Opposition Brief — Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States

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In the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., FKA PHILIP MORRIS, INC..

PETITIONER

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL

ALTRIA GROUP, INC., PETITIONER

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO (INVESTMENTS),

LIMITED, PETLLTIONER

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY. PETITIONER

us

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL.

ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI!

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

NEAL KUMAR KATYAI

Acting Solicitor General

Counsel of Record

(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)

(8 ns 2S eee RRS OREN ite ae Pee EI ANNE TR RE SORT a EEDA I SE LEI OE RCM BPS E LIS IRI

EGORY C.J. LISA

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Attorneys

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De Darlin nt of J SL2UC¢

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED

The petitions collectively present the following ques-

tions:

1. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that

an unincorporated association of corporations and

individuals may form an “enterprise” under 18 U.S.C

1961(4).

2. Whether the court of appeals was required to un-

dertake independent appellate review of the district

court’s unchallenged findings of fact establishing fraud.

3. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that

the First Amendment does not protect petitioners’ pub-

lic statements because they were fraudulent.

4. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that

petitioners’ statements about “light” and “low tar” ciga-

rettes were false, misleading, and not authorized by the

Federal Trade Commission.

5. Whether the court of appeals correctly rejected

the argument that any reasonable likelihood of future

violations was eliminated by the signing of the Master

Settlement Agreement or, alternatively, by the passage

of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control]

Act.

6. Whether the court of appeals correctly sustained

relief prohibiting specified conduct and requiring cor-

rective statements.

7. Whether the court of appeals correctly concluded

that British American Tobacco (Investments) Limited,

a foreign corporation, was subject to RICO when it used

the interstate mails and wires and engaged in other

conduct in the United States in furtherance of a scheme

to defraud American consumers, and when it conspired

with American companies to pursue that fraudulent

scheme.

8. Whether the court of appeals correctly rejected

Altria’s contention that it did not aet with specific intent

to defraud.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Opinions below .... ) . | ia eee

Jurisdiction ..... ee ae ee Be ee eae eee

Ce eee ee eae ee eee a

Armumem ......... ee Ee ee ee ae 14

A. Anunine yrporated association of corporations

and individuals may form a RICO enterprise

B. The court of appeals was not required to

undertake independent appellate review of the

district court’s unchallenged findings of fact

Ce I os oe ere ee eee eee 27

(. Petitioners’ fraud was not protected by the First

PR dy nb oe evecare eee eves reenees case OA

D. Petitioners’ statements about “light” and “low

tar” cigarettes were fraudulent and not

authorized by the FTC ........... , | 50

EK. Neither the master scttlement agreement nor

the passage of the F'amily Smoking Prevention

and Tobacco Control Act eliminated all likelihood

ee ee ; 5:

EF. The court of appeals correctly upheld the

injunction prohibiting specified conduct and

requiring corrective statements ........... 7

G. The court of appeals correctly rejected BATCo’s

claim that this case involves an extraterritorial

appucation OF RICA) ....... ccs cceccess 62

H. The court of appeals correctly concluded that

Altria acted with intent to defraud ...... aie ae

CL ANEDUNE oo a or vee ee eee ee oa ees (2

Appendix Transcript of oral argument. (D.C. C

Oct. 14, 2008)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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i(/Aaada Fe) n, 935 F.2d 475 (2d Ch cer ie] }

AO? US. 1005 (1991) RR

V/tma Grow) / f od. 129 S. Ct 6

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QR OTT ( , (XQ)

j (,0O7T) Vv. (07 AGH } j .

Lyi 166 U.S. 4& Had he

soul / ! States, 129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009 7)

Bridge v. Phi px | 1 & Indem. Ce IRS CF

Jil (YOO 1). 64. ¢ HG

b (Cj } pri f i a PY, 5 |

4 ' POOL) Pe

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pAcer ta? »C< Vv. ted |} / ;

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jf f Fi / j (7 ST OLTe <)> | ; |? ] ‘A{ i jos |

[> y J . ) . ll" ‘ ‘

ON MMLAL Landreth, 566 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2009

f YC7e) : Salaz L7. BQ S oo LOD 2OOD) }4)

('} PCTIVCHEL YN Holder HY | j: 3] LOO? (Sth Cir Api

petition for cert. pending, No. 09-1235 (filed Ay

2? OO10) 2

f V7 PILOT IDE alth brand Livi \ / y) t¢ i State

678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky. 2010), appeal

pending No. 10-5234 (6th Cir. filed Mar. 9, 2010 6

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005

MedL 4 r} ‘ Blur Cre ce DL | l VM

; P :

Lents ( ONTETCTLC E

365 U.S. 127 (1961)

‘

° { Oy y sy

yironmental De f purnd. [ne

Cir. 1993

. State Bar,

denied, 526 U.S

J 2

Lana Bant

19]

} ta rttori t

0

PQ 1 9X9

F‘londa

S. 136 (1994

Vo vs ] Madigan

538 U.S. 600 (2003)

Continued:

Lake A LTWAYS Ltd V Sahe LO Be lgian World

Arrlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984)

Levine v. CMP Publ’ns., Imc., 738 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.

Liquidation Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental s

Renta, 530 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2008)

Liv Lg De SLgNS, Inc. v. ET. Dupont de Nemours &

Co., 431 F.3d 353 (9th Cir. 2005). cert. denied,

947 U.S. 1192 (2006)

UVcCombv. Jacksonville Paper Ci

(1949)....

Vict illo ih Vv. Sale

WUcDonald v. Smith.

{cIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comn

(1995)

Mocros oft ( Orp v. Odom, 552 U.S. 985 (2007)

Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985)

Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Williams, 547 U.S. 516 (2006

Vatronal ( ONT " OF} Egg Nutrition i FTC, 570 F.2d

157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978)

NOW v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 (1994)

New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R

States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909)

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S

Nike, Ine. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654

North South Fon. Co

2d Cir. 1996)

Ocean Energy 11

J. RHR FC 21

Cases—Continued:

Odom v. Microsoft Corp., 486 F.3d 541 (9th Cir.),

cert. denied, 552 U.S. 985 (2007)

Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349

(2000) . . . 6s on 0 oo se . 40, 63,

Peel yv. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary

Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)

Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946)

Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia

Pictures Indus., Ince. 508 U.S. 49 (1993)

Republic of the Phillippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355

(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989)

Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Sup. Ct., 106 F.3d 929

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1121 (1997)

Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983)

Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,

78 F.3d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1996)

Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (1997)

S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co.. 241

(2d Cir. 2001)

SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801

(2d Cir. 1975)

SEC v. Pirate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233 (4th Cir

2009), petition for cert. pending, No. 09-1176 (filed

Mar. 26, 2010)

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. lmrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000)

linited Mine Workers of Am. v. Pennington,

381 US. 657 (1965)

spc _f

ontinued

ted States v. Aimone, 715 F.2d 822 (3d C

t. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984)

lnited States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468 (9th Cir

United States v. Butler, 954 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1992

l/nited States v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352 (9th Cir

1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976)

lJnited States v. Cr 4. 3d 71 (ist Cir. 2004)

l/nited States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (38d Cir. 1993

cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076, and 513 U.S. 812 (1994)

ited States v. Feldman, 853 k.2d 648 (9th Cir

1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989)

rited States v. Goldin Indus., Ine., 219 F.3d 1271

Lith Cir.), cert. denied 531 U.S. 1015 (2000)

ited States v. Huber. 603 k

denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980)

ited States v. Ineo Bank & Try

845 F.2d 919 (11th Cir. 1988

utes v. London, 66 F.3d 1227

eert. denied, 517 U.S. LL55 (1996)

nited States v. Masters, 924 I°.2d 1362

cert. denied, 500 U.S. 919,

(1991)

nited States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466 (4th Cu

denied, 5387 U.S. 1094 (2002)

d States v. Navarro Ordas, 770

(11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 |

) ited State ' NI,

(1977

Cases—Continued:

United States v. Pierce, 224 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2000

United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 3438 (D.C. Cir.),

cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)

l/nited States vy. Philip Morris USA, Ini

1TT7 F. Supp. 2d 191 (D.D.C. 2007)

lInited States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 2001)

‘ited States v. Stolfi, 889 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1989)

l/nited States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir

eert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 458 U.S. 1109,

and 459 U.S. 825 (1982)

nited States v. Turket

19S]

rib rl ( 0 \ FTC.

cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 |

vuderer Vv. Office O} Dis

(1 U.S. 626 (1985

id rules—Continued:

), 123 Stat. 1782

Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and

Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73,

$ 968, 103 Stat. 506

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq. ............

by. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947

).S.C. 1961

S.C. 196101)

. 196103)

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>», 1Y61(D)

>. 1961(10)

1962(¢)

> 1962(d)

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li 5.C. 1964(b

IS U.S.C. 1964(¢)

Weapon >of Mass Destruction Prohibition

Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-45

§ 68$02(e), 118 Stat. 3767

» ULS.C. 38345(a)(2)

5 U.S.C. 3345(a)(3)

IS U.S.C. 1001

8 U.S.C. 1341

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Rule 65(d

Rule 65(d)(1

Rule 65(d)(4

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Jn the Supreme Court of the Gnited States

No. 09-976

PHILIP MORRIS USA INC., FKA PHILIP MORRIS, IN¢

PETITIONER

.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, |

No. 09-977

t.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY, ET A!

PETITIONERS

.

NITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET

No. 09-979

CRIA GROUP, INC., PETITIONE!

?).

NITED STATES OF AMERI

No. 09-980

. TOBACCO (INVES

ETITIONER

U.

NITED STATES OF AMI

No. 09-1012

4RD TOBACCO COMPANY, PI

?)

NITED STATES OF AMERICA, F’

PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CER

UNITED STATES COURT OF

> TET DIS rRIt TLR ¢ O] 4 WB) ?

FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la

1004) is reported at 566 F.3d 1095. The opinion of the

district court (Pet. App. 10la-2181la) is reported at 449

F. Supp. 2d 1.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on

May 22, 2009. Petitions for rehearing were denied on

September 22, 2009 (Pet. App. 2182a-2815a). On No-

vember 10, 2009, the Chief Justice extended the time

within which to file petitions for a writ of certiorari to

and including February 19, 2010, and the petitions were

filed on that date. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under 28 U.S.C, 1254(1).

STATEMENT

The United States brought this action under the

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(RICQ), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., alleging that petitioners

engaged in a coordinated scheme to deceive Americans

about the addictiveness and health risks of cigarettes,

thereby enhancing petitioners’ cigarette sales and asso-

ciated profits. The district court held a nine-month

bench trial, admitting nearly 14,000 exhibits and hearing

live testimony from 84 witnesses and written testimony

from 162 witnesses. Pet. App. 8a. The voluminous evi-

dentiary record includes large numbers of petitioners’

internal documents, see, e.g., 7d. at 36a-39a, as well as

testimony from numerous former tcbacco industry em-

ployees and participants that detail petitioners’ fraudu-

lent behavior, e.g., id. at 35a-36a.

Based on that record, the district court issued a final

decision documenting the “overwhelming evidence” that

3

petitioners conducted and conspired to conduct the af-

fairs of a RICO enterprise through a pattern of racke-

teering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(¢) and (d),

by engaging in a decades-long scheme to defraud that

petitioners executed in part through their use of mail

and wire communications. Pet. App. 103a, 114a-115a,

1887a; see 2d. at 1885a-2004a. The court’s opinion, which

spans nearly an entire volume of the federal Supple-

ment, includes more than 4000 enumerated findings of

fact and details the affairs of petitioners’ enterprise and

petitioners’ pattern of mail and wire fraud. See id. at

119a-1885a.

The district court found, and the court of appeals

unanimously affirmed, that the government proved that

petitioners participated in the conduct of an enterprise

and “knowingly and intentionally engaged in a scheme

to defraud smokers and potential smokers, for purposes

of financial gain, by making false and fraudulent state-

ments, representations, and promises.” Pet. App. 1888a;

id. at 5a-6a, 30a. “Put more colloquially, and less legal

istically, over the course of more than 50 years, [peti-

tioners] lied, misrepresented, and deceived the Ameri-

can public, including smokers and the young people they

avidly sought as ‘replacement smokers,’ about the devas

tating health effects of smoking and environmental to-

baeco smoke, they suppressed research, they destroyed

documents, they manipulated the use of nicotine so as to

increase and perpetuate addiction, they distorted the

truth about low tar and light cigarettes so as to discour

age smokers from quitting, and they abused the legal

system in order to achieve their goal.” /d. at 1887a-

1S&Sa.

As the court of appeals observed, a summary of peti

tioners’ conduct “cannot adequately present the volume:

of evidence underlying the district court’s findings of

fact.” Pet. App. 37a. “(T]he evidentiary picture must be

viewed in its totality in order to fully appreciate how

massive the case is against [petitioners], how irresponsi-

ble their actions have been, and how heedless they have

been of the public welfare and the suffering caused by”

their fraudulent conduct. /d. at 112a. The following

summary thus provides but an outline of the nature and

history of the RICO enterprise as found by the district

court and affirmed by the D.C. Circuit.

1. In 1953, petitioners’ RICO enterprise was estab

lished when the presidents of Philip Morris, Reynolds,

Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, and American met to

develop a joint response to the growing public concern

about the health risks of smoking. Pet. App. 122a-127a,

1923a-1925a. The companies, normally rivals in the cig

arette market, agreed that no manufacturer would “seek

a competitive advantage by inferring to its public that

its product is less risky than others,” 7d. at 124a, and

jointly issued a full-page advertisement entitled “A

Frank Statement to Cigarette Smokers” that they pub

lished in newspapers nationwide on January 4, 1954. /d.

at 128a-132a. “The Frank Statement set forth the indus-

try’s ‘open question’ position that it would maintain for

more than forty years—that cigarette smoking was not

a proven cause of lung cancer; that cigarettes were not

injurious to health; and that more research on smoking

and health issues was needed.” /d. at 129a.

At its core, petitioners’ scheme was designed to “mis-

lead[] consumers in order to maximize [petitioners’ | rev-

enues by recruiting new smokers (the majority of whom

are under the age of 18), preventing current smokers

from quitting, and thereby sustaining the industry.”

Pet. App. 201 1a; see id. at 18&&a. The goal of the “open

question” strategy, as a senior Philip Morris executive

later explained, was to create the impression of scientific

uncertainty and thereby “give smokers a psychological

crutch and a self-rationale to continue smoking.” /d. at

417a. The companies declared in the Frank Statement

that “[wJe accept an interest in people’s health as a basic

responsibility, paramount to every other consideration

in our business”; asserted that “[wJe believe the prod-

ucts we make are not injurious to health”; and promised

to fund objective research into “all phases of tobacco use

and health” by scientists “of unimpeachable integrity

and national repute.” /d. at 131a-132a.

Yet at the time the companies issued the “Frank

Statement,” they already had “documented a large num-

ber of known carcinogens contained in cigarette smoke.”

Pet. App. 396a. Over the ensuing decades, petitioners

developed a sophisticated understanding of the toxicity

and addictiveness of cigarettes that outpaced that of the

public, regulators, and public health authorities. /d. at

9a-lla. As the public’s knowledge increased, the compa-

nies intensified the level of their deceptions. The dis-

trict court, as the court of appeals explains, catalogued

“countiess examples of deliberately false statements” by

petitioners regarding the health effects of smoking and

secondhand smoke, the addictiveness of nicotine and pe-

titioners’ manipulation of nicotine delivery to create and

sustain addiction, and the claimed health benefits of

“light” cigarettes. /d. at 45a. The district court found

that petitioners’ “efforts to deny and distort the scien

tific evidence of smoking’s harms are demonstrated by

not only decades of press releases, reports, booklets,

newsletters, television and radio appearances, and scien-

tific symposia and publications, but also by evidence of

their coneerted|] efforts to attack and undermine the

6

studies in mainstream scientific publications such as the

Reports of the Surgeon General.” /d. at 1894a. In addi-

tion, “[La]s their internal documents reveal, [petitioners]

engaged in massive, sustained, and highly sophisticated

marketing and promotional campaigns to portray their

light brands as less harmful than regular cigarettes.”

Id. at 1904a. Petitioners “have known for decades that

filtered and low tar cigarettes do not offer a meaningful

reduction of risk, and that their marketing which em-

phasized reductions in tar and nicotine was false and

misleading.” Jd. at 1905a-1906a.

Petitioners executed their scheme to defraud by uti-

lizing an array of jointly created entities, the most visi-

ble of whieh was the Tobacco Institute (TI), which

served for four decades as “the leading public voice of

[petitioners].” Pet. App. 195a; 7d. at 119a. Petitioners

jointly financed T'l’s operations through payments ex-

ceeding $600 million, cd. at 183a, and their chief execu-

tive officers served on TI’s Executive Committee, zd. at

180a, which had the “‘final voice on TI matters’ and To-

bacco Institute statements.” /d. at 216a (citation omit

ted). TI “created, issued, and disseminated press re-

leases, public statements, advertisements, brochures,

pamphlets, and other written materials on behalf of [pe-

titioners]” that denied “any link between smoking and

disease,” denied that “nicotine was addictive,” denied

that “cigarette companies marketed to youth,” denied

that secondhand smoke “posed a health risk,” and

“diseredit|ed] scientists and public health officials who

took a different position on these issues.” /d. at 196a.

As internal TI documents admit: “Our basic position in

the cigarette controversy is subject to the charge, and

maybe subject. to a finding, that we are making false or

misleading statements to promote the sale of ciga-

rettes.” Jd. at 186a.

The Tobacco Institute was but one part of a “network

of interlocking organizations” that petitioners created to

maintain unity and discipline. Pet. App. 1777a. The In-

stitute’s Executive Committee emphasized internally

that it was “of prime importance that the industry main-

tain a united front and that if one or more companies

vere to conduct themselves as a matter of self interest,

particularly in advertising, obvious vulnerability would

be the result.” /d. at 218a (citation omitted). To that

end, the International Committee on Smoking Issues

(ICOSI) and its successor organizations, the Interna-

tional Tobacco Information Center (INFOTAB) and the

Tobaceo Documentation Centre (TDC), were established

to enable Philip Morris, Reynolds, British American

Tobacco (BATCo) and other tobacco companies to “meet

disereetly to develop a defensive smoking and health

strategy for major markets,” including the United

States. /d. at 1619a (citation omitted); see also zd. at

320a-335a. BATCo acknowledged internally that “[t]he

aim of ICOSI is defensive research aimed at throwing up

a smoke screen arid to throw doubt on smoking research

findings which show smoke causes diseases.” /d. at

1624a (citation omitted). The members of this group

included Philip Mere . .eynolds, Lorillard, BATCo and

Tl, as well as for ».tobaeco companies. /d. at 327a

328a.

Petitioners also formed a variety of organizations to

create what they termed “marketable science.” Pet.

App. 1687a. For example, through the Council for To-

bacco Research (CTR) and Lawyers’ Special Accounts,

petitioners jointly financed research programs that were

directed hy company lawyers and ecaleulated to yield

favorable results. /d. at 240a-275a. Petitioners regu-

larly cited the conclusions of the scientists funded

through these programs as if they were the objective

results of disinterested research, without revealing that

the scientists had, in fact, been funded by the industry.

Id. at 195a.

Petitioners likewise created organizations that ap

peared to have no connection to the industry, but were

in fact designed to generate purportedly independent

evidence for use as “ammunition” in manipulating public

opinion. Pet. App. 1614a (citation omitted). For exam-

ple, petitioners created the Center for Indoor Air Re

search (CIAR) in a manner designed “to ‘hide’ industry

involvement,” zd. at 1652a (citation omitted), and CIAR’s

influential papers on secondhand smoke failed to dis

close the organization’s connection to the tobacco indus-

try. Jd. at 165la-1653a. Similarly, Indoor Air Interna-

tional (LAI) held itself out as “a ‘learned society’ dedi-

cated to ‘promoting indoor air quality,’” id. at 1695a-

1696a (citation omitted), while in reality it was funded by

Philip Morris and BATCo and run by the law firm of

Covington & Burling, zd. at 1695a-1698a, which served

as legal counsel! for TI and the industry. /d. at 181a,

214a. “All billing was processed through Covington &

Burling to avoid any direct connection to the industry

[d. at 1695a.'

he district court found that attorneys actively facilitated and

“nlayed an absolutely central role” in petitioners’ legal activity “lalt

every stage” by, inter alia, “directling| scientists as to what research

they should and should not undertake”; “vett[ing! scientific research

papers and reports”; “hid[ing] the relationship between [scicntifie wit

nesses] and the industry”; “devis[ing] aad carr| ying] out document de

truction policies”; and taking “shelter behind baseless assertions of the

attorney client privilege.” Pet. App. 106a

Q

2. In 2006, after developing an immense trial record,

the district court held that petitioners had participated

in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a

pattern of racketeering activity, and conspired to do so,

in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(c) and (d). Pet. App.

1885a, 1995a. The court determined that petitioners’

enterprise had the common purpose of preserving and

expanding the cigarette market through fraud, 2d. at

1923a-1925a; that it operated through formal and infor-

mal organizations, 7d. at 1925a-1928a; and that it has

functioned as a continuous unit since 1953, id. at 1928a-

1930a.

The district court specifically found that petitioners

“knowingly and intentionally engaged in a scheme to

defraud smokers and potential smokers, for purposes of

financial gain, by making false and fraudulent state-

ments, representations, and promises.” Pet. App. 18&8a.

[t explained that, “[iJn the majority of instances, the

authors of the fraudulent statements alleged as Racke-

teering Acts were executives, including high level sci-

entists—CEOs, Vice Presidents, Heads of Research &

Development, not entry level employees—at each of the

[petitioner] companies who would reasonably be ex-

pected to have knowledge of the company’s internal re-

search, public positions, and long term strategies.” /d.

at 1984a. The court found it “absurd to believe that the

highly-ranked representatives and agents of these cor-

porations and entities had no knowledge that their pub-

lic statements were false and fraudulent,” explaining

that the “Findings of Fact are replete with examples of

C.E.O.s, Vice-Presidents, and Directors of Research and

Development, as well as [petitioners’] lawyers, making

statements which were inconsistent with the internal

10

knowledge and practice of the corporation itself.” /d. at

1890a-1891a.

Based on its findings about the profitability of peti-

tioners’ participation in the enterprise and the sophisti-

cation and resilience of their scheme to defraud, the dis-

trict court found a reasonable likelihood of future viola-

tions. Pet. App. 2007a-202la. The court accordingly

granted injunctive relief enjoining petitioners from com-

mitting further acts of racketeering or fraud relating to

the marketing of cigarettes, id. at 2069a-2070a; from

reconstituting specified organizations, id. at 2';69a; and

from making express or implied health claims about cig

arettes, including use of descriptors such as “light” or

‘low tar,” 27d. at 2070a-2071a. The court’s order requires

that petitioners make corrective statements in specified

media, zd. at 2071a-2077a; maintain publicly accessible

document depositories, id. at 2077a-2084a; and disclose

certain marketing data to the government, id. at 2084a.

3. Petitioners appealed, challenging the district

court’s liability ruling and injunctive relief. [n their ap-

pellate briefs, petitioners made almost no mention of the

district court’s factual findings and presented no argu

ments purporting to show that any such findings were

erroneous. At oral argument, counsel representing all

petitioners (App., irfra, la) represented that, although

petitioners did not “agree with the fact findings of the

The electronic versions of the government’s appellate briefs on

DVD-ROMs explain the evidentiary record in detail (e.g., Gov't C.A. Br.

5-58) and include an embedded hyperlink for every record citation,

enabling the reader to display immediately the relevant page of the

record. A similar DVD version of the district court’s opinion also in-

cludes an embedded hyperlink for each ofits numerous record citations

Cf. Order, No. 06-5267 (D.C. Cir. July 28, 2008) (directing clerk to file

lodged DVDs).

1]

district court,” “we’re bringing legal challenges to the

court” and “haven’t challenged * * * any fact finding.”

Id. at 5a, 7a.

4. In May 2009, the court of appeals unanimously

affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. Pet.

App. la-100a. The court’s decision affirmed the district

court’s liability findings in all significant respects, but

remanded for further proceeding on “four discrete is-

sues.” /d. at 6a, 100a.

The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ threshold

argument that petitioners could not be liable under

RICO for participating in the conduct of the affairs of an

“enterprise” because, in petitioners’ view, RICO “pro-

vides an exclusive list of possible enterprises that covers

lonly] groups of individuals associated in fact, not

mixed groups of individuals and corporations associated

in fact.” Pet. App. 18a. The court held that the defini-

tion of “enterprise” in 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) is non-exhaus-

tive and includes groups of corporations associated in

fact (like petitioners). Pet. App. 18a-20a, 28a. The court

reasoned that petitioners’ contrary argument was incon-

sistent both with RICO’s text and the uniform decisions

of al] ten courts of appeals to have addressed the ques-

tion, and that RICO’s broad statutory understanding of

“enterprise” ensures that sophisticated racketeers can-

not evade liability by employing the corporate form. /d.

at 18a-29a.

The court of appeals concluded that other purported

legal challenges were not properly presented. For ex

ample, although the court indicated that it shared peti-

tioners’ doubt that a corporation’s specific intent to de-

fraud could properly be established by aggregating the

knowledge of disparate corporate employees under a

theory of “collective intent,” it did “not pass on the mer

its of such astandard * * * because the district court

relied on a permissible view of specific intent.” Pet.

App. 33a, 41a. The court explained that the “over-

whelming indirect and circumstantial evidence was suffi-

cient to allow the district court to reasonably infer that

the high level executives, including ‘CEOs, Vice Presi

dents, |and| Heads of Research & Development’ for [pe-

titieners| knew about their respective companies’ ‘inter-

nal research, public positions, and long term strategies’’

and “then made, caused to be made, and approved public

statements contrary to this knowledge.” /d. at 39a (cita-

tion omitted).

The court of appeals rejected petitioners’ First

Amendment defenses, concluding that petitioners’ public

statements were “clearly and deliberately false” and

therefore fell outside the scope of protected speech.

Pet. App. 43a-45a. The court explained that it was “not

dealing with accidental falschoods, or sincere attempts

to persuade,” and that “[petitioners] knew of their fal-

sity at the time and made the statements with the intent

to deceive.” Jd. at 45a. The court similarly held that

“Noerr-Pennington protection” tor attempts to per-

suade the legislature or executive to take particular ac

tion “does not apply” because the doctrine does not ex-

tend to “deliberately false or misleading” statements

and petitioners’ racketeering acts were themselves “in-

tended to defraud consumers.” /d. at 44a, 46a.

The court rejected petitioners’ contention that the

Federal Trade Commission (FTC) had “blessed their

use of labels such as ‘light’ and ‘low tar’” cigarettes, ex-

plaining that the argument was foreclosed by this

Court’s decision in Altrra Group, Ine. v. Good, 1298S. Ct.

538 (2008) (Altria). Pet. App. 46a-47a. In addition, the

court emphasized that the district court “did not find

liability solely based on the use of descriptors such as

‘light’ and ‘low tar’”; rather, the district court permissi-

bly found that “( petitioners] orchestrated ‘highly sophis-

ticated marketing and promotional campaigns to portra)

their light brands as less harmful than regular ciga-

rettes,’” despite their knowledge of the falsity of that

claim. /d. at 47a-48a.

The court further concluded that the Master Settle-

ment Agreement (MSA) executed in separate lawsuits

by the tobaceo companies and several States did not

eliminate the likelihood of petitioners’ future violations.

Pet. App. 6la-67a. It explained that petitioners “began

to evade and at times even violate the MSA’s prohibi-

tions almost immediately after signing the agreement”

and that petitioners’ failure to alter their conduct after

the MSA amply warranted the district court’s conclusion

that future violations were likely. Jd. at 64a, 67a.

The court rejected challenges to liability that were

specific to petitioners Altria and BATCo, Pet. App. 55a-

60a, and it rejected most of petitioners’ challenges to the

district court’s injunctive order. The court explained

that the injunctions “sufficiently specify the activities

enjoined,” 7d. at 73a, and that the district court permis-

sibly required that corrective statements appear in the

same media that petitioners used “to promulgate false

smoking and health messages.” Jd. at 83a."

The court vacated the finding of liability as to CTR and TI because

those entities had been dissolved pursuant to the MSA. Pet. App. 100a.

he court also vacated certain minor provisions of the injunction and

remanded for reconsideration of those “discrete issues,” such as the

application of the injunction to petitioners’ overseas subsidiaries and

clarification of the requirements for point-of-sale displays. /bid. The

panel also rejected the government’s cross-appeal on remedies, /d. at

14

5. Petitioners tiled five separate rehearing petitions,

all of which the court of appeals denied without dissent.

Pet. App. 2183a.

Meanwhile, petitioners Philip Morris, Reynolds, and

Lorillard filed a “Suggestion Of Mootness And Motion

For Partial Vacatur,” arguing that the June 2009 pas-

a of the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco

Yontrol Act (FSPTCA), Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123

“a 1776, had rendered aspects of the injunction moot.

The government’s opposition explained that the

EF SPTCA did not render the injunetion moot and that

any request to modify the injunction in light of the legis-

lation should be directed to the district court in the fi rat

instance. Gov't Opp. to Suggestion of Mootness 3-4,

11-12. The court of appeals denied the suggestion of

mootness and vacatur motion without opinion.

ARGUMENT

Collectively, petitioners suggest that nearly every

aspect of the unanimous decision of the court of appeals

presents a significant legal error warranting certiorari.

That suggestion is without merit. The D.C. Circuit cor-

rectly resolved the only pure question of law the peti-

tioners presented in a ruling that reflects the uniform

judgment of all ten courts of appeals to have considered

the issue. The remaining legal issues that petitioners

now raise are either not properly presented on the re-

cord in this case, not subject. to any conflict, or otherwise

unworthy of review. The petitions should therefore be

denied.

92a-99a. The government's peti 1 forawrit of eertiorar

seeks review of the remedial : S] ect of the c ‘ourt’s judgm ent

ld

A. An Unincorporated Association Of Corporations And

Individuals May Form A RICO Enterprise

Petitioners Philip Morris and Lorillard contend that

certiorari is warranted because the court of appeals pur-

portedly erred in holding that a RICO “enterprise” may

consist of corporations and individuals associated in fact.

09-976 Pet. (PM Pet.) 24-28; 09-1012 Pet. (Lorillard Pet.)

11-28. In their view, 18 U.S.C. 1961(4) “provides an ex-

clusive list of possible enterprises” and that list includes

“sroups of individuals associated in fact” but “not

mixed groups of individuals ard corporations associated

in fact.” Pet. App. 18a. That contention lacks merit.

RICO’s text and the reasoning of Boyle v. United States,

129 S. Ct. 2237 (2009), demonstrate that RICO provides

non-exhaustive examples of an “enterprise” that illus-

trate, but do not restrict, the ordinary meaning of the

term. All ten courts of appeals to have confronted the

question have likewise concluded—without as much as

a dissenting opinion from even one jJudge—that corpo-

rate entities associated in fact may form a RICO enter

prise. No further review is warranted.

1. a. Congress routinely defines statutory terms in

one of two ways. Exhaustive statutory definitions—

which state precisely what the defined term “means”—

establish a self-contained meaning for the term that

“excludes any meaning that is not stated.” Burgess v.

United States, 558 U.S. 124, 1380 (2008) (citation omit-

ted). Terms so defined take their meaning from the def-

inition Congress provides in statute instead of the

“term’s ordinary meaning.” Stenberg v. Carhart, 530

U.S. 914, 942 (2000). By contrast, non-exhaustive defini-

tions merely state that the defined term “includes” cer-

tain enumerated things. In that context, “the term ‘in-

cludfes]’ is not one of all-embracing definition, but eon-

l6

notes simply an illustrative application of the general

principle,” Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co.,

314 U.S. 95, 100 (1941), that itself builds upon the “ordi

nary connotation of the [underlying] term.” Groman v.

Commissioner, 302 U.S. 82, 88 (1937); rd. at 85-86;

American Sur. Co. v. Marotta, 287 U.S. 513, 517 (1933)

(the term ““‘include’ is frequently, if not generally, used

as a word of extension or enlargement” in definitional

provisions).

RICOQO’s definitional section, 18 U.S.C. 1961, provides

a non-exhaustive definition of “enterprise.” Section

1961(4) states that the term “‘enterprise’ excludes any

individual, partnership, corporation, association, or

other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals

associated in fact although not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C.

1961(4) (emphasis added). As the court of appeals ex-

plained, Congress’s “use of the word ‘includes’ indicates

that RICO’s list of ‘enterprises’ is non-exhaustive.” Pet.

App. 25a-26a. The term therefore encompasses groups

that fall within the ordinary meaning of “enterprise” —

such as “a group of individuals, corporations, or partner-

ships associated in faect”—even though Section 1961(4)

does not “expressly mention{] this type of association.”

Id. at 19a; see id. at 21a. The broader context of Section

1961 confirms “the non-exhaustive nature of ‘includes’”

because Congress chose in that provision to “alternat[e]

between the words ‘means’ and ‘includes’ to introduce

the section’s various definitions,” thereby “signal[ing] its

intent to distinguish between [the] exhaustive and non-

exhaustive lists” defining RICO’s statutory terms. /d.

at 26a.

One month after the court of appeals issued its deci-

sion, this Court confirmed that Section 1961(4)’s defini-

tion of “enterprise” is non-exhaustive. In Boyle, this

17

Court made clear that Section 1961(4)’s “obviously

broad” “enumeration of included enterprises” does “not

purport to set out an exhaustive definition of the term”

and does “not specifically define the outer boundaries of

the ‘enterprise’ concept.” 12958. Ct. at 2243 & n.2. Like

the court below, Boyle concluded that Congress’s dispa-

rate use of “means” and “includes” in RICO’s defini-

tional section demonstrates that the inclusive definition

of “enterprise” retains the “ordinary meaning” of the

term and therefore “does not foreclose the possibility

that the term might include” other types of enterprises

other than the “specifically enumerated” ones. /d. at

2243 n.2 (citing the Court’s similar interpretation of Sec

tion 1961 in H.J. /ne. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492

U.S. 229, 238 (1989)). Boyle therefore reasoned that the

ineaning of “enterprise” reflected in “ordinary usage”

informs the meaning of the term in RICO and held,

based on that ordinary meaning, that an association in

fact of individuals “must have a purpose” to qualify as an

“enterprise.” /d. at 2244.

Boyle’s reasoning is fatal to Lorillard’s contention

(Pet. 14-18) that Section 1961(4) exhaustively describes

the entities that may constitute an “enterprise.” In re-

solving the question whether “an association-in-fact en

terprise must have an ascertainable structure beyond

that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity,”

Boyle, 129 S. Ct. 2244 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted), the Court expressly held that Section

1961(4) does not provide “an exhaustive definition” of

“enterprise” or “define the outer boundaries” of the

term. /d. at 2243 & n.2. If Lorillard were correct that

RICO’s text provides a wholly exhaustive definition,

then the ordinary meaning of “enterprise” would have

been irrelevant and the (purportedly exhaustive) defini

1s

| text in Section 1961({4) would have controlled. See

rhart, 530 U.S. at 942 (citing cases). The Court in

interpreted “enterprise” based on the “meaning of

term in ordinary usage” as reflected in dictionary

tions precisely because the definitional text was

yt itself exhaustive. See Boyle, 1298S. Ct. at 2244.

The court of appeals’ decision also follows from the

gic of several decisions of this Court that have repeat-

edly drawn a distinction between “means” and “in

cludes” when Congress has alternated between those

terms to introduce statutory definitions. Those deci-

sions nave consistently found that such “disparate inclu

sion or exclusion” (Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.

16, 28 (1983) (citation omitted)) to reflect an intent to

provide a non-exhaustive definition of those terms that

Congress has defined to “include” specifically enumer-

ated items. See, e.g., Boyle, 1298S. Ct. at 2243 n.2 (con

struing Section 1961(4)); see also, e.g., United States v.

New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 169 & n.15 (1977);

Helvering v. Morgan’s, Inc., 293 U.S. 121, 125 nl

(1934); American Sur. Co., 287 U.S. at 517; ef. H.J. Inc.,

492 U.S. at 237 (concluding that the definitional use of

“require” instead of “mean” in Section 1961(5) reflects

that the scope of the defined term is “broad”).

Lorillard asserts (Pet. 16) that Section 1961’s other

definitions beginning with “includes” are “exhaustive”

even though it offers argument only for the definition of

“Attorney General.” Even that definition, however, is

not “exhaustive.” The enumeration in Section 1961(10)

does not, for example, specifically include a person se

lected by the President to perform temporarily “the

functions and duties” of the Attorney General, 5 U.S.C.

3345(a)(2) and (3), or an independent counsel that could

have been appointed by a court to prosecute RICO viola-

19

tions, 28 U.S.C. 593(b), 599 (expired 1999), neither of

whom are “designated by the Attorney General” under

the definition. See 18 U.S.C. 1961(10); cf. Authority of

the President to Name an Acting Attorney General, 31

Op. Off. Legal Counsel —_ (2007), http://www.justice.

gov/olc/2007/authority-of-the-president-name-ag-

070908.pdtf. Lorillard makes no attempt to demonstrate

that any other definition in Section 1961 that begins with

“includes” is exhaustive, but simply quotes (Pet. 16) the

definition of “person” and “documentary material” with-

out elaboration.

3ased on Congress’s direction in RICO that courts

may issue appropriate orders, “including, but not limited

to,” three categories of orders, 18 U.S.C. 1964(a), Loril

lard also contends (Pet. 16-17) that Congress used the

term “includes” differently in Section 1961 because Con-

gress omitted the phrase “but not limited to.” But that

supplementary language in Section 1964(a)—which

is not a definitional section--simply emphasizes the

breadth of the appropriate remedial orders that it au-

thorizes. Section 1961 had no need for such emphasis

because it employs “includes” in a significantly different

context: the juxtaposition of “means” and “includes” in

that section itself makes clear that the inclusive defini

tions are non-exhaustive. See Pet. App. 27a.

Lorillard’s reliance (Pet. 17) on Carcieri v. Salazar,

129 S. Ct. 1058 (2009), is also misplaced. Although

Curciert interpreted a single, free-standing provision

defining “Indian” to “inelude” certain categories of Indi

ans as comprehensively defining the term, 25 U.S.C. 479,

it did so because other statutory provisions specifically

showed that Congress recognized that the definition did

not “encompass tribes other than those” in the statutory

enumeration. 1298S. Ct. at 1066. And, unlike RICO, the

20

definition in Carciert does not disparately employ

“means” and “includes” to define different statutory

terms, reflecting Congress’s intent to enact exhaustive

and non-exhaustive definitions.

b. Because the ordinary meaning of “enterprise” is

not restricted by Section 1961(4)’s non-exhaustive “enu-

meration of included enterprises,” Boyle, 129 S. Ct. at

2243 & n.2, Lorillard’s heavy emphasis on that enumera-

tion is misplaced. As Boyle explains, the ordinary mean-

ing of “enterprise” encompasses “a ‘venture,’ ‘undertak-

ing,’ or ‘project.’” /d. at 2244 (citation omitted). And

Lorillard’s own arguments show that “a group of corpo-

rations associated in fact” constitute, in common par-

lance, just such a “joint venture[].” See Lorillard Pet.

26. So long as a joint venture by corporate entities re-

flects a common “purpose,” embodies “relationships

among those associated with the enterprise,” and has

“tongevity sufficient to permit those associates to pursue

the enterprise’s purpose,” Boyle, 129 8S. Ct. at 2244, it

qualifies as an “enterprise” under RICO.

Philip Morris resists the conelusion that the “ordi

nary meaning” of enterprise can include a group of cor-

porale entities, asserting that “a group of unaffiliated

corporations informally cooperating in an effort to influ-

ence government policy” would not be thought of as an

“enterprise.” PM Pet. 26-27. But that assertion (which

reflects a factual premise far removed from this case)

cannot be squared with this Court’s explanation that “an

association-in-fact enterprise is simply a continuing unit

that functions with a common purpose.” Boyle, 129 S.

Ct. at 2245. Even an “‘informal’ group” without much

“structure” can constitute an enterprise if its members

coordinate their actions to pursue a common objective.

I bid.

c. Petitioners’ restrictive interpretation of Section

1961(4) disregards this Court’s repeated admonition that

“RICO is to be read broadly.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v.

I/mrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 (1985); accord Boyle, 129 8.

Ct. at 2243 (citing cases). Congress followed a “pattern

* * * utilizing terms and concepts of breadth” in RICO,

including in the statute’s inclusive definition of “enter-

prise.” Russello, 464 U.S. at 21; see also NOW v.

Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 257 (1994) (“RICO broadly de-

fines ‘enterprise’”); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.

576, 580-581, 583 (1981) (construing “enterprise”). If

there were any doubt on that score, Congress’s express

statutory direction that RICO be “liberally construed to

effectuate its remedial purposes” confirms the “expan

sive” seope of its “concept of an association in fact.”

Boyle, 1298. Ct. at 2243 (quoting RICO, Pub. L. No. 91-

152, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947); see also S. Rep. No. 617, 91st

Cong., Ist Sess. 158 (1969) (“enterprise” is defined “to

include associations in fact, as well as legally recognized

associative entities,” and that “infiltration of any asso-

clative group by any individual or group capable of hold-

ing a property interest can be reached”); H.R. Rep. No.

1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1970) (same).

‘he broad scope of the enterprise concept reflects

RICO’s origins. “RICO was an aggressive initiative to

supplement old remedies and develop new methods for

fighting crime.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498. And, while

Congress undoubtedly intended the statute to be used to

combat organized crime, “Congress for cogent reasons

chose to enact a more gencral statute, one which, al-

though it had organized crime as its focus, was not lim-

ited in application to organized crime.” H.J. Inc., 492

U.S. at 248: accord NOW, 510 U.S. at 260. RICO aceord-

ngly targets criminal associations that “extend well be

PLP J

aoe

yond|] those traditionally grouped under the phrase ‘or-

ranized crime’” in order to target “a wide range of crim-

inal activity, taking many different forms” and involving

“a broad array of perpetrators operating in many differ-

ent ways.” H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243, 248-249.

Congress’s decision to provide a broad, non-

exhaustive definition of “enterprise” capturing the full

range of associational forms that might be employed by

sophisticated criminals is consistent with its intent that

RICO be “a weapon against the sophisticated racketeer

as well as (and perhaps more than) the artless.” United

States v. Perholiz, 842 F.2d 348, 353 (D.C. Cir.), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988) (rejecting petitioners’ inter-

pretation of “enterprise” for its “hizarre result{s]”). As

the D.C. Circuit explained, an association of individuals

and legal entities that exhibits common purpose, organi

zation, and continuity is plainly among “the kinds of en-

tities Congress had in mind.” Pet. App. 28a (emphasis

omitted) (citing Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583). Congress

had no reason to doubt that corporations, labor unions,

partnerships, or other legal entities would be capable of

entering into the sort of dangerous de facto alliances

that characterize RICO enterprises. See id. at 24a (ex-

plaining that, on petitioners’ theory, “racketeers who

would otherwise constitute an association-in-fact might

evade RICO’s grasp by virtue of their ability to operate

through corporations and establish complex networks of

companies, kickbacks, and contracts to achieve their

elicit ends”). As the Seventh Circuit observed:

Surely if three individuals can constitute a RICO

enterprise, as no one doubts, then the larger associa-

tion that consists of them plus entities that they con

trol can be a RICO enterprise too. Otherwise while

three criminal gangs would each be a RICO enter-

prise, a loose-knit merger of the three, in which each

retained its separate identity, would not be, because

it would not be an association of individuals. That

would make no sense.

United States v. Masters, 924 F.2d 1362, 1366 (7th Cir.),

eert. denied, 500 U.S. 919, and 502 U.S. 823 (1991);

United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393-394 (2d Cir.

1979) (petitioners’ reading would “perversely insulate

the most sophisticated racketeering combinations from

RICO’s sanctions”), cert. denied 445 U.S. 927 (1980); see

also McCullough v. Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 143-144 (7th

Cir. 1985) (““[WJe cannot believe that Congress would

have wanted gangsters to be able to escape the clutches

of section 1962(c) Just by avoiding the corporate form.”).

d. Lorillard contends that vagueness concerns, prac-

tical considerations, and the rule of lenity, should

“resolvie any] ambiguity” in Section 1961(4) by limiting

enterprises to those expressly listed. Lorillard Pet. 20;

id. at 20-25. But Section 1961(4) is an inclusive, not ex-

clusive, definition whose text employs capacious, not

ambiguous terms. Congress specifically directed that

RICO’s terms be “liberally,” not narrowly, construed to

effectuate the statute’s remedial goals, Boyle, 1298S. Ct.

at 2243, and this Court has declined repeated requests

to narrow the scope of RICQO’s “enterprise” concept with

restrictions that themselves are not found tn the statu-

tory text. See, e.g., id. at 2245-2246 (declining to impose

limits that are not “fairly inferred from the language of

the statute”); VOW, 510 U.S. at 260-261 (refusing to

adopt economic-motive limitation); Turkette, 452 U.S. at

580-581 (declining to limit “enterprise” to legitimate

associations because RICO imposes “no restriction upon

the associations embraced” by the term and because

Congress could have, but did not, “narrow ] the sweep of

24

the definition by inserting” additional text). The Court

has repeatedly rejected similar appeals to narrow

RICO’s provisions based on the rule of lenity. Boyle,

129 S. Ct. at 2246-2247; see also NOW, 510 U.S. at 262;

Sedima, 473 U.S. at 492; Turkette, 452 U.S. at 588 n.10;

Russello, 464 U.S. at 29.

e. Petitioners’ remaining contentions largely reflect

policy arguments of the kind this Court has rejected “in

favor of the clear but expansive text of the statute,”

Boyle, 129 S. Ct. 2246-2247 (collecting cases). Lorillard

asserts that the “purpose of RICO” is to protect corpo

rations from being “victimized by organized crime,” not

“to combat ecrporations engaged in joint criminal activ-

ity.” Lorillard Pet. 18-19 (emphases omitted). But as

the court of appeals explained, there is no dispute that

corporations can be RICO defendants under the stat-

ute’s plain terms. Pet. App. 2la (discussing 18 U.S.C.

1961(3), 1962(c)). Indeed, this Court has emphasized

that “[RICO’s] use ‘against respected businesses alleg-

edly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified crimi-

nal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming

that the provision is being misconstrued.’” H..J/. /ne.,

492 U.S. at 249 (quoting Sedima, 473 U.S. at 499). Quite

the contrary, the “ability to use RICO against busi-

nesses engaged in a pattern of criminal acts” is a result

that itself is “inherent in the statute as written.” /bid.

(quoting Sedima, supra); see also Sedima, 473 U.S. at

499 (explaining that the fact that plaintiffs have brought

“fraud cases * * * against” nominally legitimate busi

nesses under RICO “does not demonstrate ambiguity”

in the statute, “JiJt demonstrates breadth’) (citation

omitted).

2. Petitioners ultimately provide no sound reason

for this Court to revisit RICO’s definition of “enter

prise” so soon after Boyle addressed the term’s mean-

ing. Petitioners concede that their interpretation of Sec-

tion 1961(4) finds no support in the “uniform” decisions

of the courts of appeals, Lorillard Pet. 12, 27, which all

agree “with the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that a group of

corporations can constitute an ‘associated in fact’ RICO

enterprise.” PM Pet. 27.* Indeed, all ten courts of ap-

peals to have considered the question have held that

legal entities like corporations that are associated in fact

may form or be part of a RICO enterprise. See United

States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1243-1244 (1st Cir. 1995)

(corporation and a sole proprietorship), cert. denied, 517

U.S. 1155 (1996); Huber, 603 F.2d at 393-394 (2d Cir.)

(corporations and individuals); United States v. Aimone,

715 F.2d-822, 828 (3d Cir. 1983) (individuals and a corpo-

ration), cert. denied, 468 U.S. 1217 (1984); United State:

v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 625-626 (5th Cir. 1982) (individ-

uals and corporations), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 458

U.S..1109, and 459 U.S. 825 (1982); Dana Corp. v. Blue

Cross & Blue Shield Mut., 900 F.2d 882, 887 (6th Cir.

1990) (group of corporations); Masters, 924 F.2d at 1366

(7th Cir.) (aw firm, two police departments, and three

individuals); Atlas Pile Driving Co. v. DiCon Fin. Co.,

886 F.2d 986, 995 & n.7 (8th Cir. 1989) (five legal enti

ties): United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 655-656

(Yth Cir. 1988) (individuals and corporations), cert. de-

nied, 489 U.S. 1030 (1989); United States v. Navarro

Ordas, 770 F.2d 959 19 (11th Cir. 1985) (group of

corporations), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986);

Perholtz, 842 F.2d at 352-354 (D.C. Cir.) (group of indi

Lorillard suggests (Pet. 27) that review is warranted to resolve

wnetner ar orpe ration and its ¢ mployees Can constitute an associat

n-fact enterprise. That issue is not preserted by the facts of this ca

nd was not addressed by the court of appeal:

viduals, corporations, and partnerships). Those courts

have reached that unanimous conclusion without even

one judge in dissent. Pet. App. 19a-20a (citing cases).

In many other cases—including in an eleventh court of

appeals—the courts have similarly upheld RICO claims

involving association-in-fact enterprises with members

including corporations. Jd. at 20a-2la.° Congress, in

turn, has repeatedly amended RICO’s definitional sec-

tion against the background of that strikingly uniform

appellate authority without adjusting R1CO’s definition

of “enterprise.”

See, e.g., U nited States v. Najjar, 300 F.3d 466, 484-485 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1094 (2002): see also, e.g., Odom v. Microsoft

Corp., 486 F.3d } AL. 547-553 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 552 U.S.

985 (2007); Living Designs, Ine. v. ET. Dupont de Neniowrs & Co., 431

F.3d 353, 361 (9th Cir. 2005), a denied, 547 U.S. 1192 (2006); Ureited

States v. Cranci, 378 F.3d 71, 79-85 (1st Cir. 2004); United States v.

Goldin Indus., Ire., 219 F a 1271, 1275-1277 & n.6 (LLth Cir.), cert.

denied, 531 U.S. 1015(2000); U/nited States v. Parise, 159 F.3d 790, 794-

795 (3d Cir. 1998): United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 652 (3d Cir.

1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076, and 513 U.S. 1012 (1994): United

States v. Blinder, 1O TF, 3d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir. 1993): United States 2

Butler, 954 F.2d 114, 120 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. Stolfi, 889

F.2d 378, 379-380 (2d Cir. 1989); Ocean Energy Ll, Ine. v. Alexander &

Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 748-749 (5th Cir. 1989); B unker Ramo

Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc., 713 F.2d 1272, 1285 (7th Cir. 1983);

(/nated States v. Campanatle, 518 F.2d 352, 357 n.11 (9th Cir. 1975), cert

denied, 423 U.c. 1050 (1976).

See, e.g., Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-

ment Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 968, 103 Stat. 506 (adding bank

fraud as a predicate act); Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act

of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 13886 (adding criminal in-

fringement of copyright and tratficking in counterfeit labels for corn-

puter programs, movies, and im UsiCc). Weapons of Mass Destruction

Prohibition Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6802(e),

118 Stat. 3767 (adding offenses relating to biological, chemical and

nuclear materials).

27

Petitioners’ reliance on the oral argument transcript

in Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Williams, No. 05-465 (ar-

gued Apr. 26, 2006), see, e.g., Lorillard Pet. 11-12, 16-17,

simply underscores the absence of authority for their

pusition.’ The Mohawk petitioner argued that corpora-

tions cannot be members of an association-in-fact enter

prise, even though its petition for a writ of certiorari did

not separately raise the issue. At oral argument, Justice

Scalia noted that the Court would have been “unlikely to

accept certfiorari]” on that issue if it had been raised,

given the unanimous holdings of the courts of appeals.

05-465 Tr. at 6. This Court ultimately dismissed the writ

in Mohawk as improvidently granted, 547 U.S. 516

(2006), and denied a subsequent petition that expressly

presented the question. See Microsoft Corp. v. Odom,

552 U.S. 985 (2007); Pet. at i, 18-19, Mecrosoft, supra

(No. 07-138); Br. in Opp. at 2, 11-14, Microsoft, supra.

There is no reason for a different result here.

B. The Court Of Appeals Was Not Required To Undertake

Independent Appellate Review Of The District Court’s

Unchallenged Findings Of Fact Establishing Fraud

Although petitioners expressly disclaimed any chal-

lenge to the district court’s factual findings on appeal,

they now contend that the court of appeals was nonethe-

less required to undertake “independent appellate re-

view” of the more than 4000 findings of fact made by the

When the Court decided Boye, it presumably was familiar with the

oral argument in Mohawk. The petitioner repeatedly cited to the

Mohawk argument transcript, Pet. Br. at 48 n.37, 53 n.42, Boyle, supra;

teply Br. at 12-13, Boyle, supra; and his amici specifically argued that

corporations could not constitute an association-in-fact enterprise be-

cause Section 1961(4) employs the term “includes” to set out an “ex-

haustive” list of cntities constituting a RICO “enterprise.” See Cham

ber of Commerce Amiei Br. at 32-33 & n.5, Boyle pra

district court. See PM Pet. 13-23 (citing bose Corp. '

Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485

(1984)); see also 09-977 Pet. (RJR Pet.) 29; Lorillard

Pet. 28-29. The question of the proper standard of re-

view for a party’s challenge to factual determinations is

not presented when the party makes no such challenges.

Moreover, no court has adopted petitioners’ view that

every factual determination in a fraud case must be sub-

jected to de novo review on appeal. Finally, petitioners

do not explain how independent review would have made

a difference to the outcome here, given the “overwhelm-

ing evidence” establishing their fraud. Pet. App. 103a.

1. In Bose, the Court held that the “ultimate fact” of

“actual malice” in a defamation case is not an ordinary

factual finding reviewed only for clear error under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 52(a). 466 U.S. at 498 n.15, 499-500. The stan

dard of review for such ultimate facts, the Court ex-

plained, “must be faithful to both Rule 52(a) and the ig

of independent review applied in New York Times Co.

Sullivan, [376 U.S. 254 (1964)],” which held that palelt

in defamation actions must review the record as a whole

to ensure that the ow does not interfere with free

expression. Bose, 466 U.S. at 499. The Court empha-

sized, however, that even in such a case, an appellate

ecourt’s review of the record must give

+

te

due regard’

to the trial judge’s opportunity to observe the

demeanor of the witnesses,” 7d. at 499-500 (quoting Fed.

R. Civ. P. 52(a)), and must afford “special deference” to

the “trial judge’s credibility determinations,” <b7d.

2. Petitioners argue that bose required the court of

appeals to review de novo the district court’s factual

findings. #.g., PM Pet. 13-23. Unlike the defendant in

Bose, however, petitioners did not challenge any of the

district ecourt’s factual findings as unsupported by the

PQ

evidence. Instead, they made a strategic decision to

raise only legal claims before the court of appeals. Thus,

their joint appellate brief assured the court of appeals

that it “need not delve into the district court’s lengthy

fact-finding.” C.A. Joint Br. 22. At oral argument, de-

fense counsel reiterated that petitioners “haven’t chal-

lenged * any fact finding.” App., anfra, 5a (Mr.

Kstrada). He explained that although petitioners did

not “agree with the fact findings of the district court,”

“we’re bringing legal challenges to the court.” Jd. at 7a.

It is thus entirely unsurprising that the court of appeals

did not discuss the applicability of Bose and repeatedly

noted that the key factual findings underlying the dis-

trict court’s judgment were unchallenged by petitioners.

See, e.g., Pet. App. 53a (“[Petitioners]| never challenge

the district court’s findings documenting the impact of

nicotine on the body and, more importantly, [petition-

ers’} understanding of its effects.”); 2d. at 52a (citing the

“unchallenged findings” that petitioners acted with

“fraudulent intent” in denying the risks of second-hand

smoke).*

Petitioners cannot credibly challenge the standard of

review applied to a claim they did not make. This case

would accordingly present a poor vehicle for deciding

the relevance of Bose to factual findings in a fraud case.

3. Even if petitioners had challenged the district

court’s factual findings below, there would be no basis

for review of their Bose claim. Although this Court sug

gested that an appellate court “could” review a fraud

finding independently “[a]s an additional safeguard,”

Petitioners’ opening and reply briefs cited Bose in the standard ot

review sections, see C.A. Joint Br. 20-21 & C.A. Joint Reply Br. 6, but

only once elsewhere, and that lone citation was not in connection with

a challenge to a factual finding, see C.A. Joint Br. 112-113

30

Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc.,

538 U.S. 600, 621 (2003) (Madigan), the Court did not

suggest that such review is required. In fact, the Fourth

Circuit expressly rejected the argument that independ-

ent review is required in a fraud case. See SEC v. Pi-

rate Investor LLC, 580 F.3d 233, 242 (4th Cir. 2009),

petition for cert. pending, No. 09-1176 (filed Mar. 26,

2010). Petitioners fail to identify any case in which a

court has applied Bose in reviewing a finding of fraud

under the mail or wire fraud statutes.

The few cases petitioners cite (PM Pet. 14-17) do not

involve intentional fraud, but rather constitutional re-

view of broad restrictions on commercial advertising

alleged to be potentially misleading. /hanez v. Florida

Department of Business & Professional Regulation, 512

U.S. 136 (1994), found the Florida Board of Publie Ac

countancy’s reprimand of.an attorney for (truthfully)

including her designation as a certified public accoun-

tant on her letterhead to violate the First Amendment.

id. at 144. In doing so it did not cite Bose or discuss the

standard of review.”

Similarly, Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplin-

ary Commission, 496 U.S. 91 (1990), found a prophylac-

tic rule prohibiting attorneys from accurately listing

specialization credentials in their advertisements to vio-

late the First Amendment. In that setting, the Court

was reviewing whether the overall character of the ad-

vertising placed it beyond the protections of the First

Amendment, see 2d. at 108, not findings of historical fact

such as those in a fraud action. As this Court has ex-

Moreover, it is clear that the Court would have reached the same

determination under any standard of review—the Board’s argument

that the letterhead was misleading was “entirely insubstantial.” /banez,

512 U.S. at 143

31

plained, there is a critical constitutional difference be-

tween such a “‘broad prophylactic rule’” categorically

limiting speech and “a properly tailored fraud action

targeting fraudulent representations themsclves.”

Madigan, 538 U.S. at 619 (alterations omitted); see

Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 317-318 (7th Cir. 1992)

(“In Peel, the issue was whether a prophylactic regula-

tion applicable to all lawyers, completely prohibiting an

entire category of potentially misleading commercial

speech, passed constitutional muster. * * * Here, by

contrast, the issue is whether an individualized FTC

cease and desist order, prohibiting a particular set of

deceptive ads, passes constitutional muster. * * Ac

cordingly, we decline to review de novo the FTC’s find

ings.”), eert. denied, 507 U.S. 909 (1993)."°

The concerns animating the holding in Bose (and sub

sequent cases assessing claims that certain categories of

professional advertising are potentially misleading) do

not apply to the factual findings in a fraud case. “The

meaning of terms such as ‘actual malice’—and, more

particularly, ‘reckless disregard’— * is not readily

captured in ‘one infallible’ definition,” and “only through

Byrumy. Landreth, 566 IF’ .3d 442 (Sth Cir, 2009), likewise involved

a constitutional challenge to a state prophylactic rule that “prohibit| ed |

significant truthful speech” in interior designers’ advertisements. /d

at 448; sec PM Pct. 16. By contrast, when a case-specifie finding of

truth or falsity based on assessment of witness credibility is at issue,

the Fifth Circuit reviews only for clear error. See Levine v. CMP

Publns, Ine., 738 F.2d 660, 672 & n.19 (1984) (“Even the Bose court

recognized that it is important for the reviewing court to respect suct

choices made by the finder of fact.”). Revo vy. Disciplinary Bd. of the

Sup. Ct., 106 F.3d 929 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 521 1).S. 1121 (1997)

and Falanga v. State Bar, 150 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,

526 U.S. 1087 (1999), see PM Pet. 16, also involved challenges to pro

phylactic rules on attorney advertising.

the course of case-by-case adjudication can [appellate

courts} give content to these otherwise elusive constitu

tional standards.” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.

v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 686 (1989). The Court

has explained that in the libel setting, it therefore has

been “reluctant to give the trier of fact’s conclusions

presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a federal appel-

late court of its primary function as an expositor of law.”

Millerv. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985). By contrast,

the elements of fraud, such as falsity and specifie intent

to deecive, are not “elusive.” Harte-Hanks Cammunica-

tions, Inc., 491 U.S. at 686. They are well-established

legal concepts that can be readily applied by fact-finders

without a need for de novo exposition by appellate courts

n every single fraud appeal. See Altria Group, Tne. v.

Good, 1298. Ct. 538, 545 (2008) (“| F Jraud claims ‘rely

only on a single, uniform standard: falsity.’”) (citation

omitted); Cherichel v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1002, 1012 (8th

Cir. 2010) (‘Specific intent is a term of art in American

jurisprudence, well known to practitioners and law stu-

dents alike.”), petition for cert. pending, No. 09-1235

(filed Apr. 12, 2010); United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d

31,40 n.7 (1st Cir. 2001) (same)

4. Finally, petitioners’ assertion that “independent

appellate review would likely have altered the outcome

of th{is] case” (PM Pet. 21) is meritless. It was for good

reason that petitioners made no attempt in the court of

appeals to challenge the district court’s fact-finding. As

the court of appeals explained, the district court docu-

mented “countless examples of deliberately false state-

ments by |petitioners],” Pet. App. 45a, and the finding of

intent to deceive rested on “hundreds” of subsidiary

findings, 7d. at 38a; see also Part C, infra

Moreover, the vast majority of the district court’s

findings establish historical faets—such as the fact that

TI’s president was warned in writing that “lolur basic

position in the cigarette controversy is subject to the

charge, and may be subject to a finding, that we are

making false or misleading statements to promote the

sale of cigarettes,” Pet. App. 37a (brackets in origi-

nal)—that would unquestionably be subject to review

only for clear error even if Bose had some applicability

here. See 466 U.S. at 514 n.31. Similarly, even where

Bose is applicable, “special deference” is due “to the

trial judge’s opportunity to observe the demeanor of the

witnesses.” Jd. at 499-500; see also zd. at 500 (noting

that deference to a trial judge’s findings “tends to in-

crease when trial judges have lived with the controversy

for weeks or months instead of just a few hours”). Here,

the district court found that petitioners had engaged in

“a multi-faceted, sophisticated scheme to defraud” (Pet.

App. 2009a) after observing the live testimony of 84 wit-

nesses, including many of petitioners’ senior executives,

over the course of a nine-month trial. /d. at Sa.

Petitioners highlight (PM Pet. 21) one sentence in

the section of the court of appeals’ decision on the likeli-

hood of future violations suggesting that it “may not

have reached all of the same conclusions as the district

court.” Pet. App. 67a; see zd. at 50a. Such formulaic

recitations of the clear-error standard, particularly

where the parties have not contested the factual deter

minations of the district court, do not suggest that the

result below would have been different if the panel had

conducted “independent” review under Bose. Indeed,

the immediately preceding sentence in the court of ap

peals’ opinion observes that “examples in the record of

[petitioners’] marketing campaigns and internal docu

ments amply support the district court’s conclusion that

[petitioners] ‘continue to make[] false and misleading

statements regarding low tar cigarettes in order to reas-

sure smokers and dissuade them from quitting.’” /d. at

67a (emphasis added; brackets in original)."’

C. Petitioners’ Fraud Was Not Protected By The First

Amendment

Petitioners Reynolds and Lorillard eontend (RJR

Pet. 5-29; Lorillard Pet. 29-30) that the district court’s

judgment violates the First Amendment by imposing

civil liability for constitutionally protected speech. They

contend that their statements to the public in press re-

leases, pamphlets, and television appearances are enti-

tied to First Amendment protection as expressions of

opinion “in an ongoing scientific and political debate.”

RJR Pet. 21; see Lorillard Pet. 29. Petitioners claim

protection for their statements made to Congress and

'' Philip Morris cites three examples of purported “factual findings”

it claims would be reversed under the standard of review it urges. PM

Pet. 21; see 2d. at 21-23. First, it cites the district court's finding of

specific intent, but it makes alegal argument, v.e., that the court applied

the wrong standard. Compare PM Pet. 21-22, with RJR Pet. 23-29 &

09-979 Pet. (Altria Pet.) 7-8. Second, it challenges the finding of fraud

in connection with use of “low tar” and “light” descriptors, but, again,

this is a legal claim (indeed, one that Reynolds claims is the subject of

i circuit split, see RJR Pet. 30-32). Finally, Philip Morris claims the

district court erred in concluding there was a “scientific consensus” on

the dangers of environmental tobacco smoke and cancer in 19&%6. PM

Pet. 22. As the court of appeals explained, however, this contention is

“beside the point.” Pet. App. 50a. “The district court based its finding

of fraudulent intent not just on the existence of a consensus but also on

evidence of | petitioners’] own knowledge” of the dangers of environ-

mental tobacco smoke, and petitioners before the court of appeals

. 2.2

nowhere challenge the accuracy of anv of the district court's

other findings suggestive of their knowledge” Jd. at 50a-5la

a

federal agencies under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine,

an antitrust doctrine with underpinnings in the First

Amendment’s petition clause.

Those contentions lack merit. Although framed in

terms of the First Amendment, petitioners’ arguments

in reality amount to belated factbound challenges to the

district court’s findings that their statements were

fraudulent. Because the district court properly found

that petitioners’ statements satisfied all the traditional

elements of fraud, the First Amendment issues peti-

tioner identifies are not presented here. The court of

appeals’ decision upholding the district court’s view of

the evidence establishing fraud does not conflict with

any decision of this Court or of another court of appeals.

Further review of is therefore unwarranted.

1. “[{I]t is well settled that the First Amendment

does not protect fraud.” Pet. App. 43a-44a (citing Mc/n

tyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995)

(the government “may, and does, punish fraud di-

rectly”). Petitioners do not contest that bedrock princi-

ple. Instead, they assert that the court of appeals failed

to apply the traditional requirements of a fraud claim

and therefore impermissibly extended the civil fraud

statutes. Specifically, petitioners assert that unlike ac-

tionable fraud, their publie statements were not false,

material, or made with specifie intent to defraud con-

sumers of money or property. Each assertion is merit

less, and none presents a legal question warranting re

view.

a Falsity. Petitioners argue that their public pro-

nouncements could not form the basis for fraud liability

because they were not “false factual statements,” but

instead were assertions supporting “one side of a scien-

tific debate.” RIR Pet. 20 (citation, emphasis, and ellip-

‘yp >

ab

sis omitted). It is unclear whether petitioners are con-

tinuing to assert that their statements about cigarettes

are not in fact false—that, for example, it remains an

open question whether cigarettes cause disease—or in-

stead whether petitioners are asserting that their state-

ments were not deliberately false at the time they were

made. Either way, petitioner’s contention fails in the

face of the district court’s extensive factual findings

based on evidence that the court of appeals correctly

labeled “overwhelming.” Pet. App. 39a. As the court of

ippeals explained, the district court found that petition-

ers’ statements were “clearly and deliberately false,”

and it provided “countless examples” of such “deliber-

ately false statements.” /d. at 45a.

The basis for the district court's findings included

“decades of evidence that scientists within the [peti-

tioner] corporations and outside scientists hired by the

corporations and their joint entities were continually

conducting research and reviewing the research of other

scientists regarding cigarettes and health, addiction,

nicotine and tar manipulation, and secondhand smoke.”

Pet. App. 35a. “The evidence at trial demonstrated that

the results of this research—essential to the core of [pe-

titioners’] operations, including strategie planning, prod-

uct development, and advertising—were well known,

acknowledged, and accepted throughout the corpora-

tions.” Jbid. “These results established that cigarette

smoking causes disease, that nicotine is addictive, that

light cigarettes do not present lower health risks than

regular cigarettes due to smoker compensation, and that

secondhand smoke is hazardous to health.” /bzd.

Trial testimony and internal company documents

“demonstrate that [petitioners’| top officials were di-

rectly informed of negative research results,” Pet. App.

rT

{

>

37a, and “that the executives crafted their corporate

priorities and strategies in response to these findings.”

Id. at 36a-37a. For example, Dr. William Farone, a

Philip Morris scientist for 18 years whom the district

court found to be “impressive and credible as both a fact

and expert witness,” 7d. at 35a-36a (quoting zd. at 445a),

testified that there was “widespread acceptance” at the

company “that smoking caused disease,” zd. at 36a, that

nicotine is addictive, id. at 37a-38a, and that petitioners’

“superior knowledge of compensation * * * was closely

held within Philip Morris and the tobacco industry.” /d.

at 38a. Indeed, petitioners’ own documents support the

finding that their statements were false, and deliber-

ately so. TI’s Vice President of Public Relations advised

its President confidentially: “[Ojur basic position in the

cigarette controversy is subject to the charge, and may

be subject to a finding, that we are making false or mis-

leading statements to promote the sale of cigarettes.”

Id. at 37a (citation omitted).

Based on specific examples and “hundreds more find-

ings” of fact, the court of appeals concluded that the

district court had sufficient evidence from which to con-

clude that petitioners’ “executives, who directed the ac-

tivities of the [petitioner] corporations and their joint

entities, knew about the negative health consequences of

smoking, the addictiveness and manipulation of nicotine,

the harmfulness of secondhand smoke, and the concept

of smoker compensation,” and that “[t]hese executives

then made, caused to be made, and approved public

statements contrary to this knowledge.” Pet. App. 38a-

39a; see id. at 45a (district court provided “countless

examples of deliberately false statements by [petition

ers|”). Those findings defeat petitioners’ efforts to char-

acterize their public statements as good-faith expres-

38

sions of opinion on a matter of legitimate disagreement.

There is no reason for this Court to review both the dis-

trict court’s and the panel’s evaluation of the trial re-

cord, which included nearly 14,000 exhibits and the testi-

mony of nearly 250 witnesses, 7d. at 8a, especially given

that petitioners disclaimed any challenge to the district

court’s factual findings below, see App., infra, 5a, Ta.

b. Money or property. Petitioner Reynolds ad-

vances the related argument that the statements on

which the district court based fraud liability were “not

directed to consumers” or aimed at obtaining their

money or property, but rather addressed “important

publie controversies.” RJR i-et. 15. This assertion con-

tradicts the district court’s factual findings. Reynolds

asserts that “[nJeither court below disputed that. most of

the allegedly ‘fraudulent’ speech was not designed to

deprive consumers of money or property.” RJR Pet. 14-

15. That is simply incorrect: The district court specifi-

cally found that “the vast majority of [petitioners’] state-

ments were made with the primary purpose of influenc-

ing smokers” and “potential smokers,” as well as the

general public, Pet. App. 1960a, while the court of ap-

peals concluded that all of the racketeering acts on

which the district court relied “were intended to defraud

eonsumers,” zd. at 46a.

The premise of Reynolds’ disagreement with the

courts below is its assertion that any statement other

than a “product advertisement” necessarily was not di-

rected at consumers or intended to deprive them of

money or property. See RJR Pet. 16 (contending that

“98.9% of the ‘fraudulent’ public statements identified

by the district court * * * were not product advertise-

ments,” and thus that such statements are “plainly not

speech directed at consumers”). But a statement obvi-

oy

ously need not take the form of an advertisement to be

targeted at consumers or intended to persuade them to

purchase cigarettes. To cite one particularly notable

example, the Frank Statement itself was not a “product

advertisement,” but it was plainly targeted at consum-

ers—indeed, it was entitled “A Frank Statement To Cig-

arette Smokers”—and the evidence at trial showed that,

like petitioners’ many other false public statements, the

k'rank Statement was designed to obtain money or prop-

erty by persuading smokers to continue purchasing ciga-

rettes. Pet. App. 128a; see, e.g. 1d. at 417a (noting that,

according to petitioners’ own documents, the open ques-

tion strategy was intended to “give smokers a psycho-

logical erutch and a self-rationale to continue smoking”).

ce. Materrality. Petitioner Reynolds argues (Pet. 18-

20) that both courts below erred in deeming its false

statements material to consumers. Pet. App. 41a-438a.

As with its challenge to the falsity findings, Reynolds’

arguments on materiality amount to an attack on the

district court’s factual determinations and present no

question of law warranting this Court’s review.

Reynolds asserts that there was “not a scintilla of

evidence or any district court finding that any of the

challenged statements (excluding ‘lights’) were ‘impor-

tant to a reasonable person purchasing cigarettes.’’

RJR Pet. 18 (quoting Pet. App. 42a). But the district

court specifically found that petitioners’ false state-

ments were material to consumers, Pet. App. 1986a-

1990a, and that petitioners intended the public to rely on

their claims. /d. at 198a. Those findings of materiality,

are neither speculative nor “counterintuitive.” RJR Pet.

18. As the panel explained, the matters addressed in

petitioners’ false statements are important to a reason-

able consumer “because each concerns direct and signifi-

40

cant consequences of smoking.” /d. at 43a. “When de-

ciding whether to smoke cigarettes, tobacco consumers

must resolve initial reservations (or lingering qualms)

about the potential for cancer, the risk of addiction, or

the hazardous effects of secondhand smoke for friends,

family, and others who may be exposed.” J/bzd.

The open question strategy itself shows materiality.

That strategy reflected petitioners’ recognition that, to

meet their objectives, it was necessary only to create

enough publie uncertainty to reassure smokers that the

connection between smoking and disease was an “open

controversy,” “not a closed case.” Pet. App. 1752a (cita-

tion omitted). For similar reasons, there is no merit to

Reynolds’ contention (Pet. 19-20 & n.5) that its false

statements could not be material because they contra-

dicted “[tjhe overwhelming public knowledge of smok-

ing’s health effects.” Such contradiction was an integral

part of the open question strategy. As Brown and Wil-

liamson observed in 1967: “Doubt is our product since

it is the best means of competing with the ‘body of fact’

that exists in the mind of the general public.” Pet. App.

456a; see id. at 43a (“| Petitioners’| prevarications about

each of these issues suggests full awareness of this obvi-

ous fact; reasonable purchasers of cigarettes would con-

sider these statements important.”).'*

'* Reynolds incorrectly contends that the government was required

to prove that identified consumers actually relied on petitioners’

misrepresentations. As this Court has explained, “[ujsing the mail to

execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail

fraud, and hence a predicate act of racketeering under RICO, even ifno

one relied on any misrepresentation.” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &

Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2138 (2008). That is because the mail and

wire fraud statutes “punish[] the scheme, notits success.” Pasquantino

v. United States, 544 U.S. 849, 371 (2005) (quoting U/nited States v.

Preree, 224 F.3d 148, 166 (2d Cir. 2000))

4]

Reynolds is therefore incorrect in contending (RJR

Pet. 6-7) that its First Amendment challenge resembles

the one at issue in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 5389 U.S. 654

(2003). Nike involved non-fraudulent, freestanding cor-

porate speech about publie policy issues, not, as in this

case, an integrated course of conduct designed to de

ceive and defraud consumers. As the government ex-

plained in the portion of its Nike amicus brief that

Reynolds quotes in its petition (Pet. 6-7), the First

Amendment concern in that case arose because the Call

fornia law at issue permitted private suits challenging

speech “that does not injure individuals or materially

affect their purchasing decisions.” U.S. Amicus Br. at 9,

Nike, supra. In this case, by contrast, the district court

specifically found, and the court of appeals correctly

agreed, that petitioners’ false statements both injured

individuals and materially affected consumers’ decisions

about whether to purchase cigarettes. The issues in

Nike. therefore are not presented here. As the govern-

ment noted in Nike, suits of this kind—based on “legis-

lation that protect[s| purchasers of goods and services

from deception, including fraud”—“are unquestionably

compatible with the First Amendment.” /drd.

d. Specific intent to defraud. Reynolds contends

(Pet. 23-28) that the court of appeals erred in upholding

the district court’s finding that it acted with specific in-

tent to defraud consumers. Pet. App. 32a-4la. To the

extent that this argument reflects disagreement with

the district court’s view of the evidence, it simply re-

peats the belated challenge to the district court’s finding

that petitioner’s statements were deliberately false and

fails for the same reasons. See pp. 35-38, supra. In ad-

dition to challenging the finding of falsity, however,

Reynolds advances two specific arguments about the

42

manner in which the courts below determined that the

specific-intent requirement was satisfied. Those argu-

ments lack merit and do not warrant review.

i. First, Reynolds argues (Pet. 23-26) that the dis-

trict court rested its specific-intent finding on an inecor-

rect legal standard because, Reynolds contends, the

court considered the “collective intent” of the corpora-

tion as a whole and did not require that any single em-

ployee act with specific intent to defraud. /d. at 23-24

(emphasis omitted).'? That argument is incorrect. Al

though the district court mentioned a “collective know!l-

edge doctrine,” Pet. App. 1980a, the court made clear

that a finding of specific intent requires proof that a per-

son with authority to act on behalf of the corporation

possessed the requisite wrongful intent or acted with

reckless disregard for or willful blindness to the truth.

Id. at 198la. Indeed, the district court noted that, in

Saba v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 78 F.5d 664,

670 n.6 (1996), the D.C. Cireuit stated that “the pro-

seribed intent (willfulness) depend|s] on the wrongful

intent of specific employees.” /bzd. The district court

also specifically rejected the proposition “that aggrega-

tion of different states of minds of various corporate

actors is sufficient to demonstrate specific intent in

cases where individuals within a corporation make

fraudulent statements.” /bid.

The district court’s analysis is consistent with the

court of appeals’ articulation of the governing legal prin-

ciples, which Reynolds does not dispute. As the court of

appeals explained, see Pet. App. 32a-34a, “[c]orporations

* Petitioner Altria presents a separate slatulory argument premised

ona challenge tu the legal standard the district court applied in deter-

mining whether Altria acted with specific intent to defraud. See Altria

Pet. 7-10. That argument is addressed in Part H, «zfra.

43

may be held liable for specific intent offenses based on

the ‘knowledge and intent’ of their employees.” /d. at

33a (quoting New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. vy.

United States, 212 U.S. 481, 495 (1909)). “Because a

corporation only acts and wills by virtue of its employ-

ees, the proscribed corporate intent depends on the

wrongful intent of specific employees.” /bid. A showing

of specific intent does not require that individual officers

or employees personally testify to their frame of mind.

“A person’s state of mind is rarely susceptible of proof

by direct evidence, so specific intent to defraud may be,

and most often is, inferred from the totality of the cir-

cumstances, including indirect and circumstantial evi-

dence.” /bid.

Applying these principles, the court of appeals cor-

rectly upheld the district court’s finding that Reynolds

acted with specific intent to defraud. As the panel ex-

plained, the district court concluded “that the chief exec-

utiveofficers and other highly placed officials in the [pe-

titioner] corporations made or approved statements they

knew to be false or misleading, evineing their specific

intent to defraud consumers.” Pet. App. 34a. In light of

the “overwhelming evidence” that petitioners knew of

the toxicity and addictiveness of their products, the dis-

trict court explained that “it is absurd to believe that the

highly-ranked representatives and agents of these cor-

porations and entities had no knowledge that their pub-

lic statements were false and fraudulent.” /d. at 1890a;

see 7d. at 1984a (noting that, “[iJn the majority of in-

stances, the authors of the fraudulent statements al-

leged as Racketeering Acts were executives, including

44

high level scientists—-C EQs, Vice Presidents, Heads of

Research & Development, not entry level employees.”)."*

Thus, contrary to Reynolds’ assertions (Pet. 24-25),

the district court did in fact find, properly based on in-

ferences from “overwhelming” evidence, that petition-

ers’ executives knew the information that rendered their

public statements false and misleading—in other words,

that they acted with specific intent to defraud. The

court of appeals therefore correctly held that the “dis-

trict court did not commit legal error by imputing to [pe-

titioners’| executives knowledge of the falsity of their

statements based on inferences reasonably drawn from

the facts shown.” Pet. App. 35a.

As noted, the district court explicitly disavowed the

“collective intent” theory that petitioner attributes to it.

‘“ Petitioner Reynolds challenges the validity of the district court’s

inference of knowledge on the ground that “most of the alleged ‘fraud’

was statements by the Tobacco Institute.” RJR Pet. 26 (emphases

omitted). But even if that were true, Reynolds did not dispute its re-

sponsibility for Tl’s conduct in the court of appeals. and for good

reason. As the panel explained, petitioners (including Reynolds) cre-

ated TI, staffed its board and its committees, and used TI (along with

other joint entities) to conduct their “joint public relations through false

and misleading press releases and publications.” Pet. App. 9a; see also

rd. at 188a (petitioners funded TI’s operations with contributions ex

ceeding $600 million). Indeed, the district court found that petitioners

formed TI to serve as their collective spokesperson on matters of smok-

ing and health and to provide a confidential forum in which to refine and

coordinate their fraudulent scheme. See generally id. at 177a-230a.

Petitioners structured their operations in this way because, as the TI

Executive Committee stressed, it was “of prime importance that the in-

dustry maintain a united front and that if one or more companies were

to conduct themselves as a matter of self interest, particularly in adver-

tising, obvious vulnerability would be the result.” Jd. at 21&a (citation

omitted). Petitioners’ effort to characterize TI as “a separate entity”

(RR Pet. 26) is thus squarely at odds with the record.

45

Pet. App. 198la. But even if it had not, the court of ap-

peals explained that the district court “relied on a per-

missible view of specific intent,” id. at 41a, finding that

the individuals who made and directed the fraudulent

statements in fact knew that those statements were

false. See id. at 1890a. Because the district court’s

“conclusions based on the proper standard are sufficient

to uphold its judgment,” zd. at 41a, the court of appeals

correctly found no need to decide the validity of the

“collective intent” theory that petitioners challenge

here. Accordingly, the validity of that theory is not pre-

sented for this Court’s review. See Cutter v. Wilkinson,

944 U.S. 709, 718 n.7 (2005) (“| We are a court of review,

not of first view.”).

ii... Second, Reynolds contends Pet. 27-29) that it was

deprived of due process because it was denied the oppor-

tunity to “show[] that all corporate statements accu-

rately reflected the prevailing internal views—and cer-

tainly the speakers’ views.” RJR Pet. 27, 28-29. The

record in the district court belies the assertion that

Reynolds was “tricked” into “putting on no defense on a

hotly contested issue.” Jd. at 28.

Reynolds had every opportunity and incentive in the

nine-month trial in this case to establish, by oral testi-

mony or otherwise, the exceedingly unlikely propositior

that its executives believed the public statements made

on behalf of the corporation. In their opening state-

ment, petitioners declared that “the evidence will show,

Your Honor, these defendants gen|uine ]ly believed their

positions, advanced legitimate assessments of the sci-

ence, and made statements with no intent whatsoever to

mislead or to defraud anybody.” 9/22/04 Tr. 337. The

government then presented volumes of evidence estab-

lishing petitioners’ specific intent to deceive. As the

46

court of appeals explained, “(t]he government presented

evidence indicating that specific high-ranking corporate

officials were directly informed” about “the negative

health consequences of smoking, the addictiveness and

manipulation of nicotine, the harmfulness of secondhand

smoke, and the concept of smoker compensation,” and

that “{t]hese executives then made, caused to be made,

and approved public statements contrary to this knowl-

edge.” Pet. App. 38a-39a.'° The central dispute at trial

was whether the statements made by petitioners and

their employees “accurately reflected” the “prevailing

internal views” of the corporation and the speaker. RJR

Pet. 28-29. It is simplv implausible that Reynolds pos-

sessed but deliberately withheld exculpatory evidence

that not only would have disproved the showing

Reynolds contended the government was required to

make but also would have rebutted the specific evidence

the government presented. Reynolds’ factbound claim

of unfairness lacks any merit and does not warrant this

Court’s review.

2. Petitioners Reynolds and Lorillard contend (RJR

Pet. 7-8, 17-18; Lorillard Pet. 29-30) that a subset of

their public statements—those directed in the first in-

stance toward Congress or other governmental agen-

cies—enjoy protection under the Noerr-Pennington

” Indeed, the government’s post-trial brief provided more than 20

pages of “examples of particular executives, employees, and agents of

[petitioners] who possessed the specific intent required under the mail

and wire fraud laws,” with citations to the supporting record evidence.

C.A. App. A1l393-A1414. Petitioners made no attempt to rebut this

evidence in the district court, claiming only that the officers who made

or approved petitioners’ false statements might have “personally be-

lieved” the statements were true despite a wealth of contradictory evi-

dence. Jd. at Al1489 (citing petitioners’ joint post-trial brief)

47

doctrine. The court of appeals correctly rejected that

contention, which does not present any legal issue war-

ranting review.

The Noerr-Pennington doctrine bears only slight, if

any, relevance to this case. Under that doctrine,

“[tlhose who petition government for redress are gener-

ally immune from antitrust liability.” Professional Real

E’state Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures tndus., Inc.,

508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993); see Hastern R.R. Presidents Con-

ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136

(1961) (Noerr); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Pen

nington, 381 U.S. 657, 669 (1965). Were this an antitrust

case, the Noerr-Penninaton doctrine might have some

conceivable bearing. But as the court of appeals ex

plained, Pet. App. 44a-46a, this case concerns fraud on

consumers; petitioners’ liability rests on their use of the

mails and wires while executing a scheme to defraud

cigarette purchasers of their money. 18 U.S.C. 1341,

1343 (Supp. II 2008)."° This Court has never suggested,

and petitioners cite no case holding, that the Noerr-

Pennington doctrine confers some sort of generalized

immunity from laws punishing consumer fraud. See Pet.

App. 44a-45a."‘

» Petitioner Reynolds argues (Pet. 16) that its speech before Con

gress or other government agencies does not constitute “consumer

fraud” because it “was not directed to consumers.” But the same state-

ments may be intended both to influence government agencies and to

defraud consumers of money or property. The district court’s findings

make clear that what petitioners describe as their “Noerr-Pennington

speech” was In fact an integral part of petitioner's overall strategy to

portray the health effects of smoking as an “open question” and thereby

to obtain money from cigarette smokers by means of false represent

LiONs.

* Petitioners are thus mistaken in claiming (PM Pet. 26n.4; RJR Pet

18)) that the decision below conflicts with other circuits’ application

48

Similarly, while Noerr-Pennington immunity stems

in part from First Amendment right-to-petition con-

cerns, see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 138, this Court has

stressed that “[t]he Petition Clause * * * was inspired

by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us

the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble|,| * *

and there is no sound basis for granting greater consti-

tutional protection to statements made in a petition

* * than other First Amendment expressions.” Mc-

Donald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985); see id. at 484

(concluding that “petitions to the President that contain

intentional and reckless falsehoods do not enjoy consti-

tutional protection”) (internal quotation marks and cita-

tion omitted).

Petitioners appear to contend that the Noerr-Pen-

nington doctrine confers immunity from all liability for

any speech—even knowingly false statements—that is

addressed to a government agency and takes the form of

“efforts to affect governmental regulation.” Lorillard

Pet. 29-30; see RJR Pet. 17. But that sweeping proposi-

tion cannot be squared with established and unquestion

ably constitutional prohibitions against making false

when

’

eral courts. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1001 (prohibiting false

statements to the federal government); 18 U.S.C. 162]

(perjury of witnesses); see also Buckman Co. v. Plain

tiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) (explaining

that federal law “amply empowers the [Food and Drug

Administration] to punish and deter fraud against the

Administration’).

the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. All of the eases on which petitioner

rely, like Noerr itself, involved immunity from antitrust claims. None

involved consumer fraud.

be

In any event, the scope of the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine is not squarely presented in this case. As a

precautionary measure, the district court excluded evi-

dence of certain testimony petitioners’ executives pro-

vided to Congress. See Pet. App. 46a; id. at 1962a-

1963a. Even if those statements were properly ex-

cluded, a question the court of appeals found no need to

resolve, see id. at 46a, the district court specifically

found “that the vast majority of [petitioners’] statements

were made with the primary purpose of influencing

smokers, potential smokers, and the general public and

are, therefore, not protected by the Noerr-Pennington

doctrine.” /d. at 1960a; see id. at 46a (concluding that,

ever if petitioners’ congressional testimony was prop-

erly excluded, petitioners’ “remaining acts were in-

tended to defraud consumers, so Noerr-Pen nington pro-

tection does not apply”). Indeed, even if the district

court had excluded from consideration not just congres

sional testimony but all of petitioners’ statements to the

FTC and other federal regulators, the record would still

contain ample evidence—including misleading market-

ing materials, press releases, statements on television

talk shows, and advertising campaigns—to support the

finding of a scheme to defraud consumers. In view of

that record, the question that Reynolds seeks to raise

(RJR Pet. 17)—whether First Amendment protection

applies to deliberate deception of regulatory bodies and

legislators in pursuit of a fraudulent scheme aimed at

consumers—is not properly presented.

DD. Petitioners’ Statements About “Light” And “Low-Tar”

Cigarettes Were Frauduient And Not Authorized By The

PTC

Petitioners Reynolds and Philip Morris (RJR Pet.

29-34; PM Pet. 29-30) contend that the court of appeals

erred in upholding fraud liahility based on their adver-

tising of “light” and “low-tar” cigarettes. That conten-

tion is based on two arguments, neither of which has

merit or warrants review.

First, petitioners argue that “they should be immune

from liability because the [FTC] * * * has blessed

their use of labels such as ‘light’ and ‘low tar.’” Pet.

App. 46a-47a. But as the court of appeals explained,

that argument is “entirely foreclosed” by this Court’s

decision in Allria, which held that “the FTC has in fact

never required that cigarette manufacturers disclose tar

and nicotine yields, nor has it condoned representations

of those yields through the use of ‘light’ or ‘low tar’

descriptors.” Pet. App. 47a (quoting Altria, 129 S. Ct. at

900).

Second, petitioners contend that their “light” and

“low tar’ descriptors were not actionable under the

fraud statutes because although such statements “could

be interpreted to imply a heaith benefit, that is not the

only reasonable interpretation that could be drawn from

the terms.” Lorillard Pet. 30-31; see also RJR Pet. 30.

The district court found, however, that petitioners knew

and intended that consumers would interpret “light” and

“low tar” descriptors to convey a health benefit, see Pet.

App. 1068a-1096a, even though petitioners “have known

for decades that filtered and low tar cigarettes do not

offer a meaningful reduction of risk, and that their mar-

keting which emphasized reductions in tar and nicotine

was false and misleading.” /d. at 46a (quoting zd. at

>]

1905a-1906a); see itd. at 1140a-1147a, 1255a-1256a.

There is also no merit to petitioners’ characterization of

“light” and “low tar” descriptors as “simply verbal rep-

resentations of numerical ratings authorized by the

FTC.” Jd. at 49a. That argument “founders on the dis-

trict court’s finding that ‘there are lights of certain

brands with higher tar levels than regulars of other

brands from the same company, and there are also lights

and regulars of the same brands that have the same

FTC tar rating.’” /bzd. (quoting zd. at 1907a); see 2d. at

1142a (finding that the terms “light” and “low tar,” as

used by petitioners, are empirically “meaningless” and

“arbitrary”’). This evidence, “which [petitioners] do not

attempt to show is clearly erroneous, reveals the

descriptors were not simply representations of numeri-

cal ratings and thus were not ‘literally true.’” /d. at 49a.

In any event, the “fraudulent activity surrounding

‘light’ cigarettes was not merely limited to the use of

misleading descriptors.” Pet. App. 48a. The district

court found, for example, that petitioners’ public state-

ments about the demand for light cigarettes were “bla-

tantly false,” 7d. at 1906a; that petitioners “withheld and

suppressed their extensive knowledge and understand-

ing of nicotine-driven smoker compensation,” id. at

1907a; and that petitioners intentionally designed their

light cigarettes to facilitate smokers’ ability to compen-

sate and thereby obtain the required dosage of nicotine

to remain addicted, zd. at 1905a. See generally id. at

775a-850a (describing petitioners’ efforts to “design

commercial cigarettes that were capable of delivering

nicotine across a range of doses that would keep smok

ers addicted,” including through filter design, the place-

ment of ventilation holes, paper porosity, and alterations

to the chemical form of the nicotine delivered to smok

ers’ brains).

EK. Neither The Master Settlement Agreement Nor The Pas-

sage Of The Family Smoking Prevention And Tobacco

Control Act Eliminated All Likelihood Of Future Viola-

tions

Both courts below properly found that an injunction

was warranted, especially given petitioners’ vast,

decades-long fraudulent enterprise. Pet. App. 60a-67a,

2007a-2021a; see 18 U.S.C. 1964(a) (injunctions available

under RICO to “prevent and restrain violations”). This

Court has long recognized that “|iJn exercising its equi-

table jurisdiction, [a] federal court has broad power to

restrain acts which are of the same type or class as un-

lawful acts which the court has found to have been com-

mitted.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. llazeltine Research,

Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 132 (1969) (internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). Petitioners Philip Morris and

Lorillard nonetheless contend that the Master Settle-

ment Agreement (MSA) and the FSPTCA “[floreclose

[fluture [rJacketeering” and thus “extinguished the dis-

trict court’s jurisdiction.” PM Pet. 28; see zd. at 28-31;

Lorillard Pet. 31-32. Petitioners do not contend that the

district court’s injunction conflicts with any decision of

this Court or any court of appeals, and their challenge is

without merit.

1. Petitioners erroneously contend that the injunc-

tive relief ordered in this case was barred by the MSA

—an agreement between state attorneys general and

some tobacco companies settling tort and reimburse-

ment suits through a variety of state-specific injunctions

and consent decrees, see Pet. App. 61la-66a, 1864a-1870a.

As an initial matter, they cite no authority whatsoever

53

for the proposition that a racketeer’s settlement of other

causes of action with other parties can strip a federal

district court of “jurisdiction” to provide injunctive re-

lief for the United States in a RICO case. PM Pet. 28;

see Pet. App. 62a (characterizing this argument by peti-

tioners as “odd”); cf. SEC v. Management Dynamics,

Ine., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975) (“I njunctive relief

is not barred by a defendant’s disclaimer of an intent to

violate the law in the future.”). In any event, this con

tention ignores the district court’s express factual find-

ings regarding petitioners’ violations of the MSA, as

well as the settlement’s inadequacy when compared to

the injunction issued here.

As the court of appeals found, petitioners “cannot

hide behind the MSA to avoid the imposition of RICO

remedies when they do not comply with the agreement.”

Pet. App. 66a. Those petitioners subject to the MSA

“began to evade and at times even violate the MSA’s

prohibitions almost immediately after signing the agree-

ment.” /d. at 64a. For example, “although the MSA

vequired [petitioners] to dissolve CIAR, only two days

after signing the MSA Lorillard’s general counsel wrote

to Philip Morris, Reynolds, and Brown & Williamson

asking to ‘discuss the status of the plan to reinstate

CIAR.’” Jbid. (citation omitted). “Shortly thereafter,

Covington & Burling LLP informed the CIAR contrac-

tors ‘[tj]he members of CIAR have decided to create a

new organization to continue the work. . . . The mem-

bers of CIAR that will be members of the new organiza-

tion intend to continue to fund the research.” /d. at 64a-

65a (citation omitted). “Subsequently, in 2000, Philip

Morris initiated a new research program that had the

same offices, phone numbers, and board as CLAR and

many of the same employecs, management, researchers,

o4

peer reviewers, and grantees.” /d. at 65a; see also zbid.

(“CIAR is not the lone example of [ petitioners’| organi.

zations poised to circumvent the MSA’s prohibitions

against joint activities or participation in an enter-

prise.”).

Moreover, as further “evidence of the MSA’s failures

and pitfalls, the district court noted that despite the

MSA [petitioners] still fraudulently denied the dangers

of secondhand smoke, marketed ‘low tar’ cigarettes as

a healthier alternative to quitting, and falsely denied

manipulating nicotine delivery and marketing to youth.”

Pet. App. 66a; see also zd. at 1873a-1877a (summarizing

additional MSA violations by petitioners); 7d. at 2044a

(“| Petitioners] continue to make affirmative statements

on smoking and health issues that are fraudulent.”).

Petitioners offered “no rebuttal” to these factual find-

ings. /d. at 66a.

Additionally, the MSA does not include core compo-

nents of the injunctive relief ordered in this case. See

Pet. App. 1884a (MSA does not enjoin against future

RICO violations, regulate “‘light’ and ‘low tar’” descrip-

tors, require corrective statements, or fund smoking

cessation programs. ).

Finally, the States “could not be relied upon to ‘vigor-

ously’ enforce the MSA,” Pet. App. at 66a (citation omit-

ted); some provisions of the MSA had either expired at

the time of the district court’s order or were on the cusp

of expiring, cbzd.; and BATCo and Altria were not even

parties to the MSA, zbid.; see id. at 1879a. The MSA is

no substitute for the injunction ordered in this case, and

it certainly did not deprive the district court of “juris-

diction” to enter injunctive relief.

2. Shortly after the panel decision was issued, Con-

gress enacted the FSPTCA, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 1238

Stat. 1776. Congress specifically cited the district

court’s findings in this case in its own legislative find-

ings, see § 2(47)-(49), 1238 Stat. 1781, and instructed that

“(njothing” in the new Act “shall be construed to * *

affect any action pending in Federal, State, or tribal!

court,” § 4(a), 123 Stat. 1782. Nonetheless, several peti-

tioners filed a Suggestion Of Mootness And Motion For

Partial Vacatur (“Suggestion Of Mootness”) in the court

of appeals, arguing that the new law rendered aspects of

the injunction “moot.” The government opposed the

motion, explaining that the legislation was not co-exten-

sive with the injunction in this case and arguing that any

request to modify the injunction should be presented to

the district court in the first instance. The panel denied

the Suggestion Of Mootness. See PM Pet. 1. The court

of appeals also denied Philip Morris’s petition for re-

hearing en banc, which made a similar argument. See

Pet. App. 2183a.

Review of the court of appeals’ summary rejection of

petitioners’ claims regarding the new legislation is not

warranted. See PM Pet. 29-31; Lorillard Pet. 31-32.

Petitioners can assert their claim that the injunction in

this case should be modified in light of the new law in

the district court, which is the appropriate forum to con-

sider it in the first instance. See Horne v. Flores, 129 S.

Ct. 2579, 2593 (2009) (party subject to an injunction may

seek relief from the district court in light of changed

circumstances). In particular, that court is better situ-

ated to evaluate petitioners’ factual contention that the

new legislation renders it unlikely that they “will engage

in future joint racketeering activity of the type the dis-

trict court found and on which it premised its forward-

looking injunctive relief.” PM Pet. 30. The district

court’s disposition of such a request would then be

ony

reviewable in the court of appeals and, if necessary, i

this Court. Review now is premature.

Allowing the district court to evaluate this contention

in the regular course is especially appropriate in light of

the fact that petitioners Reynolds and Lorillard, as well

as other plaintiffs, have brought a First Amendment

challenge to the FSPTCA. See Commonwealth Brands,

Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky.

2010), appeal pending, Nos. 10-5234 and 10-5235 (6th

Cir. filed Mar. 9, 2010). Petitioners cannot establish

that the new law “dispels any doubt” about whether they

will engage in future racketeering, PM Pet. 30, while

two of them are simultaneously attempting to invalidate

the legislation."

Nor is there any merit to Philip Morris’s cursory

suggestion that the new legislation renders this case

moot. PM Pet. 30-31. That very contention was re-

jected by Congress in the text of the Act itself. § 4(a),

123 Stat. 1782. In an attempt to alter the meaning of

this text, Philip Morris points to some of the legislation’s

provisions that address topics also covered by the in

junction, but it does not and cannot claim that the new

law wholly duplicates the district court’s injunction. For

example, the Act does not purport to provide tailored

remedies for decades of fraud, such as the corrective

statements ordered by the district court. Nor does it

provide any redress for the harm to the millions of vic-

Lims of petitioners’ scheme who, as petitioners intended,

© Philip Morris argues in the alternative that this Court should grant

vacate, and remand to allow the court of appeals to consider its argu-

ment regarding the impact of the new legislation. I'M Pet. 28,31. But

the court of appeals has already considered the impact of the new leg

lation, denying petitioners’ Suggestion Of Mootness and petitions for

rehearing en bance, so a GVR would not be appropriate

oJ

continue to purchase cigarettes because they have be-

come chemically dependent on nicotine. See Gov't Pet.

t 29-31, United States v. Philip Morris USA, Ine., No.

09-978 (filed Dec. 10, 2009).

KF. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Upheld The Injunction

Prohibiting Specified Conduct And Requiring Correc-

tive Statements

1. The district court enjoined petitioners from “com-

mitting any act of racketeering, as defined in 18 U.

§ 1961(1), relating in any way to the wenchach a ukeren

marketing, promotion, health consequences, or sale of

cigarettes in the United States,” Pet. App. 2069a, and

from “making, or causing to be made in any way, any

materia! false, misleading, or deceptive statement or

representation, or engaging in any public relations or

marketing endeavor that is disseminated to the United

States publie and that misrepresents or suppresses in-

formation concerning cigarettes,” id. at 2070a. Petition-

ers contend that these provisions are too vague to sat-

isfy Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). PM Pet. 31-34; Lorillard Pet.

That claim, which involves application of settled law

to the particular circumstances of this case, does not

warrant this Court’s review and is meritless in any

event.

RICO specifically authorizes district courts to “pro-

hibit{] any person from engaging in the same type of

endeavor as the enterprise engaged in,” 18 U.S.C.

1964(a), and that is precisely what the district court did

in this ease. This is not. a case in which the district court

“enjoin[ed] all future illegal conduct of the defendant”

or even all future violations of RICO “however unrelated

to the violation found by the court.” Zenith Radio

Corp., 395 U.S. at 133. Instead, the court exercised its

5 ds

well-established equitable authority to enjoin petition-

ers “from committing other related unlawful acts.” /bzd.

In doing so, there was no requirement “that all of the

untraveled roads to that end be left open and that only

the worn one be closed.” Jbid. As the district court ex-

plained, “Rule 65(d) does not require the [dlistrict

(cjourt to ‘predict exactly what [petitioners] will think of

next,” especially since “it would be impossible to foresee

what the ingenuity and creativity of [petitioners’] cadres

of sophisticated lawyers could ‘think of next.’” United

States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 477 F. Supp. 2d 191,

196 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting S.C. Johnson & Son, Ine. v.

Clorox Co., 241 F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2001)).

The eases that Philip Morris cites (Pet. 32-33) are

inapposite. In Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States,

323 U.S. 386 (1945), this Court held that an order pro-

hibiting acts “as charged in the complaint” was imper

missible under Rule 65(d), which bars courts from de-

seribing the acts enjoined “by referring to the com-

plaint.” Jd. at 410; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1)(C). In

International Longshoremen’s Ass'n v. Philadelphia

Marine Trade Ass’n, 389 U.S. 64 (1967), the Court va

eated an injunction purporting “to enforce an arbitra-

tor’s award” where that award “contain[ed] only an ab-

stract conclusion of law, not an operative command ¢a-

pable of ‘enforcement.’” /d. at 74. Here, the district

court order did not refer to the complaint or direct the

“enforeement” of abstract conclusions of law. And it

“specified the matters about which [petitioners] are to

avoid making false statements or committing racketeer-

ing acts: the manufacturing, marketing, promotion,

health consequences, and sale of cigarettes, along with

related issues that [petitioners] have reason to Know are

of concern to cigarette consumers.” Pet. App. 73a-74a

The court of appeals concluded that the injunction

‘sufficiently specif]ied] the activities enjoined as to pro-

vide [petitioners | with fair notice of the prohibited con-

duct,” given that the district court “did not abstractly

enjoin | petitioners] from violating RICO or making false

statements, but instead specified the matters about

which [petitioners] are to avoid making false statements

or committing racketeering acts.” Pet. App. 73a-74a.

The court of appeals went on to observe that separate

and apart from the clear terms of the injunction itself,

“the context of the district court’s legal conclusions and

4,088 findings of fact about fraud in the manufacture,

promotion, and sale of cigarettes” provided yet more

clarity. /d. at 74a. Petitioners argue that this observa-

tion by the court of appeals “squarely contravenel(d|

Rule 65(d)” by referring to the findings of fact. PM Pet.

33; see Fed. KR. Civ. P. 65(d)C1 (CC) (‘Every order grant

ing an injunction * * * must * * * describe in rea-

sonable detail—and not by referring to the complaint or

other document—the act or acts restrained or re-

quired.”). An appellate opinion cannot “contravene{ }”

this rule (PM Pet. 33), for it is not an “order granting an

injunction,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(1). The district court’s

injunction order did not rely on the findings of fact to

provide specificity or otherwise violate Rule 65(d).

At bottom, petitioners’ objection is not that the in-

junction is unclear, but that it happens to be broad. But

tule 65(d) limits vague injunctions, not comprehensive

ones, and this Court has stressed that broad decrees

prohibiting future violations of a statute are “wholly

warranted” “where a proclivity for unlawful conduct has

been shown.” McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336

U.S. 187, 192 (1949) (coneluding that an order “enjoin-

[ing] any practices which were violations of th/e] statu-

-

60

tory provisions” was justified by the defendant’s “record

of continuing and persistent violations”). That is exactly

what the record established here. Pet. App. 74a (citing

McComb, 336 U.S. at 192).

2. The district court also ordered petitioners to pub-

lish corrective statements on their websites, as a one-

time full-page advertisement in thirty-five major news-

papers, and in ten advertisements on a major television

network over the course of one year. Pet. App. 83a.

“The court chose these media in order to ‘structure a

remedy which uses the same vehicles which | petitioners]

have themselves historically used to promulgate false

smoking and health messages.” /bid.; see also id. at

2047a-2048a. The district court found such statements

appropriate to counteract decades of false and mislead-

ing statements by petitioners concerning the health ef-

fects of smoking and nicotine addiction, commercial

speech that even at the time of the court’s order

“continue[d] to omit material information or present

information in a misleading and incomplete fashion.” /d.

at 2043a; see id. at 86a (all such statements were “at-

tempts to persuade the public to purchase cigarettes”).

The court of appeals properly concluded that against the

hackground of petitioners’ false and fraudulent state-

ments to consumers about their products over 50 years,

the publication of appropriate corrective statements

addressing petitioners’ false assertions in the same me-

dia petitioners themselves have used is a suitable means

of preventing petitioners from continuing to deceive

their customers. /d. at $3a-89a.

The court of appeals affirmed this aspect of the dis

trict court’s order only in the abstract, however, noting

that the content of the corrective statements has not yet

been determined. See Pet. App. 88a. Indeed, the dis-

ty]

trict court said it would determine the content of the

corrective statements based on submissions by both the

lTnited States and petitioners, id. at 204%a-2049a, so

petitioners themselves will have an opportunity to shape

the statements. Accordingly, review of the corrective

statements requirement by this Court at this time, as

petitioner Reynolds urges (Pet. 34-56), would be prema-

ture.

The court of appeals cautioned the district court that

the statements must be “carefully phrased so they do

not impermissibly chill protected speech.” . Pet. App.

88a. “Consequently, the court must confine the state

ments to ‘purely factual and uncontroversial informa-

tion,’ gearcd towards thwarting prospective efforts by

[petitioners] to either directly mislead consumers or

capitalize on their prior deceptions by continuing to ad-

vertise in a manner that builds on consumers’ existing

misperceptions.” /bid. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of

Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct., 471 U.S. 626, 651

(1985)).. The court of appeals coneluded that “/a]ssum-

ing the corrective advertising once drafted meets these

requirements, itis a permissible restraint on | petition-

ers’| commercial speech.” /d. at 89a (emphasis added).

This Court could not meaningfully evaluate petitioner

Reynolds’ claim that the corrective statements will vio-

late the First Amendment and RICO without knowing

what the corrective statements are.

Reynolds erroneously contends (Pet. 35) that the

court of appeals’ affirmance of a corrective statement

obligation in the abstract conflicts with National Com-

mission on Egg Nutrition v. FTC, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir.

1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978). In that decep-

tive advertising case, the Seventh Circuit modified an

FTC order requiring corrective statements on the ex-

62

press ground that the case did not involve “a long his

tory of deception” that had “permeated the consumer

mind.” /d. at 164. That is precisely what the district

court found here. See Pet. App. 2047a-2048a. Indeed,

the Seventh Circuit contrasted the record before it with

the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Warner-Lambert Co. v.

FTC, 562 F.2d 749 (1977), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 9450

(1973), which sustained a corrective advertising require

ment as a remedy for decades of false advertising. See

id. at 769 (upholding corrective statements because,

after fiftv years of false claims, “advertising which fails

to rebut the prior claims * * * inevitably builds upon

those claims; continued advertising continues the decep-

tion, albeit implicitly rather than explicitly”). Likewise

here, the pancl explained, petitioners “violated RICO by

making false and fraudulent statements to consumers

about their products” for “over fifty years.” Pet. App.

Sd.

G. The Court Of Appeals Correctly Rejected BATCo’s

Claim That This Case Involves An Extraterritorial Ap-

plication Of RICO

BATCo contends that the deciston below conflicts

with decisions of other courts of appeals holding that

KICO does not apply to conduct oecurring outside the

United States merely because it has “effects” in the

United States. 09-980 Pet. (BATCo Pet.) 10. This case,

however, does not provide any occasion for resolving the

asserted conflict. In addition to engaging in overseas

conduct with effects in the United States, BATCo en-

gaged in extensive conduct within the United States,

and it also conspired with U.S.-based petitioners.

BATCo may therefore be held liable for violations of

RICO’s substantive and conspiracy provisions without

regard to any foreign conduct, and this case does not

involve extraterritorial liability under the test used by

any of the courts of appeals. In any event, the cases

giving rise to the asserted conflict involved private civil

RICO damages actions, in which the plaintiffs were re-

quired to show that the defendants’ actions had proxi-

mately caused their injuries. Those decisions are not

relevant to this case, which arises from an action by the

United States for equitable relief under Section

1964(a)—a provision that does not impose a proxi

mate-causation requirement.

1. The premise of BATCo’s petition is that its liabil-

ity rests on “wholly foreign conduct.” Pet. i; see zd. at

13 (arguing that “this Court has long treated laws as

having extraterritorial reach if they apply to conduct

that occurs in a foretgn country”). That is incorrect.

BATCo is liable under RICO’s substantive provision

because it used the interstate mails and wires—and en-

gaged in other conduct within the United States—in

furtherance of a scheme that was aimed at defrauding

American consumers. Such an application of RICO pre-

sents no issue of extraterritoriality. See Pusquuntino v.

United States, 544 U.S. 349, 371 (2005) (application of

the wire-fraud statute did not have extraterritorial ef-

fect where defendants “used U.S. interstate wires to

execute a scheme to defraud a foreign sovereign of tax

revenue”); Environmental Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey,

986 F.2d 528, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“Even where the sig-

nificant effects of the regulated conduct are felt outside

U.S. borders, the statute itself does not present a prob-

lem of extraterritoriality, so long as the conduct which

Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely within the

LInited States.”); Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 479-480

2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1005 (1991); Republic of

4

the Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1358-1359 (9th

Cir 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (1989).

This Court has explained that “|[mlJail fraud * * *

occurs whenever a person, ‘having devised or intending

to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,’ uses the

mail ‘for the purpose of executing such scheme or arti-

fice or attempting so to do.’” Bridge v. Phoenix Bond &

Indem. Co., 128 8. Ct. 2151, 2138 (2008) (quoting 18

U.S.C. 1341). “{T]he indictable act under § 1341 is not

the fraudulent misrepresentation, but rather the use of

the mails with the purpose of executing or attempting to

execute a scheme to defraud.” Jd. at 2140; see Pas-

guantino, 544 U.S. at 355 n.2 (noting that the Court has

adopted a parallel construction of the identical language

of the wire-fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1343). Thus, in Pas

quantino, this Court rejected the argument that the

application of the wire-fraud statute to a scheme to de-

fraud the Government of Canada of liquor-tax revenues

gave the statute extraterritorial effect, emphasizing that

the defendants In that case “used U.S. interstate wires

to execute a scheme to defraud.” 544 U.S. at 371. Be-

cause the defendants’ “offense was complete the mo-

ment they executed a scheme inside the United States,”

the Court explained, the “domestic element of [their]

conduct is what the Government is punishing.” /bid

Like the offenses in Pasquantino, BATCo’s predi

cate offenses were consummated when it used the

United States mails and wires in furtherance of petition-

ers’ fraudulent scheme. See, e.g., Pet. App. 1851a-1852a

(describing BATCo’s practice of delivering sensitive

research reports to petitioners in the United States by

sending unmarked envelopes to an attorney in Ken-

tucky); 7d. at 591a-592a (BATCo sent report document-

ing the phenomenon of nicotine compensation to B&W

_-

65

in the United States); id. at 690a (BATCo sent research

on the physiological effects of nicotine to B&W in the

United States); see also id. at 2145a. Indeed, before

trial, BATCo stipulated that it had used the U.S. mails

and wires as alleged by the government in eleven sepa-

rate instances, including mailings to BATCo’s United

States affiliate B&W. See BATCo Pet. 3 n.3 (describing

BATCo’s affiliation with B&W); Gov’t Exh. 86,700, 91 1

(stipulating that the documents identified in Racketeer-

ing Acts 11, 30, 50, 51, 53, 54, 57, 60, and 63 were “trans-

mitted via U.S. mails as that term is used in 18 U.S.C.

§ 1341” and that “[a]ll requirements for mailing pursu-

ant to 18 U.S.C. § 1341 have been satisfied with respect

to” those mailings); 7d. 11 2-3 (similar stipulation for

wire-fraud offenses). BATCo’s various claims (Pet. 5

n.4) that its mailings were “unpublished,” were not “di-

rected at U.S. consumers,” and did not “describe[] state-

ments or conduct by BATCo in the United States” are

irrelevant under the mail-fraud statute, which prohibits

any use of the mails in furtherance of a scheme to de-

fraud.. See Bridge, 128 S. Ct. at 21388. In light of its

stipulations, BATCo cannot now contend (Pet. 31) that

its liability rests on “wholly foreign conduct.”

Moreover, BATCo’s domestic conduct in furtherance

of the U.S.-based scheme to defraud extended well be-

yond its use of the mails and wires: the district court

also documented BATCo’s direct and extensive partici-

pation in petitioners’ enterprise in the United States.

For example, BATCo was the organizer of a nicotine

pharmacology conference for petitioners in South

Carolina. Pet. App. 848a-849a. Its representatives at-

tended T'l’s “College of Tobacco Knowledge” for train-

ing in the enterprise’s coordinated public-relations mes-

sages. /d. at 221la-222a. They also attended meetings in

66

the United States of the joint industry groups that were

used to coordinate the affairs of the enterprise. See,

e.g., 7d. at 326a-327a (ICOSI meeting in Kansas City,

Missouri); 7d. at 332a-33838a (INFOTAB meeting in

Washington, D.C.). BATCo maintained “frequent and

direct” contacts with “high level smoking and health

research scientists” at the U.S.-based TI Research Com

mittee and the CTR, including frequent visits to the

United States by BATCo scientists and executives. /d.

at 138a-139a. BA'T'Co operated an experimental tobacco

farm in North Carolina for producing tobacco that was

genetically engineered to yield extra nicotine. /d. at

788a. And BATCo sold millions of cigarettes in the

United States through a marketing agreement with a

Reynolds subsidiary. /d. at 2022a n.&83.

In sum, even without the actions taken by BATCo

abroad in furtherance of the scheme to defraud United

States consumers, there was ample evidence to support

$ATCo’s hability under RICO. Although the court of

appeals had no occasion to discuss BATCo’s conduct

within the United States, the government argued that

BATCo’s liability could be sustained on that basis, see

Gov’t C.A. Br. 175-177, and it would provide an alterna-

tive ground for affirming the judgment below.

2. In addition to violating RICO’s substantive provi-

sions, BATCo also engaged in a RICO conspiracy, in

violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d). Pet. App. 1991a-2002a.

Under RICO, a conspirator is liable for the acts of its co

conspirators undertaken in furtherance of the conspir

acy, Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997),

and it is well established that a co-conspirator outside

the United States may be held liable for substantive

offenses committed in furtherance of a conspiracy by

conspirators inside the United States. See, e.g., Ford v.

67

United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619-624 (1927) (defendants

whose conspiratorial activity occurred outside the

United States were liable for conspiracy to violate

United States law because of conduct of other conspira-

tors within the United States); accord United States v.

Inco Bank & Trust Corp., 845 F.2d 919, 920 (11th Ci

1988) (“It is well settled that the government has the

power to prosecute every member of a conspiracy that

takes place in United States territory, even those con-

spirators who never entered the United States.”);

United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 982 (Sth Cir.),

cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975). Since there is no dis-

pute that the conduct of BATCo’s co-conspirators oc

curred in the United States, that principle—which

KATCo does not address—provides an independent ba

sis for the decision below.

3. The court of appeals based its decision on the

“substantial domestic effects” of BATCo’s overseas con-

duct. Pet. App. 58a. As the court correctly explained,

“(blecause conduct with substantial domestic effects

implicates a state’s legitimate interest in protecting its

citizens within its borders, Congress’s regulation of for-

eign conduct meeting this ‘effects’ test is ‘not an extra-

territorial assertion of jurisdiction.’” /bird. (quoting

Laker Airways Lid. v. Sabena, Belgian World Avrlines,

731 F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984))."" Aceording to

-

Phe evidence amply supported the conclusion that BATCo’s foreign

conduct was intended to cause, and did cause, substantial effects in the

linited States. KATCo was a founding member of ICOSI—a joint or

ganization used, in the words of an internal BATCo document, to

“throw[] up a smoke screen and to throw doubt on smoking researct

findings which show smoke causes diseases.” Pet. App. 1624a. BATC

iso founded or participate {in other joint entities and covert pera

tions” that petitioners used to further the goals of the enterprise

6S

BATCo, the court’s analysis conflicts with decisions of

other courts of appeals that have held that domestic ef-

fects of foreign conduct are insufficient to establish

RICO liability. For the reasons explained above, this

case does not implicate that asserted conflict because

BATCo’s domestic conduct—and its conspiracy with the

domestic cigarette manufacturers—provide independent

grounds for liability, and that lability is not extraterri-

torial under the test used by any court of appeals.

In any event, BATCo’s suggestion of a conflict is in-

correct. BATCo’s argument rests in part (Pet. 12, 20,

30) on several decisions addressing the extraterritorial

effect of various statutes other than RICO. As BATCo

admits (Pet. 34), however, “RICO is quite different”

from those statutes, and therefore those decisions shed

little light on whether, or under what circumstances,

Congress intended RICO to apply to conduct abroad

that has substantial effects in the United States.

As to the few cases that did involve RICO, all of them

arose from the very different context of private actions

under Section 1964(c), which allows a plaintiff to recover

damages caused “by reason of” a RICO violation. The

“by reason of” language requires the plaintiff to prove

United States. See, e.g., id. at 1620a (“Operation Berkshire”); id. at

1627a (INFOTAB); zd. at 1634a-1635a (“Operation Downunder”); 2d. at

1660a (International ETS Management Committee); zd. at 1693a (Asso-

ciation for Research on Indoor Air); 7d. at 1695a-1696a (LAI). BATCo

collaborated with other petitioners to craft and enforce a unified mes-

sage on matters of smoking and health, with a particular eye toward the

consequences in the United States. See id. at 300a, 302a-303a, 3054,

307a-308a, 31 la-315a, 317a, 319a, 343a, 570a-571a, 1620a, 1625a-162b6a.

Thus, the Tl praised INF OTAB, of which BATCo was a founding mem-

ber, as critical in protecting the industry’s position in the United States

from the “powerful[]” “back-wash” of anti-smoking developments in

other countries. /d. at 343a (citation omitted); 7d. at 60a

69

that the RICO violation was the proximate cause of in-

jury to the plaintiff's business or property. See bridge,

128 S. Ct. at 2141. In one case cited by BATCo, the

Ninth Circuit held that RICO did not reach the defen-

dants’ overseas conduct because there was no evidence

that it had “‘directly caused’ loss or injury in the United

States” to any of the plaintiffs’ businesses or property.

Doe lv. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 961-962 (2002), va-

eated, 395 F.3d 978 (2003). In another, the Eleventh

Circuit held that RICO did not reach the defendant’s

foreign conduct under the “effects” test because “[nJo

United States person or business [was] harmed by this

scheme,” although the court went on to hold that liabil-

ity could be based on the “[s]ignificant amounts of con-

duct” that took place in the United States. Liquidation

Comm'n of Banco Intercontinental v. Renta, 5380 F.3d

1339, 1352 (2008).~"

Unlike the cases cited by BATCo, this ease involves

a suit by the United States under Section 1964(a) “to

prevent and restrain” RICO violations. See 18 U.S.C

1964(b) (authorizing the Attorney General to bring such

proceedings). It does not require that the violation have

proximately eaused injury, or even that it have caused

any injury at all. Moreover, a mail or wire fraud viola-

tion may occur whether or not the scheme to defraud

succeeded in harming any intended victim. See Bridge,

128 8. Ct. at 2137-2141; Durland v. United States, 161

U.S. 306, 315 (1896). Thus, principles of causation artic-

ulated in Section 1964(c) cases are not applicable to

BATCo aiso relies (Pet. 17-18) on North South Finance Corp. v. Al-

Turki, 100 F.3d 1046 (2d Cir. 1996), but, as it acknowledges (Pet. 18),

the court in that case expressly declined to consider whether a civil

RICO damages action may be based on foreign conduct with substantial

effects in the United States. See North S. Fin. Corp., 100 F.3d at 1052.

7

cases arising under Section 1964(a). BATCo does not

argue that there is any circuit conflict on the proper

standard for the application of RICO in the context of

Section 1964(a) to conduct abroad, and in light of the

extensive evidence of BATCo’s domestic conduct, this

case presents no occasion for addressing that issue.

Moreover, because the conduct at issue here had “a sub

stantial, direct, and foreseeable effect within the United

States,” Pet. App. 59a, BATCo has not shown that any

other court of appeals would have decided this case dif

ferently even under the standards applicable to Section

7

1964(c).

H. The Court of Appeals Correctly Concluded That Altria

Acted With Intent To Defraud

Altria contends that there was insufficient evidence

to show that its executives acted with intent to defraud.

That fact-intensive question, which was resolved against

Altria by both lower courts, see Pet. App. 55a-57a; id. at

2005a-2007a, does not warrant this Court’s review. In

any event, the evidence established that Altria’s execu-

tives were active participants in the enterprise.

For example, Altria directed and funded CTR “spe

cial projects,” which were research projects on topics

selected by petitioners’ lawyers and designed to gener-

ate ostensibly independent results that were used to

support petitioners’ false public statements. Pet. App

7a; see, €.g., 7d. at 25a (letter from Altria vice-president

transmitting check to cover Altria’s contribution to CTR

special project); id. at 356a; see generally zd. at 9a, 240a-

258a. Altria executives participated in meetings of the

TI’s board of directors and its Executive Committee,

which had final approval authority on all Tl matters. /d

at 183a-184a, 350a. Altria participated on TI’s Commit-

71

tee of Counsel and hosted several meetings of that com-

mittee at its corporate headquarters in New York. /d.

at 210a-2lla. Altria organized and hosted petitioners’

“Operation Downunder” conference, where petitioners

devised their strategy for denying the health risks posed

by second-hand smoke. /d. at 1629a-1635a. And Altria

issued a joint statement on behalf of petitioners denying

the addictiveness of nicotine. /d. at 634a.

Altria does not address the many findings by the

district court demonstrating its active participation in

the enterprise. Instead, it contends that there was no

proof that its mailings were sent with intent to defraud.

09-979 Pet. (Altria Pet.) 3-7. As the court of appeals

explained, this objection misunderstands the governing

law. “Nothing in the mail fraud statute requires a mail-

ing to be fraudulent at all, as long as the mailing is in

furtherance of a fraudulent scheme.” Pet. App. 56a; see

Bridge, 1288S. Ct. at °138. In light of the factual find-

ings establishing Altria’s participation in the enterprise,

the district court did not clearly err in further finding

that Altria’s executives acted with specific intent to de-

fraud. Pet. App. 57a. Altria joined the scheme to de-

fraud; its executives acted with specifie intent in doing

so; and Altria’s lawyers used the mails to further that

scheme.*' No more was required to establish Altria’s

liability for mail fraud.

Altria also fails to challenge the district court’s addi-

tional conciusion that Altria violated RICO’s conspiracy

Although Altria stresses (Pet. 3) that. the mailings were all cease

and-desist letters written by in-house counsel, there is no question that

they were in furtherance of petitioners’ scheme to defraud. Altria sent

the letters to suppress publication of data that would have revealed

petitioners’ intimate internal understanding of the physiological! effects

of nicotine. See Pet. App. 680a-68 1a.

provision. See Pet. App. 57a. “The district court’s find-

ings of fact regarding Altria’s actions in furtherance of

the goals of the enterprise|,] * * * as well as the volu-

minous findings of concerted action and explicit agree-

ment by [petitioners], amply support the circumstantial

inference that Altria conspired with the other [petition-

ers] to violate RICO.” Jbid; see Salinas, 522 U.S. at 66

(finding RICO conspiracy where defendant “knew about

and agreed to facilitate the scheme”). Altria’s liability

for the RICO conspiracy provides an independent basis

for subjecting Altria to the remedia! order. See 2d. at

63-64 (each member of RICO conspiracy “is responsible

for the acts of each other” (citing Pinkerton v. United

States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946)).

CONCLUSION

The petitions for a writ of certiorari should be de

nied.

tespectfully submitted.

NEAL KEiMAR KATYAI

Acting Soli thor Geite rahi

TONY WEST

Assistant Attorney General

MARK B. SFERN

ALISA B. KLEIN

MARK R. FREEMAN

GREGORY C.J. LISA

(llorneus

MAY 2010

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 06-5267

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,

AND TOBACCO-FREE KIDS ACTION FUND, ET AI

INTERVENORS

PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC. F/K/A PHILIP MORRIS, IN«

ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS

Tues. Oct. 14, 2008

APPEARANCES:

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS:

MICHAEL A. CARVIN, ESQ

MIGUEL A. ESTRADA, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLEES:

MARK B. STERN, Esq. (DO.J)

ON BEHALF OF THE INTERVENORS:

IIOWARD C. CRYSTAL, ESQ.

Before: Chief Judge SENTELLE and Circuit Judge

TATEL and BROWN

(la)

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MIGUEL A. ESTRADA, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MR. ESTRADA: Thank you, Your Honor. And may

it please the Court. My name is Miguel Estrada. I’m

counsel for Philip Morris USA, and I, and | will speak

on behalf of all defendants to the lights issue, the future

violations issue, and the remedies issue.

Let me start with the lights. The government’s posi-

tion in this case is that it is perfectly lawful for the [26]

defendants to tell a consumer that a pack of cigarettes

has per cigarette 16 milligrams of tar under the F'T'C

measure, and that another pack has 11 milligrams of tar,

but that it is criminal fraud to tell the consumer that 11

is lower than 16. To call this position incomprehensible,

as Judge Alito did in the argument last week, doesn’t

quite do it justice. It is now the case, and it has never

been the case, that the use of descriptors is fraudulent

or even false because they correctly characterize the

outcomes of the FTC-authorized tests since 1966.

Now the government's theory in the case, and which

Judge Kessler accepted, is entirely this. This would not

be fraud. This would not be false but for compensation.

Because of the fact that a consumer may puff more

deeply or smoke more cigarettes, this has now become

fraud. Now this was—

JUDGE TATEL: Well isn't her, isn’t her reason for

that that the, that the companies knew that? When, in

other words, when they said, when they say that it’s a

low-tar cigarette, they knew, based on their own re-

search, that in fact it wasn’t because of compensatory

smoking?

2s

Pa

MR. ESTRADA: I did not hear the first part of the

question.

JUDGE TATEL: Oh, l’m sorry. Is this better? My

question was, didn’t the, didn’t the District court say

that extractly, the phrase low-tar is not inaccurate, but

that [27] based on the company’s own research about

compensatory smoking that they knew that in facet they

weren't low-tar because of the way smokers compen

sate?

MR. ESTRADA: See but—

JUDGE TATEL: That’s her theory, right?

MR. ESTRADA: Yes. And that’s exactly right.

JUDGE TATEL: Yes.

MR. ESTRADA: At finding, I believe, 2068, she ex-

plains that the way consumers compensate is by puffing

more deeply on the one hand or smoking more ciga-

rettes.

JUDGE TATEL: Right. And the eompanies—

JUDGE SENTELLE: (Indiscernible.)

JUDGE TATEL: Yes, and the companies knew that

based on their own research.

MR. ESTRADA: Everybody knew it, Judge Tatel.

That's, that’s the problem.

JUDGE TATEL: Well but the point is, the point is

in terms of whether it’s fraudulent or not

MR. ESTRADA: Well but

JUDGE TATEL: —if the companies knew it—

MR. ESTRADA: hut on that. we ean goto the re

A

cord. I mean, on the one hand, just as a matter of law,

4a

it is unreasonable to say that a consumer could think

that, that he would get the prescribed amount solely on

the basis of, of smoking more units of the product. And

the fact is, in 1966, [28] and this is in the record, when

the FTC was conducting hearings on this issue, the com-

panies did tell the FTC that a smoker might be com-

pelled to get his nicotine fix by smoking more, and that’s

Joint Exhibit 47, 48—

JUDGE TATEL: Right.

MR. ESTRADA: —at page 131. This was known in

1966. Now on whether consumers would puff more

deeply, the issue has been sort of speak, ventilated ad

nauseam in this courthouse. The Brown d& Williamson

liigation came here in 1983. You may recall that the

whole issue in the litigation was compensation. And

both the FTC, Judge Cazelle (phonetic sp.) and this

Court were fully aware that compensation was going on

and that there were two types of it. You could smoke

more or take deeper puffs. And the FTC, Judge Cazelle

and this Court all said, it is irrelevant because every-

body has known from 1966 that the point of the system

is to tell the consumer how much tar they would get

compared to another cigarette if they smoked the two

cigarettes in the same way. It was never from the get-

go any sort of a claim, by the agency mind you, that, that

this was, that any of these numbers had any bearing on

the amount of tar or nicotine that a, that a consumer

would get.

JUDGE TATEL: Is there, is there a difference in

your, is there a difference between, I, I think your point

about low tar. Your point there is that low tar reflects

the [29] actual numbers, right? Low tar identifies cipa-

rettes that in fact have low tar, correct?

MR. ESTRADA: Yes.

JUDGE TATEL: But what about, what about the

phrases like, like light? And I ask that because of the

District court. The District court has this finding. She

says, there are lights of certain brands with higher tar

levels than regulars of other brands from the same com-

pany. And there are also lights and regulars of the same

brand that have the same FTC tar rating. Now so what

she’s saying there is that these, that the labels, light, are

being used inconsistently, that they don’t always reflect

low tar.

MR. ESTRADA: Well [ think there—

JUDGE TATEL: Is that, by the way, you don’t chal-

lenge that fact finding, do it?

MR. ESTRADA: We haven't challenged any fact—

JUDGE TATEL: Right.

MR. ESTRADA: —any fact finding, Judge Tatel.

JUDGE TATEL: Okay. So that, that’s a fact find-

ing

MR. ESTRADA: (indiscernible) arguments are

purely legal.

JUDGE TATEL: Yes.

MR. ESTRADA: The key point about something like

lights ts that there is, that no consumer gets the same

[30] message from hearing, lights.

JUDGE TATEL: No, but in terms of, you were say-

ing that the labels accurately describe

MR. ESTRADA: But they do, and that’s the point

ba

JUDGE TATEL: —the level. Let me, let me just

finish. You say the labels accurately describe the tar

level in the cigarettes, but here, you have a finding that

that’s not the case, that they are inaccurate.

MR. ESTRADA: Well, no. Whether they are accu-

rate or inaccurate I would think is a legal conclusion.

But in fact, the finding is—

JUDGE TATEL: Well! let me go back. I| thought

you said they’re just, they’re, they’re just true. They

are literally true.

MR. ESTRADA: They are true.

JUDGE TATEL: That’s your argument.

MR. ESTRADA: They’re literally true. They’re

actually true.

JUDGE TATEL: But, but here, here you have a

finding. Here you have a finding that you haven’t chal-

lenged which suggests that’s not the case.

MR. ESTRADA: Well because what, what is going

on with lights as opposed to low tars, that lights are a

particular kind of low-tar cigarette. And what lights do

accurately describe is that they are, that they have low-

er tar [31] than the regular pack of the small brand, and

also have, have also the meaning that—

JUDGE TATEL: Well actually, that’s inconsistent

with this finding.

MR. ESTRADA: I don’t believe so, because I don’t

believe she was making any findings as between brands.

But in any event, it also conveys a taste message. And

of course, look, we have a large, a dispute in the District

court on the question of whether, whether the defen-

fd

dants intended a health message or a taste message.

Our position is that we intended a taste message * * *

*

i118]

ORAL ARGUMENT OF MIGUEL A. ESTRADA, ESQ.

ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

MR. ESTRADA: Thank you, Your Honor. I have

some quick points.

I don’t want to be misquoted as having said that I

agree with the fact findings of the distriet court. What

I said is, we’re bringing legal chalienges to the court.

Obviously, we disagree with a lot of what Judge Kessler

had to say, and just because she calls something a find-

ing also does not make it a finding. As you know, the

Supreme Court said in Pullman Standard v. Swint, you

have (indiscernible) of law and fact, and if you have

made a legal error in your approach to the facts, you

know, the judgment may be set aside on that basis.

Frankly, after you get a trial in which 60 years of

your conduct out on trial, and an appeal in which even

with [119] more pages, you cannot possibly address all

of that. It is the only thing that we could do to sort. of

bring the, the unfairness and the injustice of the whole,

of the whole process in front of the court, and to high-

light that this is the type of case that was tried purport-

edly under a federal criminal trial under circumstances

that never would have heen permitted if it were a crimi-

nal trial.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Opposition Brief — Philip Morris USA Inc. v. United States · 561 U.S. 1025 | Frix