Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Laguna v. California Board of Education
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j 992058 APR 24 2000
OFFICE OF Ide GOERS
No.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Anited States
JESSE LAGUNA, BARBARA VICKROY, RENEE SILVA,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Petitioners,
Vv.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent,
ESCONDIDO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, PAUMA SCHOOL
DISTRICT, VALLEY CENTER UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,
ESCONDIDO UNION ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT, SAN
PASQUAL UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Real Parties In Interest.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
- California Court of Appeal,
Fourth Appellate District
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
WILLIAM G. GILLESPIE
UNITED STATES JUSTICE FOUNDATION
2091 E. Valley Parkway, Suite 1-C
Escondido, CA 92027
(760) 741-8086
Attorney for Petitioners
WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 -— WASHINGTON, D. C. 20001
ad
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
IS THE RIGHT TO VOTE INFRINGED WHERE A
TAXING DISTRICT FUNNELS EARMARKED BOND
MONEY, WITHOUT VOTER APPROVAL, FROM ITS
INTENDED DISTRICT INTO A PROJECT IN AN-
OTHER DISTRICT?
IS “TAXATION WITHOUT REPRESENTATION” AN
INTEREST SO FUNDAMENTAL THAT IT INVOKES
STRICT SCRUTINY?
IS THE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PETITION
VIOLATED WHEN THERE IS “TAXATION WITH-
OUT REPRESENTATION? ”
(i)
il
LIST OF ALL PARTIES
All parties are named in the caption of this case. To
Petitioners’ knowledge, there are no parent companies or
non-wholly owned subsidiaries of the parties.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ................
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PE EE PREF MUIR UMD seniesesscesscsssnssssenccnsesescansscves
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS AND ORDERS
EER PIRI MES GUE PRIDE ccninirescsscnsscsoscnccssncscenasensce
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL BASIS ...........
CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS
INVOLVED IN THE CASE ................ccccecesceseesceeeeee
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..............cccccescesceeeseeeeeeeee
ARGUMENTS AMPLIFYING AND SUPPORTING
sec SETS an aici
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A. “STRICT SCRUTINY” IS THE PROPER
STANDARD FOR VOTING RIGHTS
CASES WHEN “FUNDAMENTAL IN-
TERESTS” ARE PRESENT . .......................
1. The residents of the City of Escondido
were substantially affected by the
redistricting election as they will incur
tax obligations for_the benefit of Valley
Center Unified School District but will
be deprived of all political rights ............
2. In light of the obligations visited upon
the residents of the City of Escondido,
the right to vote in a redistricting
election is fundamental and, thus,
exclusion of the City of Escondido
voters must be viewed with “strict
SESE REESE Oe an eae a
Page
iV
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued
Page
B. REASONS WHY THE ISSUES PRE-
SENTED FOR REVIEW MERIT THE
GRANTING OF THE PETITION .................... 10
Bhs Cra i IIT -aitlsncsscissnsainenicciiomatcannaurbannieciaasoumen 12
APPENDIX
A. OPINIONS AND ORDERS ENTERED IN
Fes Gili scabinsesinantislncsiiacndeakcatsiltasahanadaonlipaitiaiie la
1. Order and Transcript of Trial Court's
POE, sina’ iecisecsichintcinnensielbiiacdutsibinnapaiabaan la
2. Unpublished Written Opinion = of
California's Fourth District Court of
DIE ciavtnnnisiiiusienainsniniichiiaplidtiabannlenialicenain 12a
3. Denial of Petition by the Supreme Court of
CI iisiniicientieinreccnintanened Riactcsidiiadbevaaudireia 30a
B. OTHER ESSENTIAL MATERIAL
WUE CE CUI ascckirniinitccicriniesinnncsnnisenitinatintdbahiaisiink 3la
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: Page
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216 (1984)................. 7
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.-134 (1972) uu... 7
Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686 (1973).............008 7
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204
; IN shi eal ca ibn i tins nidat 9, 10, 11
Eastern R. Conf. v. Noerr Motor, 365 U.S. 127
RINT ciaaiciadiicliclocnninsscidahincelcaciebciapbectihinhsiaiealecanoneindeitepiinnss 12
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S.
EIGER ESET Sakae ain Dennen ee cae 6
Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975) ........... eee 7,8, 10, 11
In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973)......cceceeesseeeees 7
Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621
__ MRNEISRE TES SoS ie! COE AC ae Pe 6
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973)..............08 7
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1962).....00..00000000000000 r
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)... 6
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)........... 4,6
Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 US.
Ne tied alias anads iasinaiinieansntannsivanviighancnns 5
Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. | (1964)...........000.. 5,6
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Constitution, First Amendment ..................... 11
U.S. Constitution, Fourteenth Amendment, Sec-
SNC sited idl tsidabiah visite Rectaedabactadieaiusiiaeeaandiadsanensiaadanie 2
FEDERAL STATUTES
Title 28, U.S.C. Section 1257(a).......000...secccccscseeess |
STATE STATUTES
California Education Code, Section 48209. 1......... 9
OTHER AUTHORITIES
The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (2nd ed.
NN edith facta aces ae cdi lpaiesettinntiniadimeheniienenees 12
CITATIONS TO OPINIONS AND
ORDERS ENTERED IN THE CASE
The judgment of the trial court, the unpublished written
opinion of the California Fourth District Court of Appeal,
Division 1, and the denial of review by the California
Supreme Court all appear in Appendix A to this Petition.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONAL BASIS
The opinion of the California Supreme Court from which
petitioner Laguna seeks review was issued on January 25,
2000, and became final on that date. An extension to file this
petition was (on April 27, 2000) granted until June 26, 2000,
under Rule 14.5. As such, this petition is timely filed. The
jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.
§1257(a), which provides as follows:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court
of a state in which a decision could be had, may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United
States is drawn in question or where the validity of a
statute of any state is drawn in question on the ground of
its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws
of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege,
Or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the
Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any
commission held or authority exercised under, the
United States.
| CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER PROVISIONS
| INVOLVED IN THE CASE.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
States, in pertinent part, as follows:
Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the . . . right
of the people . . . to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
2
The Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, states, in pertinent part, as
follows:
[Njor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The voters in a public high school district (“ESCONDIDO
UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT” or “EUHSD”) passed
a bond in the amount of $42,976,000 in June of 1996. The
bond money was earmarked to be used for repair and
renovation of EUHSD’s schools, as well as to build a new
high school (“WALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL”) in a
community in the eastern portion of the district. Sixteen
million dollars of the bond money was used to build
VALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL on fifty-two acres of
land owned by EUHSD. As construction of VALLEY
CENTER HIGH SCHOOL was nearing completion, the State
Board of California (“STATE BOARD”) approved a
redistricting plan in which two elementary school districts in
the eastern portion of the high school district could unify and
became a kindergarten through 12th grade school district
(“VALLEY CENTER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT”).
The California State Board of Education (“STATE
BOARD”) ruled that only residents within the proposed new
school district could vote on the matter. The residents of the
more populous City of Escondido were prohibited from
voting on the redistricting.
VALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL was completed and
ne residents of the proposed new school district voted to
form VALLEY CENTER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT.
Ho” 2ver, residents of the remainder of EUHSD (City of
Escondido) are required to pay off the $16,000,000 of bond
money used to build VALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL
3
for the next twenty-five years. The payment will be in the
form of property taxes. However, residents of the City of
Escondido will have no representation on VALLEY
CENTER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT’s board of
trustees. The reason is that residents of the City of Escondido
will be prohibited from voting for members of the VALLEY
CENTER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT board of trustees.
Moreover, children from the City of Escondido have no right
to attend VALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL.
Petitioners filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the
Superior Court of California in and for the County of San
Diego. Said petition was denied. The California Court of
Appeal for the Fourth District affirmed the Superior Court's
denial of the writ. The California Supreme Court denied
review. -
The Federal questions on which Petitioners now seek
review were raised at the trial court in the Wnit as follows:
By excluding residents of the City of Escondido from vot-
ing on school redistricting, STATE BOARD denied Laguna
the equal protection of the laws resulting in (1) a loss of
voting rights, (2) a loss of his First Amendment right to
petition his government for redress of grievances, and (3) his
being taxed without benefit of representation?’
The trial court passed on it in the following manner in its
verbal order (references are to the transcript of the order, a
copy of which is in Appendix A-1)
It denied Petitioners’ Petition for Writ of Mandate by
noting that the Board's authority is “plenary” and of “wide
discretion” [p. 8a] in the area of school redistricting; and that
the voting restrictions imposed by the Board bore a rational
relationship to a legitimate State purpose. [p. 4a].
' This is not a quote but a concise summary of ¥J 21 and 26 of the
Writ.
4
The Federal questions were also raised in California’s 4th
District Court of Appeal. In Petitioners’ Appeal and Reply
Briefs the issues were raised in a manner similar to that of the
trial court.
The California 4th District Court of Appeal passed on it in
the following manner: It noted that the State has plenary
power over public education, the convoluted bureaucratic
maze involved acted as a safeguard, and thus the case did not
sufficiently implicate the right to vote so as to review the
denial of such right under a strict scrutiny standard. [p. 20a-
2la of Unpublished Opinion, a copy of which appears in
Appendix A-2].
The Federal questions were raised in the California
Supreme Court by Petition filed on December 8, 1999. These
current questions were specified in the “Questions for
Review” section of the petition as follows:
When a taxing district funnels earmarked bond money,
without voter approval, to a project in another district,
will strict scrutiny apply?
As the Supreme Court denied review, it gave no opinion, nor
did it pass on the Federal questions involved.
ARGUMENTS AMPLIFYING AND
SUPPORTING WRIT
I. INTRODUCTION
The case before this Court involves the issue of whether
there were any “fundamental interests” present when
Petitioners were denied the opportunity to vote on school
redistricting. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U. S. 618, 638
(1969). Petitioners assert that paying taxes for twenty-five
years to pay for a school in another district, in which they (1)
receive no political representation, (2) have no standing to
petition their government for a redress of grievances, and, (3)
receive no educational benefits, involves such “fundamental
5
interests” that it was indeed unconstitutional to prevent
Petitioners from voting on the neighboring school
redistricting.
In contrast, the State Courts of California have ruled in this
case that the above interests are either not fundamental or
have not been invoked; and thus that the “rational basis test”
was appropriately used by the State of California to deny
Petitioners the right to vote. In addition, the lower courts
claim that the State of California’s power in this matter is
“plenary.” The heart of the matter is whether there were
enough fundamental interests present to require a review
using “strict scrutiny.”
A. “STRICT SCRUTINY” IS THE PROPER
STANDARD FOR VOTING RIGHTS CASES
WHEN “FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS” ARE
PRESENT.
STATE BOARD classified the voters of the City of
Escondido and the remaining part of the EUHSD school
district, VALLEY CENTER and PAUMA VALLEY
(hereinafter referred to collectively as “VALLEY CEN-
TER”). The City of Escondido was classified as an urban area
and VALLEY CENTER as a rural area. In view of said
classifications, STATE BOARD used the “rational basis test”
to eliminate the City of Escondido from the democratic
process based upon (1) its population, and (2) speculation as
to either how the voters of the City of Escondido would cast
their ballots, or speculation as to their motivation in casting
their ballots.
True enough, in most equal protection cases a classification
need only bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state
purpose. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 US.
164, 172 (1972). But such an exception to this rule (requiring
a compelling state interest for the statute or rule in question to
survive) is where (as here) “fundamental interests” are at
6
stake. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). Thus,
the initial question in this case is whether voting qualifies as a
“fundamental interest.”
Voting is perhaps the most fundamental of rights which are
at the core of our system of government. Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964). The Court noted:
No right is more precious in a free country than that of
having a voice in the election of those who make the
laws under which, as good citizens, we must live. Other
rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined. Our Constitution leaves no room for
classification of people in a way that unnecessarily
abridges this right. In urging the people to adopt the
Constitution, Madison said in No. 57 of The Federalist:
Who are to be the electors of the Federal
representatives? Not the rich more than the poor,
not the learned more than the ignorant, not the
haughty heirs of distinguished names more than the
humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune.
The electors are to be the great body of the people
of the United States.
Id., at 17-18.
The right to vote is one of those rights that is “preservative
of other basic civil and political rights. Reynolds v. Sims, 377
US 533, 562 (1964). As such, any alleged impairment of the
right must be subjected to “strict scrutiny” by the court.
Kramer v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969).
Inasmuch as the right to vote is a fundamental right, any
classification or restriction limiting the ability to exercise the
right must meet, under a strict scrutiny review, the dictates of
the equal protection guarantee before a court can sustain the
measure as constitutional. Harper v. Virginia Board of
Elections, 383 US 663, 670 (1966). Thus, when states impose
-
restrictions on the right to vote, courts review those
restrictions under a “strict scrutiny” standard. Under this
severe standard, a discriminatory law will not be given effect
unless its classification, first, promotes a compelling state
interest; second, the classification is necessary to achieve the
government's goal; and third, the classification is narrowly
drawn to achieve the goal by the least restrictive means
possible. Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219, 227 (1984); In
re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-722 (1973); Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 217 (1982). In essence, “strict scrutiny” means that
courts must independently review the voting regulation or
restriction. In the present case, STATE BOARD used the
“rational basis test,” rather than “strict scrutiny,” to restrict
the voting rights of the residents of the City of Escondido.
It is true that a restriction can be upheld if it is related to an
important or overriding state interest. For example, this Court
has upheld reasonable age, citizenship, and residency
requirements. Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973);
Burns v. Fortson 410 U.S. 686, 687 (1973).
However, the “compelling interest” test must be applied if
a classification has a “real and appreciable impact” upon the
faimess and integrity of the electoral process. Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972). To determine this, courts
look to whether the election will cause the disenfranchised
group to be “substantially affected” by the election's
outcome. Hill v. Stone, 421 US 289, 296 (1975).
1. The residents of the City of Escondido were
substantially affected by the redistricting
election as they will incur tax obligations for
the benefit of Valley Center Unified School
District but will be deprived of all political
rights.
A group of citizens is “substantially affected” by the
outcome of an election when said election will (1) provide
8
them with benefits and/or (2) result in obligations incurred.
Id.
In the case at bar, the redistricting which took place as a
result of the unification election has obliged the residents of
the City of Escondido to pay taxes for twenty-five years into
another school district. In essence, they will be required to
pay the majority of the $16,000,000 bond debt used to build
VALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL through property taxes.
However, despite having to pay taxes for the benefit of
another school district, the residents of the City of Escondido
will have no opportunity to vote on members of the Board of
Trustees of the new school district. They will thus be without
any elected officials to represent them. As it now stands, the
residents of City of Escondido are primarily the ones paying
for VALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL. The taxpayers of
the City of Escondido will be paying on the bond, which
made construction of VALLEY CENTER HIGH SCHOOL
possible, for the next twenty-five years. However, Escondido
taxpayers do not reside in the new school district and thus
will not be allowed to vote on the new school district’s school
board elections. The essence of the matter is that the residents
of the City of Escondido are being taxed without the benefit
of representation. :
In addition, they will have no standing to petition the new
school district's school board for redress of grievances.
Pursuant to the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, all residents have the right to petition their
government for the redress of grievances. This is a
fundamental right. The trustees of the new school district will
not represent the residents of the City of Escondido even
though said residents pay taxes for the benefit of said school
district. The heart of the matter is that the taxpayers of the
City of Escondido will pay taxes but will receive no political
benefits, including First Amendment rights, for paying said
taxes. As a result, the residents of the City of Escondido have
9
a very strong interest in the issue of redistricting. This interest
is not merely financial but is one of core political rights.
Further, the children residing in the City of Escondido have
no right to attend the new high school built with the funds
coming from the City of Escondido.” Thus, for this reason
also, the residents of the City of Escondido have a
fundamental interest in the outcome of the redistricting
election:
Presumptively, when all citizens are affected in
important ways by a governmental decision subject to a
referendum, the Constitution does not permit .. . the
exclusion of otherwise qualified citizens from the
franchise.
City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski 399 U.S. 204, 209 (1970).
As this Court found in City of Phoenix,
Not only do those persons excluded from the franchise
have a great interest in approving or disapproving
municipal improvements, but they will also contribute,
as directly as property owners, to the servicing of the
bonds by the payment of taxes to be used for this
purpose.
Id. at 210.
In like manner, the residents of the City of Escondido have
an interest relative to their obligation to pay for the servicing
of the bonds by the payment of taxes which built VALLEY
CENTER HIGH SCHOOL.
2 Pursuant to the California Education Code, a student may submit an
application to a foreign school district to attend a school within said
district. However, the foreign school district has no obligation to grant the
application of the student. California Education Code §48209.1.
10
2. In light of the obligations visited upon the
residents of the City of Escondido, the right to
vote in a redistricting election is fundamental
and, thus, exclusion of the City of Escondido
voters must be viewed with “strict scrutiny.”
Since the redistricting involves financial obligations and
political rights, all persons within EUHSD are substantially
affected by the election. As this was an election of general
interest, the restrictions placed upon the residents of the City
of Escondido should be viewed with strict scrutiny:
Our cases, however, have not held or intimated that only
property-based classifications are suspect; in an election
of general interest, restrictions on the franchise of any
character must meet a stringent test of justification.
Hill v. Stone, supra 421 U.S. at 298.
STATE BOARD used a “rational basis” test to determine
that there were differences in the interests between residents
of the City of Escondido and those residing within the
proposed unification area. As a matter of law, a difference in
interest is not enough for a governmental entity to justify
restrictions on the voting franchise under a “strict scrutiny”
analysis. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra 399 U.S. at
212. The State entity must show that the party being deprived
of the right to vote has an interest “substantially less” than
those allowed to participate in the election. STATE BOARD
has failed to do this.
B. REASONS WHY THE ISSUES PRESENTED
FOR REVIEW MERIT THE GRANTING OF
THE PETITION.
A review of the issues presented in this case is appropriate
at this point. First, “is the right to vote infringed where a
taxing district funnels earmarked bond money, without voter
approval, from its intended district into a project in another
1]
district?” The discussion above shows that, absent a
compelling state interest, the classification which denied the
residents of the City of Escondido an opportunity to vote
despite the presence of fundamental interests was an
infringement of Constitutional proportions.
Second, “Is ‘taxation without representation’ an interest so
fundamental that it invokes strict scrutiny?” As this Court has
noted, by contributing to the servicing of the bonds by the
payment of taxes’ qualifies as a fundamental interest in its
own right. City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, supra, 399 U.S. at
210. When adding to this the fact that those paying taxes for
the benefit of another jurisdiction have no_ political
representation, it is evident that such taxation without
representation involves a fundamental interest. This Court has
never provided an analysis of this issue in this specific
context. As such, this case will provide the Court an
opportunity to clearly articulate that “taxation without
representation” is not only tyranny, but is also repugnant to
an interest so fundamental as to require strict scrutiny.
Regrettably, the State Courts in California do not see
“taxation without representation” to be a fundamental interest
requiring strict scrutiny.
Finally, the third issue for review is, “Is the First
Amendment right to petition violated when there is ‘taxation
without representation?” As described above, the residents of
the City of Escondido will be required to pay taxes for
twenty-five years into another school district. However, they
cannot vote for board members for said school district. In
other words, there is no member of the school board in the
foreign school district who represents them.
The California Courts have responded }y stating that any
member of the public can attend a school board meeting and
> This fundamental interest belongs to property owners and non-
property owners alike. Hill v. Stone, supra., 421 U.S. at 297.
12
~_
place a matter on the agenda, and thus (so it is claimed) the
right to petition has not been implicated. The issue then is
whether being allowed to place an item on a foreign school
board agenda is equivalent to having political representation.
But the mere ability to address a foreign board of trustees
does not carry the same weight as a constituent. Constituents
vote for or against their representatives; non-constituents
have no such control. This Court has stated that the right to
petition is the guarantee of “the ability of the people to make
their wishes known to their representative.” Eastern R.
Conf. v. Noerr Motor 365 U.S. 127, 139 (1961) (emphasis
added). To have any effect, the right to petition logically
requires that one has a representative to petition. Petitioners
request that this Court decide whether the First Amendment
right to petition is violated when, as here, there is “taxation
- without representation.”
Il. CONCLUSION
It has been well and truly said that “taxation without
representation is tyranny.” * In this case, Escondido residents
are being taxed yet can appeal to no_ representative.
Petitioners are thus victims of an unjust tyranny. The Petition
should be granted.
Respectfully submitted:
WILLIAM G. GILLESPIE
UNITED STATES JUSTICE FOUNDATION
2091 E. Valley Parkway, Suite 1-C
Escondido, CA 92027
(760) 741-8086
Attorney for Petitioners
Dated: June, 2000
* Attributed to James Otis (1725-1783) as the watchword of the
American Revolution. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations (2 nd ed.
1953).
APPENDICES
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APPENDIX A
[Filed Oct. 28, 1998]
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
(NORTH COUNTY BRANCH)
CASE NO. N 078926
JESSE LAGUNA, BARBARA VICKROY, RENEE SILVA,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Petitioners,
v.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
ESCONDIDO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT; PAUMA SCHOOL
DISTRICT; VALLEY CENTER UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,
ESCONDIDO UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT, SAN PASQUAL
UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Real Parties In Interest. -
ORDER DENYING PETITIONERS’
FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDATE
Petitioner’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate
was regularly heard on October 5, 1998, at 9:30 a.m. in
Department M of this court. Appearing for petitioner was
Kevin T. Snider of United States Justice Foundation and
appearing for respondent was Edmundo Aguilar, counsel for
the California State Department of Education. Appearing for
Real Parties in Interest, Escondido Union High School
District, Pauma School District and Valley Center Union
School District, was Martha Buell Scott of Miller Brown &
2a
Dannis. The matter has been fully briefed by the parties, and
oral argument has been carefully considered. The Reporter's
Partial Transcript, dated October 5, 1998, is attached hereto
as Exhibit A and incorporated by reference herein.
Good cause appearing therefor, the COURT ORDERS AS |
FOLLOWS:
The Petition is denied and the matter is dismissed in favor
of respondent.
BY ORDER OF THIS COURT
Dated: October 28, 1998
APPROVE AS TO FORM:
/s/ Kevin T. Snider
KEVIN T. SNYDER
Attorney for Petitioner
Dated: October 23, 1999
/s/ Edmundo Aguilar,
EDMUNDO AGUILAR
Attorney for Respondent
Dated: October 23, 1998
/s/ David B. Moon, Jr.
THE HONORABLE DAVDD B. MOON, JR.
JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
3a
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
NORTH COUNTY BRANCH
DEPARTMENT M BEFORE HON. DAVID B. MOON
CASE NO: N078926
JESSE LAGUNA, et al.,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Petitioners,
vs.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent.
ESCONDIDO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Real Parties of Interest.
VISTA, CALIFORNIA MONDAY OCTOBER 5, 1998
(TRANSCRIPT EXCERPT.)
THE COURT: I have enough information to make a
decision. I’ve spent quite a bit of time on this case and I’ve
penned out a tentative ruling, which I will now read into the
record as the courts ruling.
And, Pam, you can mark it from this point forward. I’m
sure counsel will want to get a copy.
This is the court’s ruling: the court, as I’ve said before,
declines to rule on specific evidentiary objections; however,
the court will disregard all evidence which is found to be
incompetent Or inadmissible, and for this proposition see
BILJAC, B-I-L-J-A-C, associates versus FIRST INTER-
STATE BANK (1990) 218 cal.app.3d 1410.
The petitioners’ request for judicial notice is granted. The
petition for writ of mandate pursuant to CCP 1085 is denied
as follows, and this is the reasoning therefore:
4a
The request for an order directing the respondent, State
Board, to set aside that portion of Its resolution for the
formation of the Valley Center Union school district, passed
July 9, 1998, which prohibits the voters in the portions of the
Escondido Union high school district line outside of the
Pauma school district and the Valley Center Union school
district from voting on the unification of the Pauma school
district and the valley center union school district and
directing respondent to require the area of voting in the
election to include the entire territory of the Escondido Union
High School District is denied.
Don’t you just hate these long sentences.
The voting restriction imposed by the board bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. That is,
avoiding an election in which the residents of the city of
Escondido, open quote, could Overwhelm the smaller number
of voters in the petitioned area, prevent those voters from
obtaining the benefits of the proposed reorganization, i.e., a
local school Government which reflects the interest of the
community, or conversely, require the transfer to take place
against the will of the petitioned area of voters and, comma,
in so doing impose a higher tax burden on the property
owners in the effected territory, closed quote.
This quote is from the petitioners’ lodged exhibit 6 pages
13 and 14.
Contrary to the petitioners’ arguments, the strict scrutiny
test does not apply to the review of the determination of the
area of election pursuant to the holding in board of
supervisors of Sacramento County versus local agency
formation commission of Sacramento County, (1992) 3 Cal.
4th 903.
This case does not come within the holding in Fullerton
Joint Union High School District versus state Board of
Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, as the instant election does
not result in an, open quote, real and appreciable impact upon
the equality, fairness, and integrity of the judicial process,
Sa
close quote, thus requiring a compelling state interest in order
to justify the area of election adopted by the board.
Petitioners argue that similar to the situation in the
Fullerton case, the area of election in this case involves a
suspect classification, that is, it will result in the exclusion of
thousands of Hispanic voters. As pointed out by the court in
the board of supervisors case. This type of classification
could justify application of strict scrutiny and was likely the
reason behind the holding in the Fullerton case. See the Board
of Supervisors case supra at 918.
However, there is no merit to the petitioners claim that
carving out an election area that merely excises a certain raw
number of minority voters has a discriminatory effect. This is
especially true where the evidence shows that the relative
number of minority voters in terms of percentages is
unchanged as a result of limiting the election area. For
reference see the petitioners, lodged exhibit 11.
There is likewise no merit to petitioners claim that they
stand to lose other fundamental Constitutional rights and that
this loss along with the financial impact on them of the
proposed unification justified application of the strict scrutiny
test. The Fundamental constitutional right delineated by
Petitioners is the first amendment right to petition their
government for redress of grievances; however, Petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that this right Will be negatively
impacted by the proposed unification.
The petitioners argue for the first time in their reply brief
that they will also be subject to taxation without rep-
resentation; however, petitioners fail to distinguish that right
from the right to petition the government for redress.
Financial Impact identified by the petitioners is the type
found to be modest, as that term was used by the court in the
Board of Supervisors case, leaving that court to conclude that
there was no justification for applying strict scrutiny to the
election area adopted by the Board.
6a
There is no merit to petitioners' claim that they were not
afforded due process of law. The agendas for the April and
May meetings before the Escondido Union High School
District Board of Trustees, those are Exhibits “C” and “D” to
the Jenkins’ declaration, demonstrate that the unification
issue was to be considered. Petitioners’ claim that these
agendas do not reflect that the board would be considering—
considering material amendments is irrelevant in.view of the
fact that the petitioners were already on notice That material
changes were necessary. And for reference, see the
petitioners’ lodged exhibit number 6. And in view of the fact
that petitioners were actually represented at the public
hearings. For reference see Exhibits “D” and “F” to the
Jenkins’ declaration.
In addition, petitioners failed to cite to authority imposing a
duty on the agency to include notice of material changes in
such matters. Petitioners' claim that they have a duty process
right to a hearing at a specific location is not supported with
authority. Petitioners have failed to demonstrate that they did
not have notice of those meetings or were not afforded an
opportunity to be heard at them. The State Board had
jurisdiction to hear the amended Petition despite m fact that
no petition was forwarded From the Escondido Union High
School District to the offices to in turn be forwarded to the
state board.
The Petitioners’ exhibit number 16 reveals that the
Escondido Union High School District was present at the
state board meeting in July of 1998 and voiced its approval of
the amended petitions. The Petitioners’ claim that the state
board did not have, open quote, official authorization, closed
quote, from The Escondido Union High School District board
is not supported with authority.
Petitioners' claim that the board lacked jurisdiction to hear
what were clearly materially amended petitions pursuant to 5
CCR section one eight seven—five seven two also lacks
merit as this regulation does not apply to the facts of this
Ta
case. that regulation expressly applies only, open quote,
following a decision by the board on a proposal petition or
appeal, close quote.
Petitioners fail to present evidence showing That prior to
July 1998, the board breached any, open quote, decision on a
proposal, petition, or appeal, close quote, using that same
language, for unification, Which would trigger 5 CCR section
18572. Also see for reference the Petitioners’ lodged exhibit 6
at page 2. '
The Petitioners’ request for an order directing the
Respondent to set aside that portion of its resolution for the
formation of the Valley Center Unified School District,
passed July 1998 in which the Pauma School District and the
Valley Center Union School District will not assume its
proportionate share of the Bonded indebtedness of the
Escondido Union High School District, and the request to
require the Pauma and Valley center district to accept their
proportionate Share of that indebtedness is also denied.
The allocation of bonded indebtedness contained in the
resolutions of the Pauma School District, the Valley Center
Union School District, and The Escondido Union High
School District adopted by the State board in July 1998 does
not constitute an abuse of discretion in that the board properly
adopted the resolution dividing the bonded indebtedness
pursuant to the education code section 35738. The petitioners’
Claim that the amended allocation is less equitable than an
allocation pursuant to education code section 35576.
Parenthetically when I write these things, I use sentences
that are too long. I think I have a verb in there.
MS. SCOTT: We won't exercise strict scrutiny, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: [have a verb in there.
They do so by ignoring the impact on the new school
district if it were to assume the entire sixteen million dollar
bonded indebtedness. See the Petitioners’ lodged exhibit
number 6.
8a
In view of the wide discretion granted to the board
pursuant to education code section 35738, it cannot be said
that the state boards’ exercise of its Is plenary powers were
fraudulent, unreasonable, or so arbitrary as to so indicate an
abuse of discretion as a—as a matter of law, and the case
citation for that is California School Employees Association
versus Pasadena Unified School District (1977) 71 cal.app.3d
328.
Have I made sufficient findings and legal rulings for
purposes of any writ or appeal, Mr. Snider?
MR. SNIDER: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And Ms. Scott?
MS. SCOTT: Your honor, yes. And I would just point
out, in the interest of clarity, that back when the court was
issuing its ruling on jurisdiction, there was a sentence about
the no petition was forwarded by the high school district to
the state board, and I believe that the word that the court
wanted to use was resolution at that point.
THE COURT: That could be. Instead of petition?
MS. SCOTT: Yes.
THE COURT: It was.
MS. SCOTT: Resolution?
THE COURT: Let me see if I can find that here.
No resolution was forwarded.
MS. SCOTT: I think that’s—
THE COURT: You are correct.
Mr. Aguilar, are there any other findings and/or legal
~ilings that I need to make to preserve your rights on appeal
or writ?
MR. SNIDER: No Your Honor. That's fine. Thank you.
THE COURT: Ms. Scott, in light of the court’s ruling, do
you want to prepare the appropriate order on this petition for
writ of mandate? Even though you weren’t the moving party.
Ms. Scott: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And circulate that for signature as to form?
MS.SCOTT: Yes
SS
9a
MR. SNIDER: Your Honor, because of this election
coming up in march and wanting to cause as little harm as
possible, we would like that the final order be done as quickly
as possible.
THE COURT: Ms. Scott, would you prepare that and
submit it so that the court will have it in 10 days?
MS. SCOTT: Thank you.
MR. AGUILAR: Thank you.
MR. SNIDER: Thank you, Your Honor.
(Brief recess.)
THE COURT: All right. Did you want this on the record?
MS.SCOTT: Yep, because it affects the tentative ruling.
THE COURT: All counsel are here again on the record.
MS. SCOTT: You had an inquiry.
MS. SCOTT: Just a detail, Your Honor. The terms Union
School District and Unified School District are terms of art
and they mean different things.
THE COURT: ! know. If I misstated that—
MS. SCOTT: It’s Escondido Union High School District
throughout the decision, and not unified.
THE COURT: Did I say union or unified?_
MS. SCOTT: You apparently did. I didn't catch it, but the
superintendent did.
THE COURT: Well, my recollection is that there’s a
Union School district and there's a Unified High School
District.
Is it Union High School?
MS. SCOTT: It’s the Union High School and it
comprises a number of little elementary districts, two of
which want to unify and become a “K” through 12 district.
THE COURT: All right. Wherever I said then Escondido
unified, I meant Escondido Union High School District.
MS. SCOTT: Right.
THE COURT: All right. With that correction—now,
there’s also an Escondido Union Schoo! District?
10a
MS.SCOTT: That’s the Elementary School District.
THE COURT: Yes
MS. SCOTT: You can’t tell the players without a
program.
THE COURT: Is there a unified in any of those districts?
MS. SCOTT: Not yet, but we eventually hope there will
be if we can have the election.
THE COURT: I’m used to San Diego unified.
MS. SCOTT: That’s correct. Unified, it means it goes all
the way from kindergarten to 12th grade.
THE COURT: Right. Pll direct the reporter’s transcript
will indicate that—will reflect wherever it says unified, if I
used that word, it should be union.
MS. SCOTT: With reference to the Escondido
Se 2 *
High School District, Yes. You used the word Unified
means Union. Unified refers with respect to the new District
that hasn’t been formed yet.
THE COURT: Thank you.
(THIS MATTER IS ADJOURNED)
lla
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ___)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO _)
I, Pamela A. Carter, CSR Certificate No. 9982, an official
reporter of the Superior Court of The State of California, in
and for the county of San Diego, hereby certify that I reported
in machine shorthand the proceedings in the within case, and
that The foregoing transcript, consisting of pages numbered |
to 12 inclusive is a true and correct transcription of the
proceedings in this case
Dated at San Diego, California, this 8th day of
October, 1988.
/s/ Pamela A. Carter,
PAMELA A. CARTER CSR #9982
Official Court Reported
12a
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
[Filed Oct. 29, 1999]
D032295
(Super. Ct. No. N78926)
JESSE LAGUNA et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
V.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant and Respondent,
ESCONDIDO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,
Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County, David B. Moon, Jr., Judge. Affirmed.
On July 8, 1998 State Board of Education (State Board)
approved a resolution to create the Valley Center Unified
School District (New District) by merging the Valley Center
Union School District (Valley Center), the Pauma School
District (Pauma) and the portion of the Escondido Union
High School District (Escondido Union) that lay within the
territorial boundaries of the Valley Center and Pauma
districts. Jesse Laguna, Barbara Vickroy and Renee Silva
(collectively Petitioners) appeal from the denial of a writ of
mandate to direct State Board to set aside the portions of the
resolution that: (1) prevented voters who reside in the
territory of Escondido Union not included in New District
from voting on the resolution to create New District and (2)
allowed New District not to assume its proportionate share of
Escondido Union's bonded indebtedness. Petitioners' contend
(1) the resolution denied them equal protection of the (a) by
Y
13a
denying them their constitutional right to vote, (b) by
disenfranchising the Hispanic community, (c) by burdening
them with taxes, (d) by taxing them without representation,
and (e) by interfering with the constitutional rights to petition
the government and to _ education; - (2) the pro-
ceedings denied Petitioners due process; (3) State Board
lacked jurisdiction to pass the resolution; and (4) State Board
abused its discretion by apportioning the bonded indebtedness
pursuant to Education Code section 35738. We affirm.
FACTS
New District covers a geographic area north and east of the
City of Escondido: It includes three rural communities and
several American Indian reservations. This area is distinct
from the City of Escondido because of its rural character and
the inland mountains, which separate it from the City of
Escondido. Until the reorganization, this area was part of
Escondido Union and had no high school within its
boundaries.
Petitioners Jesse Laguna, Barbara Vickroy and Renee Silva
are voters and taxpayers who reside in the portion of
Escondido Union not included in the reorganization of New
District. Petitioner Laguna is a second generation Mexican-
American.
On July 26, 1995, the boards of Valley Center, Pauma and
Escondido Union, and the boards of the other two elementary
districts within Escondido Union—Escondido Union
Elementary District and San Pasqual Elementary District—
filed a petition to form New District. On September 6, 1995,
the San Diego County Office of Education (County Office)
held a public meeting in Pauma and another in Valley Center
to discuss the petition. In December 1995, County Office
recommended the reorganization be approved-and forwarded
its analysis to the State Board. County office recommended
that any liabilities for Escondido Union's permanent assets be
l4a
allocated to New District based upon the relative assessed
valuation of the property within New District.
On June 4, 1996, before State Board acted upon the
petition, the voters in Escondido Union approved a
$42,976,000 bond measure. Escondido Union used
$16,000,000 of the bond proceeds to build a new high school
in Valley Center (New High School)
On October 31, 1996, the superintendents of Escondido
Union, Valley Center and Pauma asked State Board to delay
its decision for at least one year to allow Escondido Union to
build New High School and to allow the three districts to
decide how to allocate the liability for the school bond. The
districts within Escondido wanted New District to assume the
amount of the bonds used to build New High School. That
allocation would double the portion of New District's tax
rates charged for the bonded indebtedness (from $17.21 to
$34.33 per $100,000 assessed valuation) but only minimally
reduce the tax rates. in the rest of Escondido Union (from
$17.21 to $13.28). Valley Center and Pauma were unwilling
to assume the tax increase.
In December 1996, State Board held a hearing to consider
the reorganization proposal. A document produced for that
hearing reviewed the state-mandated criteria and recom-
mended the reorganization. The document specified that only
the voters within the Valley Center and Pauma districts would
vote on the reorganization and that New District would
assume the portion of the liability for the bond measure used
to build New High School. State Board postponed
consideration of the reorganization to allow the parties to
agree to an equitable division of assets and liabilities.
After negotiations, the three districts agreed to a resolution
that allocated to New District all physical property, furniture
and equipment located within its borders and no other
property except school buses, did not change the tax rate
15a
charged for the bonded indebtedness, and provided for New
District to pay $1, 000, 000 to Escondido Union.
All three districts held public meetings to discuss the
resolution and get public input. On April 2, 1998, Valley
Center and Pauma held a joint public meeting to discuss the
resolution. The school boards of Valley Center and Pauma.
each approved the resolution at public meetings held on May
14. Escondido Union discussed the resolution during three
public meetings held in Escondido on April 28, May 19 and
June 9. Petitioner Vickroy spoke against the resolution during
the May 19 and June 9 meetings. At the May 19 meeting, the
school board of Escondido Union adopted the resolution and
directed that it be forwarded to State Board to be placed on
the July 1998 agenda, with the understanding that it could be
pulled from State Board’s agenda if the questions that had
been raised at the meeting were not resolved to the
Satisfaction of the Escondido Union school board. On June 9
the school board elected not to reverse its previous approval
of the resolution.
On July 9, State Board held a public hearing to discuss the
reorganization. Petitioners Vickroy and Laguna spoke against
the resolution at that hearing. State Board approved the
resolution with a minor modification.
On August 18, Petitioners filed a petition for a writ of
mandate (C.C.P. § 1085) to set aside, vacate, or modify
portions of the resolution. The Superior Court denied the writ
on October 28.
On March 2, 1999, the voters who resided within New
District approved the resolution creating New District.
DISCUSSION
State Board’s approval Of the resolution is a quasi-
legislative act. (Fullerton Joint Union High School Dist. v.
State Bd. of Education (1982) 32 Cal.3d 779, 786 & fn. 3
as
l6a
(hereafter Fullerton) Judicial review of a quasi-legislative
decision is limited to deciding whether State Board. abused
its discretion. (/bid.), A state agency abuses its discretion
when its action is “arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in
evidentiary support .. . .” (Pitts v. Perluss (1962) 58 Cal.2d
824, 833.) “In essence, the question is whether substantial
evidence supports the agency's decision (citation], although it
has also, been stated that ‘what constitutes reasonable
evidentiary support may vary depending upon the nature of
the action. (Mike Moore’s 24 —Hour Towing v. City of San
Diego (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1306, quoting Shapell
Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th
218, 232.)
Deciding whether a state agency abused its discretion is a
question of law. (Shapell Industries, Inc. v. Governing Board,
supra, | Cal.App.4th at p. 233.) Therefore, we independently
review the trial court it’s decision. (Mike Moore’s 24-Hour
Towing v. City of San Diego, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p.
1305.)
Insofar as Petitioners challenge State Board’s action as
unconstitutional, the standard of review is different. (See
California Assn. of Psychology Providers v. Rank (1990) 51
Cal.3d 1, 11 [reviewing de novo whether regulation is
inconsistent with terms or intent of authorizing statute].) We
independently review constitutional questions. (State of Ohio
v. Barron (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 62, 67.)
I. Equal Protection
We reject Petitioners, contention that they were denied
equal protection because they were not allowed to vote on the
resolution to create New District. In most equal protection
cases, courts apply the rational basis test to decide whether
the legislative classification is “rationally related to a
legitimate governmental purpose” or “bears some fair
relationship to a legitimate public purpose.” (Board of
17a
Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Com. (1992) 3 Cal.
4th 903, 913 (hereafter Local Agency), quoting Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1985) 473 U.S. 432, 436 and
Plyler v. Doe (1982) 457 U.S. 202, 215.) If, however, the
legislation involves fundamental interests or suspect classes,
then the court must apply strict scrutiny, which requires a
showing that the classification is necessary to further a
compelling state interest. (Curtis v. Board of Supervisors
(1972) 7 Cal.3d 942, 952.)
Petitioners do not deny that State Board’s determination of
who could vote was rationally related to the legitimate
government interest of the “logical formation and
determination of local agency boundaries, [which] is an
important factor. in promoting orderly development.” (Gov.
Code § 56001.) Petitioners contend instead that this portion of
the resolution should be subject to strict scrutiny because it
affects the fundamental interests of voting, taxation without
representation, petitioning for grievances, and education and
also involves suspect classes because it disenfranchises the
Hispanic community.
We reject Petitioners’ first contention that the resolution is
subject to the strict scrutiny standard because it denied them
their fundamental right to vote. Petitioners argue we Should.
rely upon Fullerton instead of Local Agency. Fullerton is a
plurality opinion that lacks authority as precedent. (Local
Agency, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 918.) The California Supreme
Court in Local Agency implicitly disapproved the Fullerton
court’s reasoning by adopting the reasoning of the dissent.
The court explained that strict scrutiny might have been
appropriate in Fullerton due to concern that the creation of
that new district could result in racial segregation. (ibid.) In
contrast, New District and Escondido Union will have the
same proportion of white and minority students. We rely
therefore on Local Agency.
—
18a
“{I]ndividual interests in voting are much attenuated by the
state's plenary power to oversee and regulate the formation of
its political subdivisions, and the same power entitles the state
to identify as, differing in degree the interests of those, who
may vote and those who may not.” (Local Agency, supra, 3
Cal.4th at p. 914.) In Local Agency, the state’s legislative
scheme gave the right to ratify a proposal to incorporate a
new city only to those voters within the boundaries of that
city. (/d. at p. 906-907.) The court relied upon the state’s
plenary power to create political subdivisions and the lengthy,
legislatively required administrative process that preceded the
voters’ ratification of the proposal. (/d. at p. 912.) That
process includes the voters’ petition, public hearings and
review of a multitude of legislatively required factors. (/d. at
p 910-912.)
The holding and reasoning of Local Agency apply directly
to this case. Like the power to create political subdivisions,
the state legislature has plenary power over public education
and over the formation of school districts, which are the
state’s agents (Cal Const. art IX, §5; Butt v. State of
California (1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 681; Fullerton, supra, 32
Cal.3d at 786, fn. 3; Hall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177,
180-181.) As in Local Agency, only the voters in the
geographic area of New District were given the right to ratify
the resolution. The legislative scheme for creating a new
school district, like that for incorporating new cities, is a
complicated process, which parallels the, process used to
incorporate new cities. The process begins with a petition
either of registered voters or of the majority of the governing
boards of each of the affected districts. (Ed. Code,
§ 35700.) Within 60 days, the county committee on school
district organization must hold one or more public hearings,
' All further statutory references are to the Education Code unless
otherwise specified.
19a
having made available a description of the petition that must
include specific information. (§§ 35705, 35705.5.) The
county committee may add to and amend the petition.
(§ 35705.5, subd. (a).) The county committee must then
forward the petition and its recommendation to State Board.
(§ 35708.) Prior to approving the petition, State Board must
hold a public hearing and must insure that specific conditions
are met.” (§§ 35752-35754.) State Board may amend the
> The description of the petition must include all of the following:
“(1) The rights of the employee's in the affected districts to continued
employment.
“(2) The revenue limit per unit of average daily atiendance for each
affected district and the effect of the petition, if approved, on such revenue
limit.
“(3) Whether the districts involved will be governed, in part, by
provisions of a city charter and, if so, in what way.
“(4) Whether the governing boards of any proposed new district will
have five or seven members.
“(S) A description of the territory or districts in which the election, if
any, will be held.
(6) Where the proposal is to create two or more districts, whether the
proposal will be voted on as a single proposition.
(7) Whether the governing board of any new district will have trustee
areas and, if so, whether the trustees will be elected by only the voters of
that trustee area or by the voters of the entire district.
‘(8) A description of how the property, obligations, and bonded
indebtedness of existing districts will be divided.
“(9) A description of when the first governing board of any new district
will be elected and how the terms of office for each new trustee will be
determined.,” (§ 35705.5, subd. (b).)
’ Section 35753, subdivision (a) provides:
“The State Board of Education may approve proposals for the
reorganization of districts, if the board has determined, with respect to the
proposal and the resulting districts, that all of the following conditions are
substantially met:
20a
petition. (§ 35754.) Only after State Board has approved the
petition can the voters ratify the petition through an election.
(§ 35756.) If the petition does not specify the territory within
which the election will be held, “the election shall be held
only in the territory proposed for reorganization.” (§ 35732.)
This complicated process, like the process for incor-
porating new cities, includes the safeguards of numerous
public hearings, required information, specific conditions to
be met and review by two governmental bodies. The voters’
role in confirming a new school district, like the voter’s role
in confirming the incorporation of a new city, “is rather like
“(1) The new districts will be adequate in terms of number of pupils
enrolled.
“(2) The districts are each organized on the basis of a substantial
community identity.
“(3) The proposal will result in an equitable-division of property and
facilities of the-original district or districts.
“(4) The reorganization of the districts will not promote racial or ethnic
discrimination or segregation.
“(5) The proposed reorganization will not result in any substantial
increase in costs to the state.
“(6) The proposed reorganization will not significantly disrupt the
educational programs in the proposed districts and districts affected by the
proposed reorganization and will continue to promote sound education
performance in those districts.
“(7) The proposed reorganization will not result in a significant
increase in school housing costs.
“(8) The proposed reorganization is not primarily designed to result in
a significant increase in property values causing financial advantage to
property owners because territory was transferred from one school district
to an adjoining district.
“(9) The proposed reorganization will not cause a substantial negative
effect on the fiscal management or fiscal status of the proposed district or
any existing district affected by he proposed reorganization.
“(10) Any other criteria as the board may, by regulation, prescribe.”
2la
that of the masons who place a keystone at the apex of a high
and intricate arch. The voters’ approval is an essential piece,
but as we have shown, by the time the question reaches the
electorate the proposal will already have undergone a
labyrinthine process containing elaborate safeguards designed
to protect the political and economic interests of [its various
constituencies] (Local Agency, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 912.)
For that reason, the creation of a new school district, like the
incorporation of a new city, is based upon the state's plenary
power and does not sufficiently implicate the right to vote to
require strict scrutiny. (/d. at p. 917.)
We also reject Petitioners, contention that the strict
scrutiny standard should apply because the election
disenfranchised the vast majority of the Hispanic population.
Because Petitioners I contention raises the prospect that State
Board’s specification of the voting district may have violated
equal protection due to invidious racial discrimination,
Petitioners’ contention is similar to that of racially
gerrymandered districting schemes. The United States
Supreme Court case recently addressed this issue:
“[A]ll laws that classify citizens on the basis of race,
including racially gerrymandered districting schemes,
are constitutionally suspect and must be strictly
scrutinized. When racial classifications are explicit, no
“inquiry into legislative: purpose is necessary. A facially
neutral law, on the other hand, warrants strict scrutiny
only if it can be proved that the law was motivated by a
racial purpose or object, or if it is unexplainable on
grounds other than race.”
(Hunt v. Cromartie (1999) 119 S. Ct. 1545, 1548-1549
[italics added, internal quotations and citations omitted].)
There is no evidence that the decision to allow only
residents of New District to vote was racially motivated. The
Hispanic population does not constitute a majority of
22a
Escondido Union or of New District.* in fact, Hispanic voters
have the same proportional representation in both districts.
Additionally, School Board has stated nonracial reasons to
limit the vote: “to encourage orderly growth and
development” and “to avoid island of unwanted, remote, or
poorly served school communities within large districts.”
Because the record does not show a racial purpose, the
decision to allow only the residents of New District to vote is
not subject to strict scrutiny.
We also reject Petitioners contention. that the outcome Of
the election has resulted in a substantial. financial detriment
because they must continue to pay for the portion of the
bonded indebtedness used to build New High School.
Substantial evidence supports the court’s assessment that
these taxes are merely a “modest detriment.” The bonded
indebtedness created by the 1996 bond measure resulted in a
cost of $17.21 per $100,000 of assessed valuation. If the
bonded indebtedness used to build New High School were
transferred to New District, New District’s cost would rise to
$34.33 per $100,000 of assessed valuation and the remaining
Escondido Union’s cost would decrease to $13.28 per
$100,000 of assessed valuation. This decrease of $4 per
$100,000 valuation is similar in size to the loss of tax revenue
of $5 per resident found to be a "modest detriment" in Local
Agency, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 923. Therefore, the financial
obligation is not substantial enough to require the application
of strict scrutiny.
* Petitioners submitted 1990 United States Census figures that show
Escondido Unified including New District has a population of 129,285, of
which 30,311 or 23 percent are Hispanic. New District has a population of
20,650, of which 4,931 or 24 percent are Hispanic. By limiting the vote to
the population of the New District, 84 percent of the Hispanic voters
could not participate in the election.
23a
We also reject Petitioners’ contention that they are taxed
without the benefit of representation in that they are obligated
to pay a share of the portion of the bonded indebtedness used
to build New High School, but cannot vote for the members
of the school board of New District. The voters within the
original Escondido Union district were eligible to vote on the
bonded indebtedness prior to the school district reor- .
ganization. At the time of the vote, the voters were informed
that a portion of the money would be used to build a new high
school. Furthermore, the board of New District has no power
to use the funds from the bonded indebtedness.- Escondido
Union built New High School before the district reor-
ganization. The remaining funds from the bonded in-
debtedness will be used in Escondido Union. Therefore,
Petitioners cannot claim taxation without representation.
They were able to vote on the bonded indebtedness and to
elect the members of the school board of Escondido Union
who decided how the funds were used.
Petitioners also contend their right to petition the
government for redresses, has been violated because they will
not have standing to petition New District even though they
will continue to pay the bond indebtedness used to build New
High School. We disagree.
The right to petition "refers more generally to the right of
the people to inform their representatives in government of
their desires with respect to the passage or enforcement of
laws .... [T]he petition clause . . . includes acts designed to
influence public opinion concerning an issue before a
legislative or administrative body. In this general sense, the
right. of petition embraces such activities as complaint letters
to government agencies, publicity campaigns, boycotts, and
other forms of protest.” (Zhao v. Wong (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th
1114, 1122 [internal quotations And citations omitted].)
Petitioners exercised their right to petition in the present
case. Petitioners Laguna and Vickroy raised their objections
24a
before the State Board of Education. Vickroy carried out a
publicity campaign on this issue. Vickroy also raised
objections at two meetings during which the Escondido
Union school board discussed and approved the allocation of
bond indebtedness.
Petitioners can continue to exercise their right to petition
before the school boards of Escondido Union and New
District. Residency is not a requirement for placing matters
on a school board's agenda under section 35145.5, nor for
addressing a school board under Government code section
54954.3. . Sa, the record does not support Petitioners,
contention: that they were or will be denied their right to
petition.
Petitioners contend we should apply the strict scrutiny
standard because the creation of New District impacts the
fundamental right to an education by moving the newest high
school out of overcrowded Escondido Union and making it
more difficult for Escondido Union children to attend New
High School. We disagree.
Education is a fundamental right under the California
Constitution, which requires each district to provide its.
Students with an education basically equivalent to that
provided elsewhere in the State. (Butt v. State of California
(1992) 4 Cal.4th 668, 683, 685; Serrano v. Priest (1976) 18
Cal.3d 728, 767-768.). The constitution does not require
educational programs to be identical, nor does it require the
State to remedy all problems a district may have. (Butt, supra,
4 Cal.4th at p. 686.) There is a constitutional violation only if
“the district’s program, viewed as a whole, fundamentally
falls below the prevailing statewide standards.” (Jd. at pp.
686-687.)
Because the record is silent as to the severity of current
overcrowding, Petitioners have not met their burden of
proving the overcrowding in Escondido Union is of
25a
constitutional dimension. Furthermore, substantial evidence
supports School Board’s finding that the overcrowding would
not be affected by the reorganization because Escondido
Union had planned to build a new high school in the territory
now part of New District.
Petitioners also contend that Escondido Union students,
right to education is violated because the Students will no.
longer have the right to attend New High School.
(§§ 35160.5, subd. (b), 48209.1.) We disagree. The California
Constitution merely guarantees a student a right to “basically
equivalent” education. (Butt, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 685.) That
right simply cannot be stretched to include the right to attend
a specific school. Therefore, the fundamental right to an
education is not implicated in the decision to create New
District.
Strict scrutiny is not appropriate, because the election has
not affected Petitioners' fundamental rights nor have
Petitioners suffered a significant financial detriment. The
decision to limit the vote to the residents of New District does
not violate equal protection.
II. Due Process
Petitioners contend their due process rights were violated
because’ they claim (1) no hearings were held within the City
of Escondido, and (2) no hearings were held prior to
approving the bond allocation. The record does not support
their claims.
Although County Office did not hold meetings in the City
of Escondido prior to County Office’s approval of the
original proposal, Escondido Union held three meetings in
Escondido to discuss and approve the resolution that allocated
the assets and liabilities. Petitioner Vickroy spoke at two of
those meetings. Liabilities Therefore, public meetings in
which the allocation of the bonded indebtedness was
26a
discussed were held in Escondido. In addition to these local
meetings, State Board held a public meeting before it
approved the resolution. Petitioners Laguna. and Vickroy
spoke at that meeting. Therefore, Petitioners exercised their
opportunity to be heard before State Board approved the
proposal. Additionally, substantive due process. does not
apply because, as discussed in Part I above, Petitioners were
not denied fundamental rights.
Il. State Board's Jurisdiction
Petitioners contend State Board did not have jurisdiction to
approve the resolution because State Board did not have
before it Escondido Union's approval of the resolution. We
disagree.
Under section 35700, a petition for reorganization can be
filed by a majority vote of board members from all school
districts affected by the proposed reorganization. This
occurred in 1995 when five districts approved the initial
proposal and sent it to County Office. The resolution
approved by State Board was amended, however, to include
the allocation of the 1996 bond measure. Although Escondido
Union had approved the resolution incorporating this
allocation, it failed to send the resolution to State Board.
Therefore, before it approved the modified resolution, State
Board had before it resolutions approved by Pauma and
Valley Center, but not Escondido Union. However, a member
of the Escondido Union school board testified before State
Board that Escondido Union had approved the resolution.
Nothing in the Education Code requires each of the school
districts to approve modifications to a reorganization
proposal. Both County Office and State Board have the
power to amend the proposal. (§§ 35705.5, subd. (a), 35754.)
The materials. Before State Board explained that it was ©
amending the original proposal under section 35754.
Therefore, State Board acted within its jurisdiction when it
27a
approved the resolution, thereby amending the original
petition.
IV. The Apportionment of the Bond Issue
Petitioners contend State Board abused its discretion when
it apportioned the bonded indebtedness by using its broad
equitable powers under section 35738° instead of following
the formula outlined in section 35576, subdivision (b)° We
disagree.
* Section. 35738 provides: “Plans and recommendations may include a.
method of dividing the bonded-indebtedness other than the method
specified in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (b) of section 35576 for
the purpose of providing greater equity in the division. Consideration may
be given to assess valuation, number of pupils, property values, and other
matters which the petitioners or county committee deems pertinent.”
© Section 35576, subdivisions (a) and (b) provide in pertinent part:
"(a) when territory is taken from one district . . . [tlhe territory
transferred shall cease to be liable for the bonded indebtedness of the
district of which it was formerly a part and shall automatically assume its
proportionate share of the outstanding bonded indebtedness of any district
of which it becomes a part.
“(b) The acquiring district shall pay the original district the greatest of
the amounts determined under provisions of paragraphs (1) or (2) or the
amount determined pursuant to a method prescribed under Section 35738.
“(1) The proportionate share of the outstanding bonded indebtedness of
the original district, which proportionate share shall be in the ratio which
the total assessed valuation of the transferring territory bears to the total
assessed valuation of the original district in the year immediately
preceding the date on which the annexation is effective for all purposes.
This ratio shall be used each year until the bonded indebtedness for which
the acquiring district is liable has been repaid.
“(2) That portion of the outstanding bonded indebtedness of the
original district which was incurred for the acquisition or improvement of
28a
County Office and State Board initially recommended that
liabilities be allocated as required by section 35576. After the
voters’ approval of the bonded indebtedness, however, Valley
Center and Pauma were unwilling to use that formula because
it would double their tax rates. After. negotiations, the three
school districts decided to reallocate the bonded indebtedness.
In such a way as to leave the tax rates unchanged. In lieu of
that, New District would pay Escondido Union $1,000,000.
State Board approved the districts, decision under section
35738. ;
Under section 35738, State Board has broad powers to
decide how to apportion bonded indebtedness to provide the
greatest equity. Here, State Board approved the districts,
decision that it was more equitable to leave the
voter-approved tax assessments unchanged. There is nothing
in the record that supports Petitioners’ argument that this
decision was arbitrary, capricious or lacking evidentiary
support. Before the. decision was made, State Board held a
public. hearing during which Petitioners explained their
objections to this allocation. Further, as discussed in Part I
above, this allocation does not violate Petitioners con-
stitutional rights. State Board did not abuse its discretion.
school lots or buildings, or fixtures located therein, and situated in the
territory transferred.”
29a
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/ O” Rourke, J.
O’ Rourke, J.
WE CONCUR:
/s/ Huffman
HUFFMAN, Acting P.J.
/s/ McDonald
MCDONALD, J.
30a
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT,
DIVISION ONE, NO D032295 S084272
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
EN BANC
[Filed Jan. 25, 2000]
JESSE LAGUNA et al.,
Appellants
Vv
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent
ESCONDIDO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al..
Real Parties In Interesi
Appellants’ petition for review DENIED.
GEORGE
Chief Justice
3la
APPENDIX B
SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
NORTH COUNTY BRANCH
[Filed Aug 12 1998]
Case No. N0O78926
JESSE LAGUNA, on behalf of himself
and all others similarly situated
Petitioner,
V.
STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Respondent,
ESCONDIDO UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT .
PAUMA SCHOOL DISTRICT .
VALLEY CENTER UNION SCHOOL DISTRICT, -
Real Parties In Interest.
WRIT OF MANDATE
[Code of Civil Procedure § 1085]
JESSE LAGUNA hereby petitions this Court for a WRIT
OF MANDATE and herein alleges as follows:
I.
THE PARTIES
1. Petitioner, JESSE LAGUNA, is a voter and taxpayer
who resides within the Escondido Union High School District
(hereinafter referred to as “EUHSD”).
2. Petitioner complains on behalf of himself and all other
persons who reside, and/or vote, and/or pay taxes in EUHSD.
32a
Such members of the class are readily ascertainable but are so
numerous as to make joinder impracticable. There is a well-
defined community of interest in the questions of law and fact
involved affecting the parties to be represented. The claims of
Petitioner is typical of the claims of the class. Petitioner will
fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.
3. Respondent, the CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION (hereinafter referred to as “STATE BOARD”),
at all times mentioned herein was, and is, now the agency
charged with approval or disapproval of petitions for the
reorganization of school districts.
4. Real Party In Interest, EUHSD, is the governmental
agency responsible for the administration of the public
secondary school system for the City of Escondido and
adjacent communities, including Valley Center and Pauma
Valley.
5. Real Party In Interest, PAUMA SCHOOL DISTRICT
(hereinafter referred to as “PSD”), is the governmental
agency responsible for the administration of the public
elementary school system for the area generally known as
Pauma Valley.
6. Real Party In Interest, VALLEY CENTER UNION
SCHOOL DISTRICT (hereinafter referred to as “VCUSD”)
is the governmental agency responsible for the administration
of the public elementary school system for the area generally
known as Valley Center.
Il.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
7. On July 26, 1995, the governing boards of EUHSD,
PSD, and VCUSD filed a petition for unification of PSD and
VCUSD to become the Valley Center Unified School District
(hereinafter referred to as “NEW SCHOOL DISTRICT”). A
portion of EUHSD’s territory would be transferred to form
33a
NEW DISTRICT. A copy of he petition is lodged with the
court and marked as EXHIBIT 1.
8. On August 2, 1995, said petition was transmitted to
the San Diego County Committee on School District
Organization (hereinafter referred to as “COUNTY
COMMITTEE”). COUNTY COMMITTEE set September 6,
1995, for public hearings per Education Code (hereinafter
referred to as “Educ.C.”) §35705. Said hearings were noticed
at the addresses of PSD and VCUSD’s district offices. A
copy of the Notice of Public Hearings is lodged with the
Court and marked as EXHIBIT 2.
9. The above-described meetings were held on
September 6, 1995. However, no meeting was noticed or held
at EUHSD district offices. On September 13, 1995,
COUNTY COMMITTEE established a timeline for the
required unification process and ratified a contract with a
consulting firm (CALDWELL FLORES WINT ERS, INC.) to
develop analysis and conclusions of STATE BOARD'S
criteria for unification, and the tentative plans and
recommendations for PSD and VCUSD’s unification
proposal. A copy of CALDWELL FLORES WINTERS,
INC.’s final report is lodged with the Court and marked as
EXHIBIT 3.
10. On December 13, 1995, COUNTY COMMITTEE
recommended approval of the proposed unification of NEW
SCHOOL DISTRICT. A copy of said recommendation is
lodged with the Court and marked as EXHIBIT 4.
11. In San Diego County the San Diego County Board of
Education acts as COUNTY COMMITTEE.
12. In June, 1996, a general obligation bond of
approximately Forty-Three Million Dollars ($43,000,000.00)
was passed by the voters of EUHSD. Said money was to be
used for the repair and renovation of the district’s schools as
well as to build a new high school (Valley Center High
34a
School). Valley Center High School (hereinafter referred to
as VCHS) is located within the boundaries of NEW
SCHOOL DISTRICT. A copy of the bond measure is lodged
with the Court and marked as EXHIBIT 5.
13. Sixteen Million Dollars ($16,000,000.00) of the
above-described bond money was used for the construction of
VCHS. Further, the District received another Sixteen Million
Dollars ($16,000,000.00) in matching funds from the State of
California to construct VCHS.
14. On December 12, 1996, STATE BOARD produced a
document entitled, “Valley Center Unification Proposal—San
Diego County” (hereinafter referred to as “STATE BOARD
PROPOSAL”). A copy of STATE BOARD PROPOSAL is
lodged with the Court and marked as EXHIBIT 6.
15. In pertinent part STATE BOARD PROPOSAL
would cause the proportionate share of bonded indebtedness
of EUHSD to be assumed by NEW DISTRICT. This is based
upon a legal opinion from the San Diego County Counsel. A
copy of said opinion is lodged with the Court and marked as
EXHIBIT 7.
16. Another pertinent portion of STATE BOARD
PROPOSAL provided that the election would be limited to
the petition area only, i.e., within the boundaries of PSD and
VCUSD. STATE BOARD used the “rational basis test” to
find that the “voters in the remaining Escondido Union High
School District [City of Escondido] do not have a substantial
interest in the proposed reorganization and could, by
overwhelming the smaller number of voters in the petitioned
area, prevent those voters from obtaining the benefits of the
proposed reorganization; or, conversely, require the transfer
to take place against the will of the petitioned area voters and,
in so doing, impose a higher tax burden on the property
owners in the affected territory.” (EXHIBIT 6).
35a
17. In May, 1998, the San Diego County Office of
Education (hereinafter referred to as “SDCOE”) filed
resolutions, passed by two (2) of the three (3) affected school
districts (PSD and VCUSD) in May, 1998, with STATE
BOARD. A copy of these resolutions and SDCOE’s
transmittal letter are lodged with the Court and marked as
EXHIBIT 8. Said transmittal letter does not contain a
resolution passed by EUHSD These resolutions changed the
formula for the division of assets and debts for the respective
school districts In sum, NEW SCHOOL DISTRICT will give
EUHSD a Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) in cash. NEW
SCHOOL DISTRICT will keep the Sixteen Million Dollars.
($16,000,00000) of bond money to build VUHS. Further,
NEW SCHOOL DISTRICT will keep the Sixteen Million
Dollars ($16,000,000.00) in matching funds. EUHSD Will
transfer title of the real property, on which VCHS is- built,
from EUHSD to NEW SCHOOL DISTRICT. All EUHSD
equipment located within NEW SCHOOL DISTRICT will
become the property of NEW SCHOOL DISTRICT. In
addition, EUHSD will assume the debt for the Sixteen
Million Dollars ($16,000,000.00) in bond money which was
used to build VCHS. At a normal rate of interest, for twenty-
five (25) years, the Sixteen Million Dollars ($16,000,000.00),
in bonded indebtedness, will ultimately increase to close to
Thirty-Two Million Dollars ($32,000,000.00).
18. On July 9, 1998, STATE BOARD approved the
resolution which, in pertinent part, (1) allowed NEW
SCHOOL DISTRICT to keep the bond money, along with the
assets and debts described in the preceding paragraph, and,
(2) allowed only those within the boundaries of PSD and
VCUSD to vote on unification to the exclusion of the
remaining part of EUHSD, i.e., the City of Escondido. A
copy of the resolution and accompanying report are lodged
with the Court, marked as EXHIBIT 9.
36a
19. On July 29, 1998, SDCOE Superintendent of Schools,
RUDY CASTRUITA (hereinafter referred to as “CAS-
TRUITA”), ordered the election on the unification of NEW
SCHOOL DISTRICT to be held on March 2, 1999. A copy of
the Order is lodged with the Court, marked as EXHIBIT 10.
As per STATE BOARD’s resolution, CASTRUTTA’s order
provides that only the voters of PSD and VCUSD will vote
on the issue of unification.
Il.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
20. Petitioner realleges the foregoing paragraphs as
though fully set forth hereat.
21. In the absence of a compelling State interest in
limiting the election area, the relevant geographic area for an
election is composed of all affected districts. The decision of
Respondent limiting the election proposed for transfer, in the
absence of a compelling state interest violates the
Constitutional right of the electors of the remaining portions
of EUHSD to equal protection under the California and
United States Constitutions.
22. The population of the City of Escondido, Pauma
Valley, and Valley Center is approximately One Hundred
Twenty-Nine Thousand Two Hundred Eight-Five (129,285),
as per the 1990 Census. Of that number, Thirty Thousand
Three Hundred Eleven (30,311) are Hispanic surnamed, with
Twenty-Five Thousand Three Hundred Eighty (25,380)
Hispanic: surnamed individuals living in Escondido. A copy
of the pertinent portion of the Census data is lodged with the
Court and marked as EXHIBIT 11.
23. The exclusion of the City of Escondido from voting
on unification has resulted in excluding eighty-four percent
(84%) of the Hispanic surnamed vote. In addition, and/or in
the alternative, said exclusion is a violation of the equal
37a
protection clauses under the California and United States
Constitutions.
24. Petitioner has exhausted all administrative remedies
and there is no remedy at law for the violation of Petitioner’ s
cights as alleged herein above. The Petitioner is entitled to
relief as requested to have the decision limiting the area for
election vacated.
IV.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A REPRESENTATIVE
FORM OF GOVERNMENT
25. Petitioner realleges the foregoing paragraphs as
though fully set forth hereat.
26. Petitioner, and all persons in Petitioner’s class, will be
paying taxes on the Sixteen Million Dollars ($16,000,000.00)
of bonded indebtedness, which has gone to construct VCHS,
for twenty-five (25) years. Although Petitioner is compelled
to pay this tax, Petitioner is prohibited from voting at future
elections for the elected officials who represent NEW
SCHOOL DISTRICT. Further, as a citizen residing outside of
NEW DISTRICT, Petitioner has no Standing to petition
NEWDISTRICT governing body for a redress of grievances.
This, in spite of the fact that Petitioner has paid, and will
continue to pay, taxes for NEW DISTRICT’s assets. In
essence, Petitioner is being taxed without the benefit of
representation.
27. Petitioner has exhausted all admimstrative remedies
and there is no remedy at law for the violation of Petitioner’s
rights as alleged herein above. Unless this Court. issues the
Writ as requested, Petitioner will be irreparably harmed by
the violation of his Constitutional rights as described herein
above.
28. Petitioner is entitled to the relief as requested by this
Petitionfor Writ of Mandate to the decision to not have PSD
38a
and VCUSD assume their portion of the bonded indebtedness
vacated
V.
. ~ DUE PROCESS
29. Petitioner realleges the foregoing paragraphs as
though fully set forth hereat.
30. As a result of there being no public hearings at the
district offices of EUHSD, as described above, Petitioner
class was excluded from the debate of the issues described
above, and was thus deprived of due process.
31. After all public hearings were over, Real Parties In
Interest changed the formula for division of assets and
liabilities as well as for the bonded indebtedness. Real Parties
In Interest then submitted the new formula to SDCOE and
STATE BOARD without the opportunity for full public
disclosure and debate. This resulted in a further deprivation of
due process for Petitioner class.
32. Petitioner is entitled to the relief as requested by this
Petition for Writ of Mandate to have the decision to not have
PSD and VCUSD assume their portion of the bonded
indebtedness vacated.
VI.
RESPONDENT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANT-
ING REAL PARTIES IN INTERESTS’ PROPOSAL TO
NOT REQUIRE PSD AND VCUSD TO ASSUME ITS
PROPORTIONATE SHARE OF BONDED
INDEBTEDNESS
33. Petitioner realleges the foregoing paragraphs as
though fully set forth hereat.
34. Educ.C. §5738 requires that bonded indebtedness
may be divided in a manner different than Educ.C. § 35576.
Pursuant to Educ.C. § 35576, NEW DISTRICT must assume
39a
its proportionate share of bonded indebtedness. This was
explained to Real Parties In Interest in a legal opinion by
County Counsel. (EXHIBIT 7). Under Educ.C. § 35738,
alternatives to Educ.C. § 35576 can be used for the division
of bonded indebtedness if the alternatives provide greater
equity in said division. As described above, the proposed
division provided to SDCOE by Real Parties In Interest and
submitted to STATE BOARD do not provide greater equity
than having NEW DISTRICT assume its portion of the
outstanding bonded indebtedness.
35. Since the alternatives for dividing bonded indebt-
edness are not more equitabie than that prescribed by Educ C
§ 35576, STATE BOARD abused its discretion
36. Petitioner is entitled to the relief as requested by this
Petition for Writ of Mandate to have the decision to not have
PSD and VCUSD assume their portion of the bonded
indebtedness vacated.
Vil.
SDCOE’S FAILURE TO SUBMIT A RESOLUTION BY
EUHSD ON UNIFICATION TO STATE BOARD
RENDERS THE PETITION FOR UNIFICATION
FATALLY DEFECTIVE.
37. Petitioner realleges the foregoing paragraphs as
though fully set forth hereat.
38. The governing boards of PSD and VCUSD passed
final resolutions on unification. (EXHIBIT 8).
39. The resolutions were submitted to SDCOB which
filed them with STATE BOARD.
40. There is no record of EUHSD submitting a final
resolution to SDCOE. Further, the record contains no such
resolution, submitted or not.
41. As a result of there being no final resolution by
EUHSD submitted to SDCOE and subsequently filed with
40a
STATE BOARD, the Petition filed by SDCOE is fatally
defective.
42. Petitioner is entitled to the relief as requested by this
Petition for WRIT OF MANDATE to vacate the STATE
BOARD resolution.
Vill.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays as follows:
1. That the Court grant this WRIT OF MANDATE
directing Respondent to set aside that portion of its resolution
of July 9, 1998, which prohibits voters in the remaining
portions of EUHSD from voting on the unification of PSD
and VCUSD;
2. That the Court grant this WRIT OF MANDATE
directing Respondent to set aside that portion of its resolution
of July.9, 1998, in which PSD and VCUSD will not assume
its proportionate share of the bonded indebtedness of
EUHSD.
3. That the Court grant this WRIT OF MANDATE
directing Respondent to vacate the resolution of July 9, 1998,
in its entirety.
4. That the Court grant this WRIT. OF,MANDATE to
requite the remaining portions of EUHSD to vote on the
unification of PSD and VCUSD;
5. That the Court grant this WRIT OF MANDATE to
require PSD and VCUSD to accept their proportionate share
of the bonded indebtedness;
6. For attorney’s fees;
7. For taxable costs of suit incurred herein; and
8. For such other and further relief as the Court deems
just and proper.
4la
Dated: August 13, 1998
UNITED STATES JUSTICE FOUNDATION
By: Kevin T. Snider
KEVIN T. SNIDER
Attorney for Petitioner, JESSE LAGUNA
42a
VERIFICATION
I, JESSE LAGUNA, declare:
I am the Petitioner in the above-entitled action. I have read
the foregoing WRIT OF MANDATE and know the contents
thereof. The same is true of.my own knowledge, except as to
those matters which are therein alleged on information and
belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the
State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.
Executed this 13th day of August, 1998, at Escondido,
California.
/s/ Jesse Laguna
JESSE LAGUNA
nape OOP RIAA RE
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- SMI
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.