Opposition Brief — At&t Family Federal Credit Union v. First National Bank & Trust Co.

No. 92-2010 ())

IN THE

Supreme Court of the CQnited States

OCTOBER TERM, 19938

~ |

sncnisomnssiattait re 4

AT&T FAMILY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION AND

Y T Y i cy

CREDIT UNION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, INC? *'

Petitioners,

¥;

First NATIONAL BANK & Trust Co., et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For The District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF NONFEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN

OPPOSITION

MICHAEL S. HELFER

Counsel of Record

Louis R. COHEN

LANCE W. EDWARDS

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING

2445 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037-1420

(202) 663-6000

Counsel for Nonfederal

Respondents

JOHN J. GILL III

MICHAEL F. Crotty

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION

1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 663-5026

Of Counsel

September 1, 19928

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether banks (and their trade association) that

compete for customers and business against AT&T

Family Federal Credit Union have standing to chal-

lenge decisions of the National Credit Union Admin-

istration permitting AT&T Family Federal Credit

Union to expand its membership in violation of the

express ‘“‘common bond”’ requirement of the Federal

Credit Union Act?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

The parties below were as follows:

The First National Bank and Trust Company,

plaintiff in the district court and-appellant below, is

a nationally chartered bank headquartered in Ashe-

boro, North Carolina.

Lexington State Bank, plaintiff in the district court

and appellant below, is a state chartered bank head-

quartered in Lexington, North Carolina.

Randolph Bank and Trust Company, plaintiff in the

district court and appellant below, is a state chartered

bank headquartered in Asheboro, North Carolina.

Bankers Trust of North Carolina, plaintiff in the

district court and appellant below, is a state chartered

bank headquartered in Greensboro, North Carolina.

Piedmont State Bank, plaintiff in the district court

and appellant below, formerly a state chartered bank

headquartered in Greensboro, North Carolina, merged

with Bankers Trust of North Carolina on July 15,

1992, and no longer exists as a legal entity. Bankers

Trust of North Carolina is the surviving entity.

American Bankers Association, plaintiff in the dis-

trict court and appellant below, is a trade association

for the commercial banking industry.’

' Pursuant to Rule 29.1, the nonfederal respondents’ listing of

parent companies and subsidiaries (except wholly-owned subsi-

diaries) is as follows:

The parent company of respondent First Nationa] Bank and

Trust Company is FNB Corp. The parent company of respondent

Lexington State Bank is LSB Bancshares, Inc. Respondent Ran-

dolph Bank and Trust Company has no parent; Corporate Data

ill

Petitioners AT&T Family Federal Credit Union and

Credit Union National Association, Inc., were per-

mitted to intervene as defendants in the district court

and were appellees below.

The North Carolina Alliance of Community Finan-

cial Institutions, a trade association representing com-

munity financial institutions in North Carolina, filed

a brief amicus curiae below, urging reversal of the

decision of the district court’s judgment.

The National Credit Union Administration,

defendant in the district court and appellee below, is

the agency charged with the administration and en-

forcement of the Federal Credit Union Act.

Services, Inc. is its only subsidiary (other than wholly-owned

subsidiaries). The parent company of respondent Bankers Trust

of North Carolina is BTNC Corp.; DataBank, Inc. is its only

subsidiary (other than wholly-owned subsidiaries). Respondent

American Bankers Association has no parent companies or sub-

sidiaries (other than wholly-owned subsidiaries).

—

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS ........ 2

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NG FI oc Paes a ed a ae ce 6

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION WAS

A STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CORRECT AP-

PLICATION OF THE COMPETITOR STAND.-

ING DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. ................. 6

Il. THERE IS NO REASON TO GRANT

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: Page

Air Courier Conference of America v. American

Postal Workers Union, AFL-CIO, 498 U.S. 518

CRIED | sicidccscorevensnseesccasuneinenialadanieisehiatatanaiaiias 9

Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) .. 6

Association of Data Processing Service Organiza-

tions v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) ............... 6

Branch Bank & Trust Co. v. NCUA, 786 F.2d 621

(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063

CRED cscscivseesecuncsaceccvensedenranictavesubnccman naan 10,11

Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388

TRIED cniscecercsccecsesravnunetexeusssecnseavieavaumneennuneacan passim

Community First Bank v. NCUA, No. 5:93-ev-59

(W.D. Mich. June 25, 1993) ...........0s.s.cseescseese 11

Control Data Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283 (D.C.

Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 881 (1981) .......... 11

First National Bank & Trust Co. v. NCUA, 988

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First National Bank & Trust Co. v. NCUA, 772 F.

Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1991), reversed, 988 F.2d

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Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617

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—————

Table of Authorities Continued

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RULES AND REGULATIONS:

Organization and Operations of Federal Credit

Unions; Charter-Related Activities, Interpretive

Ruling and Policy Statement 89-1—Chartering

and Feld of Membership Policy, 54 Fed. Reg.

Pe LEETER BPO : diashtesincsnciadaasessvataasiaxatanscs

OTHER MATERIAL:

NCUA, Region III Div. of Ins. Field of Membership

Checklist re AT&T Credit (July 31, 1990) .....

2,4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

—

No. 92-2010

——_—_

AT&T FAMILY FEDERAL CREDIT UNION AND

CREDIT UNION NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Petitioners,

V.

First NATIONAL BANK & TrusT Co., et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For The District of Columbia Circuit

BRIEF OF NONFEDERAL RESPONDENTS IN

OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals, Pet. App. la-

15a, is reported at 988 F.2d 1272. The opinion of the

district court, Pet. App. 16a-25a, is reported at 772

F. Supp. 609.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered

on April 2, 1993. The petition for a writ of certiorari

OO

2

was filed on June 21, 1993. The jurisdiction of this

Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS

The relevant portions of the texts of the following

statutes and regulations are set forth in the Appen-

dix, see App. la-2a:

1. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.

§ 702.

2. The ‘‘common bond”’ limitation of the Federal

Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1759.

3. Interpretive Ruling & Policy Statement 89-1—

Chartering and Field of Membership Policy, 54°

Fed. Reg. 31,165 (NCUA 1989).

STATEMENT

This case involves a straightforward application of

decisions of this Court under which competitors of a

regulated entity have standing to challenge regulatory

action that permits the regulated entity to expand

beyond the bounds set by Congress. E.g., Clarke v.

Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Invest-

ment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (“ICT’’).

Plaintiffs are banks (and their trade association)

that compete for business against a large, multi-state

credit union called AT&T Family Federal Credit

Union (“AT&T Credit’). On the merits—which have

not yet been reached—the issue is whether the ap-

proval by the National Credit Union Administration

(‘‘NCUA’’) of numerous expansions of AT&T Credit’s

‘field of membership” violated the “‘common bond”’

restriction in the Federal Credit Union Act (‘““FCUA’’).

The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of

standing. The D.C. Circuit reversed in a unanimous

decision (Judges Wald, Silberman and D.H. Ginsburg)

based on Clarke and other competitor standing de-

cisions of this Court. Certiorari has been sought solely

by intervenor AT&T Credit and its trade association.

The Solicitor General, representing defendant NCUA,

has not sought certiorari.

Background. Credit unions take federally insured

deposits from and make consumer and mortgage loans

to their members. These activities compete with

banks. Congress granted credit unions specific com-

petitive advantages as compared to banks: for ex-

ample, credit unions are tax-exempt, 12 U.S.C. § 1768,

and are not restricted by the geographic limitations

on branch banking. But Congress also specifically lim-

ited membership in a federal credit union to “groups

having a common bond of occupation or association.”’

12 U.S.C. § 1759. The ‘‘common bond”’ limitation con-

strains the competitive scope of every federal credit

union, because a credit union can generally take de-

posits from and make loans only to its members. 12

U.S.C. § 1757(5), (6).

Until recently, AT&T Credit’s field of membership

was limited to a small number of related employees.

In recent years, however, AT&T Credit has requested

approval by the NCUA of the addition to its field of

membership of numerous employee groups spread over

a wide geographic area who admittedly have no ‘‘com-

mon bond” with the core AT&T employee groups or

to one another.2 NCUA’s current chartering policy

2 Before a credit union may begin operating it must submit

“organization certificate” to the National Credit Union

| an

permits a federal credit union to ‘‘consist of a com-

bination of distinct, definable occupational and/or as-

sociational groups’’, even though the result is a credit

union whose members do not share a single ‘‘common

bond.” Interpretive Ruling and Policy Statement 89-

1—Chartering and Field of Membership Policy, 54

Fed. Reg. 31,165, 31,170 (NCUA 1989), App. 2a. Fol-

lowing this policy, the NCUA has approved almost all

of AT&T Credit’s proposals to add new members who

have no relationship to the existing members, and has

not denied any such proposal based on the ‘‘common

bond”’ requirement. Through these licensing decisions,

we contend, the NCUA has essentially nullified the

statutory common bond requirement.®

This Lawsuit. AT&T Credit’s size and tax-exemp-

tion make it a formidable competitor, and it takes

customers and business away from the banks that

have to compete against it. Accordingly, five local

banks that compete against AT&T Credit and their

trade association brought this action against the

NCUA challenging the NCUA’s interpretation of the

Administration stating, inter alia, ‘‘the proposed field of mem-

bership, specified in detail.’’ 12 U.S.C. § 1753(5). A credit union

may not begin operating until its organization certificate has

been approved by the NCUA. 12 U.S.C. § 1754. Any amendment

to a credit union’s organization certificate, including to its field

of membership, likewise requires NCUA approval. See 12 U.S.C.

§§ 1753, 1754.

’ AT&T Credit has enjoyed exponential membership growth in

recent years. AT&T Credit has over 60,000 members and has

assets in excess of $237 million. NCUA, Region III] Div. of Ins.

Field of Membership Checklist re AT&T Credit (July 31, 1990)

(attached as Exhibit 11 to the Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judg-

ment filed February 5, 1991 in the district court).

common bond requirement and NCUA’s decisions to

permit AT&T Credit to expand its field of member-

ship to include persons who do not havea common

bond with one another.

The district court dismissed the complaint without

reaching the merits. It held that the banks and their

trade association did not have ‘‘prudential’’ standing

to challenge NCUA’s unlawful actions. Pet. App. at

25a.4

The court of appeals reversed and remanded for

further proceedings in a unanimous decision. It noted

that the common bond provision was designed to pro-

tect credit union members by ensuring that those

making lending decisions would be familiar with the

borrowers, with whom they had a common bond, and

borrowers would in turn be reluctant to default. The

plaintiff banks, said the court, have standing as com-

petitors to maintain the action because the interest

they are pursuing—confining credit union membership

to those sharing a common bond—is congruent with

the interests protected by the common bond require-

ment. Pet. App. at 9a, 12a-13a.

The court of appeals’ conclusion that plaintiffs have

standing flowed inevitably from its review of JCI and

Clarke. Indeed, it said, “‘the parallels between those

cases and the present one are striking.” Pet. App.

at 8a. ICI and Clarke, the court of appeals concluded,

establish that ‘‘a plaintiff who has a competitive in-

terest in confining a regulated industry within certain

congressionally imposed limitations may sue to pre-

vent the alleged loosening of those restrictions, even

‘The banks’ constitutional standing is not at issue. See Pet.

App. at 19a n.1, 5a.

be RRR RR Eee a

if the plaintiff's interest is not precisely the one that

Congress sought to protect.’’ Pet.. App. at 9a. Ap-

plying that principle here, the court found that the

common bond requirement “‘limit[ed] a credit union’s

customer base,’’ just like the ‘‘entry restrictions’’ in-

volved in JCI and Clarke. Id. Therefore, the plaintiff

banks (and their trade association) as competitors of

AT&T Credit injured by the expansion of AT&T

Credit in violation of the statutory limitation had

standing to challenge the NCUA’s actions. Pet. App.

at 12a-13a.

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS’ DECISION WAS A

STRAIGHTFORWARD AND CORRECT APPLICATION

OF THE COMPETITOR STANDING DECISIONS OF THIS

COURT.

The Administrative Procedure Act grants standing

to persons “‘adversely affected or aggrieved by agency

action within the meaning of a relevant statute.’”’ 5

U.S.C. § 702. Under Association of Data Processing

Service Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153

(1970) (““ADPSO’’), a party meets this standard if

“apart from the ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ test, ... the

interest sought to be protected by the complainant is

arguably within the zone of interests to be protected

or regulated by the statute ... in question.’”’ Applying

the ‘‘zone of interests’ test, this Court has squarely

and repeatedly held that competitors have standing

to enforce statutory limitations on the scope of the

activities of regulated entities. See Clarke v. Securities

Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987); Investment Co. Inst.

v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v.

Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970). Indeed, in ADPSO itself,

~~ the Court — that data processors ‘‘as competitors

ii ee

7

of national banks’? had standing to challenge a de-

cision of the Comptroller of the Currency permitting

national banks to provide data processing services,

allegedly in violation of limits prescribed in the bank-

ing laws. 397 U.S. at 157.

The court of appeals correctly applied these deci-

sions to the present case. Banks compete for business

with credit unions, and the plaintiff banks lost busi-

ness when AT&T Credit was permitted to expand its

membership to persons who have no common bond

with its existing members. As competitors of the reg-

ulated entity the plaintiff banks and their trade as-

sociation have standing to challenge as unlawful the

decisions of the NCUA that have resulted in com-

petitive injury.

As the court of appeals found, “‘the parallels be-

tween [the JCI and Clarke] cases and the present one

are striking.” Pet. App. at 8a. In ICI, an association

of mutual fund companies challenged the Comptroller

of the Currency’s approval of First National City

Bank’s application to establish and operate a collec-

tive investment fund for managing agency accounts.

ICI’s challenge was based on the Glass-Steagall Act,

which benefited banks by prohibiting securities firms

from taking deposits, but which also contained a lim-

‘tation on the securities activities of banks. 12 U.S.C.

§§ 24 (Seventh), 378(a). The Court held that mutual

fund providers had standing to sue the Comptroller

to enforce a limitation on the extent to which banks

could enter the investment company business. 401

U.S. at 620-21. Here, similarly, the banks have stand-

ing because, as the court of appeals said, the common

bond requirement in the FCUA limits ‘‘a credit union's

customer base’’ and thus the extent to which it may

lawfully compete with banks. Pet. App. at Qa.

Clarke involved a challenge by investment firms to

a decision of the Comptroller permitting banks to es-

tablish discount brokerage offices anywhere in the

country, notwithstanding the limitations on branch

banking in the McFadden Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 81.

That Act, of course, “‘was designed ... to protect

smaller banks from competition from out-of-state lev-

iathans, not to protect investment bankers.”’ Pet. App.

at 8a (citation omitted). Nonetheless, this Court held

that the investment firms in Clarke, as competitors

injured by the Comptroller’s decision, had standing

to sue the Comptroller for permitting banks to open

out-of-state offices that allegedly violated the Mc-

Fadden Act. 479 U.S. at 403.

Clarke is indistinguishable from the present case.

Like the branch banking limits at issue in Clarke, the

statutory common bond requirement at issue here re-

stricts the extent to which the regulated entity may

expand the marketplace for its services. Like the se-

curities firms who were the plaintiffs in Clarke, the

banks who are the plaintiffs here compete with the

regulated entity and are injured by the regulatory

decision they brought suit to challenge. And, contrary

to AT&T Credit’s bald assertion, Pet. at 11, it is just

as clear here as it was in Clarke that Congress in-

tended ‘‘to limit the competitive reach of the regu-

lated entit[y].’’ The FCUA expressly states that the

membership (and thus the customers) of every federal

credit union “‘shall be limited’’ to those having a com-

mon bond with one another. 12 U.S.C. § 1759 (em-

phasis added).

AT&T Credit’s principal argument (Pet. at 7) is that

a competitor has standing only if it can show that

Congress had an “‘intent to benefit” the plaintiff. But

nothing in this Court’s decisions requires a court to

look beyond the limitations imposed by the statutory

language to search for subjective congressional mo-

tivations. To the contrary, this Court rejected exactly

this argument in Clarke when it pointed out that in

ICI and the other competitor standing cases

there was no evidence that Congress had in-

tended to benefit the plaintiff's class [e.g.,

mutual fund providers in JCI] when it limited

the activities permitted national banks. ...

[I]t was enough to provide standing that Con-

gress, for its own reasons ... had forbidden

banks to compete with plaintiffs by entering

the investment company business.

479 U.S. at 398.

The Court went on in Clarke to summarize the “zone

of interest” test as not requiring any “‘indication of

congressional purpose to benefit the would-be

plaintiff.” 479 U.S. at 399-400.°

This Court’s decision in Air Courier Conference of

America v. American Postal Workers Union, AF'L-

CIO, 498 U.S. 517 (1991), is fully consistent with the

court of appeals’ decision. Air Courier was not a

Ss AT&T Credit wrongly suggests that the D.C. Circuit rec-

ognized that the general purpose of the FCUA was to encourage

the “growth” of credit unions. Pet. at 13. The court actually

stated that Congress’ purpose was to encourage the ‘‘prolifer-

ation” ef credit unions. Pet. App. at 6a. The proliferation of

credit unions, of course, will be a natural byproduct of the en-

forcement of the common bond requirement.

10

competitor standing case at all; rather, it involved the

question whether a union had standing to sue the

Postal Service for adopting a rule that the union

claimed was unlawful and reduced employment op-

portunities for the union’s members. There is no in-

dication that this Court by reviewing carefully the

language and purpose and history of the Private Ex-

press Statute intended in any way to overrule or mod-

ify the competitor standing cases or engraft onto them

a requirement that a competitor show a subjective

congressional intent to confer standing on it (see Pet.

at 9). To the contrary, Air Courier expressly stated

that ‘‘Clarke is the most recent in a series of cases

in which we have held that competitors of regulated

entities have standing to challenge regulations.”’ 498

U.S. at 529 (emphasis added). That is exactly what

the D.C. Circuit here held.

II]. THERE IS NO REASON TO GRANT CERTIORARI

The Solicitor General has not sought certiorari on

behalf of defendant NCUA. None of intervenor AT&T

Credit’s remaining arguments justify granting

certiorari. :

1. There is no conflict in the circuits requiring res-

olution by this Court. The Fourth Circuit did hold in

Branch Bank & Trust Co. v. NCUA, 786 F.2d 621

(4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1063 (1987),

that a bank did not have standing to challenge 4

decision of the NCUA approving expansion of a credit

union in violation of the common bond requirement.

But that case was decided before Clarke, and, as the

D.C. Circuit said, Pet. App. at 9a n.8, Branch Bank

cannot survive Clarke. Branch Bank was part of a

line of cases that limited standing to express bene-

ficiaries of a statutory restriction. This whole line of

11

cases—including a D.C. Circuit case, Control Data

Corp. v. Baldridge, 655 F.2d 283, cert. denied, 454

U.S. 881 (1981), that the Fourth Circuit cited in

Branch Bank, 786 F.2d at 625—was expressly over-

ruled in Clarke. 479 U.S. at 400 n.15. And, as noted

above, Clarke was quite explicit that, contrary to what

the Fourth Circuit had held in Branch Bank, ‘“‘there

need be no indication of congressional purpose to ben-

efit the would-be plaintiff.” Jd. at 399-400.

The Fourth Circuit has not cited Branch Bank since

Clarke was decided, nor has it had occasion to con-

sider whether in light of Clarke it would now follow

or reject the D.C. Circuit’s decision in the instant

case. Under these circumstances, and given the clarity

of the holding in Clarke and its effect on Branch

Bank, there is no reason to believe there is a live

conflict in the circuits.

2. There is no “‘confusion”’ in the courts about the

application of JCI, Clarke, and the other competitor

standing cases, either in general or as applied to suits

against the NCUA in particular. Indeed, AT&T Credit

does not cite a single post-Clarke case in which a

competitor has been denied standing to challenge

agency action expanding the authority of a regulated

entity.®

8. The prediction of disruption of NCUA’s pro-

grams, Pet. at 16-17, is no reason to grant certiorari.

6 In the one ‘‘common bond”’ case of which we are aware since

the D.C. Circuit decision here, a district court in Michigan held

that the plaintiff banks did have standing to sue the NCUA,

following the D.C. Circuit and rejecting the NCUA’s reliance on

the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Branch Bank. Community First

Bank v. NCUA, No. 5:93-cv-59, slip op. at 7-8 (W.D. Mich. June

25, 1993).

12

Other federal agencies—including the banking agen-

cies such as the Comptroller of the Currency, which

was the defendant in ADPSO, ICI, and Clarke, among

others—face the possibility of competitor standing

suits without any evidence that their ability to carry

out their regulatory responsibilities has been im-

paired. NCUA is certainly capable of doing the same

thing.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

MICHAEL S. HELFER

Counsel of Record

LouIs R. COHEN

LANCE W. EDWARDS

WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING

2445 M Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037-1420

(202) 663-6000

Counsel for Nonfederal

Respondents

JOHN J. GILL III

MICHAEL F. Crotty

AMERICAN BANKERS ASSOCIATION

1120 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 663-5026

Of Counsel

September 1, 1993

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX

5 U.S.C. § 702:

A person suffering legal wrong because of agency ac-

tion, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action

within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to

- Judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United

States seeking relief other than money damages and stat-

ing a claim that an agency or an officer or employee

thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or

under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor

relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against

the United States or that the United States is an indis-

pensable party. The United States may be named as a

defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree

may be entered against the United States: Provided, That

any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Fed-

eral officer or officers (by name or by title), and their

successors in office, personally responsible for compliance.

Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial re-

view or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any

action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or

equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief

if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly

or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought.

12 U.S.C. § 1759:

Federal credit union membership shall consist of the

incorporators and such other persons and incorporated and

unincorporated organizations, to the extent permitted by

rules and regulations prescribed by the Board, as may be

elected to membership and as such shall each, subscribe

to at least one share of its stock and pay the initial in-

stallment thereon and a uniform entrance fee if required

by the board of directors; except that Federal credit union

membership shall be limited to groups having a common

bond of occupation or association, or to groups within a

well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district.

2a

Shares may be issued in joint tenancy with right of sur-

vivorship with any persons designated by the credit union

member, but no joint tenant shall be permitted to vote,

obtain loans, or hold office, unless he is within the field

of membership and is a qualified member.

54 Fed. Reg. 31,165, 31,170 (1989):

4. Multiple-Group Charters. NCUA may charter a Fed-

eral credit union to serve a combination of distinct, defin-

able occupational and/or associational groups. However,

NCUA will not charter as a single Federal credit union

multiple grouns which include one based on a community

common bond.

In addition to general chartering requirements, special

requirements pertaining to multiple-group applications must

be satisfied before NCUA will grant such a charter.

a. Each group to be included in the proposed field of

membership of the Federal credit union must have its own

common bond.

An example of a multiple-group field of membership is:

“The field of membership of this Federal credit union

shall be limited to those having the following common

bond:

1. Employees of DuPont Corp. who work in Wilmington,

Delaware:

2. Partners and employees of the law firm of Smith &

Jones who work in Wilmington, Delaware:

3. Members of the GHI Associations who live in Wil-

mington, Delaware, and qualify for membership in accord-

ance with its constitution and bylaws.

ats

be sind

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