Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Pratt v. City of Houston

Supreme Court brief2003

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03 428 wu 142003

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

$--

Willie E. Pratt, and

Bernard Garrett,

Pro Se Petitioners

Vv.

City of Houston, Texas,

Respondent

On Petition For A Writ of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Fifth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Anthony Hall Bernard Garrett, Pro Se

City Attorney Pro Se Petitioner

Donald Fleming 2703 Bringhurst

Sr. Ass’t. City Attorney Houston, Texas 77026

City of Houston (713) 723-0449

P. O. Box 1562 (832) 876-1095

Houston, Texas 77251

(713) 247-2000

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Why did the Southern District Court allow all legal

representation to waive the rights for a trial by a jury

knowing ihe Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and

remanded this case back to the district court and stated not

for the court to be inconsistent with their opinion ruling?

See U.S. Constitution, 14 Amendment, Articles VI and

VII; Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 as

amended; Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 299 F.3d 838,

2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15484 (9" Cir. Nev., 2002); and

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 530 U.S.

133 (2000).

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

C. Vance Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent |

Cons. ~ce Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

i. Why did the lower court knowingly ignore what

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered and conducted

this trial without a jury knowing that civil liability

decisions, weighing of the evidence, credibility

determinations and drawing inferences from the facts are

jury functions only? See U.S. Constitution, 14"

Amendment, Articles VI and VII; Title VII of the Civil

Rights Acts of 1964 as amended; Costa v. Desert Palace,

Inc. 299 F.3d 838, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15484 (9" Cir.

Nev., 2002); and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2009).

SUC ee A CE YT a

iii

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

C. Vence Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Constance Acosta, Supe.’/ising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

2. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Remanded

and Reversed this case back to the lower court (Southern

District) as a matter of law. The Southern District

Court ignored and misinterpreted the Fifth Circuit’s first

Opinion Ruling. The Plaintiff-Appellants went back

to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to mandate the lower

court to follow the upper court’s interpretation of the law

and opinion ruling. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals did

not validate or uphold their own opinion first ruling.

Why would the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals (in the

Plaintiff's second rehearing request and trial by jury)

allow the lower court, Southern District court to make a

decision contrary to the law and what they ordered in the

Fifth Circuit Court’s first opinion ruling? See Rule 10 (a)

(b) (c) the U.S. Supreme Court Rules, (Part III, Rule 10

(a) (b) (c)); U.S. Constitution, 14" Amendment. Articles

VI and VII; Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 as

amended; Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 299 F.3d 838,

2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15484 (9" Cir. Nev., 2002); and |

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing allie: Inc.530 US.

133 (2000).

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

seiilaciaasia Dati

Sy sau a — Oe OS ———-—— i——_—_——-_—

C. Vance Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Constance Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

3. Did both lower courts (Southern District and the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) err in ignoring the facts

of law in this case? The facts relative to:

a) prima facie,

b) requesting additional evidence,

c) atrial by a jury,

d) the judge making the decisions which were only

for a jury,

e) the upper and lower courts shifted the

burden of proof to the plaintiffs-appellants, rather than the

defendant. See U. S. Constitution, 14" Amendment,

Articles VI and VII; Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of

1964 as amended; Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc. 299 F.3d

838, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15484 (9" Cir. Nev., 2002);

and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 530

U.S. 133 (2000).

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

C. Vance Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Vii

Constance Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

4. Why did the courts failed to address these issues

of law and facts ? See U.S. Constitution, 14"

Amendment, Articles VI and VII; Title VII of the Civil

Rights Acts of 1964 as amended; Costa v. Desert Palace,

Inc. 299 F.3d 838, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15484 (9" Cir.

Nev., 2002); and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

a Did the trial court (Southern District) and the

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals err when it concluded that

race was not a factor and requested additional evidence?

See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc. 530 US.

133 (2000).

List of Parties:

Vill

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

C. Vance Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Constance Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for,

Respondent ,

6. Why did the lower court take the liability from

the jury in this case? Certainly the district court must have

known and if not then the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

should have known? See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Se Oe ee ee ee

; F stat wae Re Can

ix >

Products Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2000); Costa v. Desert

Palace, Inc. 299 F.3d 838, LEXIS 15484 (9" Cir. Nev.,

2002). :

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

€. Vance Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Constance Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

: Did Southern District Court err in their

interpretation of what the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

opinion ruling instructed them to do? And why wasn’t the

Plaintiffs/Appellants’ second request to the Fifth Circuit

upheld and enforced as a matter of law? See Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

C. Vance Christopher, Attorney ffor Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Constance Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Cre ane NE Da cial

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

8. When it was established by the Defendants, City

of Houston, Texas in the lower District Court hearing and

the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that denial of

promotion to the better qualified black applicants, Willie

Pratt and Bernard Garrett, plaintiffs in lieu of a lesser

qualified white applicant, Edward Rutland was due to race

and was a motivating factor may a plaintiff prove that a

challenged employment practice creates disparate impact

and denial of benefits afforded under Civil Rights Acts of

1964, as amended, § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, § 701 et

seq., 2000e et al seq.?

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

C. Vance Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff

Petitioners

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

xii

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc

Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Constance Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

10. When an employer knowingly uses a

significantly different undisclosed test to prevent

qualified minority employees from being promoted to

upper level positions, may a plaintiff prove

discriminatory disparate impact and special treatment

given to the non minority, candidate who was special

treatment?

List of Parties:

Joseph Amad, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

C. Vance Christopher, Attorney for Plaintiff Petitioners

Xili

Sim Lake, Judge for Southern District Court,

Houston, Texas

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, Smith, Wiener, and

Barksdale

Fifth Circuit _— of Appeals, En Banc

‘Anthony Hall, City Attorney for Respondent

Constance Acosta, Supervising Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. City Attorney

Debra Schriefer Caldwell, Assistant City Attorney

Monticella Flanakin, Attorney and Counsel for

Respondent

a ae

X1V

LIST OF PARTIES

Willie Pratt is representative of a class of all past,

present and future non white employees of the City of

Houston who have been, are or will continue to be

discriminated against with regard to the terms and

conditions of their employment because of their race,

including denial of career growth and promotions and

other benefits afforded them under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964.

Bernard Garrett Pratt is representative of a class of all

past, present and future non white employees of the City

of Houston who have been, are or will ee to be |

discriminated against with regard to the terms and

conditions of their employment because of their race,

including denial of career growth and promotions and

other benefits afforded them under Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964. Also Mr. Garrett continues to be

harassed, retaliated against, and docked of his livelihood

since filing this lawsuit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS

ee ees eee aOR i-viii

Bet 2S 2): ne xiv

TABLE OF

Gide cha ee XV

TABLE OF CITED

Tosi eee xvi

TABLE OF

PE cock ccaeesceae he steenaee xxi

OPINIONS

ic ctl aden

STATEMENT OF

FURESDICTION,. ..scccsscescoscesesessnuceonssescnvesovscsnevesnvssesuvoronsersuse

CONSTITUTIONAL

ia crevices escuishlesmnnctigaeslitionneh 2

ARGUMENT/CONFLICT OF FEDERAL LAW.........0--+- 13

STATEMENT OF THE

| a ae oe cea 18

| STATEMENT OF

ee are nee een nien emer 19

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION ...........-+ 25

XVi

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. supra at

| 9.10

Bannistor v. Ullman, 287 F.3d 394, 401 (5" Cir.

Casarez v. Burlington Northern/Sante Fe Co., 193 F.3d 334,

337 n.3 (5" Cir.

Cf. Furnco Construction Corp., v. Waters 438 U.S. 567, 577

(19°78 ).......+<0+0s»s0eeueseaetensieseenannennnndnnnE 16

Continental Oil Co., v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370

U.S. 690, 696, 2.6 (PSBZD. .viicccssciemeaeenisl 9,10

‘

NS BPN IARI OD Oo APO DE he ae Sh EE TO aE One

XVll

Cited Authorities

Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, LEXIS 15484 (9"

Ne Ps BED csevineveverecsvessrerscevees i, ii, iv, Vi, Vil, ix, 6, 7,26

Derosher E. Price v. Federal Express Corp., (5 Cir.

Eastland v. T.V.A., 704 F.2d 613, 626(11" Cir.

Eberheim v. New York State Health Dept.,

704 F.2d 613, 626 (11 Cir. 1983).......ccccceseseeeees 20, 21, 22

Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332 (CA2

Kona Technology Corp v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 225

Be WE 1S, DOOD) os. eccensnscsvenvvssnsveversvvsaveesvennnes 21

Lilly v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, 842 F.2d 1496(4" Cir.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green 411 U.S. 792, 802

PEP ray, 248 U0. DED (E9DD)..........0cccceccrcesees 5, 6, 10, 21, 26

XV1il

Cited Authorities

Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498 (5" Cir.

Pratt and Garrett v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d at 601, 605,

0 Be iieethemnennntcaen 21, 26

Redditt v. Mississippi Extended Care Centers, Inc. 718 F.2d

SE SI cient 20, 21

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133

(2000)............ i, ii, iv, Vi, vii, x, 2, 3 7, 9,10,16, 17, 18

ssnislelanciatigiigeactpaaiisadesapauemtdabdadescddadinteid eds 21,26, 28, 28, 29

Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 994 (5" Cir.

PT SE I icisnicasinnnsisinnteneicecevncibcbunaindssidicnmbesisuntudidmiaabiaums 26

Rubenstein v. Administrators of Tulane Educational Fund

218 F.3d 392, 399 (5™ Cir. 2000)........cccccccesessecesecseeeeess 6, 27

Rutherford v. Harris County, Texas 197, F3.d 173, 179 (5"

St. h“ary’s Honor Center, supra at 524 (quoting Aikens, 460

Ps: OE ii sevidiicndnlesebinnsionuadninibinnes sebnineninensniieaineibieasiasiaandaniaaa 27

Vadie v. Mississippi State University, 218 F.3d 365, 373 (5™

Cir. 2000) cert. denied 121 S. Ct. 1092 2001)... 27

X1X

Cited Authorities

Valdez v. Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc. 683 F.Supp. 596, 630

CW. BD. Ting, FB) scinivcnssconcendssnnnscamsinasstynasiormenseneniianneniianestil 13

Walker v. Thompson, 214, F.3d 615, 624 (5 Cir. 2000)

sntthsintesivindheanigtaieesiaacs natalia 5, 6, 27

CONSTITUTIONAL STATUES, REGULATIONS and

COURT RULES:

Civil Rights Acts of 1866, 1871, 1981, 1983 and 1964....... 1,

| sssnseesnesenseensessncensncennennnecanennnssssanecs vi, vii, xi, 2, 3, 4,5, 11, 27

| BO UB. & 1ZSG-ET piven ccersssrersicessseshintentnnionenpentoummanienanaas 2

| BZ ULB. ©. & DIG = 2 Ca vcrrscsesinesevesvessentaneinnnniannmiosanmmninians 12

| 42 US. C.. & BRC — © Cid ivcieieserecscicencomenceminensemeonnnann 12

42 U.S. C. § 2000e~ 5 6g) (2) CB) snvessoctneescannvepensnvocnsenaneneneni 11

42 U.S. C.F BRS COD eccctcrsrnnntieeniisatieapeaas 1]

42 U.S.C. § 1964, as amended................. eee (See Title

' VII of the Civil Rights of Act of 1964, as amended).... i, iv,

eo V, Vi, Vil, x1, 2, 3, 4, 11, 27

BS VIDAL. © TSG secesssscrsesonressunaanssimanennanns 2, 3, 4, 5,11, 27

| 2 UBL. 8 WEB sistdncmnaeeneee 3,11

Cited Authorities

42 U.S.C. § ZO0GG, GB BOE, ccscccsseesrtanmenncsnitiarentmincnies mee

Age Discrimination and Equal Protection Clause of 14”

Amend/Employment Act of 1997 (ADEA)...............04. 11,12

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth ( 14) Amendment,

Alt. VE, VR ccescsscesinniscignemammmntnmal i, il, 1V, Vi, Vii, 2, 3, 12

Seventh (7) Amendmentt............cccecesecesesesecscseseeccesesecseceeuces 38

Texas Commission on Human Rights Acts vol. 3, Doc. 3,

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

TIA ee Se eS: i, ti, ,Vi, Vii, xi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 12, 27

U. S. Supreme Court Rules, Part III, Rule 10 (a) (b)

(0). .<ccscnsisesensesennisecveenninesuaninindasieniseneaananaaaae iv, 3, 28, 30

sate

Seed te ce OM tha ARENA M8 oP sae Pe

: oe ee

XXi

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Appendix A — Fifth Circuit Court Appeals (Initial/First)

Opinion Ruling — Reversed and Remanded.................... la

Appendix B — Southern District Court Finding of Fact

I cee 22a

Appendix C — Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Second Opinion

Ruling, Decision (Unpublished)....................::cccseeeeesseeeees 36a

Appendix D - En Banc Hearing

Pe isesisiccranicncnitivesepesitiescstoneinantinnihesitiiealiaiaiinitinninannneiiiisie 39a

XXii

TABLE OF APPENDICES

Appendix E -- Brief of the Appellants’ in the United States

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals For the Second

I ccensssicsnssionshiniiaiitnniiitiieniaainnbiaiaheiaaemdaaae 42a

Appendix F- Appellants’ Petition For Rehearing En Banc in

the United States Fifth Circuit Court of

ieee intnidinnincr tet saiee seein

a ORT eT

Petitioners of the State of Texas, City of Houston, Willie Pratt

and Bernard Garrett respectfully petition for a Writ of

Certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals (5" Circuit), 5" Circuit, En Banc and the United

States Southern District Court.

OPINIONS BELOW

The Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit Initial Opinion Ruling

Reversed and Remanded (App A, p. la ). The Southern

District Court Facts of Finding/in favor of Defendant (App. B,

p. 22a). The court of appeals, Fifth Circuit response to 2

hearing request/Affirm lower court Unpublished (App. C ,

p.36a). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, On Petition for

Rehearing En Banc/Denied (App. D, p. 39a).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The court of appeals’ judgment was filed on or about April

15, 2003. A timely petition for rehearing was denied on or

About April 28, 2003, and on or about May 14, 2003 The Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals filed its denial of the Plaintiffs

EEE

Request for a Petition for Rehearing En Banc. (App. F, p.

88a). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254 (1). This petition is filed with the U.S. Supreme Court

in a timely fashion.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

At stake in this discrimination case is the integrity of the

elements of the claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964, as amended and 42 U. S. C. § 1981, which is identical

in Casarez v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Co., 193 F.3d 334,

337 n. 3 (5" Cir. 1999). Also, Rutherford v. Harris County,

Texas 197 F.3d 173, 179 (5" Cir. 1999); Shackelford v.

Deloitte & Touche, 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5" Cir. 1999) and

Reev: .. Sanderson Plumbing, Inc., 530, U. S. 133 (2000) and

Derosher Price v. Federal Express Corp., 5" Cir. 2002). This

case raises important, recurring questions relating to the

preemptive scope of violations to Federal Law interpretation

and to establishing the requirement for a prima facie case of

race discrimination and infringement upon the Equal

Protection Clause the Fourteenth Amendment of the U. S.

Constitution, Constitutional Law, Due Process Clause in the

14° Amendment, the Right to a Jury for a Civil Trial under the

7” Amendment, (See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products

Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2000)); Protection from Employment

Discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 US.

C. § 1983 and 42 U.S. C. § 2000e et seq., and Texas

Commission on Human Rights Act (““TCHRA”). Vol. 3, Doc.

3, pp. 1-9. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,

530 U.S. 133 (2000). The District Court had subject matter

jurisdiction over Plaintiffs-Petitioners Willie E. Pratt (“Pratt”)

and Bernard Garrett’s (“Garrett”) cause pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e et seq., and 42 U. S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S. C. 1983 and

the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and

: Supreme Court Rules Part III, Rule10 (a) (b) (c).

There is a Conflict in the courts. See U.S. Supreme Court

Rules — Part III Rule 10(a) (b) (c). The hearing of this case in

the Southern District Court and the decision made, conflicts

with the Remanded and Reversed opinion ruling decision (first

opinion ruling) of the Fifth Circuit Judges: Smith, Jolly and

Jones in the Court of Appeals, on or about November, 2000

and heard in the lower court (Southern District) in February,

2002. The Fifth Circuit Reversed and Remanded the case

back to the lower courts for a trial by jury, to show: The Fifth

Cir. Court of Appeals — Reversed and Remanded Opinion.

The elements of this case under Title VII, and 42 U.S.C. §

1981 are identical. Casarez v. Burlington Northern/Santa Fe

Co.,193 F.3d 334, 337 n.3 (5™ Cir. 1999) evaluating both

claims using the same analysis. ra

Also, “for a prima facie case of race discrimination, a

plaintiff must prove that 1) he is a member of a protected class;

2) he was qualified for the position; 3) he was not promoted;

and 4) either the position was filled by someone not in the

protected class, or the person was not promoted because of his

race. See Rutherford v. Harris County, Texas, 197 F.3d 173,

179 (5" Cir. 1999): Shackleford v. Deloitte & Touche, 190

F.3d 398, 404 (5" Cir. 1999). Because Prat and Garrett both

are black, fit the minimum qualific..ions for the position, and

3 th

§ fc

+ were not promoted to a position eventually filled by a white

‘ candidate, there is no question that they established a prima

facie case of discrimination.”

Also there is another conflict of the district court’s

+ interpretation of prima facie and other important federal issues

| under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 that conflict with the

initial decision of the upper court, Fifth Circuit Court of

| Appeals REVERSED and REMANDED. After the lower

: court (Southern Dist.) not following the directives of the Fifth

} Circuit court, the plaintiffs-petitioners brought a request to the

) Fifth Circuit again and the Circuit Judges Smith, Wiener and

Barksdale, Fifth Circuit refused to stand by its own decision

and upheld the lower court. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

| Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), 528 U.S. 985 (1999); Kline

j v. TVA, 128 F. 3d 337 (CA6 1997) (prima facie liability for

: intentional discrimination). In the original Opinion Ruling of

4} the Fifth Circuit, Judges Jolly, Jones, and Smith sited the

following case law, Walker v. Thornpson, 214 F.3d 615, 624

(Sth Cir. 2000). “Summary judgment is proper when the

evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-

movant, reflects no genuine issues of material fact.” Rubinstein

v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund, 218 F.3d

392, 399 (Sth Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 69 U.S.L.W. 3366 (U.S.

Mar. 19, 2001)(No. 00-996). On a motion for summary

judgment, a court reviews the facts in the light most favorable

to the non-movant. Walker, 214 F.3d at 624.

In Pratt and Garrett v. the City of Houston, Texas, both

African American males, in a Protective Class by law, met all

the requirements for a “prima facie” and had presented

substantial evidence in this case prior to remand and reversal to

the lower court. However, the District Court allowed the

Plaintiffs to be subjected to the shifting of the burden of proof

to the Plaintiffs instead of the Defendant, City of Houston,

Texas. See McDonnell Douglas Corp, v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,

802 (1973); See Desert Palace, Inc., DBA Caesars Palace Hotel

& Casino, Petitioner v. Catharina F. Costa, case Costa v.

Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS

| 15484 (9" Cir. Nev., 2002). U.S. Supreme Court analysis on

| Labor & Employment Law Discrimination, Disparate

Treatment Burden Shifting Analysis under 42 U.S.C. Section

2000e-2 (m), “a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence

for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the

: evidence, that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a

motivating factor. for any employment practice. Direct

j discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases.” U.S.

Supreme Justice O’Connor, “concurred in the judgment,

i concluded that the burden would shift only where a disparate

‘ treatment plaintiff could show by “direct evidence that an

illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the

: employment decision.” Id., at 276; See Reeves v. Sanderson

| Plumbing Products, Inc., June 12, 2000.

In Derosher Price v. Federal Express Corp., (Sth

Cir.2002), Judge Emilio Garza characterized the holding

in Pratt I: “Finally, in cases where we have applied Reeves

to reverse a district court’s grant of summary judgment, the

evidence of pretext was considerably more substantial than

‘he evidence present by Price. In Pratt, two unsuccessful!

candidates brought claims of racial discrimination after

failing to receive a promotion. 247 F.3d at 605. We held

that the plaintiffs had made a sufficient showing of pretext,

in light of the plaintiffs’ qualifications were superior, the

successful candidate was given special treatment, and the

supervisor had allegedly discriminated on previous

occasions.” Id 607.

The next area in which the District Court erred was to

try the case without a jury, one of the civil rights afforded

under the Seventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution is trial

by jury for a civil matter. Plaintiffs in this case trusted the

Judicial System to work. The system is no stronger than its

consistent and unbiased interpretation of the law. The

Southern District Court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

both erred by allowing all legal representation to waive a trial

by jury knowing the facts that the court must draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and it

may not make credibility determinations, or weighing of the

evidence. Credibility determinations the weighing of the

evidence and drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts

are jury functions and not those of a judge. Therefore, a trial

by jury should have been reinstated. See Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Product Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court opinion states,

“Tn doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not

make credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.

] Lyle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-555 (1990);

Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254; Continental Ore Co. v.

Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696, n. 6

(1962).

The Supreme Court Justice O’Connor stated in Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., “In doing so,

however the court must draw all reasonable inferences in

favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make

credibility determinations or weigh the evidence. Lyle v.

Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-555 (1990);

Liberty Lobby, Inc., supra, at 254; Continental Ore Co.

v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, n.6

(1962). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the

evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from

the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Liberty

Lobby, supra at 255.

Justice Ginsburg, concurring in the Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. case, stating,

“atypical, it follows that the ultimate question of

liability ordinarily should not be taken from the jury

once the plaintiff has introduced the two categories of

evidence: first, prima facie case as in the term used in

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802

(1973); and second, evidence from which a rational

factfinder could conclude that the employer’s proffered

explanation for its actions was false. Because the Court

of Appeals in this case plainly, and erroneously, required

the plaintiff to offer some evidence beyond those two

categories, no broader holding is necessary to support

reversal.”

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides in

relevant part: “The Laws of the United States *** shall be the

supreme Law of the Land*** any Thing in the Constitution or

Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S.

Constitution, The Equal Protection Clause of the 14"

Amendment prohibits states from denying any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law.

The Constitution of the United States also states under

Article VI, “This Constitution, and the laws of the United

States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; ***under the

authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the

land; and the: judges in every state shall be bound thereby,

anything. in the Constitution or laws of any State to the

contrary notwithstanding.” Additional statues involved are 42

U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 42 U. S. C. 2000e — 2 (m), 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e-5 (g) (2) (B), 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

Age Discrimination § Equal Protection Clause of the 14”

Amendment, Employment Act of 1997 (ADEA), Texas

Commission on Human Rights, Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended. This Protection of the Law was 1

not provided under the law for Plaintiffs, Pratt and Garrett in |

the lower courts.

4. U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a): It shall be an unlawful employment

practice for an employer — (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to |

discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against

any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,

conditions or privileges of employment, because of such

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) |

to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for |

employment in any way which would deprive or tend to

deprive any individual or employment opportunities or |

otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because

of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national

origin. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(k): (1A) An unlawful

employment practice based on disparate impact is established

under this title only if — (i) a complaining party demonstrates

that a respondent uses a particular employment practice that

| causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to demonstrate

that the challenged practice is job related for the position in

question and consistent with business necessity...

ARGUMENT/

CONFLICT OF FEDERAL LAW

The United States Southern District Court refused and ignored

4 the Fifth Circuit’s directives via the initial Opinion Ruling,

“REVERSED and REMANDED” in case number 99-21166 in

or about November, 2000 in which the appeal was filed timely.

The Southern District Court entered a Summary Judgment for

the Defendant, City of Houston without considering the

ultimate issues of law, pretext and motivation. See Corley v.

Jackson Police Depart., 566 F.2d 994 (5° Cir. 1978); Valdez v.

Church’s Fried Chicken, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 596, 630 (W. D.

Tex., 1988).

The Southern District Court failed to properly address the

evidence at the trial and the same court demarcated the ©

essential findings in a previous appeal and the same court also |

misinterpreted and misapplied the ietter of the law and rights

afforded to the plaintiffs under the Constitution and civil rights

law in this case. In Reply to the Brief of Appellants, Fifth |

Circuit, by David T. Lopez, attorney, it is stated, “the District

Court failed to properly address the evidence at trial and this is

particularly regrettable, since this court precisely delineated the —

essential findings in a previous appeal.” See Reply to Brief of

Appellants, pp. 4.

The trial court considered only the acknowledgement of non

discriminatory motives of the City without considering

disparity of treatment and departure from the regular practice

of the City. Mr. Pratt, who was already performing the duties

of the job for which he sought and had quite impressive

experience with the City and the military was not referred

because he did not “meet the minimum qualification”.

However, on the other hand Mr. Garrett was not considered for

the position because he refused to take a skills test, which the

evidence showed was not required by the City’s policy and

practice, although Mr. Garrett had no objection to taking a

skills test. On or about November, 2002 the 5" Circuit

refused to uphold its original opinion ruling and enforce the

law in the lower court. The facts are both Mr. Pratt and Mr.

Garrett, male who are black exceeded the minimum

qualifications in direct work experience, education and skills

and a lesser qualified white applicant was given special

treatment and received the Senior Inspector’s position.

The above facts of interpretation of the law were

ignored and/or misapplied in the lower court (Southern

District) and upon the Plaintiffs-Petitioners second request

to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals for reversing or

remanding the case, the Fifth Circuit did not uphold their own

initial opinion ruling. Severe conflict of federal law

interpreta‘on exists and conflict of decisions of important

facts of federal law.

Finally, in quoting from Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., case review, Justice O’Connor delivered

the following opinion: “the jury’s verdict, the Court of

Appeals misapplied the standard of review dictated

under Rule 50. Again, the court disregarded critical

evidence favorable to petitioner-namely, the evidence

supporting petitioner’s prima facie case and undermining

respondent’s nondiscriminatory explanation. See p.197

F.3d at 693-694. The court also failed to draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of petitioner.” See

Furnco, 438 U.S. at 580 (evidence that employer’s work

force was racially balanced, while “not wholly

irrelevant,” was not “sufficient to conclusively

demonstrate that [the employer’s] actions were not

discriminatorily motivated”). |The Court of Appeals

impermissibly substituted its judgment concerning the

weight of the evidence for the jury’s.

Justice O’Connor, and quoting from the review of

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., “In

reaching this conclusion, however, we reasoned it is

permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact

of discrimination from the falsity of the employer’s

explanation.” Specifically, we stated: “The factfinder’s

disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant

(particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of

mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima

facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.

Thus, rejection of the defendant’s proffered reasons will

permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of

intentional discrimination.” Id., at 511. Proof that the

defendant’s explanation is unworthy of credence is

simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is

probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be

quite persuasive. See id., at 517. And lastly, “It suffices

to say that, because a prima facie and sufficient evidence

to reject the employer’s explanation may permit a

finding of liability, the Court of Appeals erred in —

proceeding from the premise that a plaintiff must always ~

introduce additional, independent evidence of

discrimination.

The Plaintiffs-Petitioners are requesting the U.S. Supreme

Court to interpret the facts of law in this case and render a j

decision of resolve. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc., in quoting, Justice O’Connor’s review “Given vi

the evidence in the record supporting petitioner, ‘we see no 7

reason to subject the parties to an additional round of litigation :

before the Court of Appeals rather than to resolve the matter

here.” |

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs-Petitioners Pratt and Garrett are referred to

collectively as employees or when individual reference is :

appropriate, by their surname. References to the City of

Houston, Texas defendant-respondent, or as the City. The

Department of Public Works and Engineering is referred to as |

@ their not being promoted to a Senior Position in the

Department of Public Works and Engineering, the employees

sued on October 28, 1998, asserting claims under the Civil

Rights Act of 1866, and 1964, as amended. Summary

Judgment was granted on November 12, 1999. Rec. 44. The

| Fifth Circuit Reversed and Remanded, Rec. 48.

4 In February, 2002 the lower district court conducted a hearing

in Judge Sim Lake’s court. The initial opinion ruling from the

4 Fifth Circuit stated not to be inconsistent with this opinion

| ruling. All legal representatives failed to carry out this

directives knowing that certain functions such as weigh in the

facts, evidence and credibility are jury functions, only. Final

judgment was entered on March 22, 2002. A timely notice of

appeal was filed on March 22, 2002.

Statement of Facts

In the opinion reversing summary judgment on a finding

there was sufficient evidence to infer that race was a factor in

the City’s failure to promote either Pratt or Garrett. Willie

Pratt and Bernard Garrett, both black men, were community ;

service inspectors for the City of Houston’s Department of {

Public Works and Engineering (““DWPE”). In July, 1997

DWPE posted a job opening for a senior inspector. The

posting listed the position’s minimum qualifications as (1) an |

associate’s degree or certification/licensing in a_ technical

specialty program of between 18 months and three years

duration; (2) four years of experience investigating or :

inspecting criminal environmental pollution; (3) a valid Texas @°

driver’s license and compliance with the City’s policy on 1 |

driving. The posting also listed a preference for experience in 1

criminal case development and environmental investigations. ’

Under “Selections/Skills Tests Required,” the posting stated, ] |

“NONE”. |

The Defendants, City gave an unofficial skills test and assisted

the lesser-qualified white applicant, Edward Rutland with the |

test by giving him a book with the answers. The process was

manipulated and special treatment was given to the lesser-

qualified white applicant, Edward Rutland. See Eberheim v.

4 New York State Health Dept., 904 F.2d 161 (2 Cir. 1990);

: Brown v. Trustees of Boston University, 891 F.2d 337 (1% Cir.

1989); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.

133 (2000); McDonnell Douglas Corp., v. Green, 411 U.S. 792

(1973); Corley v. Jackson Police Dept., 566 F.2d 994, 1001 (5"

Cir. 1978); Redditt v. Mississippi Extended Care Centers, Inc.,

9 718 F.2d 1381, 1386 (5" Cir. 1983); Bannistor v. Ullman, 287

7 F.3d 394, 401 (5" Cir. 2002) and Kona Technology Corp., v.

Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 225 F.3d 595, 601 (5™ Cir.

' 2000); Willie Pratt Bernard Garrett v. City of Houston.

As was stated in Mr. Joseph Ahmad and Mr. C. Vance

| Christopher’s initial appeal request to the Fifth Circuit Court

: g and quoting, “In fact, Rutland was not just less qualified, he

1 was unqualified under the City’s own policies and procedures

because he did not meet the minimum qualifications for Senior

Inspector. Vol. 2, Doc. 39, p.495. It is well established that

4 promotions of lesser-qualified whites over more qualified

blacks is proof in itself of pretext and therefore discrimination.

See Eberheim v. New York State Health Dept., 904 F.2d 161

(2™ Cir. 1990) (reversing the lower court, the Second Circuit ;

held that the defendant’s failure to promote the most qualified

individual “pointed to” discrimination, and therefore the case

was remanded for a determination for damages); Brown v.

Trustees of Bostcn University, 891 F. 2d 337 (1% Circ. 1989)

(inference of pretext my reasonably be drawn where employee j

qualifications are at issue, and the successful applicant’s

qualifications are lower than the known qualifications of the

plaintiff); Lilly v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, 842 F.2d 1496

(4 Cir. 1988) (pretext found when black employee with a

good record was passed over in favor of a white with less |

education, less experience, and less seniority); Eastland v.

T.V.A., 704 F.2d 613, 626 (11™ Cir. 1983) Court of Appeals !

held trial court’s finding of no discrimination concerning

promotion decision to foreman was clearly erroneous where ]

black plaintiff had more years of experience, had acted as a

acting or substitute foreman, and the white selected had i

demonstrated attendance and drinking problems before the

selection)” stated in Mr. Ahmad and Mr. Christopher’s in the

prior appeal.

Testing of such should have never been given by Mr. Tom

Collins. In fact, the reasons it was not disclosed on the job

posting are: 1.) the test would have been given by someone

other than Collins himself and no special treatment given to his

designee 2.) the test would have been stated and disclosed in

the job posting and 3.) could only be administered by the City

of Houston “Central” Human Resources Department. Tom

Collins, (a white male) Chief Inspector of the Neighborhood

Protection Division DWPE, who supervised Garrett and was

responsible for selecting the new senior inspector also

attempted to change the minimum qualifications in an attempt

to make the white applicant eligible for the position. However,

; Pratt and Garrett both applied for the senior inspector position.

Pratt holds a BS Degree and a year of graduate school, two and

a half years of experience as a pollution investigator for the

Coast Guard, and had been a DPWE community service

j inspector for the prior two years.

Garrett had a Master’s Degree and a Ph.D. (pending |

submission of his dissertation) in environmental engineering, |

and had spent four previous years as a community service 7

inspector in DPWE. Pratt and Garrett were more than

qualified for the Senior Inspector and were currently working : |

in the department where the opening was, but neither were i

selected for the job. Tom Collins has a pattern of

discrimination and this is not the first occurrence.

The selected candidate was not initially referred for the

position by Sally Layman or Roderick Newman of the Central

Human Resources Department because he did not meet ; |

minimum qualifications. However, with manipulation by '

Collins he was selected for the Senior Inspector job for which |

he did not qualify. The word Discrimination means, “bias, j

favoritism, prejudice, unfairness, inequality, bigotry,

intolerance, and even hatred towards a group, a class or an

individus: because of their racial make up”. All of the i

foregoing descriptions of the word discrimination was what 3

Mr. Pratt and Mr. Garrett felt. Although Mr. Pratt and Mr. j

4 Garrett were both already employed by the Defendant and

j more than exceeded the minimum qualifications and according

i to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Original Opinion ruling

stated they were the superior candidates for the position. Pratt

4 and Garrett both experienced the Senior Inspector positions

opening and closing on many other occasions and their not

being considered for the job.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

There is a Conflict of law interpretation between the lower

courts, Southern District and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said there is enough

4 evidence for this case to be Reversed and Remanded to the

lower court, which is the Southern District court for trial and

{ for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

The Southern District Court failed to follow the letter of the

| law of the upper court. The second request for rehearing from

® the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Fifth Circuit En

Banc conflicts with the original hearing on _ racial

discrimination and it also conflicts with decisions of other

court of Appeals, as well as decisions made by this court in }

other racial discrimination cases. See McDonnell Douglas

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 892, 802 (1973), Kline v. TVA, 7

F.2d 994, 1001 (5" Cir. 1978); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil |

Tools, Desert Palace, Inc., DBA Caesars Palace Hotel &

Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15484 (9" :

Cir. Nev., 2002). Fisher v. Vassar College, 114 F.3d 1332

(CA 2 1997) En Banc and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing :

Products, Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2000). “Thus, a plaintiff's prima

facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the

employer’s asserted justification is false, may permit the trier

of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully

discriminated.” A reasonable jury could have found that

respondent’s explanation for its employment decision was

pretextual. See Pratt and Garrett v. City of Houston, 247 F.3d

601, 605 (5 Cir. 2001). Again, both lower courts (Southern

District and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals) erred.

(SAAR ESR INL ERIM PLT MT

j Under the Title VII and 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 race

discrimination claims the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found

sufficient evidence to reverse and grant summary judgment by

the district court. See Walker v. Thompson, 214 F.3d 615, 624

(5™ Cir. 2000) and Rubenstein v. Administrators of the Tulane

Educational Fund, 218 F.3d 392, 399 (5" Cir. 2000); Reeves v.

Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120

§.Ct. 2097 (2000); St. Mary Honor’s Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S.

‘

) Teal reason was intentional discrimination”).

502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (1993) and Vadie v. Mississippi State

i University, 218 F.3d 365, 373 (5™ Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121

S. Ct. 1092 (2001). Also, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing

Products, Inc.,’s review, Supreme Court Justice O’Connor

+ delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court and Justice

Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, and quoting, (“[P]roving

the employer’s reason false becomes part of (often

considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the

Both the lower courts,(Southern District and Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals during the second request for reversal)

erred when the Plaintiffs-Petitioners were required to

produce additional evidence. Therefore, there is a matter of

interpretation of law in both courts, which is not consistent

with the United States Constitution and previous cases

heard in the U. S. Supreme Court. See Reeves v. Sanderson

Plumbing Products, Inc. 530 U. S. 133 (2000) and Supreme

Court of the United States Rules Part III, Rule 10 (a) (b) (c)

Considerations Governing Review on Writ of Certiorari

which states, “a United States court of appeals has eritered a

decision in conflict with the decision of another United

States Court of Appeals on the same important matter; has

decided an important federal question in a way that

conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or

has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of

judicial proceedings, or sanctioned such a departure by a

lower court, as to call for an exercise of this Court’s

supervisory power.”

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Southern

District Court/s have invoked two different interpretations of

s crucial law which conflicts with decisions made of other

j circuits. The Plaintiffs continued to seek justice in the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals and in the lower court. In the

second rehearing request the Fifth Circuit did not stand or

enforce their own opinion ruling. Plaintiffs continued to seek

relief in the judicial process by taking their appeal to the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals, En Banc. The En Banc denied the

a The courts have entered a decision in conflict with

the decision of another court of appeals and a lower federal

§ court ona important federal matter of law. Therefore, an

q appeal for Writ of Certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court is

necessary to exercise and enforce the consistency of the

United States Constitution and the Judicial process. This

decision should be made by this court. See Reeves v.

j Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).

9 Nowlin v. Resolution Trust Corp., 33 F.3d 498, 500 n. 1 (5"

7 Cir. 1994) and Burch v. City of Nacogdoches, 174 F.3d 615,

618 (5" Cir. 1999) and U.S. Supreme Court Rules, Part III |

Rule 10 (a) (b) (c).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons the petition for a writ of certiorari

should be granted.

Bernard Garrett

2703 Bringhurst

Houston, Texas 77026

713/723-0449

832-876-1095

Plaintiff-Petitioner, Pro Se

Respondent Counsel:

Anthony Hall, City Attorney

Donald Fleming, Sr. Assistant Attorney

City of Houston, Texas

P.O. Box 1562

Houston, Texas 77251

713/247-2000

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.