. Decision of the Supreme

Court of Virginia, April 21, 2000

Denying rehearing

Appendix J. Decision of the Supreme

Court of Virginia, December 20, 1995

Dismissing without prejudice

Appendix K. Constitutional, Provisions

And Statutes

Appendix L. Bond

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Austin v. Winston, 11 VA.

(1 Hen. & M.) 33 (1806).

Equal Opportunity Comm'n v.

Recruit U.S.A. 939 F.2d 746

(9th Cir. 1991).

Ford, et. al. v. Buffalo Eagle

Colliery Co., et. al. 122

F.2d 555 (1941).

Page

27

29

31

35

36

37

38

40

Page

11

Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S.

1032 (1983), 77 Led. 2d 1201,

103 S. Ct. 3469. : 8

Morgan v. Wright, 219 Georgia :

385, 133 S.E. 2d 341 (1963). 8

Pitzelle v. Cohn, 217 Ill. 30,

75 N.E. 392 (1905) ; 11

Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v.

Automotive M. Mach. Co., 324

U.S. 806 (1944). 6, 10

Richards v. Musselman, 221 VA.

181, 267 S.E. 2d 164 (1980). 11

U. S. v. Cannabis Cultivators Club,

5 F. Suppl. 2d, 1086 (N.D. CAL.(1998)--——-- 7

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION —

\ AND STATUTES

Page

United States Constitution, Article IV, section l-- 7,14

United States Constitution, Article IV, section 2-- 6,7

United States Constitution, Article VI, clause 2---- 6,7

United States Constitution, Amendment 10-------- 6,7,8,9

United States Constitution, Amendment 14 7,8,9,13

28 U.S.C., Section 1257 2

Code of Georgia, Title 23-1-10 8

iV

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 2000

LINDA G. CHAPLAIN, Petitioner

V.

CHARLOTTE TIMBER CO. INC., Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AND REQUEST FOR SUMMARY REVERSAL

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA

AT RICHMOND

Linda G. Chaplain, the petitioner herein respectfully prays

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

Supreme Court of Virginia at Richmond entered in the

above-entitled case on April 21, 2000 and March 6, 2000.

The March 6, 2000 opinion of the Supreme Court of

“Virginia whose judgment is herein sought to be reviewed is

unpublished record number 992349 reprinted in the separate

Appendix H to this Petition pp 35; April 21, 2000 is

reprinted in the separate Appendix I to this Petition pp 36;

and decision of December 20, 1995 is reprinted in the

separate Appendix J to this Petition pp 37.

OPINIONS BELOW

The prior opinions of the Circuit Court of Prince Edward

County is unpublished case number CH 93-56 date of

decision July 13, 1999 and is reprinted in the separate

Appendix A to this Petition pp 15; Decision of August 3,

1999 and is reprinted in the separate Appendix B to this

petition pp 22; Decision of November 18, 1994 and is

reprinted in the separate Appendix C to this Petition pp 23;

Decision of November 18, 1994 and is reprinted in separate

Appendix D to this Petition pp 25; Decision of November 18,

1994 and is reprinted in separate Appendix E to this Petition

pp 27; Decision of July 28, 1994 and is reprinted in separate

Appendix F to this Petition pp 29; and Decision of

September |, 1995 and is reprinted in Appendix G to this

Petition pp 31.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia was

entered on April 21, 2000. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked pursuant to 28 USC section 1257.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED

Appendix Page

United States Constitution

Article VI, section 1 38

United States Constitution

Article VI, section 2 38

United States Constitution

Article IV, clause 2 38

United States Constitution

Amendment Ten 38

United States Constitution

Amendment Fourteen 38

28 U.S.C. section 1257 39

Code of Georgia, Title 23-1-10 39

STATEMENT OF CASE

The Trial Court, on November 18, 1994, without

objection from and specifically with the consent of opposing

counsel ORDERED that:

“The real estate involved be sold singly or in

combination...by advertising the time, place, and

terms of sale in the Farmville Herald once a week for

four (4) consecutive weeks...and report to this

Court for confirmation or rejection of any offers

received either privately or by public action...”

(emphasis added)

After entry of said Order and after bond was posted, but

without notice to either the Court, Co-Special Commissioner,

or Opposing party, Charlotte Timber Co., Inc. (Hereinafter

referred to as “Charlotte Timber”) purchased the one-fourth

interest of each of the three original plaintiffs by Deed dated

December 13, 1994.

Tyler E. Williams, II, Esq., counsel to the original

complainants and by Court Order then Co-Special

Commissioner was aware of said transaction and acted as

counsel to the original complainants in said transaction. Co-

Special Commissioner J. Warren Tomlin was not informed

of the purchase of the complainants’ interest until after the

Deed was recorded and only upon receipt of the Motion To

Intervene. No report or notification was made to the Court in

accordance with the Revised Decree Of Sale for confirmation

or rejection of the offer received to purchase singly the

interest of each of the three original plaintiffs.

A hearing was held before the Honorable Richard S.

Blanton, Judge Circuit Court for the County of Prince

Edward on June 8, 1995, on Charlotte Timber’s Motion To

Intervene and Linda G. Chaplain’s (Hereinafter referred to as

“Chaplain”) objection thereto. The Trial Court granted

Charlotte Timber’s Motion To Intervene, to which Chaplain

objected and excepted, then appealed to the Supreme Court

of Virginia who dismissed the Petition, without prejudice, by

Order of December 20, 1995. The matter was re-referred to

a new Commissioner, to whose report exceptions were

sustained, and the Court subsequently appointed its own

experts whose determinations of value were objected to and

whose calculations were, after entry of a Final Decree Of

Partition on July 13, 1999, found to be fatally flawed.

Chaplain moved for reconsideration, which said Motion was

denied by Order entered August 3, 1999.

Appeal was made to the Supreme Court of Virginia,

which denied Chaplain’s Petition For Hearing by Order of

March 6, 2000 and Petition For Rehearing by Order of April

21, 2000, from which an appeal was made to the United

States Supreme Court.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The Trial Court erred in refusing to invoke the “clean

hands” doctrine on behalf of the defendant.

The terms of the Revised Decree of Sale entered by the

Trial Court on November 18, 1994 are clear, as are the

fiduciary duties and obligations of the Special —

Commissioners, as per the Code of Virginia. The fact the

transaction between Charlotte Timber and the original

Complainants occurred after entry of the Revised Decree of

Sale and without notice to Co-Special Commissioner Tomlin

and without report to the Court is uncontested. Said sale also

occurred after bond was posted by the Special

Commissioners pursuant to the Order of the Court of

November 18, 1994. (see Bond Appendix F)

Only after “consummation” of the “deal” by recordation

of a deed was either the Court or the Co-

Special Commissioner informed of the transaction. No

formal Motion for confirmation of said “private sale” was

ever made by the original Petitioners, Charlotte Timber, or

Special Commissioner Williams. Thus, not only is the deed

to Charlotte Timber void ab initio in that it violates the

Decree Of Sale entered November 18, 1994, but, in addition,

no “sale” has been confirmed by the Court in accordance

with that same Order.

The Order of September 1, 1995, allowing Charlotte

Timber to intervene specifically holds, “All previous Orders

and Decrees of this Court in this matter,... shall otherwise

remain in full force and effect.” (Order Allowing

Intervention, Prince Edward County Circuit Court,

November 18, 1994). This included, but is not limited to the

Decree Of Sale dated July 28, 1994 and the Revised Decree

Of Sale dated November 18. 1994.

Charlotte Timber (and its predecessors) by deception

failed to comply with the Decree Of Sale and Revised Decree

Of Sale, and Special Commissioner Williams has

circumvented the performance of his duty to the Court, as

ordered and bonded, with each participating in this

unconscionable bargain designed to deceive Chaplain.

Petitioner Chaplain was subjected to this litigation by the

actions of the original Plaintiffs. Those original Plaintiffs

sought the benefit of the Court’s jurisdiction and relief

available through its special statutory authority regarding -

ee

partition. Your Petitioner is and was entitled to rely upon the

authority and jurisdiction of the Court once the same was

imposed. The sale of the property, in direct violation of the

existing Court Order, is a fraud upon the Court and Chaplain

in that those very persons seeking relief from the Court

arbitrarily and intentionally sold their interests in the real

property, which they had requested that the Court partition or

order sold.

Accordingly, said offer for purchase of the interest of the

original Complainants, by the Trial Court’s own Decree, had

to be reported to the Court for confirmation or rejection as

being in the best interest of all the parties. Having failed to

comply, the “sale” to Charlotte Timber was/is in violation of

the Trial Court’s Revised Decree Of Sale and is therefore

void.

Charlotte Timber’s counsel cannot assert that he was at

liberty to act as a private attorney in the purchase-sale

transaction while ignoring his duty to the Court as a Special

Commissioner. Having been so appointed, he was required

to fully comply with the Court’s Order. For the original

_ Petitioners to have sought relief from the Court, only to

subsequently violate an Order, which granted them the

specific, original relief sought, is unconscionable and is a

fraud upon the Court and Chaplain.

The Judgment of the Supreme Court of Virginia

should be reviewed by this Court because the

Commonwealth of Virginia allowed violation of Order in

conflict with United States Supreme Courts Decision in

Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. Mach. Co., 324

U.S. 806 (1944). The Tenth Amendment of the United

States Constitution reserves the personal right to have this

Court to review this action involving Chaplain’s common

law right.

Article VI clause 2 of the United States Constitution

provides that “this Constitution... shall be the supreme Law

of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound

thereby...” Absent a Commonwealth of Virginia law to the

contrary, the supremacy clause (Articled VI section 2) and

other provisions of the Constitution guarantee Chaplains

common law civil right. One of the main purposes of this

linchpin section of the Constitution is to insure personal

common law rights of the individual and specifically

regarding these personal common law rights from being

eroded or taken away by any judge of any state. The

Supreme Court of Virginia and/or the Trial Court has denied

Chaplain equal protection of the Tenth, the Fourteenth,

Article IV, sections 1 and 2, and Article clause 2 of the

Constitution of the United States.

The United States Constitution Article IV section 1 and 2

Article VI clause 2, Amendment 10 and Amendment 14

when applied to equity allows Chaplain the common law

right that the equity of a party who was misled is superior to

that of the person (or company) who willfully misleads such

party. :

While the Commonwealth of Virginia does not have a

law, the United States District Court N.D. California has

defined such in U. S. v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F.

Supp. 2d, 1086, 1104 (N. D. CAL 8) citing Equal

Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Recruit U.S.A. 939

F.2d 746, 752 (9th Cir. 1991):

The "clean hands" doctrine insists that one

who seeks equity must come to the court without

blemish... This maxim "is a self-imposed ordinance

that closes the doors of a court of equity to one

tainted with an inequitableness or bad faith relative to

the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper

may have been the behavior of the defendant..." This

rule applies to the government as well as to private

litigants...

Where the state of Georgia has a current law published in

Code of Georgia, Title 23-1-10 as follows: "He who would

have equity must do equity and give effect to all equitable

rights of the other party respecting the subject matter of the

action.” See Morgan v. Wright, 219 Georgia 385, 133 S.E.

2d 341 (1963). The “clean hands” decision of the Virginia

Trial Court is clearly in conflict with this decision (Morgan

v. Wnght) where the Supreme Court of Georgia barred

equitable relief.

Where the Commonwealth of Virginia has chosen not

to publish a law embodying the common law right of "clean

hands", Chaplain is protected by the United States

Constitution having the right to enforce this common law

right; jurisdiction of the equity court will be removed where

there has been a violation by the plaintiff

It is abundantly clear from all sources of common law and

Statutes that equity is without jurisdiction and will refuse to

give any assistance whatever to plaintiff who has "unclean

hands".

The Supreme Court of Virginia says in Austin v. Winston,

11 VA. (1 Hen. & M.) 33, 33(1806) it is a maxim at law that

“ where the parties are equally culpable or criminal the

defendant must prevail”.

In this case where the state and federal grounds are

interwoven with private grounds reserved to the people and

the basis for decision is ambiguous as in Michigan v. Long,

463 U.S. 1032 (1983), this Court is compelled to decide the

matter by the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments.

The Constitution allows all common law to be retained by

the federal government and by the people absent a law by the

state to the contrary. If common law rights are to be taken

from the people, there must be a written constitutional statute

enacted and published.

Without a decision by this Court, all equity cases tried in

the State of Virginia will be questionable where there has

been “unclean hands” by plaintiff and all defendant’s will be

denied this cornerstone doctrine to guarantee protection of

constitutional common law right against being forever

damaged by “unclean hands”.

The Tenth Amendment clearly allows Chaplain to

retain the common law "clean hands" doctrine, which she

invokes in this case, that he who would have equity must do

equity and must give effect to all equitable rights of the other

party respecting the subject matter of the action. This

common law and rule has never been applied in the

Commonwealth of Virginia to the benefit of a defendant of

the common law right to retain their property.

Where the Commonwealth of Virginia does not have a

constitutional law embodying the "clean hands " doctrine, the

Fourteenth Amendment protects Chaplain, a United States

citizen under the equal protection of the equity "clean hands”

doctrine of common law. In this case where the opposing

party (or intervening party) seeks sale of the property,

Charlotte Timber (being a land speculator and seller of

timber) having violated the Trial Court's Order, and Chaplain

has invoked the common law right to retain the property and

pay the other parties for their interest, the Trial Court does

not have jurisdiction to continue this equitable case over

Chaplain's objection.

Where the Trial Court (Judge Snoddy) on July 28, 1994

Ordered “that no one or more of the co-owners is willing to

take an assignment of the real estate and pay the others such

sums as their respective interests may entitle them to” (see

Appendix F); and this question was ordered reconsidered by

Order of the Circuit Court of Prince Edward, September 1,

1995 and Chaplain answered that she was willing to comply

with this question; it became the Law of the case. The Judge

of the Circuit Court of Prince Edward was without

jurisdiction to divide in a manner less than Chaplain testified

she would take where Charlotte Timber only wanted to sell.

Where the plaintiff has unclean hands invoked by

Chaplain, The Courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia are

without jurisdiction to award equity to the plaintiff over

Chaplain’s objection and exception, nor does the Trial Court

have jurisdiction to award property to a plaintiff who sells

land over Chaplain’s objection when she is willing to buy

and pay the plaintiffs their fair share, which is her common

law right she invoked; nor jurisdiction, where Chaplain has

been damaged by the award (loss of Bond and premium paid,

additional attorney fees, error hidden by forester using Doyle

lumber rule prices while using International rule

measurement, thus causing at least 17 acres of Chaplain's

land to be awarded to Charlotte Timber and other objection

of record such as road frontage, stream management area,

etc.)

Charlotte Timber and/or their predecessors in this case

violated the Order and the "clean hands" doctrine that “to

receive justice one must do justice”.

The United States Supreme Court in Precision Instr.

Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,818

(1944) stated “... who are parties to... proceedings have an

uncompromising duty to report to it all facts concerning

possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the... issue”.

10

Charlotte Timber (and/or the previous plaintiffs) having

kept a sinister silence when they should have spoken with

candor and courage prior to the transfer of titie (and prior to

the Trial Courts Order of November 18, 1994, if the

defendant had “unclean hands"), equity closes it's door

against the plaintiff and leaves them to obtain from a court of

law what they can as a reward for their cunning and

calculating action.

The Supreme Court of Virginia has published a case

referring to "clean hands" in Richards v. Musselman, 221

VA. 181, 267, S.E. 2d 164, 168 (1980) where the Supreme

Court of Virginia adopted the reasoning of the Supreme

Court of Illinois in Pitzele v. Cohn, 217 Ill. 30, 38-39, 75

N.E. 392, 395 (1905) stating the well settled doctrine "If a

plaintiff require any aid from an illegal transaction to

establish his demand, he cannot recover it".

The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth

Circuit has stated in Ford, et al. v. Buffalo Eagle Colliery

Co., et al. 122 F.2d 555, 563 (1941) regarding the "clean

hands” maxim:

"it is introduced to protect the court of equity and the

party defendant from having the powers of the court

used in bringing about an inequitable result in the

particular litigation before it".

Also, the States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth

Circuit published in Ford, et. al. v. Buffalo Eagle Colliery

Co., et al.122 F.2d, 555, 563 (1941) the West Virginia Rule:

The clean-hands maxim is sometimes thus stated: "He

that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity.”

Iniquity involves absence of, or deviation from, just

dealing. It negatives the existence of uprightness, and

means that there has been substituted therefore gross

injustice, wickedness. Where a litigant's conduct can

properly be thus characterized, it is termed

unconscionable and, if such conduct has transpired in

connection with the immediate subject matter of the

Suit, equity will close its doors against the party thus

tainted. It is said on high authority that any really

unconscientious conduct, connected with the

immediate controversy, will repel the suitor. 1

Pomeroy's Equity Jur. section 404."

There is a greater significance where real estate inevitably is

affected because of the public importance involved. Where

Charlotte Timber seeks affirmative relief while being guilty

of conduct involving fraud, deceit, unconscionability or bad

faith relating to the bonded Order for sale of this property,

injures Chaplain and destroys the balance of equities between

the litigants, equitable relief shall not be awarded to them.

Charlotte Timber (and/or their predecessors) has not

displayed that standard of conduct required to the

maintenance of this suit in equity.

Chaplain owns a one-fourth undivided minority

interest in the real estate and the transfer of three one-fourth

undivided interests to one party, Charlotte Timber giving

them a majority interest, disturbs the balance of equities

between the litigants, thus prejudiced Chaplain’s interest.

That disparate effect has been readily demonstrated in

Charlotte Timber’s ability to meet and exceed each of

Chaplain‘s offers to purchase the entire parcel with amounts

of only one-third of those required of Chaplain.

Accordingly, having failed to comply with the

Court’s Revised Decree Of Sale and the result of the

purchase being the inherent detriment to Chaplain, the Court

should have invoked the “clean hands” doctrine against

Charlotte Timber (and/or their predecessors). Charlotte

Timber (and/or former Plaintiffs), by their conduct and

12

words, has manipulated these judicial proceedings in a

manner that has worked an injustice to the defendant.

With the trial court an abetter of inequity, this will turn

every piece of Virginia real estate into a situation like a

corporation where 51% ownership precludes minority rights,

jeopardizing the rights of every orphan, infant, widow or

others holding a minority real estate interest. There would be

no private rights, only a percentage of stock in real estate.

The Trial Court decision if allowed to stand, will allow and

promote the deception of enough minority parties between

the time of the order and the time of the sale to gain control

of the real estate.

As in this case where Chaplain has been damaged,

Charlotte Timber (being a timber company and speculator),

has doubled its value frorn its cost basis, and/or the amount

of money which it tried to force Chaplain to take; in addition,

she was not allowed to buy (where she was willing) any

portion of the property and pay the plaintiffs their fair share.

The balance of equities between the litigants has been

substantially and irrevocably damaged.

The “Due Process of Law” provision of the Fourteenth

Amendment section 1 assures Chaplain of her right protected

by the Bill of Rights, and prevents the Trial Court from

balancing the equities between the litigants by awarding or \

creating civil rights for Charlotte Timber over Chaplain,

where no rights are provided in the Constitution for

companies. The civil rights protection of the Fourteenth

Amendment section 1 protects individual right not only from

state but from companies, corporations and other entities, as

well.

If the Court does not abide by its Order, how can it

expect the people or litigants to do so? It must be their

quality not their quantity of the Order. Standards must be

13

enforced to be respected. If they are merely left as

something on paper, they might as well be written on water.

Otherwise, why have the full faith and credit clause of the

Constitution of the United States, Article IV section 1.

: CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petitioner respectfully

prays that its petition for a writ of certiorari and Request for

summary referral be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

LG Mbp he

inda G. Chaplain, pro se

1225 Tanager Trail

Virginia Beach, Va. 23451

Dated: July / 72000.

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY

HARRY E. DIXON, et als., COMPLAINANTS

V.

TEXON, INC., DEFENDANT

FINAL DECREE OF PARTITION

This day came the parties hereto, Charlotte Timber Co.,

Inc., the intervening Complainant (hereinafter

“Complainant”) and Linda G. Chaplain, the intervening

Defendant (hereinafter “Defendant”), upon the

Commissioner’s Report based upon the hearing conducted by

the Commissioner in Chancery on April 1, 1996 and the -

testimony and exhibits introduced at that hearing, upon the

Exceptions to the Report of Commissioner filed herein by

Complainant, upon Defendant’s Exceptions to the

Commissioner’s Report, upon the testimony and exhibits

introduced at that hearing conducted herein on March 6,

1997, upon the letter of this Court to counsel for the parties

dated April 21, 1997, upon the Motion by Complainant on

June 6, 1997 for appointment of a forestry expert to appraise

the timber values upon the property in question, upon the

testimony and exhibits introduced at hearing conducted

herein on June 20, 11997, upon the Memorandum of

Defendant, upon the Complete Appraisal Summary

Report...dated October 13, 1997 filed herein by Knight,

Dorin & Rountrey (incorporating the survey and timber

appraisal services performed by Draper Aden Associates),

upon the testimony and exhibits introduced at that hearing

conducted herein on February 9, 1998, upon the revision to

the aforesaid Complete Appraisal Summary Report... dated

June 25, 1998 filed herein by Knight, Doris & Rountrey

(incorporating additional survey and timber appraisal

15

services performed by Draper Aden Associates), upon the

Motion in Opposition to the Complete Appraisal Summary

Report of Knight, Dorin & Rountrey filed by Defendant,

upon the Exceptions to Complete Appraisal Report... filed

herein by Complainant, upon the hearing conducted herein

on November 16, 1998, and upon the plat of William W.

Dickerson, L.S., dated July 30, 1998 and revised November

23, 1998, and was argued by counsel.

And it appearing that the Report of the Commissioner has

been filed in the Clerk’s Office for more than ten (10) days,

and that the Exception to Report of Commissioner filed

herein by Complainant and the Defendant’s Exceptions to the

Commissioner’s Report were timely filed, the Court, after

careful consideration of the evidence introduced at that

hearing and at that hearing conducted on March 6, 1997, is of

the opinion that the exception of the Complainant to the

Answer to Question No. | therein should be and is hereby

overruled, and is further of the opinion that the exception of

Defendant to the Answer to Question No. 3 of the

Commissioner’s Report should be and is hereby sustained

and the Court would have the Property appraised by its own

experts, and is further of the opinion that the exceptions of

Defendant to Answer to Question No. 4 of the

Commissioner’s Report should be and is hereby sustained

and the Court finds that the property that is the subject of this

suit (hereinafter the “Property” is susceptible to partition in

kind, and is further of the opinion, sua sponte, that the

Answer to Question No. 8d of the Commissioner’s Report is

in error and that the costs and fees claimed by the :

Commissioner totaling $4,937.44 should be assigned to the

parties in the proportion of their respective ownership interest

in the Property, that is, Complainant should be and is hereby

ordered to pay three fourth (3/4) or $3,703.08, of said

charges, and the Defendant should be and is hereby ordered

to pay one fourth (1/4) or $1,234.36, of said charges, and the

Court is further of the opinion that the remaining objections

APPENDIX A 16

EEE

of Defendant to the Commissioner’ s Report should be and

are hereby overruled and the Court hereby adopts the

remaining findings of said Report of Commissioner not in

conflict herewith. The exceptions of Complainant and

Defendant to these rulings are noted for the record.

The Court has appointed the firm of Draper Aden

Associates to provide survey and timber appraisal services

which firm was assisted by Knight, Dorin & Rountrey to

provide appraisal services. Upon consideration of the

evidence of the qualifications of said firms, the Court is of

the opinion that the objections of the parties to the

qualifications of Draper Aden Associates and Knight, Dorin

& Rountrey to perform survey, timber and appraisal services,

and asking for appointment of another forestry consultant to

perform such services should be and are hereby overruled.

The exceptions of Complainant and Defendant to these

rulings are noted for the record.

The Court has considered the Complete Appraisal

Summary Report... of Knight, Dorin & Rountrey dated

October 13, 1997 as revised by letter dated June 25, 1998

which revised Summary Report incorporates the services of

Draper Aden Associates and the objections thereto of the

Complainants and the Defendant and the court is of the

opinion and does so find that the Property is susceptible to

partition in kind, and that the recommendation for the

partition in kind contained herein is a fair and equitable

partition of the Property and accepts and adopts such

recommendation for partition in kind of the Property, and the

reports and recommendations contained in said Complete

Appraisal Summary Report... should be and are hereby

affirmed, ratified and incorporated herein by referenced

thereto by the Court as the basis for the partition in kind of

the Property, and further finds that the value of the Property

is $848,000.00, and the objections thereto of the parties

should be and are hereby overruled. The exceptions of

APPENDIX A 17

Complainant and Defendant to these rulings are noted for the

record.

The Court accepts, over Defendant’s objection, the

aforesaid plat of survey of William W. Dickerson, L.S., as

the basis for the partition in kind to be ordered herein.

Now, therefore, it is ADJUDGED, ORDERED and

DECREED, pursuant to section 8.01-88 of the Code of

Virginia, 1950, as amended, and to confirm the aforesaid

partition in kind, that Complainant, Charlotte Timber Co.,

Inc., shall be allotted as its share of the Property, free and

clear of any further claims therein of the Defendant, Linda G.

Chaplain, her predecessors in interest and all who claim

through her, the following described property, to-wit:

TRACT 1: All that certain tract or parcel of land,

lying and being in Buffalo Magisterial District, Prince

Edward County, Virginia and containing 70.70 acres

according to that plat of survey of William W.

Dickerson, Jr., L.S., dated July 30, 1998 and revised

November 23, 1998 which plat is attached hereto and,

by reference, is made a part hereof for a more

particular description of this tract by metes and

bounds.

TRACT 2: All that certain tract or parcel of

land, lying and being in Buffalo Magisterial District,

Prince Edward County, Virginia and containing

224.53 acres according to the aforesaid plat of survey

of William W. Dickerson, Jr., L.S., which plat is

attached hereto and, by reference, is made a part

hereof for a more particular description of this tract

by metes and bounds.

TRACT 3: All That certain tract or parcel of

land, lying and being in Buffalo Magisterial District,

Prince Edward County, Virginia and containing

98.09 acres according to the aforesaid plat of survey

APPENDIX A 18

of William W. Dickerson, Jr., L.S., which plat is

- attached hereto and, by reference, is made a part

hereof for a more particular description of this tract

by metes and bounds.

Tracts 1, 2 and 3, herein, are a portion of

that property conveyed unto Harry E. Dixon, William

H. Dixon, Dwight A. Dixon and Jo D. Andrews from

G. A. Dixon and Clara L. Dixon by Deed dated

October 13, 1969 and recorded in the Clerk’s Office

for this Court in Deed Book 171 at page 764.

And, it ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED,

pursuant to section 8.01-88 of the Norfolk and Western

Railway and lands now or formerly owned by Edward T.

Wilson and Olivia L. Wilson, on the southerly side by lands

now or formerly owned by William C. Moore, W. Scott, R. J.

Neely, the old Worsham Place and others, and being the

remaining portions of three parcels of land containing in the

aggregate 685.81 acres conveyed to G.A. Dixon by deeds

from D. W. Long and wife date March 29, 1943, recorded in

Deed Book 99, page 334 (a quitclaim deed to the same parcel

having been executed by Reece F. Longsworth and others

dated February 6, 1953, recorded in Deed Book 158, page

625), and from Reece F. Longsworth et al, dated August 26,

1950, recorded in Deed Book 116, page 122, after of-

conveyances by the parties of the first part by the following

deeds: (1) 1 acre to David Morton and Fannie Morton, dated

October 2, 1950, recorded in Deed Book 116, page 418; (2) 2

acres to W. M. Morton dated December 12, 1955, recorded in

Deed Book 130, page 68; (3) 2 acres to John A. Hudson and

Mildred G. Hudson dated December 12, 1955, recorded in

Deed Book 130, page 70; (4) 29.5 acres to Fannie Styles

Reid dated November 12, 1958, recorded in Deed Book 139, ~

page 247; and (5) 111 acres to P. E. Welch dated January 27,

1951, recorded in Deed Book 117, page 124.

19

APPENDIX A

SAVE AND EXCEPT three parcels containing

70.70 acres, 224.54 acres and 98.09 acres allotted this day to

Charlotte Timber Co., Inc. by this Decree of Partition.

It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of this Court shall

spread this Decree of Partition upon the Deed Books

maintained in the Clerk’s Office for this Court and index this

Decree in the names of the Complainant and the Defendant

as to the allotments made hereby.

And it further appears to the Court that the real property

taxes upon the Property have been paid through 1998, and

that the bill of Donald C. Blessing as Commissioner in

Chancery has been paid in full.

And it further appearing to the Court that a Memorandum

of Lis Pendens has been filed herein by the Complainant, that

the names of the interested parties are as listed on said

Memorandum, that the issues of this suit have been fully

completed, it is further ORDERED and DECREED, pursuant

to section 8.01-16y9 of Code of Virginia, 1950, as amended,

that the Clerk of this Court shall release said Memorandum

of Lis Pendens but shall not do so until after the expiration of

the time in which an appeal or writ of error may be applied

for, or, if an appeal or writ of error is applied for by either or

both parties, after final judgment or decree is entered by the

appropriate appellate court.

ENTERED:_“s/

Judge

DATE: 7/13/99

Seen and objected to:

“s/ , p.q.

Tyler E. Williams, III

Attorney for Intervening Complainant

APPENDIX A 20

Seen and objected to:

“s/ , p.d.

Warren Tomlin

Attorney for Intervening Defendant.

A copy of Order recorded in Chancery

Order Book 24 at page 485.

Teste: “‘s/ , Clerk

a: hn

APPENDIX A 21

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE

EDWARD COUNTY

Harry E. Dixon, et als,

Complainants

V. In CH#: 93-56

Texon, Inc.,

Defendant

DECREE

The Court having considered the defendant's Motion

for Reconsideration and To Set Aside A Portion of the Final

Decree of Partition, the Court hereby denies the request.

Endorsement of counsel is dispensed with pursuant to

Rule 1:13 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.

Enter: 8/3/99

“s/Richard S. Blanton

Judge

A copy of Order recorded in

Chancery Order Book 24 at page 512.

Teste:

"s/Frank L. Overton, Clerk.

By: "s/Earlma R. Blessing, D.C.

APPENDIX B rs

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE

EDWARD COUNTY

HARRY E. DIXON, et als.,

Complainants

¥

TEXON, INC.,

Defendant

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on this day upon the Motion to

Intervene of Linda G. Chaplain, by counsel, who requested

leave of this Honorable Court to intervene in the above-

styled matter, pursuant to the Decree of Sale entered herein

on July 28, 1994, and upon other papers filed herein, and was

argued by counsel.

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it appearing

to the Court that a one-fourth interest in the real property

which is the subject of this litigation was conveyed to

Petitioner by Deed from Defendant, Texon, Inc. dated April

17, 1992 and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit

Court of Prince Edward County in Deed Book 222 at page

425;

AND IT FURTHER APPEARING that Petitioner has

a claim germane to the subject matter of the suit given her

ownership of a significant interest in the real property which

is the subject of this suit, which said property is subject to

sale by Special Commissioner’s pursuant to ORDER of this

Honorable Court consistent with the Report of the

Commissioner in Chancery;

APPENDIX C 23

BE IT THEREFORE ADJUDGED, ORDERED,

AND DECREED that the Motion to Intervene be and hereby

is GRANTED.

ENTER:"s/J. Snoddy, Judge"

DATE: November 18, 1994

I ASK FOR THIS:

"s/J.W. Tomlin, p.d.

SEEN:

"s/Tyler Williams, p.q.

A copy of Order recorded in

Chancery Order Book 22 at

page 646.

Teste:

"s/Frank L Overton, Clerk

By:"s/Earlma R. Blessing, D.C.

APPENDIX C 24

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE

EDWARD COUNTY

HARRY E. DIXON, et als.,

Complainants

V.

TEXON, INC., and LINDA G. CHAFLAIN,

Defendant

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on this day upon the Motion of Tomlin

and Thomas, P.C., to be substituted as Counsel of Record for

Defendants, Texon, Inc., and Linda G. Chaplain, herein, in

the above-styled action and upon the Motion of Defendant,

by counsel, that J. Warren Tomlin, Esquire, be appointed Co-

Special Commissioner in the place and stead of Dannie R.

Sutton, Jr., pursuant to the Decree of Sale entered herein on

July 28, 1994, and upon other papers filed herein, and was

argued by Counsel.

UPON CONSIDERATION WHHEREOF, it appearing to

the Court that subsequent to July 28, 1994, the date of entry

of a Decree of Sale herein, Dannie R. Sutton, Jr., expressed

his desire not to serve as Co-Special Commissioner pursuant

to the terms of said Decree,

AND IT FURTHER APPEARING that Defendant, Linda

G. Chaplain, was allowed to intervene this matter for good

cause shown;

AND IT FURTHER APPEARING that Defendants,

Texon, Inc., and Linda G. Chaplain, have requested the law

firm of Tomlin and Thomas, P.C., to represent the

Defendants herein,

APPENDIX D 25

AND IT FURTHER APPEARING that Defendants

Texon, Inc., and Linda G. Chaplain, have requested that J.

Warren Tomlin, Esquire, act as Co-Special Commissioner, in

the place and stead of Dannie R. Sutton, Jr., with Tyler E.

Williams, III, pursuant to said Decree:

BE IT THEREFORE ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND

DECREED that the Motion for Substitution of Counsel and

Co-Special Commissioner be, and hereby is, GRANTED.

ENTER “‘s/

JUDGE

DATE November 18. 1994

We Ask for This:

“s/ J. Warren Tomlin, p.d.

Seen and Agreed:

“s/ Tyler E. Williams, II, p.a.

A TRUE COPY TESTE:

“s/Frank L. Overton CLERK

By”s/E.R. Blessing D.C.

APPENDIX D 26

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE

EDWARD COUNTY

HARRY E. DIXON, et als.,

Complainants

Vv.

TEXON, INC.,

Defendant

REVISED DECREE OF SALE

This cause came on this day upon the Decree of Sale

entered herein dated July 28, 1994 and recorded in the

Clerk's Office for this Court in Chancery Order Book 22 at

page 568, upon the representation by Dannie R. Sutton, Jr.

that he does not wish to serve herein a Special

Commissioner, upon the motion of Defendant, by counsel, to

appointing J. Warren Tomlin to serve as co-Special

Commissioner in the place and stead of said Dannie R.

Sutton, Jr., and upon the other papers filed herein, and was

argued by counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, it appearing to the

Court proper to do so

It is ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED that

the motion to appoint said J. Warren Tomlin to serve as co-

Special Commissioner with Tyler E. Williams, III is granted.

It is further ADJUDGED, ORDERED and

DECREED that the real estate involved be sold singly on in

combination, and that J. Warren Tomlin and Tyler E.

Williams, III be and are hereby appointed co-Special

Commissioners to solicit bids for said real estate, in

APPENDIX E : 27

accordance with the recommendations set forth in the report

of Commissioner Elizabeth Taylor Carter, by advertising the

time, place and terms of sale in the Farmville Herald once a

week for four (4) consecutive weeks on the following terms:

10% in cash at the day of sale with balance within thirty (30)

days, and report to this Court for confirmation or rejection

any offers received either privately or by public auction, but

before the said co-Special Commissioners shall act under this

Decree, they shall execute bond, with surety, in the penalty

of Four Hundred Fifty Five Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty

Three Dollars ($455,833.0) before the Clerk of this Court

and, thereafter, the said co-Special Commissioners shall

report to the Court herein. All other findings, ratifications,

approvals and confirmations contained in the aforesaid

Decree of Sale not explicitly changed, revised or amended

herein shall remain in full force and effect.

ENTER: “s/

JUDGE

DATE: November 18, 1994

We ask for this:

“‘s/Tyler E. Williams, III

Tyler E. Williams, III

“s/J. Warren Tomlin

J. Warren Tomlin, Esq.

Counsel for Defendant

A TRUE COPY TESTE:

“s/Frank L. Overton, CLERK

By “s/E.R. Blessing, D.C.

APPENDIX E 28

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE

EDWARD COUNTY

HARRY E. DIXON, et als., ~ COMPLAINANTS

v.

TEXON, INC., DEFENDANT

DECREE OF SALE

This cause came on this day upon the Report of the

Commissioner, Elizabeth Taylor Carter, Esq., filed June 28,

1994 and the exhibits thereto, and the depositions taken and

filed on behalf of Complainants, and was argued by counsel.

Upon consideration whereof, it appearing to the Court that

the Report of Commissioner Elizabeth Taylor Carter has

been filed for a period of more than ten (10) days and no

exceptions have been filed thereto, and no exceptions have

been filed and no just ground for exceptions being perceived,

said report is accordingly ratified, approved and confirmed in

all respects.

And it further appearing to the Court that all of the parties

interested in said real estate are properly before the Court and

that partition among the owners thereof cannot conveniently

be made and that no one or more of the co-owners is willing

to take an assignment of the real estate and pay the others

such sums as their respective interests may entitle them to,

and that the interests of those entitled to said real estate or its

proceeds will be promoted by a sale of all of said real estate

and a division of the proceeds among them, according to

their respective rights and interests contained in the

aforementioned report,

APPENDIX F 29

It is therefore ADJUDGED, ORDERED and DECREED

that the real estate involved be sold singly or in combination,

And that Tyler E. Williams, III and Dannie R. Sutton, Jr. be

and they are hereby appointed Special Commissioner to

solicit bids for said real estate, in accordance with the

recommendations set forth in the report of Commissioner

Elizabeth Taylor Carter, by advertising the time, place and

terms of sale in the Farmville Herald once a week for four (4)

Consecutive weeks on the following terms: 10% in cash at

the day of sale with balance within fifteen (15) days, and

report to this Court for confirmation or rejection any offers

received either privately or by public auction, but before the

said Special Commissioners shall act under this Decree, they

shall execute bond, with surety, in the penalty of Four

Hundred Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty Three Dollars

($455,833.00) before the Clerk of this Court and, thereafter,

the said Special Commissioners shall report to the Court

herein.

ENTER: “s/

JUDGE

2p DATE: July 28, 1994

Seen:

**5/

Tyler E. Williams, II

Counsel for Complainants

“e/

Dannie R. Sutton, Jr.

Counsel for Defendant A TRUE COPY TESTE:

“/ Frank L. Overton , Clerk

By/ “s E. R. Blessing, D.C.

APPENDIX F 30

’

%

7

VIRGINIA: IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF

PRINCE EDWARD COUNTY

HARRY E. DIXON, et als. COMPLAINANTS

v.

TEXON, INC., DEFENDANT

ORDER

THIS CAUSE came on this 8" day of June, 1995, upon

the Petition of Charlotte Timber Company, Incl., by counsel,

to intervene in the above-styled matter and Petitioner’s

Motion to Allot, Defendant’s Third Amended Motion in

Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Intervene, Defendant’s

Motion in Opposition to Petitioner’s Motion to Allot,

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Defendant’s Motion to

Allot, Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of the

Revised Decree of Sale, and other papers filed herein, and

was argued by counsel.

IT APPEARING to the Court that Petitioner seeks to

assert a claim germane to the subject matter of this suit and it

further appearing proper to the Court to do so;

Now, therefore, it is ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and

DECREED that the Motion to Intervene filed herein by the

Petitioner should be and is hereby GRANTED; that

Defendants Third Amended Motion in Opposition to

Petitioner’s Motion to intervene and Defendant’s Motion to

Dismiss should be and are hereby DENIED:

AND IT FURTHER APPEARING that offers equivalent

in value from the Intervening Defendant and the Petitioner

(now intervening Complainant) to purchase the interest of the

EXHIBIT G 3]

other are before the Court, that neither offer should be

preferred over the other and it appearing proper to do so;

Now, therefore, it is ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and

DECREED that neither the intervening Defendant nor the

Petitioner (now intervening Plaintiff) are entitled to allotment

and therefore the Motion to Allot of each party should be and

is here by DENIED;

AND IT FURTHER APPEARING to the Court that some of

the evidence upon which the Report of the Commissioner

was based may have changed since the hearing before said

Commissioner which was conducted on April 18, 1994 such

that the Court desires that some of the findings contained in

said Report be updated, Defendant’s Motion for

Reconsideration of the Revised Decree of Sale entered by

this honorable Court on November 18, 1994 is hereby

GRANTED, and it is hereby ADJUDGED, ORDERED and

DECREED that this cause be and it is hereby referred to

Donald C. Blessing, Commissioner in Chancery of this court,

who after giving due notice of the time and place for

executing this reference as required by law, shall inquire,

take evidence, and report, as follows:

1. Henceforth from April 18, 1994, the date of the

Hearing of the initial Commissioner in Chancery in

this matter, who are the record owners of, and in what

proportions does each own, the real property

described in this matter?

2. What is the present tax status of the real property, are

any said taxes delinquent, and if so, in what amount

and to what extent, and are there any liens of record

on said real property, and if so, their amounts and

(t)he order of their priority?

3. What is the fair market value of the fee simple and

what, if any, is the annual rental value of said real

property?

4. Whether the real property is susceptible of partition in

kind between/among the parties entitled thereto?

5. Ifthe answer to inquiry number four (4) herein is

negative, then, whether either/any of the owners is/are

willing to take the whole or any part of the real

property and pay the other owner(s) such sums of

money as their respective interest(s) may entitle them

to?

6. If the answer to inquiry number five (5) herein is

negative, then, whether the interest of those entitled to

said real property or the proceeds therefrom would be

promoted by the sale of said real estate and division

of the proceeds?

7. If the answer to inquiry number six (6) herein is

affirmative, then, whether the parties are properly

before the Court in this cause and whether this Court

may enter any decree or order affecting a sale of the

real property? And, .

8. Any land all other matters deemed pertinent to this

matter by said Commissioner in Chancery and such

pertinent matters concerning which said

Commissioner is required to report by any party in

interest.

AND BE IT FURTHER ADJUDGED, ORDERED, and

DECREED that said Commissioner in Chancery shall make

his/her report to this honorable Court, and that all previous

Orders and Decrees of this Court in this matter not otherwise

_—

modified herein shall otherwise remain in full force and

effect, and this matter shall remain on the docket.

ENTER: “s/

JUDGE

DATE:9/1/95

I ask for this:

“s/Tyler E. Williams, III, p.d.

Seen and objected to for reasons stated on the record:

“*s/J. Warren Tomlin, p.q.

A copy of Order recorded in

Chancery Order Book 22 at page

892.

Teste:

“s/Frank L. Overton, Clerk

By: “s/Earlma R. Blessing, D.C.

EXHIBIT G 34

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme

Court Building in the City of Richmond on Monday the 6th

day of March, 2000.

Linda G. Chaplain. Appellant,

against Record No. 992349

Circuit Court No. CH93-56

Charlotte Timber Co. Inc.., Appellee.

From the Circuit Court of Prince Edward County

Upon review of the record in this case and

consideration of the argument submitted in support of and in

opposition to the granting of an appeal, the Court is of

opinion there is no reversible error in the judgment

complained of. Accordingly, the Court refuses the petition

for appeal.

A Copy,

Teste,

David B. Beach, Clerk

By: "s/

Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX H 35

VIRGINIA:

In the Supreme Court of Virginia held at the Supreme

Court Building in the City of Richmond on Friday the 21st

day of April, 2000.

Linda G. Chaplain, | Appellant,

against Record No. 992349

Circuit Court No. CH93-56

Charlotte Timber Co., Inc., Appellee.

Upon a Petition for Rehearing

On consideration of the petition of the appellant to set

aside the judgment rendered herein on the 6th day of March,

2000 and grant a rehearing thereof. the prayer of the said

petition is denied.

A Copy,

Teste:

“s/

Clerk

EXHIBIT | 36

Corrected

VIRGINIA;

In The Supreme Court of Virginia held at the

Supreme Court Building in the City of Richmond on

Wednesday the 20th day of December, 1995.

Linda G. Chaplain, Intervenor, etc., Appellant,

against Record No. 952109

Circuit Court No. CH93-56

Charlotte Timber Company, Inc., etc., et al., Appellees.

From the Circuit Court of Prince Edward

County

Finding that the order appealed from is not a final

order under Code section 8.01-670(A) (3), the Court

dismisses without prejudice the petition for appeal filed in

the above-styled case.

A Copy,

Teste:

David B. Beach, Clerk

By: "s/

Deputy Clerk

APPENDIX J 37

I. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS STATUTES,

RULES AND REGULATIONS.

Constitution of the United States.

Article IV. Relation of the states to each other.

Section 1. Full faith and credit shall be given in each state

to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of

every other state; And the Congress may by general laws

prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and

Proceedings shall be proved, and the effects thereof

Section 2. (1) The Citizens of each state shall be entitled

to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in several States.

Article VI, clause 2. Supremacy of the national government.

This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which

Shall be made in Pursuance thereof: and all Treaties made, or

which shall be made, under the Authority of the United

States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land: and the J udges

in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the

Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary

notwithstanding.

Amendment 10. Powers retained by the states and the

people.

The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to

the states respectively, or to the people.

Amendment 14. Civil Rights

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United

States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof. are citizens of

the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No

state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

APPENDIX K 38

privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor

shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its

jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

28 U.S.C. section 1257. State courts; certiorari.

(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest

court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be

reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari where

the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on

the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties,

or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, _

privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under

the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any

commission held or authority exercised under, the United

States.

_(b) For the purposes of this section, the term “highest

court of a State” includes the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals.

Code of Georgia. Title 23-1-10. Who would have equity

must do equity.

He who would have equity must do equity and give effect

to all equitable rights of the other party respecting the subject

matter of the action.

APPENDIX K 39

170

KNOW ALL MEN by THESE PRESENTS, That we, J.

Warren Tomlin and Tyler E. Williams, III and Fidelity and

Deposit of Maryland are held and firmly bound unto the

Commonwealth of Virginia in the sum of --- Four Hundred

Fifty-Five Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-three & .00/0

To the payment whereof, well and truly to be made to the

said Commonwealth of Virginia, we bind ourselves, and each

of us, our and each of our heirs, executors and administrators,

jointly and severally, firmly by these presents. And as to this

bond, we hereby severally waive our homestead exemption.

In Testimony Whereof, we hereunto subscribe our name

and affix our seal this, the 21“ day of November, 1994.

The Condition Of The Above Obligation Is Such, That

whereas, the above bound ------J. Warren Tomlin and Tyler

E. Williams, III----was by Order of the Circuit Court of

Prince Edward County, Virginia, appointed Co-Special to

sell privately or by public auction real estate in the chancery

case now before this Court under the style of HARRY E.

DIXON, ET ALS Vs. TEXON, INC..

SEE CHANCERY ORDER BOOK 22 PAGE 650

Now, therefore, If the said J. Warren Tomlin & Tyler E.

Williams, III as aforesaid, shall faithfully discharge the duties

of the office, post or trust of Co-Special Commissioners then

this obligation to be void; otherwise to remain in full force

and virtue.

“‘s/ (SEAL)

J. Warren Tomlin

“s/ (SEAL)

Tyler E. Williams, III

aE ES a a a laa

Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland

By: “s/ (SEAL)

Peggy W. Newcomb

VIRGINIA:

In the Clerk’s Office of the Circuit Court for the County of

Prince Edward the 21* day of November, 1994.

This bond was executed and acknowledged by the

obligors, and ordered to be recorded.

SURETY ACCORDING THE CHANCERY ORDER

(COB 22 PAGE 650)

Teste:

**¢/

Earlma R. Blessing D. Clerk

COPY 80

4]