Petition for ReHearing — Collier v. Pruett (No. 06-253)

2) | FILED

No. 06-253} NOV 24 2006

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

in The SUPREME COURT, U.S.

Supreme Court of the United States

Stephen Carroll Collier,

Petitioner,

Jim Pruett, individually,

John Tam, individually,

John Williamson, individually,

Susan Meredith, individually,

General Communications, Inc., and

Wells Fargo Bank,

Respondents.

On Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court of Appeals

For the Ninth Circuit

REHEARING OF ORDER

DENYING WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Stephen Carroll Collier

In Propria Persona

c/o P.O. Box 104178

Anchorage, Alaska 99510

(907) 522-1776

Table of Authorities

Cases

Adkins v. Lyons, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).. 5

Almeida-Sanchez v. U. S., 413 U.S 266 (1973) 2

Amer. Ins. Co. v. 356Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 (1828). 7

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986)... 2

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991).......... 10

Comner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. 591 (1855)...... 7

Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F Cas. 546 (1823)... 2

Dismuke v. U.S., 297 U.S. 167 (1936)... 2

Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410 (1870)

Enochs v. Williams Packing, 370 U.S. 1... |

Ex Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300 (1855) _ 3,7

Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. 603 (1869)............ 3

Knights Templars’ v. Jarman, 187 U.S. 197 (1902) 5

Marbury v. Madison, | Cranch 137 (1803) 7

McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876)... 7

Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) 8

Richards v. Jefferson, Ala., 517 U.S. 793 (1996) 8

Tutun v. U.S., 270 U.S. 568 (1926) 2

U.S. v- Babcock, 250 U.S. 328 (1919)... 2

U.S. v. Dobson, 781 F.2d 1374 (9" Cir. 1986) 3

U.S. v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822 (1984) 8

U.S. v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457 (9" Cir. 1983) .. 3

U/. S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) 3

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) 2

U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 US. 579 (1983) 3

United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) 3.4

W-W Volkwagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)... 8

Statutes

Judiciary Act of 1789... l

§ U.S.C. § 552a(2) & (13) ]

iF sUSC 5 §52(a)(1)

NOUSE 668 teases eee

WUE 608 2... ct ee eee

ith ot |) ee ree 7

26 U.S.C. § 1397 Eo ccccccccccce

26 U.S.C. §3121.......... 7

26 U.S.C. § 3306... occccccccccccececesseesee et hee

DEES BO oe ee

.

6

26 U.S.C. §7421 0...

26U S.C. §7701........

28 USC. § 1355

es ER ccc nance NAAN ES

28 USC § 2201 ann halecdenuei oun dudaaniiacu eae

cf Mh . e oeee aoe

38 Stat. 956 (1915 Ch. 90) PRs d eRe MINTS hoes TE | 6

49 Stat 620 as amended... Pa ad (olecauaseunin nae

62 Stat. 934 (1940 Ch. 646)........ ; aa ee 6

62 Stat. 964 of June 25, 1948... 5

48 Stat. 955, Ch. $12 ...... PETA DNS J eet

1935 Ch. 829 amended 274d ................ eg aaca e

1940 Code Ch. 10............ kes nh el a ele ERTS ae

1940 Code Sec. 400 as revised from Mar. 3, 1911............. a

1940 Code, Ch. 10, Section 371 ............ 6

Constitutional Provisions

Article V1. Clause 2 aww me Ba eee ees oe

Constitution of the United States i >

Rehearing of Order Denying

Writ of Certiorari

Jurisdiction of this instant Case arises under the

Judiciary Act of 1789 as lawfully amended by the Electors of

the several States and the Constitution of the United States.

Plaintiff in Error (“Piffin Err”) is enforcing a private

right in this instant Case where the 9" Circuit incorrectly,

thereby being a reversible error, affirmed the Anti-Injunction

Act of 26 U.S.C. §& 7421 that presumably prohibits an

Injunction against the individually named Employees even

when they are alleged to have violated the specific

congressional mandate of 5 USC. § 552(a){1), which now

acts as an insulator for potential wrongdoing by agency

personnel. The § 7421 estoppel against suit was based upon

the holding of Enochs v. Williams Packing, 370 U.S. 1

(1962), where the issue there was to enjoin the collection of

federal social security and unemployment taxes against a

corporation. Lnochs has no application to the P/ffin Err as he

is not registered as a corporation and has not withheld FICA

taxes nor is he bound by contract with the collection agency

of the Social Security Act, being the IRS. Additionally,

Williams Packing Inc. was not entitled to any of the

privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several States

as corporations are of a class that the Constitution does not

recognize and as such have no constitutional rights, see

Ducat v. Chicago, 77 U.S. 410 (1870). The Lnochs case

involves a subject-matter that is completely off-point to the

Piffin Err’s Case and convincingly shows that the dismissal

was based on an unsound principle as a matter of law.

Furthermore, the primary essential element in the

holding of the Enochs case is namely the social security

system, ie. 49 Stat 620 as amended (“SSA”) and

unemployment taxes The social security system and

unemployment taxes is only for “citizens of the United

States’ who make claim by oath to that specific allegiance

and have made application for a federal benefit which is

when the United States creates rights in Individuals as found

in5 U.S.C. § 552a(2) & (13).

The Supreme Court of the United States has

consistently held that when the United States creates rights

(benefits) in Individuals against itself, the United States is

under no obligation to provide any remedy through the courts

of the United States and can withhold any remedy if

Congress so chooses, see U.S. v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331,

Dismuke v. U.S., 297 U.S. 167; Tutun v. U.S., 270 U.S. 568.

This Case is an Error in Law of which only the

Supreme Court of the United States can and must correct

arising under Article II] in all Cases in Law and Equity

exercising the judicial Power of the United States under the

authority of the United States, as the P/ffin Err has no Social

Security Number in his true name as already plead; and, owes

no allegiance to that of an abstract “citizen of the United

States”, but is a citizen of one of the several States with his

Privileges and Immunities secured in Article IV Section 2

Clause 1; and, does not claim to have any rights as those

created for Individuals due to the registration for a benefit

from the United States. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92

U.S. 542, 554-55 (1875); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,

75 (1872); Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 551-52 (1823).

In the adjudged decision of A/meida-Sanchez v. U.S.,

413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) it was held that “It is clear, of

course, that no Act of Congress can authorize a violation of

the Constitution.” See U.S. v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S.

579, 585 (1983), U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 433 (1976);

U.S. v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877-78 (1975), U.S. v.

Dobson, 781 F.2d 1374, 1376 (9"" Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Spetz,

721 F.2d 1457, 1470 (9" Cir. 1983) The Pf in Err in this

Case has been methodically denied access to a constitutional

court that exercises the whole judicial Power of the United

States due to statutes that violate his Fifth Amendment nghts.

“Due process of law” does not include jurisdiction of law

outside the several States when the citizen holds allegiance to

a birthright from one of the several States of the Union. Suca

ta

is the case for this P/ff in Err, who has collectively

established his allegiance to that of being a “citizen of one of

the several States’ and not the undefined “citizen of the

United States” as “there is no such thing as a citizen of the

United States.” see Fx Parte Knowles, 5 Cal. 300, 302

(1855) (stating the object of the exercise of naturalization is

to make citizens of the respective several States). This

analysis establishes the basis of this viewpoint as supported

by the public record and guarantees within the Constitution.

In the adjudged decision of Hepburn v. Griswold, 75

U.S. 603, 611-12 (1869) it was explicated that the duty of the

Supreme Court is to uphold the provision found in Article VI,

Clause 2 that the Constitution, the Laws of the United States

and Treaties shall be the supreme Law of the Land and no

Act of Congress is entitled to violate it, to wit:

Not every act of Congress, then, is to be

regarded as the supreme law of the land; nor is

it by every act of Congress that the judges are

bound. This character and this force belong

only to such acts as are ‘made in pursuance of

the Constitution.’ .. When, therefore, a case

arises for judicial determination, and the

decision depends on the alleged inconsistency

of a legislative provision with the fundamental

law, it 1s the plain duty of the court to compare

the act with Constitution, and if the former

cannot, upon a fair construction, be reconciled

with the latter, to give effect to the

Constitution rather than the statute. This

seems so plain that it is impossible to make it

plainer by argument. If it be otherwise the

Constitution is not the supreme law, it is

neither necessary or useful, in any case, to

inquire whether or not any act of Congress

was passed in pursuance of it, and the oath

which every member of this court is required

to take. that he ‘will administer justice without

respect to persons, and do equal right to the

poor and the nich, and faithfully perform the

duties incumbent upon him to the best of his

ability and understanding, agreeably to the

Constitution and laws of the United States,’

becomes an idle and unmeaning form.

Even though the Social] Security System has been in

operation for quite some time, /.e. since 1935, this can be of

no excuse for violations of the Constitution of the United

States as held in the adjudged decision of United States v.

Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 433 (1976), to wit:

[F]or it is well settled that the mere existence

of statutes or practice, even though long

standing, is no defense to an unconstitutional

practice. “(N)o one acquires a vested or

protected right in violation of the Constitution

by long use, even when that span of time

covers Our entire national existence and

indeed predates it.”

In the adjudged decision of Adkins v. Lyons, 261 U.S.

525 (1923) the pronouncement was very clear, to wit:

This court, by an unbroken line of decisions

from Chief Justice Marshall to the present

day, has steadily adhered to the rule that

every possible presumption is in favor of the

validity of an act of Congress until

overcome beyond rational doubt. But, if by

clear and indubitable demonstration a statute

be opposed to the Constitution, we have no

choice but to say so.

Where there are two interpretations of a statute each

equally obvious, the cardinal rule of construction is that the

one which is clearly in accordance with the Constitution is to

be preferred, see Knights Jemplars’& Masons’ L. Indem. Co.

v. Jarman, 187 U.S. 197, 205 (1902)

The federal circuit court system found reason to

dismiss the P/ff in Err’s Case based in part on the Act of

Congress of 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Examining § 2201 clearly

establishes that this statute has been recast and revised from a

Law of the United States to a class of statute that precludes

citizens of the several States and precludes the “several

States” by substituting it with the different term of “States.”

Section 2201 credits the source of this Act of

Congress to 62 Stat. 964, June 25, 1948 and the 1940 Code §

400 as revised from the act of Mar. 3, 191], Ch. 231, § 274d.

Starting at the beginning of the historical enactments

for Ch. 231, § 274d, one finds in the 1911 Judicial Code the

heading “Provisions Common To More Than One Court,”

being Chapter 11, which includes sections 256 through 274.

There is a jurisdictional statement for 36 Stat. 1160 at Sec.

256, being “The jurisdiction vested in the courts of the

United States in cases and _ proceedings hereinafter

mentioned, shall be exclusive of the courts of the several

States.” (Emphasis added) -

Section 274 of the Judicial Code of 1911, being under

the Ch. 11 jurisdiction of the “several States,” starts at 36

Stat. 1164 and includes amendments from later years. The

next immediate one being 38 Stat. 956 (1915 Ch. 90) adding

sections 274a, 274b and 274c, and, in 1934 another being Ch.

512 (48 Stat. 955) added retroactively to the Judicial Code of

1911 and designated section 274d. In 1935 Ch. 829 amended

section 274d by adding after the words “actual controversy”

the following words, “except with respect to Federal taxes.”

It was in 1935 that the SSA was enacted authorizing the IRS

to enforce collections for the SSA’s financial support.

Progressing to the 1940 Code, Ch. 10, Section 371,

the jurisdiction was still of the “several States”, to wit: “The

jurisdiction vested in the courts of the Umited States in the

cases and proceedings hereinafter mentioned, shall be

exclusive of the courts of the several States.”

In this 1940 Code Ch. 10 the jurisdiction of the

“several States’ were in the following sections being Sec

396 (for sec. 274), and, Sec. 397 (for sec. 274a), and, Sec

398 (for sec. 274b), and, Sec. 399 (for sec. 274c); and, Sec

400 (for sec. 274d) with the added words of “except with

respect to Federal taxes” included

In the recasting of the 1948 Code, Ch. 646 at 62 Stat.

934 in Section 1355 we find significant changes by the

omission of the “several States” to just “States,” which

evidences a change in jurisdiction, and the addition of “under

any Act of Congress”, to wit: “The district courts shall have

original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of

any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of

any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,

incurred under any Act of Congress.” In the unambiguous

language of 28 U.S.C. § 1366 we find “reference to laws of

the United States or Acts of Congress” that is conclusive of

the different jurisdictions bearing singular descriptive titles

A Congress for the several States arises under Article VI and

is only empowered and authorized to enact “ Laws of the

United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.” A

Congress for the territories acts in two capacities, being that

of a general (national) and a state government, to enact “Acts

of Congress.” But in the several States, Congress is bound to

only a national capacity, enacting “Laws of the United

States.” See 7he American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,

26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828). Section 2201 clearly opposes the

Constitution and the jurisdiction of the several States

The “several States” were established from the

“original States” in the Articles of Confederation Articles IV,

VIII and IX, Clause 7, and the term is used seven (7) times in

the Constitution of the United States. Congress has no grant

of authority to°change the jurisdiction of the “several States”

into territorial “States,” which only includes all of the

possessions and D.C. as currently found in 26 U.S.C. §§ 42.

103, 115, 1397E, 3121, 3306, 5891 and 7701. See Conner v.

Elliott, 59 U.S. 591, 593 (1855), McCready v. Virginia, 94

U.S. 391, 395-96 (1876). The district court issued judgment

without the jurisdiction of “the several States” and therefore

had no jurisdiction over the P/t/ in Lrr with his citizenship of

one of the several States thereby violating his Article TV, s2

6

protections. “The judgment must be rendered by a court

legally constituted, having jurisdiction of the cause and the

person. Without jurisdiction there is no validity or vitality to

the judgment,” see Springer v. Shavender, 23 S.E. 976, 978

(1896). It is well settled law that only the judicial department

declares the law, being pronounced in Marbury v. Madison, |

Cranch 137, 177 (1803), “(i)t is emphatically the province

and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”

Sec. 2201 is evidence of an Act of Congress that 1s not “made

in pursuance of the Constitution” as it is without the

jurisdiction of any of the several States.

The Piff in Err labors greatly to have this court

acknowledge the essential facts that “a distinction both in

name and privileges is made to exist between citizens of the

United States ex wi termini and citizens of the respective

States. To the former no privileges or immunities are granted;

and it will hardly be contended, that political status can be

derived by implication against express legal enactments.” See

Ex Parte Knowles at 304 (emphasis in the original).

One of the many essential elements in the

Constitutional Republic firmly established as inviolate is

right of “due process of law” being in the Fifth Amendment

The words ‘due process of law,’ when applied to

judicial proceedings, as was held by Mr. Justice Field.

speaking for this court in the adjudged decision of Penoyer v.

Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877), to wit

. [MJean[{[s] a course of legal proceedings

according to those rules and principles which

have been established in our systems of

jurisprudence for the protection and

enforcement of private rights. To give such

proceedings any validity, there must be a

tribunal competent by its constitution - that 1s,

by the law of its creation - to pass upon the

subject-matter of the suit; and, if that involves

merely a determination of the personal

liability of the defendant, he must be brought

within its jurisdiction by service of process

within the state, or his voluntary appearance.

See also World-wide Volkwagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

286, 291+ (1980), Richards v. Jefferson, Ala., 517 U.S. 793,

797(1996), U.S. v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828+ (1984).

Further in Neff, supra. ibid at 722, every one of the

several States has exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty

over persons and property within its territory, to wit:

The several States of the Union are not, it is

true, in every respect independent, many of

the right and powers which originally

belonged to them being now vested in the

government created by the Constitution. But,

except as restrained and limited by that

instrument, they possess and exercise the

authority of independent States, and the

principles of public law to which we have

referred are applicable to them. One of these

principles is, that every State possesses

exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over

persons and property within its territory. As a

consequence, every State has the power to

determine for itself the civil status and

capacities of its inhabitants,-to prescribe the

subjects upon which they may contract, the

forms and solemnities with which their

contracts shall be executed, the rights and

obligations arising from them, and the mode in

which their validity shall be determined and

their obligations enforced, and also to regulate

the manner and conditions upon which

property situated within such territory, both

personal and real, may be acquired, enjoyed,

and transferred.

The P/ff in Err in this instant case is domiciled within

the territorial boundaries of Alaska and his property is only

within these boundaries. Yet, the courts of Alaska were not

allowed retain cognizance of the Case as it was removed to

the USDC, which is without the original jurisdiction of the

United States, that resulted with a judgment where the USDC

used statutes that had no jurisdiction of the P/ffin Err’s Case

to dismiss, which has been affirmed by the 9" Circuit.

If the Supreme Court of the United States does not

correct this absolute violation of the P/ff in Err’s inviolate

right to have “due process of law” in some court arising

under the Constitution of the United States under Art. III or

arising under a court of one of the several States, he is denied

access to any court within the boundaries of any of the

several States and of the United States when it, is

incontrovertible that the P/ffin Err’s property has been taken

with no known legal duty established or declared by any of

the parties. The P/ff in Err has tried every court available

from the Superior Court of Alaska, the USDC, 9"" Circuit and

now the Supreme Court of the United States to obtain “due

process of law” as it pertains to Article IV, sec. 2 protections.

In the adjudged decision of Cheek v. United States,

498 US. 192, 199, 201-202 (1991) it was held that

willfulness is not disjunctive where there must exist a law

that is definite and knowable by the defendant; and, that this

definite and knowable existing law imposes a legal duty upon

the defendant; and, willfulness is not disjunctive with the

definite and knowable existing law that imposes the legal

duty must be known by the defendant; and, willfulness is not

disjunctive that the defendant voluntarily and intentionally

violated the known legal duty imposed by the definite and

knowable existing law. The federal circuit has ignored what

the known legal duty is for the P/ffin Err, if any exists at all.

The P/ff in Err has provided conclusively that there is

no law that is definite and knowable in existence for the

taking of his private property without court judgment, that

there is no legal duty established, and no known legal duty

has been disclosed to the Piffin Err, ibid, and this has never

been disputed by any of the Appellees during the entire time it

has taken to arrive at the Supreme Court of the United States,

being the court of last resort available to correct and protect

the private and fundamental rights of the P/ff in Err.

If the Supreme Court of the United States chooses not

exercise it’s mandated duty and judicial Power of the United

States arising in Article 1I] with the separation of Powers

doctrine in this instant Case, then the ultimate fact of the

usurpation by Congress is affirmed and held true by this

current Supreme Court of the United States, as stated in

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 761 (1986) Justice White’s

dissenting opinion “with the advent and triumph of the

administrative state ...”, for the SSA to be irrevocably applied

upon all American subjects, as it stands perpetual in duration.

If there is no Fifth Amendment “due process of law”

available today in the several States and the United States for

a citizen of one of the several States, then the Constitutional

Republic as established and ordained has descended in worth

to be similarly compared to the days of the Empire of Rome’s

collapse from it’s own internal corruption and dishonesty.

The honored principles in the Constitution were enacted by

the sovereign People with a limited grant of authority to the

United States government. The grantors, being citizens of

the several States, cannot and should not become subservient

to the grantee (Congress), it being of limited delegated

authority, particularly when there is the substitution of the

sovereign jurisdiction for that of a dissimilar administrative

jurisdiction in an endeavor of creating nghts against the

United States upon Individuals to limit remedies in court that

does not and cannot include citizens of the several States

Therefore, I pray that this Honorable Court will

provide the P/ff in Err his day in a constitutional Court

without loss of jurisdiction of the several States © .d remand

this back to the District Court for remand to the ,urisdiction

of the Superior Court of Alaska

Stephen Collier, Pro per

P.O. Box 104178

Anchorage, Alaska 99510

907.522.1776

10

Certification Certificate

This request for Rehearing of the order denying the writ of

certiorari based upon the errors of the lower courts is

presented in good faith and not for delay. It includes

substantial grounds not previously presented.

Si

Stephen Collier