Opposition Brief — Holmes v. Louisiana (No. 08-1358)

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Supreme Court. U.S.

(0 0. 08-1358 JUN 4 - 2003

OFFICE OF tre CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the Anited States

BRANDY AILEEN HOLMES,

Petitioner,

STATE OF LOUISIANA,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of Louisiana

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

CHARLES REX SCOTT

Counsel of Record

Caddo Parish District Attorney

CATHERINE M. ESTOPINAL

Assistant District Attorney

501 Texas Street

Shreveport, LA 71101

(318) 429-7618

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TAB, CP APTI ieee ose conscccecsesssncescoseccvanensve li

STATEMENT OF THE CABE..........c.scscccocsscssncesenavs

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ....................cccceesseees 9

FAR, ince dssinssten vicccces puaciudcinuainisiiniiamn sane 12

I. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL RE-

QUIREMENT THAT THE LOUISIANA

SUPREME COURT CONDUCT PROPOR-

TIONALITY REVIEW OF CAPITAL

I es:20h0sejasnxensxstonaeéseceisenn ieee aueemnencenne 12

Il. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT

CONDUCTED A THOROUGH PROPOR-

TAPE AURMGET MRTG TY vuncccvéncanscdevscvncovercaberine 19

CONCLUSION ....... ~anishaiiaeondeiseiseaaleninanicematiemen -aaeueles 28

APPENDIX

1. Sentence Review Memorandum filed by

the State Of LOUISiOGA ..... «00.5. -00s0scencceeceseeness App. 1

2. Sentence Review Memorandum filed by

petitioner Brandy A. Holmes...................... App. 77

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct.

RS SU BML BOO (ZOUZ) .........ccccccccrccccvevesereses 14

Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct.

Se Oe a Mn ed ED (1ST ).............c0cccccccsccceccsscsees 16

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ...... ee. 14

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909,

a 16

Narvaiz v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 688 (5th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 947, 118 S.Ct.

EE BODE oo. s.cscccccccsccccscnscesccccvecescsecess 26

Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988,

I EE © BED ccc ccccccccccscecccccccccscccscceses 11

Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct.

Beet, bbe be. 2a 720 (1991) ..................... 16, 17, 18

Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79

co, os iccscnscecoccesescnssccsosesccsecess 13, 19

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct.

CE EE) 14

South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109

a re. sce §, ee 2a 676 (1969)....................... 16

State v. Anderson, 2006-2987 (La. 9/9/08), 996

So.2d 973, rehearing denied, cert. denied, 129

es eeudbeeucdecevecveceeevens 15

State v. Cedric Edwards, 97-1797 (La. 7/2/99),

750 So.2d 893, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1026,

ES Se” Fy) 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

State v. Darrell Dewayne Draughn, 05-1825

(La. 01/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, rehearing de-

nied, 3/30/07, cert. denied, ___ ~U.S. ___, 128

OG. Ges, LOD Ei Be eT CT vievcnscvcetccciccesercsss 21

State v. Felton Dorsey, 1st J.D.C., Docket No.

BET OEE os cvidiece bicteid caSeatanies sce ccdanocnaece aaa eomeceaiad 21

State v. Holmes, 2006-2988 (La. 12/2/08), 5

So.3d 42, rehearing denied, 1/30/09................ passim

State v. John L. Donaldson, 391 So.2d 1182

OU RE io idissvedscavecdencnavdads ade: eevee eke ok eens 21

State v. Michael Cooks, 97-0999 (La. 9/9/98),

720 So.2d 637, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1042,

119 S.Ct. 1342, 143 L.Ed.2d 505, rehearing

denied, 526 U.S. 1128, 119 S.Ct. 1789, 148

Un Ue i a han ee 21

State v. Nathaniel Code, 627 So.2d 1373 (La.

1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct.

1873, 128 L.Ed.2d 490, rehearing denied, 512

U.S. 1248, 114 S.Ct. 2775, 129 L.Ed.2d 887 .......... 20

State v. Robert Coleman, reversed and re-

manded, 2006-518 (La. 11/02/07), 970 So.2d

511, rehearing denied, OV/07/08...............cccececseceeeee 20

Walker v. Georgia, 129 S.Ct. 453 (2008) .............. Ss. 34

Watson v. Blackburn, 756 F.2d 1055 (5th Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct.

2259, 90 L.Ed.2d 703, rehearing denied, 478

U.S. 1028, 106 S.Ct. 3341, 92 L.Ed.2d 749............ 15

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733,

77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983).............. Rei apei a-AaRe Ns 15, 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

LOUISIANA ACTS

Rh I Be H.W aise cao ides sinvks ccd somes vtendavessuckocacusbanuee 14

Ce Cos Si vcd cé'ccac ap ednseucekaeeechnaaeacenaceunes 15

LOUISIANA CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Ball, Scere PE ISIS Bc s.nv: ces casavenesccnnchaccestscensstunte 23

it, COR Pete is Ble vv nss's ness vusiacnoasansevavevendecssvas 22

Bal, GAO, PARI Tt Pisce scisececcovavcnccencsaseccsesseceseve 15

Bah. Fo ee Ce I bkcescntanccsceinecescsnsdvcsvieccecheedkeess 20

La. CrP Artaci® BOGS .........c0..cccccssevceseveses tésgiueeete’ 20

i ee I we kssakbcecoccinccachucsackccuvicessnguaconins 26

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

U.S. Constitution, Eighth Amendment ......... 19, 21, 28

LOUISIANA COURT RULE

Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 28 ...................... 26, 27

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Brandy Holmes and Robert Coleman entered the

Brandon home in rural Caddo Parish during the

evening hours of New Year’s Day 2003. After pushing

their way into the front door of the Brandon resi-

dence, Julian Brandon, a retired Baptist preacher,

was shot at near contact range under the chin with a

.380 caliber handgun. The projectile separated into

two pieces. One piece entered his brain, while the

other piece exited the top of his head and was later

recovered from the ceiling of the dining room adjacent

to the front entryway. Julian Brandon collapsed. (Vol.

25, p. 5354, Vol. 26, p. 5528, Vol. 27, pp. 5642, 5674-

5677, 5724-5733)

Mrs. Alice Brandon was taken to the rear bed-

room and made to lie down. Alice Brandon was inter-

rogated about her valuables and begged for her life. A

pillow was placed over Mrs. Brandon’s face, and she

was shot in the head and left for dead. (Vol. 25, p.

5350, Vol. 27, p. 5731) The attention of the intruders

was again focused on Reverend Brandon as they

observed him struggling with his wounds, and they

attacked Reverend Brandon a second time. At least

three separate Chicago Cutlery style knives from the

Brandon’s kitchen were used in this second attack.

Reverend Brandon received slashing cuts to his nose

and face in addition to stabbing wounds on the top

and rear of his head. The attack to the rear of

Reverend Brandon’s head was delivered with such

force that one of the knives shattered; that knife was

found in pieces at the scene. The offenders cut his

throat by multiple starting/stopping incisions starting

from the front right, across the front of his neck and

around to the back of his head. Reverend Brandon was

repeatedly stabbed in the upper chest with wounds

penetrating up to six inches, and was also stabbed in

the back where a six-inch knife was found imbedded

up to the handle. Reverend Brandon also had a large

contusion from blunt force trauma on his forehead.

(Vol. 25, pp. 5529-5534, Vol. 27, pp. 5734-5737)

Several days passed before the Brandons were

discovered. A family friend, who missed the Brandons

from regular phone contacts and attendance at

morning and evening Sunday services went to the

home and found the couple on January 5, 2003. (Vol.

25, p. 5345) Mrs. Brandon was still alive and was

transported by helicopter to the hospital. (Vol. 25, pp.

5363-5365) Mrs. Brandon lived in a severely impaired

state for almost six years as a result of the gunshot

wound to the head, dying in October of 2008. (Vol. 28,

pp. 5832-5838)

After the discovery of the crime scene, the Caddo

Sheriff’s Office investigation gained momentum with

a call from persons at a nearby apartment complex.

It was learned that shortly after New Year’s Day

Brandy Holmes was in a nearby apartment complex

trying to sell jewelry and making statements about

killing an old couple down the road by a church. (Vol.

25, pp. 5399-5400, 5405, Vol. 26, pp. 5480-5484)

Detectives went to the Holmes’ trailer, which was just

around the corner from the homicide scene, and con-

tacted Holmes, Coleman and other family members.

The group agreed to go to the detective office for

interviews. Coleman denied involvement but display-

ed a cut on his right hand. (Vol. 26, pp. 5424-5428,

5484-5486, Vol. 27, pp. 5564, 5660) Holmes made

several statements over the course of the next two

days that implicated her and others as being involved

in the homicide. (Vol. 26, pp. 5428-5433, 5504, 5508,

5516-5519, Vol. 27, pp. 5558-5561)

Holmes made at least six separate statements to

authorities that related to the Brandon homicide.

(Vol. 1, pp. 168-193, 250, Vol. 2, pp. 251-252, 363-461,

499, Vol. 3, pp. 508-522) In most of these statements,

Holmes implicated herself and others to varying de-

grees. Of the four interviews that were taped, Holmes

destroyed the one in which she unequivocally admit-

ted her role as the shooter and active participant in

all the events concerning both Reverend Brandon

and Mrs. Brandon. Holmes destroyed this tape by

sneaking it into the ladies’ room and flushing the

magnetic tape down the toilet, after substituting a

blank tape in the stack of taped statements that had

been left unsecured on a detective’s desk. Investi-

gators also noticed that after Holmes’ bathroom visit,

she was no longer wearing some of the jewelry they

had observed earlier. (Vol. 26, pp. 5510-5514)

In all but her first interview with detectives,

Holmes described various details of the homicide with

great precision. She admitted that she had stolen her

father’s .380 handgun while visiting him in Missis-

sippi. She repeatedly acknowledged her presence and

involvement in the attack on the Brandons, and on

numerous occasions acknowledged her willingness to

kill both Reverend and Mrs. Brandon. During her

taped statements to Caddo deputies, Brandy Holmes

admitted to bleaching her boots and burning her

jacket stained with blood from Reverend Brandon’s

neck wound.

During her contact with investigators Holmes

further revealed that on January 4, 2003, she took

two of her nephews to view the bodies of Reverend

Brandon and Mrs. Brandon. Her younger nephew

later corroborated Holmes’ account of this visit to the

scene of the murder. The older nephew did not enter

the residence, but Holmes’ nine-year-old nephew went

in with his aunt and saw Reverend Brandon lying

in a pool of blood, and also heard Mrs. Brandon

screaming from another room in the house. Holmes

and her nephews were seen going to the Brandon

residence together. The same witness observed the

nephews hurriedly leaving the Brandon residence

without their aunt. (Vol. 27, pp. 5614-5617)

The investigation revealed and the evidence

showed a close link between Holmes and Coleman.

Holmes and Coleman traveled from Mississippi,

where they lived together as girlfriend and boyfriend,

to Shreveport on Christmas Eve 2002. They were

picked up by Holmes’ mother and resided in her trail-

er while the couple was in Shreveport. They brought

with them the .380 caliber handgun that belonged to

Holmes’ father. That handgun was determined to

be the murder weapon both by Holmes’ admission

and by ballistics comparison of projectiles and shell

casings. (Vol. 26, pp. 5448-5459, Vol. 27, pp. 5674-

5687)

The items that were known to have been stolen

from the Brandon residence included jewelry, particu-

larly a multi-colored bracelet, and bankcards. There

was an attempt to use one of the Brandon’s bank-

cards where an incorrect PIN was used at an ATM in

a nearby convenience store. In addition, Holmes and

Coleman were recorded minutes later and just up the

street on a Hibernia bank surveillance video trying to

use a bankcard, again with an incorrect PIN number.

(Vol. 26, pp. 5462-5469, 5473-5476)

Many incriminating items were recovered from

the Holmes’ trailer where the two murderers had

stayed. Among those items was a clear plastic food

service glove found in the rain gutter of the trailer,

containing a multi-colored bracelet and a pear! brace-

let. (Vol. 26, pp. 5462-5468) Reverend Brandon’s

daughter identified the multi-colored bracelet as one

she had given her mother some time earlier. (Vol. 26,

pp. 5473-5476) A box of Subway food service \ gloves

was recovered from the bedroom shared by Coleman

and Holmes. (Vol. 26, p. 5489) The food service gloves

had a diamond pattern consistent with patterns in

blood transfer stains observed at the Brandon

residence. (Vol. 27, pp. 5659, 5634) Additionally, a

pillow was found in Holmes’ bedroom with a bullet

hole through it. (Vol. 26, pp. 5489-5494) That pillow

was not the one used to cover Mrs. Brandon’s face

when she was shot, but was apparently a “practice”

pillow.

In the same rain gutter that contained the multi-

colored bracelet, three fired .380 cartridge casings

were found. (Vol. 26, pp. 5462-5468) Investigators

went to Holmes’ father’s residence in Mississippi.

There her father took detectives to a location where

he had fired the .380 handgun that was discovered

missing at the time of Coleman and Holmes’

departure from Mississippi. (Vol. 26, p. 5455) One of

the cartridge casings found in the gutter was

matched to a .380 cartridge casing recovered from

that location in Mississippi. (Vol. 27, pp. 5684-5687)

During analysis at the crime lab, Reverend Brandon’s

DNA was found on a swab taken from one of the fired

cartridge casings found in the gutter. (Vol. 27, p.

5706) The portions of the .380 projectile that were

recovered from Reverend Brandon’s brain and dining

room ceiling were matched to a projectile recovered

from a tree pointed out by Holmes’ father at the same

location in Mississippi where investigators had

recovered the cartridge casing. (Vol. 27, pp. 5674-

5687)

Victim impact testimony from family members

was introduced at the penalty phase. That testimony

consisted of the two daughters testifying about the

impact of this crime upon the Brandon family, and

specifically upon Alice Brandon, as well as an edited

video of Mrs. Brandon’s existence in her daughter's

care. (Vol. 29, pp. 6039-6058)

Evidence of the unadjudicated attempted bur-

glary and potential murder of Mrs. Patncia Camp

and the unadjudicated homicide of Terrance Blaze

were also admitted. On December 27, 2002, Holmes

made a 911 call from her raother’s house in reference

to a gated community located very close to her

mother’s trailer known as “Nob Hill.” The call was an

attempt to gain an access code for the gate at the

front of that community. (Vol. 29, pp. 5911-5917) No

access code was given to Holmes during that call;

however, Holmes was able to get into the neigh-

borhood. Later that same day, Holmes, wearing a wig,

attempted to get into the residence of Mrs. Patricia

Camp by ringing the doorbell and asking to use the

phone. Mrs. Camp spoke with Holmes, but denied her

entry to her house. Mrs. Camp saw Holmes again two

days later, again while Holmes was trying to gain

entry to her residence. Mrs. Camp did not let Holmes

in on this subsequent attempt either, and noticed

a man was standing at the street waiting. (Vol. 29,

pp. 5920-5924) Holmes admitted in a statement to

authorities “If she would have opened that door, she

would have been like Mr. Brandon” and “My plan was

to get somebody on the hill that night.” (Vol. 29, pp.

5928-5929)

Evidence of the Terrance Blaze homicide came

into play when, as part of the Brandon investigation,

Holmes directed authorities to Blaze’s body. (Vol. 29,

pp. 5933-5934, 5941-5944) High velocity blood spatter

and other bloodstains matched to Blaze were found in

Holmes’ mother’s vehicle and on Robert Coleman’s

right boot and right pants leg. (Vol. 29, pp. 5948-5955,

5985-5991) The stains indicate that Terrance Blaze

was shot in Holmes’ mother’s vehicle, that Robert

Coleman was likely the driver at the time the shot

was fired, and that the shot most likely came from

the back seat. (Vol. 29, pp. 6029-6037) Holmes con-

fessed in a letter to a prosecutor that she killed Ter-

rance Blaze. (Vol. 29, p. 6011) Blaze was shot in the

back ef the head with a .380 caliber weapon and the

bullet was recovered from his skull. The bullet had

the same class characteristics as the bullet recovered

from the tree in Mississippi. A cartridge casing found

near where Blaze’s body was dumped was matched to

the cartridge case found in Mississippi. (Vol. 29, pp.

6001-6004)

Brandy Holmes and Robert Coleman were indict-

ed for the first degree murder of Reverend Julian

Brandon and the attempted first degree murder of his

wife, Alice Brandon, as well as the first degree

murder of Terrance Blaze. Holmes went to trial on

the first degree murder of Reverend Brandon on

February 6, 2006, in Caddo District Court and was

convicted and sentenced to death. On direct appeal,

the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s

conviction and sentence, and rehearing was denied.

State v. Holmes, 2006-2988 (La. 12/2/08), 5 So.3d 42,

rehearing denied, 1/30/09. Petitioner’s application for

writs of certiorari followed.

— o -_

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

As proportionality review is not required by the

Eighth Amendment, there is no basis for federal re-

view of a purely state court procedure.

Petitioner failed to raise many of her current

complaints and supporting arguments in the state

courts below.

CORRECTION OF

PETITIONER’S MISSTATEMENTS

1. Prosecutorial “misconduct”

Petitioner asserts that the Louisiana Supreme

Court failed to consider that the prosecutor stated at

the codefendant’s trial that he was the more culpable

party, rather than petitioner. (p. 11, petitioner’s writ

application) This is a reworking of petitioner’s claim

on appeal that the State pursued inconsistent theo-

ries of prosecution, a claim that the Louisiana Su-

preme Court specifically found to be misleading:

“As borne out in the record and her brief

to this Court, defendant’s focus on selective

portions of the evidence presented and the

State’s closing arguments at both trials is

misleading. As an initial matter, defendant

concedes in her brief that at ‘Coleman’s trial,

the prosecution argued that Coleman and

Holmes both played an active role in the

murder of Mr. Brandon [and] ... charged

Coleman as a principal in the alternative.’

Brief for the Appellant, p. 14. It is abundant-

ly clear that the State was free to speculate

which of the defendant’s statements was the

most truthful concerning her actual partici-

pation in the shooting of Julian Brandon.

More importantly, during closing argument

at the guilt phase, the State argued that

even if the defendant was merely ‘policing up

the crime scene making sure nobody gets

caught,’ she was concerned in the commis-

sion of the offense and thus guilty as a

principal. Trial Tr., vol. XXVIII, p. 5777 (Feb.

14, 2006).

During rebuttal closing at the guilt phase,

the State further argued:

We can’t say which slice she inflicted,

which stab she inflicted, which one of the

times the trigger was pulled her finger was

on it. But we can tell you that she was there

helping, participating. It was too much for

one person and that she wanted them dead

because she didn’t wear a mask and all the

other things we've told you. When you

realize that she had the specific intent to

kill, she was involved in the killing and as

the defense has conceded the victims were

over 65, it was during an armed robbery, a

burglary, and there was more than one

person, the only appropriate verdict is guilty

as charged of first degree murder. Trial Tr.,

vol. XXVIII, pp. 5812-13 (Feb. 14, 2006).

Similarly at the penalty phase, rather than

arguing that defendant was the shooter, as

she claimed in one of her statements, counsel

for the State argued:

...I don’t think we’re ever going to have

an answer to whose hand the gun was in as

it relates to the Brandons and whose

particular hand the knife was in as it relates

to the Brandons, you have seen what the

evidence does show. And that’s simply com-

ing back to this concept that they partici-

pated part and parcel together from start to

finish. Trial Tr., vol. XXX, p. 6236 (Feb. 16,

2006).”

(Pp. 37a-38a of petitioner’s appendix, or see State v.

Holmes, supra, 5 So.3d at 64-65)

The duty to represent a client zealously does not

excuse a lack of candor with the Court. Nix v. White-

side, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123

(1986).

2. No clear diagnosis of FAS was agreed upon

by petitioner’s expert witnesses

Petitioner also makes some telling omissions

from her claims that her mitigating evidence was

“compelling.” At a pretrial hearing where petitioner

attempted to prove she was mentally retarded, one of

petitioner’s expert witnesses, psychiatrist Dr. Richard

Williams diagnosed her with Fetal Aleohol Syndrome

(FAS). Dr. Williams confidently predicted that peti-

tioner would be found to have frontal lobe damage.

(Vol. 19, pp. 4153, 4162) His testimony was deflated

during the penalty phase when Dr. James Patterson’s

analysis of the MRI and PET scan test results did not

support this prediction. (Vol. 30, pp. 6199-6206)

The State addresses this matter in more depth

later in this opposition brief.

3. Louisiana Supreme Court DID review po-

tential racial factors

As for petitioner’s complaints that “Louisiana’s

review also fails to consider the introduction of invid-

ious factors such as the race of the defendant and

victim,” petitioner did not raise this complaint in the

state court. Indeed, she could hardly do so when the

Louisiana Supreme Court specifically addressed the

question of potential racial discrimination in its

opinion, noting that petitioner and her victims were

of the same race. Holmes, at 95-96.

ARGUMENT

I. THERE IS NO CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIRE-

MENT THAT THE LOUISIANA SUPREME

COURT CONDUCT PROPORTIONALITY RE-

VIEW OF CAPITAL CASES

Petitioner advances a number of arguments to

support her claim that the Louisiana Supreme Court

failed to make a sufficient review of similar capital

cases. None of them are convincing, and some are

inaccurate.

Petitioner relies heavily on Justice Stevens’

statement issued in relation to the writ denial of

Walker v. Georgia, 129 S.Ct. 453 (2008). Although

acknowledging that Walker did not present his claims

in the state court, thereby precluding review, Justice

Stevens expressed his views regarding state propor-

tionality review in what can only be regarded as

dicta, prompting Justice Thomas’s concurrence.

Justice Thomas’s concurrence with the denial of

the writ makes clear, however, that “Proportionality

review is not constitutionally required in any form.”

Walker v. Georgia, 129 S.Ct. 481, 483 (2008). Louisi-

ana, like Georgia, “simply has elected, as a matter of

state law, to provide an additional protection for

capital defendants.” [bid. As there is no constitutional

mandate, there is no basis for this Court to review

the Louisiana Supreme Court’s proportionality review

process. Nor does Walker, or petitioner’s claim, raise a

new issue. This Court determined twenty-five years

ago that certiorari review of such state procedures is

not federally mandated:

“Proportionality review was considered to be

an additional safeguard against arbitrarily

imposed death sentences, but we certainly

did not hold that comparative review was

constitutionally required.” Pulley v. Harris,

465 U.S. 37, 50, 104 S.Ct. 871, 879, 79

L.Ed.2d 29 (1984).

Petitioner attempts to turn back the clock by

claiming that amendments to Louisiana’s capital

punishment plan look “more and more” like the

mandatory death penalty plan condemned in Furman

v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). This argument was

not raised in the Louisiana Supreme Court, and can-

not serve as the basis for review in the instant case.

Walker, 129 S.Ct., at 454.

Moreover, petitioner’s argument is disingenuous.

Pre-Furman, a mandatory death sentence was the

norm in Louisiana as well as Georgia. There can be

no rational argument that more recent changes to the

first degree murder statute have returned capital

cases to a mandatory footing. While some elements of

first degree murder may have been added, petitioner

ignores the erosion of the death penalty that has

occurred through the prohibition of the execution of

the mentally retarded and the juvenile murderer.

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153

]L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), Reper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,

125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005).

Petitioner claims that “far more individuals are

eligible for a possible death sentence today than when

this Court last validated the Louisiana capital sen-

tencing scheme.” Petitioner, however, is not one of

those individuals: in the instant case, two of the three

aggravating circumstances found in petitioner’s case

have been part of the statute since 1979. La. R.S.

14:30 has since that time defined first degree murder

as an intentional killing committed during the course

of an armed robbery, and/or an intentional killing

committed when the offender has the intent to kill or

inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person,

among other elements. Louisiana Acts 1979, No. 74.

The remaining aggravating circumstance returned

by the jury in petitioner’s case, the intentional killing

of a victim over the age of sixty-five, was added by a

1992 amendment. La. Acts 1992, No. 296. In light of

the fact that even an invalid aggravating circum-

stance will not undermine a death sentence where

there are valid aggravating circumstances remaining,

any unrelated additions to Louisiana’s first degree

murder statute are irrelevant to petitioner’s case.

Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77

L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); State v. Anderson, 2006-2987 (La.

9/9/08), 996 So.2d 973, rehearing denied, cert. denied,

129 S.Ct. 1906; Watson v. Blackburn, 756 F.2d 1055

(5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153, 106 S.Ct.

2259, 90 L.Ed.2d 703, rehearing denied, 478 U.S.

1028, 106 S.Ct. 3341, 92 L.Ed.2d 749.

The State presented evidence of petitioner’s mur-

der of another person within a few days of the murder

of Julian Brandon, and of her efforts to gain entry at

another home a few days before, including her admis-

sion that if that homeowner had opened the door, she

would have been dead. Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure Article 905.2.A provides that “The sen-

tencing hearing shall focus on the ... character and

propensities of the offender.” Nothing could be more

relevant for a jury considering whether to impose the

death sentence.

Also raised for the first time in petitioner’s appli-

cation for certiorari is the claim that Louisiana’s sen-

tencing plan fails to “harness” jurors’ discretion

because it does not require jurors to “weigh” aggra-

vating versus mitigating circumstances, and does not

impose a standard of proof on the jury’s determina-

tion of sentence. Petitioner has not only failed to

allege this claim in the state court, she has also

failed, and failed utterly, to show that uniformity of

state sentencing schemes is required by the Con-

stitution.

Petitioner is also far from the mark when she

complains that the Louisiana Supreme Court acted

unconstitutionally by allowing more information be

given to jurors during the penalty phase. As early as

Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 203-204, 96 S.Ct.

2909, 2939, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), this Court rejected

an attack on the Georgia statute because of the “wide

scope of evidence and argument allowed at presen-

tence hearings.” The joint opinion stated:

“We think that the Georgia court wisely

has chosen not to impose unnecessary

restrictions on the evidence that can be

offered at such a hearing and to approve

open and far-ranging argument.... So long

as the evidence introduced and the argu-

ments made at the presentence hearing do

not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not

to impose restrictions. We think it desirable

for the jury to have as much information

before it as possible when it makes the

sentencing decision.”

In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 821, 111

S.Ct. 2597, 2606, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), the Court

specifically reversed Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,

107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), and South

Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207,

104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989), which had imposed limits on

evidence and argument the prosecution could present

during the penalty phase:

“Under our constitutional system, the

primary responsibility for defining crimes

against state law, fixing punishments for the

commission of these crimes, and establishing

procedures for criminal trials rests with the

States.” Payne, supra, emphasis added.

There are some limitations, of course, but “[bleyond

these limitations ... the Court has deferred to the

State’s choice of substantive factors relevant to the

penalty determination.” California v. Ramos, 463

U.S. 992, 1001, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3453, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171

(1983), Payne, supra.

Payne cut petitioner’s claims out from under her

feet in another respect: the complained-of expansion

of aggravating factors and crimes which serve as the

basis for first degree murder:

“Within the constitutional limitations

defined by our cases, the States enjoy their

traditional latitude to prescribe the method

by which those who commit murder shall be

punished.’ Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S.

299, 309, 110 S.Ct. 1078, 1084, 108 L.Ed.2d

255 (1990). The States remain free, in capital

cases, as well as others, to devise new

procedures and new remedies to meet felt

needs ... victim impact evidence serves

entirely legitimate purposes.”

Payne, 501 U.S. at 824-825.

Besides these complaints about the victim impact

testimony and the addition of aggravating factors,

petitioner also complains about the evidence of other

crimes which were presented as part of the “character

and propensities” evidence required during the pen-

alty phase.

“A wide range of evidence is admissible on

literally countless subjects: ‘We have Long

recognized that [flor the determination of

sentences, justice generally requires ... that

there be taken into account the circum-

stances of the offense together with the

character and propensities of the offender.’

Gregg, supra, 428 U.S. at 189, 96 S.Ct. at

2932 (emphasis added).”

Zant v. Stephens, supra, 462 U.S. at 900, 103 S.Ct. at

2755.

Petitioner’s claims are without merit. There is no

constitutional basis for review of the Louisiana Su-

preme Court’s proportionality review of petitioner’s

death sentence.

Ii. THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT CON-

DUCTED A THOROUGH PROPORTIONAL-

ITY REVIEW

A fact which has no Eighth Amendment implica-

tions whatsoever

A. The Louisiana Supreme Court conduct-

ed a state-wide review of home invasion

capital verdicts

Petitioner complains that the Louisiana Supreme

Court erred in considering only first degree murder

cases where the death penalty was actually returned

in performing its proportionality analysis. As noted

above, the Eighth Amendment does not require pro-

portionality review, and the States are free to omit or

include such a review of death penalty cases. The fact

that one state may include the consideration of cases

where the death penalty was not returned does not

mean that every state must employ the same meth-

odology. As Harris demonstrates, California has no

proportionality review at all.

The Louisiana Supreme Court conducted a state-

wide analysis of home invasion first degree murder

cases, not being content to rely on only those in

Caddo Parish. Holmes, supra, 5 So.3d at 96. On her

direct appeal, petitioner attempted to draw a com-

parison between eleven robbery first degree murder

cases in Caddo Parish where the death penalty was

returned and ten robbery first degree murder cases

where a life sentence was imposed (either by agree-

ment of the jury or their inability to reach a sentence

verdict, which triggers an automatic life sentence

under La. C.Cr.P. Articles 905.6, 905.8). Petitioner’s

complaints are inconsistent, to say the least. On the

one hand she complains that the Louisiana Supreme

Court did not consider enough of one kind of case,

while on the other she complains that they considered

cases state-wide.

The comparisons actually made by the Louisiana

Supreme Court are more relevant than those ad-

vanced by petitioner, as the cases the court used are

so much closer to the facts of the instant case: “This

Court has observed that Louisiana juries appear

especially prone to impose capital punishment for

crimes committed in the home.” Holmes, 5 So.3d at 97,

emphasis added. Undertaking the type of district-

specific analysis used by petitioner in the state court,

of the now 43 first degree murder cases tried in

Caddo Parish since 1976, there were eight which

involved home invasion robberies. Of those, seven

defendants received the death penalty, the most

recent being Felton Dorsey, whose death penalty was

returned by the jury May 28, 2009.' (See State’s

Listing of capital cases in Caddo Parish:

1. State v. Nathaniel Code, 627 So.2d 1373 (La.

1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1873, 128

L.Ed.2d 490, rehearing denied, 512 U.S. 1248, 114

S.Ct. 2775, 129 L.Ed.2d 887

2. State v. Robert Coleman, reversed and remanded,

2006-518 (La. 11/02/07), 970 So.2d 511, rehearing de-

nied, 01/07/08

(Continued on following page)

Appendix 1.) The sole case involving a home invasion

robbery where the death penalty was not returned

was in 1976.’ (See State’s Appendix 1, p. 12.) Under

the very type of analysis which petitioner urges, that

being the inclusion of similar cases where the death

penalty was not returned, it can be clearly seen that

petitioner’s death sentence was neither freakish nor

arbitrary.

B. The weight to be given mitigating cir-

cumstances is for the trier of fact

Petitioner complains that the Louisiana Supreme

Court did not consider mitigating circumstances in its

proportionality review. There is no Eighth Amend-

ment requirement that it do so. That task is for the

3. State v. Michael Cooks, 97-0999 (La. 9/9/98), 720

So.2d 637, cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1042, 119 S.Ct. 1342,

143 L.Ed.2d 505, rehearing denied, 526 U.S. 1128, 119

S.Ct. 1789, 143 L.Ed.2d 816

4. State v. Felton Dorsey, 1st J.D.C., Docket No.

251,406

5. State v. Darrell Dewayne Draughn, 05-1825 (La.

01/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, rehearing denied, 3/30/07,

cert. denied, _ U.S. __,, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d

377 (2007)

6. State v. Cedric Edwards, 97-1797 (La. 7/2/99), 750

So.2d 893, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1026, 120 S.Ct. 542,

145 L.Ed.2d 421

7. State v. Brandy Aileen Holmes, 2006-2988 (La.

12/2/08), 5 So.3d 42, rehearing denied, 1/30/09

* State v. John L. Donaldson, 391 So.2d 1182 (La. 1980)

jury to do, and their determination was a reasonable

one. The mitigating evidence was not nearly as clear-

cut or “compelling” as petitioner presents it to the

Court in her application, as noted above.

According to Dr. James Patterson, there is as yet

not much objective statistical image analysis data on

people with FAS, and he was unable to say that any

physical brain defect caused petitioner to commit

criminal acts. (Vol. 30, pp. 6201-6205) Moreover, it

was not proven by a preponderance of the evidence

that petitioner was either mentally retarded or has

FAS. Dr. Patterson testified at the penalty phase

about his analysis of the MRI and PET scans of

petitioner’s brain, and found that, although some

brain abnormalities were found which were consis-

tent with what was expected in “published results” on

FAS, petitioner did not have other expected brain

abnormalities. (Vol. 30, pp. 6200, 6202-6206) Dr.

Patterson was unable to “reach a conclusion either

way.” (Vol. 30, p. 6205)

As for petitioner’s claims of mental retardation,

petitioner never filed the required notice of a claim of

mental retardation, and her plea of “not guilty and

not guilty by reason of insanity” was withdrawn after

the report of the sanity commission was received. La.

C.Cr.P. Article 905.5.1.B (Vol. 11, pp. 2350-2352, 2356-

2365, Vol. 18, pp. 4046-4049) Her expert witnesses

were similarly equivocal on the retardation issue

presented at a motion to quash.

Psychologist Dr. Mark Vigen’s opinion apparently

morphed between his original report to defense

counsel and the motion to quash. In his first report to

defense counsel, Dr. Vigen had found that appellant

was not mentally retarded. (Vol. 11, pp. 2393-2395)

By the time of the hearing, Vigen testified that

appellant was mentally retarded by the standards set

out by La. C.Cr.P. Article 905.5.1, but not under the

DSM-IV, and that he therefore could not diagnose her

as mentally retarded. (Vol. 19, pp. 4194, 4203, 4206)

Although Dr. Vigen testified at the motion to quash

that petitioner was limited in two or more adaptive

skills (Vol. 19, p. 4194), at the penalty phase he found

that petitioner was “street smart,” could drive, buy

groceries, and was “responsible for her actions,” com-

petent and sane. (Vol. 30, pp. 6111, 6115, 6128)

Petitioner has been subjected to much psycholog-

ical testing throughout her life. Those tests diagnosed

petitioner as having depression, developmental disor-

ders, oppositional defiant disorder, post-traumatic

stress disorder and various learning disabilities and

personality disorders. (See chart at Vol. 12, pp. 2609-

2630.) None of them found her to be mentally

retarded. This is not surprising, as her full scale 1Q

scores ranged from 74 to 78. An IQ of 70 or below is

generally regarded as an indicator of mental retar-

dation. (DSM-IV, p. 49)

Petitioner’s other expert was also less than con-

clusive about whether she is mentally retarded. Dr.

Richard Williams opined that appellant is mentally

retarded under the definition of La. C.Cr.P. Article

905.5.1, but testified that he could not diagnose her

as mentally retarded because she did not fit the

criteria set out in the DSM-IV, rather she has a

learning disorder. (Vol. 19, pp. 4154-4155, 4171) At

the penalty phase, Williams testified that petitioner

has “borderline intellectual functioning.” (Vol. 30, p.

6141)

Conflicting testimony of expert witnesses who

are unable to reach conclusions or make diagnoses

about claimed mental defects hardly constitute “com-

pelling” mitigating evidence.

C. The Louisiana Supreme Court conduct-

ed a state-wide review of similar cases

Petitioner complains that the Louisiana Supreme

Court proportionality review “employs an inter-district

review in only some cases, without a consistently-

articulated justification for the inconsistency.” In peti-

tioner’s case, however, the court employed a state-

wide review of capital cases involving home invasion

robberies, attacks on more than one victim, and

attacks on elderly victims. Holmes, at 97-98.

As noted above, if the court had chosen to

conduct a Caddo-Parish-only review of home invasion

cases, it would have been revealed that of the seven

capital trials for home invasion robberies that had

been tried in Caddo Parish at the time of the appeal,

six defendants reczived the death penalty.

In her direct appeal, petitioner limited her own

comparison of first degree murder cases to those tried

in Caddo Parish. Despite this, the Louisiana Supreme

Court reviewed cases from other districts throughout

the state. On rehearing, petitioner then complained

that the court conducted a state-wide proportionality

review. (Petitioner’s Application for Rehearing, p. 10)

Petitioner has not stated a constitutional basis for

micro-managing whether state supreme courts may

conduct district-only or must conduct state-wide

review of similar cases, for those states which have

proportionality review.

As for petitioner’s claims that the Louisiana Su-

preme Court did not conduct a review for arbitrary

factors, the State has previously addressed the inac-

curacies in a portion of this claim, regarding potential

impact from racial discrimination. There remains

petitioner’s new claim that the judicial district in

which the case arose was an “arbitrary factor” that

should have been considered in the court’s propor-

tionality review. The State cannot but note that the

district in which the case arose was not due to any

arbitrary action by the State, judge or jury, but falls

upon the murderer herself. She chose the location as

well as the victims. Petitioner has failed, moreover, to

enlighten the reader as to just what this has to do

with proportionality.

Petitioner even goes so far as to complain about

the content of the Sentencing Memorandum filed by

the State. Such complaints about whether the State

included details of her mental illness claims are

absurd. Federal courts are not “super” state courts

acting to correct interpretations of state law. Claims

that the trial court improperly applied state law do

not constitute an independent basis for federal re-

view. Narvaiz v. Johnson, 134 F.3d 688, 695 (5th Cir.

1998), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 947, 118 S.Ct. 2364, 141

L.Ed.2d 731.

Under Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 28,° every

capital defendant is required to file her own sentence

° Also titled as La. C.Cr.P. Article 905.9.1, Section 4.

Sentence Review Memoranda; Form; Time for

Filing.

(a) In addition to the briefs required on the appeal of

the guilt-determination trial, the district attorney and

the defendant shall file sentence review memoranda

addressed to the propriety of the sentence. The form

shall conform, insofar as applicable, to that required

for briefs.

(b) The district attorney shall file the memorandum

on behalf of the state within the time provided for the

defendant to file his brief on the appeal. The memo-

randum shall include:

i. a list of each first degree murder case in the

district in which sentence was imposed after

January 1, 1976. The list shall include the dock-

et number, caption, crime convicted, sentence ac-

tually imposed and a synopsis of the facts in the

record concerning the crime and the defendant.

ii. a synopsis of the facts in the record con-

cerning the crime and the defendant in the in-

stant case.

ili. any other matter relating to the guidelines

in Section 1.

(Continued on following page)

review memorandum, and may include whatever

facts she deems relevant in that document. In fact

petitioner did file such a memorandum, included as

State’s Appendix B. The even-handedness of Rule 28

renders petitioner’s complaints about the content of

the State’s Capital Sentencing Memorandum beside

the point: Rule 28 permits petitioner to correct

any perceived flaws or omissions in her own memo-

randum. This ensures that information petitioner

deems relevant will be seen by the reviewing court,

satisfying any due process concerns. It does not, how-

ever, permit petitioner, under the guise of a constitu-

tional claim, to require this Court dictate to the State

what to include in the State’s memorandum. Once

again, federal courts do not operate as “super” state

courts, and petitioner’s complaints were properly re-

jected by the Louisiana Supreme Court, based on

state law. Petitioner’s complaints are without merit.

half of the defendant within the time for the state to

file its brief on the appeal. The memorandum shall

address itself to the state’s memorandum and any

other matter relative to the guidelines in Section 1.

CONCLUSION

Respondent State of Louisiana shows that the

writ should not be granted in the instant case:

I. The Louisiana Supreme Court did not

err in affirming petitioner’s sentence on

appeal. Their thorough review of capital

convictions throughout the state sup-

ported the finding that the sentence was

not disproportionate.

Ii. More importantly, there is no Eighth

Amendment basis for federal review of

proportionality analysis when such anal-

ysis is not required by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the State of Louisiana prays that

Brandy Holmes’s application for writ of certiorari be

denied.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES REX SCOTT

Counsel of Record

Caddo Parish District Attorney

CATHERINE M. ESTOPINAL

Assistant District Attorney

501 Texas Street

Shreveport, LA 71101

Telephone: (318) 429-7618

Fax: (318) 841-4020

App. 1

APPENDIX 1

LOUIS? 4 NA SUPREME COURT

NO. 2006-KA-2988

STATE OF LOUISIANA

BRANDY AILEEN HOLMES

ON AUTOMATIC APPEAL FROM THE FIRST

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE

PARISH OF CADDO, STATE OF LOUISIANA,

NUMBER 226,819, CRIMINAL DOCKET

HONORABLE SCOTT J. CRICHTON,

DISTRICT JUDGE

SENTENCE REVIEW MEMORANDUM

ON BEHALF OF THE

STATE OF LOUISIANA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

PAUL J. CARMOUCHE

DISTRICT ATTORNEY

LEA R. HALL, JR.

HUGO A. HOLLAND, JR.

BRADY DENNIS O’CALLAGHAN

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

TRIAL COUNSEL

App. 2

CATHERINE M. ESTOPINAL

LA. BAR ROLL NO. 05380

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

COUNSEL ON APPEAL

FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF LOUISIANA

501 CADDO PARISH COURTHOUSE

SHREVEPORT, LOUISIANA 71101

TELEPHONE: (318) 429-7618

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SEVER LIE FATE SU OOE BEM ness esecccescsevurevccsssonesens lili

FIRST DEGREE MURDER CASES, CADDO PAR-

ISH, LOUISIANA SINCE JANUARY 1, 1976

(1) STATE V. SOLOMON BIRDSONG, JR. ..... 1

(2) STATE V. ARTHUR LEE BROWN ............. 2

(3) STATE V. CHARLES CALDWELL ............. 3

(4) STATE V. FIELD CALHOUDN ..................... 3

(5) STATE V. LADERICK CAMPBELL............ 4

(6) STATE V. NATHANIEL CODE ................... 5

(7) STATE V. ROBERT GLEN COLEMAN ...... 6

(8) STATE V. MICHAEL ANTHONY COOKSW..... 9

CB) RAE Me V. FURS BAIS cnc iisncssscsssccsscenesssss 10

(10) BEALE V. COTE ERTL. sisccesccscenccnsisersesess 11

(11) STATE V. JOHN L. DONALDSON ............. 12

(12) STATE V. WILLIE DOUGLAS .................... 13

(13)

(14)

(15)

(16)

(17)

(18)

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

(25)

(26)

(27)

(28)

(29)

(30)

(31)

(32)

(33)

(34)

(35)

(36)

App. 3

STATE V. DARRELL DWAYNE DRAUGHN .... 14

STATE V. CEDRIC D. EDWARDS .............. 15

STATE V. WAYNE ROBERT FELDE.......... 15

STATE V. MACK E. FORBEG..................000 16

ee ie EM Pt. ere 17

STATE V. RUSSELL FOY, SR. ...............000 18

STATE V. RODERICK L. GAY. ................025 18

STATE V. DEMETRIC GILLIAM ............... 19

STATE V. BOBBY RAY FALL, .......0c.000ccc000 20

STATE V. BOBBY LEE HAMPTON ........... 21

STATE V. BRANDON HAYNES ................. 21

STALE V. DIAN TIIGEE o.c0.cecessessvvesveresses 22

STATE V. EDWARD W. JOHNSON, JR. ..... 22

STATE V. RAY JONES, FR. ........ccccccesssescess 23

STATE V. MICHAEL EDWARD KING ....... 24

STATE V. JAMES ALLEN LEE.................. 25

STATE V. NICK NICHOLSON .................+4 26

EPR Ee MV. CEs Gi non cccsosccscscsecsesccccess 26

STATE V. BOBBY RAY REED.................... 27

STATE V. MYRON OSHA SMITH .............. 28

STATE V. CALVIN TOLBERT .................0++ 28

STATE V. NOLAN TURNER .....................+- 29

STATE V. JAMES TYLER, IIT.................... 30

STATE V. RICKY WASHINGTON .............. 31

App. 4

(37) STATE V. THADIUS WEBB ..............0.000000- 32

(38) STATE V. COREY D. WILLIAMS ............... 32

(39) STATE V. JAMES K. WILLIAMSON .......... 34

(40) STATE V. AARON CHRISTOPHER WIL-

MEGA scvbisevhynvalartals tassel tie 34

(41) STATE V. BRANDY HOLMEG...................:. 37

PR ITE ciics sis casactensocescsucccsentaieosl eee 41

CE eins: cvcucepisus tisssapiuisemcaniegeneiceaeraaneen 43

Cr MAE abe 0 sivas sesniscyvceavsinweeeeaeee 44

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

STATE V. BIRDSONG, 452 So.2d 1236 (La.App.2d

Re ED dabes sudancaccoscteticanmubacuuliee mine altwgiadie aia once 1

STATE V. BROWN, 478 So.2d 600 (La.App.2d Cir.

EE vc dncidde) vaidasccdcinsadsesueauiaetesadast cee era 2

STATE V. CALDWELL, 388 So.2d 1163 (La. 1980)........ 3

STATE V. CALHOUN, 554 So.2d 127 (La.App.2d

Cir. 1989), writ den. 558 So.2d GO] ..............cccccceceses 3

STATE V. LADERICK CAMPBELL, 2006-286,

La.S.Ct. Docket No. 220,544, 1st JDC ..................... 4

STATE V. CELESTINE, 443 So.2d 1091 (La.

1983), writ denied 469 U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct.

See, SSL: -e AGO CEG) on. ooacssnsncsscctnvenevericttedereess 42

App. 5

STATE V. CODE, 627 So.2d 1373 (La. 1993),

cert.den. 511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1870, 128

L.Ed.2d 490, reh. den. 512 U.S. 1248, 114

a DRE GS Gy ee » |

STATE V. ROBERT GLEN COLEMAN, 2006-

518, La.S.Ct. Docket No. 226,818 1st JDC .............. 6

STATE V. COOKS, 97-0999 (La. 9/8/98), 720

So.2d 637, cert.den. 526 U.S. 1042, 119 S.Ct.

1342, 143 L.Ed.2d 505, reh. den. 526 U.S. 1128,

Rees RIGO, BGO MRA. OLG........ccccscccosserecescescoes 9

STATE V. DAVIS, 92-1623, (La. 5/23/94), 637

So.2d 1012, cert. den. 513 U.S. 975, 115 S.Ct.

450, 130 L.Ed.2d 359, reh. den. 513 U.S.

pe, 12 &.Gt. 6o7, 190 L.Bd.2d 617 ...............00000. 10

STATE V. DEAL, 000-0434, (La. 11/28/01), 802

So.2d 1254, cert. denied 537 U.S. 828, 123

SEN TOR AG. .........000..0ccoceccercerencseoecees 11

STATE V. DONALDSON, 391 So.2d 1182 (La.

eT io, La sasveusnnsucteosesevedecetenere 12

STATE V. DOUGLAS, 37,721-KA, Second Cir-

Nee ie iks sass pinccvavosubesdesessenccesss 13

STATE V. DARRELL DEWAYNE DRAUGHN,

04-1825, La.S.Ct. Docket 212,107 Ist JDC............. 14

STATE V. EDWARDS, 97-1797, (La. 7/22/99)

750 So.2d 893, cert, den. ___—~U“-.S. ___, 120

RY > re 13,43

STATE V. FELDE, 422 So.2d 370 (La. 1982)............ 15

STATE V. FELDE, 382 So.2d 1384 (La. 1980) .......... 16

STATE V. FORBES, 362 So.2d 1385 (La. 1978)........ 16

App. 6

STATE V. FORD, 489 So.2d 1250 (La. 1985),

writ den. and remanded 479 U.S. 1077, 107

S.Ct. 1272, 94 L.Ed.2d 133, on remand 503

So.2d 1009 (La. 1987), writ den. 498 U.S.

992, 112 L.Ed.2d 547, 111 S.Ct. 537, reh. den.

498 U.S. 1075, 111 S.Ct. 803, 112 L.Ed.2d

SEA SIE CRS tenet ak sein 17

STATE V. FOY, 439 So.2d 433 (La. 1983)... 18

STATE V. GAY, 29434 (La.App.2d Cir. 6/18/97),

L,I ee a ee 18

STATE V. GILLIAM, 36,118 (La.App.2d Cir.

8/30/02), 827 S0.2d 508 .......ccccccccesecseseseesesesceeeseseeees 19

STATE V. HALL, 388 So.2d 1164 (La. 1980)..........-+. 20

STATE V. HAMPTON, 98-0331 (La. 4/23/99),

750 So.2d 867, writs den. 528 U.S. 1007, 120

S.Ct. 504, 145 L.Ed.2d 390, reh. den. 528

U.S. 1108, 120 S.Ct. 855, 145 L.Ed.2d 721

Pass Pika catteen and Goeetc aucss bavpieiaiatadisuaaeck auiiene saaree ea cae oe 21

STATE V. HAYNES, No. 27,499 (La.App.2d Cir.

11/1/95), 662 So.2d 849, writ den. 95-2768

CE, By hs ee I BO icine ss cnccciesscacccccceccccceses 21

STATE V.. BRANDY HOLMES, 2006-ka-2988

La.S.Ct., lst JDC Docket 226,819.......................... 37

STATE V. IRISH, 00-2086 (La. 01/15/02), 807

So.2d 208, cert. denied 537 U.S. 846, 123

eee i I I BO oircncs pdakstducdnssccncuncnstences 22,43

STATE V. JOHNSON, 27522 (La.App.2d Cir.

Ey INE FEE ensreevcdetenkan csc tassiiotacsrseceames 22

STATE V. JONES, 386 So.2d 1363 (La. 1980).......... 23

STATE V. KING, 395 So.2d 1367 (La. 1981)............. 24

App. 7

STATE V. LEE, 395 So.2d 700 (La. 1981) ..........

STATE V. NICHOLSON, 437 So.2d 849 (La.

STATE V. ODOM, 33,340 (La.App.2d Cir. 5/10/00),

760 So.2d 576, writ denied 2000-1816 (La.

PRE, Pie IE OEE woceencccctccecsescevesessscanccesae

STATE V. REED, 448 So.2d 794 (La.App. 2d

Cir. 1984), writ den. 452 So.2d 696 (La. 1984)

STATE V. SMITH, 31,995 (La.App.2d Cir.

5/5/99), 740 So.2d 675, writ denied 2000-1404

(La. 2/16/01), 785 S0.2d 840.......ccccccccccceceeeeeeee

STATE V. TOLBERT, 30,821 (La.App.2d Cir.

8/19/98), 716 So.2d 949, writ den. 98-2562

(La. 1/15/99), 736 So.2d 207 ....ecccccecceseeeseseeeee

STATE V. TURNER, 37162, Second Circuit

Re Me IED sii ccciaounssodenevcdapinneswacdisdveonioabiies

STATE V. TYLER, 97-0338 (La. 9/9/98), 723

So.2d 939, cert. den. 526 U.S. 1073, 119 S.Ct.

1472, 143 L.Ed.2d 556, reh. den. 526 U.S.

ereeeee

eeeeeee

1166, 119 S.Ct. 2066, 144 L.Ed.2d 230...................80

STATE V. WASHINGTON, 407 So.2d 1138 (La.

NINIED xd icucukstaleesoaaseidunsedndiawinaiadeatuehadeaatashAeddoniacteatoeees 31

STATE V. WEBB, 32607 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/26/00),

750 So.2d 479, writ denied 2000-0593 (La.

Rs 6 OE. BEIT EOD cicvancseinccestvncasssssbadenceceesssOe

STATE V. WILLIAMS, 2001-1650 (La. 11/01/02),

831 So.2d 835, writs denied 2005-1556 (La.

pgs 3g OS} 8 See:

App. 8

STATE V. JAMES K. WILLIAMSON, 27,871

(La.App.2d Cir. 04/03/96), 671 So.2d 1208,

writ denied, 96-1143 (La. 10/04/96), 679

So.2d 1380. On retrial 35,122 (La.App.2d Cir.

01/23/02), 805 So.2d 1235, writ denied, 2002-

0707 (La. 01/07/03), 8386 So.2d 94.............cccccescccsess 34

STATE V. WILSON, remanded 2003-1229, (La.

3/30/05), 899 So.2d 551; affirmed 40,767,

(La.App.2d Cir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1111..........000. 34

ATKINS V. VIRGINIA, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct.

2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002) ........cccccccccccesesceseeeeees 33

ROPER V. SIMMONS, 540 U.S. 1160, 124

S.Ct. 1171, 157 L.Ed.2d 1204 (2004) ......cccccecceeeeees 36

ROPER V. SIMMONS, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct.

1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) .......ccccccccscesceseececeseeeeee36

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

LA. C.Cr.P. ARTICLE 905.4(b)...cccccccceccesesceseseseeseseeees 15

LA. C.Cr.P. ARTICLE 905.8 .....cccccccccceccssescseeseseeees 12,31

LA. C.Cr.P. ARTICLE 905.9 .....ccccccccceccesescseessecsseseeees 41

REVISED STATUTES

Te al ern ee ae Passim

LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT RULES

A eee aM SDN i = A a EE eT 41,42

a cunabesvenvausdpevbeebenessese l

DEF Eaes WN ET IIE Riccccvcnccccedceccccscccessvocececcesecses 41

LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION

Be AD Beg CT PE TE os sicsesesicesvatcevossocccsvsccscsoeeneses 42

App. 9

NOW INTO COURT, through the undersigned

assistant district attorney, comes the State of

Louisiana, which pursuant to Rule 28, §4 of the

Rules of this Court, respectfully presents this

Sentence Review Memorandum:

The following is a list of first-degree murder

indictments returned by the Caddo Parish Grand

Jury, First Judicial District, State of Louisiana, since

January 1, 1976, where the same verdict was

returned by a petit jury in each case.

(1) State v. Solomon Birdsong, Jr., 452 So.2d

1236 (La.App.2d Cir. 1984), writ den. 457

So.2d 1200; Docket No. 120,403, First

Judicial District Court.

Solomon Birdsong, Jr., was indicted for the first-

degree murder of a Pizza Hut employee. A jury found

Birdsong guilty as charged. Following a sentencing

hearing, the jury recommended that the defendant be

incarcerated for the remainder of his life without

benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

In February of 1982, Solomon Birdsong, accom-

panied by his brother Philander, placed a Pizza Hut

employee in the “cooler” of the restaurant in the

course of an armed robbery. After leaving the victim

in the cooler, Birdsong decided to elirninate the only

witness who could identify him. He reopened the door

to the cooler, raised a .32 caliber automatic pistol and

fired a bullet into the head of the victim. He closed

the door, but reopened it thinking the victim was still

App. 10

alive. He then fired another shot into the victim to

make sure that she was dead. Birdsong then

completed the robbery by removing a bag of money

from the cash register and fleeing to his automobile

where his brother Philander waited for him.

The prosecution urged as an aggravating

circumstance that the murder occurred during the

commission of an armed robbery and that it was

committed in an especially cruel and heinous manner.

In mitigation the defense argued that Birdsong was

insane at the time of the offense. Further, the defense

urged the jury to consider Birdsong’s youth (19 years

of age), his lack of a prior criminal history and his

good family background. (Birdsong was the son of a

prominent Shreveport educator. )

(2) State v. Arthur Lee Brown, 478 So.2d 600

(La.App.2d Cir. 1985); No. 123,619-D, First

Judicial District Court.

Arthur Lee Brown and two co-defendants were

indicted by a Caddo Parish grand jury for the first-

degree murder of Charles Moss. After trial by jury,

Brown was found guilty as charged. Because the

jurors were unable to unanimously agree on the

death penalty, Brown was_ sentenced to life

imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or

suspension of sentence.

On the evening of March 26, 1983, Charles Moss

was abducted by three black males while in his

automobile waiting to pick up an order from a

App. 11

Wendy’s restaurant in north Shreveport. Brown and

his co-conspiraters, Gregory Means and Terrell

Porcer, drove Moss to a secluded area of town and

reobed him of $5. When Moss attempted to escape his

abductors he was pursued by Brown and Porter. Moss

was then stabbed approximately 35 times with a

butcher knife. He was nearly decapitated. His body

was weighted down with cement blocks and dumped

into a nearby pond. His automobile was burned

beyond recognition so as to leave no trace of their

actions.

The State argued as aggravating circumstances

that the defendant was engaged in the perpetration of

an armed robbery and an aggravated kidnapping at

the time the offense was committed. The State also

argued that the offense was committed in an

especially cruel, heinous and atrocious manner.

In mitigation, the defense contended that the

evidence of Brown’s participation was so tenuous that

the jury could not comfortably return the death

penalty. The defense argued that Terrell Porter was

engaged in a frenzied overkill at the time of the

murder and that it was he, not Brown, who was more

culpable. The defense also argued in mitigation

Brown’s youth (19 years of age) and that he had no

substantial prior criminal record.

Other pertinent facts in this case include the

jury’s awareness that Porter had been permitted to

plead guilty to first-degree murder without capital

punishment, and that Means, the prosecution’s chief

App. 12

witness, had pled guilty to armed robbery and

accessory after the fact to first degree murder.

(3) State v. Charles Caldwell, 388 So.2d 1163

(La. 1980) (per curiam); Docket No. 111,554,

First Judicial District Court.

Charles Caldwell was indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury for the first degree murder of Henry

Simmons in violation of La. R.S. 14:30. After a three

day trial, the jury unanimously convicted Caldwell of

First Degree Murder. The trial court then sentenced

Caldweli to life imprisonment without benefit of

probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

The facts leading to Caldwell’s conviction and

sentence were as follows. Pamela Caldwell moved

back into the home of her parents following a iegal

separation from the defendant. On the evening of

June 16, 1979, Henry Simmons, age 55, picked up

Pamela and returned to her home in the early

morning hours of the following day. While Ms.

Caldwell and Simmons were parked in front of Ms.

Caldwell’s home, Charles Caldwell emerged from

some bushes (where he had spent the night awaiting

Pamela’s return) carrying a rifle. Thereupon he shot

Simmons seven times, killing him.

Although the offense arose out of circumstances

which indicated that the murder was s specific intent

killing, the State chose not to seek the death penalty

because the killing did not involve any underlying

aggravating circumstances.

App. 13

(4) State v. Field Calhoun, 554 So.2d 127 (La.

App. 2d Cir., 1989), writ denied, 558 So.2d

601, Docket No. 136,984; First Judicial

District Court.

Field Calhoun was indicted for the first-degree

murder of Robert Smith. At trial the jury found

Calhoun guilty as charged, but was unable to agree

whether death or life imprisonment should be

imposed. The district court accordingly sentenced

Calhoun to life imprisonment at hard labor without

benefit of probation, parole or suspension of sentence.

On December 20, 198€, Mr. and Mrs. Robert

Smith stopped at a grocery store on the way home

from work. Mrs. Smith went inside and used a $100

bill to make some purchases. Field Calhoun was in

the store and saw the $100 bill. When Mrs. Smith left

the store, Calhoun grabbed her, put a gun to her head

and demanded her money. Mr. Smith got out of the

car to help his wife and was shot twice by Calhoun.

Calhoun testified he had been using marijuana

and cocaine that day and that he had been drinking

steadily since the day before. Calhoun also claimed

that he accidentally bumped into Mrs. Smith and was

only trying to stop Mr. Smith when, he fired. Calhoun

was 17 years of age at the time of the offense.

App. 14

(5) State v. Laderick Campbell, 2006-286,

Louisiana Supreme Court, Docket No.

220,544, First Judicial District.

Laderick Campbell was convicted of first degree

murder committed in the course of an armed robbery

and sentenced to death. On February 11, 2002, 51

year old Kathy Parker was working as a cashier at

the Magnolia Club in Rodessa in rural Caddo Parish.

At about 9:30 p.m., two black males, later identified

as twenty-two year old Laderick Campbell and James

“Peanut” Washington, entered the club. A video

surveillance camera recorded the events that tran-

spired.

Campbell, who was armed with a_ shotgun,

demanded cash from Mrs. Parker, Witnesses testified

that she said she’d give him whatever he wanted, and

begged him not to shoot her. When Mrs. Parker

opened the cash register, Campbell reached over and

grabbed the money. He then shot Kathy Parker once

in the chest. Kathy Parker died later that evening at

LSU Medical Center. Campbell and Washington fled

in a vehicle driven by Lakischa “Keeta” Holloway,

with Virginia Burkett as a passenger. Both young

women testified for the prosecution. As Campbell got

in the car, he remarked “I shot the white bitch in the

neck.”

A Caddo Parish Detective reviewed the video

surveillance tape from the Magnolia Club and

recognized both men. He had dealt with them since

they were juveniles, and he knew they associated

App. 15

with each other. The next day the same Caddo

detective received a phone call from the Cass County,

Texas, Sheriff’s Office, passing on information

regarding the identity and location of the robbery and

murder suspects. Campbell was arrested in Kildare,

Texas, on February 12, 2002, on Caddo’s warrants for

first degree murder and armed robbery. Campbell

denied any knowledge of the crime, and claimed he

was at his mother’s house in Springhill at the time.

After a thorough colloquy, Campbell represented

himself at trial, with standby counsel from the Caddo

Parish Public Defenders Office, who then conducted

the penalty phase at Campbell’s request. The State

presented victim impact testimony from Kathy

Parker’s husband, daughter and employer/friend.

Campbell presented testimony that he would be a

model prisoner in the general population, but this

was rebutted by testimony of Campbell’s unprovoked

attack with a chair on another inmate.

(6) State v. Nathaniel Robert Code, Jr., 627

So.2d 1373 (La. 1993), certiorari denied

511 U.S. 1100, 114 S.Ct. 1870, 128 L.Ed.2d

490, rehearing denied 512 U.S. 1248, 114

S.Ct. 2775, 129 L.Ed.2d 887; Docket No.

138,860 - A, First Judicial District Court.

Nathaniel Code was indicted for eight counts of

first-degree murder, committed over four years. Code

was tried for the murders of Vivian Chaney, Carlitha

Culbert, Jerry Culbert and Billy Joe Harris (“the

Chaney family”), convicted and sentenced to death on

App. 16

each of the four counts. The jury found as

aggravating circumstances that Code had knowingly

created a risk of death to more than one person, that

three of the murders had been committed in a

particularly heinous, atrocious or cruel manner and

that Code was engaged in the perpetration or

attempted perpetration of aggravated burglary,

armed robbery, first-degree robbery or simple robbery.

This matter is currently pending post-conviction

relief.

The Chaney family was murdered on July 19,

1985. Billy Joe Harris was shot five times and had his

throat cut. Jerry Culbert was shot once in the head as

he slept. Vivian Chaney’s face was brutally beaten

and she was forced to sit in her daughter’s blood after

Code slashed Carlitha’s throat. Vivian Chaney was

then strangled by use of a ligature and/or drowned in

the bathtub where her body was found. Code’s palm

print was found on the bathtub. After murdering

Vivian Chaney, Code returned to Carlitha who had

been crawling on the floor. He slashed her throat

repeatedly, nearly decapitating her. Each of the three

stabbing victims was bound with electrical cord or

shoelaces and all but Billy Joe Harris were sight

impaired or legally blind. Code was charged after his

fingerprints were matched to the latent print found

on the bathtub.

At trial the State also proved that Code had

murdered four other people. Evidence as to these

murders was admitted to show system and identity.

During the penalty phase, the State showed that

App. 17

Code had previously pled guilty to attempted

aggravated rape, reduced from aggravated rape, an

incident in which he threatened the victim with a

knife, and threatened to kill her children. Code

served fifteen years at hard labor for the attempted

aggravated rape. The first of the eight murders was

committed eight months after his release.

(7) State v. Robert Glen Coleman, 2006-518,

Louisiana Supreme Court, Docket No.

226,818, First Judicial District.

Robert Coleman and Brandy Holmes were

arrested by the Caddo Sheriff’s Office and later

indicted for the first degree murder of Rev. Julian

Brandon and the attempted first degree murder of his

wife, Alice Brandon, as well as the first degree

murder of Terrance Blaze. Coleman was convicted

and sentenced to death.

Coleman and Holmes entered the Brandon home

in rural Caddo Parish during the evening hours of

New Year’s Day 2003. After pushing their way into

the front door of the Brandon residence, Julian

Brandon, a retired Baptist preacher, was shot at near

contact range under the chin with a .380 caliber

handgun. The projectile separated into two pieces.

One piece entered Julian Brandon’s brain. The other

piece exited the top portion of his head and was later

recovered from the ceiling of the dining room adjacent

to the front entryway. Brandon collapsed.

App. 18

Mrs. Brandon was taken to the rear bedroom and

shot in the head and left for dead. Reverend Brandon

was then attacked again by the intruders. At least

three separate Chicago Cutlery style knives from the

Brandons’ kitchen were used in this second attack.

Brandon received cuts to his nose, face and top of the

head. Rev. Brandon’s throat was cut by multiple

starting/stopping incisions from the front right of his

neck, across the front and around to the back of his

head. He was stabbed four times in the upper chest

with wounds that penetrated up to 6 inches. He was

also stabbed in the back where a six-inch knife was

found imbedded up to the handle in his back. Rev.

Brandon also had a large contusion from blunt force

trauma on his forehead. Pieces of the shattered knife

blades from these knives were found at the scene.

When the scene was discovered on January 5, 2003,

Mrs. Brandon was still alive and was transported by

helicopter to the hospital. Mrs. Brandon continues to

be in an impaired state as a result of the gunshot

wound to her head.

The Caddo Sheriff’s Office investigation started

off quickly with a call from persons at a nearby

apartment complex. It was learned that shortly after

New Year’s Day Brandy Holmes was in a near-by

apartment complex trying to sell jewelry and making

statements about killing an old couple down the road

by a church. Detectives went to the Holmes’ trailer,

which was just around the corner from the homicide

scene, and contacted Holmes, Coleman and other

family members. The group agreed to go to the

App. 19

detective office for interviews. Coleman denied

involvement but displayed a small cut on his hand.

The investigation revealed and the evidence

showed a close link between Coleman and Holmes.

Coleman and Holmes traveled from Mississippi,

where they lived together as boyfriend/girlfriend, to

Shreveport on Christmas Eve, 2002. They were

picked up by Holmes’ mother and resided in her

trailer while the couple was in Shreveport. They

brought with them a .380 caliber handgun, which

they had acquired from Holmes’ father.

Coleman was seen at a New Year’s Eve party at

Holmes’ trailer with a pistol and overheard making

inquires about where he could “hit a lick” (i.e, a

robbery). The next evening the home invasion robbery

and murder of Rev. Brandon occurred. Among other

thing, jewelry, particularly a multicolored bracelet,

and bankcards were taken from the home. Coleman

and Holmes were recorded on a Hibernia bank

surveillance video a short time later trying to use a

bankcard with the incorrect pin number.

Several days passed before the Brandons were

discovered. A family friend who missed the Brandons’

regular phone contacts and attendance at morning

and evening Sunday services went to the home and

found the couple. Bloody footprints were found during

the processing of the scene, which was occurring

simultaneously with the interviews of the persons

from the Holmes’ trailer. As a result, Coleman’s boots

were seized. Pants from a duffle bag carried by

App. 20

Coleman were seized later. Preliminary tests showed

positive for bloodstains on these items. DNA analysis

later confirmed that Rev. Brandon’s blood was on the

boots worn and seized from Coleman in a distinctive

blood spatter pattern. Blood from the unrelated

murder of Terrance Blaze was also found on

Coleman’s pants. This information was presented

during the penalty phase.

The blood pattern of very small blood spots seized

from Coleman’s boots revealed that he had to be

standing close to Brandon when the blood transfer

occurred. This type of blood spatter comes from fast

moving blood, such as from gunshots. It was not the

type of blood pattern that would come from walking

through a bloody area. Coleman was arrested for

murder after the interviews that evening and the

next morning.

Coleman was placed in an intake cell with two

other inmates. Coleman made statements relating

details of how he and his girlfriend, who he was

“training” and “putting to the test,” robbed and killed

an old couple. The inmates immediately contacted the

guards. They were separated from Coleman and

reported the statements to detectives

Many incriminating items were recovered from

the Holmes’ trailer where the two murderers had

stayed. Most importantly, a clear plastic food service

glove was found in the rain gutter of the trailer. A

multi-colored bracelet and a pearl bracelet were

found in the glove. Three empty fired .380 shell

App. 21

casings were found in the gutter near the glove. Rev.

Brandon’s daughter identified the multi-colored

bracelet as one she had given her mother some time

earlier and which was missing from the home after

the attack. The shell casings were matched to .380

shell casings recovered from Mississippi where

Holmes’ father showed detectives where he had fired

a .380 handgun that was missing at the time of

Coleman and Holmes’ departure from Mississippi just

prior to the murder. The portions of the .380 projectile

that were recovered from Rev. Brandon’s brain and

dining room ceiling were matched to a projectile

recovered from a tree at the same location in

Mississippi where police had recovered shell casings

pointed out by Holmes’ father.

Victim impact testimony from family members

and a family friend was introduced at penalty phase.

Evidence of Coleman’s prior convictions, including

armed robbery, and the unadjudicated homicide of

Terrance Blaze were also admitted, Coleman’s case is

currently pending appeal.

(8) State v. Michael Anthony Cooks, 97-0999

(La. 09/09/98), 720 So.2d 637, certiorari

denied 526 U.S. 1042, 119 S.Ct. 1342, 143

L.Ed.2d 505, rehearing denied 526 U.S.

1128, 119 S.Ct. 1789, 143 L.Ed.2d 816;

Docket No. 173,208, First Judicial District

Court.

Michael Anthony Cooks was indicted for and

convicted of the first-degree murder of Joe Frazier.

App. 22

The jury unanimously recommended the death

penalty, finding as aggravating circumstances that

the killing took place in the course of a robbery and

that Cooks knowingly created a risk of death or great

bodily harm to more than one person.

On January 20, 1995 Cooks, known as “Da Mad

Monsta Crip,” and at least five others invaded

Frazier’s home and forced him and two other victims

to the floor. Frazier was shot fourteen times in the

back with three different caliber bullets, including a

.45 caliber. The other two victims were shot five or six

times each, one losing an eye. Both were shot in the

head and sustained some brain damage. At trial the

surviving victims testified that Cooks was the leader

and gave orders to the others to “kill this bitch.”

Cooks was carrying a .45 chrome automatic. As Cooks

was leaving the house, Frazier was crawling across

the floor. Cooks shot him in the back, put a new clip

in his weapon and shot him some more. Cooks stole

marijuana and cash from the house. Cooks’ girlfriend

called police and turned him in. While in prison

Cooks wrote letters in “gang script” to the girlfriend

threatening the lives of the surviving victims. He also

threatened to kill the girlfriend and her sister after

burning their genitals with a cigarette lighter.

During the penalty phase, Cooks’ defense team

presented testimony by Mark Vigen, a psychologist,

that Cooks had a little lower than average IQ but was

not borderline or retarded and that Cooks handled

stress through violence. Cooks’ sister testified that

their mother’s boyfriends had pushed him around.

App. 23

His niece testified that Cooks had once taken her

“trick or treating” and his thirteen year old son,

whom he had rarely seen until he was nine, testified

that he’d be sad if his father got the death penalty.

The State presented restricted evidence of an

aggravated battery committed while incarcerated

awaiting trial where Cooks had stabbed out the eye of

another inmate. The State also presented limited

testimony regarding another aggravated battery

incident where Cooks and other gang members

attacked a customer in a liquor store. As in the

instant case, Cooks directed his companions to kill

their victim. Cooks personally beat this victim with a

newspaper rack and threatened to kill two liquor

store attendants if they told police. It is hardly

surprising that the jury, confronted with “Da Mad

Monsta Crip’s” violent tendencies, agreed unani-

mously to impose the death sentence.

(9) State v. Percy Davis, 92-1623, (La. 5/23/94),

637 So.2d 1012, certiorari denied 513 U.S.

975, 115 S.Ct. 450, 130 L.Ed.2d 3539,

rehearing denied 513 U.S. 1066, 115 S.Ct.

687, 130 L.Ed.2d 617; Docket No. 151,074,

First Judicial District Court.

Percy Davis was indicted for two counts of first-

degree murder committed two days apart. The counts

were tried together and Davis was found guilty and

sentenced to death on both counts. The jury found as

to each count the aggravating circumstance that

App. 24

Davis had been engaged in the perpetration of armed

robbery. The case is now on post-conviction relief.

Mark Sanchez was a cashier at a Circle K

convenience store on North Market Street in

Shreveport. On June 29, 1990, he was working after

midnight. Davis parked his car behind the Circle K

and went in. He shot Mark Sanchez three times:

twice in the abdomen and once right between the

eyes. Davis then jumped onto the counter and opened

the cash register, obtaining $30 to $40. Sanchez died

the next day.

On July 1, 1990, Calvin Moore and his wife

Norma were working at “Fats’ Exxon,” a convenience

store in the North Market Street area which he and

his wife owned. At midnight, Davis and Rodney Hill

entered the store. Davis took a gun from his sock and

shot Calvin Moore in the chest. He shot at Norma

Moore as well. This time, a video surveillance camera

recorded the murder. Local television § stations

broadcast part of the tape and Rodney Hill turned

himself in to police that same night. Davis was

arrested shortly thereafter. His gun, a .25 Raven

automatic, was identified as the murder weapon in

both killings as well as the attempted murder of

Johnny Hall, the same night as Mark Sanchez was

murdered. Hall was working as a cashier at Fats’

Exxon at the time.

The jury found the presence of three aggravating

circumstances for each of the murders of Mark

Sanchez and Calvin Moore.

App. 25

The jury found as to both murders that the

murders were committed in the perpetration or

attempted perpetration of armed robbery, and that the

offender had been previously convicted of an un-

related armed robbery. This additional armed robbery

occurred in Bossier City only a few days before the

Shreveport murders, and testimony proved defen-

dant’s plea of guilty to that charge.

As to the murder of Mark Sanchez, the jury

found as an additional aggravating circumstance that

the murder was committed in an especially heinous,

atrocious or cruel manner.

As to the murder of Calvin Moore, the jury found

as an additional aggravating circumstance that the

offender knowingly created a risk of death and great

bodily harm to more than one person. During the

armed robbery of Fats’ Exxon, Percy Davis not only

shot Calvin Moore, he also fired at Norma Moore,

hitting a display case near where she was standing.

Defense counsel tried to present Davis as a victim

of his cocaine addiction and argued intoxication in

mitigation.

(10) State v. Curtis Deal, 00-0434 (La. 11/28/01),

802 So.2d 1254, certiorari denied 537 U.S.

828, 123 S.Ct. 124, 154 L.Ed.2d 42; Docket

No. 184,852, First Judicial District Court.

Curtis R. Deal was convicted of the First Degree

Murder of his eleven week old son, [Name Of Minor

App. 26

Child Omitted]. The jury sentenced the defendant to

death.

On the evening of November 16, 1996, Deal and

his wife, the mother of his infant son, were

entertaining a house guest at the home which they

shared with the victim’s grandmother. After much

drinking of beer, Deal was up alone after everyone

else went to sleep. In the early morning hours of

November 17, 1996, the victim began crying. Deal

became frustrated with the baby continuing to cry

after he had fed the child. Deal stuffed a golf ball size

piece of paper towel down the baby’s throat and then

fractured the baby’s skull by throwing the child into

the baby bed, causing the baby’s head to strike the

slats of the crib. The Fire Department responded to

Deal’s 911 call and found the baby dead. The towel

was removed from the baby’s throat, but fevered

efforts at resuscitation were unsuccessful. Later that

same afternoon Deal confessed to Shreveport Police

Department detectives what he had done.

At the penalty phase Deal testified that he never

meant to kill his son. The defendant also presented

the evidence of Dr. Mark Vigen, a psychologist, who

testified Deal was of average intelligence and the

product of developmental circumstances and of bio-

logical vulnerability. Dr. Vigen said Deal was dependent

on alcohol and drugs. Dr. Vigen also testified that he

was told by family members that Deal had a terrible

temper and as a child would often tease and behave

cruelly toward his siblings. Dr. Vigen was also told

that Deal had a history of cruelty to animals,

App. 27

including squeezing the family dog’s testicles and

allowing the dog to attack penned chickens and

terrify a pet caged rabbit. Dr. Vigen also found Deal

likely to have chronic problems with anger and

irritability which my be disruptive if not dangerous.

(11) State v. John L. Donaldson, 391 So.2d 1182

(La. 1980) (per curiam); Docket No. 110,214,

First Judicial District Court.

John L. Donaldson was indicted by a Caddo

Parish grand jury for the first degree murder of an

elderly Shreveport woman on January 12, 1979.

Donaldson was also indicted for the aggravated

burglary of the victim’s home. Following trial by jury

Donaldson was found guilty as charged of first degree

murder. The jury was unable to reach agreement on a

sentence. Donaldson was then sentenced to life

imprisonment pursuant to La.C.Cr.P. Article 905.8.

The facts surrounding Donaldson’s conviction

and sentence were as follows. Eighty years old at the

time of her death, Mrs. Herrin sustained three fatal

stab wounds in her back. When police arrived to

investigate, they discovered that the murderer had

taken numerous items from the home, includ*g

diamond rings taken from the fingers of Herr? :. and

weapons from the home. Shortly thereafter Donaldson

was stopped by Bossier City police on a traffic violation.

Police officers discovered the items stolen from the

Herrin residence and the murder weapon in his

vehicle.

App. 28

The prosecution argued as aggravating circum-

stances that the killing occurred during the com-

mission of an aggravated burglary and that it was an

especially cruel and heinous offense. In mitigation,

the defense argued that Donaldson had no previous

criminal history and that he had a wife and family.

The defense also urged the jury not to return the

death penalty since the prosecution’s case was en-

tirely circumstantial.

(12) State v. Willie Douglas, 37,721-KA, (La.App.2d

Cir. 12/10/03), 862 So.2d 390, writ denied

2004-0153 (La. 5/7/04}, 872 So.2d 1080; Docket

No. 207,807, First Judicial District Court.

Willie Douglas was convicted of the first degree

murder of his girlfriend’s three year old daughter,

[Name Of Minor Child Omitted]. The jury was unable

to reach a unanimous verdict during the sentencing

phase, so a life sentence was imposed.

Douglas was the live-in boyfriend of Gwen

Remedies, who was about 6 months pregnant with his

child. Gwen’s friend Anita was letting Gwen and

Willie stay with her. Anita and Gwen were moving

that week to a new place where Willie was not going

to be living. Anita left her two children with Willie

while she and Gwen went to the new place to clean

up. Gwen also left three year old [Name Of Minor

Child Omitted) with Douglas.

Douglas later called 911, claiming [Name Of

Minor Child Omitted] fell down the stairs on the way

App. 29

to the pool, but gave differing versions of how it

happened. In fact, as the coroner testified, [Name Of

Minor Child Omitted] was shaken so hard that her

brain began to separate from itself and the walls of

the skull, causing a severe hematoma. Her injuries

were not consistent with a fall down the stairs.

One side of the brain swelled so much it com-

pressed the other down onto the brain stem, eventually

stopping the signals necessary to make the heart beat

and the lungs breathe. In addition [Name Of Minor

Child Omitted]’s abdomen was compressed in a

manner that left no external mark but to such a degree

the coroner said he could feel her spine if he pressed

down with his hand. This resulted in a laceration

inside the liver as it was crushed against the spine.

The child had “fingertip” bruises consistent with

being held violently as well as a broken rib.

In addition at the hospital while [Name Of Minor

Child Omitted] was in the pediatric intensive care

unit, Douglas assaulted the investigating officer and

told an LSU Medical Center police officer: “I should

have kicked her ass. I run her and if I tell her to shut

down the investigation, it stops.” At the penalty

phase, twenty or so church members, family members,

etc. testified as to Douglas’s character.

(13) State v. Darrell Dewayne Draughn, 05-1825,

Louisiana Supreme Court; Docket No.

212,107, First Judicial District.

Darrell Draughn was convictec. of the first degree

murder of sixty-four year old Loretta White. The jury

App. 30

found that the offense was committed during the

course of an armed robbery, first degree robbery or

simple robbery, and was committed in an especially

heinous, atrocious and cruel manner. Draughn was

sentenced to death.

Loretta White’s body was discovered on the

morning of April 10, 2000, by her son when he arrived

to take her to work. Loretta White had been stabbed

51 times, mostly in her head, face and neck. Her

hands and forearms had defensive wounds. One stab

wound to her right shoulder severed the carotid

artery, and was likely the fatal wound. At least two

stab wounds to her abdomen were post-mortem,

probably inflicted to determine if Loretta White was

actually dead.

Mrs. White’s purse, wallet and picture holder

were in the hallway next to the kitchen where her

body was found. Missing from the wallet was the

small amount of cash she habitually carried, from $20

to $40, and her credit cards and checkbook.

Blood droplets located at the crime scene were

later matched to Draughn’s DNA, who had become a

suspect after an anonymous tip. Upon his arrest, a

large scar was observed on Draughn’s right hand

between the ring finger and the little finger. The ring

finger was also “drawn up” as if it had been injured.

Draughn lived with his mother, a few houses

down from the victim’s home on the same block of

East Boulevard Street. At the time of his arrest, some

seven months after the instant offense, Draughn was

App. 31

incarcerated for an unrelated homicide where he had

been positively identified in a shooting. That second

degree murder charge was dismissed after Draughn

was sentenced to death for the instant offense. Evi-

dence of the unrelated homicide was presented to the

jury during the penalty phase of the trial. Draughn’s

case is currently pending appeal before this court.

(14) State v. Cedric D. Edwards, 97-1797 (La.

7/2/99), 750 So.2d 893, certiorari denied 528

U.S. 1026, 120 S.Ct. 542, 145 L.Ed.2d 421;

Docket No. 177,994, First Judicial District

Court.

Cedric Edwards was convicted of the first-degree

murder of Victoria Catanese Kennedy and was sen-

tenced to death.

Edwards and at least one unidentified man made

an unauthorized entry into the home of Gerald and

Victoria Kennedy. The men had entered after Gerald

saw them and went into the house to get a gun. He

yelled to his wife and daughter to run. Edwards shot

Gerald, breaking his arm. Victoria fell as she ran and

Edwards shot her twice in the back of the head. Their

teenage daughter hid under a sofa and escaped

injury.

The jury found as aggravating factors that the

offender was engaged in the commission or attempted

commission of armed robbery or aggravated burglary

and that the offender knowingly created a risk of

death or great bodily harm to more than one person.

App. 32

(15) State v. Wayne Robert Felde, 422 So.2d 370

(La. 1982); certiorari denied 461 U.S. 918,

103 S.Ct. 1903, 77 L.Ed.2d 290 (1983); Docket

No. 109,803, First Judicial District Court.

Wayne Robert Felde was indicted by a Caddo

Parish grand jury for the first degree murder of

Shreveport police officer Glen Tompkins and found

guilty as charged. The same jury unanimously rec-

ommended a death sentence on the ground of one

aggravating circumstance: the victim was a peace

officer engaged in his lawful duties. La. C.Cr.P.

Article 905.4(b).

On October 20, 1978, Wayne Robert Felde, an

escapee from a Maryland penitentiary where he had

been serving time for manslaughter and four counts

of felonious assault, shot and killed a Shreveport

police officer. Police had responded to a disturbance

at a pizza restaurant where they arrested Felde. A

pat-down search failed to disclose a pistol hidden in

his trousers.

On the way to the Shreveport Police Department,

Feide managed to withdraw the weapon from his

trousers and fired into the back of the front seat

where Officer Tompkins sat behind the wheel.

Tompkins was shot in the back and died only minutes

afterwards. The defense presented a complex insanity

defense, alleging that be suffered from a _ post-

traumatic stress syndrome as a result of combat in

Viet Nam. Felde also alleged intoxication as part of

his defense.

App. 33

The sole aggravating circumstance urged by the

prosecution was that the victim was a police officer

engaged in his lawful duties at the time of the

offense. Felde testified at the penalty phase and

urged the jurors to return the death penalty. His

counsel urged the jury to return the death penalty in

keeping with his agreement with Felde that a verdict

of “not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity”

was the only acceptable verdict.

The foregoing prosecution was tried in Rapides

Parish, Louisiana, on a change of venue due to

extensive pro-trial publicity. State v. Felde, 382 So.2d

1384 (La. 1980). State v. Felde was the first first-

degree murder case since 1976 where Caddo Parish

prosecutors obtained the death penalty.

Felde was executed on March 15, 1988.

(16) State v. Mack E. Forbes, 362 So.2d 1385 (La.

1978) (per curiam); No. 104,937, First Judicial

District Court.

Mack E. Forbes was indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury for the first degree murder of Delores

Edwards. Forbes was tried before a jury in November,

1977, and found guilty as charged. After a sentencing

hearing, the jury recommended that Forbes be sen-

tenced to life imprisonment.

The evidence adduced during trial showed that

Forbes confronted Edwards and her boyfriend, James

Green, in front of the Brown Ow! Bar in Shreveport,

App. 34

Louisiana. As the victim and James Green turned to

walk away from Forbes to avoid a confrontation, the

defendant started shooting at Green. He shot four

times with three bullets striking Green. Forbes then

turned to Delores Edwards, knocked her to the

ground, held the pistol up to her chest and shot her

twice in the chest at close range.

The State argued that the defendant had created

a risk of death to two or more persons and that the

offense was committed in an especially cruel and

heinous manner. The defense countered with the

argument that the offense was essentially a crime of

passion arising out of domestic violence, as Forbes

had shot his former girlfriend who was accompanied

by her new boyfriend. Although Forbes had served a

great deal of time in prison as a result of several

burglary convictions, the State was not permitted to

argue Forbes’ substantial criminal record because

they were not crimes of violence. The defense thus

was able to exploit Forbes’ apparent absence of

previous criminal conduct.

(17) State v. Glenn Ford, 489 So.2d 1250 (La.

1986), writ granted and remanded 479 U.S.

1077, 107 S.Ct. 1272, 94 L.Ed.2d 133, on

remand 503 So.2d 1009 (La. 1987), writ

denied 498 U.S. 992, 112 L.Ed.2d 547, 111

S.Ct. 537, rehearing denied 498 U.S. 1075,

111 S.Ct. 803, 112 L.Ed.2d 864; No. 126,005,

First Judicial District Court.

Glenn Ford was indicted for the first-degree

murder of Isadore Rozeman, an elderly jeweler. The

App. 35

jury found Ford guilty as charged and imposed the

death sentence. The jury found as an aggravating

circumstance that the murder was committed in the

perpetration of an armed robbery.

On November 5, 1983, Mr. Rozeman’s body was

found by a friend in his home watch repair shop. Mr.

Rozeman had been shot once through the head. A

duffle bag was used to cover Mr. Rozeman’s head

when he was shot. A brown paper bag had been used

as a glove to fire the weapon, and revealed a partial

print consistent with Ford’s.

The shop display cases had been emptied, of

jewelry and Mr. Rozeman’s pockets turned out.

Neighbors placed Glenn Ford, Mr. Rozeman’s

yardman, in the area near the time Mr. Rozeman had

spoken with the friend who later found his body, the

last time Mr. Rozeman was known to be alive.

Pawnshop receipts showed Ford had pawned

jewelry similar to that taken from Mr. Rozeman’s shop

immediately after the murder. Ford had purchased a

gun the morning before the murder and tried to sell

one later that afternoon. A gunshot residue test was

positive. Ford told a cellmate that he and two other

men robbed Mr. Bozeman and that he shot him. Ford

presented an alibi defense.

App. 36

(18) State v. Russell Foy, Sr., 439 So.2d 433 (La.

1983); Docket No. 114,783, First Judicial

District Court.

Foy was arrested and indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury on two counts of first-degree murder. Foy

was tried by a jury on April 26, 1982, and found guilty

as charged. Following a sentence hearing the jury

unanimously recommended that Foy be sentenced to

life imprisonment without benefit of probation,

parole, or suspension of sentence.

On June 7, 1980, Carr Allen Corbin. his common-

law wife, Betty Williams, and their two daughters

were confronted by the defendant who directed

Corbin to drive his automobile to a remote area in

Caddo Parish. They were followed by an unidentified

male in another car. There Russell Foy shot and

killed Carr Corbin. Foy then left the Corbin vehicle

and got into the other car. Shortly thereafter the

automobile stalled as Ms. Williams tried to drive

away and Foy’s vehicle pulled up alongside her. Foy

approached Ms. Williams and shot her three or more

times. The two little girls were not harmed.

As an aggravating circumstance the prosecution

argued that Foy knowingly created a risk of death or

great bodily harm to more than one person. In mit-

igation, the defense urged the jurors to consider Foy’s

relatively young age, the absence of a prior significant

criminal history, and that Foy was married.

App. 37

(19) State v. Roderick L. Gay, 29,434 (La.App.2d

Cir. 6/18/97), 697 So.2d 642; Docket No.

174,135-A, First Judicial District Court.

Roderick L. Gay was indicted for the first-degree

murder of David L. Morris on March 24, 1995, and

found guilty as charged. The jury was unable to agree

on the penalty and Gay was therefore sentenced to

life imprisonment.

David Morris was selling clothes out of the trunk

of his car when Gay put a gun to the back of Morris’s

head and demanded “give me all your shit.” When

Morris turned, Gay shot him in the chest through the

armpit. Gay then pressed the gun to Morris’s side and

fired again, severing his spinal column. Gay shot

Morris yet again as he lay paralyzed in the street,

with the shot entering Morris’s temple. Morris’s wife

and daughter were present during the shooting.

After shooting Morris, Gay stole several armloads

of clothing from the trunk of Morris’s car. Witnesses

identified Gay as the shooter. At trial Gay claimed he

was intoxicated and that Morris was shot in a struggle

over the gun that began because Gay thought that

Marvin Young, a State’s witness, was trying to “beat

him” out of some money he gave Young for drugs.

At the penalty phase the State argued as the sole

aggravating circumstance that the killing was com-

mitted in the course of an armed robbery. The defense

presented testimony that Gay was intoxicated and a

crack addict and Gay maintained that the shooting

arose because of an argument over drug money.

App. 38

(20) State v. Demetric Gilliam, 36,118 (La.App.2d

Cir. 8/30/02), 827 So.2d 508, writ denied 2002-

3090 (La. 11/14/05), 858 So.2d 422; Docket No.

209,258, First Judicial District Court.

Demetric Gilliam was convicted of the first

degree murder of a three year old boy and sentenced

to life imprisonment.

On August 18, 1998, Demetric Gilliam got

together with his brother, Terance, and a friend,

Larry White, and went looking for one Tyrell Odell.

Mr. Odell had been giving Demetric trouble for

several months, and the last straw was the robbery of

a dice game a few days before where Demetric lost

$4,500.00, part of some $10,000.00 supposedly stolen

in the robbery.

When Gilliam saw Odell’s car parked at the

Hollywood Liquor Bank, he pulled up and stopped his

car broadside, blocking Odell’s car in. Odell, who had

his former girlfriend, Teresa Bryant, her two children,

and a friend, Eric Calhoun, in the car, reversed in an

attempt to get away, colliding with the side of

Gilliam’s car as a result. Gilliam began to fire his .45

out of the window, part of the time firing blind as he

ducked down the seat. Terance, with the assault rifle,

and Larry White, with the shotgun, emerged from

Gilliam’s Grand Am and riddled Odell’s car with

gunfire, with some 25 bullets entering through every

side of the vehicle. Every occupant of Odell’s vehicle

sustained gunshot wounds. The three year old victim,

who had been shielded by Calhoun, jumped up when

App. 39

Calhoun was shot and sustained a gunshot wound to

the back of the head from the assault rifle. He was

the sole fatality of the ambush.

Gilliam was arrested the next day as be cowered

in the attic of a girlfriend’s home, interrupted in his

preparations to flee. Gilliam was indicted for first

degree murder where there was a substantial risk of

death or great bodily harm te more than one person.

Gilliam was found guilty as charged and, the jury

being unable to agree on a sentence, received life

imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole or

suspension of sentence. At the penalty phase, Gilliam’s

family members testified to his good character. Gilliam

lacked any prior felony convictions.

(21) State v. Bobby Ray Hall, 388 So.2d 1164 (La.

1980) (per curiam); No. 110,856, First Judicial

District Court.

Bobby Ray Hall was indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury for the first degree murder of his wife,

Ollie Mae Hall, in violation of La. R.S. 14:30. Hall

was found guilty as charged by the jury. Following a

sentencing hearing Hall was _ sentenced to life

imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of pro-

bation, parole or suspension of sentence.

On March 24, 1978, Bobby Ray Hall got into an

argument with his wife, Ollie Mae Hall. Shortly

thereafter, Hall fired two shots at his wife, striking

her in the arm and back. He was seen running from

App. 40

the residence with a .12 gauge shotgun in his hand.

In a recorded statement Hall admitted shooting his

wife but claimed that he didn’t mean to kill her.

The prosecution did not actively seek the death

penalty in this case. The circumstances of the offense

indicated that the killing arose out of a domestic

disagreement and that Hall may have been under the

influence of a mental or emotional disturbance at the

time of the killing.

(22) State v. Bobby Lee Hampton, 98-0331 (La.

4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, certiorari denied

528 U.S. 1007, 120 S.Ct. 504, 145 L.Ed.2d

390, rehearing denied 528 U.S. 1108, 120

S.Ct. 855, 145 L.Ed.2d 721 (2000); Docket

No. 176,627, First Judicial District Court.

Bobby Lee Hampton was convicted of the first-

degree murder of Russell Coleman during the course

of an armed robbery and was sentenced to death.

On August 12, 1995, Hampton and two compan-

ions entered a Thrifty Liquor Store on Greenwood

Road in Shreveport. Hampton shot Coleman three

times in the back without warning. During the pen-

alty phase, the jury learned of Hampton’s prior con-

victions for aggravated battery and second-degree

battery, attempted simple escape and attempted

armed robbery. Evidence was also adduced regarding

an unadjudicated armed robbery Hampton committed

six days before the murder where the 27 year old

Hampton pistol-whipped a Kroger grocery store

App. 41

employee. Hampten’s family members asked the jury

to spare his life.

(23) State v. Brandon Haynes, 27,499 (La.App.2d

Cir. 11/1/95), 662 So.2d 849, writ denied 95-

2768 (La. 2/16/96), 667 So.2d 1050; Docket

No. 166,637, First Judicial District Court.

Brandon Haynes was indicted for and convicted

of the first-degree murder of Fang Yang. The jury was

unable to agree on the penalty, so a sentence of life

without benefit was imposed by the trial court.

Fang Yang was a 26 year old graduate student at

LSU Medical School in Shreveport. On October 26,

1993, her body was found near the ten-story Bio-

Medical Research Institute (BRI) building under con-

struction at the medical school. She had been raped

both anally and vaginally and cut and stabbed super-

ficially before falling to her death from the roof of the

ten-story building. Overnight surveillance film at the

medical school showed construction worker Brandon

Haynes reaching up to turn off the camera on the

ninth floor of the medical school building which was

connected to the BRI building. Fang Yang’s wallet

was found concealed in the wall of Haynes’ home and

human blood was present in his car. DNA testing

confirmed that Haynes was the person who had raped

Fang Yang. Blood was also found on the roof of the

BRI building.

At trial Haynes’ defense team admitted their

client’s guilt as to the kidnapping and rape of Fang

App. 42

Yang, over their client’s express objection. The de-

fense concentrated on their claim that Fang Yang’s

fall was accidental, perhaps as she ran to try to

escape Haynes. Haynes had no prior criminal convic-

tions.

(24) State v. Daniel Irish, 00-2086, (La. 01/15/02),

807 So.2d 208, certiorari denied 537 U.S.

846, 123 S.Ct. 185, 154 L.Ed.2d 73; Docket

No. 186,209, First Judicial District Court.

Danny Irish was convicted of the first degree

murder of his landlord, contractor Russ Rowland,

during the course of an armed robbery, and was

sentenced to death.

Evidence at trial showed that Irish had discussed

for several days a plan to rob and murder one of two

local contractors, finally deciding on Rowland, to

whom Irish owed back rent. Irish lured Rowland to

his trailer on the promise of a rent check. When

Rowland arrived, a co-defendant, who later pled

guilty and testified against Irish at trial, shot Row-

land in the stomach with a twelve-gauge sabot slug.

Irish then shot Rowland in the head with a 30/30 as

he begged for his life. Irish dragged the body into the

trailer, but was unable to get his co-defendant to help

him dispose of the body. He: had planned to put the

body in a sleeping bag and “sink” it in a near-by

swampy area. Police arrived before he was able to

carry out his plan.

App. 43

At the penalty phase, Irish put on evidence that

he had moved frequently as a child, and that his

mother had been married five times. A defense expert

diagnosed him as having an antisocial personality

disorder.

(25) State v. Edward W. Johnson, dr., 27,522

(La.App.2d Cir. 12/6/95), 665 So.2d 1237;

Docket No. 162,565, First Judicial District

Court.

Edward Johnson, Jr., was convicted of the first-

degree murder of Shreveport police officer Ron Dean

during the execution of a drug search warrant on

December 16, 1992. The jury sentenced him to life

imprisonment.

Ron Dean was the first man on the entry team.

He was wearing a black T-shirt with “POLICE” in big

white letters across the front and back. He also wore

a bullet-proof vest. The officers continuously an-

nounced their presence, yelling “Police, search war-

rant” and Dean attacked the door with a battering

ram. Dean then kicked the door open. As he ran in,

Johnson shot Dean twice. One bullet hit Dean in the

left armpit, an area uncovered by the vest. Dean died

due to severe hemorrhage as the bullet traveled

through both lungs and his heart. Another bullet was

found in the back of the vest. Another police officer

was shot in the leg by Johnson, who sustained two or

three minor gunshot wounds himself.

App. 44

At trial, Johnson claimed that he did not hear the

officers yelling and thought the officers were bur-

glars, and was therefore acting in self-defense.

(26) State v. Ray Jones, Jr., 386 So.2d 1363 (La.

1980); Docket No. 110,300, First Judicial

District Court.

Ray Jones, Jr., was indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury for the first-degree murder of his two and

one-half month old son. After trial by jury, he was

found guilty as charged. The same jury then recom-

mended that Jones be sentenced to life imprisonment

without benefit of probation, parole or suspension of

sentence.

On January 18, 1979, Ray Jones, Jr., smoked a

PCP cigarette in the home of his common-law wife.

After shaving his head and removing all of his cloth-

ing, he choked his common-law wife into unconscious-

ness while chanting the word “satan.” He then beat

his young son and threw his body into the back yard.

He was arrested a few blocks away while scuffling

with two white men working in a vacant house. Jones

screamed that he had been sent by God to kill all

white people. Jones was immediately transported to

the psychiatric ward of the LSU Medical Center in

Shreveport. Medication had an immediate beneficial

effect on Jones, who then recounted to the hospital

staff and Shreveport Police the circumstances leading

up to, and including, the offense. Jones explained

App. 45

that he killed the child because he felt the child was

Satan.

The State did not seek the death penalty in this

case because of the presence of the obvious mitigating

circumstance that Jones was under the influence of

his voluntary intoxication. The prosecution neverthe-

less did advise the jury that if they found that the

offense had been committed in an especially heinous,

atrocious, or cruel manner that the death penalty was

an available option. In mitigation, Jones presented

evidence from the two members of the Sanity Com-

mission regarding the defendant’s intoxication and

the PCP level found in his urine sample.

(27) State v. Michael Edward King, 395 So.2d

13867 (La. 1981) (per curiam); Docket No.

109,890, First Judicial District Court.

Michael Edward King was indicted by a Caddo

Parish grand jury for the first-degree murder of

Audria Renee Kellum in violation of La. R.S. 14:30.

Following a jury trial the defendant was found guilty

as charged. Thereafter the jury recommended that he

be sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of

parole, probation or suspension of sentence.

The evidence at trial revealed that Michael

Edward King lived in a common-law relationship

with Audria Renee Kellum and her two children. In

November of 1978, King came home one night carry-

ing a pistol. He argued with Audria until she called

the police to have him ordered out of the house. King

App. 46

was twice ordered to leave the premises but feigned

doing so. Upon re-entering the home he packed a

suitcase. While in the process of leaving King fired

two or three shots at Audria while she was seated in

a chair only a few feet from him. The fatal wound

severed her jugular vein after entering her right

cheek. The offense was committed in full view of the

victim’s mother and children, who were all in the

same room.

The prosecution pointed out the existence of two

aggravating circumstances during the penalty phase

of the trial, to-wit: that the offender created a risk of

death or great bodily harm to more than one person

and that the offense was committed in an especially

heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. The State did not,

however, actively seek the death penalty in the case

because the prosecution felt that such a penalty was

not warranted, the murder having arisen out of a

domestic confrontation. The jurors were merely

advised that if one of those aggravating circum-

stances were found that they could recommend the

death penalty as an option. In mitigation, the defense

adopted the evidence adduced at the guilt phase

which attempted to show that King was intoxicated

at the time of the killing and was under the influence

of a mental disturbance.

App. 47

(28) State v. James Allen Lee, 395 So.2d 700

(La. 1981); No. 105,594, First Judicial Dis-

trict Court.

James Allen Lee was indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury for the first-degree murder of Jerry Dennis

committed on June 18, 1977. Defendant entered a

dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of

insanity. Lee’s jury rejected his defense, convicting

him as charged. The jury then unanimously recom-

mended that Lee be sentenced to life imprisonment at

hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or

suspension of sentence.

On June 18, 1977, James Allen Lee went to the

Shady Oaks Cafe, a neighborhood bar and restaurant.

Jerry Dennis owned and operated the cafe on the

night in question. Dennis and Lee were acquain-

tances. Initially Lee was at the cafe at approximately

12 p.m., complaining to Dennis and two of the pa-

trons that someone had taken his car keys. A patron

told Lee to leave the cafe as no one there had his

keys.

Lee returned to his house and retrieved a shot-

gun. Lee returned to the cafe and shot Jerry Dennis

in the throat and chest, killing him.

Lee’s trial was extraordinary. He was a self-

proclaimed born-again Christian and religious zealot.

He repeatedly and vigorously recited scripture to all

who would listen for the duration of the trial. Lee also

was a huge physical specimen; his muscular build

was like that of a professional weight lifter. On more

App. 48

than one occasion Lee was handcuffed and shackled.

He repeatedly interrupted the trial with outlandish

and sometimes violent behavior. His conduct ranged

from the singing of the National Anthem before the

jury to a physical confrontation with six large deputy

sheriffs. He often interrupted argument and testi-

mony with loud recitations of scripture.

The death penalty was not sought by the prosecu-

tion in this case for obvious reasons. However, the

jury was made aware that the death penalty was a

viable option, though no one encouraged the jury to

return the same.

(29) State v. Nick Nicholson, 437 So.2d 849 (La.

1983); Docket No. 119,116, First Judicial

District Court.

Nick Nicholson was indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury for the first-degree murder of Kelly Ann

Gramm in violation of La. R.S. 14:30. Nicholson was

found guilty as charged by unanimous verdict. The

same jury was unable to unanimously agree on the

penalty. The trial court subsequently sentenced

Nicholson to spend the remainder of his life in prison

at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence.

The evidence at trial showed that Kelly Ann

Gramm, the only night attendant at a Citgo Quick

Mart, was attacked by Nicholson with a pocket knife

at approximately 2 a.m. The victim sustained 39 stab

wounds over her head and body. A piece of the knife

App. 49

blade was found lodged in her head. Having bruta!ly

murdered his victim, Nicholson grabbed the cash

He was quickly apprehended by a police officer who

was responding to a silent alarm at the Citgo Quick

Mart and saw Nicholson’s vehicle leaving the parking

lot. The register was on the front seat of Nicholson’s

car.

The State sought the death penalty on the basis

of two aggravating circumstances, to-wit: that the

murder was committed during the course of an armed

robbery and that it was accomplished in an especially

cruel and heinous manner. The defense urged several

arguments in mitigation, including Nicholson’s youth

(18 years of age) and that he had no significant prior

criminal history. The defense also put on numerous

character witnesses in the penalty hearing, urging

the jury to spare Nicholson’s life.

(30) State v. Cecil Odom, 33,340, (La.App.2d

Cir. 5/10/00), 760 So.2d 576, writ denied

2000-1816 (La. 6/29/01) 794 So.2d 821;

Docket No. 189,353, First Judicial District

Court.

Cecil Odom was found guilty as charged of two

counts of First Degree Murder. The jury was unable

to agree on the penalty so the defendant received the

mandatory life sentence for both counts. Odom

stabbed his wife but she survived. He stabbed and

killed his adopted teenaged daughter and her

App. 50

natural grandmother. Evidence showed Odom was

obsessed with the girl and angry at her contempt for

him. Odom had entered a plea of not guilty and not

guilty by reason of insanity. The defendant had

previously been diagnosed with a mental illness and

had a family history of mental illness.

The defense adduced much evidence at the guilt

phase about Odom’s mental illness and his family

history. At the penalty phase of the trial the defense

put on evidence about his horrible childhood and his

father’s physical abuse of Odom and sexual abuse of

Odom’s sister. The defendant claimed he had also

been sexually abused by his uncle and one other

relative.

(31) State v. Bobby Ray Reed, 448 So.2d 794

(La.App. 2d Cir. 1984), writ denied 452

So.2d 696 (La. 1984); Docket No. 120,263,

First Judicial District Court.

Bobby Ray Reed was indicted by a Caddo Parish

grand jury for the first-degree murder of Tempie Ann

Jones. At the penalty phase of the trial the jury could

not unanimously agree on the imposition of the death

penalty. Reed therefore was sentenced to life impris-

onment at hard labor without benefit of parole,

probation or suspension of sentence.

On the evening of January 15, 1982, Reed went

to the victim’s home where they argued over money.

Reed beat the victim with his fists, cut her with a

knife and pistol-whipped her. He forced her into the

App. 51

trunk of her automobile and drove to a service station

where he purchased twenty-five cents worth of gaso-

line and placed it in a plastic bottle. Reed then drove

his victim to a secluded area, poured gasoline into the

trunk and set the trunk ablaze. Tempie Ann Jones

died two weeks later of the burns she received.

The State argued, as aggravating circumstances,

that Reed was engaged in the perpetration of an

aggravated arson, that the offense was committed in

an especially heinous, atrocious, or crue] manner, and

that Reed had a substantial criminal history. In

mitigation, the defense argued that Reed was intox-

icated at the time of the offense and could not formu-

late the requisite specific intent to kill. In addition,

the victim’s mother testified at the penalty hearing

that she preferred life imprisonment for Reed over

the death penalty.

(32) State v. Myron Osha Smith, 31,955

(La.App.2d Cir. 5/5/99), 740 So.2d 675, writ

denied 2000-1404 (La. 2/16/01), 785 So.2d

840; Docket No. 178,758, First Judicial

District Court.

Myron Osha Smith was indicted for the first-

degree murder of fourteen year old Andre Brooks. He

was found guilty as charged and the jury agreed on a

life sentence.

On November 4, 1995, Brooks was in a friend’s

home when Smith shot fourteen bullets through the

house where seven children cowered in fear. The

App. 52

shooting was apparently in retaliation for an earlier

drive-by.

During the penalty phase Smith’s mother begged

for her son’s life, bringing some jurors to tears.

(33) State v. Calvin Tolbert, 30,821 (La.App.2d

Cir. 8/19/98), 716 So.2d 949, writ denied 98-

2562 (La. 1/15/99), 736 So.2d 207; Docket

No. 171,362, First Judicial District Court.

Calvin Tolbert was convicted of the first-degree

murder of Wilma Liberto. The jury was unable to

agree on a sentence and so Tolbert was sentenced to

life imprisonment without probation, parole or sus-

pension of sentence.

On August 1, 1994, Tolbert and two companions

entered Liberto’s Grocery in the Allendale area of

Shreveport while two more companions waited out-

side. Mrs. Liberto, then 77 years old, and her son

Paul ran the grocery. Tolbert stood in line and when

he got to the counter he shot Mrs. Liberto and Paul

Liberto once each. Tolbert never said a word, and the

victims only knew there was a robbery happening

when the shots were fired. Mrs. Liberto was killed.

Paul Liberto was rendered a paraplegic, and died less

than one year after the trial.

During the penalty phase, the State presented

evidence that the 17 year old Tolbert had a juvenile

adjudication for illegal discharge of a weapon and

that he had a bad discipline record at Caddo

App. 53

Correctional Center since his incarceration. The

defense presented Dr. Mark Vigen, who testified that

Tolbert was of “borderline” intelligence. Tolbert’s

family pleaded for mercy.

(34) Slate v. Nolan Turner, 37162, (La.App.2d

Cir. 10/29/03) 859 So.2d 911, writ denied

2003-3400 (La. 3/26/04) 871 So.2d 347;

Docket No. 203,173, First Judicial District

Court.

Nolan Turner was convicted of First Degree

Murder for the robbery and killing of Doyle Wayne

Winn at the Jewella Tire Shop. The jury unanimously

imposed a life sentence.

The Winn family owned and managed the tire

business where the shooting took place. Turner along

with co-defendant Jimmy Charles Coleman entered

the building around 5 p.m. on July 8, 1999. Doyle

Winn along with his sons Heath and Garrett Winn

and a child from the neighborhood were in the office

area of the shop. Turner pointed a gun at the victims

and demanded that they go to the back of the store.

The three boys complied and got on the floor in the

back of the shop. A scuffle ensued between Doyle

Winn and Turner. Doyle Winn called to Heath for

help so Turner shot Heath twice, paralyzing him

permanently. Doyle Winn was also shot twice and

died from his injuries.

At the guilt phase, the State introduced the

testimony of Heath and Garrett Winn. Heath had

App. 54

chosen Turner from a photo line-up following the

shooting and again identified him before the jury. An

employee of the church across the street testified that

she was waiting to pull onto Jewella when she heard

shots and saw the robbers exiting the store. She

followed the man matching Turner’s description and

saw him with a gun. She too chose Turner from a six-

person photo line-up following the shooting. Turner

gave an alibi that was later refuted.

At the penalty phase, the State called Heath and

Garrett Winn and Doyle Winn’s fiancée Helen Luck-

ing as victim impact witnesses. By stipulation be-

tween the State and defense, the defendant’s prior

convictions of possession of cocaine and illegal posses-

sion of stolen things were introduced to the jury.

General evidence of good character was intro-

duced by the defense through various friends and

family members, including Turner’s father who is

incarcerated in Huntsville, Texas. Evidence of his

relationship with his young son in Baton Rouge was

also introduced.

(35) State v. James Tyler, III, 37-0338 (La.

9/9/98), 723 So.2d 939, certiorari denied

526 U.S. 1073, 119 S.Ct. 1472, 143 L.Ed.2d

556, rehearing denied 526 U.S. 1166, 119

S.Ct. 2066, 144 L.Ed.2d 230; Docket No.

175,282, First Judicial District Court.

James Tyler, III, was indicted for first-degree

murder in the death of Jock Efferson. Tyler was found

App. 55

guilty and sentenced to death. The jury found as

aggravating circumstances that Tyler was engaged in

the perpetration of a robbery and that he knowingly

created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more

than one person.

On May 29, 1995, at around 9:30 p.m., Jock

Efferson, Denise Washington and Rahsaan Roberson

were working in a Pizza Hut on Greenwood Road in

Shreveport, Caddo Parish, when James Tyler, III,

walked up to the drive-through window and began

talking to Efferson about buying a pizza. He walked

off and several minutes later entered the restaurant

through the rear entrance used by employees. Tyler

had a handgun in one hand and a ski mask in the

other. He ordered Efferson to open the cash register,

which he did. Tyler then ordered the three employees

to the cooler, ordered them to lie on the floor and shot

them each in the head. Washington and Roberson

remained conscious and when they thought Tyler was

gone they got up and locked the back door. Washing-

ton’s boyfriend arrived and rendered assistance to

them. Efferson died of his wounds the next day.

The evening of May 30, 1995, Sharlot Tedder, a

prostitute who had acted as a confidential informant

in the past, related to police that she had stayed with

a black male calling himself Marcus “Cricket” Tomlin

at the Palomar Hotel across the street from the Pizza

Hut. On the 29th, he left at around 9:30 saying he

had to “do” something and returned about a half hour

later nervous and sweating. She knew him to possess

App. 56

a .22 caliber revolver. Tedder saw emergency vehicles

at the Pizza Hut about 10 p.m., and asked “Tomlin” if

he “did that across the street.” He replied “yes,” and

offered to tell her about it, but she declined. “Tomlin”

now hat a large wad of money and bought a large

amount o: cocaine. “Tomlin” later confided a number

of details of the robbery to her. He seesawed between

remorse, saying God wouldn’t forgive him for what he

had done, and disbelief that two of the victims were

in fair condition after being shot in the head. Upon

learning of Efferson’s death from the television news,

he remarked “one down, two to go.” He then told

Tedder to come back into the room with him, saying

he’d already “got three ... what’s one more?” Tedder

became fearful for her life after he confided this,

called police and participated in setting up his arrest.

Upon his arrest, it was determined that Tomlin, in

fact, was James Tyler, ITI.

At the penalty phase, defense counsel presented

a number of psychiatric experts who testified as to

Tyler’s disturbed mental condition going back to his

troubled childhood. The State presented Elvis Hop-

son, the manager of a fast food restaurant in St.

Louis, Missouri, who had been shot by Tyler, his em-

ployee, during a robbery Christmas Eve, 1994. Tyler

had not yet been arrested for this robbery and at-

tempted murder before the murder of Jock Efferson.

App. 57

(36) State v. Ricky Washington, 407 So.2d 1138

(La. 1981); Docket No. 110,490, First Judi-

cial District Court.

Ricky Washington was indicted by a Caddo Par-

ish grand jury for the first-degree murder of Grady

Haynes in violation of La. R.S. 14:30. The jury re-

turned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder. After

deliberation, the jury was unable to unanimously

agree upon a sentence recommendation. The trial

court thereupon sentenced Washington to life impris-

onment pursuant to La. C.Cr.P. Article 905.8.

The evidence at trial showed that on February 1,

1979, Grady Haynes, the owner and live-in manager

of a grocery store, was shot to death behind the count-

er of his store. He was shot once in the back of the

head with a .32 caliber handgun. The defendant’s fin-

gerprint was found at the scene. The cash register

drawer was open. Washington gave two exculpatory,

yet conflicting, statements to authorities, blaming dif-

ferent individuals for the death of Haynes. A search

conducted at Washington’s home produced the mur-

der weapon.

The sole aggravating circumstance urged by the

State was that the murder was accomplished during

the course of an armed robbery. The defense proffered

substantial arguments in mitigation, including the

offender’s youth (Washington was 18 years old), the

absence of a prior criminal history, that others were

involved (presumably he was less culpable), and

Washington’s diminished mental capacity.

App. 58

(37) State v. Thadius Webb, 32607 (La.App.2d Cir.

1/26/00), 750 So.2d 479, writ denied 2000-0593

(La. 12/08/00), 775 So.2d 1078; Docket Num-

ber 184,452, First Judicial District Court.

Thadius Webb was convicted of the first-degree

murder of Carl Ivey during the course of an armed

robbery. After penalty phase, the jury unanimously

agreed to a life sentence.

Carl Ivey met the defendants at the Pinstripe

Lounge and agreed to give them a ride to Amos

Desadier’s house in Cedar Grove. When they arrived

in the alley behind Desadier’s home, Webb and co-

defendant David Thompson attacked Ivey. Thompson

was the ring leader and the evidence showed that he

stabbed and beat Ivey while Webb held him down.

Ivey’s body was put in the backseat of his car and

driven by Thompson to Wallace Lake Road. Webb

helped dump the body in the woods. Torture wounds

were identified on Ivey’s legs by the coroner. Three

fishing poles were taken from the car by Thompson.

The evidence showed Thompson to be the actual

killer and Webb to be only a principal. In addition,

Webb did not have a criminal record of any kind.

(38) State v. Corey D. Williams, 2001-1650, (La.

11/01/02), 831 So.2d 835, writs denied 2005-

1556 (La. 2/17/06), 921 So.2d 105; Docket No.

193,258, First Judicial District Court.

Corey Williams was convicted of the first degree

murder of Jarvis Griffen, a young pizza delivery

App. 59

driver, during the course of an armed robbery, and

was sentenced to death on October 28, 2000. On the

night of January 12, 1998, life-long friends Corey

Williams and Gabriel Logan met up at Renee

Iverson’s residence at [Home Address Omitted] in

Shreveport, Caddo Parish, La. Renee had several

friends over at her house when the group decided to

order from Pizza Hut.

There were six people in the house when Jarvis

Griffen, a 26 year old long time employee of Pizza

Hut, delivered the pizza. Gabriel Logan exited the

house as Griffen was standing in the doorway collect-

ing money for the pizza. Logan walked outside and

talked to Corey Williams who was standing in front of

the house. During their discussion Logan handed

Corey Williams a pistol. Corey Williams then ap-

proached Jarvis Griffen as he reentered his vehicle.

Williams fired several shots at the victim at point

blank range with his arms outstretched clutching

the pistol with both hands. Jarvis Griffen died of

a gunshot wound to the chest which caused massive

damage to both lungs, the arteries and the heart.

Gabriel Logan then ran to the victim’s vehicle

after it crashed into a house a short distance away.

Logan entered the vehicle, pulled Griffen’s body out

onto the ground, rifled his pockets, reentered the ve-

hicle, tried unsuccessfully to steal the car and finally

exited with the money bag and a pizza. Williams fled

the scene with the murder weapon immediately after

the shooting.

App. 60

In his statement, Williams said that he told the

victim prior to shooting him to “give me the money.”

When the victim moved Williams shot him because “I

wasn’t fixin’ to get killed.”

At the penalty phase, the State introduced evi-

dence of Williams’ juvenile felony convictions for il-

legal use of a weapon and attempted simple robbery.

Victim imvact evidence was limited to the testimony

of Griffen’s uncle.

The jury also learned of Williams’ extensive disci-

plinary records at both Caddo Correctional Center

pending trial and during his juvenile incarceration.

These included threats and violence directed against

correctional officers as well as other inmates and an

escape from juvenile detention. Defense expert Mark

Vigen, PhD, opined that Williams had an antisocial

personality disorder, was dangerous and could kill

again.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the con-

viction and remanded for a hearing to determine if

Williams is mentally retarded, under Atkins v. Vir-

ginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335

(2002). Wiliams was found by the trial court judge to

be retarded. Williams’ death sentence was vacated

and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.

App. 61

(39) State v. James K. Williamson, 27,871 (La.App.2d

Cir. 04/03/96), 671 So.2d 1208, writ denied

96-1143 (La. 10/04/96), 679 So.2d 1380. On re-

trial 35,122 (La.App.2dCir. 01/23/02), 805 So.2d

1235, writ denied 2002-0707 (La. 02/07/03),

836 So.2d 94; Docket No. 164,901, First Judi-

cial District Court.

On June 19, 1993, James K. Williamson, entered

the Soap Opera Washateria on Pines Road in Shreve-

port, Louisiana, and attempted to abduct Vickie

Ferguson (later Perkins), his former girlfriend. Estal

Thompson and his sons, Michael and Scott, inter-

vened and all three were shot by defendant. Estal

died at the scene while his sons, though seriously

injured, survived. Williamson forced Vickie into his

car and drove off with her. When his car broke down

he forced Vickie down into a drainage ditch and

began choking her. An armed motorist pointed his

gun at Williamson and threatened to shoot him if he

did not stop. Williamson fled into the woods and was

arrested the next day.

Prior to his trial in 1995 Williamson filed a

motion to dismiss his appointed counsel and sought to

try the case himself. The trial court denied the mo-

tion. The jury found Williamson guilty of first degree

murder and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

Williamson’s conviction and sentence were affirmed

on appeal, but Williamson won a new trial through a

federal writ of habeas corpus on his claim that he

should have been allowed to represent himself at

App. 62

trial. Williamson was re-tried, this time for second

degree murder, and was found guilty as charged.

(40) State of Louisiana v. Aaron Christopher Wil-

son, State v. Wilson, remanded 2003-1229,

(La. 3/30/05), 899 So.2d 551; affirmed 40,767,

(La.App.2dCir. 8/23/06), 938 So.2d 1111; Dock-

et No. 213,012 First Judicial District Court.

Aaron Wilson was convicted of First Degree mur-

der and sentenced to death for the kidnapping, rob-

bery, rape and murder of Vicki Lynn McGraw. At

approximately 9 p.m. on December 23, 2000, Wilson

along with three friends (Leon Bagley, Torius Scrog-

gins & Derrick Bouya) were riding about Shreveport

looking for a person to carjack and rob. They pulled

behind a white Chevy Blazer SUV and saw that only

one person was in the vehicle. They followed the SUV

driven by Mrs. McGraw into the Southern Oaks

apartment complex on 70th Street. When she stepped

out of her car, Wilson, armed with a .380 semi-

automatic handgun, and co-defendant Derrick Bouya,

armed with an assault rifle, forced her back into her

vehicle at gunpoint. Mrs. McGraw drove them to a

local ATM where she was forced to withdraw money

from her account and give it to one or both of the

men. Bouya then got in the driver’s seat and drove

the SUV south of town for approximately twenty

miles. Wilson was in the backseat with Mrs. McGraw.

During the ride, Wilson forced her to disrobe and

raped her orally, vaginally, and anally. She defecated

App. 63

on the backseat of the vehicle. When Mrs. McGraw

asked to use the restroom, Bouya pulled the car onto

the side of the rode. While Mrs. McGraw was squat-

ting down next to the truck defecating, Wilson shot

her in the top of the head. The two men drove away

leaving her body on the side of the road where it was

discovered the next morning by a resident looking for

her lost dog. Mrs. McGraw’s truck and cellular phone

were recovered several days later after being used by

the various persons involved. In addition, her credit

cards were used to purchase clothing, jewelry and

other items at local malls.

At the jury trial, the State introduced the taped

confession of the defendant given at the time of his

arrest. In the statement, he admitted to the vaginal

and oral rape of Mrs. McGraw as well as to being the

shooter. DNA expert Connie Brown of the North

Louisiana Crime Lab testified that Wilson’s DNA was

found on the vaginal swab taken during the autopsy.

The former deputy coroner and a forensic pathologist,

Dr. Stephen Cogswell, testified that there was dam-

age to Mrs. McGraw’s anus that was indicative of

forced penetration.

The defense called the defendant to testify on his

own behalf. Although he again admitted to the oral

and vaginal rape of Mrs. McGraw, he denied his role

as the shooter. He testified that he lied to the police

because he was scared of Derrick Bouya. Wilson told

the jury that Bouya was the actual shooter. In

addition, Wilson’s father and aunt testified regarding

App. 64

Wilson’s relationship with his mother who suffered

from multiple sclerosis.

At the penalty phase, the State presented the

testimony of co-defendant Derrick Bouya. A plea

agreement between Bouya and the State guaranteed

him a plea to second degree murder and a life sen-

tence if he gave useful and truthful testimony at the

Wilson trial. Bouya testified consistent with the

statement he gave police following his arrest. He

admitted to his role in the robbery and carjacking of

Mrs. McGraw. He also admitted that he received

clothes and jewelry charged on her credit card, used

her cell phone and drove her vehicle after her murder.

As he stated previously to police, he testified that

Wilson was the shooter of the fatal bullet. In addition,

the State called Wanda Simpson and James Stroud,

siblings of the victim for victim impact evidence.

The defense called several family and friends of

the defendant to testify that he was polite, respectful

and a generally good person who had gotten involved

with the wrong crowd and drinking. However, facts of

the defendant's expulsion from high school and

subsequent enrollment in an alternative school were

elicited from these witnesses by the state. The cause

of the expulsion was not admissible and not presented

to the jury. In addition, the defendant’s wheelchair-

bound mother asked the jury to spare her son’s life.

Finaliy, the defendant again took the stand and

recounted the story he had told the jury during

the guilt phase of the trial. He continued to deny

App. 65

responsibility for the death of Mrs. McGraw by

blaming Bouya for the shooting.

During its rebuttal case, the State called wit-

nesses to impeach the testimony given by the defen-

dant regarding a prior conviction. The defendant’s

statement to the arresting officer was inconsistent

with the story he presented the jury about the inci-

dent. The jury returned a penalty of death, finding as

the sole aggravating circumstance that the defendant

committed the killing in the course of a robbery, rape

and kidnapping.

Wilson’s appeal was stayed, pending the outcome

of Roper v. Simmons, 540 U.S. 1160, 124 S.Ct. 1171,

157 L.Ed.2d 1204 (2004), regarding the constitution-

ality of the imposition of the death penalty on mur-

derers who were under the age of eighteen at the time

of the offense. Pursuant to Roper v. Simmons, 543

U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005), Wil-

son’s death sentence was vacated, and he was sen-

tenced to life imprisonment.

(41) State v. Brandy Holmes, 2006-KA-2988 Loui-

Siana Supreme Court; Docket # 226,819,

First Judicial District Court

Brandy Holmes and Robert Coleman were in-

dicted for the first degree murder of Rev. Julian

Brandon and the attempted first degree murder of his

wife, Alice Brandon, as weil as the first degree

murder of Terrance Blaze. Holmes went to trial on

the first degree murder of Rev. Brandon on February

App. 66

6, 2006, in Caddo District Court and was convicted

and sentenced to death.

Holmes and Coleman entered the Brandon home

in rural Caddo Parish during the evening hours of

New Year’s Day 2003. After pushing their way into

the front door of the Brandon residence, Julian

Brandon, a retired Baptist preacher, was shot at near

contact range under the chin with a .380 caliber

handgun. The projectile separated into two pieces.

One piece entered his brain, while the other piece

exited the top of his head and was later recovered

from the ceiling of the dining room adjacent to the

front entryway. Julian Brandon collapsed.

Mrs. Alice Brandon was taken to the rear bed-

room and made to lie down. Alice Brandon was inter-

rogated about her valuables and begged for her life. A

pillow was placed over Mrs. Brandon’s face, and she

was shot in the head and left for dead. The attention

of the intruders was again focused on Rev. Brandon

as they observed him struggling with his wounds, and

they attacked Rev. Brandon a second time. At least

three separate Chicago Cutlery style knives from the

Brandon’s kitchen were used in this second attack.

Rev. Brandon received slashing cuts to his nose and

face in addition to stabbing wounds on the top and

rear of his head. The attack to the rear of Rev.

Brandon’s head was delivered with such force that

one of the knives shattered; that knife was found in

pieces at the scene. The offenders cut his throat by

multiple starting/stopping incisions starting from the

front right, across the front of his neck and around to

App. 67

the back of his head. Rev. Brandon was repeatediy

stabbed in the upper chest with wounds penetrating

up to 6 inches, and was also stabbed in the back

where a six-inch knife was found imbedded up to the

handle. Rev. Brandon also had a large contusion from

blunt force trauma on his forehead.

Several days passed before the Brandons were

discovered. A family friend, who missed the Brandons

from regular phone contacts and attendance at morn-

ing and evening Sunday services went to the home

and found the couple on January 5, 2003. Mrs. Brandon

was still alive and was transported by helicopter to

the hospital. Mrs. Brandon continues to live in a

severely impaired state as a result of the gunshot

wound to the head.

After the discovery of the crime scene, the Caddo

Sheriff’s Office investigation gained momentum with

a call from persons at a nearby apartment complex.

It was learned that shortly after New Year’s Day

Brandy Holmes was in a nearby apartment complex

trying to sell jewelry and making statements about

killing an old couple down the road by a church.

Detectives went to the Holmes’ trailer, which was just

around the corner from the homicide scene, and con-

tacted Holmes, Coleman and other family members.

The group agreed to go to the detective office for

interviews. Coleman denied involvement but dis-

played cuts on his right hand. Holmes made several

statements over the course of the next two days that

implicated her and others as being involved in the

homicide.

App. 68

Holmes made at least six separate statements to

authorities that related to the Brandon homicide. In

most of these statements, Holmes implicated herself

and others to varying degrees. Of the four interviews

that were taped, Holmes destroyed the one in which

she unequivocally admitted her role as the shooter

and active participant in all the events concerning

both Rev. Brandon and Mrs. Brandon. Holmes de-

stroyed this tape by sneaking it into the ladies’ room

and flushing the magnetic tape down the toilet. In-

vestigators also noticed that after Holmes’ bathroom

visit, she was no longer wearing some of the jewelry

they had observed earlier.

In all but her first interview with detectives,

Holmes described various details of the homicide with

great precision. She admitted that she had stolen her

father’s .380 handgun while visiting him in Missis-

sippi. She repeatedly acknowledged her presence and

involvement in the attack on the Brandons, and on

numerous occasions acknowledged her willingness to

kill both Reverend and Mrs. Brandon. During her

taped statements to Caddo deputies, Brandy Holmes

admitted to bleaching her boots and burning her

jacket stained with blood from Reverend Brandon’s

neck wound.

During her contact with investigators Holmes

further revealed that on January 4, 2003, she took

two of her nephews to view the bodies of Rev. Brandon

and Mrs. Brandon. Her younger nephew later cor-

roborated Holmes’ account of this visit to the scene

of the murder. The older nephew did not enter the

App. 69

residence, but Holmes’ nine-year-old nephew went in

with his aunt and saw Rev. Brandon lying in a pool of

blood, and also heard Mrs. Brandon screaming from

another room in the house. Holmes and her nephews

were seen going to the Brandon residence together.

The same witness observed the nephews hurriedly

leaving the Brandon residence without their aunt.

The investigation revealed and the evidence

showed a close link between Holmes and Coleman.

Holmes and Coleman traveled from Mississippi,

where they lived together as girlfriend and boyfriend,

to Shreveport on Christmas Eve 2002. They were

picked up by Holmes’ mother and resided in her

trailer while the couple was in Shreveport. They

brought with them the .380 caliber handgun that

belonged to Holmes’ father. That handgun was deter-

mined to be the murder weapon both by Holmes’

admission and by ballistics comparison of projectiles

and shell casings.

The items that were known to have been stolen

from the Brandon residence included jewelry, partic-

ularly a multi-colored bracelet, and bankcards. There

was an attempt to use one of the Brandon’s bank-

cards where an incorrect PIN was used at an ATM in

a nearby convenience store. In addition, Holmes and

Coleman were recorded minutes later and just up the

street on a Hibernia bank surveillance video trying to

use a bankcard, again with the incorrect PIN number.

Many incriminating items were recovered from

the Holmes’ trailer where the two murderers had

App. 70

stayed. Among those items was a clear plastic food

service glove found in the rain gutter of the trailer

that contained a multi-colored bracelet and a pearl

bracelet. Rev. Brandon’s daughter identified the

multi-colored bracelet as the bracelet she had given

her mother some time earlier. A box of these food

service gloves was recovered from the bedroom

shared by Colemnman and Holmes. The food service

gloves had a diamond pattern consistent with pat-

terns in blood transfer stains observed at the Brandon

residence. Additionally, a pillow was found in the

Holmes’ bedroom with a bullet hole through it. That

pillow was not the one used to cover Ms. Brandon’s

face when she was shot, but was apparently a

“practice” pillow.

In the same rain gutter that contained the multi-

colored bracelet, three fired .380 cartridge casings

were found. Investigators went to Holmes’ father’s

residence in Mississippi. There her father took detec-

tives to a location where he had fired the .380 hand-

gun that was discovered missing at the time of Cole-

man and Holmes’ departure from Mississippi. One of

the cartridge casings found in the gutter was matched

to a .380 cartridge casing recovered from that location

in Mississippi. During analysis at the crime lab, Rev.

Brandon’s DNA was found on swabs taken from

the fired cartridge casings found in the gutter. The

portions of the .380 projectile that were recovered

from Rev. Brandon’s brain and dining room ceiling

were matched to a projectile recovered from a tree

pointed out by Holmes’ father at the same location in

App. 71

Mississippi where investigators had recovered the

cartridge casing.

Victim impact testimony from family members

was introduced at penalty phase. That testimony con-

sisted of two family members testifying about the

impact of this crime upon the Brandon family, and

specifically upon Alice Brandon.

Evidence of the unadjudicated attempted murder

of Mrs. Patricia Camp and the unadjudicated homi-

cide of Terrance Blaze were also admitted. On Decem-

ber 27, 2002, Holmes made a 911 call from her mother’s

house in reference to a gated community located very

close to her mother’s trailer known as “Knob Hill.”

The call was an attempt to gain an access code for

the gate at the front of that community. No access

code was given to Holmes during that call; however,

Holmes was able to get into the neighborhood. Later

that same day, Holmes attempted to get into the

residence of Mrs. Patricia Camp by ringing the

doorbell and asking to use the phone. Mrs. Camp

spoke with Holmes, but denied her entry to her

house. Mrs. Camp saw Holmes again two days later,

again while Holmes was trying to gain entry to her

residence. Mrs. Camp did not let Holmes in on this

subsequent attempt either. Holmes admitted in a

statement to authorities that “If she would have

opened that door, she would have been like Mr.

Brandon” and “My plan was to get somebody on the

hill that night.”

App. 72

Evidence of the Terrance Blaze homicide came

into play when, as part of the Brandon investigation,

Holmes directed authorities to Blaze’s body. High

velocity blood spatter and other bloodstains were

found in Holmes’ mother’s vehicle and on Robert

Coleman’s pants. The significance of those stains was

that Terrance Blaze was shot and bled in Holmes’

mother’s vehicle and that Robert Coleman was likely

the driver. Expert testimony established that Blaze

was most likely shot from the rear seat of the vehicle,

not the driver seat. Holmes confessed in a letter to a

prosecutor that she killed Terrance Blaze. Blaze was

shot in the back of the head with a .380 caliber

weapon and the bullet was recovered from his skull. A

cartridge casing found near the location Blaze’s body

was dumped was matched to the cartridge case found

in Mississippi.

Robert Coleman was convicted in a separate trial!

and sentenced to death as well. His case is pending

appeal.

ARGUMENT

Article 905.9 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal

Procedure requires this Honorable Court to review

Brandy Aileen Holmes’ sentence of death to deter-

mine whether or not it is unconstitutionally exces-

sive. This query is guided by Louisiana Supreme

Court Rule 28, Rule 905.9.1, § 1, which provides for

capital sentence review as follows:

App. 73

Section 1. Review Guidelines. Every sen-

tence of death shall be reviewed by this court

to determine if it is excessive. In determining

whether the sentence is excessive the court

shall determine:

(a) whether the sentence was imposed

under the influence of passion, prejudice or

any other arbitrary factors, and

(b) whether the evidence supports the

jury’s finding of a statutory aggravating cir-

cumstance, and

tionate to the penalty imposed in similar

cases, considering both the crime and the

defendant.

This is accomplished by considering both the de-

fendant and the offense he committed. State v. Celes-

tine, 443 So.2d 1091 (La. 1983), certiorari denied 469

U.S. 873, 105 S.Ct. 224, 83 L.Ed.2d 154 (1984).

Section l(a)

A death sentence imposed under the influence of

passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factors is

constitutionally excessive and must be vacated. The

State submits that a review of the record fails to

disclose the presence of any arbitrary factor which

would have prejudiced appellant. The State submits

that there is no error which created a substantial risk

that Coleman’s death sentence was imposed in an

unjust manner.

App. 74

There was no indication that the death sentence

was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice

or any other arbitrary factors. The defendant and her

victim were of the same race and the record reflects

no racial prejudice as a factor in the trial.

Section l(c)

The final question before this Court is whether the

sentence in this case is disproportionate to the penalty

imposed, considering both the crime and the defendant.

Article I, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution and

Louisiana Supreme Court Rule 28 require a com-

parative proportionality review to determine whether

the sentence herein is disproportionate to the penalty

imposed in similar cases within the same parish. The

review requires a comparison of both the crime and

the defendant.

The State’s sentence review memorandum lists

41 first-degree murder convictions in the First Judi-

cial District (Caddo Parish) in which sentence was

imposed after January 1, 1976. The death penalty

was imposed in sixteen of these cases.[1]

In State v. Edwards, supra, at 914, this Honor-

able Court reviewed First Judicial District Court

death penalty cases involving murders committed

during the perpetration of an armed robbery, as well

as numerous other armed robbery death penalty

cases on a statewide basis, noting that “this Court

has consistently affirmed death penalties in cases

involving killing during armed robberies.”

App. 75

More recently, the Court noted “on a statewide

basis, cases are legion in which this Court has af-

firmed capital sentences based primarily on the jury’s

finding that the defendant killed the victim in the

course of an armed robbery or attempted armed

robbery.” State v. Irish, supra, at 217.

In the instant case appellant and her confederate

shot and stabbed an elderly minister and shot his

wife, killing the husband and rendering the wife in an

impaired state. Appellant also committed an unrelat-

ed murder shortly thereafter. The State submits that

the death penalty is not disproportionate for this

offense and this offender.

CONCLUSION

The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Brandy Aileen Holmes murdered Julian Brandon in

the course of a robbery, as well as proving the other

aggravating factors. This type of first-degree murder

warrants the imposition of the death penalty.

The State respectfully submits that the sentence

imposed herein should be upheld.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Catherine M. Estopina!l

CATHERINE M. ESTOPINAL

ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY

App. 76

CERTIFICAT

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing

sentence review memorandum has been mailed to:

Jelpi P. Picou Sarah L. Ottinger

Attorney at Law Attorney at Law

636 Baronne 1340 Poydras St.,

New Orleans, Louisiana Suite 2110

70113 New Orleans, LA 70130

counsel on appeal for defendant-appellant Brandy

Aileen Holmes, postage prepaid, this 16th day of

January, 2007.

/s/ Catherine M. Estopinal

CATHERINE M. ESTOPINAL

App. 77

APPENDIX 2

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF LOUISIANA

No. 2006-KA-2988

STATE OF LOUISIANA, Plaintiff-Appellee

BRANDY AILEEN HOLMES, Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from Conviction

and Death Sentence Imposed

In the First Judicial District, the Parish of Caddo,

No. 226,819, Hon. Scott J. Crichton, Presiding.

THIS IS A DEATH PENALTY CASE

APPELLANT’S CAPITAL

SENTENCE REVIEW MEMORANDUM

Sarah Ottinger,

La Bar No. 24589

Senior Staff Attorney

Caroline Wallace Tillman,

La Bar No. 31411

Capital Post-Conviction

Project of Louisiana

1340 Poydras Street, Suite 1700

New Orleans, LA 70112

(504) 212-2110

(504) 212-2130 (fax)

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,

BRANDY AILEEN HOLMES

App. 78

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

INTRODUCTION

FACTS TO BE CONSIDERED FOR

PURPOSES OF THE COURT’S EXCES-

SIVENESS REVIEW —- THE FAILURE

OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND

TRIAL COURT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE

OR ACCURATE INFORMATION

THE DEATH SENTENCE IN THIS CASE

IS CONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE

BECAUSE IT WAS IMPOSED IN THE

FACE OF OVERWHELMING MITIGAT-

ING EVIDENCE

THE EXECUTION OF PERSONS WITH

FETAL ALCOHOL SYNDROME VIOLATES

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PRO-

HIBITION AGAINST CRUEL AND UND-

SUAL PUNISHMENT AND VIOLATES

LOUISIANAS BROADER PROHIBITION

AGAINST CRUEL, EXCESSIVE OR UNU-

SUAL PUNISHMENT

THE SENTENCE OF DEATH IS

EXCESSIVE BECAUSE THE JURY IN

MS. HOLMES CASE, ENCOURAGED

BY THE PROSECUTION, FAILED TO

GIVE MITIGATING EFFECT TO SUB-

STANTIAL MITIGATING EVIDENCE........

VI.

App. 79

THE DEATH SENTENCE IN THIS

CASE IS DISPROPORTIONATE BE-

CAUSE NO ONE ELSE WITH SUCH

POWERFUL MITIGATING EVIDENCE

HAS BEEN SENTENCED TO DEATH .....

The law requires that this court

consider mitigating circumstances as

an essential part of its proportion-

ee IN a gino oh secica sn a vcacseructvapeenmietinoress

The greater number of first degree cases

involving crimes of armed robbery have

resulted in jurors rejecting death in

favor of a life sentence ................seseeceeees

Ms. Holmes’ case presents more

substantial and compelling mitigation

than any other Caddo Parish case

resulting in a sentence of death..........

The mitigation presented in Ms. Holmes’

case more closely resembles mitigation

in cases resulting in a life sentence, even

when the heinousness of the crime is

CARON MEO BOCOUIE ...... 00 ccccecessecsescesessees

The death penalty is excessive for a

woman with the mitigating circum-

stances in Ms. Holmes’ case ................

MS. HOLMES DEATH SENTENCE WAS

IMPOSED UNDER THE INFLUENCE

OF PASSION, PREJUDICE, AND ARBI-

Te Ws OI oirn dso sscksscevivonacesurnticcees

App. 80

VII. THE DEATH PENALTY IMPOSED IN

TIM CASE IS ITSELF AN UNCON-

STITUTIONALLY CRUEL, UNUSUAL

AND DEGRADING PUNISHMENT .........

Of Wb Le yy OR) eo 4g | Ot eer 26

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) ............. passim

California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1987).................. 14

Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982)................... 12

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) ....... 20, 21, 25

Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980)...............20... 11

Lockett v. Ohioi, 4388 U.S. 586 (1978)..............02.c0rcse0s 14

Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.

gf SERA tr ncn or SI NEL EOP ERIS SEE MOT eT 25

Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989).......... 13, 14, 16

Roberts v. Louistana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)................. 17

State v. Bernard, 608 So.2d 966, (La. 1992) .............. 22

State v. Birdsong, 452 So.2d 1236 (La.App.2d

Ree SES 052d 5: cases sans iis pei aueeeecion eae eeeiniewes 17

State v. Brown, 478 So.2d 600 (La.App.2d Cir.

5s RARER epee ea NE nO stiD ere ARATE UML Gs Be fon RI orm ceed ae EN 17

State v. Calhoun, 554 So.2d 127 (La. App.2d

Cir., 1989), writ den. 558 So.2d 601 ...................000 17

State v. Code, 627 So.2d 1373 (La.1993).............. 17, 18

App. 81

State v. Coleman, 2006-0518 (La. 11/02/07), 2007

La. LEXIS 2392

State v. Cooks, 97-0999 (La. 09/09/98), 720 So.2d

State v. Donaldson, 391 So.2d 1182 (La.1980)

State v. Draughn 05-1825, (pending appeal)

State v. Edwards, 97-1797 (La. 7/2/99); 750

So.2d 893

State v. Ford 489 So.2d 1250 (La. 1986); cert.

granted and remanded, Ford v. Louisiana,

479 U.S. 1077 (1987); on remand, 503 So.2d

1009 (La. 1987), cert. denied, Ford ov.

Louisiana, 498 U.S. 992 (1990)

State v. Frank, 1999-05553 (La 05/22/07), 95”

So2d. 724

State v. Gay, 29,434 (La.App.Zd Cir. 6/18/97),

697 So.2d 642

State v. Hampton, 980331 (La. 4/23/99), 750

So.2d 867

State v. Haynes, (La.App.2d Cir. 11/1/95), 662

So.2d 849, writ den. 95-2768 (La. 2/16/96),

667 So.2d 1050

State v. Hoffman, 98-3118 (La. 4/11/00), 768

Naat RI AR eli er et RE Re ost) 9 ea 1

State v. Irish, 00-2086, (La. 01/15/02), 807 So.2d

State v. Jackson, 608 So. 2d 949 (La. 1992)............... 23

App. 82

State v. Jones, 474 So. 2d 919 (La. 1985)

State v. Nicholson, 437 So.2d 849 (La.1983)

State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992)

State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979)....... 1,13

State v. Smith 400 So.2d 587 (La. 1981)

State v. Sonnier, 380 So.2d 1 (La. 1979) passim

State v. Tolbert, 30, 821 (La.App.2d Cir.

8/19/98), 716 So.2d 949, writ den. 98-25262

(La. 1/15/99), 736 So.2d 207

State v. Turner, 37,162, (LaApp.2d Cir.

10/29/03), 859 So.2d 911, writ den. 2003-3400

(La.3/26/04) 871 So.2d 347

State v. Tyler III, 97-0338 (La. 9/9/98), 723

So.2d 939

State v. Washington, 407 So.2d 1138 (La. 1981)

State v. Webb, 32,607 (La.App.2d Cir. 1/26/00),

750 So.2d 479, writ den. 2000-0593 (La.

12/8/00)

State v. Wilson 2003-1229 (La. 3/30/05), 899

So. 2d 551

State v. Wilson, 2001-2815 (La. 11/22/02): 836

ree i Ga 13

Ward v. Whitley, 21 F.3d 1355 (5th Cir. 1994),

COTt. COMIC, BE Cite BE A ose on cnecsccesccccccccees 24

Williams v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 381 (5th Cir. 1982)

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)

App. 83

Statutes

Rl ee a swcincudceutencenoen SERe PRU RUY navn 8: 25

Other Authorities

Andrea Shapiro, Unequal Before The Law:

Men, Women And The Death Penalty, 8 Am.

U.J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 427 (2000)

Janice L. Kopek, Avoiding a Death Sentence in

the American Legal System: Get a Woman to

Do It, 15 Cap. Def. J. 353 (2003)

Victor L. Streib, Symposium: Death Penalty for

Battered Women, 20 FI St. U.L. Rev. 163

6 5 RT ACER O Mr Hn Ne ee PL 0 6 a Aid at SENG Spaee 23

Victor L. Streib, Women As Perpetrators Of

Crime: Rare And Inconsistent: The Death

Penalty For Women, Fordham Urb. L.J. 609

(2006)

Rules

Supreme Court Rule XXVIII

Constitutional Provisions

La. Const. Art. I, Sec.

La. Const. Art. I, Sec. ¢

La. Const. Art. I, Sec

La. Const. Art. I, Sec.

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INTRODUCTION

COMES NOW, APPELLANT, BRANDY HOLMES,

through counsel, and pursuant io Rule XXVIII of the

Rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, Article

905.9 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure,

the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amend-

ments to the United States Constitution, and Article

I, sections 2, 3, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 24 of the

Louisiana Constitution of 1974, respectfully files this

Sentence Review Memorandum in response to the

State’s Sentence Review Memorandum and the trial

court’s Uniform Capital Sentence Report. In respect of

the latter, Appellant refers the Court to her Defense

Opposition to Factual Contents Uniform Capital

Senience Report and Capital Sentence investigation

App. 85

Report, and incorporates it herein. Appellant also

incorporates all facts, law and claims raised in her

previously or subsequently filed appellate pleadings,

including Motion for Hearing to Determine Compe-

tency on Appeal, and Appellant’s Brief.

This Court has a constitutional obligation to

review each sentence of death to determine if it is

constitutionally excessive. This review, mandated by

the legislature, safeguards a capital defendant’s

rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments

to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 20

of the Louisiana Constitution.’ State v. Hoffman, 98-

3118 (La. 4/11/00), 768 So. 2d 542, 589. “Scrupulous

appellate review is constitutionally required in death

‘ Art 1, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution provides: “[n]Jo

law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture or to cruel,

excessive, or unusual punishment.” (emphasis added). State v.

Perry 610 So.2d 746, 750 (La. 1992). “The framers of our state

constitution clearly intended for this guarantee to go beyond the

scope of the Eighth Amendment in some respects.” State uv.

Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762, 764 (La. 1979) (“The Louisiana

Constitution of 1921 merely prohibited “cruel and unusual

punishment.” Article I, Section 12. In a deliberate change of

wording, the new Louisiana Constitution of 1974 broadened the

constitutional provision (and the duty of our courts in review of

sentences) by providing, Article I, Section 20: “No law shall

subject any person ... to cruel, Excessive, or unusual

punishment.” (Italics ours.) The deliberate inclusion of a

prohibition against “excessive” as

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