Plaintiffs Brief — Lochner v. New York
Supreme Court brief1905
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-IN THE
Supreme Gourt of the Gnited States,
OCTOBER TERM, 1904.
—
JosepH Locuner, Plaintiff in )
Error (Defendant below),
” — No. 292
Tun PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF
New York, Defendant in Er-
ror (Plaintiff below). i
*
IN ERROR TO THE COUNTY OOURT OF
ONEIDA COUNTY, STATE OF
NEW YORK.
*
*
BRIEF FOR PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.
*
STATEMENT.
This action was commenced in the County Court
of Oneida County in the State of New York. It
was a criminal procecding in which the defendant,
Joseph Lochner, was charged with a misdemeanor,
in that he violated Section 110, of Article Eight, of
Chapter 415, of the Laws of 1897, of the State of
New York, known as “The Labor Law,” which
said Section reads as follows:
“No employe shall be required or permitted
to work in a biscuit, bread or cake bakery or
. confectionery establishment more than sixty
hours in any one week or more than ten hours
im any one day, unless for the purpose of mak-
ing a shorter work day on the last day of the
week; nor more hours in any one week than
will make an average of ten hours per day for
the number of days during such week in which
such employe shall work.”
The indictment charges that on the 21st day of
December 1899, he, the plaintiff in error, was ar-
rested upon complaint of one of his employees for
violating the law in permitting an employe to
work in a bakery more than sixty hours in any one
week. That he was convicted in the County Court,
and fined twenty dollars, or in default thereof,
stand committed to the County Jail for twenty
days, and that he paid the fine; that after such con-
viction the defendant wrongfully, unlawfully and
knowingly, with intent on his part to violate the
law, permitted and employed another employe
named, to work more than sixty hours in one week
during the week commencing April 19th, and end-
ing April 26th, 1901, in the defendant’s biscuit,
bread and cake bakery and confectionery establish-
ment, thereby committing a misdemeanor as a sec-
ond offense, contrary to the form of the statute in
such case made and provided and against the peace
of the people of the State of New York and their
dignity.
The defendant demurred to the indictment on
two grounds, (1) that more than one crime was
charged and (2) that the facts stated did not con-
stitute a crime. The local court overruled the
demurrer and the different allegations in the in-
dictment were taken as true under Section 330 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure of said State; and
3
judgment of conviction was entered,
fendant sentenced to
ppeals, where the judg-
ment was again affirmed by a bare majority of the
Court.
The Statute upon which the judgment rests is to
be found in the Penal Code, Section 384-1, and
reads as follows:
“Any person who
ply with * * «#
meal food products is guilty
of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall
be punished for a first offense by a fine of
not less than fifty
dollars, or by im
thirty days,
The case was argued in the Ne
Courts upon the constit
constitutionality of
cle 8, of Chapter 415,
State of New York, al-
Article 14, Section I. of the
ASBIGNMENT OF ERRORS,
I,
That the court below erred in holding that Sec-
tion 110 of Article 8, of Chapter 415 of the Laws of
1897, of the State of New York, entitled “The Labor
Law,” does not violate Article 14, Section 1, of the
Constitution of the United States, in holding that
the facts us wet forth in the indictment constitute a
crime,
II.
That the court below erred in holding that See-
tion 110 of Article 8, of Chapter 415 of the Laws of
1897 of the State of New York, entitled “The Labor
Law” was constitutional and not in violation of
Article 14, Bection 1 of the Constitution of the
United States,
III.
That the court below erred in holding thta Sec-
tion 110 of Article 8, of Chapter 415 of the Laws of
1897 of the State of New York, entitled “The Labor
Law” is a health measure, and is a reasonable and
proper exercise of the police power of the said State
of New York,
IV.
That the court below erred in holding that See-
tion 110 of Article 8, of Chapter 415 of the Laws of
is07 of the State of New York, entitled *The Labor
Lan“ did not violate the Ist Section of the 14th
Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States, in that it did not abridge the privileges and
5
immunities of the Citizens of the United States in
respect to the freedom of individuals to enter into
contract with oae another.
V.
That the court below erred in holding that See-
tion 110, of Article 8, of Chapter 415 of the Laws
of 1897, of the State of New York, entitled “The
Labor Law,” did not violate Section 1 of Article
14 of the Constitution of the United States, in that
it did not deprive plaintiff in error of his liberty
and property “without due process of law,” in that
it did not permit him to agree with his employees
upon the number of hours per day and week in
which they should work,
VI.
That the court below erred in holding that See-
tion 110 of Article 8, of Chapter 415 of the Laws
of 1897, of the State of New York, entitled “The
Labor Law” does not violate Article 14, Section 1
of the Constitution of the United States, in that
it denies to plaintiff in error the equal protection of
the laws, And in holding said act is not class leg-
islat ion and is equal and uniform.
VII.
That the court below erred in holding that Bee-
tion 110 of Article 8, of Chapter 415 of the Laws of
1897 of the State of New York, entitled The Labor
law” does not violate Article 14, Section 1 of the
Constitution of the United States, in that said law
fixes an arbitrary number of hours during which
employees in bakeries in said State shall be em-
ployed and allowed to work, thus discriminating
between such employees and employees in other
lines of business, and in refusing to allow such
employees to contract with their employers for
6
extra hours of work, as in other occupations they
are allowed to do.
VIII.
That the court below erred in holding that See-
tion 110, of Article 8, of Chapter 415, of the Laws
of 1897 of the State of New York, entitled “The
Labor Law“ does not violate Article 14, Section 1
of the Constitution of the United States, in that
by reason of the nature of the bakery business it
is sometimes necessary to contract with employees
for extra hours of labor, in order to save and pre-
nerve the property of the employer; and by the de-
cision of the court below, the plaintiff in error is
deprived of his property without due process of law.
We rely upon all of these assignments of error,
which express in various forms, the manner in
which the statute under review violates the pro-
visions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
We shall take up the questions raised herein by
the assignment of errors in the following order:
The statute in question denies to the plaintiff
in error the equal protection of the laws, It ap-
pears from sections of The Labor Law,” following
the section under review, from statutes and decis-
ions of other States, and from facts within the
common knowledge of mankind, that there are
many other persons engaged in the same line of
business that are not subject to the restrictions and
penalties of the statute.
The statute in question is not a reasonable ex-
ercise of the police power, and this branch of the
case is discussed under two subdivisions ;
(a) From the standpoint of the trade ita.
(hb) From the standpoint of the decisions in-
terpreting the exercvine of the police power in con-
nection with the 14th Amendment of the United
States Constitution.
A review of the history of the legislation lead-
ing up to the adoption in its present form, of the
statute in question, showing that the first section
is clearly intended as a labor law, and not an exer-
cise of the police power of the State.
The case of Holden vs. Hardy (169 U. S. 366),
distinguished from the case at bar.
In the Appendix to this brief will be found the
following documents:
Sections 110, 111, 112, 113, 114 and 115 of Article
VIII of “The Labor Law,” Chapter 415, Laws of
1897 of the State of New Vork.
New York Penal Code, Section 3841, the statute
under which the plaintiff in error was indicted and
convicted.
Tables of various trades taken from the report of
the Bureau of Labor of the State of New York for
1900, showing that the baker's trade is fully up to
the average healthfulness of all trades; and also a
table of trades affecied by the inhalation of dust,
„te, in which the baking trade is not included.
Various high medieal authorities which we have
collected showing that the conclusions of Judge
Vann are not warranted,
1. The statute in question denies to certain persons
in the baking trade the equal protection of the
laws.
The legislation must affect equally all persons
engaged in the business of baking in order to con-
form to this provision of Article 14 of the United
States Constitution.
It really affecta but a portion of the baking
trade, namely, employes “in a biscuit, bread or cake
bakery, or confectionery establishment.”
It will be seen that this provision covers two
classes of workmen; namely, employes in biscuit,
bread or cake bakeries and employes in confection-
ery establishments, The former are bakers; the
latter are candy makers,
We are concerned only with the employes in bis-
cuit, bread and cake bakeries, They do not by any
means comprise all persons engaged in the business
of baking. While no figures are obtainable, it is
probably safe to say that at least one-third to one
half of the persons engaged in the baking business
are not within the prohibition of the statute,
The employers themselves, a large proportion of
whom personally engage in the baking trade, may
work 24 hours a day if they are so minded, There
are many small establishments where the proprie
tor does most of his own baking. There are aleo
bakeries where a number of the employers are in
partnership, and do all or mostly all of their own
baking.
Then again, the employes themselves may work
twenty-four hours a day, and they are not subject
to punishment for so doing, It is only when the
employer requires or permits an employe to work
beyond the prescribed time that the penalty of the
statute applies, If this is a health law, the em-
ployer himself should be restrained in the cause of
public health, and the employe should pot be al-
lowed to work more than the lawful number of
hours,
Then again, there is that very large class of bak-
ers who are employed in pie bakeries, hotels,
restaurants, clubs, boarding-houses and private
9
families, that are not within the terms of the
statute, The number of bakers employed in these
establishments are probably as numerous as those
employed in biscuit, bread and cake bakeries. They
are engaged in the same business, yet even the large
restaurants where great quantities of biscuit,
bread, cake and pie are turned out daily by journey-
men bakers; the great hotels with their army of
bakers, doing the same work; the clubs which are
becoming more numerous every year, and where a
considerable part of the business population of
New York City take their noon-day meal; the great
number of boarding houses, some of them employ-
ing a number of skilled bakers, the pie bakeries
such as the Consumers Pie Baking Company, the
New York Pie Baking Company, and many more;
are none of these entitled to the “equal protection
of the laws“?
Then there is the American housewife, Here is
the real artist in biseuits, cake and bread, not to
mention the American pie, The housewife cannot
bound her daily and weekly hours of labor, She
must toil on, sometimes far into the night, to satis-
fy the wants of her growing family.
It seems never to have occurred to these ungal-
lant legislators to include within the purview of
the statute these most important of all artiste in
this most indispensable of trades,
Another serious objection to the statute is that
it affects all employes in biscuit, bread and cake
bakeries, This would not mean the bakers alone
but the drivers, cash girls, counter girls, bookkeep-
ers and others, Is their trade one within the scope
of the police power? And is it more dangerous to
wait on a counter, keep books or drive for a baker
than for a butcher or grocer? This feature alone
is fatal to the statute,
In the recent case of Union Rewer Pipe Company
10
(184 U. S., 540), the discrimination in favor of
‘agricultural products and live stock in the hands
of the producer or raiser, in the Illinois Trust Act
of June 20th, 1893, exempting them from the pro-
visions of the statute, was held to render the act
repugnant to the provisions of the United States
Constitution, 14th Amendment, in respect of the
equal protection of the laws, The different lines
of business affected by the Trust Act in question
are very numerous, yet the exception of two lines
of business was held to invalidate the statute, Can
it then be said that the statute in question, which
only affects a part of the bakery business, is not
repugnant to the Constitution in a much greater
degree?
The reason why bakers employed in hotels, clubs,
restaurants, boarding houses and private houses,
are not protected by the provisions of the statute,
is not hard to find. The necessities of these estab-
lishments are such that during busy seasons it is
absolutely necessary to keep their bakers until the
business of the day or the night is finished, It
would be impossible for these bakers to get employ-
ments in such establishments unless they were will-
ing to work as long as their services were required,
Nor is it true that the bakers who are within the
protection of the statute are as a rule, employed in
less desirable and healthful surroundings than
those who are not within the provisions of the
statute, The average bakery of the present day is
well ventilated, comfortable both summer and win-
ter, and always sweet smelling. The other class of
establishments, where cooks as well as bakers are
employed, are as a rule, much more close and ill
' smelling than the bakeries. Many modern baker-
ies resemble factories in their general appearance,
They have light comfortable places for their work-
men, while the average kitchen even of the finest
hotels, in the cities at least, are usually under-
ground, with great open ranges which make them
intensely hot. The baker's oven, on the contrary
is made of brick, with walls several feet
ness, generally lined with sand to keep the heat
within the oven, The principle on which they are
built is to keep the heat within the oven and pre-
vent its radiating into the outside air. Inspection
of any bakeries in any city will show that the
average bakery is much more desirable as a place
to work in than the average kitchen.
A valuable illustration of the facet that this
statute offends against this clause of the 14th
Amendment is found in some of the labor statutes
of the several States. In California we find the fol-
lowing statute:
„It shall be unlawful for any person en-
gaged in the business of baking to permit or
engage others in his employ, to engage in the
labor of baking for the purpose of sale be
tween the hours of six o’clock P, M. on Batur-
day and six o'clock '. M. on Sunday, except
in the setting of sponge, preparatory to the
night's work; provided, however, that restau-
rants, hotels and boarding houses may do such
baking as is necessary for their own consump-
tion.”—-Exparte Westertield, 55 Cal. 550.
Jt will be seen that this statute is first general
in its terms, and affects “any person engaged in the
business of baking.” It then excepts from the pro-
hibition of the statute, restaurants, hotels and
boarding houses.” This statute clearly recognizes
the fact that we are here calling to the attention of
the court; namely, that persons engaged in the
occupation of baking are not confined to those em-
ployed in biscuit, bread and cake bakeries.
In the statute now before the Court we find
12
reference to other bakers than those in biscuit, bread
and cake bakeries, In Section 111 it refers to
rooms occupied as biscuit, bread, pie or cake baker-
jes; and the same words are used again in the lat -
ter part of Section 112. Section 113 speaks of the
“bake-room of any bakery, hotel or public
restaurant.” Here is a clear recognition of the
carrying on of the baking trade in pie bakeries,
hotels and public restaurants,
It seems therfore perfectly clear that this
statute denies to a substantial part of the baking
trade the equal protection of the laws. The em-
ployer of bakers in biscuit, bread and cake bakeries
is subjected to heavy penalties of fine and imprison-
ment for requiring or permitting his men to work
more thar the prescribed number of hours, whereas
employers of the same class of men doing the same
work throughout the state are exempt from the
isions of the statute, This brings the statute
clearly within the decisions under this part of the
14th Amendment.
2. The authorities upon this subject are uniform
and controlling in the case at bar.
It must be remembered that the Constitution it-
self says that no state shall “deny to any person
within ita jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” It does not say, “no considerable number of
persons,” but “any person.” And this plaintiff in
error may appeal with confidence to the supreme
law of the land against this law which singles out
a certain number of men employing bakers, and
permits all others similarly situated, including
13
7
many who are competitors in business, to work their
employes as long as they choose,
Professor Freund, in his work on the Police
Power, says at p. 633:
“Equality ix for the purpose of controlling
the validity of legislation, a more definite con-
ception than liberty, for it has the advantage
of being measurable. Government cannot be
conceived without an infringement of liberty,
while the claim of equality is consistent, in
idea at least, with almost any form of govern-
mental power,
Again, at page 635, he says:
"It is an elementary principle of equal jus
tice, that where the public welfare requires
something to be given, or done the burden be
imposed or distributed upon some rational
basis, and that no individual be singled out to
make a sacrifice for the community,”
This Court has said that the guarantee of the
equal protection of the law means that no person
or class of persons shall be denied the same pro-
tection of the laws which is enjoyed by other per-
sons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances,”
Missouri v. Lewis (101 L. 8. 22, 31).
In the case of Connolly vs. Union Rewer Pipe
Company, (1840. 8. 540) Mr. Justice Harlan says,
at page Dds;
"The State has undoubtedly the power, by
appropriate legislation, to protect the public
morals, the public health and the public safety ;
but if, by their necessary operation, its regula-
tions, looking to either of those ends, amount
14
to a denial to persons within its jurisdiction of
the equal protection of the laws, they must be
deemed unconstitutional and void.”
In the case of Barbier v. Connolly, (113 U. 8. 27)
Mr. Justice Field says, at page 31;
“The Fourteenth Amendment in declaring
that no State shall deprive any person of life,
liberty or property without due process of law,
nor deny to any pervon within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, undoubtedly
intended not only that there should be no ar-
bitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or arbi-
trary spoliation of property; but that equal
protection and security should be given to all
under like circumstances in the enjoyment of
their personal and civil rights, that all persons
shout be equally entitled to pursue their hap-
piness and acquire and enjoy property, that
they should have like access to the courts of
the Country, for the protection of their persons
and property, the prevention and redress of
wrongs, and the enforcement of contracts; that
no impediment should be interposed to the pur-
suits of any one except as applied to the same
pursuits by others under like circumstances;
that no greater burdens should be laid upon
one than are laid upon others in the same call-
ing and condition, and that in the administra-
tion of criminal justice no different or higher
punishment should be imposed upon one than
such as is subscribed to all for like offences,”
Judge O'Brien, in his dissenting opinion, says
(Record, Folios 58, 61);
“Work of the same general character is ex-
et from cooks and domestic servants in
practically all the private houses in the land,
15
und to a great extent, in hotels, restaurants and
other public places, It would be absurd to say
that all, or even the greater part of the biscuit,
bread, cake and confectionery consumed in this
State comes from what are called bakeries, The
law does not even apply to bakers in small
towns and villages who do their own work, It
applies only to bakers who find it necessary to
employ labor, and they alone are subjected to
criminal prosecution in case they permit the
servant to work more than ten hours in a day,
even though the servant is willing and is given
extra compensation, The baker is forbidden
under the penalty of fine and imprisonment to
contract or agree with his servant upon the
hours of labor in such way as would be mutual-
ly beneficial; but his business is practically
regulated by statu.
Confirming the views of Judge O’Brien we find
in the report of the New York Factory Inspector's
Bureau to the Legislature of that Btate, of 1897,
that the number of bakeries inspected during that
year was 3828, of which number more than one
half employed but two, one and no journeyman bak-
ers. It is evident that in bakeries of this character
the employer either does his own baking without
any help, or he has the aid of members of his family,
or in some causes, one or two bakers additional to
hisown labor, The members of the families of these
small bakers cannot be classed as employes, and
yet they do the same work, and like the employer
himself, are not subject to the provisions of the
statute,
In discussing the inequality of the Ilinois Trust
Act the Court calls attention to the freedom ac-
corded by the law to agriculturisie and live stock
raisers through the exception allowed in their favor
16
and to the possibilities of the exercise of that free-
dom in direct opposition to and subversion of the
geneval scheme of the act as intended by the Legin-
lature. And this although the exception equally
applied to all members of the agriculturists and
live stock raisers as a class, while in the case at bar,
the statutory restraints are limited to a small part
of the members of the class sought to be effected by
it.
If the exception accorded to two classes of trade
by the Illinois Trust Act was deemed sufficient to
hold the burden imposed upon a number of otner
trades and callings, not at all affected by the trade
competiton of those excepted, as unequal, how much
more so must this principle apply to the case at bar
where the inequality extends to members of a class
and where the exemptions, which in effect are en-
joyed by large numbers of bakers, accord them a
distinctive economic advantage over those subjected
to the rigors of the law,
The principle of equality means that equal con-
ditions must receive equal treatment (Freund on
Police Power, page 633),
The Stock Yards Act of Kansas attempted to
prescribe rules and rates for the Kansas City Stock
Yards Company exempting numerous small stock
yard owners, The statute also conferred certain
exclusive stock yard privileges upon the company
as against the other dealers, This act was declared
unconstitutional, Cotting vs. Goddard, 1838 LU. 8.
79-02,
On page 282, Judge Cooley in his book on Con-
stitutional Limitations, says: “And if a corpora-
tion has power to prohibit the carrying on of dan-
gerous occupations, within its limits, a bylaw
which should permit one person to carry on such an
occupation and prohibit another, who had an equal
right from pursuing the same business, or which
17
should allow the business to be carried
isting; buildings but prohibit the erection
for it, would be unreasonable,”
hair cut to the uniform length of one inch,
invalid as being directed specially against
Chinese, Tin Bing vs. Washburn, 20 Cal, 5344;
also Yick Wo vs, Hopkins, 118 U, . 856,
Classification must be based upon some differ.
ence bearing a reasonable and just relation to the
act in respect to which the classification is at-
tempted, but no mere arbitrary selection can ever
be justified by calling it classification, The fact
that all persons and corporations brought under
the influence of an act, are subjected to the same
liabilities and duties under similar circumstances,
is sufficient to sustain un act as against the charge
of the denial of the equal protection of the laws.
Atchison, Topeka & Banta Ve E. R. Co, va, Mat-
thews, 174 U. . 105, Clans legislation of the char-
acter of the act in imue enacted by the States which
discriminates in favor of one person or set of per-
sons and against another or others is forbidden by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, Gulf C., & F“. H. Co, vs, Bilis, 165 U, N.
150; Cotting vs. Kansas City . V. Co., 188 U. 8.
79; Connolly ve. I“, . L'. Co, 184 7, K. 540 People
v8, Orange County Koad Construction ., 175 N.
V. 87-00,
“In Vick Wo vs, Hopkins, IIS I“, S. S56, a case
Where a municipal ordinance of Ban Prancisco de
signed to prevent Chinese from carrying on the
laundry business, was adjudged void, the Court
says: This Court looked beyond the mere letter of
the ordinance to the condition of things as they ex-
isted in Ban Pranciseo, and saw that under the
;
guise of regulation an arbitrary classification was
intended and accomplished.
See also the language of Mr. Justice Matthews in
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356, 369) “the
equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the pro-
tection of equal laws.”
Gibbons vs. Ogden (9 Wheat., 1, 210).
Sinnot vs. Davenport (22 How. 227, 243).
Missouri vs. Lewis (101 U. S. 22, 31).
Butcher’s Union Co. vs. Crescent City Co. (111
U. S. 746).
Barbier vs. Connolly (113 U. S. 27, 31).
Yick Wo vs. Hopkins (118 U. S. 356, 369).
Gulf C. & F. R. Co. vs. Ellis (165 U. S. 150).
Missouri K. & T. R. Co. vs. Haber (169 U. S. 613,
626).
Cotting vs. Kansas City S. Y. Co. (183 U. S. 79).
Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Company (184
U. S. 540).
People vs. Orange County Road Cons. Co. (175.
N. V. 84).
3. The Statute in Question is Not a Reasonable
Exercise of the Police Power.
We will discuss this branch of the case under the
following subdivisions:
(a) From the standpoint of the trade itself.
(b) From the standpoint of the decisions inter-
preting the exercise of the police power in connec-
tion with the 14th Amendment of the United States
Constitution.
(a) The business of the baker is one of the old-
est known trades.
The trade of the baker in years gone by, when
the kneading of the “dough” or “sponge” was done
by hand, may have caused some flour dust. But the
contention that flour dust is at all unhealthful is
disputed by high medical authority. It is doubtless
also true that the quarters of the bakers have in the
past been highly unsanitary. Regulations made by
law for the purpose of bringing about sanitary con-
ditions in bakeries, by providing for a certain
amount of air space and ventilation, by excluding
domestic animals from premises where baking is
conducted, by forbidding sleeping apartments,
privies, ete., from opening into the bake-room, are
all provisions clearly within the police power, and
highly beneficial to the trade and to the public.
The trade of the baker has, however, been much
changed in more recent times, by the introduction
of machinery into the preparation of the dough.
The biscuit bakeries are conducted on a
very large scale, all of the main processes are
conducted by machinery, the work is usually done
in large, well lighted buildings where the trade of
the baker is absolutely sanitary, and as healthful
as the best conditions and pleasant surroundings
can make them. All of the factories of the Ameri-
can Biscuit Company and the National Biscuit
Company are of this character. The bakery of the
National Biscuit Company on 10th Avenue, New
York City, is the largest bakery in the world and
covers two city blocks. Its employes number about
one thousand. The same thing is true of the large
bread bakeries scattered to-day through our great
cities. Large buildings, with many employes are
given up wholly to the making of bread, which is
distributed by wagons to the grocery stores and
private houses. These great factories are models
of cleanliness and healthfulness, yet they are with-
in the terms of the act.
20
The ordinary bakery has two shifts of men the
bread bakers who work at night, and the cake bak-
ers who work in the day-time. In almost every
bakery of this character in our large cities, which
has any considerable amount of business, mixing
machines are installed for making the dough or
“sponge.” These mixing machines absolutely re-
move any possibility of flour dust filling the air.
The cake bakers, who make all kinds of fancy cakes,
pies, ete., do not raise dust in their operations.
The most cursory examination of bakeries in any
considerable city in the country, will show that
for comfort, ventilation and healthful surroundings
the baker’s trade compares favorably with that of
any other important trade. The making of dough
may occupy an hour or two hours of the day’s
work. The rest of the day is occupied in mould-
ing the dough into bread and rolls and baking it.
And the mixing even in small shops, is now done
mainly by machinery. How then can the shorten-
ing of hours affect the question of flour dust?
The statute in question goes far beyond any pre-
vious attempt to regulate the ordinary pursuits of
mankind by legislative enactment under the guise
of the police power, if indeed, the Legislature ever
intended this to be a health regulation. Consider-
ing the statute from the standpoint of its reasona-
bleness as a health regulation, we therfore urge
that a very large proportion of the bakers affected
by the statute are employed in bakeries of the
classes above referred to, where their surroundings
cannot be reasonably objected to on the ground
which led a majority of the Court of Appeals of
New York to sustain this statute. Why should the
employes of the National Biscuit Company have
laws enacted governing their hours of labor on the
ground that their occupation is unhealthful? In
like manner, why should the proprietors of one of
—
our great bread baking establishments be arrested
and imprisoned for permitting their men to work
more than sixty hours per week, on the ground that
their health is endangered, or the health of the pub-
lic is endangered by the nature of their business?
Why should the numerous proprietors of first class
baking establishments throughout our great cities,
whose bakeries are well ventilated, clean and com-
fortable in every respect, with mixing machines to
handle the dough, and improved appliances of
every kind, be subjected to this alleged “health”
law?
In so far as the baker works under unsanitary
conditions, in small and poorly ventilated bake-
shops, his interests are protected by the other sec-
tions of this law. A proper enforcement of the
real health provisions of the statute will give him
healthful and desirable surroundings. Where
these ends are attained the Legislature has gone as
far in its interference with the private business of
the baker as a reasonable interpretation of the
police powers of the State will admit.
21
It was never the intention of our law-makers
nor the intention of the people in adopt-
ing the Federal and State Constitutions, to erect
a government so paternal in its character that the
treasured freedom of the individual and his right
to the pursuit of life, liberty and happiness, should
be swept away under the guise of the police power
of the State. And while it is difficult to define
the extent of the police powers of the States, this
court should not, under the plea of pro-
tecting the powers of the various States to guard
the lives, morals, welfare and safety of its citizens,
permit the States, little by little, to break down
and sweep away the most cherished rights of Ameri-
can citizenship. Each new attempt by the
States to interfere with the contract and property
r
32 *
— —
rights, and freedom to exercise a trade or calling
by the citizen, should be most closely and jealously
scrutinized by this court; and unless the justifica-
tion of the laws was reasonably clear and appar-
ent, the statute should be declared unconstitution-
al. To resolve every doubt in favor of the police
powers of the State, instead of resolving them in
favor of the liberty of the individual would soon
lead to absurd conclusions that are more consistent
with the autocratic governments whose day seems
rapidly passing, than to the great Republic whose
boast has been that the Federal Constitution se-
cured its liberties for all time against encroach-
ment from any source,
If this law can be sustained because a few bakers
may still be using old fashioned methods, whereby
for a few minutes in each day they may possibly
breathe a little flour dust into their lungs, why
should not the doctor be protected because he is
brought in contact by his trade with contagious
diseases? Or the lawyer, because his occupation
requires him to damage his eye-sight by poring over
badly printed law books and decisions of the
courts? Or the Wall Street operator because he is
kept in a condition of undue nervous excitement by
the gambling features of his business?
Judge Vann, of the New York Court of Appeals,
in his concurring opinion in this case, says
(Record, Folio 48): “I do not think the regulation
in question can be sustained unless we are able to
say from common knowledge that working in a
bakery and candy factory is an unhealthy employ-
ment. If such an occupation is unhealthy the Leg-
islature had the right to prohibit employers from
requiring or permitting their employes to spend
more than a specified number of hours per day or
week in the work, because such a command would
be in the interest of public health and would pro-
23
mote the general welfare. As in the Jacobs case we
took judicial notice of the nature and qualities of
tobacco, so in this case we may take judicial notice
of the effect of very fine particles of flour and sugar
when inhaled into the lungs from the heated atmos-
phere of manufactories of bread and candy. Neces-
sarily in considering the subject we may resort to
such sources of information as were open to the
Legislature.” After quoting a number of medical
authorities, census reports and encyclopedias, some
of them evidently referring to places where the
flour was ground, others based entirely upon the
unhealthfulness of the apartments in which the
trades are carried on, and others showing that the
baker’s trade was about on the general average of
healthfulness, he concludes as follows (Record,
Folio 53), “The evidence, while not uniform, leads
to the conclusion that the occupation of a baker or
confectioner is unhealthy and tends to result in
diseases of the respiratory organs. * * * Such
legislation under such circumstances is a health
law, and is a valid exercise of the police power.”
Judge O’Brien, in his dissenting opinion in this
case says (Record, Folio 61) :
“What possible relation or connection the num-
ber of hours the workmen are permitted to work in
the bakery has, or can have to the healthful quality
of the bread made there, is quite impossible to con-
ceive. * * * There is nothing on the face of the
law or in its manifest operation to show that it has
any relation to the public health.”
These opinions are confirmed by the common
knowledge of mankind. Flour and meal are used in
all families. Has any member of the court found
flour dust in the air of his kitchen? On entering
the kitchen, one may see the steam from the kettle,
or scent the odor of the boiled dinner, but who has
24
been conscious of the presence of this death dealing
flour dust?
As Judge Bartlett points out in his dissenting
opinion (Record, Folio 67), the commodities of the
baker are “more calculated to produce dyspepsia in
the consumer than consumption in the producer.”
(b.) This statute cannot be sustained unless it
can be justified as a proper exercise of the police
power of the State of New York.
Blackstone defines the public police as the due
regulation and domestic order of the kingdom,
whereby the inhabitants of a state, like members of
a well governed family are bound to conform in
their general behavior to the general rules of pro-
priety, good neighborhood and manners, and to be
decent, industrious and inoffensive in their respect-
ive stations. 4 Bl. Com. 162.
Police is in general a system of precaution, either
for the prevention of crime or calamities. The
power is exercised for the prevention of offenses,
calamities, diseases, for charity, interior communi-
cation, police of public amusements, for recent in-
telligence and for registration. Edinburgh edition
of works of Jeremy Bentham, part IX. 157.
“The police of a state in a comprehensive sense,
embraces its system of internal regulation, by which
it is sought, not only to preserve public order and
to prevent offenses against the State, but also to
establish for the intercourse of the citizen with
citizens those rules of good manners and good neigh-
borhood, which are calculated to prevent a conflict
of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own, so far as it is reasonably
consistent with like enjoyment of others. Cooley
Con. Lim. 572.
Kent says: But although property be thus pro-
tected, it is still to be understood that the law given
has the right to prescribe the mode and manner of
—
25
using it, so far as it may be necessary to prevent
the abuse of the right to the injury to others or of
the public. 2 Kent’s Comm. 340.
In the Slaughter House Cases (16 Wall. 36, 37),
Field, J., says: “All sorts of restrictions and bur-
dens are imposed under the police power, and, when
these are not in conflict with any constitutional pro-
hibitions or fundamental principles, they cannot be
successfully assailed in a judicial tribunal. * * *
But under the pretense of prescribing a police regu-
lation, the state cannot be permitted to encroach
upon any of the just rights of the citizen, which the
constitution intended to secure against abridge
ment.”
In re Jacobs (98 New York, 98), Judge Earl
Says, at page 108:
“The limit of the power cannot be accurately de-
fined and the Courts have not been able or willing
definitely to circumscribe it. But the power, how-
ever broad and extensive, is not above the constitu-
tion. When it speaks, its voice must be heeded. It
furnishes the Supreme Law, the guide for the con-
duct of legislators, judges and private persons, and
so far as it imposes restraints, the police power must
be exercised in subordination thereto.”
Again at page 110, he says:
“These citations are sufficient to show the police
power is not without limitations and that in its ex-
ercise, the Legislature must respect the great funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. If
this were otherwise, the power of the legislature
would be practically without limitation. In the as-
sumed exercise of the police power in the interests
of the health, the welfare or the safety of the public,
every right of the citizen might be invaded and
to
6
‘every constitutional barrier might be swept away.
Under the mere guise of the police regulations, per-
sonal rights and private properiy cannot be arbi-
trarily invaded, and the determination of the Legis-
lature is not final and conclusive.”
Tiedemann on the Limitations of Police powers,
Says:
“Secion 178. Laws, therefore, which are design-
ed to regulate the terms of hiring in strictly pri-
vate employments, are unconstitutional, because
they operate as an interference with one’s natural
liberty in a case in which there is no trespass upon
private right and no threatening injury to the pub-
lic. And this conclusion not only applies to laws
regulating the rate of wages of private workmen,
but also any other law whose object is to regulate
any of the terms of hiring, such as the number of
hours of labor per day, which the employer can de-
mand. There can be no constitutional interference
by the state in the private relation of master and
servant except for the purpose of preventing frauds
and trespasses.”
See also Freund on Police Power, page 534.
> oD
“To prevent an abuse of the police power, for the
alleged protection of the health or safety or the
alleged prevention of fraud, the Court must be al-
lowed to judge whether restrictive measures have
really these ends in view. A remote and slight
danger should not be recognized as a sufficient
ground of restriction, and the provisions of the law
should be scrutinized in order to see whether they in
reality tend to effectuate their object.”
On the question of the reasonableness of an act,
to authorize it under the police power, the same
author says on page 58 of his book on Police Power:
27
“If reasonableness is understood to mean well
adapted to the end in view, there is practically no
judicial claim to control the judgment of the legis-
lature of what is reasonable. The Courts are cer-
tainly emphatic in their assertion that they have
nothing to do with the wisdom or expediency of
legislative measures. The question of judicial
power practically confines itself to a third meaning
of reasonableness, namely, moderation and propor-
tionateness of means to end.”
Where the ostensible object of an enactment is to
secure the public comfort, welfare or safety, it must
appear to be adapted to that end, it cannot invade
the rights of persons and property under the guise
of the police regulation, when it is not such in fact.
Eden vs. People, 161 III. 296. Ex Parte Jentsch 112
Cal. 468, Ritchie vs. People, 155 III. 98, Lake View
vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. 70 Ill. 191.
In re Jacobs (98 N. Y. 98) arose under a statute
forbidding the making of cigars in tenement houses.
There was no question but that this was intended
by the legislature to be « health regulation. The
court was unanimous that the statute was uncon-
stitutional and not a proper exercise of the police
power. It will be noticed that the court speaks of
the baker as one of the “innocuous trades” that do
not fall within the police power.
Judge Earl says, at page 114:
Under the guise of promoting the public health
the Legislature might as well have banished cigar-
making from all the cities of the State, or confined
it to a single City or Town, or have placed under a
similar ban the trade of a baker, of a tailor, of a
shoe maker, of a wood carver, or of any other of the
innocuous trades carried on by artisans in their
own homes. The power would have been the same,
—
28
and its exercise, so far as it concerns fundamental,
constitutional rights, could have been justified by
the same arguments. Such legislation may invade
one class of rights today and another tomorrow,
and if it can be sanctioned under the Constitution,
while far removed in time we will not be far away
in practical statesmanship from those ages when
governmental prefects supervised the building of
houses, the rearing of cattle, the sowing of seed and
the reaping of grain, and governmental ordinances
regulated the movements and labor of artisans, the
rate of wages, the price of food, the diet and cloth-
ing of the peop e, and a large range of other affairs
long since in ai civilized lands regarded as outside
of governmental functions. Such governmental in-
terferences disturb the normal adjustments of the
social fabric, and usually derange the delicate and
complicated machinery of industry and cause a
score of ills while attempting the removal of one.”
The Court further says, “When a health law is
challenged in the Courts as unconstitutional on the
ground that it arbitrarily interferes with personal
liberty and private property without due process of
law, the Courts must be able to see that it has at
least in fact some relation to the public health, that
the public health is the end actually aimed at, and
that it is appropriate and adapted to that end.”
People vs. Marx (99 N. Y. 377) arose under an
act prohibiting the manufacture or sale of substi-
tutes for butter or cheese. It was unanimously held
unconstitutional because not limited to unwhole-
some or simulated substances. Judge Rapallo says,
at page 387:
“Equal rights to all are what are intended to be
secured by the establishment of constitutional
limits to legislative power, and impartial tribunals
to enforce them.”
29
In the case of People vs. Gillson (109 N. X. 389)
an act prohibiting the sale of any article of food
upon the inducement that something would be given
to the purchaser as a premium or reward (Laws
1887, ch. 691) was held to be an unauthorized in-
vasion of the rights of property and an improper
exercise of the police power of the State. It was
expressly declared in that case that the courts must
be able to see upon a perusal of the enactment that
there is some fair, just and reasonable connection
between it and the public good, and that unless
such relation exists the statute cannot be upheld
as an exercise of the police power.
Judge Peckham, writing the opinion of the
court in the Gillson case, says, at page 398:
“At the same time it must be remembered that
the Constitution is the supreme law of the land,
and that when an act of the Legislature properly
comes before the court to be compared by it with the
fundamental law, it is the duty of the court to de
clare the invalidity of the act if it violates any pro-
vision of that law.”
Again, on page 399, he says:
“Liberty, in its broad sense, as understood in this
country, means the right, not only of freedom from
servitude, imprisonment or restraint, but the right
of one to use his faculties in all lawful ways, to live
and work where he will, to earn his livelihood in
any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade
or avocation * *
“It is quite clear that some or all of these funda-
mental and valuable rights are invaded, weakened,
limited or destroyed by the legislation under con-
sideration. It is evidently of that kind which has
been so frequent of late, a kind which is meant to
protect some class in the community against the
30
fair, free and full competition of some other class,
the members of the former class thinking it impos-
sible to hold their own against such competition,
and therefore ‘flying to the Legislature to secure
some enactment which shall operate favorably to
them or unfavorably to their competitors in the
commercial, agricultural, manufacturing or pro-
ducing fields.”
On page 400, he says:
“This brings us to the consideration of the ques-
tion whether the act is valid as a proper exercise of
what is, by way of classifification, called the police
power of the State. That power has never yet been
fully described nor its extent plainly limited, fur-
ther at least, than this; it is not above the Consti-
tution, but it is bounded by its provisions, and if
any liberty or franchise is expressly protected by
any constitutional provision it cannot be destroyed
by any valid exercise by the Legislature or the ex-
ecutive of the police power.”
Again on page 403, he says:
“It is further argued, however, that the act is
valid as a health law, a regulation of trade in food,
and to prevent dealing in impure, unwholesome and
adulterated food. The same principles apply here
as have already been stated, i. e., there must be
some fair and reasonable relation of means to end,
which courts can see and admit the force of. We
think it clear there is no such relation here. We
think the act has not the slightest tendency to ac-
complish the alleged purpose.”
In the case of People vs. Biesecker (169 N. Y. 53)
a statute forbidding the use of preservatives in
dairy products was held void. Judge Cullen says at
page 60, “while it may regulate, it may not destroy
the industry.”
31
In declaring unconstitutional Chapter 931 of the.
Laws of 1896, which required all convict made.
goods to be labeled “convict made” before they
could be exposed for sale and which act was sought
to be sustained under the police power as a measure.
for the public welfare, Judge O’Brien writing the
majority opinion, gives expression to these prin-
ciples.
“A law which interferes with property by depriv-
ing the owner of the profitable and free use of it or
hampers him in the application of it for purposes of
trade or commerce, or imposes conditions upon the
right to hold or sell it, may seriously impair its
value against which the constitution is a protection.
The fact that legislation hostile to the rights of
property assumes the guise of a health law or a
labor law will not save it from judicial scrutiny
since the courts cannot permit that to be done by
indirection which can not be done directly. People
vs. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 1.
The last case decided in New York which is di-
rectly in point is People vs. Beattie (96 App. Div.
383) decided in July, 1904. It arose under an act
providing for the examination and licensing of
horseshoers. The court declared it unconstitutional
as an improper exercise of the police power. Judge
Hatch writing the opinion of the Court, says at
page 390:
“To undertake the regulation of these subjects
would inject into the body politic a paternalism
which is repugnant to free institutions.”
And again at page 3991:
“We are of opinion, therefore, that this law ar-
bitrarily interferes with personal liberty and pri-
vate property without due process of law, for which.
reason it is invalid.”
32
The following decisions of the New York Court
of Appeals interpreting the “Labor Law” of that
State are not directly in point, but are important
expressions of the views of that court on some
branches of the case at bar.
The earliest case under the Labor Law which
came before the New York Courts was that of
People ex rel. Rodgers vs. Coler (166 N. X. 1).
That was an application by a contractor with the
city to compel the payment of his claim. It was
resisted on the ground that the contractor had
failed to comply with the Labor Law so far as it
required payment by him to his employees of the
prevailing rate of wages. It was held that the
Labor Law, so far as it required that in contracts
with the municipality the contractor should agree
to pay his employees the prevailing rate of wages,
was unconstitutional and void, and that the con-
tractor was entitled to payment, though he had
failed to comply with that provision.
People vs. Orange County Road Construction
Company (175 N. Y. 84), was a case arising under
the Penal Code which made any one contracting
with the state or a municipality who should require
more than eight hours work of an employee guilty
of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine. As is
pointed out in the opinion rendered in the case the
statute did not assume to punish a contractor for
violating his contract but for doing the prohibited
act, i. e., requiring more than eight hours labor
from an employee, regardless of whether or not he
had agreed by his contract not to require such a
term of labor and even though his contract might
have been made years before there was any legisla-
tion on the subject. It was held that this penal
enactment could not be sustained as a police or
health regulation because of the arbitrary distine-
33
tion drawn between workmen employed on a state
or municipal work and those performing similar
labor under other contracts.
Ryan vs. City of New York (177 N. Y. 271),
arose under the Labor Law, the plaintiff, an em-
ployee of the city, suing for the difference between
the wages actually paid him by the city and the
prevailing rate of such wages. It was there held
by a majority of the court that the direction of the
Labor Law that the city should pay its employees
the prevailing rate of wages was constitutional and
imposed upon the city officers the duty of fixing
wages at the prevailing rate, but that the acceptance
by the employee of a different rate and his contin-
uance in the employment of the city at such rate
constituted a waiver of all claim on his part for
greater compensation.
The last “Labor Law” decision in New York was
People ex rel Cossey vs. Grout (179 N. Y. 417).
This was a case where the relator agreed in his
contract with the city not to employ his men more
than eight hours per day. The relator prevailed on
the ground that the law was an unconstitutional
invasion of the rights of the municipality. We cite
the case for the purpose of calling attention to the
statement of Judge O’Brien at page 434, where he
shows the ground of dissent of three judges of that
court in the Lochner case. It is quite true that this
court has recently held that the legislature could
make it a criminal offense for a baker to permit his
workmen to work more than ten hours in the day,
but the struggle in that case was to make what some
of us thought was a labor law a health law and so
within the police power.”
No case yet decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States would warrant the affirming of the
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in this
34
case. We have elsewhere pointed out that Holden
vs. Hardy (169 U. S. 366) was clearly distinguish-
able from this case. The occupation of mining has
ever been held: properly within the police powers;
while a decision pronouncing the bakers trade sub-
jeet to arbitrary regulation under the police power,
would mean that all trades will eventually be held:
within the police power; and the 14th Amendment
will become mere idle words. We feel confident of
this.as we show by the tables in the “Appendix” of
this brief, that the baker’s trade is about on the
general average of healthfulness of all trades.
We cite briefly some of the leading cases decided
by this Court.
In Butcher's Union Company against Crescent
City Company (111 U. 8. 746), Mr. Justice Field
says, on page 757 : “Among the inalienable rights as.
proclaimed in the Declaration of Independence is
the right of men to pursue their happiness, by
which is meant the right to pursue any lawful busi-
ness or vocation, in any manner not inconsistent
with the equal rights of others, which may increase
their prosperity or develop their faculties, so as to
give them their highest enjoyment. The common.
business and calling of life, the ordinary trades
and pursuits, which are innocuous in themselves
and have been followd in all communities from
time immemorial, must, therefore, be free in this.
country to all alike upon the same conditions. The
right te pursue them, without let or hindrance, ex-
cept that which is applied to all persons of the
same age, sex, and condition, is a distinguishing
privilege of citizens of the United States, and an
essential element of that freedom which they claim
as their birthright.”
The case of Munn vs. Illinois (94 U. S. 79) is not
35
an authority for the act of the New York legisla-
ture here complained of. In that case it was held
that an occupation whose regulation was necessary
“for the public good” was within the police power;
but as Mr. Justice Field points out, it must be a
case where one undertakes “a public employment,
with special privileges which the State alone can
confer upon him,” and the warehousing of grain
having become a “virtual monopoly” gave the busi-
ness a public character that. warranted its regula-
tion.
The words of Chief Justice Chase in the case of
Calder vs. Bull (3 Dallas 386, 388), have never been
questioned by this court and are still authority for
our contention in this case that the legislature is
not omnipotent. He says:
“I cannot subscribe to the omnipotence of the
State Legislature, or that it is absolute and without
control; although its authority should not be ex-
pressly restrained by the constitution or funda-
mental law of the state. * * * The nature and
ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of
it. This fundamental principle flows from the very
nature of our free republican governments, that no
man should be compelled to do what the laws do not
require; nor to refrain from acts which the law
permit. There are acts which the federal or state
legislature cannot do without exceeding their
authority. There are certain vital principles in our
free repulican governments, which will determine
and overrule an apparent and flagrant abuse of leg-
islative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by
positive law; or to take away that security for per-
sonal liberty or private property, for the protection
whereof government was established. * * * A
few instances will suffice to explain what I mean.
A law. that punished a citizen for an innocent. ac-
36
tion, or, in other words, for an act, which when
done, was in violation of no existing law; a law
which destroys or impairs the lawful private con-
tracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a judge
in his own cause; or a law that takes property from
A and gives it to B; it is against all reason and jus-
tice for a people to entrust a legislature with such
powers; and therefore it cannot be presumed that
they have done it. * It (the legislature)
cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish in-
nocence as a crime, or violate the right of anteced-
ent lawful private contract; or the right of private
property.”
In United States vs. Martin (94 U. S. 400, 403),
this court construed Section 3738 of the Revised
Statutes, providing that eight hours shall constitute
a day’s work for employes of the Government. It
was there held that this statute was “in the nature
of a direction from a principal to his agent; that
eight hours is deemed to be a proper length of time
for a day’s labor, and that his contracts shall be
based upon that theory. It is a matter between the
principal and his agent, in which a third party has
no interest.” (p. 404.)
The court also says:
“It does not establish the price to be paid for a
day’s work. Skilled.labor necessarily commands a
higher price than mere manual labor, and whether
wages are high or low depends chiefly upon the in-
quiry whether those having labor to bestow are
more numerous than those who desire the service of
the laborer. * * *
“The statute does not provide that the employ
und the laborer may not agree with each other as to
what time shall constitute a day’s work. There are
some branches of labor connected with furnaces,
foundries, steam or gas works, where the labor and
37
the exposure of eight hours a day would soon ex-
haust the strength of a laborer and render him
permanently an invalid. The government officer is
not prohibited from knowing these facts, nor from
agreeing, when it is proper, that a less number of
hours than eight shall be accepted as a day’s work.
Nor does the statute intend that, where out-of-door
labor in the long days of summer may be offered for
twelve hours at an uniform price, the officer may
not so contract with a consenting laborer.”
This decision clearly puts this court on record, as
against the arbitrary regulation of innocuous
trades by act of the Legislature.
The case of United States against Martin is simi-
lar in principle to People vs. Phyfe (136 N. Y. 554).
In the case of Henderson vs. Mayor of New York
(92 U. S. 259), a State law regulating the landing
of passengers was held unconstitutional and not
within the police powers.
The case of Petit vs. Minnesota (177 U. S. 164),
is also distinguishable from the case at bar. A
Sunday law which in effect made the determination
whether a given occupation was an act of charity or
necessity a question of fact in all trades, except
barbers. Sunday laws have universally been held
within the police powers. This statute is a declara-
tion that the barber's trade does not involve work
of necessity or charity.
We regard the decision of this Court in the case
of Atkin vs. Kansas (191 U. S. 207, 224), as favor-
able to our contentions in the case at bar. The
statute there under review regulated the hours of
labor on public works. It did not interfere with
the right of private contract. Mr. Justice Harlan
calls attention to this and says “Its action touching
such a matter is final so long as it does not, by its
—
38
regulations, infringe the personal rights of others,
and that has not been done.”
Wynehamer vs. People (13 N. Y. 378); In re
Jacobs (98 N. Y. 98); People vs. Marx (99 N. Y.
377); People vs. Gillson (109 N. Y. 401); People
vs. Budd (117 N. Y. 15); Health Dept. vs. Rector
(145 N. Y. 32); Colon vs. Lisk (153 N. Y. 188)
People vs. Hawkins (157 N. Y. 1); People ex rel.
Tyroler vs. Warden of Prison (157 N. Y. 116) ; Peo-
ple ex rel. Rodgers vs. Coler (166 N. X. 1); People
vs. Biesecker (169 N. Y. 53) ; People vs. Orange Co.
Road Cons. Co. (175 N. Y. 84); Ryan vs. City of
New York (177 N. Y. 271); People ex rel. Cossey
vs. Grout (179 N. Y. 417); Calder vs. Bull (3 Dal-
las 386): Slaughter House Cases (16 Wall. 36);
Henderson vs. Mayor of New York (92 U. S. 259);
Munn vs. Illinois (94 U. S. 79); Missouri vs. Lewis
(101 U. S. 22); Butchers’ Union Co. vs. Crescent
City Co. (III. U. S. 746); Barbier vs. Connolly (113
U. S. 27); Holden vs. Hardy (169 U. S. 366) : Pettit
vs. Minnesota (177 U. S. 164); Connolly vs. Union
Sewer Pipe Co. (184 U. S. 540); Atkin ve. Kansis
(191 U. S. 207); Cook vs. County of Marshall (De
cided by this Court January 16, 1905).
In the other State Courts legislation of the kind
in issue has been almost uniformly declared invalid.
Sawyer vs. Davis (136 Mass. 239, 243) ; Eden vs.
People (161 III. 296); Ritchie vs. People (155 III.
98); Ex parte Kuback (85 Cal. 274); Godcharles
vs. Wigeman (113 Penn St. 431); State vs. Good-
will (33 West. Va. 179); Leep vs. St. Louis R. R.
Co. (58 Ark. 407); Low vs. Rees Pub. Co. (41 Neb.
127) ; Exparte Westerfield (55 Cal. 550).
The latter case is directly in point and pronoun-
ces the bakers’ trade not one subject to the police
power of the state.
39
In the Westerfield case, a California statute pro-
vides: “It shall be unlawful for any person en-
gaged in the business of baking, to engage or permit
others in his employ to engage in the labor of bak-
ing for the purpose of sale, between the hours of six
o’clock p. m. on Saturday and six o’clock p. m. on
Sunday, except in the setting of sponge preparatory
to the night’s work; provided, however, that
restaurants, hotels and boarding houses may do
such baking as is necessary for their own consump-
tion”; the act is made a thisdemeanor ,punishable
by fine and imprisonment, or both. Held void as a
special law. Myrick, J.: “The act purports, accord-
ing to its title, to be an act to provide for a day of
rest. Instead of pursuing that intent, it goes on to
say that certain acts, viz., the labor of baking for
the purpose of sale, if performed by certain persons,
viz., persons ‘engaged in the business of baking for
the purpose of sale’ shall constitute a crime and
sliall be punished. The employers are not to be
punished. This is special legislation. A certain
class is selected. * * * The baking of bread is in
itself lawful and necessary.” McKinstry, J., con-
curring: “The baking of bread is not only lawful
and necessary, but we will take notice that there is
nothing so peculiar in the occupation as that those
engaged in it require—as a sanitary measure, or for
the protection of their morals----a period of rest not
required by those engaged in many other employ-
ments. A general law must include within its sanc-
tion all who come within its purpose and scope. It
must be as broad as its object.”
From all of the decisions on the exercise of the
police power we find its exercise fairly tested by ‘the
questions set forth in Section 143 of Freund on
Police Power.
“The questions which present themselves in the
40
examination of a safety or health measure are:
Does a danger exist? Is it of sufficient magnitude?
Does it concern the public? Does the proposed
measure tend to remove it? Is the restraint or re-
quirement in proportion to the danger? Is it pos-
sible to secure the object sought without impairing
essential rights and principles? Does the choice of
a particular measure show that some other interest
than safety or health was the actual motive of leg-
islation?“
Tested by these questions we believe the consti-
tutionality of the case at bar cannot be maintained.
4. The statute in question was never intended .as
a health provision but was purely a labor law.
This is indicated by the facts leading up to the
adoption of this statute by the New York legis-
lature.
The classic country of modern factory legisla-
tion, England, brought forward the first law regu-
lative of conditions of bakeshops, that we are able
to discover, to wit, the “Bakehouse Regulation Act”
passed by Parliament in 1863 (26, 27 Vict. Ch. 40).
This act was the result of an investigation of a
Parliamentary commission. The law forbids per-
sons under the age of eighteen to work between the
hours of 6 p. m. and 5 a. m. and apprentices to
work in excess of 10 hours per day.
In addition thereto it provides for a number of
sanitary rules similar to those of the New York
Labor Law, but it in no wise seeks to interdict the
operation of bakeshops or restrict the hours of
labor of the adult employees. The Factory Act
41
of 1883, designed as “Factory and Workshop Act,
1883” amended the Bakehouse Act of 1863 in sev-
eral particulars in regard to the location and main-
tenance of privies, water closets, sewage, drains and
pipes and other strictly sanitary matters, but in
no wise sought to interfere with the hours of labor
of employees.
As our factory legislation in America was large-
ly borrowed from that of England, so did the bak-
ery legislation of the several states take its impe-
tus from the precedents established by our cousins
across the sea.
The first demand for a ten hour work day for
bakers in our country, appears to have been made
by resolution adopted in a mass meeting of bakers
of the City of New York, in Irving Hall, on April
23d, in 1887. In the same year a Bill made its ap-
pearance in the New York Legislature promoted
by George G. Block, the Secretary of the Journey-
men’s Bakers Union which read as follows:
Section 1. A day’s work in a bakery, shop
or other place in which articles of food are
mannfactured, shall not exceed ten hours
per day.
Section 2. This act shall take effect im-
mediately.
See Baker’s Journal, New York City, May 8th,
1895. This bill was rejected by the Legislature.
Five years later in 1892, the Commissioner of
Labor Statistics of the State of New York, with the
aid of the Organization of the Journeymen Bakers,
made an investigation of the conditions of labor
and the construction of the bakeshops of New York
City, which resulted in an agitation of the Jour-
neymen Bakers renewing the struggle for a ten
hour law for bakers and a number of sanitary pro-
42
visions which as stated above were largely bor-
rowed from the English Bakehouse Act.
Report of New York State Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics of 1892, Volume ITT.
In 1895 a Bill was introduced into the Legis-
lature entitled “An Act to regulate the Manufac-
ture of Flour and Meal Food Products.” It be-
came a law as Chapter 548 of the Laws of 1895.
It was the first Baker’s Law passed in any country
of the world, which arbitrarily fixed the hours of
labor of adult employees of bakeries and confec-
tionery establishments, without providing for ex-
ceptions in emergency cases. In 1896 another bill
was introduced adding certain sanitary amend-
ments to the new law, such as providing for a min-
imum height of eight feet for all bakeshops and
prohibiting domestic animals to be kept in bak-
eries. The Act which became known as Chapter
672 of the Laws of 1896 is substantially the pres-
ent Article VIII. of the Labor Law. In 1897 the
Legislature was engaged in consolidating into a
series of general laws the Laws of the State and
among others embodied all of the former indepen-
dent acts bearing upon and having relation to the
condition of labor and workmen into one act, en-
titled “The Labor Law,” Chapter 32 of the General
Laws. It was then that the question of the classi-
fication of the Bakery Inspection Law first pre
sented itself to the Legislature and the latter al-
though at the same time collating the laws rela-
tive to the public health under an act called the
“Public Health Act,“ which was adopted the same
year, placed the Bakery Act into the Labor Law.
The legislature thus determined that this act
was a labor measure and that its passage was so
intended and in conformity thereto inserted it in
43
the Labor Law, as Article VIII. thereof and not
in the Public Health law.
This act is the most arbitrary of its kind on the
‘statute books of this country. It prohibits abso-
lutely the employment of employees in baking and
confectionery establishments over the prescribed
limit of 60 hours a week without regard to loss of
property or other emergencies that may arise, the
desire of employes to contract for overtime, or the
employer's willingness to pay for extra work in
‘cases of emergency.
The Utah Miner’ 8 Hour Law sustained by this
Court in Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U. S. is clearly
‘distinguishable i in this respect from the act in ques-
tion since it provides for an exception “in cases of
emergency where life or property is in imminent
danger,” as well as in the fact that mining is not
classed with the baking trade as innocuous.
The Acts of New York State of a similar nature
are the act providing that ten hours within twelve
consecutive hours should constitute a day’s work
‘on certain railroads. Overtime is here permitted
in case of accident or unavoidable delay. Laws of
1897 Ch. 415, Section 5
The New York Law relative to work in brick
yards, forbidding employers to allow the men to
work more than 10 hours per day, allows overtime
agreements.
Outside of New York, most of these special Laws
applying to adult labor concern railways or mines.
Three other states followed New York in regulat-
ing the working time of men employed in bakeries,
New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Missouri; as did
also Ontario, Can.
The New Jersey Act was passed in April, 1896,
and is almost an exact copy of the act here in is-
44
sue. The introducers of the act sought to enact
the statute in the same form as the New York Act
but the Legislature amended the ten hour work
day provision, permitting employers in cases of
emergency to employ the men two additional hours
provided they receive extra remuneration for such
extra time at the regular wage rate paid such em-
ployees.
An Act respecting Bakeshops, assented to April
7, 1896, is the title of a similar measure of the
Province of Ontario. Section 7 thereof reads as
follows: No employer shall require, permit or suf-
fer any employee in any bakeshop to work more
than sixty hours in any one week except by per-
mission of the inspector given in writing to the
employer.
It has already been remarked that the English
Bakehouse Act has no restrictions as to the hours
of labor of adults; nor do we find any such restric-
tions in the Bakery Inspection Laws ef Connecti-
cut, Massachusetts and Maryland passed in 1896
and 1897, and in the Act of Minnesota passed in
1895. The restrictions in the Acts of Pennsyl-
vania and Missouri of 1897 apply to Sunday labor
only.
Other laws regulative of the hours of labor may
be distinguished from the act as respecting the
freedom of contract in every State of the Union.
While providing for a legal workday and for strict
prohibitions against working over the legal limit
they invariably either grant the parties to the labor
contract the right to agree otherwise, to accept or
pay extra compensation for over work, for extra
work in cases of emergency, or of danger to life or
property or for extra work to make up for lost
time. We have failed to find an instance where
an employer is so utterly helpless to protect his
5. Holden v. Hardy (169 U. S. 366) distinguished
from the case at bar.
Working in underground mines has always been
recognized as hazardous and unhealthful. The bak-
ers trade has not. We have a specific reference to
the bakers trade as an “innocuous” one in the opin-
ion of Judge Earl in the Jacobs case, (98 N. Y. at
page 114). And a similar declaration by the highest
Court of California in re Westerfield (55 Cal. 550).
The Utah miners act was passed pursuant to a
provision of the State constitution which provided
as follows “the legislature shall pass laws to pro-
vide for the health and safety of employes in fac-
tories, smelters and mines” (Const. Art. 16, § 6).
The Utah Legislature pursuant to this provision
enacted a law which was certainly intended as a
health regulation.
The New York Statute is contained in “The
Labor Law” of the State and is purely a regulation
of the hours of a trade which under present day con-
ditions is not unhealthful. The additional pro-
visions relating to the sanitary surroundings of the
bake shop amply protect the baker against unsani-
tary conditons. Such protection is impossible to
the miner.
The Utah law applies to “workingmen in all un-
derground mines and workings.” The New York
—
be
46
law affects only employes in a “biscuit, bread or
cake bakery.” The law should have applied to all
persons engaged in the business of baking. Such is
the language of the California statute on the same
subject (55 Cal. 550).
The Utah statute excepts “cases of emergency
where life or property is in imminent danger.” The
New York Statute is unreasonable in this respect
and makes no exception. The baker’s business is
peculiarly liable to changes in the time of the ma-
turing of the material and changes of temperature
affect it to the extent of hours. Yet the employer
is a criminal if he compels or permits his employes.
to work over the prescribed time, though they do it
willingly and are paid for overtime, and though
the bakers product is destroyed thereby.
6. The plaintiff in error, believing the New York
statute under review to be unconstitutional prays.
that the judgment of the New York Court of Ap-
peals be reversed.
Respectfully submitted,
Frank Harvey FIs,
HENRY WEISMANN,
of Consul for plaintiff in error.
APPENDIX.
THE LABOR LAW.
CHArr Rn 415, Laws or 1897.
Article VIII.—Bakeries and Confectionery Estab-.
ments.
Section 110. Hours of labor in bakeries and con-
fectionery establishmenta No employee shall be
required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread or
cake bakery or confectionery establishment more
than sixty hours in any one week or more than
ten hours in any one day, unless for the purpose of
making a shorter work day on the last day of the
week; nor more hours in any one week than will
make an average of ten hours per day for the num-
ber of days during such week in which such employe
shall work.
Source.—L. 1895, Ch. 518, Sec. 1, as amended by
L. 1896, ch. 672.
Section 111. Drainage and plumbing of build:
ings and rooms occupied by bakeries—All build-
ings or rooms occupied by bakeries —All buildings
or rooms occcupied as biscuit, bread, pie or cake
bakeries shall be drained and plumbed in a man-
ner conducive to the proper and healthful sanitary
condition thereof, and shall be constructed with air.
shafts, windows or ventilating pipes, sufficient to
insure ventilation. The factory inspector may di-
rect the proper drainage, plumbing and ventilation
of such rooms or buildings. No cellar or basement
not now used for a bakery shall hereafter be so
occupied or used unless the proprietor shall ‘comply.
with the sanitary provisions of this article.
48
Source. L. 1895, Ch. 518, See. 2, as amended by
L. 1896, ch. 672.
Section 112. Requirements as to rooms, furni-
ture, utensils and manufactured products.—Every
room used for the manufacture of flour or meal food
products shall be at least eight feet in height, and
shall have, if deemed necessary by the factory in-
spector, an impermeable floor constructed of
cement, or of tiles laid in cement, or an additional
flooring of wood properly saturated with linseed
oil. The side walls of such rooms shall be plas-
tered or wainscoted. The factory inspector may re-
quire the side walls and ceiling to be whitewashed
at least once in three months. He may also require
the woodwork of such walls to be painted. The
furniture and utensils shall be so arranged as to be
readily cleansed and not prevent the proper clean-
ing of any part of a room. The manufactured flour
or meal food products shall be kept in dry and airy
rooms, so arranged that the floors, shelves and all
other facilities for storing the same can be prop-
erly cleaned. No domestic animals, except cats,
shall be allowed to remain in a room used as a
biscuit, bread, pie or cake bakery, or any room tn
such bakery where flour or meal products are
stored.
Source. L. 1895, Ch. 518, Secs. 3, 4, as amended
by L. 1896, ch. 672.
Section 113. Wash-room and closets; sleeping
places.—Every such bakery shall be provided with
a proper wash-room and water-closet or water-closet
apart from the bake-room or rooms where the manu-
facture of such food product is conducted, and no
water-closet, earth-closet, privy or ash-pit shall be
within or connected directly with the bake room of
any bakery, hotel or public restaurant.
No person shall sleep in a room occupied as a
49
bake-room. Sleeping places for
ployed in the
Source.—L, 1895, Ch. 518, Secs. 5, 6, as amended
by L. 1896, ch. 672.
Section 114.—Inspection of
of
red by him
premises, either
50
.
ee. who violates, or does not comply with
„the provisions of Article Eight of the Labor
Law, relating to bakeries and confectionery estab-
lishmenta, the employment of labor and the manv-
facture. of flour or meal food products therein
js guilty of a misdemeanor and upon con-
viction shall be punished for a first offense by a fine
of not less than twenty nor more than one hundred
dollars; for a second offense by a fine of not less
than fifty nor more than two hundred dollars, or
by imprisonment for not more than thirty days, or
by both such fine and imprisonment; for a third
offense by a fine of not less than two hundred and
fifty dollars, or by imprisonment for not more than
sixty days, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
From Buck’s Hygiene and Public Health, 1879,
Volume II., Pages 10-11:
L
OCCUPATIONS INVOLVING THE INTRODUCTION or
DELETERIOUS MATTERS INTO THE BODY.
1. By Inhalation.
A. Vapors and Gases:
. Irritating—Metal-refiners, gold and silver
mmiths, jewelers, electrotypers, etchers,
- bleachers, straw-hat makers, manufacturers
of chemicals...
b. 88 gilders, eee
brass founders, mateh- makers, rubber manu;
facturers, smelters, manufacturers of ani-
line, photographers, cloth-scourers.
51
oil-pressers, cheese makers, scavengers, su-
gar-refiners, fullers, hostlers, .
rag-pickers.
B. Dust:
a Irritating—Metallic: Bronzers, file cutters,
fitters, grinders, needle-makers, pin-pointers,
cutlers. Mineral: Cement-makers, stone-cut-
ters, potters, lime burners, plaster-burners,
glass-cutters, sandblast operatives, diamond-
cutters, lithographers. Vegetable: Chimney-
sweeps, molders, millers, cotton, flax and
hemp operatives, tobacco operatives. A.
mal: Brush-makers, button-makers, feather,
wool and silk operatives. Miwed: Carpet-
cleaners, hair-pickers, street-sweepers.
b. Poisonous—Artificial- flower makers, Wall-
2. Poisonous: Paederasts, prostitutes.
52
II.
OOCUPATIONS INVOLVING EXPOSURE TO CONDITIONS
THAT INTERFERE WITH NUTRITION.
1. Elevated or Variable Temperature.
a. Vicissitudes of weather—Boatmen, fishermen,
farmers, (florists, gardeners, nurserymen),
drivers (cartmen, hackmen, omnibus driv-
ers), laborers, bricklayers, masons.
b. Artificial heat—Brick-makers, bakers, cooks,
charcoal-burners, blacksmiths, engineers,
stokers,. forgemen, iron-puddlers, glass-blow-
. Nervous system (mental worry)—Brokers,
.. . gamblers, merchants, physicians, tea-tasters. —
d Byee-—Engravers, lapidaries
-seamstresses: (embroiderers, lace makers).
e. Vocal Organs Actors, clergymen, singers, pub
lie speakers.
d. Muscles—Athletes, copyists, musicians, (pian-
ists, violinists, bras»instrument players).
3. Gonstrained Attitude.
‘Printers (compositors, pressmen), coopers, car
penters, cabinet-makers, shoe-makers, tail-
ors, sales men and women.
4. Sedentary Life.
Artists, clerks, lawyers, literary men, students,
teachers.
53
III.
OCCUPATIONS INVOLVING EXPOSURE TO MBOHANIGAL
VIOLENCE.
1. From machinery: Factory operatives, machin-
ists, railway employees.
2. From preventable accidents: Lumbermen,
quarrymen, roofers.
3. From variations in atmospheric pressure:
Aeronauts, caisson workers, drivers, boiler-
makers.
OCCUPATIONS WITH HIGHEST AND Lowest MorTAL-
ITY FiguRES IN ENGLAND, 1890-2.
(Supplement to 55th Annual Report of the Regis-
trar-General. )
Comparative
Occupation mortality figure.
CC erry rep yr fee rire 1,829
TTT Ä Stks, Cieeieeeebe 1,810
JJ. 8 1,783
1 . ᷣ ò ò ᷣ ò»bc!lnn .. 1,725
Potter, earthenware manufacturer 1,706
Innkeeper, servant, eta 1,659
Costermonger, hawker. ......:.... ies kas 1,652
TE sarin cae esdwen n6e Oc Kap eeSA 1,642
Coal heaver..... JJC 3;
Cutler, scissors maker 1,516
General laborer (industrial districts).. 1,500
Glass manufacture a EE 1,487
TR 5 5 6 5 cE Role Soiss CSS feo i 1,427
General laborer (London)) 1,413
Tool, scissors, file, saw, ete., maker. 1,412
%% ᷣͤ ͤ AAA ae dv v oneaeeeneens 1,409
Coal miner (Monmouthshire and South
Wales)
Cotton, etc., manufacture
Occupation. ,
Silk, satin, etc., manufacture
Commercial clerk
Blacksmith, whitesmith
Coal miner (West Riding)
„ „„ „ „%% „% %%% „ „% eee eee „ „
693232525244 „„ „„ „46
ee eee „ „33
eee eee eee eee eee en eee ere eon ee
Coal miner (Durham and Northumber- _
—. . ĩ Oo RRS 774
Ironstone miner . 774
/ cesses sein gehen 768
Domestic indoor serv ant. 757
undd e ⁰àÄ˙ʃ“ ce's pe cceteces 756
„ ie 65's 6 obs dks ow kok Sass 74¹
Coal miner (Derbyshire and .
T.. ͤ ᷣ ᷣͤ VVA 727
c . 713
I 8 709
Hosiery manufacture 698
Laborer in agricultural group 666
ee ß ee G 664
Agricultural laborer 632
Se . ͤͤœ- Gmßʒ eee 604
%% 0 se os iev ive 602
pe” Bee PeeET epee Pr, Flr 563
r . eve As 553
, ss Ved eke yen 5 533
Nore.—Occupations in the first column have a
mortality above and those in the second column be- .
low the average for all occupied males (953)...
Among the 48 other occupational groups 39 are
above and 9 below this figure. The standard of
56
(1,000) is the mortality figure for all
77 4 —*
Indented lines indicate sub- classes or occupa-
The number of deaths of male persons between 25
aiid 65 years of age in the years 1890, 1891 and 1892
is compared with the number of living persons exer-
cising the various occupations as returned by the-
census of 1891. The mortality of ali males within
the age period 25-65 years is then taken as a stand-
ard (1,000) with which the death rate in the
various occupations is compared. The unoccupied
males had a death rate more than twice as large
as that of all males, the exact ratio being as 2,215
to 1,000, while the oceupied males of course had a
lower mortality, thus:
All males (standard)
Unoceupied males
Occupied males—England
Occupied males—London
Occupied males Industrial dis-
, WHERE BREAD 18 MavE.—By F. J. Waldo, M. A.,
M. D.; from article in Journal of the Sanitary In-
stitute, April, 1894 (England), dealing with bakers
and bake-houses and closing with thirteen recom-
mendations of sanitary changes in the shops of
London. He concludes the article by saying “if bak-
ing be carried on in well ventilated places, with a
perfect sanitary environment, there is no reason
why it should be a particularly dangerous or un-
healthy trade.”
57
BAKESHOP SANITATION AND THE REDUC
TION OF THE WORKTIME OF BAKERS.
The claim that the reduction of the hours of”
labor of bakers is an element in bake-shop sanita-
tion and in the promotion of the health of bakers
and the wholesomeness of their products, is not
sustained by medical and sanitary authority, and
we fail to find an instance in which those who have:
given thought and labor to this question, have in
any wise adverted to it.
The following references and opinions are not-
able in this connection.
The Lancet, Vol. 2, 1895, page 298, contains a
joint paper of Dr. F. J. Waldo and Dr. David
Walsh, two English sanitary experts of note, deal-
ing with underground industries, especially with
reference to the baking trade in London. They state:
that the underground rooms are ‘unfit for workmen.
The only way in which they can be made fit to
work in is to have them at least eight feet high and
a minimum of 500 cubic feet of air space for each
workman, and a special allowance for each gas
jet. Walls must be kept smooth and dry. Win-
dow space must equal one eighth of the floor and
ventilation, light, drainage and lavatory accommo-
dations must be such as to satisfy advanced modern
requirements, floors should have nine-inch concrete:
and drains should be a foot deep laid in concrete.
There should be a front area outside and a back or
side area to promote the circulation of air.
The recommendations of these men do in no wise
refer to the reduction of the hours of labor of the
employees. Report of Lancet, Special Sanitary
‘Commission on Bakeries and Bread Making, 1889,
Vol. 2, page 1140, treating of the unsanitary con-
ditions of bakeries and poor ventilation. It states
on Bakeries and Bread Making,.1890, Vol. 1, Page
c
application of sanitary laws.
No. 3, Page 208, same book, treating of ventila-
tion and proper sanitation as followed in Belgium
and France.
No, 4, Page 719, same volume, condemns poor
sanitary and ventilating conditions in Scotland,
states there are very few model bakeries in Scot-
land, most of the bakeries being under the ground.
Comparativ Mortality of men 25 to 65 years of
age in different occupations—Referencee handbook
of Medical Sciences,Vol. 6, page 317, mortality of
clergymen being lowest, 100 out of a list of 21 oc-
cupations, the highest being cotton workers at 196.
Bakers are number 11 on the list at 172, above the
bakers are scheduled cabinet makers 173, masons
and brick layers 174, blacksmiths 175, clerks 170,
railway laborers 185, gunsmiths 186, wool workers
180, tailors 199, hatters 191, and cotton workers as
above stated. Millers have a higher death list than
bakers, see page 325.
On page 317 is shown that the mortality from
phthisis is far more frequent in many other trades
than among bakers.
The “Practitioner,” Vol. 53, 1894, pages 387,
389, 390, and up to page 400, treats of unsanitary
conditions and poor ventilation of bakers and advo-
cates reforms in that direction, but does not allude
to the hours of labor.
Dr. Arlidge in his work entitled “The Diseases
of Occupations” enumerates" the unhealthy infin. sy
ences to which the baker is exposed, as follows: —
Frrposure 0 heat from ovens, dust storm, varia
supplement to the 45th Annual Report of the Reg-
ister General.
The calculations were made from deaths regis-
tered during 1880-1881, 82, that is to say, prior to
Regulation
The comparative mortality figures of the
and confectioners stands at 938, and it
noted that while he compares unfavorably
grocer and with the shop keepers as a
compares favorably with the cheesemongers,
or butter man, the green-grocer and fruiterer,
fish monger and the poulterer and the
He states on page 396 that statistics
the mortality from phthisis and from diseases
!
:
;
te
1
MONARY DISEASES TO ANY OONSIDER-
ABLE EXTENT.
Our attention has been called to the fact that the
bakers are in their majority night workers, that but
a minority of them marry and lead a domestic life;
7 pr 9 say 8 as 0 ;
contribute largely to the debilitation and unhealth-
kan condition of the men, where ‘such condition may
eee e as these and life
in these surroundings will render an extensive lei-
sure of the employes more dangerous to their health
in both a physical and moral sense, than corre-
spondingly long hours of work in bake-shops prop-
erly conducted under the sanitary rules provided
for by the provisions of the bakery inspection laws.
Professor Oliver, M. A., M. D., F. R. C. P.,
who is the medical expert of the White
Lead, Dangerous Trades, Pottery and Lucifer
Match Committees of the British Home Of-
fice, strongly supports this opinion. In statistics
showing “the comparative mortality from specified
causes in certain dusty occupations,” he shows that
the mortality among bakers stands eighteenth in a
mortality list covering twenty-two such occupa-
tions, being exceeded by the mortality in such
trades as Locksmith, Tinsmith, Bricklayer, Stone-
cutter, Cooper and Wood Turner, and various
trades involving the handling of iron, steel, brass,
copper and zinc, as well as the textile trades. More-
over, Prof. Oliver shows that the mortality among
bakers from phthisis and diseases of the respiratory
system is the lowest of all the twenty-two occupa-
tions he cites, which occupations cover nearly all
the groups in which artisans are employed.
It is therefore plain that the occupation of a
baker is not in itself as harmful as many trades for
which no special legislation has been enacted.
The occupation not being inherently harmful, it
shops, with resultant injustice not only to the opera-
tives, but to the consumers of bakery products.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.