Amicus Curiae Brief — Alabama v. Bozeman
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FILED
JAN oF 2e0( « | JAN 25° 990
No. 00-492 | OFFIC imo |
dee
Jun the Supreme Court of the Guited States
STATE OF ALABAMA, PETITIONER
UV.
MICHAEL HERMAN BOZEMAN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Acting Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
JOHN C. KEENEY
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
MICHAEL R. DREEBEN
Deputy Solicitor General
JEFFREY A. LAMKEN
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20580-0001
(202) 314-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether a one-day transfer of a federal prisoner to
state custody for purposes of arraignment, without
completing the trial on the state charges, violates
Article IV(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
and requires dismissal of the state charges.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Interest of the United States ...........cccccscccecccsessssssecosesssesescosseees., 1
ce TES ETS I OD 2
or he ESET RTT 10
Argument:
Article [V(e) of the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers is not violated by a brief interruption of
confinement that does not affect substantial rights ........ 12
A. The vast majority of federal courts have
correctly concluded that de minimis transfers
ot i | TL ATTA 13
B. The decision below is inconsistent with
fundamental principles of statutory con-
Sr ITITT Sidi asa ichgdatbaacighiecintnatncegnabnscanesbnenshdamnbsatanceseena 20
RES SRE AD nO a a 27
EEE DSSS ONTO la
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 |: ee aon 23
Baxter v. United States, 966 F 2d 387 (8th Cir.
SLES SLES TOT 16
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716 (1985) ..ccccccccssssssscsosses 2, 3,13
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) cccccccossseeccoe.oo.. 23
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433 (1981) ceccccccsscscsscssseccoseseoes 2
Delaware v. Van Arsdail, 475 U.S. 673 ( i 23
General Carbon Co. v. OSHA, 860 F.2d 479
et deleiinkacescnssannsscnsncanssnninacianee 20
Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing S.E., Inc.
v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2423 (2000) coccccccccecccccocceess.., 21
New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110 (2000) -.ccccccccccscosssee. 3, 14, 23, 24
Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997) cccccccccccse....... 24
Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371 (5th Cir.
1981) " 8, 15-16, 17
(IIT)
IV
Cases—Continued: Page
State v. Sassoon, 242 S.E.2d 121 (Ga. 1978) ..........sscssessees 8
United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974) .........ccceeee 22
United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d 25 (Ast Cir.
SE sentasshanasesascitin ; 15, 17, 18
United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977) ............000 22
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) ............... 22
United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167 (9th Cir.),
cort. domied, GOG UES. BIO. (IBGE) onc.ccseccesesnsscsscssirecsencnenasevens 16
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) «02... eeseeeeeee 3
United States v. Roy, 771 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986) .......sscscseseseseneneneees 15, 17, 25
United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988) ..........+00 4, 10, 15, 16
United States v. Sorrell, 413 F. Supp. 138 (E.D.
Pa. 1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
Gen GS UI, DE Ce teinierinsinenatainsienitheneninnscininniicninness 9
United States v. Taylor, 173 F.3d 538 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 987 (1999) ..........ccccccccscccsssecsesccsescesees 16
United States v. Taylor, 947 F.2d 1002 (ist Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 991 (1992) ............sscssssssceseeees 16
United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316 (1st Cir.
POD cicsssihensicussiabameticiteininibtinaibilia 15, 17
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) ..........sccccseseees 24
Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr.,
big, RD ie TG CID cicchieiesincaresininnthncicisintainctcinin 11, 12, 21, 26
Constitution, statutes and rules:
U.S. Const. Art. I, § 10, Cl. 3 (Compact Clause) ................. 2,1la
Crime Control Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406,
4B Stak. SOD 6 WB. TIBI) wisscesnssicnininesncrinscniimscnnsins 2
Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1397, as amended by Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7059,
102 Stat. 4403 (18 U.S.C. App. 2) ...cccssssssssssssssssssssessseees 2,18, la
§ 2:
BRE scsssescimineemasicinisnii -~ 13,23
Statutes and rules—Continued: Page
REG LOUD) ciswiensincivierieaccatideianabieielannensaieria: 3, 2a
SO EEE saccenstsatstnicntinscsotianniiidetions 5, 3a
REED ‘sibdiininesitieninsiniiabigtnneteg ees ts 14, 3a
Art. IV a m 3, 13, 5a
FG ED iti titihniaicreiseg: . 3, 5a
Art. IV(c) stpeacnniicinianntahonineinabiniseinaitenieasanie 3, 14, 6a
Fg | Nev WO SII PEIRCE ls ROEM O Ee passim
WORF sssisntnseniincintesbiaistiasiccisisseodesans 3, 13, 7a
Te TE siscitnemccintrsanieinijedsieitncaninsisloniitegbnicctii teas 14, 8a
TRS WOU diarcisisiistaeiciininibibicladiadiitis ition 3, 14, 8a
Art. IX ' sseveesesesaueesosseneoane 8, 24, 10a
IP adhidicineisnaniatnactiaian - 2,18,12a
OCF seationaicishcinsetcpiceaibccincelbibiabiiasicee asta cts koa 14, 18, 12a
§ 9(2) . ‘ sanpitelsnidgiiiiaiac 18, 12a
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Tit. IIT, 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq. ..ccesccsscsesccssscsssssssosssee 22
A er UI Siauiiciipnisceisenigepickeitaabaneneie dita eect ate 4
I PMT E shiliseieiliticsitiigliatacli ah Ss 23, 1a
Ala. Code §§ 15-9-80 et seq. (1995) ...c.cccccessesssssssessssesecoseceeesee. 2
dhcgac hea, te inca: heb SE Nee NN TTA 23, 13a
AMMEN eRe ENS NETS DEN Rae OIE Lorn 23, 13a
Miscellaneous:
MiP Stay. TR, RFI CRD vicccscsctsnssieasssttsdeesrseasinnsddeaastcsins 15, 19
4 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts ( SUES sanenteiaieiscs 21
Council of State Governments, Suggested State
Legislation, Program for 1957 (1956) ... de 13, 25
2 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts
cts Ee INEPT NOM NSN OO RE EPROM SE SS 21
W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts
(5th ed. 1984) = —- 20-91
15 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts (4th ed. :
er A EINE OA TAI EI PRT 21
S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ceeccccceccocsssecoee. 25
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 00-492
STATE OF ALABAMA, PETITIONER
Vv.
MICHAEL HERMAN BOZEMAN
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
This case involves the construction of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), a congressionally
authorized interstate compact to which the United
States is a party. The question presented is whether
Article IV(e) of the IAD requires the dismissal of the
state charges against respondent with prejudice be-
cause he was transferred from federal custody to state
custody for arraignment and returned to federal
custody one day later without completing his state trial.
As a party to the compact, the United States has an
interest in its correct interpretation and application. In
addition, the United States has an interest in being able
to accommodate a State’s request for temporary cus-
(1)
2
tody of a federal prisoner in connection with a state
prosecution that may not be completed before the
prisoner is returned. Finally, issues similar to the
present one have arisen in federal prosecutions,
although Congress has enacted special laws to address
the case in which the federal government obtains
custody of a state prisoner from the State in connection
with a federal prosecution and returns the prisoner to
state custody before trial has been completed, see 18
U.S.C. App. 2, § 9.
STATEMENT
1. The Compact Clause of the United States Consti-
tution, Art. I, § 10, Cl. 3, provides that States may enter
into agreements and compacts with one another, but
only with “the Consent of Congress.” Pursuant to that
authority, Congress in 1934 authorized the States to
enter into agreements, including the Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers (IAD), to regulate the apprehension
and prosecution of criminals. See Crime Control
Consent Act of 1934, ch. 406, 48 Stat. 909 (4 U.S.C.
112(a)); Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 438, 441-442 & n.9
(1981). Since the IAD’s promulgation, 48 States have
entered into it. Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719
(1985). For example, the IAD is codified as part of
Alabama Law as Ala. Code §§ 15-9-80 et seq. (1995).
The United States became a party to the IAD in 1970,
see Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Pub. L.
No. 91-538, 84 Stat. 1897, as amended, Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7059, 102 Stat. 4403,
and the IAD is codified as a matter of federal law in 18
U.S.C. App. 2.’
! Before the United States became a party to the IAD, the
government employed the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
to obtain custody of state prisoners in order to proceed with
a aeoeneilincinieibbeliitet » awe 2: sap piaiegasteaeeeenem,
3
Detainers are ordinarily employed when one State
seeks to bring charges against a prisoner in another
State’s custody. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111-
112 (2000).’ As this Court has explained, a “detainer is
a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the
institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking
the institution either to hold the prisoner for the agency
or to notify the agency when release of the prisoner is
imminent.” Carchman, 473 U.S. at 719. Articles IV
and V of the IAD provide the mechanisms through
which one jurisdiction may, for purposes of criminal
prosecution, obtain temporary custody of a prisoner
incarcerated by another jurisdiction. Under Article IV,
a State that has lodged a detainer against a prisoner
may, by written notice, request temporary custody or
availability of the prisoner. IAD, Art. IV(a). Once that
State has received custody of the prisoner, it must try
him within 120 days, subject to reasonable continuances
for good cause shown in open court. IAD, Art. IV(c).
Article V(e) provides that, “[a]t the earliest practicable
time consonant with the purposes of” the IAD, “the
prisoner shall be returned to the sending State.”
Article IV(e), known as the anti-shuttling provision,
provides that, “i]f trial is not had on any indictment,
information, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to
federal prosecutions. This Court has held that, notwithstanding
Congress’s adoption of the IAD, the federal government may con-
tinue to employ that writ to obtain custody of state prisoners. See
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 360-361 (1978).
2 The IAD defines the term “State” as including not only the
various States and Commonwealths that compose the Union, but
also the United States of America, the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States. IAD,
Art. Il(a). Throughout this brief, we use the term “State” in the
same sense.
4
the prisoner’s being returned to\the original place of
imprisonment pursuant to article V(e)” of the IAD,
“such indictment, information or complaint shall not be
of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter
an order dismissing the same with prejudice.” The anti-
’ shuttling provision is meant “to protect the prisoner
against endless interruption of the rehabilitation pro-
grams because of criminal proceedings in other juris-
dictions.” United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 636 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988).
2. In June of 1995, respondent Michael Herman
Bozeman was arrested in Covington County, Alabama,
on federal charges, including conspiracy to possess
methamphetamine with intent to distribute it in vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. 846. On November 38, 1995, respon-
dent appeared before the United States District Court
for the District of Georgia, and pleaded guilty to those
charges. He was sentenced to 75 months of impris-
onment, to be followed by four years of supervised
release; the term of imprisonment was later reduced to
36 months, but the term of supervised release was left
unchanged.
In September of 1996, a Covington County, Alabama,
grand jury indicted respondent on various shooting
charges, including two counts of discharging a firearm
into an occupied dwelling, two counts of discharging a
firearm into an unoccupied vehicle, and one count of
discharging a firearm into an unoccupied dwelling.
Respondent had committed those offenses in June of
1995, before he was arrested on federal charges. The
Covington County District Attorney sent a request to
the Federal Bureau of Prisons in Atlanta, asking that a
detainer be placed against respondent under the IAD.
Bureau of Prisons officials responded by stating that
the detainer had been filed pursuant to the District
5
Attorney’s request. Respondent apparently received
and signed, on November 4, 1996, a notice that advised
him of the detainer, notified him of the untried indict-
ments, and informed him that he had the right under
Article III of the LAD to request prompt disposition of
the charges against him. Respondent was later trans-
ferred from the Federal Penitentiary in Atlanta to a
federal facility in Marianna, Florida. Pet. 5. Marianna
is in northwestern Florida, near the Alabama border,
approximately 80 miles (as the crow flies) from the
county seat of Covington County, which is the city of
Andalusia.®
On January 8, 1997, the District Attorney requested
temporary custody of respondent from Bureau of Pri-
sons officials in Marianna, Florida, indicating that
respondent was needed for arraignment and appoint-
ment of counsel on the shooting charges. The written
request stated that respondent would be picked up on
January 15, 1997, and returned the next day, on
January 16, 1997. It was not until January 238, 1997,
however, that respondent was made available to and
placed in the temporary custody of Covington County
authorities, who transported him to Covington County.
The next day, January 24, 1997, respondent received
appointed counsel, was arraigned on the shooting
charges, and transferred back to federal custody in
Marianna, Florida. Pet. App. 17-18, 28; Pet. 5-6.
On the day of arraignment, respondent’s pro se
motion to dismiss the indictment, which claimed that
there had been a violation of the IAD, was filed.
(Respondent apparently had earlier been transferred
3 The driving distance between Marianna, Florida, and An-
dalusia, Alabama, is approximately 110 miles. We are advised that
the estimated travel time is two hours and ten minutes.
fe
for arraignment on separate drug charges, which were
later dismissed, and returned to federal authorities
before being indicted on the shooting charges. See note
4, infra.) Appointed counsel stated that there were
possible questions on that issue, and asked to reserve
’ the issue for post-arraignment consideration; the trial
court granted the motion. Apparently, respondent did
not object to being returned to federal custody follow-
ing the arraignment, and he was so returned. Pet. 6.
On February 21, 1997, respondent’s counsel filed a
motion to dismiss the untried charges. Article [V(e) of
the IAD, he argued, compelled dismissal because re-
spondent had been brought to Covington County under
the IAD, but had been returned to his original place of
incarceration without having been tried. Shortly there-
after, on February 27, 1997, respondent was trans-
ferred back into the custody of Covington County
officials to stand trial on the shooting charges. He was
tried that day, and the jury unanimously found him
guilty of all charges the next day, February 28, 1997.
Pet. 7.
Following his conviction, respondent renewed the
motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the trial court
denied the motion. The only issue before it, the trial
court stated, was whether Article IV of the IAD had
been violated. Pet. App. 27. The trial court found that,
because respondent had been “brought to Covington
County * * * to attend to short pre-trial matters, not
anticipated to require his extended presence,” it “made
much sense to bring him into the county briefly to see
to those matters, and thereupon return him to the
surroundings to which he was accustomed.” Id. at 28.
“That course,” the court explained, “appears to have
been conservative of defendant’s interest in main-
taining any course of rehabilitation available to him in
7
federal prison. He certainly would not receive much
rehabilitation in a county jail.” Ibid. “[MJany prison
inmates,” the court continued, “don’t care to stay in our
county jail for two or three months pending trial.” bid.
The court therefore found that “there was a failure of
proof that” respondent’s transfer had “interfered with
[his] participation in any rehabilitative program, or that
he was denied, threatened with the denial of, or feared
losing any privileges because of this state charge.” Pet.
App. 28.‘ Instead, the court found that the transfer was
“wholly consistent with the goal of the IAD to expedite
the prosecution of state charges without interfering
with any rehabilitative programs.” Jd. at 29. The court
therefore held that there had been no violation of the
IAD, and it declined to dismiss the charges.
3. The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
Pet. App. 15-26. The court began by noting that the
federal courts of appeals were divided on whether a
one-day transfer between a sending and a receiving
jurisdiction, without resolution of the pending charges,
violates Article IV(e) of the IAD. Id. at 21. The posi-
4 The trial court’s opinion speaks of “transfers” in the plural
because, before being transferred to Covington County on the
shooting charges, respondent was once transferred to Covington
County in connection with state drug charges that were later
dismissed. See Pet. 4 n.2. The Court of Criminal Appeals con-
cluded that, because the shooting charges were not pending at the
time respondent was transferred to Covington County and then
returned to federal custody in connection with the drug charges,
the IAD could not be read as requiring dismissal of the shooting
charges based on that earlier transfer. The IAD, the court ex-
plained, only applies to “untried indictments,” and there was no
untried indictment charging the shooting offenses when respon-
dent was transferred and returned in connection with the drug
charges. See Pet. App. 16-17. Respondent has not sought further
review of that holding.
8
tion of the courts finding no violation, the Court of
Criminal Appeals concluded, was more persuasive in
light of paragraph 1 of Article 1X of the IAD, which
states that the agreement “shall be liberally construed
so as to effectuate its purposes.” Jbid. In this case, the
court noted, the transfers did not interfere with the
purpose of the IAD. /bid. To the contrary, the court of
appeals observed that respondent had failed (until
appeal) to claim that he had suffered any prejudice
from the transfer. Id. at 21-22.° Keeping a prisoner
“for trial, rather than returning him immediately after
arraignment,” the court explained, often would “inter-
fere[] with [the prisoner’s] legitimate interest in partici-
pating in the program of rehabilitation in which he was
enrolled;” in contrast, brief removal and “prompt return
* * * after arraignment” did not have that effect. Jd.
at 23 (quoting Sassoon v. Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371,
375 (5th Cir. 1981), and State v. Sassoon, 242 S.E.2d
121, 123 (Ga. 1978)). Based on that reasoning and the
record before it, the court held that respondent’s “brief
transfer in January 1997 for arraignment * * * and
return to federal custody the following day did not
violate Article IV(e) of” the IAD. Jd. at 26.
4. The state supreme court reversed, with three
justices dissenting. Pet. App. 1-14. The majority
5 On appeal, respondent apparently “made a conclusory asser-
tion that his transfers interfered with his ability to aid in his de-
fense.” Pet. App. 22 n.2. The Court of Criminal Appeals noted
that the argument had not been timely raised before appeal, id. at
21-22, and declined to address it, id. at 22 n.2. See also id. at 12
(dissenting opinion) (Respondent “does not argue on appeal that he
was prejudiced by the transfer back to federal custody before his
trial.”); id. at 12 n.9 (noting that “the record does not contain “evi-
dence to support” the assertion of prejudice). See also id. at 7-10
(state supreme court decision reversing without finding prejudice).
9
reasoned that, under the text of the IAD, there is no
exception for technical violations of Article IV(e).
Instead, the majority stated, the IAD unambiguously
requires that, whenever the prisoner is returned to the
sending jurisdiction before trial, any untried charges in
the receiving jurisdiction must be dismissed. Jd. at 8.
The court did not dispute that, in individual cases, a
one day trip might cause no more than “minimal inter-
ruption of the rehabilitative process.” Pet. App. 7
(quoting United States v. Sorrell, 413 F. Supp. 138
(E.D. Pa. 1976), aff’d, 562 F.2d 227 (3d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 949 (1978)). The court concluded, how-
ever, that the IAD was not drafted to deal with “an
individual situation, but rather [to be] an agreement of
national scope.” Ibid. Given the tremendous distances
between and within States, the court continued, trans-
fers could require trips measuring hundreds of miles
and create more than minimal disruption. Jd. at 8. The
legislature could have, the court continued, “stepped
beyond the confines of the text of the compact and
included limitations in the statute expressly allowing
‘technical’ violations to occur. However, it * * * did
not do so. This Court will not interject its interpreta-
tion of what the Legislature should have done.” Jbid..
Three justices dissented, and a fourth recused herself
because she had been a member of the Court of
Criminal Appeals when that court considered the case.
Pet. App. 10-14. The dissenting justices stated that a
technical violation of the IAD does not require the
dismissal of charges with prejudice. A majority of
federal courts of appeals, they pointed out, had con-
cluded that a one-day transfer like the one at issue here
was not a material violation of the Act. Indeed, they
noted, transferring the prisoner back to the sending
institution promptly will often be more consonant with
10
the Act’s purposes, because it enables the prisoner to
participate in rehabilitation programs _ he would
otherwise miss. Id. at 12.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of Alabama erroneously held
that even a technical and wholly harmless defect in a
temporary transfer under the Interstate Agreement on
Detainers requires dismissal of an indictment with
prejudice. :
A. The IAD seeks to minimize the negative impact
that detainers can have on a prisoner’s participation in
rehabilitation programs in the jurisdiction in which he
is incarcerated. Article IV(e), the anti-shuttling rule,
serves that goal by protecting “the prisoner against
endless interruption of the rehabilitation programs be-
cause of criminal proceedings in other jurisdictions.”
United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628, 636 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988). Consistent with that
purpose, the overwhelming majority of federal courts of
appeals have reached the common sense conclusion that
Article IV(e) of the IAD is not materially violated
when a prisoner’s confinement is briefly interrupted
by transfer to another jurisdiction for purposes of
arraignment if the prisoner is returned to the original
place of confinement within a day and his participation
in rehabilitation programs is unaffected. Those courts
have observed that a contrary, inflexible construction of
the statute would undermine the IAD’s express goals.
The rapid return of a prisoner to the original place
of confinement minimizes any interruption of the
prisoner’s participation in rehabilitative programs. In
contrast, requiring the prisoner to remain in what may
be lengthy custody in the receiving State would
prevent the prisoner from participating in rehabili-
-
11
tation programs at his original place of confinement,
forcing him instead to spend an extended period in a
local pre-trial detention facility where, as here, such
programs are often unavailable.
B. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the
plain language of the IAD compelled it to require dis-
missal because of the one-day transfer of custody in this
case. In particular, that court reasoned that, because
the IAD does not contain an express exception for
“technical” or “de minimis” breaches, excusing such
errors would be tantamount to judicial legislation. Pet.
App. 8. That conclusion, however, is inconsistent with
the principle of de minimis non curat lex—“the law
cares not for trifles’—which, this Court has held, “is
part of the established background of legal principles
against which all enactments are adopted, and which all
enactments (absent contrary indication) are deemed to
accept.” Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue v. William
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992). In fact, the
reasoning adopted by the Alabama Supreme Court in
this case is virtually indistinguishable from the line of
argument this Court rejected in Wrigley. It is also
inconsistent with the similar and universally accepted
principle of criminal procedure that harmless errors—
errors that do not affect substantial rights—cannot be
noticed. Nothing in the IAD indicates that it was
meant to abrogate the well-settled de minimis principle
or the doctrine of harmless error. To the contrary,
applications of those principles in this context would be
wholly consistent with the statutory purpose of mini-
mizing, rather than exacerbating, the potentially dis-
ruptive effect that pending charges in another juris-
diction can have.
12
ARGUMENT
ARTICLE IV(e) OF THE INTERSTATE AGREE-
MENT ON DETAINERS IS NOT VIOLATED BY A
BRIEF INTERRUPTION OF CONFINEMENT THAT
DOES NOT AFFECT SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS
In Wisconsin Department of Revenue v. William
Wrigley, Jr., Co., 505 U.S. 214, 231 (1992), this Court
held that “the venerable maxim de minimis non curat
lex (‘the law cares not for trifles’) is part of the estab-
lished background of legal principles against which
all enactments are adopted, and which all enactments
(absent contrary indication) are deemed to accept.” In
criminal procedure, the similar view that non-
prejudicial errors shall be disregarded finds expression
in the related and universally accepted principle of
harmless error, under which a conviction may not be set
aside unless the error complained of affected the defen-
dant’s substantial rights. In this case, the Supreme
Court of Alabama erroneously declined to construe
Article [V(e) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
in light of those background principles of law. To the
contrary, that court held that, even if the alleged
violation of the IAD is wholly trivial, causes no injury
to the substantial rights of the prisoner, and actually
benefits the interests of the prisoner that the IAD was
meant to protect, the “plain language” of Article IV(e)
requires that the harsh remedy of dismissal with pre-
judice be imposed and the criminal defendant must be
permitted to escape prosecution for his crimes. Be-
cause that result is not compelled by the statutory
language, is inconsistent with the background prin-
ciples that all federal enactments are deemed to accept,
and defeats the purposes Article [V(e) of the IAD is
13
designed to serve, this Court should reverse the judg-
ment below.
A. The Vast Majority Of Federal Courts Have Correctly
Concluded That De Minimis Transfers Do Not Offend
The IAD
The IAD seeks to minimize the negative impact that
the lodging of a detainer can have on a prisoner’s parti-
cipation in rehabilitation programs in the jurisdiction in
which he is incarcerated. In proposing the legislation
that became the IAD, the Council of State Govern-
ments observed that an inmate who has a detainer
against him often confronts great uncertainty about his
future and, as a result, “frequently does not respond to”
rehabilitation efforts. Council of State Governments,
Suggested State Legislation, Program for 1957, at 74
(1956). In addition:
[A prisoner subject to a detainer] often must be
kept in close custody, which bars him from treat-
ment such as trustyships, moderations of custody
and opportunity for transfer to farms and work
camps. * * * Instead, he often becomes embittered
with continued institutionalization and the objective
of the correctional system is defeated.
Ibid. See also Carchman v. Nash, 473 US. 716, 719-720
(1985).
The IAD was drafted to minimize such interference
with rehabilitation programs and “to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of [outstanding]
charges and determination of the proper status of any
and all detainers based on untried indictments, informa-
tions, or complaints.” IAD, Art. I. To that end,
Articles IV and V of the IAD provide (among other
things) procedures for the temporary transfer of
14
custody of a prisoner from the jurisdiction where he is
incarcerated to the jurisdiction filing the detainer for
prompt resolution of the charges on which the detainer
is based. To minimize the time the prisoner must spend
away from his original place of incarceration, Article
IV(c) requires States that request temporary custody
of a prisoner for purposes of trial to begin the trial
within 120 days of obtaining custody. And Article V(e)
of the IAD requires that, “[a]t the earliest practicable
time consonant with the purposes of this agreement,
the prisoner shall be returned to the sending State.”
See also New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 118 n.3 (2000).°
To ensure that repeated transfers between juris-
dictions do not interfere with the prisoner’s partici-
pation in rehabilitation programs in the jurisdiction in
which he is incarcerated, the IAD contains the pro-
vision at issue in this case, Article IV(e), which is
known as the “anti-shuttling” provision. Article IV(e)
states:
If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or
complaint contemplated hereby prior to the pris-
oner’s being returned to the original place of
imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such
indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of
6 In addition, under Article III(a) of the IAD, the prisoner can
demand prompt resolution of the charges underlying any detainer
lodged against him. Upon such a request, the prisoner must be
brought to trial within 180 days, subject to reasonable con-
tinuances for good cause shown in epen court in the presence of the
prisoner or his counsel. IAD, Art. III(a). Failure to try the
prisoner within the applicable statutory period requires dismissal
of the indictment, with prejudice. IAD, Art. V(c). See generally
Hill, 528 U.S. at 112. But see 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 9(1) (providing
that, where federal charges are at issue, dismissal can be with or
without prejudice).
15
any further force or effect, and the court shall enter
an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
IAD, Art. IV(e). Article IV(e) is “meant to protect the
prisoner against endless interruption of the rehabili-
tation programs because of criminal proceedings in
other jurisdictions,” United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628,
636 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1068 (1988),
and “prevent[s] prisoners from being abused by the
lodging of detainers and transfer to a requesting
state unaccompanied by an intent or ability to try the
individual,” 134 Cong. Rec. 32,703 (1988). See also
United States v. Taylor, 861 F.2d 316, 319 (1st Cir.
1988) (“[T]he requirement * * +* primarily was
designed to avoid the shuttling of prisoners back and
forth between institutions in different states or in
distant parts of the same state.”).
Consistent with that purpose, the overwhelming ma-
jority of federal courts of appeals—including the First,
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits—have concluded that Article IV(e) of the IAD
is not materially violated by a brief interruption in
confinement for purposes of arraignment when the
prisoner is returned to the original place of confinement
within a day and his participation in rehabilitation
programs is unaffected. Absent a material violation,
those courts hold, the sanction of dismissal with pre-
judice is improper. See United States v. Daniels, 3 F.3d
25, 27 (Ist Cir. 1993) (“[A] brief interruption in state
prison confinement for purposes of arraignment, where
the prisoner is returned to state custody the same day,
does not violate the IAD.”); United States v. Roy, 771
F.2d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 1985) (no violation necessitating dis-
missal where prisoner was out of state custody over-
night), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1110 (1986); Sassoon v.
16
Stynchombe, 654 F.2d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 1981) (no vio-
lation when prisoner’s return to federal penitentiary,
after five day absence for arraignment, “allowed him to
participate in the extensive rehabilitative education
program available there”); United States v. Taylor, 173
- F.3d 538, 542 (6th Cir.) (“[W]e agree with the ‘common
sense’ approach applied by a majority of the circuits.”),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 987 (1999); Roy, 830 F.2d at 636
(no violation when prisoner’s “overnight stay” in
federal custody was not a “real interruption of [his]
state incarceration and * * * he was not deprived of
any privilege at the state institution as a result”);
Baxter v. United States, 966 F.2d 387, 389 (8th Cir.
1992) (“[A]rticle I[V(e) of the IADA does not apply
when a prisoner is removed from a state prison for a
few hours to be arraigned, plead, and be sentenced in
federal court without ever being held at any other
place of imprisonment and without interrupting the
prisoner’s rehabilitation in the state prison.”); United
States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.) (con-
cluding that one-day transfers did not violate the [AD
absent some injury to the prisoner’s opportunity to
participate in prison programs), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
879 (1992). See also United States v. Taylor, 947 F.2d
1002, 1004 (1st Cir. 1991) (““[W]e rely on * * * the
single day interruption of the state confinement, and
the manifest lack of injury.”), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 991
(1992).
A contrary, inflexible construction of the statute
would be at war with the IAD’s express goals. The
rapid return of a prisoner to the original place of con-
finement following a single-day absence for arraign-
ment, those courts have noted, minimizes any interrup-
tion of the prisoner’s participation in rehabilitative
programs. Roy, 830 F.2d at 636 (“one-day interruption”
17
of confinement “quite obviously ‘pose[s] no threat to a
prisoner’s rehabilitation sufficient to constitute a
violation of the Agreement’ ”); Daniels, 3 F.3d at 27
(“brief interruption in state custody poses no threat to
the prisoner’s rehabilitation efforts”). In contrast,
requiring the prisoner to remain in the custody of the
charging State—precluding his return to the original
place of confinement upon threat of dismissal—during
the sometimes lengthy period between arraignment
and trial would force the prisoner to remain in a local
pre-trial detention facility, where rehabilitation ser-
vices are often unavailable, for an extended period of
time. As one court of appeals has explained:
[If] a prisoner could not be returned safely to
his original place of imprisonment * * * , the
[receiving jurisdiction] would be forced to keep the
prisoner in its custody throughout the period
necessary for final resolution of the * * * charges;
to do otherwise would risk dismissal of the indict-
ment for technical noncompliance with the Agree-
ment. This practice would frequently result in
incarceration for several weeks or months in local
jails, often in disadvantageous ‘holdover’ status,
thereby unnecessarily interrupting the rehabili-
tation of the prisoner and bringing about the very
evil that the Agreement was enacted to prevent.
Roy, 771 F.2d at 60. Accord Taylor, 861 F.2d at 319
(“[R Jequiring the [receiving State] to retain custody of
appellant until his trial would conflict with the
Agreement’s goal that a prisoner be able to pursue his
original rehabilitation program with as little inter- -
ruption as possible.”); Sassoon, 654 F.2d at 375 (retain-
ing prisoner “for trial, rather than returning him
immediately after arraignment” would have “interfered
18
with [the prisoner’s] legitimate interest in participating
_in the program of rehabilitation in which he was en-
roiled”); Daniels, 3 F.3d at 28 (“such interruptions may
be advantageous to a defendant”).
Congress, in fact, reached precisely the same con-
clusion, and it amended the federal statutes imple-
menting the IAD to clarify Article [V(e) as a result.
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 7059, 102 Stat. 4403. In particular, responding to the
decisions of the two courts of appeals that had parted
company from the rest on this issue, Congress in 1988
amended 18 U.S.C. App. 2 by adding a new Section 9.
Section 9(1) provides that dismissals of federal charges
for violations of the Act can be made with or without
prejudice, depending on the circumstances. 18 U.S.C.
App. 2, § 9(1). And Section 9(2) essentially codifies the
position taken by the majority of federal courts of
appeals, declaring that “it shall not bea violation of the
agreement on detainers if prior to trial the prisoner is
returned to the custody of the sending State pursuant
to an order of the appropriate court issued after rea-
sonable notice to the prisoner and the United States
and an opportunity for a hearing.” 18 U.S.C. App. 2,
§ 9(2) (emphasis added).'
The legislative history of that amendment notes that,
when a prisoner is transferred between federal and
state authorities for a brief period, the “sanction” of
dismissal for returning the prisoner before trial “makes
7 Congress, of course, did not attempt to unilaterally amend
the IAD itself, or the various state laws adopting and imple-
menting it. As a result, 18 U.S.C. App. 2, § 9, operates only with
respect to the disposition of federal charges where a violation of
the IAD is alleged; it does not by its terms directly control the
disposition of state charges.
19
little sense,” because such a transfer often will be
within “the same state, perhaps across the street, for
trial.” 134 Cong. Rec. 32,703 (1988). If the two loca-
tions are sufficiently close and the interruption of con-
finement brief, Congress observed, permitting the
prisoner to return to the original institution of con-
finement following arraignment “is clearly not harmful
_to the prisoner and ought not to lead to the drastic
remedy of dismissal.” Jbid. To the contrary, permitting
the prisoner to continue his residence in the original
place of confinement following arraignment “frequently
is for the prisoner’s benefit” because it “may enable him
or her to resume participation in * * * rehabilitative
programs whereas, if retained in [the receiving juris-
diction’s] custody, the prisoner might have to be lodged
ina * * * jail-type institution for a protracted time
without comparable treatment or facilities.” Jbid.
The same considerations exist in this case as well.
Respondent, who was serving a multi-year sentence
in a federal penitentiary in Marianna, Florida, was
briefly placed in the custody of Covington County
officials, transported a relatively short distance (a drive
of approximately two hours) to Covington County,
Alabama, for purposes of arraignment, and then sent
back to his original place of confinement, all within a 24-
hour period. Respondent has not shown that the brief,
one-day interruption in federal custody interfered with
his participation in rehabilitative programs. And the
procedure may well have accrued to his benefit. Rather
than having to spend a month awaiting trial in a local
Covington County jail, respondent returned to the
federal facility with which he was familiar. As the trial
court observed, the transfer was “conservative of
defendant’s interest in maintaining any course of
rehabilitation available to him in federal prison,” since
20
he “certainly would not receive much rehabilitation in a
county jail.” Pet. App. 28. Indeed, respondent nowhere
claims that he would have preferred to stay in the
Covington County jail. The trial court, which was most
familiar with local conditions, noted that such a pref-
erence would be somewhat unusual. “(MJany prison
inmates,” the court explained, “don’t care to stay in our
county jail for two or three months pending trial.” /bid.
B. The Decision Below Is Inconsistent With Funda-
mental Principles Of Statutory Construction
The Supreme Court of the State of Alabama did not
disagree with the above considerations. It concluded,
however, that the result reached by the overwhelming
majority of federal courts of appeals could not be
reconciled with the IAD’s language. Under the IAD,
the court stated, any untried charges must be dismissed
with prejudice “(ilf trial is not had” on them “prior to
the prisoner’s being returned to the original place of
imprisonment.” Pet. App. 4, 8. We disagree with that
analysis of the IAD.
The Supreme Court of Alabama’s supposedly “plain
text” construction of the IAD overlooks the background
legal principle, which should be found applicable to a
compact such as the IAD, that in the absence of a
material breach of the relevant proscription, no remedy
may be imposed—de minimis non curat lex. Indeed,
one can often fairly say that, absent a material breach
and resulting injury, there has been no breach at all.
8 See, e.g., General Carbon Co. v. OSHA, 860 F.2d 479, 487
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (where violation is “de minimis,” it “means not
only that no penalty is imposed * * * but also that the violation
need not be abated”). Thus, in the law of torts, the absence of a
material injury to the plaintiff defeats any cause of action for
negligence. W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 30, at
21
As the Court explained in Wrigley, 505 U.S. at 231, “the
venerable maxim de minimis non curat lex (‘the law
cares not for trifles’) is part of the established back-
ground of legal principles against which all enactments
are adopted, and which all enactments (absent contrary
indication) are deemed to accept.” -
The Alabama Supreme Court’s reasoning in this case
cannot be reconciled with that principle. That court
reasoned that, because the IAD does not contain an
express exception for “technical” or “de minimis”
breaches, excusing such errors would be tantamount to
judicial legislation. Pet. App. 8. But Wrigley holds
the opposite to be true: That absent an indication of
contrary intent, the maxim of de. minimis non curat
lec—that the law does not recognize insignificant
errors—is part of the “background of legal principles
against which all enactments,” including the IAD, “are
adopted, and which all enactments,” including the IAD,
“are deemed to accept.” Indeed, the reasoning adopted
by the Alabama Supreme Court in this case is virtually
indistinguishable from the line of argument this Court
rejected in Wrigley. In Wrigley, the State asserted
that the “plain language of the statute bars * * *
recognition of a de minimis exception, because” no such
exception was expressly provided for. 505 U.S. at 281.
165 (5th ed. 1984). And, in the law of contracts, one party’s failure
of performance cannot justify the dramatic remedy of excusing the
other party’s performance unless the breach is “material,” or “goes
to the root or essence of the contract.” See 2 E. Allan Farnsworth,
Farnsworth on Contracts § 8.16, at 442 (1990); 15 Richard A. Lord,
Williston on Contracts § 44:55, at 231-232 (4th ed. 2000); 4 Arthur
L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 946, at 809, 811 (1951). See also
Mobil Oil Exploration.& Producing S.E., Inc. v. United States,
120 S. Ct. 2423, 2440-2441 (2000); id. at 2449 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting). ,
22
Here, the Alabama Supreme Court declined to excuse
de minimis infractions because there is no “limitation[]
in the statute expressly allowing ‘technical’ violations to
occur.” Pet. App. 8. This Court rejected the State’s
“plain language” argument in Wrigley because the
de minimis principle is deemed accepted by “every
statute” absent a contrary indication. The Court should
for the same reasons reject the Alabama Supreme
Court’s “plain language” argument here. ”
That result is particularly appropriate in light of the
fact that the rule against cognizance of non-prejudicial
defects finds universal application through the criminal
procedure doctrine of harmless error, under which
courts will not vacate or reverse convictions unless the
asserted error affected the defendant’s substantial
9 This Court has construed other federal statutes restricting
the scope of permissible government conduct, including Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. 2510 et seg.—the principal federal wiretapping statute— in
a manner consistent with that principle. For example, the Court
has rejected the contention that “every failure to comply fully with
any requirement provided in Title III would render the inter-
ception of wire or oral communications ‘unlawful’” within the
meaning of Title III so as to require the suppression of the
evidence so obtained. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433
(1977) (quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-575
(1974)). Instead, the Court held, the exclusionary rule applies
where the requirement of Title III that was allegedly violated
serves a “substantive” and “central” role in the statutory purpose
of preventing “unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic sur-
veillance.” Chavez, 416 U.S. at 578. See Donovan, 429 U.S. at 433-
434 (“[S]uppression is required only for a ‘failure to satisfy any of
those statutory requirements that directly and substantially
implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept
procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment
of this extraordinary investigative device.’”) (quoting United
States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527 (1974)).
23
\ rights. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22
(1967) (“All 50 States have harmless-error statutes or
rules.”). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for
example, provide that “[a]ny error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). See also
28 U.S.C. 2111. The Alabama Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure similarly provide that “[n]o judgment may be
reversed or set aside * * * unless * * * the error
complained of has probably injuriously affected sub-
stantial rights of the parties.” Ala. R. App. P. 45. The
harmless error doctrine, this Court has explained, “is
essential to preserve the ‘principle that the central
purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the factual
question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence, and
promotes public respect for the criminal process by
focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather
than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial
error.’” Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308
(1991) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673,
681 (1986)).
Nothing in the text of the IAD or its history suggests
that it was meant to preclude application of the prin-
ciple of de minimis non curat lex, or to eliminate the
application of the related doctrine of harmless error. To
the contrary, on its face, the IAD, including Article
IV(e), is silent with respect to those doctrines. Lest
Term, this Court confronted similar silence in the IAD
with respect to the effect of waiver or forfeiture of the
speedy-trial right provided by that Act. See Hill, 528
U.S. at 114 (“No provision of the [AD prescribes the
effect of a defendant’s assent to delay on the applicable
time limits.”). In light of that silence, the Court con-
cluded that the rights provided by the IAD are, like
almost all other rights of a criminal defendant, subject
24
to waiver. Id. at 663-664."° The Court should similarly
hold that the purported violations of Article IV(e) at
_issue here, like almost all other procedural errors in the
criminal process, are subject to the de minimis prin-
ciple and thus the rule that they cannot form the basis
of relief unless they affect substantial rights."
The rule of liberal construction provided by the IAD
itself, as well as the IAD’s legislative history, both
support that result. Article IX of the IAD, which the
Alabama Supreme Court’s opinion did not mention,
states that the “agreement shall be liberally construed
so as to effectuate its purposes.” IAD, Art. IX (empha-
sis added). Construing the IAD as abrogating the de
minimis and harmless error principles would, as the
above discussion attests, undermine the IAD’s purpose.
See pp. 15-20, supra. The anti-shuttling provision is
designed to prevent transfers and re-transfers between
10 Indeed, the Court explained that, even though it was pos-
sible to draw a “negative implication” from the statutory text, that
implication was “not clear enough to constitute the ‘affirmative
indication’ required to overcome the ordinary presumption that
waiver is available.” Hill, 528 U.S. at 116.
1! That is not to say that Congress implicitly intends to exempt
from the scope of all of its criminal laws those violations that might
be argued to be “relatively trivial.” See United States v. Wells,
519 U.S. 482, 498 (1997). The question is one of the intent of the
drafters. In construing criminal laws, this Court has made clear
that “the first criterion in the interpretive hierarchy” is “a natural
reading of the full text.” Jd. at 490; see Salinas v. United States,
522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997) (“Courts_in applying criminal laws generally
must follow the plain and unambiguous meaning of statutory
language.”). In the present context, however, involving application
of a procedural regime governing prisoners who face charges in
another jurisdiction, application of the Wrigley principle is con-
sistent with the purpose of the IAD, and there is no countervailing
indication that it should not be applied. Ke
25
different States from disrupting the prisoner’s partici-
pation in rehabilitation and training programs in the
institution in which he is incarcerated. Where, as here,
the prisoner is removed from federal custody for only a
day, is transferred a relatively moderate distance for
arraignment, and promptly returned with no apparent
interruption of his participation in rehabilitative pro-
grams, the transfer poses no threat to that purpose.
The contrary rule, in contrast, would. Under it, a pris-
oner would have to be kept away—for the sometimes
lengthy period between arraignment and trial—from
the institution to which he had become accustomed and
from any training and rehabilitation programs there in
which he might be enrolled; the prisoner, moreover,
would likely end up confined in a pre-trial facility that
offers no such programs. See pp. 16-20, supra; Pet.
App. 28 (explaining that, in this case, respondent
“certainly would not receive much rehabilitation in a
county jail”). There is no warrant for reading the IAD
in a manner that is inconsistent with settled back-
ground principles, when the result is to contradict the
statute’s underlying purpose. See Roy, 771 F.2d at 60
(“Construing the Agreement to have been violated in
[such] circumstances * * *, thereby precipitating
serious interruption of rehabilitative programs, would
not comport with the requirement that the Agreement
should be ‘liberally construed so as to effectuate its
purposes.’ Art. [X.”). That is especially true where, as
here, such a construction would provide criminal defen-
dants with a windfall, a result the [AD was supposed to
avoid. See Council of State Governments, supra, at 76-
77 (agreement “gives [the defendant] no greater oppor-
tunity to escape just conviction”); S. Rep. No. 1356, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1970) (“The agreement gives the
26
prisoner no greater opportunity to escape a convic-
tion.”).
“Whether a particular activity is a de minimis
deviation from a prescribed standard must, of course,
be determined with reference to the purpose of the
standard.” Wrigley, 505 U.S. at 232. In this case, there
can be little doubt that any violation of the [AD was de
minimis and did not affect respondent’s “substantial
rights.” Respondent was out of the federal prison for
only a day; there is no evidence that his participation in
federal training programs was affected; and the local
Covington County, Alabama, jail where respondent
would have had to remain for the month between
arraignment and trial absent his prompt return could
offer him none of the programs and services available in
the federal facility to which he had become accustomed.
We do not mean to suggest that the de minimis prin-
ciple or harmless error rule would excuse repeated and
vexing transfers between jurisdictions, transfers be-
tween distant institutions, or return after an extended
period in the custody of the receiving State. But re-
turning a prisoner to a federal facility after an
overnight stay with the charging State not only im-
poses no injury on the prisoner, but serves his interests
and those the IAD seeks to protect. Under such
circumstances, the de minimis principle and harmless
error doctrine preclude application of the harsh sanc-
tion of dismissal with prejudice.
27
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of
Alabama should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
BARBARA D. UNDERWOOD
Acting Solicitor General
JOHN C. KEENEY
Acting Assistant Attorney
General
MICHAEL R. DREEBEN
Deputy Solicitor General
JEFFREY A. LAMKEN
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
JANUARY 2001 -
Se ee
APPENDIX
1. The Compact Clause of the United States Consti-
tution, Art. 1, § 10, Cl. 3, provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,
lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of
War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement
or Compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded,
or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.
2. Section 2111 of Title 28 of the United States Code
provides:
§ 2111. Harmless error
On the hearing of any appeal or writ of certiorari
in any case, the court shall give judgment after an
examination of the record without regard to errors
or defects which do not affect the substantial rights
of the parties.
3. The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Title
18 of the United States Code Appendix 2, provides as
follows:
§.1. Short title
This Act may be cited as the “Interstate Agreement
on Detainers Act”.
§ 2. Enactment into law of Interstate Agreement on
Detainers
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers is hereby
enacted into law and entered into by the United States
(la)
2a
on its own behalf and on behalf of the District of
Columbia with all jurisdictions legally joining in
substantially the following form:
“The contracting States solemnly agree that:
“ARTICLE I
“The party States find that charges outstanding
against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indict-
ments, informations, or complaints and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated
in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which ob-
struct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilita-
tion. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party States
and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the
expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and
determination of the proper status of any and all de-
tainers based on untried indictments, informations, or
complaints. The party States also find that proceedings
with reference to such charges and detainers, when
emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly
be had in the absence of cooperative procedures. It is
the further purpose of this agreement to provide such
cooperative procedures.
“ARTICLE II
“As used in this agreement:
“(a) ‘State’ shall mean a State of the United States;
the United States of America; a territory or possession
of the United States; the District of Columbia; the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
“(b) ‘Sending State’ shall mean a State in which a
prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a
request for final disposition pursuant to article III
3a
hereof or at the time that a request for custody or
availability is initiated pursuant to article IV hereof.
“(c) ‘Receiving State’ shall mean the State in which
trial is to be had on an indictment, information, or com-
plaint pursuant to article III or article IV hereof.
“ARTICLE III
“(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of
imprisonment in a penal or correctional institution of a
party State, and whenever during the continuance of
the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other
party State any untried indictment, information, or
complaint on the basis of which a detainer has been
lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within one hundred and eighty days after he shall have
caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and
the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer’s juris-
diction written notice of the place of his imprisonment
and his request for a final disposition to be made of the
indictment, information, or complaint: Provided, That,
for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of
the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable con-
tinuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accom-
panied by a certificate of the appropriate official having
custody of the prisoner, stating the term of commit-
ment under which the prisoner is being held, the time
already served, the time remaining to be served on the
sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of
parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decision of the
State parole agency relating to the prisoner.
“(b) The written notice and request for final dis-
position referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall be
given or sent by the prisoner to the warden, com-
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missioner of corrections, or other official having custody
of him, who shall promptly forward it together with the
certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and
court by registered or certified mail, return receipt
requested.
“(ec) The warden, commissioner of corrections, or
other official having custody of the prisoner shall
promptly inform him of the source and contents of any
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of
his right to make a request for final disposition of the
indictment, information, or complaint on which the
detainer is based.
“(d) Any request for final disposition made by a
prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall operate
as a request for final disposition of all untried indict-
ments, informations, or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from
the State to whose prosecuting official the request for
final disposition is specifically directed. The warden,
commissioner of corrections, or other official having
custody of the prisoner shall forthwith notify all ap-
propriate prosecuting officers and courts in the several
jurisdictions within the State to which the prisoner’s
request for final disposition is being sent of the
proceeding being initiated by the prisoner. Any notifi-
cation sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accom-
panied by copies of the prisoner’s written notice, re-
quest, and the certificate. If trial is not had on any
indictment, information, or complaint contemplated
hereby prior to the return of the prisoner to the original
place of imprisonment, such indictment, information, or
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and
the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with
prejudice.
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“(e) Any request for final disposition made by a
prisoner pursuant to paragraph (a) hereof shall also be
deemed to be a waiver of extradition with respect to
any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or
included therein by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and
a waiver of extradition to the receiving State to serve
any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion
of his term of imprisonment in the sending State. The
request for final disposition shall also constitute a
consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in
any court where his presence may be required in order
to effectuate the purposes of this agreement and a
further consent voluntarily to be returned to the
original place of imprisonment in accordance with the
provisions of this agreement. Nothing in this
paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a concurrent
sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
“(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subse-
quent to his execution of the request for final dis-
position referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void
the request.
“ARTICLE IV
“(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in
which an untried indictment, information, or complaint
is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against
whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a
term of imprisonment in any party State made available
in accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presenta-
tion of a written request for temporary custody or
availability to the appropriate authorities of the State
in which the prisoner is incarcerated: Provided, That
the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, infor-
mation, or complaint shall have duly approved, re-
corded, and transmitted the request: And provided
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further, That there shall be a period of thirty days after
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the re-
quest be honored, within which period the Governor of
the sending State may disapprove the request for
temporary custody or availability, either upon his own
motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
“(b) Upon request of the officer’s written request as
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, the appropriate
authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish
the officer with a certificate stating the term of
_commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the
time already served, the time remaining to be served on
the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time
of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of
the State parole agency relating to the prisoner. Said
authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other
officers and appropriate courts in the receiving State
who has lodged detainers against the prisoner with
similar certificates and with notices informing them of
the request for custody or availability and of the rea-
sons therefor.
“(c). In respect of any proceeding made possible by
this article, trial shall be commenced within one
hundred and twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner
in the receiving State, but for good cause shown in open
court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the
court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any
necessary or reasonable continuance.
“(d) Nothing contained in this article shall be con-
strued to deprive any prisoner of any right which he
may have to contest the legality of his delivery as
provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may
not be opposed or denied on the ground that the execu-
Ta
tive authority of the sending State has not affirmatively
consented to or ordered such delivery.
“(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, informa-
tion, or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the
prisoner’s being returned to the original place of im-
prisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indict-
ment, information, or complaint shall not be of any
further force or effect, and the court Shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice.
“ARTICLE V
“(a) In response to a request made under article IT I
or article IV hereof, the appropriate authority in a
sending State shall offer to deliver temporary custody
of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the
State where such indictment, information, or complaint
is pending against such person in order that speedy and
efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for
final disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of
temporary custody shall accompany the written notice
provided for in article III of this agreement. In the
case of a Federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in
the receiving State shall be entitled to temporary
custody as provided by this agreement or to the pris-
oner’s presence in Federal custody at the place of trial,
whichever custodial arrangement may be approved by
the custodian.
“(b) The officer or other representative of a State
accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present
the following upon demand:
“(1) Proper identification and evidence of his
authority to act for the State into whose temporary
custody this prisoner is to be given.
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“(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, infor-
mation, or complaint on the basis of which the detainer
has been lodged and on the basis of which the request
for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
“(c) Ifthe appropriate authority shall refuse or fail
to accept temporary custody of said person, or in the
event that an action on the indictment, information, or
complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been
lodged is not brought to trial within the period provided
in article III or article IV hereof, the appropriate court
of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information, or
complaint has been pending shall enter an order
dismissing the same with prejudice, and any detainer
based thereon shall cease to be of any force or effect.
“(d) The temporary custody referred to in this
agreement shall be only for the purpose of permitting
prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one
or more untried indictments, informations, or com-
plaints which form the basis of the detainer or detainers
or for prosecution on any other charge or charges
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his
attendance at court and while being transported to or
from any place at which his presence may be required,
the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other
facility regularly used for persons awaiting prosecution.
“(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with
the purposes of this agreement, the prisoner shall be
returned to the sending State.
“(f) During the continuance of temporary custody
or while the prisoner is otherwise being made available
for trial as required by this agreement, time being
served on the sentence shall continue to run but good
time shall be earned by the prisoner only if, and to the
=
9a
extent that, the law and practice of the jurisdiction
which imposed the sentence may allow.
“(g) For all purposes other than that for which
temporary custody as provided in this agreement is
exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to remain in the
custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending
State and any escape from temporary custody may be
dealt with in the same manner as an escape from the
original place of imprisonment or in any other manner
permitted by law.
“(h) From the time that a party State receives
custody of a prisoner pursuant to this agreement until
such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody
of the sending State, the State in which the one or mdre
untried indictments, informations, or complaints are
pending or in which trial is being had shall be
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs
of transporting, caring for, keeping, and returning the
prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall govern
unless the States concerned shall have entered into a
supplementary agreement providing for a different
allocation of costs and responsibilities as between or
among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be
construed to alter or affect any internal relationship
among the departments, agencies, and officers of and in
the government of a party State, or between a party
State and its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or
responsibilities therefor.
“ARTICLE VI
“(a) In determining the duration and expiration
dates of the time periods provided in articles III and IV
of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall
be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is
10a
unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the matter.
“(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy
made available by this agreement shail apply to any
person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
“ARTICLE VII
“Each State party to this agreement shall designate
an officer who, acting jointly with like officers of other
party States, shall promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of
this agreement, and who shall provide, within and
without the State, information necessary to the
effective operation of this agreement.
“ARTICLE VIII
“This agreement shall enter into full force and effect
as to a party State when such State has enacted the
same into law. A State party to this agreement may
withdraw herefrom by enacting a statute repealing the
same. However, the withdrawal of any State shall not
affect the status of any proceedings already initiated by
inmates or by State officers at the time such with-
drawal takes effect, nor shall it affect their rights in
respect thereof.
“ARTICLE [IX
“This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to
effectuate its purposes. The provisions of this agree-
ment shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence, or provision of this agreement is declared to
be contrary to the constitution of any party State or of
the United States or the applicability thereof to any
government, agency, person, or circumstance is held
invalid, the validity of the remainder of this agreement
lla
and the applicability thereof to any government,
agency, person, or circumstance shall not be affected
thereby. If this agreement shall be held contrary to the
constitution of any State party hereto, the agreement
shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining
States and in full force and effect as to the State
affected as to all severable matters.”
§3. Definition of term “Governor” for purposes of
United States and District of Columbia
The term “Governor” as used in the agreement on
detainers shall mean with respect to the United States,
the Attorney General, and with respect to the District
of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of Columbia.
§ 4. Definition of term “appropriate court”
The term “appropriate court” as used in the agree-
ment on detainers shall mean with respect to the
United States, the courts of the United States, and with
respect to the District of Columbia, the courts of the
District of Columbia, in which indictments, informa-
tions, or complaints, for which disposition is sought, are
pending. |
§5. Enforcement and cooperation by courts, depart-
ments, agencies, officers, and employees of United
States and District of Columbia
All courts, departments, agencies, officers, and
employees of the United States and of the District of
Columbia are hereby directed to enforce the agreement
on detainers and to cooperate with one another and
with all party States in enforcing the agreement and
effectuating its purpose.
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§ 6. Regulations, forms, and instructions
For the United States, the Attorney General, and for
the District of Columbia, the Mayor of the District of
Columbia, shall establish such regulations, prescribe
such forms, issue such instructions, and perform such
other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out the
provisions of this Act.
§ 7. Reservation of right to alter, amend, or repeal
The right to alter, amend, or repeal this Act is
expressly reserved.
§ 8. Effective Date
This Act shall take effect on the ninetieth day after
the date of its enactment.
§ 9. Special Provisions when United States is a Re-
ceiving State
_ Notwithstanding any provision of the agreement on
detainers to the contrary, in a case in which the United
States is a receiving State—
(1) any order of a court dismissing any indict-
ment, information, or complaint may be with or
without prejudice. In determining whether to dis-
miss the case with or without prejudice, the court
shall consider, among others, each of the following
factors: The seriousness of the offense; the facts and
circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal;
and the impact of a reprosecution on the admini-
stration of the agreement on detainers and on the
administration of justice; and
(2) it shall not be a violation of the agreement
on detainers if prior to trial the prisoner is returned
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to the custody of the sending State pursuant to an
order of the appropriate court issued after reason-
able notice to the prisoner and the United States
and an opportunity for a hearing.
4. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 provides: |
Rule 52. Harmless Error and Plain Error |
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity
or variance which does not affect substantial rights
shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were
not brought to the attention of the court.
5. Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 45 pro-
vides:
Rule 45.: Error without injury.
No judgment may be reversed or set aside, nor
new trial granted in any civil or criminal case on the
ground of misdirection of the jury, the giving or
refusal of special charges or the improper admission
or rejection of evidence, nor for error as to any
matter of pleading or procedure, unless in the
opinion of the court to which the appeal is taken or
application is made, after an examination of the
entire cause, it should appear that the error com-
plained of has probably injuriously affected sub-
stantial rights of the parties.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.