Opinion — Price v. Forrest

PRICE v. FORREST.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF THE STATE

OF NEW JERSEY.

No. 105. Argued January 3, 4, 1899. — Decided March 6, 1899.

In 1850 Price, a purser in the Navy and fiscal agent for that Department,

advanced $75,000 to the Government, from his private fortune, to meet

emergencies. His right to receive it back was questioned, and was not

settled until 1891, when Congress passed an act directing the Secretary

of the Treasury to adjust his account “ on principles of equity and jus-

tice,” and to pay to him “ or to his heirs” the sum found due him on such

adjustment. It was adjusted by the Secretary. and in August, 1892, it was

decided that there was due to Price from the United States $76,204.08.

Meanwhile Forrest had recovered In the courts of New Jersey, of which

Price was a citizen and resident, a judgment against him for $17,000.

Forrest died in 1860 without having collected the amount of this judg-

ment. In 1874 his widow, having been appointed administratrix of his

PRICE v. FORREST. 411

Opinion of the Court.

estate, caused the judgment to be revived by writ of scire facias and

asked for the appointment of a receiver. Price appeared and an-

swered, and then the cause slept until August, 1892, when Mrs. Forrest

filed a petition, stating that money was about to be paid to Price by the

United States on his claim, and asking for the appointment of a receiver

of the Treasury draft, and that Price be ordered to endorse it to the re-

ceiver, to the end that the amount might be received by him as an officer

of the court and disposed of according tolaw. A receiver was appointed,

gave bond and entered on his duties. Price died in 1894. He left no

will. No letters of administration were granted, but the New Jersey

court appointed an administrator ad prosequendum. The bill in this case

was then filed. The relief sought was, the revival of the bill of 1874,

that the administrator ad prosequendum be made a party, and that the

other parties be enjoined from receiving the money from the Treasury,

and that the receiver be authorized to receive and dispose of it under

the orders of the court. The heirs of Price set up their claims to it.

The court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to the moneys in the

Treasury and its judgment was affirmed by the highest court in the State.

Held, that the receiver, and not the heir, was the person entitled to re-

cover the money from the United States; and that the case did not come

within the prohibitory provisions against assignments of claims against

the United States, contained in Rev. Stat. § 3477.

Tue case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. John C. Fay and Mr. Flavel McGhee for plaintiffs in

error.

Mr. Cortlandt Parker and Mr. R. Wayne Parker for de-

fendants inerror. Mr. Frank W. Hackett was on their brief.

Mr. Justice Harvan delivered the opinion of the court.

4

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The ultimate question in this case is whether the plaintiffs

in error, as heirs of Rodman M. Price, are entitled to receive e

from the United States the amount standing to the credit of

the deceased on the books of the Treasury, and which repre- p

sents the balance of a sum found in his lifetime under the

authority of a special act of Congress to be due him upon an &

adjustment of his accounts as a purser in the Navy. '

The facts out of which arise the questions of law discussed 4

by counsel are as follows: 3

In the year 1848 the decedent was assigned to duty on the e

Pacific Coast in California as purser and fiscal agent of the g

*

BY

Serpe SAIS ORNS ELLE RET INES, RELL NOE PION LEE I INO ETS ENDED ESL a |

412 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

United States for the Department of the Navy. He acted

in that capacity until about December, 1849, or January,

1850, when he was detached from such service and ordered to

transfer all public money and_ property remaining in his

hands to his successor, or to such other disbursing officer of

the Navy as might be designated by the commanding officer

at the naval station at California, and immediately after such

transfer to report at the city of Washington for the purpose

of settling his accounts.

A. M. Van Nostrand was his successor, in California, as

acting purser in the Navy.

About December 31, 1849, Commodore Jones of the N avy,

commanding the United States squadron at San Francisco,

directed Van Nostrand to receive from Price all books,

papers, office furniture and funds om hand belonging to the

purser’s department at that city. Thereupon Price turned

over to Van Nostrand as acting purser of the Navy at San

Francisco, forty-five thousand dollars, that being all the pub-

lic money remaining in his hands.

Subsequently on the 14th day of January, 1850, and out of

his private funds alone, Price advanced to Van Nostrand

seventy-five thousand dollars, taking a receipt therefor as

follows: “San Francisco, January 14, 1850. Received from

Rodman M. Price, purser U. 8S. Navy, seventy-five thousand

dollars, for which I hold myself responsible to the United

States Treasury Department, $75,000. (Duplicate.) A. M.

Van Nostrand, acting purser.” This money was so advanced

Without the approval and signature of Commodore Jones.

Van Nostrand never returned the $75,000 or any part of it

to Price, nor did he account for it to the Government.

Price insisted that the United States should reimburse him

for the amount so advanced by him, but the officers of the

Government denied its liability to him on that account. In

an elaborate opinion, given March 12, 1854, Attorney General

Cushing held that, while the appointment of Van Nostrand

as acting purser was lawful and valid under the circum-

stances, the Government could not be charged with the

private funds paid to him by Price, although the latter be-

PRICE v. FORREST. 413

Opinion of the Court.

lieved at the time that his advance of money to the former

was an accommodation to the Government in the then un-

settled condition of California. 6 Opin. Atty. Gen. 357.

Finally, by an act approved February 23, 1891, c. 279, 26

Stat. 1371, entitled “An act for the relief of Rodman M.

Price,” the Secretary of the Treasury of the United States

was “authorized and directed to adjust upon principles of

equity and justice the accounts of Rodman M. Price, late

purser in the United States Navy and acting navy agent at

San Francisco, California, crediting him with the sum paid

over to and receipted for by his successor, A. M. Van Nos-

trand, acting purser, January 14, 1850, and pay to said Rod-

man M. Price, or his heirs, out of any money in the Treasury

not otherwise appropriated, any sum that may be found due

him upon such adjustment.”

Under the authority conferred by that act the Secretary of

the Treasury, in August, 1892, adjusted the accounts of Price ;

and in that adjustment he was credited with the sum advanced

to Van Nostrand, leaving due to him from the Government

the sum of $76,204.08, which of course included the above

sum of $75,000.

In order that the precise questions to be determined upon

this writ of error may be clearly apprehended we must now

refer to certain matters occurring in the courts of New Jersey

both prior to and shortly after the passage of the above act

of February 23, 1891.

In the year 1857 Samuel Forrest recovered in the Supreme

Court of New Jersey a judgment against Rodman M. Price

for the sum of $17,000 and costs. Execution upon that judg-

ment was returned unsatisfied. Forrest died in 1860 intestate.

In 1874 his wife, one of the present defendants in error, was

appointed and qualified as administratrix of his estate. In

the same year she sued out a writ of scire facias to revive the

above judgment, and it was revived. In the bill seeking a

revivor of the judgment she alleged facts tending to show

that Price had an interest in certain lands, and also that he

had equitable things in action or other property to the amount

of many thousand dollars, exclusive of all claims thereon and

414 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

of all exemptions allowed by law, which she had been unable

to reach by execution on the above judgment. By that bill

the administratrix also prayed discovery from Price of all

property, real or personal, whether in possession or action,

belonging to him, with full particulars in relation thereto,

and that the same under the order of court be appropriated

in satisfaction of such judgment; further, that a receiver be

appointed in the cause to collect and take charge of the prop-

erty, money or things in action found to belong to Price, or

to which he was in any way entitled, either in law or equity,

with power to convert the same into money, and with such

other powers as were usually granted to receivers in similar

cases; and that Price be enjoined from assigning, transfer-

ring or making any other disposition of the real estate and

personal property to which he was in anywise entitled and

from receiving any moneys then due or to become due to him,

except where the same were held in trust or the funds held

in trust proceeded from other persons than himself.

The defendants to that bill were Price and his wife and son,

the latter being alleged to claim some interest in the property

described in the bill. They appeared and filed an answer,

Price denying that any part of the properties mentioned in

the bill belonged to him, or that he had any interest in them.

After the filing of that answer the cause slept until August

9, 1892, when Mrs. Forrest, as administratrix of the estate of

her husband, filed a petition stating that since the filing of

her bill of complaint in that cause no payment had been made

on the judgment against Price, and that neither she nor her

solicitors had been able to find any personalty or real estate

belonging to Price by levy upon and sale of which any part

of the amount due on the judgment could be obtained; that

it had lately come to her knowledge that about $45,000 was

about to be paid to Price by officers of the Treasury of the

United States as the sum found to be due him by an account-

ing then lately had between him and the Government; that

that sum was to be paid by the delivery to Price or to his

attorneys of a draft of the Treasurer of the United States or

some other negotiable security made or issued by its financial

PRICE v. FORREST. 415

Opinion of the Court.

officers and drawn payable to his order, the rules of the De-

partment forbidding that it be made payable to the order of

any other person or that said sum should be paid in any other

way, and that said draft or negotiable security was to be made

and the transaction closed on the 15th day of August there-

after; and that if Price obtained said money from the United

States he would, unless restrained, put the same beyond the

reach of the petitioner. The prayer of the petition was that

a receiver of the draft or other negotiable security be ap-

pointed, and that Price be ordered and directed immediately

on the receipt of such draft or security to endorse the same

to the receiver, to the end that the amount thereof might be

received by him as an officer of the court and disposed of ac-

cording to law.

On the presentation of the petition with affidavits in its

support, the Chancellor on the 8th day of August, 1892, issued

a rule returnable at chancery chambers September 12, fol-

lowing, that Price show cause why the prayer of the petition

should not be granted, and an injunction issue, and a receiver

appointed pursuant to that prayer, which rule further directed

that Price should be and was thereby restrained and enjoined

from making any indorsement of the draft referred to in the

petition.

A duly certified copy of that order, pursuant to directions

therein, was served upon Price on the 10th day of August,

1892. Nevertheless, after that date Price received from the

Assistant Treasurer of the United States at Washington and

without permission of the court collected four several drafts

signed by that officer for the respective sums of $2704.08,

$13,500, $20,000 and $9000, in all the sum of $45,204.08, leav-

ing in the hands of the United States of the amount due on the

settlement of Price’s accounts the sum of about $31,000.

On the 10th day of October, 1892, Charles Borcherling was

appointed by the Chancery Court receiver in said cause of the

property and things in action belonging or due to or held in

trust for Price at the time of issuing said executions, or at

any time afterwards, and especially of said four drafts, with

authority to possess, receive and sue for such property and

416 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

things in action and the evidence thereof; and it was made

the duty of the receiver to hold such drafts subject to the Sur-

ther order of the court. The receiver was required to give

bond in the sum of $40,000, conditioned for the faithful dis-

charge of his duties. At the same time Price was ordered to

convey and deliver to the receiver all such property and things

in action and the evidence thereof, and especially forthwith

to endorse and deliver the drafts to him, and he and all agents

or attorneys appointed by him were enjoined and restrained

from intermeddling with the receiver in regard to said drafts,

and ordered, if in possession or control thereof, to deliver

them to the receiver with an indorsement to that officer or to

the clerk of the court for deposit ; provided, the order should

be void if the drafts other than the one for $9000 were deliy-

ered with Price’s indorsement to the clerk, the proceeds to be

deposited to the credit of the cause. Price was expressly en-

joined from making any indorsement or appropriation of the

drafts other than to the receiver or the clerk for deposit.

The receiver gave the required bond, and having entered

upon the duties of his office, he caused a copy of the above

order to be served upon Price, and demanded compliance with

its provisions.

In 1892, the particular day not being stated, the Chancery

Court issued an attachment against Price for contempt of

court in disobeying the order of August 8, 1892. By an order

made May 18, 1894, the court held him to be guilty of such

contempt and he was directed to pay to the receiver the sum

of $31,704.08 and a fine of $50 and costs, and in default of

obedience to that order to be imprisoned in the county jail

until it was complied with. 7 Dickinson, (52 N. J. Eq.) 16, 31.

Upon appeal to the Court of Errors and Appeals the order

of the Chancery Court was affirmed. 8 Dickinson, (53 N. J.

Eq.) 693.

It is stated that the balance due on the settlement of

Price’s accounts, about $31,000, was withheld by the officers

of the Government in the belief that there was a counter-

claim against Price. But it having been determined to pay

such balance, the Chancery Court made another order on the

PRICE v. FORREST. 417

Opinion of the Court.

18th day of May, 1894, by which Price was directed to exe-

cute two instruments in writing, which he had been pre-

viously required by the court to sign, seal and deliver, one

of them consenting that the balance from the Government

should be paid to the receiver, such consent to be filed with

the Treasurer of the United States, and by the other assign-

ing all his property, real and personal, and all his rights and

credits.

These last two orders were served upon Price while he was

sick, and he died June 8, 1894, without complying with either

of them. So far as was known, he left no will, and no appli-

cation had been made for the appointment of an adminis-

trator of his estate, as in case of intestacy. But letters of

administration ad prosequendum were granted by the Pre-

rogative Court of New Jersey to Allen -L. McDermott.

The present bill was filed in the Chancery Court July 5,

1894, in the name of the administratrix of Samuel Forrest and

of the receiver Borcherling. The principal defendants are the

children and heirs of Rodman M. Price. The other defendants

are John ©. Fay and McDermott, the latter as administrator

ad prosequendum.

That bill alleged that on the 9th day of June, 1894, the

defendants executed powers of attorney to the defendant Fay,

who was one of the attorneys in the litigation respecting

the drafts, authorizing him to apply to the Secretary of the

Treasury to pay to them the balance to the credit of Price

under the act of February 23, 1891,— they claiming that such

balance belongs to his /ezrs, and not to the receiver. It ap-

pears from the bill that in addition to the above four drafts,

the United States paid to Price and his attorneys the further

sum of $9000, reducing the balance apparently on the books

of the Treasury under the above settlement to the sum of

about $23,000. It was further alleged that the officers of the

Treasury Department were desirous of doing right and justice

in the premises ; that demand had been made by the receiver

upon the Treasurer of the United States. for the payment to

him of said balance of money, and that the Treasurer neither

consented nor refused to do so, but awaited the determination

VOL. CLXXMI—27

—

418 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

by some lawful tribunal of the right of the receiver in the

premises.

The relief asked was: 1. That the cause commenced by the

bill of 1874 be revived, aud the administrator ad prosequen-

dum be adjudged a proper party thereto. 2. That the de-

fendants, the children and heirs of Rodman M. Price, together

with Fay, be perpetually enjoined from making any demand

upon or application to the United States or from receiving

any part of the money awarded to the deceased then remain-

ing in the Treasury of the United States. 3. That the parties

above named be decreed to pay to the plaintiff Borcherling,

receiver, to be by him disposed of under the orders of the

court, any part of the money they might have respectively

received or might receive. 4. That the administrator ad

prosequendum, or any executor or administrator of Price

thereafter admitted as defendant in the cause, deliver to the

receiver all the property of the deceased, whether in possession

or action, which might come to their hands.

The heirs of Price filed pleas asserting their right to the

benefit of the act of February 23, 1891. The case was heard

upon the bill and pleas, and the pleas were overruled by Chan-

cellor McGill. The defendants were thereupon ordered to

answer the bill.

Upon appeal to the Court of Errors and Appeals, the order

of the Chancery Court was affirmed, and the cause was re-

mitted to that court with directions to proceed therein accord-

ing tolaw. Price v. Forrest, 9 Dickinson, (54 N. J. Eq.) 669.

The heirs then filed an answer, in which they denied that

there was any jurisdiction in the Chancery Court to sequester

the moneys in dispute in the Treasury of the United States,

and insisted that whatever amount remained in the Treasury

as the balance due on the adjustment of the accounts of

Rodman M. Price belonged under the act of Congress to the

defendants as his heirs.

The case was heard upon bill and answer, and the Chancery

Court was of opinion that the plaintiffs were entitled to the

relief asked so far as it related to the collection by the defend-

ants of the moneys mentioned in the bill of complaint and still

ESSER IR ENED TS I ERIN RE NEAT NE ALIA IIIB ISR

| PRICE v. FORREST. 419

Opinion of the Court.

in the Treasury of the United States. It was therefore “ or-

dered and decreed, that the said defendants and each of them

be and they are hereby perpetually enjoined and restrained from

making any demand upon or application to the Government

of the United States, or the Secretary of the Treasury of the

United States or any officer of the said Treasury, or from receiv-

ing from the United States, or its said Secretary of the Treas-

ury or any officer thereof, any part of the money remaining in

the Treasury of the United States at the time of filing said bill

of complaint, and which was awarded to Rodman M. Price, de-

ceased, as in the said bill stated, or now there remaining.” This

judgment was affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals of

New Jersey, 56 N. J. Eq.; and the judgment of affirmance is

here for review.

1. The first proposition of the plaintiffs in error is that con-

sistently with the statutes of the United States the defendants

in error cannot take anything under the orders adjudging

that Borcherling, the receiver appointed by the state court,

was entitled as between him and the heirs of Price to receive

the money remaining to his credit on the books of the Treas-

ury.

This contention is based upon section 3477 of the Revised

Statutes of the United States, providing that “ all transfers and

assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of

any part or share thereof, or interest therein, whether abso-

lute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration

therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders or other authorities

for receiving payment of any such claim, or of any part or share

thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely

made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting

witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertain-

ment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the

payment thereof. Such transfers, assignments and powers of

attorney must recite the warrant for payment, and must be

acknowledged by the person making them, before an officer

having authority to take acknowledgments of deeds, and shall

be certified by the officer; and it must appear by the certifi-

cate that the officer, at the time of the acknowledgment, read

i SRILA RS STII LY HSL ee on

AER OT I LNT

MEH

420 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

and fully explained the transfer, assignment or warrant of

attorney to the person acknowledging the same.”

It is insisted that the orders in the state court assume to

transfer or assign Price’s claim against the United States in

Violation of, or without regard to the requirements of the

statute, in that no assignment of the claim has ever been

freely made; that no warrant for the payment thereof had

been issued when those orders were made; and that the

indorsement or assignment that Price was ordered to make

did not fall within any of the established exceptions under

section 3477, such as assignments in bankruptey and_ insol-

vency, and assignments by operation of law.

Are these propositions supported by the decisions of this

court in which it has been found necessary to construe that

section ¢

In United States v. Gillis, 95 U.S. 407, 416, the question

Was as to the validity of a voluntary transfer of the legal

title to a claim under the Abandoned and Captured Property

Act of March 12, 1863, for the proceeds of certain cotton

seized by the military forces of the United States. The suit

was brought by the transferee in the Court of Claims which

found in his favor. By this court it was adjudged that he

could not maintain the action. While holding that the act

of February 26, 1853, c. 81, 10 Stat. 170, from which section

8477 was taken, was of universal application and covered all

claims against the United States in every tribunal in which

they might be asserted, this court stated that “there are

devolutions of title by force of law, without any act of

parties, or involuntary assignments compelled by law,” to

which the statute did not apply.

In Erwin v. United States, 97 U.S. 392, 397, which was

also an action to recover the proceeds of certain cotton cap-

tured by the military forces of the United States, it appeared

that the original claimant became a bankrupt, and assigned

his property to an assignee in bankruptey. One of the ques-

tions was whether the claim for these proceeds, even if it

constituted a demand against the Government, was capable

of assignment under the above statute. This court said:

PRICE v. FORREST. 421

Opinion of the Court.

“ The act of Congress of February 26, 1853, to prevent frauds

upon the Treasury of the United States, which was the subject

of consideration in the Gillis case, applies only to cases of vol-

untary assignment of demands against the Government. It

does not embrace cases where there has been a transfer of title

by operation of law. The passing of claims to heirs, devisees

or assignees in bankruptcy are not within the evil at which

the statute aimed ; nor does the construction given by this court

deny to such parties a standing in the Court of Claims.”

In Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. 8. 556, 560, where the ques-

tion was whether the above statute embraced voluntary

assignments for the benefit of creditors, this court, referring

to Erwin v. United States, said: “The language of the statute,

‘all transfers and assignments of any claim upon the United

States, or of any part thereof, or any interest therein,’ is

broad enough (if such were the purpose of Congress) to in-

clude transfers by operation of law, or by will. Yet we held

it did not include a transfer by operation of law, or in bank-

ruptey, and we said it did not include one by will. The

obvious reason of this is that there can be no purpose in such

cases to harass the Government by multiplying the number

of persons with whom it has to deal, nor any danger of enlist-

ing improper influences in advocacy of the claim, and that

the exigencies of the party who held it justified and required

the transfer that was made. In what respect does the volun-

tary assignment for the benefit of his creditors, which is

made by an insolvent debtor of all his effects, which must,

if it be honest, include a claim against the Government, differ

from the assignment which is made in bankruptcy‘ There

can here be no intent to bring improper means to bear in

establishing the claim, and it is not perceived how the Gov-

ernment can be embarrassed by such an assignment. The

claim is not specifically mentioned, and is obviously included

only for the just and proper purpose of appropriating the

whole of his effects to the payment of all his debts. We can-

not believe that such a meritorious act as this comes within

the evil which Congress sought to suppress by the act of

1853.”

422 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

The doctrine of these cases has not been modified by any

subsequent decision. Nor, as the argument at the bar im-

plied, is that doctrine inconsistent with the decision subse-

quently rendered in St. Paul & Duluth Railroad vy. United

States, 112 U. 8. 733. Nothing more was adjudged in that

case than that a voluntary transfer by way of mortgage of

a claim against the United States for the security of a debt,

and finally completed and made absolute by a judicial sale,

was within the purview of the prohibition contained in sec-

tion 3477, and could not be made the basis of an action against

the Government in the Court of Claims. Such a voluntary as-

signment to secure a specific debt was held to be within the

mischiefs which that section was intended to remedy. To

the same class belongs Ball v. //alsell, 161 U. S. 72, 79,

which was the case of a voluntary transfer of part of a claim

against the United States on account of the depredations of

certain Indians on the property of the claimant.

While the present case differs from any former case in its

facts, we think that the principle announced in Erwin v.

United States and Goodman vy. Niblack justified the conclu-

sion reached by the state court. That court held that it had

jurisdiction under the laws of the State, and as between the

parties before it, to put into the hands of its receiver any

chose in action of whatever nature belonging to Price and of

which he had possession or control. The receiver did not

obtain from Price in his lifetime an assignment of his claim

against the United States. But having full jurisdiction over

him, the court adjudged that as between Price and the plain-

tiffs who sued him the claim should not be disposed of by him

to the injury of his creditors, but should be placed in the

hands of its receiver subject to such disposition as the court

might determine as between the parties before it and as was

consistent with law. The suit in which the receiver was ap-

pointed was of course primarily for the purpose of securing

the payment of the judgment obtained by Samuel Forrest in

his lifetime against Rodman M. Price. But that fact does

not distinguish the case in principle from Goodman v. Ni-

black ; for the transfer in question to the receiver was the act

PRICE v. FORREST. 423

Opinion of the Court.

of the law, and whatever remained, whether of property or

money, in his hands after satisfying the judgment and the

taxes, costs or expenses of the receivership as might be or-

dered by the court, would be held by him as trustee for those

entitled thereto, and his duty would be to pay such balance

‘nto court to the credit of the cause “to be there disposed of

according to law.” Revision of N. J. Laws, 1877, sec. 26,

p- 394.

As this court has said, the object of Congress by section

3477 was to protect the Government, and not the claimant,

and to prevent frauds upon the Treasury. Bailey vy. United

States, 109 U. 8. 482; Jlobbs v. McLean, 117 U. 8S. 567;

Freedman’s Savings Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U. 8. 494, 506.

There was no purpose to aid those who had claims for money

against the United States in disregarding the just demands of

their creditors. We perceive nothing in the words or object

of the statute that prevents any court of competent jurisdic-

tion as to subject-matter and parties from making such orders

as may be necessary or appropriate to prevent one who has a

claim for money against the Government from withdrawing

the proceeds of such claim from the reach of his creditors ;

provided such orders do not interfere with the examination

and allowance or rejection of such claim by the proper officers

of the Government, nor in anywise obstruct any action that

such officers may legally take under the statutes relating to

the allowance or payment of claims against the United States.

If a court, in an action against such claimant by one of his

creditors, should, for the protection of the creditor, forbid the

claimant from collecting his demand except through a receiver

who should hold the proceeds subject to be disposed of accord-

ing to law under the order of court, we are unable to say that

such action would be inconsistent with section 3477. It may

be that the officers charged with the duty of allowing or dis-

allowing claims against the Government are not required to

recognize a receiver of a claim appointed by a court, and may,

if the claim be allowed, refuse to make payment except as

provided in section 3477. Upon this’ subject, the Second

Comptroller of the Treasury, in his opinion, rendered July

424 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

11, 1894, construing the act of February 23, 1891, and in

which he held that Price was entitled to receive in his life-

time, whatever sum was found to be due him on the ad just-

ment of his accounts, but if he died before such adjustment

was made his heirs would take, not by virtue of the act of

Congress, but accdrding to the laws of descent at the domicil

of the deceased, said: “I do not presume for a moment that

the Chancery Court of New Jersey could issue an execution

and compel payment of this money, nor could any of its

powers be brought to bear to compel, without at least addi.

tional legislation by Congress, the Comptroller to pay its

judgment; but while that is true, yet on the other hand the

Comptroller, so far having awaited the adjudication of that

Chancery Court, ought to abide by the result of that litiga-

tion, and await a final adjudication and certification of the

amount, as to who are entitled under the laws of that State.

This comes more from comity, and from a disposition on the

part of the Treasury officers to obey the laws of the land, and

to help to enforce the decrees of the courts that have jurisdic-

tion over matters in litigation of this kind, than from any

actual authority that a court may have over the Comptroller

to compel him to make payment. In conclusion, then, the

Comptroller will not at this time act in this matter but will

say to the gentlemen, that they must fight it out in the courts

of New Jersey, and that this court will follow the final deci-

sion that may be rendered there. . . . Hence this matter

will be suspended until such time as the Comptroller may be

put into possession of the final decree, either of the New

Jersey Chancery Court, or such court as may have appellate

jurisdiction therefrom.” Even if it be true that the final

order of the state court in relation to the money in question

would not impose any legal duty upon the officers of the

Treasury, it does not follow that the order of court appointing

the receiver would be null and void, as between those who

are parties to the cause and who are before the court.

It only remains to say touching this part of the case that

if section 3477 does not embrace the passing or transfer of

claims to heirs, devisees or assignees in bankruptcy, as held

PRICE v. FORREST. 425

Opinion of the Court.

in Erwin v. United States, nor a voluntary assignment by a

debtor of his effects for the benefit of his creditors, as held in

Goodman v. Niblack, it is difficult to see how an order of a

judicial tribunal having jurisdiction of the parties appointing

a receiver of a claim against the Government and ordering

the claimant to assign the same to such receiver to be held

subject to the order of court for the benefit of those entitled

thereto, can be regarded as prohibited by that section.

2, Were the heirs of Rodman M. Price entitled upon his

death, by virtue of the act of February 23, 1891, to such bal-

ance as then remained to his credit in the Treasury of the

United States on the adjustment made of his accounts under

that act? If they were so entitled, then the final judgment

of the Court of Errors and Appeals affirming the judgment

of the Chancery Court denied to the plaintiffs in error a right

specially set up and claimed by them under the above act;

and therefore the jurisdiction of this court to reéxamine that

final judgment cannot be doubted. Rev. Stat. § 709.

The plaintiffs in error insist that merson Vv. Hall, 13

Pet. 409, 413, 414, is decisive in their favor. Although this

contention is not without some force, we are of opinion that

the judgment in that case does not control the determination

of the present case. Emerson, surveyor, Chew, collector,

and Lorrain, naval officer, at the port of New Orleans, hav-

ing seized a brig for a violation of the laws prohibiting the

importation of siaves, instituted proceedings that resulted in

the condemnation of such vessel and slaves. It had been

previously decided in The Josefa Segunda, 10 Wheat. 312,

that the proceeds could not be paid to the custom-house

officers, but vested in the United States. Emerson and Lor-

rain having died, Congress, on the 3d day of March, 1831,

passed an act entitled “An act for the relief of Beverly Chew,

the heirs of William Emerson, deceased, and the heirs of Ed-

ward Lorrain, deceased.” That act directed the proceeds in

court to be paid over to the said Beverly Chew and “the

legal representatives” of Emerson and Lorrain, respectively.

The question was whether the Emerson part of the proceeds

belonged to his heirs, or were assets primarily liable for his

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426 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

debts. This court, after observing that Emerson had not acted

under any law, nor by virtue of any authority, and that his

acts imposed no obligation, legal or equitable, on the Goy.

ernment to compensate him for his services, said: “ Had Emer-

son become insolvent and made an assignment, would this

claim, if it may be called a claim, have passed to his assignees /

We think, clearly, it would not. Under such an assignment,

what could have passed? The claim is a nonentity. Neither

in law nor in equity has it any existence. A benefit was vol-

untarily conferred on the Government; but this was not done

at the request of any officer of the Government, or under the

sanction of any law or authority, express or implied. And

under such circumstances, can a claim be raised against the

Government, which shall pass by a legal assignment, or go

into the hands of an administrator as assets? . . . Aclaim

having no foundation in law, but depending entirely on the

generosity of the Government, constitutes no basis for the

action of any legal principle. It cannot be assigned. It does

not go to the administrator as assets. It does not descend to

the heir. And if the Government, from motives of public

policy, or any other considerations, shall think proper, under

such circumstances, to make a grant of money to the heirs of

the claimant, they receive it as a gift or pure donation —a

donation made it is true in reference to some meritorious act

of their ancestor, but which did not constitute a matter of

right against the Government. In the present case, the Gov-

ernment might have directed the money to be paid to the

creditors of Emerson, or to any part of his heirs. Being the

donor it could, in the exercise of its discretion, make such

distribution or application of its bounty as circumstances

might require. And it has, under the title of an act, ‘for the

relief of the heirs of Emerson,’ directed, in the body of the

act, the money to be paid to his legal representatives. That

the heirs were intended by this designation is clear; and we

think the payment which has been made to them under this

act has been rightfully made, and that the fund cannot be

considered as assets in their hands for the payment of

debts.”

PRICE v. FORREST. 427

Opinion of the Court.

.

Now, it is said that the grounds upon which in Emerson v.

Hall the claim of the heirs was sustained, exist in the present

case; that Price did not act under any law, nor in virtue of

any authority, and that his acts imposed no obligation in law

or equity upon the Government that could have been enforced

even if suit could have been maintained against it. And the

conclusion sought to be drawn is that Congress must have

intended by the act of 1891, as it was held to have intended

by the act in Hmerson’s case, to legislate for the benefit of

the heirs or next of kin of the decedent and not for his

personal representatives. But there were other facts in the

Emerson case which placed that case upon peculiar grounds.

Emerson and Lorrain were both dead when the act of March

3, 1831, was passed, and therefore Congress must have had in

mind the question whether the Emerson and Lorrain portions

of the money on deposit in court should be given to their

respective heirs or not. And the question was solved as indi-

cated by the preamble to that act. The preamble distinctly

shows that Congress had in view the heirs, and not those who

would administer the estate of the two persons whose merito-

rious services were recognized. Although a preamble has

been said to be a key to open the understanding of a statute,

we must not be understood as adjudging that a statute, clear

and unambiguous in its enacting parts, may be so controlled

by its preamble as to justify a construction plainly inconsistent

with the words used in the body of the statute. We mean

only to hold that the preamble may be referred to in order

to assist in ascertaining the intent and meaning of a statute

fairly susceptible of different constructions. United States v.

Fisher, 2 Oranch, 358, 386; United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat.

610, 631; Beard v. Iowan, 9 Pet. 301, 317; Holy Trinity

Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462; Coosaw Mining

Co. v. South Carolina, 144 U. 8. 550. In Emerson’s case the

decision was placed partly on the ground that the title of

the act of 1831 indicated that Congress, in using the words

“legal representatives ” in the body of the act, had in mind

the heirs of Emerson and Lorrain, and not technically their

personal representatives. It is a fact not without significance

428 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Opinion of the Court.

that the money awarded by the above act of 1831 did not

replace any moneys taken by Emerson and Lorrain from their

respective estates for the benefit of the Government. They

had only rendered meritorious personal services for the pub-

lic upon which no claim of creditors could be based, but

which services Congress chose to recognize by making a gift

to the heirs. This was substantially the view taken of the

case of Emerson y. Hall in the recent case of Blagge v. Balch,

162 U. S. 439, 458,

The case before us differs from the Emerson case by reason

of circumstances which we must suppose were not overlooked

by Congress when it passed the act of 1891, By advancing

to Van Nostrand Seventy-five thousand dollars to be used for

the Government, Price’s ability to meet his obligations to

creditors was to that extent diminished. As he had acted in

good faith, and in the belief that he was promoting the best

interests of the Government, the purpose of Congress was to

make him whole in respect of the amount he had in good

faith advanced to his Successor for public use. He was then

alive, and there was no occasion for Congress to think of

making any provision for those who might be his heirs. We

think that the legislation in question had reference to his

financial condition, and there is no reason to suppose that

Congress intended that the amount if any found due him

upon the adjustment of his accounts should not constitute a

part of his absolute personal estate, to be received and applied

in the event of his death by his personal representative as

required by law.

We concur with the state court in the view that the act of

1891 was not intended to confer a mere gratuity upon Price,

but was a recognition of a moral and equitable, if not legal,

obligation upon the part of the Government to restore to him

moneys advanced in the belief at the time that they would

be repaid to him in the settlement of his accounts as a dis-

bursing officer; and that the use of the words “or his heirs”

in the act was not to make a gift to the heirs of such sum as

upon the required adjustment of his accounts was found to

be due their ancestor, and thereby exclude his creditors from

.

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iii eer ree

PRICE v. FORREST. 429

Opinion of the Court.

all interest in that sum, but to provide against the contingency

of death occurring before the adjustment was consummated,

and thus to make it certain that the right to have his accounts

credited with the amount paid to Van Nostrand, upon princi-

ples of “equity and justice,” should not be lost by reason of

such death. Under this interpretation of the act, the words

“or his heirs” must be held to mean the same thing as per-

sonal representatives. We do not perceive either in the words

of the act, or in the circumstances attending its passage, any-

thing to justify the belief that Congress had any purpose in

the event of the death of Price to defeat the just demands of

creditors.

teference was made in argument to the recent case of

Briggs v. Walker, 171 U.S. 466, 473, 474. It differs in some

respects from both the Emerson case and the present case,

but the decision is in accord with the views herein expressed.

It arose under “an act for the relief of the estate of C. M.

Briggs, deceased,” and the principal question was whether the

right given by the act to Briggs’ “legal representatives” was

for the benefit of his next of kin to the exclusion of his credi-

tors. This court said: “The act of Congress nowhere men-

tions heirs at law, or next of kin. Its manifest purpose is not

to confer a bounty or gratuity upon any one; but to provide

for the ascertainment and payment of a debt due from the

United States to a loyal citizen for property of his, taken by

the United States; and to enable his executor to recover, as

part of his estate, proceeds received by the United States

from the sale of that property. The act is ‘for the relief of

the estate’ of Charles M. Briggs, and the only matter referred

to the Court of Claims is the claim of his ‘legal representa-

tives.’ The executor was the proper person to represent the

estate of Briggs, and was his legal representative ; and as such

he brought suit in the Court of Claims, and recovered the

fund now in question, and consequently held it as assets of

the estate, and subject to the debts and liabilities of his tes-

tator to the defendants in error.” It is to be observed that

the court in that case looked both to the body of the act and

the preamble in order to ascertain the intention of Congress.

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430 OCTOBER TERM, 1898.

Syllabus.

It results that the plaintiffs in error, as heirs of Rodman

M. Price, were not denied by the final judgment of the state

court any right secured to them by the act of 1891.

Something was said in argument which implied that Price

had wrongly resisted the collection of the Forrest claim and

judgment. It is proper to say that so far as the record speaks

on that subject, the course of the deceased was induced by

the belief on his part that it was a claim which he was not

bound in law or justice to pay. Our conclusion does not rest

in any degree upon the character of that claim, but entirely

upon questions of law arising out of matters that were con-

cluded, so far as this court is concerned, by the action of the

state court, and which we have no jurisdiction to review.

We find in the record no error of law in respect of the

Federal questions presented for consideration, and therefore

the decree below must be

Affirmed.