Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Raymond v. Supreme Court of Ohio

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Supreme Court, J

PILED 5.

No. 091049 MAR 2- 2019

te Tae F THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF DOUGLAS

JOEL RAYMOND FOR ADMISSION TO THE PRACTICE OF

LAW WITHOUT EXAMINATION

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of Ohio

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

STEPHEN W. GARD

Counsel of Record

1801 Euchd Avenue

Cleveland, OH 44115

(216) 687-2263

RICHARD S. KOBLENTZ

KOBLENTZ & PENVOSE, LLC

Suite 1170

55 Public Square

Cleveland,OH 44113

(216) 621-3012

Counsel for Petitioner,

Douglas Joel Raymond

a me ae cahanan etc tactnetnte tmamcor sete carted mm tenement Ete ener nce nemmnmnc eet

QUESTION PRESENTED

The Rules of the Supreme Court of Ohio,

which enumerate specific requirements for the

admission to the practice of law, expressly provide

that an application for admission shall be granted or

denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio in the exercise

of its discretion. Petitioner Douglas Joel Raymond, a

non-resident of the State of Ohio, is a member in

good standing of the bars of the States of Colorado,

Michigan and Missoun. The question presented is

whether the Supreme Court of Ohio's discretionary

denial, with no notice, no hearing and for no stated

reason, of an application for admission to the practice

of law which apparently satisfies all of the

enumerated requirements violates the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

JUDGMENT BELOW. ................

Pitj i¢-'t) ty ¢ ¢ eel

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED .....

STATEMENT.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

I. THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S DISCRETIONARY

DENIAL WITH No NOTICE, NO HEARING AND

No STATED REASON OF AN ATTORNEYS

APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE

PRACTICE OF LAW DIRECTLY CONTRAVENES

THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE

DUE PROCESS CLAUGR «ccocevsceasesemendeeee 10

THE QUESTION PRESENTED Is

EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT TO THE LEGAL

PROFESSION AND TO ALL WHO RELY UPON IT

FoR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.............-.- 14

CONCLUSION

APPENDIX A JUDGMENT OF THE QOHIO

SUPREME COURT DECIDED NOVEMBER

20. 2009

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bd. of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564 (1972)

Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,

gS. ee |

Bratton v. Chandler,

SF casetnaaebioanans

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,

y, gi 2 & 2. Ree aaceees 4

Dent v. West Virginia,

Re ee Fe CD ect teteceticacadnnnncs Rare *

D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462 (1983)................

Ex parte Garland,

71 U.S. 333 (1867)

Frazier v. Heebe,

482 U.S. 641 (1987)

Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar,

421 U.S. 773 (1975)....

Goldsmith v. U.S. Bd. of Tax Appeals,

270 U.S. 117 (1926)...

Goss v. Lopez,

419 U.S. 565 (1975).

Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,

341 U.S. 123 (1951)......

Leis v. Flynt,

439 U.S. 438 (1979)

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co..

339 U.S. 306 (1950)..

Powell v. Alabama,

287 U.S. 45 0932)

Raymond v. Moyer,

501 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2007)...

Republican Party v. White,

536 U.S. 765 (2002)..........

Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exams,

goo U.S. 232 (1957).....-.

Saenz v. Roe,

a a vn seaceacndae 18

State v. Ross,

36 Ohio App. 2d 185 (Ct. App. 1973)

Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper,

470 U.S. 274 (1985)

Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman,

487 U.S. 59 (1988)

United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,

548 U.S. 140 (2006)

United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,

338 U.S. 537 (1950).

Willner v. Comm. on Character and Fitness.

373 U-_S. 96 (1963) 2. 10, 11

Wisconsin v. Constantineau.

400 U.S. 433 (1971)

Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U_S. 356 (1886)

CONSTITUTIONAL & STATUTORY PROVISIONS

U.S. Const. amend. XIV

RULES

Conn. Super. Ct. Rules Regulating Admission

to the Bar, § 2-13 (2010)

Hil. Sup. Ct. R. 705 (2004)

lowa Sup. Ct. R. 31.12 (2009)

Ohio Prof. Conduct R. 5.5 (2010)

Ohio Sup Ct. Rules for Gov't of the Bar R_ ]

(2010) Dm

°c ry

Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1A:1-3 (2008)

OTHER AUTHORITIES

ABA Report of the Committee on Multi

jurisdictional Practice, (Aug. 2002)

http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/final_m

jp_rpt_6-5.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,

2010) 9, 19

Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign

Cash Mirror a High Court's Rulings,

N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 2006, at Al 16

Catherine Turcer & Brandi Whetstone, Just

the Beginning: November 2, 2003

February 11, 2004 Contributions to

Candidates for Chief Justice and

Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court,

(Feb. 2004), http://www-.ohiocitizen

org/about/reports.html (last visited

Jan. 26, 2010) ........ PERN | 15

VILLI

“mily Heller, Ohio: Attack Ads, Big Money

Set Tone Again this Year, Nat’! LJ.

26.10, October 28, 2002, at Al0.. 16

NW Ohio Counties Key in Taft Landslide,

The Blade (Toledo, OH), Nov. 7, 2002 16

The Ohio Citizen Action Education Fund,

Campaign Finance Profiles for

General Election Candidates for the

Ohio Supreme Court, http:

www.ohiocitizen.org (last visited Jan

22, 2010) .... ld

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner Douglas Joel Raymond respectfully

submits this petition for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio

JUDGMENT BELOW

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio

denying the application of Douglas Joel Raymond for

admission to the practice of law in the State of Ohio

is unpublished and_ unreported. The _ sole

documentary evidence of the judgment of the

Supreme Court of Ohio is reproduced herein as

Appendix A.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Ohio entered its

judgment on November 10, 2009. The jurisdiction of

this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). On

January 26, 2010 Mr. Justice Stevens granted an

extension of time within which to file a petition for a

writ of certiorari in this case to and including March

9, 2010.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The Fourteenth Amendment to the

Constitution of the United States provides, in

relevant part:

No State shall .. . deprnve any

person of life, liberty or property,

without due process of law.

U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.

STATEMENT

This Court, for over one hundred years, has

held consistently that “[a] State cannot exclude a

person from the practice of law or from any other

occupation in a manner or for reasons. that

contravene the Due Process . . . Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Schware v. Bd. of Bar

Exam Ts, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (citing Dent vu

West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 (1889)). This is true

because “the mght is not ‘a matter of grace and

favor.” Willner v. Comm. on Character and Fitness,

373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (quoting Ex parte Garland,

71 U.S. 333, 379 (1867)).

It is equally well established by this Court

that the essential requirement of due process is that

any “deprivation of life, liberty or property ‘be

preceded by notice and an opportunity for hearing

appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland

Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)

(quoting Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). This is true because

“fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided

determinations of facts decisive of rights... . ‘Secrecy

is not congenial to truth-seeking and _ self

righteousness gives too slender an assurance of

nghtness.” Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975)

(quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.

McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 170, 171 (1951) (Frankfurter,

J., concurring))

This case affords this Court the opportunity to

reaffirm or, if necessary, clarify its fundamental

procedural due process jurisprudence. The Supreme

Court of Ohio has set forth specific, detailed and

seemingly exhaustive requirements for admission to

the practice of law without examination. See Ohio

Sup. Ct. Rules for Gov’t of the Bar R. I, § 9. Despite

the enumeration of these requirements, the Supreme

Court of Ohio explicitly states that “in its sole

discretion [it] shall approve or disapprove the

application” of any attorney who seeks admission to

the practice of law without examination in the State

of Ohio. Id. at § 9(F). In addition, “it 1s the practice

of the Ohio Supreme Court never to grant a hearing

or state reasons for its decision when it denies an

application for admission to practice law without

examination.” Raymond v. Moyer, 501 F.3d 548, 555

(6th Cir. 2007).

The facts of the instant case illustrate the

procedural operation of the bar admission process in

the State of Ohio. Douglas Joel Raymond, a resident

of the State of Colorado, seemingly meets and far

exceeds the enumerated requirements for admission

to practice law in the State of Ohio. He graduated

from the University of Denver School of Law in 1981

and has been admitted to the practice of law in the

States of Colorado, Michigan and Missoun. At all

times relevant herein, Douglas Joel Raymond has

been honored to possess an Avy rating from

Martindale-Hubbell, a designation conferred upon

only the most competent and prominent attorneys in

the United States.

It has not, and cannot, be disputed that

Douglas Joel Raymond fully satisfies the good

character and fitness requirements for the admission

to the practice of law in the State of Ohio. In Ohio,

the Board of Commissioners on Character and

Fitness have the ffinal authority to “approve

applicants who possess the requisite character,

fitness, and moral qualifications for admission.”

Ohio Sup. Ct. Rules for Gov't of the Bar R. I, §

10(B)(4). Only in the event that a committee of the

Board of Commissioners makes a recommendation

other than an unqualified approval does the process

proceed to a hearing on the applicant’s character and

fitness. In that case the applicant must be given a

copy of the unfavorable report by certified maui. Zd.

at § 12(P).

In the instant case Petitioner Douglas Joel

Raymond never received any notification of any

question regarding his good character and fitness.

Thus, it was determined by the Ohio Board of

Commissioners on Character and Fitness, as it has

been on three prior occasions by the bars of the

States of Colorado, Michigan and Missour, that

Douglas Joel Raymond satisfies the character and

fitness requirements for admission to the practice of

law in the State of Ohio. Furthermore, the Supreme

Court of Ohio has no authority or jumsdictior

review a favorable decision by the Ohio Board

Commissioners on Character and Fitness. dd. at

10¢€B)(4)

The past legal practice of

Petitioner Dougla

Joel Raymond also appears to clearly demonstrat

that he possesses the legal skills adequate to practic:

law without further examination as required by thé

Rules of the Supreme Court of Ohio Id. at §

9(F’){1)(b) In addition to his AV rating from

Martindale-Hubbell and having, previously bee!

determined to possess such legal skulls by the States

of Colorado, Michigan and Missouri, Douglas Joe!

Raymond has been admitted to practice pro hac vice

in the courts of the State of Ohio on more than forty

(40) separate occasions. Under the law prevailing u

the State of Ohio admission to practice pro hac vice |

based on the following three-part balancing test

Whether the attorney has a long-standing, close or

personal relationship with the plaintiffs; 2) Whether

the attorney is customary counsel for plaintiffs in the

jurisdictions where he is permitted to practice; and 3)

Whether there is Ohio counsel currently available to

the plaintiffs that 1s competent to represent them

with respect to the issues involved in the case. Stat

Ross, 36 Ohio App. 2d 185, 197 (Ct. App. 1973)

Petitioner Douglas Joel Raymond concentraté«

and limits his legal practice to the representation of

plaintiffs in obstetmcal and neonatal medica!

malpractice cases Given the nature of his legal!

practice, Douglas Joel Raymond is never able te

satisfy the first two factors of the governing test for

pro hac vice admission in the State of Ohio. Thus, on

over forty (40) separate occasions the courts of the

State of Ohio have determined that he not only

possesses the legal skills adequate to practice law in

the State of Ohio, but also that he possesses legal!

skills that no other available Omo lawyer is

competent to provide

Petitioner Douglas Joel Raymond also has the

requisite intent to practice law in the State of Ohio

actively on a “regular and continuing basis.” Ohio

Sup. Ct. Rules for Gov't of the Bar R. [, § 9(C)(1)(d)

In addition to affirming his intent to practice law in

the State of Ohio on a continuing basis in an

affidavit sworn to under oath with the attendant

legal penalties for perjury, two objective facts confirm

the sincerity of the intention of Douglas Joel

Raymond to practice regularly in the State of Ohio

First, his past and ongoing pro hac vice practice in

the State of Ohio is itself indicative of an intent to

practice law in Ohio on a continuing basis In

addition, Douglas Joeit Raymond informed the

Supreme Court of Ohio, upon his sworn oath, that he

had made arrangements, upon his admission, to

establish a law office in Ohio with a _ respected

member of the Ohio bar and from which he would

onduct his law practice 1n the State of Ohio

Petitioner Douglas Joel Raymond first applied

for admission to the practice of law without

examination on October 1, 2004. On May 25, 2005

the Supreme Court of Ohio denied his application

without providing him with any hearing, any

opportunity to respond to any alleged deficiencies in

his application or any reason for the demal. On

September 13, 2005 Douglas Joel Raymond filed a

motion for clanfication and/or reconsideration with

the Supreme Court of Ohio in which he requested

that he be provided with some _ explanation,

justification or reason for the denial of his

application and offered to provide the Supreme Court

of Ohio with any additional information or

documentation deemed relevant by the Court. On

November 8, 2005 the Supreme Court of Ohio again

notified Douglas Joel Raymond that his application

for admission had been demed. Again, the Supreme

Court of Ohio refused to provide any reason or

explanation for the denial

On December 27, 2005 Douglas Joel Raymond

filed an action in the United States Distnct Court for

the Southern District of Ohio challenging the

constitutionality of the action of the Supreme Court

of Ohio. On appeal, the United States Court of

Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the action of

the Supreme Court of Ohio was judicial in character

and therefore the lower federal courts had no

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,

despite the fact that Douglas Joel Raymond had

received no notice, hearing or statement of reasons

by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Raymond, 501 F.3d

548. ‘The United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit expressed sympathy for Raymond’s

argument, stating: “The possibility for abuse is high

when a court can hide its reasoning and knows that

its decision is virtually unreviewable, and this

possibility raises particular concerns when, as in this

case, the decision can carry with it severe collateral]

consequences.” Jd. at 553.

Petitioner Douglas Joel Raymond filed the

instant application for admission to the practice of

law without examination in the State of Ohio on

January 16, 2008. This application is virtually

identical to his first application. On November 10,

2009 the Supreme Court of Ohio again demied the

application of Petitioner Douglas Joel Raymond for

admission to the practice of law in the State of Ohio.

Again, the Supreme Court of Ohio refused to provide

Douglas Joel Raymond any hearing, any opportunity

to respond to any alleged deficiencies in his

application or even any reason for its denial of his

application

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

This Court should grant certiorari because the

rules and practices of the Supreme Court of Ohio

directly contravene this Court's clearly established

principle that the Due Process Clause requires notice

and a hearing before an attorney may be denied

admission to practice law in a State.

The issue presented by this petition is

cnitically important to the bench, the bar and the

people of America generally. As the American Bar

Association has clearly recognized, our rapidly

changing national economy necessitates that both

individual attorneys and law firms be able to

establish their practices in different States without

the imposition of artificial and unjustifiable barriers.

See generally ABA Report of the Committee on

Multijurisdictional Practice, (Aug. 2002) http://

www.abanet.org/cpr/mjp/final _mjp_rpt_6-5.pdf (last

visited Jan. 26, 2010). In an age of increasing

specialization in the practice of law, the rules and

practices of the Supreme Court of Ohio, whereby

attorneys are denied admission to the bar as a

matter of unbridled discretion and with no statement

of the reason for such denial, operate to deny

competent counsel of choice to individuals,

corporations and public interest groups whose

complex legal meeds require’ specialized legal

expertise, often not available in the State in which

they reside.

The issue presented by this petition is also one

of major significance to this Court and _ its

jurisprudence. A State court’s discretionary denial of

an attorney's application for admission to the

practice of law with no stated reason severely

impairs this Court’s ability to insure that the State

court is adhering to the mandates of the Constitution

of the United States generally, including the

Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Equal

Protection Clause and the First Amendment. Absent

notice, a hearing and a statement of the reason for a

State court’s denial of such an application, this Court

cannot insure that the application was denied for a

legitimate, as opposed to an illegitimate reason.

Indeed, this Court’s Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which

is founded on the premise that a State court’s bar

admission process is judicial in character and

adheres to the fundamental principles of due process,

imposes a special obligation on this Court to insure

that State courts in fact adhere to the Due Process

Clause because it is the only court which has the

jurisdiction to do so.

I. THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S DISCRETIONARY

DENIAL WITH No NOTICE, NO HEARING AND

No STATED REASON OF AN ATTORNEY’S

APPLICATION FOR THE ADMISSION TO THE

PRACTICE OF LAW DIRECTLY CONTRAVENES

THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS OF THE

DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.

This Court has clearly established in a long

and unbroken line of precedent that, “A State cannot

exclude a person from the practice of law or from any

other occupation in a manner or for reasons that

contravene the Due Process Clause ... of the

Fourteenth Amendment.” Willner, 373 U.S. at 102

(quoting Schware, 353 U.S. at 102); see also Bratton

v. Chandler, 260 U.S. 110 (1922); Dent, 129 U.S. 114.

In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564

(1972), this Court favorably cited Goldsmith vu

United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117

(1926), to illustrate when a person has a property

interest which mandates the procedures guaranteed

by the Due Process Clause. The facts in Goldsmith

are substantially similar to those in this case. The

Board of Tax Appeals, like the Ohio Supreme Court,

set forth rules for the admission to practice before it,

but those rules, hike the Ohio Supreme Court rule

here, further provided that the Board in its

discretion could deny admission to an applicant. 270

U.S. at 119. The Board, like the Supreme Court of

Ohio herein, demied the application at issue with no

statement of any reason for its action. Jd. In Roth

this Court held that “the existence of the Board’s

eligibility rules gave the petitioner an interest and

claim to practice before the Board to which

procedural due process requirements applied.” 408

U.S. at 577 n.15. In short, it has long been

recognized by this Court that an applicant for

admission to the practice of law has a property

interest such that “the requirements of procedural

due process must be met before a State can exclude a

person from practicing law.” Willner, 373 U.S. at

102

The action of the Supreme Court of Ohio, in

addition to depriving an attorney applicant the nght

to practice law in the State, severely damages the

applicant’s professional reputation, thereby

infringing upon a liberty interest protected by the

Due Process Clause. See Wisconsin v. Constantineau,

400 U.S. 433 (1971). An attorney is required to

disclose the denial of an application for admission to

the practice of law in the State of Ohio to his legal

malpractice insurance carner and to the Supreme

Court of any other State to which a future

application for admission to the bar may be made.

The denial by the Supreme Court of Ohio also

impairs an attorney's ability to practice pro hac vice

in Ohio courts. An attorney is ethically obligated to

disclose the fact of the denial of admission to the bar

both to the court and to opposing counsel. This

disclosure is especially damaging because leave to

appear pro hac vice 1s entirely discretionary with the

court. Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443 (1979). In

addition, Ohio Prof. Conduct R. 5.5(b)(1) (2010)

prohibits an attorney who has not been admitted to

practice in Ohio from establishing “a systematic or

continuous presence [in Ohio] for the practice of law.”

Thus, Petitioner herein, who has previously appeared

pro hac vice over forty (40) times in the courts of

Ohio, runs the msk of incurring a disciplinary

complaint if he does so in the future. In other words,

Petitioner may be in the curious position of having

practiced too continuously in Ohio to do so pro hac

vice in the future, but not continuously or regularly

enough to be admitted to the practice of law in the

State of Ohio

The denial of admission to the practice of law

by the Supreme Court of Ohio severely damages an

applicant’s professional reputation in yet another

manner. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio

invites the applicant to seek admission by the

alternative means of taking and passing the Ohio

Bar Examination. See, e.g., Appendix A, infra. This

clearly implies that the reason for the denial is that

the applicant fails to “currently possess[ | the legal

skills deemed adequate for admission to the practice

of law in Ohio without examination.” Ohio Sup. Ct

Rules for Gov't of the Bar R. I, § 9(F)(1)(b) In

summary, attorneys who apply for admission to the

practice of law in the State of Ohio have both a

property and a liberty interest such that the

procedures guaranteed by the Due Process Clause

must be afforded the applicant

The Ohio Supreme Court’s. discretionary

denial, with no notice, no hearing and no statement

of any reason, of an attorney’s application for

admission to the practice of law violates the most

rudimentary requirements of the Due Process

Clause At a minimum the Due Process Clause

requires notice, access to the government’s evidence

and an opportunity to respond. See, e.g., Brock 1

Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252 (1987)

Loudermiull, 470 U.S. 532; Goss, 419 U.S. 565. In

Willner, this Court held that a full hearing, with the

night to cross-examine witnesses, is essential in a bar

application proceeding. The Court need not address

the specific procedures required by the Due Process

Clause in this case because the Supreme Court of

Ohio, acting in secret and exercising its sole

discretion with no notice, no hearing of any kind and

no statement of any reason for its decision, fails to

provide even the most basic procedures required by

the Due Process Clause

In Goss, this Court, quoting Mr. Justice

Frankfurter’s famous concurring opinion in McGrath,

held: “[Fljairness can rarely be obtained by secret,

one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights

No better instrument has been devised for arriving at

truth than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss

notice of the case against him and opportunity to

meet it.” 419 U.S. at 580 (quoting 341 U.S. at 170,

172-73)

The denial of admission to the practice of law

in a State must be preceded by, at a minimum,

rudimentary due process. This Court should grant

the petition for certiorari and reaffirm the basic

principles of fairness contained in the Due Process

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

IT. THE QUESTION PRESENTED Is

EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT TO THE LEGAL

PROFESSION AND TO ALL WHO RELY UPON IT

FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

The question presented is_ exceptionally

important to the bench, the bar and the American

people who rely on our system of justice to provide

them with competent legal representation. This

Court bears a unique obligation in this matter

because it is the only Court with jurisdiction to

review state court denials of applications for

admission to the practice of law D.C. Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The

Rooker-Feldman doctrine assumes that the state

courts will adhere to the fundamental requirements

of procedural fairness mandated by the Due Process

Clause of the Constitution of the United States

Nevertheless, the rules prevailing in a small number

of States, including Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio

and Virginia, fail to provide bar admission applicants

with the required procedural protections. See Conn.

Super. Ct. Rules Regulating Admission to the Bar, §

2-13 (2010); Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 705 (2004); Iowa Sup. Ct

R. 31.12 (2009); Ohio Rules of Gov't of the Bar R. I, §

9 (2010); Va. Sup. Ct. R. 1A:1-3 (2008).

A grant of certiorari in this case is essential to

the preservation of the judicial integrity and the

appearance of judicial propriety of the Supreme

Court of Ohio and of high courts in other states

whose members are selected in popular elections. It

has long been recognized that, “(t]he plea that

evidence of guilt must be secret is abhorrent to free

men, because it provides a cloak for the malevolent

the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the corrupt

United States ex. rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338

U.S. 537, 551 (Holmes, J., dissenting)

Judicial election contests in the State of Ohno

have become hotly contested and involve the

candidates’ public discussion of legal issues of publi

concern, including tort reform. Cf. Republican Party

v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). In Ohio, a majority of

the justices sitting on the Ohio Supreme Court have

raised thousands of dollars in campaign

contnbutions almost exclusively from doctors,

hospitals, imsurance companies and _ insurance

defense law firms. See, e.g., Catherine Turcer &

}

Brandi Whetstone, Just the Beginning: November :

2003 - February I11, 2004 Contributions to

Candidates for Chief Justice and Justice of the Ohio

Supreme Court, (Feb. 2004), http://www-.ohiocitizen

org/about/reports.html! (last visited Jan. 26, 2010):

The Ohio Citizen Action Education Fund, Campaign

Finance Profiles for General Election Candidates for

the Ohio Supreme Court, http://www.ohiocitizen.org

(last visited Jan. 22, 2010). In the course of this

campaign fundraising and their judicial campaigns,

members of the Ohio Supreme Court have

specifically criticized the lawyers who represent

medical malpractice claimants and promised to

provide judicial assistance to their campaign

benefactors. See, e.g., Emily Heller, Ohio: Attack

Ads, Big Money Set Tone Again this Year, Natl L.J.,

October 28, 2002, at 1: NW Ohio Counties Key in Taft

Landslide, The Blade (Toledo, OH), Nov. 7, 2002

(Justice Evelyn Lundberg Stratton promises that

doctor's efforts on her behalf will “pay off’). It has

even been asserted that the rulings of the Ohio

Supreme Court are influenced by the financial

interests of the campaign contnbutors to the justices

of the Court Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts,

Campaign Cash Mirror a High Court's Rulings, N.Y

Times, October 1, 2006 at Al. When the Ohio

Supreme Court provides no notice, no hearing and no

statement of any reason for its denial of an

application for admission the applicant cannot know

why his application was denied. What is known is

that absent intervention by this Court, discretionary

secret decision-making by the Supreme Court of Ohio

will continue unabated and the appearance that

financial interests trump impartial justice in Ohio

will remain

A grant of certiorari in this case is also

necessary to preserve the integrity and continued

viability of much of this Court’s constitutional

jurisprudence governing the bar admissions process

in the States The constitutionality of a State

official’s action in a particular matter commonly

depends not on the action taken by the official, but

on the reason for the action. Thus, the Supreme

Court of Ohio may certainly require proper

qualifications from applicants for admission to the

practice of law, but

Obviously an applicant [for

admission to the practice of law]

could not be excluded merely

because he was a Republican or a

Negro or a member of a

particular church. Even n

ipplying permissible standards

officers of a State cannot exclude

in applicant when there is no

basis for their finding that he

fails to meet these standards, o1

when their action is invidiously

discriminatory

Schware. 353 US. at 239 (citing Yick Wo Hopkin

LIS US. 356 (1886))

The Pmnvileges and I[mmunities Clause of

Article [V. §& 2 of the Constitution of the United

States prohibits a State from discriminating against

non-residents unless “(1) there is a substantial reason

for the difference in treatment; and (iu) the

discrimination practiced against nonresidents bears

a substantial relationship to the State’s objective.”

Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284

(1985). New residents of a State are similarly

protected from discrimination because of their status

as newcomers. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).

Thus, this Court has held that a State may not deny

a person admission to the practice of law because he

or she does not reside in the State. Piper, 470 U.S.

274. Neither may a State deny admission to the

practice of law to an attorney for the reason that his

or her law office is not located in the State. Frazier

v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987). Nor is the availability

of an alternative means of being admitted to the bar,

such as passing a bar examination, a reason

sufficient to justify discrimination against non-

residents or new residents of a State. Supreme Court

of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988). Each of these

holdings of this Court is premised on the legitimacy

and sufficiency of the reasons asserted by the State

for its action. If the Supreme Court of Ohio is

permitted to continue its practice of denying

admission to the practice of law with no notice, no

hearing and no statement of any reason for its action

then this Court’s constitutional precedents are an

empty promise, devoid of any meaning or practical

effect. This petition should be granted in order to

preserve the dignity and respect to which this Court

and its holdings are entitled.

This Court should grant certiorari in this case

because the issue presented is critically important to

the practicing bar throughout the nation. Thirty-five

years ago this Court recognized that the practice of

law is an integral component of our national

economy. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773

(1975). In the intervening years, rapid developments

in communication and transportation technology

have only accelerated the globalization of business

and finance. The changes in our national economy in

the past few years emphasize the necessity of a legal

profession that adapts to these changed

circumstances.

The days when lawyers established their law

offices in a single jurisdiction and served the needs of

only local residents and businesses are past.

Individual lawyers and large law firms alike must be

able to move their practices to new jurisdictions as

the need for their services dictates. It is for these

reasons that the American Bar Association has

recognized that it is critically necessary for States to

reform their rules so that non-resident attorneys may

be admitted to the practice of law, both on

permanent and temporary basis, in a fair, orderly

and predictable manner. See ABA Report, supra.

The practice of the Ohio Supreme Court of denying

applications for admission to the practice of law with

no notice, no hearing and no statement of any reason

is anathema to the needs of the legal profession. No

manager of a law firm and no individual attorney can

properly plan for the future when the outcome of an

application for admission to the bar of a State is

entirely unpredictable and uncertain.

Perhaps the most important reason why this

petition should be granted is because of its

importance to the clients of the practicing bar. The

importance of insuring the availability of competent

counsel of choice cannot be understated. This Court

is aware of, and often must deal with, the

consequences of persons and corporations being

unrepresented or represented by incompetent

counsel. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,

548 U.S. 140 (2006); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45

(1932).

Today corporations, public interest groups and

individuals often have complex legal needs which

require specialized legal expertise not available in

the State in which they reside. This is vividly

illustrated by the facts of the instant case. Here, the

Supreme Court of Ohio, in the exercise of its

unbridled discretion and with no notice, hearing or

statement of any reason, denied the application for

admission to the practice of law of an attorney who

had been determined by the courts of the State of

Ohio on over forty (40) separate occasions to have

specialized legal skills which no other available Ohio

lawyer could competentiy provide to the client.

These facts alone demonstrate that it is critically

important that this Court grant this petition and

reaffirm its clearly established rule that the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

requires that an attorney be given notice, a hearing

and a statement of reasons before an application for

admission to the practice of law may be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this petition for a

writ of certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,