Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Sibley v. Florida Judicial Qualifications Commission (No. 06-347)

Supreme

06-347 SEP 8 - 2006

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNI FIGE OF THE CLERK

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY,

PETITIONER,

VS.

THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT,

RESPONDENT.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

PETITION FOR WRiT OF CERTIORARI

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY

50 WEST MONTGOMERY AVENUE

SUITE B-4

ROCKVILLE, MARYLAND 20850

PETITIONER

YS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The Florida Supreme Court has entered an order sanctioning

Petitioner by denying him access to the Florida Supreme Court.

Accordingly, presented for review are three questions:

WHETHER, this Court’s holding in Donovan v. City of Dallas

prevents the Florida Supreme Court from so sanctioning

Petitioner.

WHETHER, the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that

Petitioner’s claims were “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous”

was so disingenuous as to violate federal guarantees of due

process.

WHETHER, it is constitutionally permissible for Florida to

limit access to court absent a finding of “frivolousness”.

oii «

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Constitutional Provisions and Statutes Involved

Senpeied OF CO gc Oe ee eee

Reason for Grenting the Wet 2... on eve scccscascvves

i. Donovan v. City of Dallas Precludes the Florida

Supreme Court From Sanctioning Petitioner .....

II. Due Process Requires Undisputed Credibility ....

III. Litigiousness is a Coiws.tutional Right ..........

Comat ong kas bia ee ee ee

- lil -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Castro v. United States, 775 F.2d 399 (1st Cir. 1985) ..... 13

Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964) ........ 4,5

In Re Demos, 500 US. i. 5 ee ee ae 14

In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180 (1989) ................. 15

In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1982) .............. 13

Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.

Ip ag a Ot ed .

Peters v. KG, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) . ccc ccc ccweccccces 12

Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980 (Fla.3d DCA 2004) .......

Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1981) ...............

Withrow. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) ...... 6.6622 eee.

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Pe ee Lee eT Lor ee re re

—.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT

Petitioner, Montgomery Blair Sibley, prays that a writ of

certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion of the Florida

Supreme Court entered on April 27, 2006, and upon which

rehearing was denied on June 15, 2006.

Review is appropriate as the Florida Supreme Court has (i)

decided an important question of federal law that has not been,

but should be, settled by this Court, and (ii) has decided an

important federal question in a way that conflicts with relevant

decisions of this Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The April 14, 2005, order of the Florida Supreme Court

Dismissing the Petition and to Show Cause is reprinted in the

Appendix hereto, Appendix -2

The April 27, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court

Sanctioning Petitioner is reprinted in the Appendix hereto,

Appendix-4.

The June 15, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court

denying rehearing is reprinted in the Appendix hereto, Appendix-

8.

JURISDICTION

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under Article III and

the Ninth Amendment to the United States Constitution and 28

U.S.C. §1257(a).

9.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES, STATUTES,

ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS INVOLVED

U.S. CONSTITUTION ARTICLE III, § 2

The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity,

arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and

treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority;--to

all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls;--to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to

controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to

controversies between two or more states;-- between a state and

citizens of another state;--between citizens of different

states;--between citizens of the same state claiming lands under

grants of different states, and between a state, or the citizens

thereof, and foreign states, citizens or subjects.

In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and

consuls, and those in which a state shall be party, the Supreme

Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before

mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction,

both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such

regulations as the Congress shall make.

U.S. CONSTITUTION, FOURTEEN AMENDMENT

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,

and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United

States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make

or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state

deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the

equal protection of the laws.

~

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On November 4, 2004, Petitioner filed a petition with the

Florida Supreme Court seeking review of the Florida Judicial

Qualification Commission’s (“JQC”)' conclusions that there was

no evidence of inappropriate conduct on the part of:

(i) A trial judge for holding an ex parte hearing

upon an un-noticed ore tenus motion that was not

made on an emergency basis and concerned a

substantive matter and issuing a ruling without

affording Petitioner an opportunity to be heard;

(ii) Two intermediate appellate judges for engaging

in ex parte communication with Petitioner’s opposing

counsel immediately prior to oral argument before

them and their subsequent refusal to disclose the

nature of that ex parte communication when

specifically requested by Petitioner; and

(iti) The entire Florida Third -District Court of

Appeals for regularly meeting ex parte with certain

chosen counsel informally before and after oral

arguments and refusing to disclose the nature of those

communications.

On April 14, 2006, the Flor'da Supreme Court issued its

order (i) dismissing the petition of Petitioner and (ii) directing

Petitioner to show cause why “the Court should not impose upon

him a sanction for his litigiousness . . .”.. Appendix-3.

Petitioner timely filed a response to that order to show cause

The Judicial Qualifications Commission is an independent

agency created by the Florida Constitution solely to investigate

alleged misconduct by Florida state judges.

on April 26, 2005.

A year later, on April 27, 2006, the Florida Supreme Court

issued its order sanctioning Petitioner by directing the Clerk of

the Florida Supreme Court to “reject for filing any future

pleadings, petitions, motions, documents or other filings”

submitted by Petitioner “in any way related to his domestic

disputes unless signéd by a member in good standing of the

Florida Bar.” Appendix-6.

This timely Petition followed.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

First, this Court’s holding in Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377

U.S. 408 (1964) prevents the Florida Supreme Court from

sanctioning Petitioner for exercising his right to access federal

court as was done here.

Second, the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that Petitioner’s

claims were “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous” is so

disingenuous as to violate federal guarantees of due process. As

detailed below: (i) Petitioner did not file three of the eight

petitions which the Florida Supreme Court found “meritless”, (ii)

two of the petitions were denied as “moot” thus their “merit”

was never determined and (iii) the remaining three petitions

were all filed as part of Petitioner’s state and federal guarantees

of the right to appeal and in all events were not

contemporaneously deemed “meritless”, “abusive” or “frivolous”.

Last, whether it is constitutionally permissible for Florida to

limit access to court absent a finding of “frivolousness” as the

Florida Supreme Court has done to Petitioner here.

x 2

I. DONOVAN v. Clry OF DALLAS PRECLUDES THE FLORIDA

SUPREME COURT FROM SANCTIONING PETITIONER

In Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413 (1964), this

Court unequivocally stated:

Petitioners being properly in the federal court

had a right granted by Congress to have the

court decide the issues they resented, and to

appeal to the Court of Appeals from the District

Court's dismissal. They have been punished

both for prosecuting their federal-court case

and for appealing it. They dismissed their

appeal because of threats to punish them more

if they did not do so. The legal effect of such a

coerced dismissal on their appeal is not now

before us, but the propriety of a state court's

punishment of a federal-court litigant for

pursuing his right to federal-court remedies is.

That right was granted by Congress and cannot

be taken away by the State. The Texas courts

were without power to take away this federal

right by contempt proceedings or otherwise.

(Emphasis added).

Here, in the order of April 14, 2005, the Florida Supreme Court

stated: “The Court notes that the Third District Court of Appeal

has already imposed such a sanction on petitioner. See: Sibley v.

Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla.3d DCA 2004).” Appendix-3.

In Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla.3d DCA 2004),

the Florida Third District Court of Appeal in entering the

referenced order stated: “In addition, the former husband has

filed at least twelve actions in federal court against judges who

have been assigned to his cases, the court system, and the former

wife.” Jd. at 988.’

Accordingly, for being “properly in the federal court”,

Petitioner was sanctioned by the Florida Supreme Court — a

result prohibited by Donovan. Implicit in such action is that “The

[Florida] courts were without power to take away this federal

right by contempt proceedings or otherwise.” Here, the

“otherwise” is the denial to Petitioner of access to the Florida

Supreme Court as a result in part of having properly accessed

federal court without a single finding there of frivolousness.

Given that this Court has yet to open up the federal district

courts for redress of this wrong’, Petitioner now enjoys a right

under Donovan without a /ocus to pursue a remedy.

Accordingly, this Court must accept certiorari of this matter

to breathe life into Donovan and secure the right of litigants to

access federal court without fear of state court reprisal.

II. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES UNDISPUTED CREDIBILITY

Second, the Florida Supreme Court’s finding that Petitioner’s

claims were “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous” is so

disingenuous as to violate federal guarantees of due process.

Obviously, there is a presumption of honesty and integrity

in those serving as adjudicators. Cf Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.

35, 47 (1975). That presumption is based upon the realization

that without “honesty” and “integrity” the judicial system would

be one of form without substance.

. This Court declined review of that matter in No. 04-1411.

3

Pending before this Court is No. 05-1625 which raises this

issue. This Court has also refused to review this issue in No.

04-1309.

”

Here, incredible as it sounds at first, the Florida Supreme

Court was neither “honest” nor demonstrated “integrity” in their

opinion of April 28, 2006. *

The Florida Supreme Court’s ex cathedra pronouncement of

“clear abuse of judicial process” was without evidentiary support

in the record. When this was pointed out to the Florida Supreme

Court by Petitioner, this inconvenient fact was ignored on two

occasions and oral argument was denied to Petitioner by the

Florida Supreme Court though specifically requested.

The Florida Supreme Court premised its April 14, 2005,

Order to Show Cause upon its apparently foregone conclusion

that “petitioner has abused the processes of the Court with his

numerous meritless filings” and that “[g]liven the petitioner’s

clear abuse of judicial process in the Court... .”. Appendix-3.

However, a review of the eight cases the Florida Supreme

Court cited to justify its conclusion of Petitioner’s “abuse” reveal -

that no such “abuse” was present. Apparently, the Florida

Supreme Court was motivated by matters outside the record as

an honest, full and public review of those cases cannot possibly

support such a finding of “abuse”.

Those cases by the Florida Supreme Court in chronological

order with descriptions are:

1. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO2-1309 (Fla. Nov. 22, 2002) - In this

case Petitioner claimed that the Third District Court of Appeals,

4

“Perhaps the sentiments contained in the following pages,

are not YET sufficiently fashionable to procure them general

favour; a long habit of not thinking a thing WRONG, gives it a

superficial appearance of being RIGHT, and raises at first a

formidable outcry in defense of custom.” Common Sense,

Thomas Paine, Introduction to the Third Edition.

eS

in direct conflict with the Florida Supreme Court and the First,

Second, Fourth and Fifth District Court of Appeals, held that two

days notice for (i) a hearing and (ii) for deposition to out-of-state

parties comports with both due process and Florida Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 1.090(d). The Florida Supreme Court denied

review but noteworthy found nothing frivolous, abusive or

incomprehensible in the petition.

2. Sibley v. Spears, SC02-2644 (Fla. May 27, 2003) - In this

case, Petitioner — who was incarcerated at the time — was

represented by attorney Bart Billbrough. Mr. Billbrough, not

Petitioner, filed this action - against Petitioner’s express wishes

to the contrary based upon the Florida Supreme Court’s holding

in Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 2002) which plainly

prohibited such a suit. Hence, for the Florida Supreme Court to

impose upon Petitioner responsibility for this patently improper

filing which he opposed is simply beyond the pale. And again,

nothing frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible was found in the

petition at that time.

3. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO03-8 (Fla. Aug. 18,2003) -Fc swing

upon his incompetent pleading in SCO2-2644, Mr. Billbrough

continuing to represent Petitioner who was still incarcerated and

again filed his petition over Petitioner’s objections in this matter.

This matter was likewise dismissed though nothing frivolous,

abusive or incomprehensible was found in the petition at that

time. Accordingly, responsibility for this filing cannot be placed

upon Petitioner.

4. Sibley v. Spears, SC03-261 (Fla. Feb. 18, 2903) -

Continuing his litany of incompetence and again over Petitioner’s

express direction that Mr. Billbrough continue litigating this

habeas corpus matter in Federal Court as state court remedies

had been exhausted, Mr. Billbrough filed this matter only to see

it suffer the same fate as SCO2-2644 and SCO3-8. Hence and

again, to seek to impose responsibility for this filing on Petitioner

is simply unfair. Notably, nothing frivolous, abusive or

~

incomprehensible was found in the petition at that time.

5. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO3-1070 (Fla. Sept. 20, 2004) - On

June 11, 2003, Petitioner filed a petition seeking an order (i)

staying all the Circuit and District Court proceedings below

pending disposition of the petition, (ii) issuing an writ of

mandamus directing that the Circuit Court Judge to rule on the

seventh, eighth and ninth motions to disqualify her and (iii)

changing the District Court of Appeal hearing these matters from

the Third District Court of Appeals which has regularly and

systematically shown a bias sufficient to warrant disqualification

of the entire Third District Court of Appeal. Fourteen months

later, on August 18, 2004, this Court entered its order in SCO3-

1070 that “this proceeding appears now to be moot given that

the Third District issued a ruling on the petition for writ of

prohibition in Sibley v. Sibley, Case No. 3D03-1392, on August

_6, 2003, and denied petitioner's motion for rehearing,

clarification, and request for written decision on September 26,

2003.” Accordingly, on September 9, 2004, the Florida Supreme

Court dismissed SC03-1070 as “moot”. Hence, the merits of this

petition were never addressed due to the Florida Supreme

Court’s delay of over 14 months in addressing the substance of

this petition. And again, the Florida Supreme Court found

nothing frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in the petition.

6. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO3-1953 (Fla. Sept. 3, 2004) - In this

case Petitioner sought review of the Third District Court of

Appeal’s opinion in 3D03-1392 which declared moot the circuit

court judge’s refusal to rule upon three outstanding motions to

disqualify her while she continue to conduct hearing and issue

orders in Petitioner’s family court case. On September 24, 2004,

the Florida Supreme Court simply declined to exercise its

jurisdiction to review and barred any motion for rehearing. ©

Noteworthy is that the Florida Supreme Court found nothing

frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in the petition.

7. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO04-178 (Fla. Apr. 14, 2004) - On

. -

February 16, 2004, Petitioner filed a petitioner seeking (i) a writ

of prohibition restraining the Honorable Alan Schwartz, Chief

Judge of the Third District Court of Appeal and the Honorable

Juan Ramirez, Jr and David L. Le.v, Associate Judges of the

Third District Court of Appeal from presiding as judges in Case

No. 3D03-2083 pending in the Third District Court of Appeal or,

alternatively, (ii) a writ of mandamus directing a-ruling with

written decision upon Father’s un-resolved motions to disqualify

(i) Judge Schwartz and (ii) Judges Juan Ramirez, Jr and David

L. Levy. This petition arose from the failure of the Florida Third

District Court of Appeal to rule upon a motion to disqualify filed

by Petitioner pending in 3D03-2083. The Florida Supreme Court

denied the petition on April 14, 2004, after learning that it was

moot as those judges had entered orders granting Petitioner’s

motion to disqualify them on March 23, 2004, in Case No.: 3D03-

2083. Anon, the Florida-Supreme Court found nothing

frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in the petition.

8. Sibley v. Sibley, SCO5-11 (Fla. Mar. 15, 2005) - In this

case, Petitioner sought review of the June 18, 2004, opinion of

the Third District Court of Appeals in Case No.: 3D04-1466

which he maintained expressly and directly conflicted with the

Florida Supreme Court and District Court decisions: (i) under

Florida Family Law Rules, Rule 12.440(a) and Florida Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 1.440, that “within a reasonable time from

the service of the notice for trial” the court “shall enter an order

setting the action for trial, fixing a date for trial, and setting a

pretrial conference, if necessary”; (ii) that mandate that a motion

to disqualify be granted when a trial judge enters an order

prohibiting a litigant from asserting federal and Florida

constitutional rights to appeal any of the trial judge’s orders; and

(iii) that mandate that a motion to disqualify be granted when

the trial judge has engaged in ex parte discussions with opposing

counsel on a substantive, non-emergency matter. On March 15,

2005, the Florida Supreme Court declined to review citing lack

of jurisdiction and prohibited any motion for rehearing but once

again found nothing frivolous, abusive or incomprehensible in

-li-

the petition.

Accordingly, of the eight cases cited by the Florida Supreme

Court that it considers “meritless”, “abusive” and “frivolous” to

the extent that collectively they warranted barring Petitioner

from the Florida Supreme Court:

(i) Three were not filed by Petitioner but his

counsel over Petitioner’s express wishes (SC02-2644,

SCO03-8 and SC03-261);

(ii) | Two were disposed of as “moot” due to the

lethargy of the Florida Supreme Court’s addressing the

claims in those_petitions (SCO3-1070 and SC04-178)

and hence the “merits” were never addressed by the

Florida Supreme Court; and

(iii) In three review was denied for lack of

jurisdiction (SC02-1309, SCO3-1953 and SCO5-11)

over a four year period.

Hence, in sum, the Florida Supreme Court sanctioned

Petitioner for filing three petitions in four years upon the sole

basis that it declined to review citing lack of jurisdiction.

Thus it is with a demonstrable basis in fact that Petitioner

now claims that the Florida Supreme Court has abandoned its

obligations to be honesty and operate with integrity in its

adjudications.

Federal guarantees to Due Process imposed upon the states

require more. It is not novel to maintain that if “due process is

violated when the prosecutor's actions treat a defendant unfairly

or impugn the integrity of the judicial process”. Likewise, the

same result attends when the judiciary itself so “impugn[s] the

integrity of the judicial process.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S.

209,f/n #5 (1981) citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97

82.

(1976). Either way, due process cannot countenance the result.

To misrepresent the record to justify sanctioning Petitioner

— who truth be told was only properly complaining to the Florida

Supreme Court of egregious ex parte judicial behavior in the

lower courts — violates the tenants of due process just as a

prosecutor does who misrepresents the record by withholding

evidence. In either case, the judicial process has been impugned

to the extent that due process has been denied.

Given that “even if there is no showing of actual bias in the

tribunal, this Court has held that due process is denied by

circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of

bias”, due process is likewise denied by the appearance — if not

the reality —- of bias so great as to cause the Florida Supreme

Court to dispense with intellectual honesty in their decision.

Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972).

Accordingly, this Court must accept this petition to review

the significant departure from the requirements of “honesty” and

“integrity” by the Florida Supreme Court in this matter.

Ill. LIiITIGIOUSNESS IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT

Significantly, the Florida Supreme Court initially premised

its order to show cause upon a query as to whether “the Court

should not impose upon [Petitioner] a sanction for his

litigiousness.” Appendix-3. _

Thereafter, in the April 27, 2006, order the Florida Supreme

Court - for the first time — stated: “However, petitioner’s

frivolous and abusive filings must immediately come to an end.”

Appendix-6. This ex post facto and gratuitous finding of

“frivolous” — while contributing to the intellectual dishonesty of

the Florida Supreme Court’s orders in this matter — is even more

significant because of this simple fact: Not one of the eight

Florida Supreme Court cases cited were found to be “frivolous”

at the time they were determined. Moreover, not one of the

43.

twenty-five appellate proceedings in the Florida Third District

Court of Appeal was found to be frivolous. Finally, not one of

the twelve federal district court proceedings was found to be

frivolous.

Patently then, for the Florida Supreme Court to claim that

Petitioner’s filings were “frivolous” is at best a prevarication.

Indeed, by this loose leap of language, the Florida Supreme

Court has expanded its power to deny access to it to those who

though demonstrably not “frivolous” are simply being punished

for being “litigious”.

While this Court has not expressly recognized “litigiousness”

as a federally guaranteed right, several federal circuit courts have

so expressly stated. Accord: In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 446 (3d

Cir. 1982)(“It should be made clear that Oliver's litigiousness

alone would not support an injunction restricting his filing

activities. Pavilonis v. King, supra at 1079; Ruderer v. United

States, 462 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 1031 (1972). Access to the courts is a

fundamental tenet of our judicial system; legitimate claims

should receive a full and fair hearing no matter how litigious the

plaintiff may be.”); Pavilonis v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st

Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829(1980) (“Although upholding the

district court in this instance, we emphasize that litigiousness

alone will not support an injunction against a plaintiff, Kane v.

City of New York, 468 F.Supp. 586, 590 (S.D.N.Y.), affd without

op., 614 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1979), and that the use of such

measures against a pro se plaintiff should be approached with

particular caution, Ai// v. Estelle, 423 F.Supp. 690, 695

(S.D.Tex.1976). Generally, this kind of order should not be

considered absent a request by the harassed defendants”); Castro

v. United States, 775 F.2d 399, 408 (1st Cir. 1985)(“We have

recognized that, in extreme circumstances involving groundless

encroachment upon the limited time and resources of the court

and other parties, an injunction barring a party from filing and

processing frivolous and vexatious lawsuits may be appropriate.

Gordon v. United States Department of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (Ast

—"o

Cir.1977) (per curiam). Other circuits have similarly held that

district courts have the power under 28 U.S.C. 1651 (a) to enjoin

litigants who abuse the court system by harassing their

opponents. . . . As the district court properly noted, appellants’

apparent “affinity for litigation,” standing alone, would not

provide sufficient justification to issue an injunction.”) (Citations

omitted).

Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court’s conclusion that

Petitioner’s pleadings were “abusive” is simply false. This Court

has identified the meaning of “abusive” in /n Re Demos, 500 U.S.

16 (1991). In that case, abusive filings which justified a sanction

of denying access occurred when Demos had “made 32 in forma

pauperis filings in this Court since the beginning of the October,

1988, Term, many of which challenge sanctions imposed by

lower courts in response to petitioner's frivolous filings.

Petitioner's method of seeking relief here -- filing three petitions

for relief from a single order of a lower court -- could only be

calculated to.disrupt the orderly consideration of cases.” /d. at

16-17.

Plainly, Petitioner pleadings do not fall in the category of

litigants such as in Demos. As such, the Florida Supreme Court

may not sanction Petitioner under a theory of “abusiveness”.

Simply stated, as the dissent in Demos postulated: “More

likely, the Court's ban on Demos’ in forma pauperis requests for

extraordinary writs is but a poorly disguised penalty for his more

numerous petitions for certiorari. See also In re Sindram, 498

U.S. 177, 183 (1991) (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting, joined by

Marshall, J. (noting that Court's ban upon petitioner's in forma

pauperis filings for extraordinary relief ‘appears to be nothing

more than an alternative for punishing [petitioner] for the

frequency with which he has filed petitions for certiorari and

petitions for rehearing’).” /d. at 19.

Accordingly, to stop the Florida Supreme Court from “setting

sail on a journey whose landing point is uncertain”, this Court

7%.

must act to review the practice of the Florida Supreme Court in

denying court access to those who it finds objectionable.

CONCLUSION

The implications of denying this petition are substantial.

First, the right to access federal court is meaningless if a litigant

can be “chilled” from doing so by threat of state court sanctions.

Second, if a tribunal is at liberty to ignore and misrepresent

the record and the law to achieve a desire result, the rule of law

is nO more.

Last, in those rare cases where access to court must be

denied to a litigant after a pattern of “frivolous” filings which

implicate a “Court's responsibility . . . to see that [judicial]

resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of

justice”, such a pattern must be present. /n re McDonald, 489

U.S. 180, 184 (1989). Here, that pattern is not present and as

such to sanction this expansion of judicial control of access to

court by denying this petition renders void the access to court

guarantees secured by King John’s signature on the Magna

Charta in 1215.

-Accordingly, this petition for a writ of certiorari should be

granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Montgomery Blair Sibley

Petitioner

A-1

CONTENTS OF APPENDIX

Opinions Below

The April 14, 2005, order of the Florida Supreme Court

Dismissing the Petition and to Show Cause...... Appendix -2

The April 27, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court

SP owned ves wew una n daca Appendix-4

The June 15, 2006, order of the Florida Supreme Court denying

NEE eed cha heed ceday en sane cea ere Appendix-8

A-2

SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

APRIL 14, 2005

CASE NO.: SC04-2129

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY vs. FLORIDA JUDICIAL

QUALIFICATIONS

COMMISSION

Petitioner(s) Respondent(s)

The all writs petition is hereby dismissed. Cf Tyson v.

Florida Bar, 826 So.2d 265 (Fla. 2002) (disciplinary proceedings

against attorneys are instituted in the public interest and to

preserve the purity of the courts, no private rights except those

of the accused attorney are involved, and the complaining

witness is not a party to the disciplinary proceeding and has no

right to appeal). This Court does not investigate a determination

by the Judicial Qualifications Commission that no formal charges

should be instigated against a member or members of the

judiciary. See Fla. Jud. Qual. Commn’n R. 6(a).

Since June 6,2002, petitioner has initiated numerous pro se

cases with the Court, all of which appear to emanate out of his

1994 dissolution of marriage proceedings in the Circuit Courtof

the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida.

None of petitioner's filings have resulted in any relief. See Sibley

v. Sibley No. SC02-1309 (Fla. Nov. 22, 2002)(denying review

based on alleged direct conflict of decisions); Sibley v. Sibley,

No. SC03-8 (Fla. Aug. 18,2003)(same); Sibley v. Sibley, No.

SC03-1953 (Fla. Sept. 3,2004)(same); Sibley v. Sibley, No.

SCOS5-11 (Fla. Mar. 15, 2005) (same); Sibley v. Spears, No. SCO2-

2644(Fla. May 27,2003) (dismissing alleged direct conflict of

decisions); Sibley v. Spears, No. SCO03-261 (Fla. Feb. 18,2003)

(same); Sibley v. Sibley, No. SCO3-1070 (Fla. Sept. 20,2004)

(dismissing petition for writ of mandamus as moot); Sibley v.

Sibley, No. SC04-178 (Fla. Apr. 14,2004) (denying extraordinary

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writ petition).

Because petitioner has abused the processes of the Court

with his numerous meritless filings, the Court finds that a

limitation on-petitioner's ability to initiate any further pro se

proceedings in this Court may be necessary in order to further

the constitutional right of access of other litigants in that it would

permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the

consideration of legitimate claims filed by others. See in Re

McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 184 (1989) (noting that "[e] very paper

filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or

frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited

resources"). The Court notes that the Third District Court of

Appeal has already imposed such a sanction on petitioner. See:

Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 980, 988 (Fla.3d DCA 2004)

(directing the clerk of court to “reject any further filings in this

court on the former husband's behalf unless signed by a member

of The Florida Bar (other than the former husband)”).

Given petitioner's clear abuse of the judicial process in the

Court, petitioner is hereby directed to show cause on or before

April 29,2005, why the Court should not impose upon him a

sanction for his litigiousness, such as directing the Clerk of Court

to reject for filing my future pleadings, petitions, motions,

documents, or other filings submitted by him related to his 1994

dissolution of marriage proceedings unless they are signed by a

member in good standing of The Florida Bar other than

petitioner.

ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE, CANTERO and BELL, JJ., concur.

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SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

APRIL 27, 2006

CASE NO.: SC04-2129

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY vs. FLORIDA JUDICIAL

QUALIFICATIONS

COMMISSION

Petitioner(s) Respondent(s)

PER CURIAM.

Petitioner, Montgomery Blair Sibley, an attorney licensed in

Florida, has previously filed a “Petition to Review the Actions,

Policies and Procedures of the Florida Judicial Qualifications

Commission,” which this Court dismissed on April 14, 2005.

Since that original filing attorney Sibley has filed numerous other

filings which culminated in the issuance by this Court of an order

directing Sibley to show cause why we should not limit his filings

or otherwise impose sanctions upon him for filing frivolous

proceedings in this Court. We now sanction Sibley.

On November 4, 2004, Sibley, a licensed Florida attorney

representing himself, filed in this Court a “Petition to Review the

Actions, Policies and Procedures of the Florida Judicial

Qualifications Commission.” In this filing, Sibley sought -to

challenge the Judicial Qualifications Commission's decision not

to pursue formal charges against several judges about whom

Sibley had filed complaints in relation to his ongoing child

custody and child support disputes with his ex-wife. The petition

was dismissed by order of the Court, which explained its lack of

jurisdiction over the Commission, and that “[t}his Court does not

investigate a determination by the Judicial Qualifications

Commission that no formal charges should be initiated against a

member or members of the judiciary. See Fla. Jud. Qual. Comm'n

R. 6(a).” Sibley v. Fla. Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, No.

SC04-2129, order at ] (Fla. Apr. 14, 2005).

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In our order of dismissal, the Court noted that since 2002,

Sibley had submitted numerous meritless filings in this Court, all

related to or emanating out of his 1994 dissolution of marriage

proceedings. Id.; see Sibley v. Sibley, 900 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 2005)

(table) (review denied); Sibley v. Sibley, 885 So. 2d 388 (Fla.

2004) (table) (mandamus petition dismissed); Sibley v. Sibley,

884 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 2004) (table) (review denied); Sib/ey v.

Sibley, 872 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 2004) (table) (prohibition petition

denied); Sibley v. Sibley, 854 So. 2d 660 (Fla. 2003) (table)

(review denied); Sibley v. Spears, 846 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 2003)

(table) (review dismissed); Sibley v. Spears, 839 So. 2d 699 (Fla.

2003) (table) (review dismissed); Sibley v. Sibley, 833 So. 2d

774 (Fla. 2002) (table) (review denied). Subsequent to the

issuance of the order to show cause, the Court denied review in

yet another case filed by petitioner in this Court, Sibley v. Sibley,

901 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 2005) (table). Accordingly, based on his

prior abuse of this Court’s processes, Sibley was directed to show

cause “why the Court should not impose upon him a sanction for

his litigioushess, such as directing the Clerk of Court to reject for

filing any future pleadings, petitions, motions, documents, or

other filings related to his 1994 dissolution of marriage

proceedings unless they are signed by a member in good

standing of The Florida Bar other than petitioner.” S/bley v. Fia.

Judicial Qualifications Comm'n, order at 2.

In his response, Sibley rejects the notion that his numerous

filings constitute an abuse of judicial process and argues that this

Court lacks the authority, constitutionally and otherwise, to

impose a sanction upon him and restrict his access to this Court.

We disagree. This Court and the United States Supreme Court

have, when deemed necessary, exercised the inherent judicial

authority to sanction an abusive litigant. See, e.g., Martin v.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, 506 U.S. 1 (1992); In re

Sindram, 498 U.S. 177 (1991); Jn re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180,

184 (1989); Armstead v. State, 817 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 2002);

Peterson v. State, 817 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 2002); Jackson v. Fla.

Dep't of Corr., 790 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2001); Rivera v. State, 728

So. 2d 1165 (Fla. 1998); Attwood v. Singletary,661 So. 2d 1216

A-6

(Fla. 1995). One justification for such a sanction lies in the

protection of the rights of others to timely review of their

legitimate filings. See Martin, 506 U.S. at 3 (imposing sanction

where petitioner’s filings for certiorari review had a deleterious —

effect on the Court's fair allocation of judicial resources); see also

Peterson, 817 So. 2d at 840 (“This Court has a responsibility to

ensure every citizen’s right of access to the courts. ...A

limitation on [the petitioner’s] ability to file would further the

constitutional right to access for other litigants because it would

permit this Court to devote its finite resources to the

consideration of legitimate claims filed by others.”). As noted by

the United States Supreme Court, "[e]very paper filed with the

Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous,

requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part

of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are

allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice." Jn re

McDonald, 489 J.S. at 184.

Upon a thorough review of the filings of Sibley in this Court,

we conclude that Sibley has abused the processes of the Court

and has hindered the ability of this Court to properly resolve

those matters which are properly before the Court. We conclude

that sanctions are merited on this record. Accordingly, in order

to preserve the right of access for all litigants and promote the

interests of justice, the Clerk of this Court is hereby instructed to

reject for filing any future pleadings, petitions, motions,

documents or other filings submitted by Montgomery Blair Sibley

in any way related to his domestic disputes, unless signed by a

member in good standing of The Florida Bar other than

Montgomery Blair Sibley. Under the sanction herein imposed,

Sibley is not wholesale being denied access to the courts. He may

petition the Court through the assistance of counsel other than

himself, whenever such counsel determines that the proceeding

may have merit and can be filed in good faith. However,

petitioner’s frivolous and abusive filings must immediately come

to an end. Further, if Montgomery Blair Sibley submits a filing in

violation of this order, he may be subjected to further contempt

proceedings or other appropriate sanctions.

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It is so ordered.

PARIENTE, C.J., and WELLS, ANSTEAD, LEWIS, QUINCE,

CANTERO, and BELL, JJ., concur.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION, AND IF FILED, DETERMINED.

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SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA

THURSDAY, JUNE 15, 2006

CASE NO.: SC04-2129

MONTGOMERY BLAIR SIBLEY vs. FLORIDA JUDICIAL

QUALIFICATIONS

COMMISSION

Petitioner(s) Respondent(s)

Petitioner's Rule 9.330 Motion for Rehearing is hereby

denied.

ANSTEAD, LEWIS, CANTERO and BELL, JJ..