Reply Brief — R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Tuazon (No. 05-1525)

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No. 05-1525

| IN THE

Supreme Court of tre United States

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

NiLto D. TUAZON,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit -

REPLY BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

BRADLEY S. KELLER DONALD B. AYER

BYRNES & KELLER, LLP (Counsel of Record)

1000 Second Avenue, ROBERT F. MCDERMOTT, JR.

38th Floor PAUL S. RYERSON

Seattle, WA 98104 JONATHAN B. BERMAN

(206) 622-2000 CHARLES T. KOTUBY, JR.

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 879-3939

November 15, 2006 Counsel for Petitioner

sinned a ee a EE a EN Te

WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether product sales and sales-related activities in

the forum state can constifute_sufficient minimum contacts to

support the exercise of general jurisdiction over a company

incorporated and headquartered elsewhere, and thus allow

suit on claims having no connection to the forum.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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I. The Circuits Are Widely Split on How

to Assess Minimum Contacts

Necessary For General Jurisdiction,

and Thus on Whether Sales-Related

ne 2

II. The Question Presented Was

Thoroughly Aired In The Court Below ........ 8

III. | The Need For Review By This Court

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Associated Transportation Line, Inc. v. Productos

Fitosanitarios Proficol El Carmen S.A., 197 F.3d

RFS Ca Ge Fe vicesicnecnvinanssconsecindabiiesinniieiiatiiaaiaiia 6

Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370 (Sth

Oe, BET Disescsnsetinsennipecaiiahiiadencolhiiniadainliaadda ati cia 3,5, 6

Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729

Fe Ee Cn Gale CE weticiceniieiiecciitiaiteainsintaietienidieacaalate 7

Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359 (Sth

Ce, Fe hinincsisniiciatsnnsishinicinnlaccichaniidiemapiidaaeschiapiviahiinimibisedaaa nied 6

Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070 (8th

Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1147 (2005)............... 4

Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 347 P.2d 1

EL. Ee cvsincviniincesescesiinindiinintaiassecnisiatieiatiidiaaisiianasdniaduandiiae 7

Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d 213 (Ast Cir.

Fl sneieniievtsetienlasndaiaaiabdandasanaicmiaaladmiadiaiaenid 3, 5, 6

Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railway

Cig BOS Cs Fe CEE Pickciihisistvasiictentaciininiicaiinnaacnaiadiiiateda 5

Harlow vy. Children’s Hospital, 432 F.3d 50 (1st Cir.

SED ccnvexsesnsassbainsiianipnsiebaaieateeanidaiiaasiiainiaaabianieane ial 6

Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall,

SEG FB, GG Le wincineinsiicsitriapntnaitiainiiinaniniaa 1,4,5

International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310

CFD icsccntsisscncsiinciincasceasemiiintedeaddasintghinidibaadanaaeaiaa y

LSI Industries Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232

Fe ES Gey Fe weneiecenceariastlassneianceninsiocmiailention 3

Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco

OE Re ie | roe 3

Michigan National Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888

Fe OE Fe CO Fa irsidceaiseesdestciniatadsbeiaienamcoiaaaaia 3

Navarro Savings Association v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458

(SG hixsininsctninnticianibdaintesmiidecinginnidaieg dip ae iaiacea nage 10

Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195 (4th

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ON

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

(continued)

Page

Old Wayne Mutual Life Association v. McDonough,

Fe A EE cic eneeccaeeneciennlediclacnesaannip hist 5

People’s Tobacco Co. v. American Tobaceo Co., 246

is aE sacsnssseseieinguienianebduslinuhduanbiniwinesadidaiaenabeenctot’ 5

Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342

Se IE REED pesteiprebitenlictntarshevierstnlapleciinsienilens Ey Sete eT

Price & Sons v. Second Judicial District Court,

Be Bee Ny Fe ieccbastcaceserirceseuessdeennniitenninoessoncerenn 7

Ratliff v. Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745

ne A PON ssciacchsseslitbianeseh cimiciusddancicsiaaiian ehietintasbarinecrios 3, 6

Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584 (ist

PR aa sacmibeaanituhe .

Simon v. Southern Railway Co., 236 U.S. 115 (1914).......... 5

Wainscott v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co.,

ee ee I FFE sacecsecrencccnsenpninntsctsianuensienendin 5

World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.

panier pees anh isso D OO SE, ean eee MTT 9,10

The Petition for Certiorari demonstrated that there is a

substantial disagreement among the circuits with regard to

how to determine the sufficiency of minimum contacts to

support general jurisdiction. It showed further that this

difference in approach has, since this Court’s last decision on

the subject in Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.

Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984), resulted in a series of decisions

from at least nine circuits, and from many states, which

sharply divide on the question whether product sales and

related activities can suffice to support general jurisdiction.

In addition, the Petition demonstrated that the

constitutional due process issue at hand, on its face a

question of fair play and substantial justice, also directly

implicates important issues of federalism and forum

shopping. And it has become a font of extensive wasteful

litigation about whether a case is in the right court, which

can only be significantly reduced by this Court’s clarification

of the proper approach to the issue.

Respondent does not dispute the importance of the issue at

hand; its recurrent nature; its close relationship to

fundamental questions of fairness, federalism and forum

shopping; or that questions of general jurisdiction have

become a subject of frequent, extended, wasteful litigation.

Indeed, he appears to “assum[e] some need to clarify aspects

of the law of general jurisdiction.” Opp. at 19. But he urges

the Court to deny certiorari for two reasons.

First, he asserts, without basis, that the issue framed in the

Question Presented was not raised in or decided by the Court

below. Second, as to the circuit conflict, he asserts that the

cases relied on by Petitioner can all be reconciled on their

facts, and that “these cases all take the same basic approach

as the decision below, . . . weigh|ing] the various contacts . ..

and compar[ing] them to the contacts in prior cases.” /d. at 9.

In essence, he echoes the reasoning of the court below, in

viewing this Court’s decisions in Perkins v. Benguet Consol.

Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) and Helicopteros as

“bookends,” with space between them that must be “filled

2

in” by unstructured, “case-by-case review.” Opp. at 13

(quoting Pet. App. 14a n.3).

But the circuit cases are not reconcilable on their facts.

And the undeniably divergent results flow directly from a

fundamental difference in approach to the analysis. As

demonstrated in the Petition and below, a growing number of

Circuits now view general jurisdiction as turning on a largely

quantitative assessment of undifferentiated facts, with the

result that companies selling large quantities of products may

well be susceptible to general jurisdiction everywhere their

products are sold. This is sharply at odds with the more

traditional approach, which focuses more on the quality than

the quantity of contacts, /nt’] Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326

U.S. 310, 319 (1945), and recognizes that general business

contacts akin to those present in Perkins must exist to assert

jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those activities.

For these reasons, as demonstrated further below, this

Court should grant certiorari to resolve the question

presented, and to clarify which of the two now-competing

approaches to analyzing minimum contacts for general

jurisdiction is embodied in the due process clause.

I. The Circuits Are Widely Split on How to Assess

Minimum Contacts Necessary For General

Jurisdiction, and Thus on Whether Sales-Related

Contacts Can Suffice

In discussing the appellate precedents, Respondent asserts

that “the only thing that accounts for the different outcomes

in these cases is their very different facts,” and that cases

finding a lack of jurisdiction merely “represent one end of a

continuum,” with the appellate courts conducting

harmonious analyses of differing fact patterns. Opp. at 8-9.

This characterization is clearly inaccurate. For example, the

Fifth Circuit found general jurisdiction lacking where

hundreds of millions of dollars of the defendant’s products

flowed into the forum state, aided by a network of seventeen

independent in-forum distributors including a wholly owned

subsidiary, and where the defendant “purchased over $195

million of goods and services from over 500 |forum state]

3

vendors.” Bearry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 818 F.2d 370,

372-73 (Sth Cir. 1987). By contrast, the Second Circuit,

viewing Bearry and the decisions of two other Courts of

Appeals, as not “particularly persuasive,” found general

jurisdiction on the basis of $4 million in sales over 6 years,

relationships with independent distributors and contractors,

and related sales support. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.

Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 571-73 (2d Cir. 1996).

Even when focusing only on the facts presented and the

result reached, the circuit split is wide and clear. The

decisions of the First, Fourth, Fifth ar Eleventh Circuits

take a limited approach to general jurisdiction, and find sales

and sales-related contacts with the forum state to be

insufficient minimum contacts for general jurisdiction.' On

the other hand, the Federal, Second, Sixth, and Eighth

Circuits have adopted a more expansive approach to general

jurisdiction, under which similar sales-related contacts were

found sufficient to support general jurisdiction.”

' For example, the following decisions found no general jurisdiction:

Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 991 F.2d 1195, 1198 (4th Cir. 1993)

(annual sales of $9-13 million in the forum, promoted by 17-21

employees working there, 13 of whom lived in the forum, and

advertising in local papers); Bearry, 818 F.2d at 372 (forum sales of

aircraft and airframe assemblies amounting to more than $300 million

over a five year period, through a network of 17 independent distributors,

promoted by nationwide advertising); Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 744 F.2d

213, 215 (ist Cir. 1984) (eight sales representatives, limited advertising

and substantial sales of pharmaceutical products through wholesale

distributors in forum state); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745,

746 (4th Cir. 1971) (authority to do business, appointed agent for service

of process, and five “detail men” promoting sale of drugs who were

resident in forum); Seymour v. Parke, Davis & Co., 423 F.2d 584, 585

(ist Cir. 1970) (“some half dozen New Hampshire salesmen, most of

whom are New Hampshire residents”). .

. E.g., LSI Indus. Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1370

(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“employs multiple distributors in Ohio and nets several

millions of dollars per year from sales” there); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,

84 F.3d at 565-66 (“five [independent] Vermont dealers” and four

“authorized builders” selling $4 million worth of products over six years);

Mich. Nat'l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 465 (6th Cir.

1989) (one “independent sales representative” and 400 total sales of

4

Thus, there can be no doubt about the existence of

significantly divergent outcomes among the courts of appeals

-— that cases decided in several circuits would come out

differently on the issue of the existence of minimum contacts

if they were decided in certain other circuits. But this is no

mere fact-specific split, in which courts applying the same

legal standard or rule simply reach divergent outcomes by

mistake or chance. To the contrary, the split reflects a

fundamental difference of approach, which could not fail to

produce different outcomes on similar or identical facts.

The circuit decisions aligned with the decision below,

which take a broad view of general jurisdiction, regard their

task as “balancling] the facts of each case” between the

“bookends” created by this Court, without a “formula,”

“precise checklist or . . . definitive litany of factors” to guide

them. Pet. App. 12a, 14a n.3. With no principled basis for

giving certain contacts greater significance than others, these

courts then set out to “[nJavigatfe] the territory between

Perkins and Helicopteros.” Pet. App. 12a. Minimum

contacts sufficient for general jurisdiction exist when there is

a sufficient “confluence of . . . physical, economic and

political presence.” Pet. App. 17a.

The longstanding, and more traditional, approach looks

not merely to the quantity of contacts with the forum, but

draws qualitative distinctions depending on the nature of the

contacts at issue. These qualitative distinctions are informed

by this Court’s decision in Perkins, in which headquarters-

activities of a corporation exiled during World War II from

the Philippines to Ohio were found a sufficient basis for

general jurisdiction. These activities, and not simply the sale

and marketing of products, were deemed the sort of “general

business” presence adequate to support jurisdiction over

(continued...)

furniture totaling $625,000 over two years); Dever v. Hentzen Coatings,

Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1147

(2005) (sales of paint through company-owned stores; no discussion of

number of stores or amount of sales).

5

claims unrelated to the forum. //elicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415.

The inquiry is whether corporate activities in the forum “sum

to the general business presence found to exist in Perkins.”

Bearry, 818 F.2d at 375.

Of course, the notion of “qualitative” rather than merely

“quantitative” distinctions antedates Perkins. Int'l Shoe, 326

U.S. at 319. Indeed, it traces back at least to the series of

cases from this Court, decided in the first years of the

twentieth century, which are discussed in the Petition, at 10-

11, but never mentioned in the Opposition to Certiorari. See

People’s Tobacco Co. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 85-

87 (1918); Simon v. S. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 115, 130 (1914);

Green v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. Co., 205 US.

530, 533 (1907); Old Wayne Mut. Life Ass'n v. McDonough,

204 U.S. 8, 20-22 (1907). At that time the Court made clear

that business activities limited to sales and solicitation in the

forum will not support jurisdiction over claims unrelated to

those activities.

Courts taking this approach include the First Circuit,

which relies on a qualitative distinction between contacts

akin to those present in Perkins, and those which exist when

a company merely sells and promotes its products in the

forum. In Glater, 744 F.2d at 216-217, the court first

discussed the facts of Perkins, and then noted the reasoning

of its own prior decision in Seymour, 423 F.2d 584, where it

had “expressly distinguished Perkins” and concluded that

where “defendant’s only activities consist of advertising and

employing salesmen to solicit orders, we think that fairness

will not permit a state to assume jurisdiction.” 744 F.2d at

217 (citing Seymour, 423 F.2d at 587). The court in Glater

then applied similar reasoning to deny general jurisdiction

where sales representatives marketed to doctors, pharmacies

> These early twentieth century cases have played an important role

in the analysis of some appellate courts which distinguish between sales-

related and general business contacts. See, e.g., Nichols, 991 F.2d at

1199-1200 (citing People's Tobacco and Green); Wainscott v. St. Louis-

San Francisco Ry. Co., 351 N.E.2d 466, 471, 474 (Ohio 1976) (same).

6

and hospitals, and sales were made through a network of in-

state distributors. /d.

The Fourth Circuit, as reflected in Nichols, takes the same

approach. The court there noted that the availability of

specific jurisdiction meant that “broad constructions of

general jurisdiction should be generally disfavored.” 991

F.2d at 1200. Referencing its own decision in Railiff v.

Cooper Laboratories, Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 1971),

the court asked whether “advertising and solicitation

activities constitute the type of continuous corporate

operation within a forum state that justifies general

jurisdiction.” 991 F.2d at 1199. The court ultimately found

its decision “controlled by Rat/iff’s rule that [such] activities

alone do not constitute the ‘minimum contacts’ required for

general jurisdiction.” /d. at 1200.

Similarly, in Bearry, the Fifth Circuit quoted and

expressly rejected the trial court’s reasoning that the

injection of “an enormous stream of commerce into the

forum” — there in the form of product sales exceeding $300

million over five years — was sufficient to support general

jurisdiction. “We disagree with the district court’s

conclusion that the ‘stream of commerce’ will support a

finding of general jurisdiction.” 818 F.2d at 375. Many

other courts have predicated denials of general jurisdiction

on similar qualitative reasoning, by which sales-related

activities standing alone are so unlike the activities present in

Perkins as to be categorically insufficient."

* See, e.g., Harlow v. Children's Hosp., 432 F.3d 50, 64-65 (st Cir.

2005) (inquiring “whether defendant’s contacts with forum state

constitute, the kind of continuous and systematic general business

contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins,” and holding that “deriv[{ing]

substantial and constant revenue” from the forum does not suffice);

Associated Transp Line, Inc. v. Productos Fitosanitarios Proficol El

Carmen S.A., 197 F.3d 1070, 1075 (11th Cir. 1999)(“General jurisdiction

has been found lacking even where a company had employees, agencies

and salespeople regularly in the forum; .. . and derived more than 26% of

its income from the forum.”); Dalton v. R & W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d

1359, 1362 (Sth Cir. 1990) (citing Perkins for the proposition that

“contacts of a more extensive quality and nature are required” for the

7

Respondent offers two objections to framing the Question

Presented in terms of the sufficiency of “sales-related

activities” to support general jurisdiction. First, Respondent

argues that minimum contacts were established in this case

on the basis of activities that were not sales-related. Second,

Respondent further argues that the phrase is so vague that it

would merely lead to further litigation as lower courts debate

its meaning. See Opp. at 16-18. Both contentions are

wrong.

The contacts at issue in this case, with one exception, are

directly related to Petitioner's local sales. Petitioner

obtained a business license that allows it to make sales, hires

a sales force of several dozen to make the sales, leases an

office to provide workspace for six or seven of its sales

representatives, hires a warehouse to store products being

sold locally, advertises to compete for sales against rival

manufacturers, and has supported political activities in an

attempt to prevent its advertising from being banned. See

Pet. at 3. Only its medical research grant to the University of

Washington — which the district court below found too

inconsequential to mention (see Pet. App. 33a-37a) — is-not

directly related to local sales. It is implausible in the

extreme to suppose that such a grant to support research in

(continued...)

assertion of general jurisdiction, and finding that 12.9% of nationwide

revenue and advertising in the forum does not connote a “general

presence in the state”); Congoleum Corp. v. DLW Aktiengesellschaft, 729

F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Perkins’ holding that the cause of

action need not arise out of the defendant’s activities in the forum is

limited to its unusual facts,” and “no court has ever held that the

maintenance of even a substantial sales force within the state is a

sufficient contact to assert jurisdiction in an unrelated cause of action.”);

Price & Sons v. Second Judicial’ Dist. Ct., 831 P.2d 600, 601 (Nev.

1992) (“Sales and marketing efforts in the forum by a foreign corporation,

without more, are insufficient to establish . . . the high level of

contact .... nevessary [for] general jurisdiction.”); Fisher Governor Co.

v. Superior Ct., 347 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1959) (Traynor, J.) (after discussing

Perkins, court held that “more contacts are required for the assumption of

{general] jurisdiction than sales and sales promotion within the state”).

—

8

the forum could be the critical contact making general

jurisdiction sustainable.”

Nor should the Petition be denied on the ground that

“sales-related activities,” a phrase Petitioner used in its

“Question Presented,” are difficult to define. | While

admittedly the activities of any business are not susceptible

to division into hermetically-sealed categories having no

connection to each other, the category of activities directly

related to the sale and marketing of products has been seen

as a coherent one by many courts, including this one. Indeed

Respondent answers his own criticism, when he aptly defines

_“sales-related contacts” as including “a physical salesroom

or sales office, . . . advertising, a license to do business in the

state, [a] number of employees and their sales-related duties,

and the payment of sales taxes.” Opp. at 9.

II. The Question Presented Was Thoroughly Aired In

The Court Below

Respondent argues initially that “the Question Presented

was neither raised nor decided below.” Opp. at 6; accord id.

at 1, 6-8, 19. While this Court has never suggested that the

precise formulation of the Question Presented must be

asserted or decided below in order for the issue to be

preserved, Respondent’s assertion, in any event, is wholly

contrary to the facts. Both the Ninth Circuit’s decision and

Petitioner’s brief before that court discussed at length

whether Petitioner’s activities created sufficient “minimum

contacts” to permit the exercise of general jurisdiction. The

focus of both the decision and the argument below was on

the jurisdictional significance of Petitioner’s sales in the

forum state and the local activities Petitioner undertook -to

generate those sales. See Pet. App. 10a-17a; Appellant’s Br.

at 1-2, 11, 13-19.

Petitioner argued below, as it does before this Court, that

“{njeither Reynolds’ product sales in the State of

5 ;

~ Apparently, Respondent also placed no importance on the medical

research grant, since there was no mention of it in Respondent’s merits

brief on appeal. See Appellee’s Br. at 7, 21-23.

9

Washington (while significant in volume), nor Reynolds’

limited activities in the nature of local sales support,

constitute the sort of presence that warrants the draconian

imposition of general jurisdiction ....” /d. at 13-14. Indeed,

though the wording is different, ithe “Question Presented” in

the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is substantively identical to

“Statement of the Issues” number | of Petitioner’s Ninth

Circuit Brief, which asks:

1. Whether a non-resident corporation,

which is not headquartered or incorporated

in the State of Washington, that conducts

limited activities in the State to support its

local product sales (similar in kind to its

activities in every other state) is subject to

general jurisdiction in Washington to

adjudicate a claim that (1) does not involve

any of the corporation’s sales and activities

in the State of Washington; and (2) arises

from the marketing or consumption of

products in the Republic of the Philippines.

Appellant’s Br: at 1-2.

Ill. The Need For Review By This Court Is Compelling

It is clear that courts in this country are heading down two

divergent paths when faced with the sufficiency of minimum

contacts to support general jurisdiction. This is an important

issue (as Respondent does not dispute), and this case

presents an excellent opportunity for this Court to provide

needed clarification.

Because the law of general jurisdiction is unclear,

businesses that sell products in numerous jurisdictions

cannot predict where they may properly be subject to suit,

notwithstanding this Court’s direction that the legal system

should afford “a degree of predictability.” World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

Pet. at 19-20. Likewise, because the law is unclear, there is

frequent litigation over jurisdictional issues, notwithstanding

this Court’s recognition that such litigation is “essentially a

10

waste of time and resources.” ~Navarro_Sav. Ass’n v. Lee,

446 U.S. 458, 464 n.13 (1980). Pet. at 23-25.

Insofar as the approach taken by some courts has led to an

improperly expansive exercise of general jurisdiction, the

result is to encourage forum shopping, notwithstanding

substantial reasons to foreclose litigation in fora that lack any

connection to the subject matter of the lawsuit. Pet. at 20-21.

Likewise, the unduly expansive exercise of general

jurisdiction is sufficiently offensive from the perspective of

many foreign legal systems that it has had a significant

adverse impact on foreign trade relations. /d. at 21-22.

Because most state long arm statutes extend to the full

limit of the due process clause, enforcement of a proper

standard is critical to the allocation of judicial power

between various state and federal courts. The issue thus

raises substantial federalism concerns, as recognized in this

Court’s admonition that the States, through their courts, “not

reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status

as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.” World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. Pet. at 22-23.

This case affords an especially appropriate vehicle for

clarifying general jurisdiction. Respondent alludes to

hypothetical fact questions that may arise in cases that also

implicate specific jurisdiction (Opp. at 17), but this case

raises no such issues. Respondent’s claim matured during

the 65 years that he lived in the Philippines, id, and he

concedes that his claim lacks any connection to the eight

days that he lived in Washington before filing suit, or to any

of Reynolds’ activities in Washington. Pet. App. 7a. Thus,

this case squarely (and solely) presents a question of general

jurisdiction: that is, whether Reynolds’ activities in

Washington support jurisdiction in that State to adjudicate a

claim that arose and matured in the Philippines.

CONCLUSION

The petition for a Writ of certiorari should be granted.

BRADLEY S. KELLER

BYRNES & KELLER, LLP

1000 Second Avenue,

38th Floor

Seattle, WA 98104

(206) 622-2000

November 15, 2006

Respectfully submitted,

DONALD B. AYER

(Counsel of Record)

ROBERT F. MCDERMOTT, JR.

PAUL S. RYERSON

JONATHAN B. BERMAN

CHARLES T. KOTUBY, JR.

JONES DAY

51 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 879-3939

Counsel for Petitioner