Opposition Brief — Housing Authority of Jefferson Parish v. Johnson (No. 05-1584)

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No, 05-1584 AN6 14 2°75

OFFICE OF THE Guerm

SUFFER: E CO" CTS

ae

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

HOUSING AUTHORITY OF JEFFERSON PARISH, et al.,

Petitioners,

V.

CATRICE JOHNSON, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED States Court OF APPEALS

FOR THE FirTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Mark A. MorEAu REAGAN W. Simpson

Laura A. TUGGLE Counsel of Record

New ORLEANS LEGAL ASSISTANCE CHRISTIAN A. GARZA

1010 Common, Suite 1400A KING & SPALDING LLP

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 1100 Louisiana, Suite 4000

(504) 529-1000 Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 751-3200

Attorneys for Respondents

202832 ce

COUNSEL PRESS

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. The Voucher Program

B. Respondents’ Allegations Below

C. Dispositions in the District Court and

Court of Appeals

Il. REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

There Is No Circuit Split

The Court of Appeals Applied Settled

The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied

Settled Law

1. Congress conferred a concrete right

to identified individuals

The obligation to confer the right is

binding

Contents

Page

4. Enforcement of the right is not

foreclosed by a comprehensive

regulatory scheme. ............. 10

CONCLUSION

iil

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Alexander y. Sandoval,

Pee Ws APP ROED vices he oe) oaxee este

Blessing v. Firestone,

WORT MIRO oc a

City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams,

544 U.S. 113 (2005) ........... SSeS

Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc.,

URES SI erg he

Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe,

SAG US DIS CNA goo ek ee

Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish,

442 F.3d 356 (Sth Cir. 2006) .............

Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish,

2004 WL 2414095 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2004),

rev'd, 442 F.3d 356 (Sth Cir. 2006) ........

Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,

og eM pe.) eee ee ere eee

Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n,

SO aa SOE RNOED coda gesew ai vaveveds

Page

passim

passim

iv

Cited Authorities

Page

Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment

& Hous. Auth.,

Te OO EM CAPOED oN e00s Od sb wES OVERS passim

STATUTES & RULES:

2 UGE. B28 7 CR ook oo oe rs eS passim

Q2U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) os cee Cee neste e's 3

BA CBS POSIT CHONG MOU) vices cs bese’ 3

24 C.E.R. $ 962.555 (Weat 2006) és vices 3, 11

H.R. Rep. No. 100-122(I) (1987), as reprinted in

BET GE AE OORT See cc hvcss bee kee es 11

PR LY. Fe AOD ove o's chews eee awe eRe CRE 2

Been WN eee My BER ic 6 Grea Gri bo Boke oe Ree 6

TABLE OF APPENDIX

Page

Appendix — Housing Choice Voucher Program

Guidebook

l

This brief in opposition is being filed jointly by all of

the respondents, who were plaintiffs below.

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Respondents receive federal rent subs*ies under 42

U.S.C. § 1437f(0) (2000), which established the Housing

Choice Voucher Program (the “Voucher Program”).

Respondents filed suit in federal district court alleging that

they had not received their full subsidies, as defined by

statute, because Petitioners had failed to calculate subsidies

with the required allowance for tenant-paid utilities.

Petitioners are the Jefferson Parish Housing Authority, its

executive director, and the Louisiana Housing Development

Corporation, which is under contract with the Housing

Authority to operate Jefferson Parish’s Voucher Program.

A. The Voucher Program.

The Voucher Program, enacted in 1988 as part of Section

8 of the Housing Act of 1937, is a tenant-based rent subsidy

program. It enables low-income families to rent suitable

housing in the private market, giving families flexibility in

choosing housing by providing a statutorily defined “monthly

assistance payment.” Jd. § 1437f(0)(2). The assistance

payment is, for purposes of this suit, equal to: the amount

by which the family’s “rent” exceeds 30% of adjusted

monthly family income, with rent expressly defined to

include the “amount allowed for tenant-paid utilities.” /d.

§ 1437f(0)(2)(A).'

1. If a family chooses a unit renting for more than the “payment

standard” (established by the housing authority in accord with

(Cont’d)

2

By adopting that formula for assistance payments,

Congress enabled families to secure both housing and

necessary utilities that would not cost them more than

30% of their adjusted monthly family income. /d.

§ 1437f(0)((2)(A).? Under that statutory formula (i.e., “rent”

minus 30% of income), monthly assistance payments increase

concomitantly with an increase in the “amount allowed for

tenant-paid utilities” (included in the term “rent’’). Jd.

The “amount allowed for tenant-paid utilities” refers to

the amount established by the housing authority in

compliance with HUD’s implementing regulations. /d.

Congress thus incorporated into its statutory formula HUD’s

regulatory requirements governing utility allowances, a long-

standing feature of all federal housing programs. At all times

relevant to this case, the Voucher Program required an

(Cont'd)

statutory formula based on fair rental values), the family’s assistance

payment is limited to the amount by which the payment standard

(rather than “rent’’) exceeds 30% of income, in which case the housing

authority’s failure to employ the correct utility allowance would not

affect assistance payments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(0)(1)(A)-(B) &

(2)(B) (2000). That alternative formula is not relevant here because

Rule 12(b)(6) requires the Court to accept as true Respondents’

allegation that they were adversely affected by the Petitioners’ failure

to increase the utility allowance. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines,

Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). Petitioners’ argument to the contrary

(Pet. at 16) improperly raises an issue not adjudicated below.

2. Section 1437f(0)(2)(A) provides two alternatives to 30% of

adjusted income — namely, 10% of unadjusted monthly income and

certain welfare payments allocated to housing, but both are

insignificant to this case and thus are omitted for the sake of

simplicity.

3

increase in the amount of utilitics if utility rates changed

10% or more. 24 C.F.R. § 982.517(b) & (c) (West 2006)

(eff. July 1994). It further mandated that the amount allowed

for tenant-paid utilities reflect the “typical cost of utilities

and services paid by energy-conservative households that

occupy [similar] housing.” /d. § 982.517(b)(1).

B. Respondents’ Allegations Below.

Respondents filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section

1983”), alleging that Petitioners failed to calculate and

provide legally required allowances for tenant-paid utilities.

As a result, Respondents were required to make rent

contributions that were higher than Congress intended, and

they received monthly assistance payments that were lower

than intended.’ Respondents further alleged that the utility

schedule for Jefferson Parish did not increase from 1995

through at least 2004, even though utility costs increased

more than 10% several times during those years. See R. 195

at 4 18. Petitioners’ own evidence demonstrated that their

2004 utility schedule decreased amounts allowed for a

number of categories of utility costs. Compare R. 136 with

R. 137 (1995 & 2004 utility schedules attached to affidavit

of Programs Director of Petitioner Louisiana Housing

Development Corporation).

3. Respondents alleged in their second amended complaint that

Petitioners failed to base their utility allowance on “typical cost of

utilities ... [of] energy-conservative households [in similar]

housing.” 24 C.F.R. § 982.517(b)(1) (West 2006). Although the

district court refused to permit Respondents to file the amended

complaint, the court did address that specific allegation. Johnson,

2004 WL 2414095, at *1 (App. B to Pet. at 26a).

4

C. Dispositions in the District Court and Court of

Appeals.

Necessarily taking Respondents’ allegations as true under

Rule 12(b)(6),* the district court held that Petitioners’

violations of the Voucher Program could not constitute a

denial of federal rights under Section 1983. Without a

hearing, the district court dismissed Respondents’ claims.

Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson Parish, 2004 WL

2414095 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 2004), rev'd, 442 F.3d 356 (Sth

Cir. 2006) (cited as Johnson) (reprinted in App. B to Pet.).

Respondents then appealed to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That court reversed in a

unanimous opinion. Johnson v. Hous. Auth. of Jefferson

Parish, 442 F.3d 356 (Sth Cir. 2006) (also cited as Johnson)

(reprinted in App. A to Pet.).

In overturning the district court, the Fifth Circuit applied

the traditional test adopted in Blessing v. Firestone, 520 U.S.

329, 340-41 (1997) (cited as Blessing), to determine whether

Congress intended to create an enforceable right to properly

calculated monthly assistance payments in the Voucher

Program. Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet. at 7a). The

Fifth Circuit applied the test narrowly, as instructed in

Gonzaga University v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 287-90 (2002)

(cited as Gonzaga). Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet.

at 7a-8a). Further, the Fifth Circuit validated its application

of the Blessing test by following this Court’s decision in

Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment Authority, 479 U.S.

418 (1987) (cited as Wright). Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360-63

4. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475

(1999).

5

(App. to Pet. at 9a-13a). Wright held, wholly consistent with

this Court’s more recent decisions, that virtually identical

language in the public housing program created an

enforceable federal right. See id. at 360 (App. to Pet. at 8a).

Applying the Blessing test in conformity with this Court’s

precedents, the Fifth Circuit determined that: (1) the text of

the statute at issue requires that assistance payments include

an allowance for tenant-paid utilities; (2) courts can

competently determine whether a housing authority has

improperly calculated utility allowances; and (3) Petitioners’

obligation to provide legally required assistance payments

is not diminished by HUD’s potential ability to waive

application of utility-allowance regulations. Jd. at 363-65

(App. to Pet. at 13a-19a). Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that

a judicial remedy is not foreclosed by any comprehensive

administrative enforcement scheme because, as Wright also

held in the context of public housing, Congress has never

given HUD comprehensive or exclusive powers to remedy a

housing authority’s violations of the Voucher Program’s

requirements. Jd. at 365-66 (App. to Pet. at 19a-21a).

For those reasons, the Fifth Circuit reversed and

remanded for further proceeding on the merits in the district

court. Petitioners now seek this Court’s review of that

decision.

Il, REASONS FOR DENYING THE PETITION

Petitioners request review of the Fifth Circuit’s ruling

that Respondents may invoke Section 1983 to seck to enforce

their statutory right under a federal housing program to an

accurate calculation of monthly assistance payments. That

ruling, which did not address the merits of Respondents’

6

claim, does not justify a grant of certiorari because it does

not create or deepen any conflict among the circuits. Further,

the ruling is simply a case-specific and proper application of

the settled legal standard that this Court articulated in such

cases as Blessing and Gonzaga.

A. There Is No Circuit Split.

This Court does not ordinarily exercise review absent a

circuit split. See U.S. Sur. Ct. R. 10. Petitioners cite no split

among the circuits because there is none. No other circuit

has addressed whether the failure to set proper utility

allowances for Voucher Program participants denies an

enforceable federal right.

Nor is there any circuit conflict on the analytical

approach that the Fifth Circuit employed. The Fifth Circuit

applied the three-part Blessing test: (1) whether the statute

creates an individual and enforceable benefit to the plaintiff;

(2) whether the right is definite enough for courts to enforce;

and (3) whether observance of the right is a binding obligation

on States. Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (citing Blessing, 520

U.S. at 340-41) (App. to Pet. at 7a). The application of the

Blessing test conflicts with no other circuit.

B. The Court of Appeals Applied Settled Law.

There is no circuit conflict over the B/essing test because

it is settled law. Repeatedly, this Court has applied the test

to determine whether a federal statute grants rights that an

individual may enforce by a Section 1983 suit. See, e.g., City

of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 119-20

(2005); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 281, 287-90.

7

Further, the Fifth Circuit did not expand the application

of Blessing beyond its boundaries. To the contrary, it

distinctly recognized the “narrowness of the [Blessing]

doctrine as typified in Gonzaga” and described its holding

as a “rarity.” Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet. at 7a-

8a). Thus, the Fifth Circuit dispelled Petitioners’ prediction

that a flood of litigation will ensue. Pet. at 12. Further, the

Fifth Circuit acknowledged, contrary to Petitioners’ argument

(Pet. at 12-14), that a right enforccable under Section 1983

must be found in the statute itself and not merely in a

regulation. /d. at 363-64 (App. to Pet. at 1 5a-16a).

C. The Court of Appeals Correctly Applied Settled Law.

The Court of Appeals correctly applied each prong of

the Blessing test. Congress intended to confer a right to

Voucher Program participants; enforcement of that right lies

within judicial competence; and the obligation to confer the

right is binding. Further, no comprehensive enforcement

scheme negates a Section 1983 suit to enforce the right. See

Blessing, 520 U.S. 340-41.

1. Congress conferred a concrete right to identified

individuals.

Congress expressly included in the statutory formula for

monthly assistance payments “the amount allowed for tenant-

paid utilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(0)(2)(A). Thus, Congress

not only anticipated HUD’s implementing regulations on

tenant-paid utilities, but it also adopted those regulations as

part of the statutory formula. As a-result, the statute expressly

conferred the benefit that Petitioners denied when they failed

to increase the utility schedule as HUD directed.

8

In addition to creating a concrete monetary right, the

Voucher Program is expressly for the benefit of identified

individuals. Section 1437f(0)(2) refers to “the monthly

assistance payment for a family receiving assistance.” /d.

(emphasis added). The next subsection provides: “For a

family receiving tenant-based assistance, ... the monthly

assistance payment for the family shall be” the expressed

statutory formula. Jd. § 1437f(0)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

In holding that the above language creates enforceable

federal rights, the Fifth Circuit properly followed this Court’s

analysis in Wright. Johnson, 442 F.3d at 360 (App. to Pet. at

8a). Wright was expressly approved by this Court in Gonzaga

because the statutory language in Wright conferred an

“iadividualized, concrete monetary entitlement.” Gonzaga,

536 U.S. at 280, 288 n.6. The same entitlement is at issue

here. As the Fifth Circuit noted, while the Voucher Program

confers more flexibility in housing choices than the program

at issue in Wright, the effect of denying properly calculated

assistance payments is identical — namely, to force families

to pay more than 30% of their income in housing costs.

Johnson, 442 F.3d at 362 (App. to Pet. at 1 la-12a). Indeed,

Wright recognized a federal right under less compelling

statutory language. The term “rent” in the statute construed

in Wright was not, as here, statutorily defined to include

tenant-paid utilities; instead, the definition was supplied only

by regulation. Wright, 479 U.S. at 420 & n.2, 431. Therefore,.

Wright is not distinguishable in any meaningful way as

Petitioners assert (Pet. at 13).°

5. Wright is not distinguishable, but Petitioners rely on cases

that are. See Pet. at 19. In Blessing and Gonzaga, federal funding

was conditioned, respectively, on the States’ adoption of effective

(Cont'd)

9

2. The right can be enforced by courts.

Petitioners’ argument that federal courts are not competent

to determine utility allowances (Pet. at 17) is simply incorrect.

No special competence is needed to decide whether utility

rates have increased more than 10% over the last decade.

Nor is any special expertise needed to determine typical

utility costs. The HUD Guidebook for the Housing Choice

Voucher Program points out that “[i]nformation regarding

typical utility usage and the cost of utilities and services is

generally available” from a number of public sources, such

as electric utility suppliers, public utility commissions, and

state or local agencies.°

Evaluating such data is well within the competence of

federal courts. This Court so held in Wright, which expressly

rejected the argument that the concept of ““‘reasonable’ allowance

for utilities is too vague” to be enforceable (479 U.S. at 431),

(Cont’d)

child support programs and privacy policies. See Blessing, 520 U.S.

at 333-35; Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 276. In each case, Congress used

federal funding to encourage policies, but stopped short of compelling

them, so that States could choose not to confer the benefits by

declining federal funds. For a different reason, no federal right existed

in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 27§ (2001), also cited by

Petitioners. Pet at 19. The statute in A/exander prohibited intentional

discrimination. Alexander, 532 U.S. at 280. The plaintiff, however,

was seeking relief from a State policy's disparate impact, which did

not fall within the statute’s prohibition. /d. at 278, 293.

6. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & UrsaAn Dev., HousinGc CHOoIce VOUCHER

PrRoGRAM GuibEBOOK § 18.3 (2001). The Guidebook is available at

www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hev/forms/guidebook.cfm.

Chapter 18 concerns allowances for utilities. Section 18.3 is quoted

above and is reprinted in the appendix to this opposition.

10

contrary to Petitioners’ assertion that the “utility allowance

schedule per se was not at issue in Wright?” (Pet. at 17).

Finally, federal courts competently address more

complex issues. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S.

498, 519-20 (1990) (stating that courts are competent to

decide reasonable and adequate rates for hospital services);

cf. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-

93 (1993) (assigning trial judges the often complex task of

making “a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning

or methodology underlying the [expert] testimony is

scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or

methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue,”

but remaining “confident that federal judges possess the

capacity to undertake this review’’).

3. The obligation to confer the right is binding.

Petitioners appear to argue that the obligation to increase

the utility schedule with rising utility costs is not binding

because HUD can waive that obligation. Pet. at 19. Yet HUD

did not waive that obligation at any time in the past, and

there is no evidence in the record that Petitioners have

received a waiver or even applied for one. Even if such a

waiver occurred in the future, it would neither remedy nor

erase Petitioners’ past failure to calculate monthly assistance

payments in accord with existing utility allowance

requirements.

4. Enforcement of the right is not foreclosed by a

comprehensive regulatory scheme.

Although HUD precludes Voucher Program participants

from challenging policies like the utility allowance in an

1]

informal administrative hearing (24 C.F.R. § 982.555(b)(3)),

Petitioners incorrectly seek to extend this bar to judicial

challenges. Pet. at 9. Administrative preclusion is hardly a

basis for prohibiting judicial enforcement of statutory rights;

instead, it is a reason for allowing a suit like this one under

this Court’s settled jurisprudence. ,

Further, in Wright, this Court held that Congress did not

create a comprehensive enforcement scheme to displace

Section 1983 suits asserting the denial of federal housing

assistance. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 423-29. That decision

mirrors relevant legislative history, which confirms

congressional intent to permit familics recciving housing

assistance to be able to bring suit under Section 1983 for

violations of housing assistance programs. See H.R. Rep.

No. 100-122(1), at 14 (1987), as reprinted in 1987

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3317, 3330 (noting congressional intent to

allow adversely affected tenants to bring suit under Section

1983 to enforce their statutory rights). Because Congress has

similarly established no comprehensive program to displace

judicial enforcement of rights conferred by the Voucher

Program, the Fifth Circuit’s unanimous ruling recognizing

Respondents’ Section 1983 claims should remain

undisturbed.

CONCLUSION

The Fifth Circuit properly decided this case in accord

with congressional intent expressed in clear statutory

language and based on the precedents of this Court. Any

hypothetical policy argument that Petitioners may posit for

violating federal law (see Pet. at 20-21) falls far short of

invoking this Court’s review powers. Therefore, the Court

should deny the petition.

12

Respectfully submitted,

REAGAN W. SIMPSON

Counsel of Record

CHRISTIAN A, GARZA

KinGc & SpaLpinc LLP

1100 Louisiana, Suite 4000

Houston, Texas 77002

(713) 751-3200

Mark A. Moreau

LaurA A. TUGGLE

NEw ORLEANS LEGAL ASSISTANCE

1010 Common, Suite 1400A

New Orleans, Louisiana 70112

(504) 529-1000

Attorneys for Respondents

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX — HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER

PROGRAM GUIDEBOOK

* * 6

18.3 Establishing a Utility Allowance Schedule

When establishing a utility allowance schedule, a PHA should

make every effort to base the allowances on actual rates and

average consumption estimates that will be adequate to cover

expected average utility costs over a twelve month period.

(Like the “budget plans” available through many local utility

companies, the allowances are based on an estimated full

year of usage divided equally over 12 months, although the

family’s actual usage may fluctuate from month to month.)

Information regarding typical utility usage and the cost of

utilities and sewices is generally available through the

following local sources:

Electric utility suppliers

Natural gas utility suppliers

Water and sewer suppliers

Fuel oil and bottled gas suppliers

Public utility commissions

Real estate and property management firms

State and local agencies

Appliance sales and leasing firms

Neighboring PHAs

Average Consumption Data

If a PHA 1s unable to find adequate sources for local

information regarding utility consumption, HUD will

approve usc of national average consumption data. These

2a

Appendix

national average consumption figures represent average

amounts for an “average” 22 bedroom unit in a locality that

has approximately 4,000 heating degree days and an average

local water temperature of 50 degrees. The consumption

figures must be adjusted for the size of the dwelling unit.

The allowances for units in the PHA’s locality may need to

be adjusted to reflect the higher or lower cost of utilities

resulting from variations in typical outdoor temperatures and/

or the temperature of the local water supply. Data on the

average number of heating or cooling degree days for the

locality (the sum of the number of days that the indoor

temperature must be raised or lowered from the outdoor

temperature level to maintain a comfortable temperature on

each day for which heating or cooling is required) is generally

available from the National Weather Service or other local

sources. Data on the average local “degree days” will provide

a basis for making local adjustments to these average

consumption figures.

NATIONAL AVERAGE MONTHLY UTILITY CONSUMPTION For A

2'4 BEDROOM DWELLING UNIT

Utility Service = FaevUtility

Category E __ Units of Measurement | — Comsumption

Electricity

a. Lighting and Refrigeration KWH

b. Cooking KWH

c. Domestic Hot Water ! KWH

d. Space Heating KWH

e. Air Conditioning

Natural Gas and Bottled Gas

a. Cooking

b. Domestic Hot Water

c. Space Heating

. Feel Oi

a. Domestic Hot Water

b. Space Heating

. Water

Domestic Use

b. Lawr

3a

Appendix

Allowances by Unit Size

Whenever possible, consumption data should be obtained

for each unit size and type. If consumption data is available

only for an average unit size (2'4 bedrooms), the utility costs

should be multiplied by the following factors to determine

the costs for a specific unit size:

ADJUSTMENT Facrors By UNit SIZE

Adjustment Factor

Unit Size (Times 24% BR Monthly

: Consumption Figure)

0-BR 0.5

1-BR 0.7

2-BR 0.9

3-BR 1.)

4-BR 14

5-BR 1.6

Calculating a Utility Allowance

In the absence of reliable third-party average utility expense

data, monthly utility allowances can be calculated by multiplying

estimated monthly consumption times the local utility rate.

——s

ESTIMATING UTILITY EXPENSE FROM AVERAGE CONSUMPTION DATA

The average consumption of electricity used for domestic hot water is

340 KWH.

Ata scheduled rate of $.0552362 per KWH, the average monthly allowance for

domestic hot water for a 2'4 bedroom unit would be:

340 KWH x $.0552362 (rate per K WH)

= $19 (rounded to nearest do!!ar)

The al.owance for a 0-bedroom unit will be.

$19 (average 24 BR cost) x 0.5 (0-bedroom adjustment factor)

= $10

The a 'owance for a S-bedroom unit wi!) be

$19 (average 2% BR cost) x 1.6

(S-bedroom adjustment factor)

= $30 (rounded to nearest dollar)

4a

Appendix

Utility Rate Schedules

The cost of gas and electricity generally varies according to

the amounts consumed, as shown on the utility suppliers’

rate schedules. For this reason, it may not be possible to

accurately calculate the cost for a utility in any one-service

category until the usage of that utility for all service categories

is known. For example, a unit with electric heating, may

qualify for a lower “All-Electric” rate if electricity is also

used for cooking, lighting, refrigeration, and domestic hot

water. Rates for gas usage may decline with the volume of

gas used, resulting in a lower cost for gas used for heating,

cooking, and domestic hot water than for each use considered

separately. For convenience in calculating the utility allowances

for any combination of utilities, it is recommended that the

PHA use the higher rates. Allowances for electric cooking,

water heating, and space heating should be calculated using

the lower rates at the middle or bottom of the company’s

rate schedule.

Ranges and Refrigerators

If rental units in the PHA’ s jurisdiction are typically leased

without owner-provided ranges and/or refrigerators, an

allowance must be made for the cost to the family of

providing its own. Allowances for tenant-provided ranges

and refrigerators should be based on the lower of the cost of

leasing the cquipment or the cost of purchasing it on an

installment plan.

Sa

Appendix

Other Utilities and Services

The utility allowance schedule should also provide

allowances for all other utilities and services for which, in

the PHA’s locality, the tenant is typically responsible, and

which are required for compliance with HQS. Examples

would be firewood used as a primary heating fuel, or the

required annual flushing of a septic tank in an area without

public sewers.