Opposition Brief — Washington v. United States

IN THI

Supreme Court of the United States

{

Ninth Cy

RESPONDENT INDIAN TRIBES’

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION _

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LS IASON DD. MORI

HARRY JOHNSE? MORISSET, SCHLO

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rABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

STATEMENT OF THE CAS

Factual Background

Course of Proceedings

ASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIO

[he Court of Appeals Created No Conflu

to Graft Species Ol lec hnology tase d

i:xpress Treaty Language

[qual Sharing of The Fish Resour

Decided” and No Conflict Exist:

it ls a “Matter Decided” that the Ste:

Provide a Right of Access to Private Prop

Override the Presumption of the Equ:

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cctrine, and No Conflict |

an +h i | ,fuy

Ww? CQUual FOOUN

(‘ourt of Appeals Created

rpretation of the Shellfish Pri

the Court of Appeals Correctly R

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Proviso Meaning De N:

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iCal EITO!

[he Proviso Meaning 1s a |

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¥," nicn the Courts Be liOw Ver l

(‘ase Presents No Opportu!

Settled Law Regarding Laches

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Kk OF AUTHORITII

bE DERAL CASES

STATUTES, TREATIES AND RULI

INTRODUCTION

[he four petitions for certiorari present ten questions,

none of which implicates a conflict in authority among the

Courts of Appeals or with a State Supreme Court. A number

Of questions rest On incorrect premises, and a number would

require this Court to engage in the heavily factbound

examination of the record already conducted by the courts

below. In all instances, petitioners press arguments. that

mark a clear departure from the plain treaty language and

this Court’s precedents. The petitions should be denied

(he courts below held that. in entering into five nearly

identical treaties with the tribes of western Washington (the

Stevens treaties), the United States made a promise that the

tribes would enjoy a permanent, meaningful right to take

shellfish from natural shellfish beds and that this promise

should be honored today. Under the treaties, (1) “The right

of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and

stations, 1s further secured to said Indians, in common with

all citizens,” (the fishing right); (2) “Provided, however, That

they shall not take shell fish from any beds staked or

cultivated by citizens” (the shellfish proviso). Treaty of

Medicine Creek, Art. III, 10 Stat. 1132, 1133 (1854)

(he majority of petitioners’ questions concern the scope

of the fishing right. Certiorari on those questions is

unwarranted because in seven previous decisions this Court

already has explored the meaning of that right and the courts

below fully adhered to those decisions. There is no conflict

with any other court.

[his Court has not considered the shellfish proviso

previously, but review of its meaning is unwarranted for two

reasons: first, because there exist no other treaties containing

language about shellfish beds, and the interpretation of the

proviso therefore does not implicate any broader concerns:

and, second, because the courts below reached thei!

conclusion as to its meaning based on a careful, factbhound

examination of the type that this Court typically will not

revisit. Petitioners also complain about the standard of

review utilized by the Court of Appeals in addressing the

proviso’s meaning, but their claims of conflict or error on

this point do not withstand scrutiny

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STATEMENT OF THI

ual Background

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shellfish subproceeding began in 198% ER 9. B

motion. the district court held that under the pl.

‘ave of the treaties, and the “elementary canon

truction that a statute should be interpreted so as not

r one part ‘noperative.” Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S

59? (1979), the right of taking fish” includes the rig}

ike shellfish App. 56 [The court then held a

‘k bench trial, after which it issued

tribes’ rights of taking shellfish a1

ion holding that the

heir rights to other fish, except to

Ktensive with t

t limited by the shellfish proviso. App. 52-53 lr]

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selling.” App. 55, 59, and “overwhelming[]” App

proviso limits tribes from taking shellfish onl) I

‘tificial shellfish beds created by citizens wh

ed t! il \ CICS CAISto App 77

dist court then issued two ordet n

mitations on tribal shellfishing in order to |

ests of private landowners. The cour held that

nav harvest shellfish from private tidelands — eve!

stence purposes — only five days a year (with

on Jarger lots). and only after providing landow!

1e-montl notice and conducting (at thet

. scientific surveys establishing the presence

hellfish population App. 126-2 The cour

tribal access acro yrivately owned uplan

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that the tribes are permitted a shal

lfish that would be present naturally on U

vers’ beds absent the grower fforts; th

tled to the entire fruits of their labor and 1

r tidelands App 33-35 [he court t! mda

ial determination of what portion ol

xempt from tribal harvest because

wers efforts la The district t

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITIO!

[he Court of Appeals Created No Conflict by

Refusing to Graft Species or Technology-Bas

Limitations Onto Express Treaty Languag:

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16

on the tribes’ historic use of different species. This 1s

irectly at odds with Fishing Vessel’s holding that the

st tarting age in allocating a common right is an equal

division of the resource. 443 U.S. at 685. Indeed, the

district court has never examined the relative dependence of

the tribes on each of the various species of finfish and the

Fishing Vessel Court did not suggest that it should have

[he Court did note the district court’s equal allocation of

those species to be consistent with other natural resource

cases where, after implying a right to a resource based on

historic usage, the courts have accorded tribes enough of the

esource to ensure their reasonable livelihood. /d. at 685-86

But the Court never suggested that instead of starting with

presumptively equal allocation of an express common right 2 a

court should do a variegated species-by-species allocation

analysis. Thus, there is no conflict between Fishing Vessel

and the holding of the courts below. No court has ever

interpreted F ‘ishing Vessel as does the State, and the State has

failed to present a basis for certiorari.

lll. It Is a “Matter Decided” that the Stevens Treaties

Provide a Right of Access to Private Property and

Override the Presumption of the Equal Footing

Doctrine, and No Conflict Exists.

Half of petitioners’ questions go to the issue w hether,

even setting the shellfish proviso to the side, the tnbes may

exercise their right to take shellfish on ome ately owned

tidelands.'” This, however, is a matter long since decided.

For more than ninety years this Court has held that the

Stevens treaty nght of taking fish includes the right of using

‘he property, and that neither state-law principles nor the

qual Footing Doctrine can impair that right. In light of this

serra 1 law, petitioners’ claims of conflict ring hollow.

A. Right of Access

UPOW and the Alexander petitioners present the

broadest challenge, arguing that the treaty fishing mght does

not provide for a tribal right of access to privately owned

tidelands to take shellfish. They argue that the Ninth

Circuit’s decision “is an unprecedented imposition of tribal

usufructuary rights on private property.” Alexander Pet. 12

See State q.2; Alexander q.1; Growers q.2; UPOW qq.1, 3

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Doctrine

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The Equal Footin:

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gulation of the mght. It only fixes in the land

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SeMe! ts as enab es 1e ry tO De CExerClISecad

S. at 384 Ever since Winans, the federal

ano . Tne er 1 ' | >it } held r)

iding in the decisions ultimately upheld in ,

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sel, see 384 F. Supp. at 401) have consistently held

Footing Doctrine not to affect the scope of the tr

ling rights. and state court decisions relying

trine to that end have consistently been reversed

ry ee oj 1NO P Id PRN (VY lL 10A1

Washington \ Tulee, 109 P.2d 280 (Wash MG

U.S. 681 (1942)

Petitioners pve: suggest that Winans 1

suse this case involves shellfish rather than salmon. B

y do not aes that the nght of taking shellfish is part

broader right of taking fish, and Winans’ holding that tl

nited States overrode the equal footing presumption so tha

2 tribes could exercise their fishing rights 1s therefore

quarely applicable. Winans admits of no sypescriane: in tl

ard between different types of fisheries, and the facts

t either. As the district court found (and as petitione

vn experts testified), the taking of salmon include

tensive use of tidelands for “beach _ seines, tid

poundment traps, stake nets and reef nets.”” App. 83

7 “70

384 F. Supp. at 352, 360-61, 370, 378. Indeed, as

aties expressly provide, the fishing right even includes tl

to “erect[] temporary houses for the purpose of curins

io]

[hese aspects of salmon fishing affect use of tidelan

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ways similar to the taking of shellfish, particular!

stringent limitations imposed bel n 1

hing on private tidelands.~” Thi

petitioners are argu

Winans holding because the proviso makes th

rary, they are forced to ignore the findings of the courts below

United States intended to guarantee to the tribes, and

ey were reserving, a permanent right of access to tl

tural shellfish beds, App. 27-28, 69-70, and that the provi

ludes the tribes from harvesting shellfish from artificial beds creat

78. For the same reason the asserted rule

ettlers. App. 26,

Ra Horse. 163 U.S. 504 (1896) and (Crow Trib

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lhe Court of Appeals Created No Conflict in It

Interpretation of the Shellfish Proviso.

The Court of Appeals Correctly Reviewed

Proviso Meaning De Novo and Subsidiary fF:

for Clear Error.

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argue tnal ne LOU yy ._ppeal 11d

the 1 t t rt nel r) ‘eoardin

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or wu real shellfishing proviso and tnadl

1 error brou it into conflict with the decisions

—

‘its and of this Court. The Court of Appeal

xpressly stated that it was conducting de no\

App. 16, and its opinion bears that statement

urt’s conclusion was “that the district court’s reasot

of the Proviso is correct,’ App. 26 (emphas

d). not just that the analysis was not clearly erroneou

xplaining its ‘'ecision, moreover, the court emphasized

ral points, reasoning that petitioners’ interpretations

re “totally inconsistent” with the repeat

ises made by the United States’ negotiators to preser

tribes’ access to their fisheries, App. 27, and that

ners’ expansive reading of the proviso is flatly at odd

the “black-letter canon[]” that textual provisos are to

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y construed. App. 28. .nalysis of this sort }

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Petitioners attack the Court

it should ‘“‘review for clear error all of the district cour

findings of historical fact, including its findings regardu

the treaty negotiators’ intentions, [and that it would} th

review de novo whether the district court reached the prop

onclusion as to the meaning of the Shellfish Proviso gi\

those findings.” App. 16. However, none of the decisiot

ited by petitioners contains any statement at odds with

lescription of the proper standard of review — indeed

one even discusses the standard of review appropriate

onsidering a district court’s subsidiary “finding

historical fact.” There simply is no conflict betwee

ourt of Appeals’ statement of law on this point al

found in any other cited decision

Nor is there any error in the Court of Appea!

Petitioners mistakenly assume that whenever an app

urt reviews a legal conclusion de novo, it should

view de novo all component parts of t

incorrect. This Court has repeatedly noted that

al court conclusion is appropriately classified

iw, an appellate court should review for

ubsidiary findings of historical fact

In Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 69

<ample, this Court held that “determinations of rea

suspicion and probable cause should be reviewed de no\

ippeal,” but “hasten[ed] to point out that a reviewing c

hould take care .. . to review findings of historical fact

for clear error.” /d. at 699. Similarly, in Miller v. Fer

474 U.S. 104 (1985), this Court held that while

oluntariness of a confession is a legal question sub)

plenary federal review on habeas, “subsidiary fa

questions, such as whether a drug has the properties

truth serum or whether in fact the police engaged

ntimidation tactics alleged by the defendant, are entitled

the presumption of correctness attaching to tf

leterminations].” /d. at 112 (citations omitted). Fed. R. ‘

P. 52(a) simply does not “exclude certain categories

factual findings from the obligation of a court of appeal

accept a district court’s findings unless clearly erroneou

Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 287 (1982). TI

is no less true where a factual finding serves as a predic

<

a i€ gal conclusion reviewed de nove

24

The decision below was fully consistent with these

principles. In the district court, petitioners raised a host of

factual allegations regarding the knowledge and intentions of

the individual treaty negotiators. They asserted, for example,

that the American negotiators lacked knowledge of the

shellfish industry and in drafting the proviso would have

looked instead to other ‘frontier contexts” like mining or

agriculture. App. 59. They further asserted that even if the

negotiators had known about the shellfishing industry, they

would have distinguished between the east and west coast

‘ndustries. and that there were no uniform industry practices

regarding the staking or cultivating of beds. See, @.g.,

Growers Pet. 5, 8. They likewise asserted that the Indian

negotiators had no knowledge of shellfishing industry

practices, uniform or not. Id. at 7. These were factual

allegations, and after a three-week trial the district court

rejected them all on the basis of “compelling and persuasive”

evidence to the contrary. App. 55. In reviewing those

claims on appeal, it was entirely appropriate for the Court of

Appeals to show deference to the district court’s findings of

fact regarding them. Rule 52(a) dictated that it do no less.

Employing a deferential standard of review with respect

to subsidiary factual findings is also fully consistent with this

Court’s decisions. Contrary to petitioners’ repeated claims,

for example, this Court in Fishing Vessel did not engage in a

plenary review of disputed facts as to the knowledge and

intentions of the Stevens treaty negotiators. Rather, it cited

extensively to the district court’s findings on those points

and conducted its treaty interpretation on the basis of those

findings. See, e.g., 443 U.S. at 664-69, 676-77 (citing to the

district. court’s findings for the proposition that

“{c]ontemporaneous documents make it clear that [the

negotiators] recognized the vital importance of the fisheries

to the Indians and wanted to protect them from the risk that

non-Indian settlers might seek to monopolize their fisheries”

(emphasis added)).~”

The Alexander petitioners cite to three other decisions of this Court,

Alexander Pet. 27, but again there 1s no tension with the decision below.

None of those decisions contains any standard of review discussion. Nor

do there appear to have been any disputed issues of historical fact on

which the lower courts had been required to make findings.

QO alli€ve a conflict in none OIL those

nad tne respective district courts resolved al

yuted issues of historical fact, so these decisions prov!

guidance as to the standard of review that the c1

ld employ in such a situation.’ Moreover, hig

ogous cases from those circuits demonstrate that th

yuld take the same approach as did the court below. |

le petitioners insist that treaties are just like statutes, tl

in fact a combination of contract and statute, and b

Li

and_ statutory principles of interpretati

ied to them.~ See O'Connor vy. United States, 4

(1986): Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 6/75

universal rule with respect to contracts 1

are disputed issues of historical fact pert

|

ning the intent of the contracting parties

rt’s resolution of those issues is reviewed for cle:

National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Circle, In

986, 989 (CAS 1990) ( “[I]f the interpretation o!

t turns on the consideration of extrinsic eviden

} r I. ~~ B _ , hea v

as evidence of the inient of the partle s, the standal

, 99 , ae

I< . ATi TT > PmMmnanaci vara.

| Pe) Cleary erroneous (\empnasls aUuuaUc

} nm: J —-) 3 424 ¥ ~ “AA 1

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rougen v. Alageway, 26 F.2d 132, 135 (CA4 1934

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VL adi avludl que LLOT] IiVO il ne | ALWV i} Clali

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factual determination subdj¢é to re

dence is conflicting.””); Washington Hosp. \ White, 3%

EF 2d 1294 (CA3 1989) (same); North Cent Airlines, Inc

Continental Oil Co., 574 F.2d 582, 586-87 (CADC 197

ame). The Ninth Circuit decision honored that rule here

.d there is no conflict on which to base a grant of certioral

The Growers complain that deferring to ubsidiar

a indings puts an appellate court In the position

) esting deferring on the ultimate issue o! treat)

‘aning. This is not so. The Growers confuse a district

ourt’s | indings regarding the treaty negotiators ‘knowledg

lesires with the ultimate question of the United Stat

In some cases the evidence regard

4

1 the tribes’ intent.

former might be equivocal, and where the district cou

‘cht draw one conclusion from that indeterminacy,

opellate court might as a legal matter draw another

er cases. however, the findings might be so strong a

nt reasonably only in one direction. This 1s such a case

The district court found that the American treal

‘tiators were familiar with the terms and practices ol

fish industry as they prevailed on both the east coast

the Washington Territory (indeed, George Gibbs’ writi

plicitly equate the two). App. 64-660, 71. It further be

at the treating Indians had knowledge of those terms and

ictices by virtue of their exposure to them at Shoalws

App. 65-66. And it found that the choice of the ten

ds staked or cultivated” in the shellfish proviso was

‘dent. but that “staked” and “‘cultivated” beds were wide!

derstood to refer to beds of shellfish created by citize

ere natural shellfish beds of that type did not exist. Ap]

78. These findings do strongly suggest the conclusio!

he treaty prohibits tribal shellfishing only from artifici

but that the evidence here is so strong does not mea!

a less deferential standard of review should

ployed, any more than a different standard of revie'

‘ld be called for where a trial court determines |

nfession was involuntary based on factual findings U

Ter

?

fendant had been tortured before confessing

To the contrary, the weight of the evidence provide

other reason for denying certiorari. The district cour

peatedly described the proof in support of the tnbe

terpretation of the proviso as “compelling and persuasive

LAT]

55. and the Court of Appeals was clearly of the

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heavily record-based and _ factbot und inquiry already

conducted by the two courts below betray a fundamental!

misunderstanding of this Court’s role and do not present a

basis for certiorari.

V. This Case Presents No Opportunity To Revisit Well-

Settled Law Regarding Laches.

Following an unbroken line of precedent, the courts

below held that the doctrine of “laches or estoppel 1s not

available to defeat Indian treaty rights” in a case such as this

App. 28 (quoting Swim v Bergland, 696 F.2d 712, 718 (CA9

1983), and citing Board of County Comm'rs v. United States,

208 IIS. 343. 350-51 (1939)). The Growers and the

property owners challenge this holding (the State does not

‘ise the argument), but allege no circuit split. Certiorar

hould be denied on this basis ‘alone

y

Pointing to the dissent in ¢ ‘ounty of Oneida v. Oneida

‘ndian Nation. 470 U.S. 226 (1985), the Growers claim that

ncertainty exists as to whether a tribe, proceeding by itself,

may be subject to the bar of laches. Not only has the alleged

incertainty failed to create any circuit split, but in this case

the United States has sued along with the tnbes for

vindication of the tnbes’ treaty rights. It is clear beyond

\vil (and petitioners make no claim to the contrary) that the

rpretation”). They argue that the proviso prohibits tribal harvesting

rom “any beds,” as if the overwhelming ev idence as to the meaning «

taked or cultivated” modifier does not matter. They claim that the

irts below relied on a technical interpretation of east coast shellfish

ww. when those courts canvassed a wide variety of non-technical

ials showing that the American public in general, and the treaty

sotiators in particular, were familiar with the terms and practices of the

Ilfish industry, and that the treating Indians understood those practice

virtue of their exposure to them at Shoalwater Bay. App 26, 59-.

argue that the courts should have deferred to a 1905 letter from the

‘smmissioner of Indian Affairs, even though that letter does not discu

roviso. had its reasoning rejected by Winans 45 days after it wa

ritten, and is in conflict with a C ommissioner” s opinion written closer

time to the treaties. ER 1161-63; App. 76-77. Finally, they argue that

e holdings below render the proviso duplicative of the treaties’ “usual

‘nd accustomed” limitation, when in fact the tribes’ usual an

custome grounds and stations are broad areas within which there ex1

y locations containing only artificial shellfish beds, which the tribe

‘al i harvest were it not for the proviso

si

LS]. 196 (1926): a | ( nilea Witale

dp} Y Li¢ »( Lal a

" ‘ ; f : thy tr he ‘ ) 7 ] orf

ap at a 145 bE CLLaA LrIUGS Vevaddd \ C/FLLiC

1 1 AX ’ >| > sal are

141-42 (1983); Board of Coun

308 U.S. at 351; United States v. Minnesota,

/ fates \ California

advocated by

46, 757 (1993) [he position

| | | , .

rs therefore has no relevance to the outcom«¢ [

Petitioners’ Overstated Claims of Hardship Do

Support a Rewriting of the Treaties.

roughout their arguments, petitioner i

ns of the courts below are highly unfair and wil

stating impact on them. While clearly design

der sympathy th ums are both fa

' ind an inappropriate D ror certiorari

com mpossible to square petitioner

th tl holding belov Phu vi

ler and UPOW petitioners allege that unfettered

to their propertie will ause them

ivenienct and emotional harm the nov

wledge tl tringent limitations that the courts b

sed OF ich access in response to their concerns

nay harvest shellfish from private tidelands onl

out of every year (with slight increases fo!

rties), and they may do so only after having give

it least a month’s notice and after having cond

rm y definiti e| guantifyin t

r e on tnose ti 1 | | ADD }.-4

nract : tear t .

T |

‘

30

Circuit remanded to the district court the question of the

natural productivity of the growe’s’ beds. The tribes have

already conceded, however, that virtually all of the growers’

oyster and mussel beds are artificial, App. 106, exempting

approximately 66% of the total value of the shellfish

commercially harvested from Washington tidelands from

any tribal share. PL-988, Tbl. 50. The remaining 34% of the

commercial harvest is largely in the form of clams, and here

again it is clear that much of the growers’ production results

from their efforts. The total tribal share of the natural

production will therefore likely be very small compared to

the growers’ overall harvest.

Petitioners, of course, make no mention of the hardship

and poverty suffered by the tribes because of years of

exclusion from their fisheries. Even more fundamentally,

petitioners’ allegations of harm cannot serve as a basis for

interpreting what the treaties mean. It is a cardinal rule that

“even Indian treaties cannot be rewritten or expanded

beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed injustice.”

Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423,

432 (1943). See also Northwestern Bands of Shoshone

Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353 (1945). This rule

is often applied to the detriment of Indian tribes; it applies

with equal force when non-Indians seek to rewrite treaty

terms to avoid a claimed injustice. This Court is simply not

in the business of recrafting treaty promises that only

Congress may amend, and petitioners’ overstated claims of

harm therefore do not create a basis for certiorari.

CONCLUSION

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

RIYAZ A. KANJI PHILLIP E. KATZEN

WILLIAMS AND CONNOLLY Counsel of Record

725 12th Street N.W. COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES

Washington, D.C. 20005 101 Yesler Way, Suite 301

(202) 434-5000 Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 464-0838

Attorneys for Respondents the Jamestown, Lower Elwha and Port

Gamble Bands of S’Klaillams, Nisqually, Nooksack, Sauk-Suiattle,

Skokomish, Squaxin Island, Stillaguamish and Upper Skagit Tribes

(Additional Attorneys and Respondents Continued)

DANIEL RAAS

HARRY JOHNSEN

OFFICE OF THE

RESERVATION ATTORNEY

Attorneys for the Lummi Indian Tribe

1503 “E” Street

P.O Box 5746

Bellingham, WA 98227-5746

(360) 647-0234

RICHARD BERLEY

JOHN ARUM

MARK SLONIM

ZIONTZ, CHESTNUT, VARNELL,

BERLEY & SLONIM

Attorneys for the Makah Tribe

2101 Fourth Avenue

Suite 1230

Seattle, WA 98121-2331

(206) 448-1230

BILL TOBIN

Attorney for the Nisqually Tribe

1209 Courthouse Square

P.O. Box 1425

Vashon, WA 98070

(206) 463-3147

KEVIN R. LYON

RON WHITENER

Attorneys for the

Squaxin Island Tribe

112 East Fourth Avenue

Suite 200

Olympia, WA 98501-1103

(360) 786-5005

MASON D. MORISSET

MORISSET, SCHLOSSER,

AYER & JOZWIAK

Attorney for the Tulalip Tribes

1115 Norton Building

801 Second Avenue

Seattle, WA 98104-1509

(206) 386-5200

ANNETTE M. KLAPSTEIN

JOHN HOWARD BELL

DEBRA S. O’GARA

LAW OFFICE OF THE

PUYALLUP TRIBE

Attorneys for the Puyallup Tribe

2002 East 28th Street

Tacoma, WA 98404

(253) 597-6200

ROBERT L. OTSEA, JR.

ALAN STAY

Attorneys for the Muckleshoot

Indian Tribe

39015 172nd Avenue S.E.

Auburn, WA 98002

(253) 939-3311

RUTH KENNEDY

GARVEY, SCHUBERT

& BARER

Attorneys for the Quileute Tribe

1191 Second Avenue

18th Floor

Seattle, WA 98101-2939

(206) 464-3939

32

KATHRYN NELSON

EISENHOWER & CARLSON PLLC

Attorneys for the Port Gamble,

Lower Elwha and Jamestown Bands

of S'Klallams and the

Skokomish Tribe

1201 Pacific Avenue

1200 Wells Fargo Plaza

Tacoma, WA 98402

(253) 572-4500

NETTIE ALVAREZ

RICHARD RALSTON

RALSTON & ALVAREZ

Attorneys for the Hoh Tribe

1420 Fifth Avenue

Suite 2200

Seattle, WA 98101

(206) 224-2882

ALLAN E. OLSON

ALIX FOSTER

Attorneys for the

Swinomish Indian Community

P.O. Box 817

LaConner, WA 98257

(360) 466-3163

EDWARD G. MALONEY

Attorney for the Upper Skagit Tribe

2284 Community Plaza

Sedro Woolley, WA 98284

(360) 856-5501

JEFFREY JON BODE

Attorney for the Nooksack Tribe

215 West Holly Street, #G-7

P.O. Box 6092

Bellingham, WA 98227-6092

(360) 734-4219

HAROLD CHESNIN

MATHEWS, GARLINGTON-

MATHEWS & CHESNIN- |

Attorney for the

Upper Skagit Tribe

219 South Washington

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 621-7557

JOHN SLEDD

Attorney for the

Suquamish Tribe

P.O. Box 498

Suquamish, WA 98392

(360) 598-3311

RICHARD REICH

Attorney for the

Quinault Indian Nation

P.O. Box 189

1214 Aalis

Taholah, WA 98587

(350) 276-8211