Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pardue v. United States

No. |

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992

JACK PARDUE,

Petitioner,

Vi

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

VOLUME 1—-PETITION

JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR.

523 West Third Street

Little Rock, AR 72201

(SO1) 371-9131

May 17, 1993 Attorney for Petitioner

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Supreme Court, US

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. The decision of the Court of Appeals is erroneous

under Jacobson v. United States and Sorrells v. United

States; there is no evidence whatsoever that petitioner was

predisposed to commit the offense prior to the govern

ment’s conduct designed to draw him into its "conspiracy."

II. The conduct of the government in using implied

threats to get petitioner and his grandson to complete the

acts they were indicted for constitutes outrageous govern

ment conduct which violates the due process clause.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW

The parties to the case below are: this petitioner, Jack

Pardue (983 F.2d 843); his grandson Michel Pardue (983

F.2d 835); and his son David Pardue (983 F.2d 850).

Michel and David Pardue are proceeding in forma

pauperis, and they are filing petitions for certiorari

concurrently herewith.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented for Review ....... cs ere

Parties to the Proceedings Below ............ oe

Ee

I tt el te 4

SS 6

Te a rr 7

Constitutional Provisions Involved ............. 7

Statutory Provisions Involved ........... LOMA TS

RE UO ee ee 8

Reasons for Granting the Writ .............. 14

I. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO JACOBSON

V. UNITED STATES AND SORRELLS V. UNITED

STATES BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE

WHATSOEVER OF PETITIONER’S PREDISPOSITION

Il. THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN USING

IMPLIED THREATS TO GET PETITIONER AND HIS

GRANDSON TO COMPLETE THE ACTS THEY WERE

INDICTED FOR CONSTITUTES OUTRAGEOUS

GOVERNMENT CONDUCT WHICH VIGLATES THE

Ee FS) 18

ee kk nw baka s 21

Se A-1l

(under separate cover)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) ... 18

Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton,

aan Te, Be ee ae ed ee eas 18

Jacobson v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 1535

bo” | ens LURK CaP ee oI 1,14,15,17,18

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1988) ... 16n

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438

43 £3 re oe are einer 20-21,21n

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)... . . . 18

Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)... . 14

Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435

he 5 eae Oe eee nner i ne 1,14,16n

United States v. Crump, 934 F.2d 947

CPE 55 @ x ik xe Sa wath ee eee 16n

United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853

Co ee SE a eA ee Des see ed 18

United States v. Leroux, 738 F.2d 943

Cas PI a sae ae eae eee cae 16n

United States v. McLernon, 746 F.2d 1098

COR Gee ke ee eee ees 17

United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906

Coe Sc ees cits ee ee A ee 17,18,19

United States v. Jack Pardue, 983 F.2d

843 (8th Cir.1993) ....... 2,6,9,9n,15,16,16n,19

United States v. Michel Pardue, 983 F.2d

Sa Se a BE bo i eee ees 2,9n

United States v. David Pardue, 983 F.2d

eee SO EU v6 5 co oo bh ete ew bw 2,9n

United States v. Pardue, 765 F.Supp.

513 (W.D.Ark.1991) .. 6,7,9,10,11,11n,12,12n,19

United States v. Pfeffer, 901 F.2d 654

(8th Cir. 1990)

United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423

(1973) atte |

United States v. Szycher, 585 ¥.2d 443

(10th Cir. 1978)

United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373

(3d Cir. 1978)

United States v. Whoie, 288 U.S.App.D.C

261, 925 F.2d 1481 (1991) .

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS:

hifth Amendment, U.S. Constitution

STATUTES AND RULES

18 U.S.C. § 371

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)

Pe Ga. Se ee ee

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

16n

18.19

19

20

14-15

7,17,18,18,20

Marcus, The Due Process Defense in Entrapment

Cases: The Journey Back, 27 AM.CRIM.L.REV.

Treatment of the Due Process Defense,

19 SETON HALL L.REV. 606 (1989)

19-20

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1992

JACK PARDUE,

Petitioner,

V.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Eighth Circuit was rendered on January 4, 1993. It is

published as United States v. Pardue, 983 F.2d 843 (8th

Cir.1993). It is reproduced in the Appendix at A-3.

Petitioner’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for

rehearing en banc was denied on February 16, 1993.

Appendix at A-16.

The district court’s opinion was decided May 13,

1991, and it is published as United States v. Pardue, 765

F.Supp. 513 (W.D.Ark.1991). It is reproduced in the

Appendix at A-34.

JURISDICTION

The Court of Appeals decided this case on January 4,

1993, and the petition for rehearing was denied on

February 16, 1993.

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari is filed within

ninety days and is, therefore, timely.

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution

provides that:

. . . [NJor shall any person . . . be deprived of life,

liberty, or property, without due process of law:

STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED

18 U.S.C. § 371 provides, in pertinent part:

If two or more persons conspire either to commit

any offense against the United States, or to defraud

the United States, or any agency thereof in any man-

ner or for any purpose, and one of more of such per-

sons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy

shall be fined not more that $10,000 or imprisoned

not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. § 1958(a) provides as follows:

Whoever travels in or causes another (including

the intended victim) to travel in interstate or foreign

commerce, or uses or causes another (including the

intended victim) to use the mail or any facility in

interstate or foreign commerce, with the intent that a

murder be committed in violation of the laws of any

State or the United States as consideration for the

receipt or, or as consideration for a promise or

agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value, shall

be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not

more than ten years, or both; and if personal injury

results, shall be fined nor more than $20,000 and

imprisoned for nor more than twenty years, or both;

and if death results, shall be subject to imprisonment

for any term of years or for life, or shall be fined not

more than $50,000, or both.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a murder for hire conspiracy case. The

defense is entrapment and outrageous governmental con-

duct. The petitioner (Jack Pardue) and his co-defendants

son (David Pardue) and grandson (Michel Pardue) were

convicted after a week long trial of conspiracy and

interstate transportation for murder for hire (18 U.S.C. §§

371 & 1958(a)).' The district court vacated the convic-

' Petitioner and his grandson Michel were convicted of one

count of interstate transportation to commit murder for hire, and

they were acquitted of one count. David Pardue, petitioner’s

son and Michel’s father, was convicted of both counts.

8

tions as to Jack and Michel on Rule 29 motions for judg

ment of acquittal and denied the motion as to David on

May 13, 1991. United States v. Pardue, 765 F.Supp. 513

(W.D.Ark.1991) (reprinted in Appendix at A-34). Jack's

role was that of the concerned grandfather trying to get his

grandson out of a bad situation that the Government

sucked his grandson into.

The government appealed. On January 4, 1993, the

Eighth Circuit reversed, reinstating the convictions of

Jack’ and Michel’ and affirming as to David.* As to

Jack, the panel divided 2-1 with former Chief Judge Lay

dissenting that Jack was entrapped as a matter of law.

United States v. Jack Pardue, 983 F.2d 843, 848 (8th

Cir.1993) (Lay, J., dissenting). On February 16, 1993,

the panel denied each of the defendants’ petitions for

rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en_ banc.

(Appendix at A-16) The facts as stated in the district

court’s opinion are substantialiy uncontradicted. The issue

arises from application of the law to those uncontradicted

facts.

A.

This case begins in April 1990 with plotting by one

Gary Garrett, a professional agent provocateur, snitch, and

* United States v. Jack Pardue, 983 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1993)

(reprinted in Appendix at A-3).

’ United States v. Michel Pardue, 983 F.2d 935 (8th Cir

1993) (reprinted in Appendix at A-17).

* United States v. David Pardue, 983 F.2d 850 (8th Cir

1993). This opinion is not reprinted in the Appendix. It is

reprinted in David Pardue’s petition for certiorari

9

prison inmate "who might be the most reprehensible char-

acter ever to testify before this court." United States v.

Pardue, 765 F.Supp. 513, 515 (W.D.Ark. 1991) (Appen-

dix at A-37) Garrett has a talent for using law enforce-

ment agencies (not just individual agents) to get things for

himself. He helped manufacture this crime and used the

Pardues in an effort to get his freedom. Jd. at 526 (Ap-

pendix at A-61).

David Pardue was mad at Bob Harrington. Harring-

ton and he went on a crime spree together. He was in-

volved with David in a robbery of a Wal-Mart store in

Benton County, Arkansas in April 1987, but Harrington

turned state’s evidence and walked free. David ultimately

was convicted of this robbery after a jury trial, and he was

in prison, sentenced to five years. While there, he talked

about Harrington, and he indicated a desire to have Har-

rington killed. Jd. at 515 (Appendix at A-37). Inside

prison, he talked with Garrett, and Garrett seized the

moment realizing that David Pardue was his ticket out.

Not content with trying to deliver just David, Garrett

plotted how to bring down three generations of the Pardue

family. /d. He talked with David Pardue to learn what he

could about David's crime, the locale where it happened,

and the players in the conviction. /d. at 516 (Appendix at

A-38)

David was also charged with perjury in connection

with his "defense" in the robbery case. He was set for

trial on July 8, 1990. Harrington was to testify against

him in that trial, too. Thus, David had a July 8th deadline

for Harrington. David, however, pled guilty to perjury

without putting the plan to "Whack" Harrington in motion.

B.

This case ends with the machinations of the FBI and

10

the Benton County, Arkansas, authorities, particularly FBI

Agent Gary Danzer, a 21-year veteran who played the role

of the "hitman" in this case "well, so well, that the court

believes that he exceeded the bounds of permissible police

conduct." Jd. at 527 (Appendix at A-63). Danzer had

Jack and Michel Pardue convinced that he was a cold-

blooded killer who would "whack" anyone for the right

price, paid in advance, of course. Jd. at 518. 519

(Appendix at A-43, A-46). He also made it absolutely

clear that he had to answer to another person who would

not be happy if he were not paid for the murder.°

Danzer was pushing, and the Pardues were unable to

extricate themselves from Danzer’s, Garrett’s, and the

FBI’s scheme. They did the only thing that they could do,

they stalled Danzer by telling him that they did not have

the money. Michel agreed to meet with Danzer, effective-

ly to get him off his back, but he made it clear that there

would be no money for him and they were not going to do

what Danzer was trying to get them to do. /d. at 519 (Ap-

pendix at A-43). Michel met with Danzer and put him

off, and Danzer said to call him back if the Pardues’

minds change. Jd. at 519-20 (Appendix at A-46--A-47).

Danzer made it clear that he may not be available later.

and that further inquiries should be through Garrett in

> Id. at 519 (Appendix at A-45):

Toward the end of the conversation, still insisting that they

meet that evening to view the money, Danzer explained his

need to see the money by saying, "If I get somebody up

here to, to help me then they’re gonna want to kill me

about the time I don’t be able to come across with, do you

understand what I’m saying? I got expenses and

responsibilities."

1]

prison. Jd. at 528-29 (Appendix at A-68).

All is well. Danzer is gone, and there is no contact

with the Pardues. In the meantime, the FBI is not content

to let this go away.° There is a planning session at the

FBI Office in Fayetteville, Arkansas where the federal and

State authorities try to figure out how to breathe new life

into this dead "conspiracy." The FBI manufactures some

letters about the alleged contract killer and sends them.

One was sent July 31, 1990. Jd. at 529 (Appendix at A-

68).

On September 16, 1990, about two months after dis-

appearing, Danzer suddenly reappears on the telephone

and tells Michel that David has authorized the murder.

Michel tells Danzer not to call him. /d. at 521 (Appendix

at A-50). On September 20th, Danzer calls back to state

tell Michel that the murder happened and that he needs his

money. /d.

Thus, as a part of the FBI plan, the professional

"hitman" who made it crystal ciear that he did not work on

credit, claimed to have done the murders and expected his

money. The FBI decided at this meeting to gain by

intimidation what guile failed to produce for it. Michel

and Jack were now scared that they had to come through

with the money for this "killer" who has other, tougher

guys to answer to, and they mailed the money to a post

office box designated by Danzer.

i

Thus, we have a crime that was generated in the mind

° Garrett is also concerned about his own deal. He writes a

letter on July 11, 1990 to the state prosecutor imploring them to

deliver on their promise to him. /d. at 529 (Appendix at A-68).

12

of Gary Garrett, maybe with David Pardue. Garrett sold

his plan to the FBI and Benton County, Arkansas

authorities in exchange for his freedom. He worked David

Pardue in prison, while Danzer worked Michel Pardue in

Fayetteville. Jack Pardue was trying to get Michel out

without getting themselves hurt. When Michel Pardue did

not come along as he was supposed to, and the "conspir-

acy" that the government had going was dead because the

Michel and Jack would not go along with the scheme to

kill the Harringtons, the government devised a scheme to

regenerate its dead conspiracy. Since the Pardues would

not pay the money to kill the Harringtons voluntarily, the

government decided to fake the killing and make the

Pardues pay the money out of fear for their own safety,

which they did.

With that, the jury convicted them even though there

was no evidence of predisposition to commit the crime.

13

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

1. THE DECISION BELOW IS CONTRARY TO JACOBSON

V. UNITED STATES AND SORRELLS V. UNITED STATES

BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE WHATSOEVER OF

PETITIONER’S PREDISPOSITION TO COMMIT THE

CRIME.

A

The decision below is contrary to Jacobson v. United

States, 112 S.Ct. 1535 (1992) (which was decided nine

months before the decision below’) and Sorrells v. United

States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). In Jacobson, this Court said,

112 S.Ct. at 1540-41:

In their zeal to enforce the law, however,

Government agents may not originate a= criminal

design, implant in an innocent person's mind _ the

disposition to commit a criminal act, and then induce

commission of the crime so that the Government may

prosecute. Sorrells, supra, 287 U.S., at 442, 53

S.Ct., at 212; Sherman, supra, 356 U.S., at 372, 78

S.Ct., at 820. Where the Government has induced an

individual to break the law and the defense of entrap-

ment is at issue, as it was in this case, the prosecution

must prove beyond reasonable doubt that the defend

ant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to

first being approached by Government Agents. United

The case was argued below about five weeks after

Jacobson was argued in this Court, and it was decided nine

months after. The effect of Jacobson was discussed at oral

argument.

14

States v. Whoie, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 261, 263-264,

925 F.2d 1481, 1483-84 (1991). (footnote omitted)

Here, the record is singularly devoid of any evidence that

Jack Pardue was predisposed to commit any criminal

offense prior to the “creative activity” of Danzer and

Garrett. As the Court said in Jacobson, 112 S.Ct. at

1541 n. 2:

The sole issue is whether the Government carried its

burden of proving that petitioner was predisposed to

violate the law before the Government intervened

The dissent is mistaken in claiming that this ts an

innovation in entrapment law and in suggesting that

the Government's conduct prior to the moment of soli

citation is irrelevant. See post, at 1544-1545. The

Court rejected these arguments five decades ago in

Sorrells, when the Court wrote that the Government

may not punish an individual "for an alleged offense

which is the product of the creative activity of its own

officials” 2. Indeed, the proposition that the

accused must be predisposed prior to contact with law

enforcement officers is so firmly established that the

Government conceded the point at oral argument

(emphasis in original)

The Court of Appeals makes no mention of Jack Par

due’s predisposition. Instead, it talks of what the jury

could have concluded that Michel and David might have

done to enlist Jack in the plan. 983 F.2d at 847. It never

discusses the fact that this all began because of the

Government’s planning and conduct. The very fact that

the Court of Appeals relied to find "some evidence” to

support a conviction of Jack occurred after Michel and

15

Jack had extricated Michel from Danzer’s plan. Jd.* The

Court of Appeals stated that the evidence was in conflict.

In some metaphysical way, all evidence in every case

is in conflict. That does not change the undisputed facts

which point to only one conclusion. Here, there is no

conflict on the material fact that there is no evidence of

predisposition of Michel Pardue prior to Danzer’s

approaching Michel at the Varner Unit parking lot. And,

Jack did not even know about it until the next day after

Danzer had plied him with the tales of how Danzer was a

professional killer there to do David Pardue’s bidding.

This is a "crime" that would not have occurred but for

the creative, insistent, and threatening efforts of FBI Agent

Danzer. Neither Jack nor Michel was predisposed to

°

The tendered defenses of entrapment and coercion

were likewise factual issues for the jury to resolve. Be-

cause the evidence was in conflict, it was for the jury to

decide if Jack did what he did because he was predisposed

to and willingly did so, or whether he did so because he

was entrapped or out of fear for his and his family’s lives.

Where the facts as to entrapment are disputed, the issue

must ordinarily be submitted to the jury. Sorrells v. United

States, 287 U.S. 435, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932);

Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62, 108 S.Ct. 883,

886, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); United States v. Crump, 934

F.2d 947, 956 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Pfeffer,

901 F.2d 654, 656 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Leroux,

738 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.1984). Because the evidence in this

case pointed to more than one reasonable conclusion, the

district court was in error when it determined that Jack had

been entrapped as a matter of law by the undercover agent.

16

commit the crime, and the evidence in this case does not

even suggest the contrary.

B. se 38

In this connection, the decision of the Court of

Appeals is contrary to United States v. McLernon, 746

F.2d 1098, 1111-12 (6th Cir.1984). Resolving all doubts

in the evidence in favor of the Government, there still is

no evidence of predisposition. —

See

The facts of this case give the Court a clear fact

Situation to apply the holding of Jacobson to situations

where the Government was not just enticing the petitioner

into committing its crime; here it used implied threats to

make petitioner to do the very act it indicted him for.

Il. THE CONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT IN USING

IMPLIED THREATS TO GET PETITIONER AND HIS

GRANDSON TO COMPLETE THE ACTS THEY WERE

INDICTED FOR CONSTITUTES OUTRAGEOUS GOVERN-

MENT CONDUCT WHICH VIOLATES THE DUE

PROCESS CLAUSE.

A.

In United States v. Mosley, 965 F.2d 906, 909 (10th

Cir.1992), the Tenth Circuit explained the outrageous

conduct defense:

The defense of outrageous conduct is distinct trom the

defense of entrapment in that the entrapment defense

looks to the state of mind of the defendant to

17

determine whether he was predisposed to commit the

crime for which he is prosecuted. See Jacobson v.

United States, --- U.S. ---, 112 S.Ct. 1535, 1540, 118

L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). The outrageous conduct de-

fense, in contrast, looks at the government’s behavior.

See United States v. Gamble, 737 F.2d 853, 858 (10th

Cir. 1984).

The outrageous conduct defense was first enunci-

ated in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93

S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). "[W]e may some

day be presented with a situation in which the conduct

of law enforcement agencies is so outrageous that due

process principles would absolutely bar the govern-

ment from invoking judicial processes to obtain a

conviction. . . ." Id. at 431-32, 93 S.Ct. at 1643

(citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct.

205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952)). Several years later, in

Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct.

1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976), a majority of the Jus-

tices left open the possibility that an outrageous

conduct defense based on the Due Process Clause

might be invoke successfully even if the entrapment

defense is unavailable because of predisposition. /d.

at 495, 96 S.Ct. at 1653 (Powell, J., with Blackmun,

J., concurring); id. at 496-97, 96 S.Ct. at 1653

(Brennan, J., with Stewart & Marshall, JJ., dissent-

ing).

Notwithstanding the lack of a clear holding on

outrageous conduct by the Supreme Court, must of the

circuits, including this one, have recognized the

viability of the outrageous conduct defense.

Outrageous governmental conduct is a question of law not

to be submitted to the jury. /d. at 909 & n.3.

18

The scope of this legal defense, however, has not been

"defined . . . with any degree of precision." It revolves

around the totality of the circumstances of any particular

case with "reference to ‘"‘the universal sense of justice.’"’

Id. at 910 (citing Russell, 411 U.S. at 432 (quoting

Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234,

246 (1960))).

B.

The district court found that the actions of the

government were outrageous in twice pulling Michel and

Jack Pardue into this "conspiracy" when the expressly

were trying to get out. 765 F.Supp. at 531 (Appendix at

A-73). The Court of Appeals disagreed in two paragraphs

stating only that the defendant’s burden on such an issue is

"quite high," and that these defendants did not meet it.

983 F.2d at 847-48 (Appendix at A-10) It simply stated

that the government "did not implant the criminal design in

any of the Pardues." Jd. at 848 (Appendix at A-10).

To the contrary, the government was solely respon-

sible for Jack Pardue having anything to do with this

"conspiracy." At the least, this case gives the Court the

opportunity to delineate the circumstances where Jack

Pardue was the victim of outrageous governmental conduct

but Michel was not.

The Government created Danzer as a convincing

"hitman" with people to answer to who might even kill

him. The Government used this clear implied threat

against Jack and Michel to get them to do what they

wanted so they could indictment. Compare United States

v. Szycher, 585 F.2d 443, 449 (10th Cir.1978) (evidence

of implied threat did not measure up; defendant was

"impressed" with government agent and tried to be friends

with him). See also Marcus, The Due Process Defense in

19

Entrapment Cases: The Journey Back, 27 AM.CRIM.L.

REV. 457 (1990).

oe

On this score, the decision below is contrary to United

States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.1978). See Marino,

Outrageous Conduct: The Third Circuit's Treatment of the

Due Process Defense, 19 SETON HALL L.REV. 606 (1989).

D.

The Court should grant certiorari to resolve the

question of whether implied threats violates "fundamental

fairness" or the "universal sense of justice" or is otherwise

"intolerable" under the Due Process Clause. In the eye of

the beholder of what the Government is doing, he cannot

do anything but go along. Our Government should not be

permitted to charge and then convict a person whom it has

drawn into and then made stay in its conspiracy by its own

implied threats.

Experience should teach us to be most on our

guard to protect liberty when the government’s pur-

poses are beneficent. .. . The greatest dangers to

liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal,

well-meaning but without understanding.

Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that

government officials shall be subjected to the sarne

rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In

a government of laws, existence of the government

will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scru-

pulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipre-

20

sent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole

people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the

government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt

for the law; it invites every man to become a law until

himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the

administration of the criminal law the end justifies the

means--to declare that the government may commit

crimes in order to secure the conviction. of a private

criminal--would bring terrible retribution. Against

that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set

its face.”

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR

523 West Third Street

Little Rock, Arkansas 7220]

May 17, 1993 (501) 371-9131

’ Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479, 485

(1927) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)

21

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