Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Gaines v. White River Environmental Partnership

dupmme Gout, US.

(r) FILE®

03 205 Jul 29 2003

———OFFIGE—OF THE-CLERK

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

LOUIS F. GAINES,

Plaintiff - Petitioner

V.

WHITE RIVER ENVIRONMENTAL

PARTNERSHIP, Et Al.,

Defendants - Respondents

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Louis F. Gaines, Pro Se

5337 North College Avenue

Indianapolis, IN 46220 - 3141

317 -- 283 - 4821

annenne eae P

PRT RIS Fee

— ae ee

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QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

1. For EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803: Since Pro

Se Plaintiff: (1) timely opposed the Defendants’

unlawful Age & Race discrimination in employ-

ment; and, (2) immediately received a "Hostile

Reply" from the Defendants, who "Silenced" him

- was the Plaintiff required to subject himself to

additional discrimination, humiliation, retaliation,

and/or threats - in order to qualify for judicial

relief? See PP. 5 - 6.

2. For EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879: (1) charge

was filed against the Defendants on January 29,

2K01; (2) for the "Date Discrimination Took

Place," Pro Se Plaintiff listed "12/26/2000" and

"1/11/2001; (3) the District Court overlooked this

charge in its review; and, (4) the Seventh Court

determined that the above charge was untimely

filed. If Pro Se Plaintiff has been denied due

process, and/or equal protection of the law, then

what relief is due? See PP. 7-8.

3. For EEOC Charge #240-A1-1110: (1) on

January 22, 2K01, EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803

was filed; (2) on January 25, 2K01, the

Defendants suddenly required the Operations

Specialists to perform large scale, and long term

"Union duty: cleaning primarily;" (3) the Plain-

tiff, however, was required to do more than his

fair share of cleaning, and to document such

cleaning, unlike others; and, (4) the Lower Courts

determined that the Plaintiff has not suffered any

adverse treatment. If the Plaintiff has been

denied due process and/or equal protection of the

law, then what relief is due? See P. 8.

4. For EEOC Charge #240-99-1616: (1) in 1999,

the Defendants were the first to file a summary

judgment motion against Pro Se Plaintiff; (2) he

was not allowed to amend his Complaint on any

authority, or under any circumstance; (3) in 2K01,

Pro Se Plaintiff was the first to file a summary

judgment motion; (4) afterwards, the Defendants

filed two motions to amend, and they were

granted; and (5), the Defendants were then grant-

ed a favorable summary judgment, which was

partially influenced by one or both amended

motions. If the Plaintiff has been denied due

process, and/or equal protection of the law, then

what relief is due? See P. 9.

5. Reference the "Doctrine of Continuing Vio-

lation:" (1) between the period of December 1,

1999 and June 1, 2K03; Pro Se Plaintiff has filed

five unlawful discrimination in employment suits

against the Defendants; (2) such suits were

provoked by the Defendants, and Pro Se Plaintiff's

attempt to defend or protect his civil and con-

stitutional rights; (3) the Lower Courts have de-

termined that some complaints were untimely

filed; and, (4) the Lower Courts have consistently

denied all relief. If the Lower Courts have er-

roneously withheld the protection of the "Doc-

trine of Continuing Violation" from Pro Se Plain-

tiff - then what relief is due? See P. 16,

6. Reference the Plaintiff's on-the-job, "Irre-

parable Injury" that the Defendants caused him to

willfully suffer during "Discovery," in 1999.

What relief, if any, is the Plaintiff due? See

PP. 3-5.

7. What other relief is the Plaintiff due?

li.

ae

| LIST OF PARTIES

1. LOUIS F. GAINES, Petitioner

5337 North College Avenue

Indianapolis, IN 46220-3141

2. WHITE RIVER ENVIRONMENTAL PART-

NERSHIP, Et. Al., Respondent

; 2700 South Belmont Avenue

Indianapolis, IN 46221

3. IWC RESOURCES CORPORATION,

Managing Partner, and Respondent

1220 Waterway Boulevard

Indianapolis, IN 46206

4. SUEZ, Partner, and Respondent

16 Rue De La Ville Leveque

75383 Paris Cedex 08

France

5. UNITED WATER SERVICES, Inc.,

Partner, and Respondent

200 Old Hook Road

Harrington Park, NJ 07640

lii.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUBJECT PAGE

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

LIST OF PARTIES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CITATION OF OPINIONS & REPORTS

CONSTITUTION & OTHER AUTHORITY

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jurisdiction of Lower Courts

Material Facts To Consider

ARGUMENT

Summary

Conclusion

APPENDIX

iv.

iii.

p—

2.

a ee ee ee ee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

SUBJECT PAGE

ANDERSON v. LIBERTY LOBBY

INC. 106 S.Ct. 2505; 1986 11.

CURTIS 1000, INC. v. SUESS,

24 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 1994) 20.

FILIPOVIC v. K & R EXPRESS

SYSTEMS, INC., 176 F.3d 390, 391

(7th Cir. 1999) 16.

GILBERT v. HOMAR, 138 L.Ed 2d

120, 121; 1997 11.

HARRIS v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC.,

126 L.Ed 2d 295; 1993 12.

KOLSTAD v. AMERICAN DENTAL

ASS'N, 119 S. Ct. 2118, 2119; 1999 20.

LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE,

112, S. Ct. 2130, 2131; 1992 19.

McCORMICK v. CITY OF CHICAGO,

390 F.3d 319 (7th Cir. 2000) 15.

McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORP. v.

GREEN, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1818; 1973 14.

O'CONNOR v. CONSOLIDATED COIN

CATERERS CORP., 134 L. Ed 2d

433; 1998 le

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

Fifth Amendment: PP. 10, 12 15,17 & 19.

Eighth Amendment: PP. 2,12 & 19.

Thirteenth Amendment: PP. 2, 12 & 19.

TITLE 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254, P. 1.

§ 1291, P. 3.

§ 1331, P. 2.

§ 1332, P. 2.

§ 1343(a), P. 2.

TITLE 29 U.S.C.

§ 623(a), P. 2.

§ 623(d), P. 2 & 14.

§ 659, P. 2.

$ 660, P. 2.

§ 666, P. 2.

vi.

:

4

.

TITLE U.S. C.

§ 1391(b), P. 2.

§ 1981, PP. 2, 11, 12, 15, 17 & 19.

| § 1981(c), PP. 11 & 12.

§ 1983, P. 2.

§ 2000e-2(a), PP. 2 & 12.

$ 2000e-2(k)(c)(2), PP. 2 & 12.

§ 2000e-2(m), P. 2.

SP LOI MIE” ne Pa Rts gt -

§ 2000e-3(a), PP. 2, 12 & 19.

§$ 2000e-5, P. 2.

FEDERAL RULES OF:

Appellate Procedure, Rule 35, PP. 2 & 17.

Civil Procedure, Rule 56, PP. 2, 11, 12,

| 15,17 & 19.

Evidence, Rule 406, PP. 2 & 21.

vii.

aera aaa

CITATION OF OPINIONS OR REPORTS

LOUIS F. GAINES v. WHITE RIVER ENVIRON-

MENTAL PARTNERSHIP, Et Al.:

530 U.S. 1230; 120 S. Ct. 2661; 147 L. Ed. 2d

275; June 12, 2000.

534 U.S. 952; 122 S. Ct. 349; 151 L. Ed. 2d

263; October 9, 2001.

| 202 F.3d 272; January 3, 2000.

248 F.3d 1157; March 23, 2001

No. 02-3849, April 4, 2003; see Appendix A.

| IP-01-1158-H/K, September 30, 2002; Ibid., B.

No. 023849, May 12, 2003; Ibid., C.

| IP 98-1741-C-M/S, August 19, 1999, and Octo-

) ber 25, 1999; 00-3802, March 23, 2001, and May

| 17, 2001; Ibid,. D

JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT

One, the "Order" of the Seventh Court was

entered on April 4, 2K03. See Appendix A., P. 1.

Two, Rule 11 does not apply. Three, the Petition

for a Rehearing was denied on May 12, 2K03.

Ibid., B., P. 29. Finally, this matter comes to the

Supreme Court on the authority of Title 28,

U.S.C., § 1254.

ee a a ee

CONSTITUTION & OTHER AUTHORITY

United States Constitution: the Fifth, Eighth,

and Thirteenth Amendments. See Appendix E,

Page 43.

Title 29, U.S.C., 8§ 623(a) & 623(d). Ibid.

Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1981, 2000e-2(a), 2000e-

2(k)(c)(2), 2000e-2(m), and 2000e-3(a). Ibid.,

PP. 44-5.

Federal Rules of: (1) Appellate Procedure, Rule

35; (2) Civil Procedure, Rule 56; and, (3)

Evidence, Rule 406 - Ibid., PP. 45-7.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jurisdiction Of The Lower Courts:

1. This case of unlawful discrimination in

employment was timely brought to the United

States District Court, Southern District of Indiana,

at Indianapolis; on August 9, 2K01. Jurisdiction,

however, was based on the following authority:

(1) Title 28, U.S.C., §§ 1331, 1332 & 1343(a); (2)

Title 29, U.S.C., §§ 626(c), 626(d), 659, 660, and

666; (3) Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1391(b), 1981, 1983,

and 2000e-5; and, (4) the United States Consti-

tution, First, Fifth, Eighth, and Thirteenth Amend-

ments.

2. On September 30, 2K02, the District Court

2.

PIES BE DON SERIE BAA RAL TOOT ge Set EB

entered a summary judgment for the Defendants.

On October 25, 2K02, the case was timely

appealed to the Seventh Court, and on the

authority of Title 28, U.S.C., § 1291.

Material Facts To Consider:

Motions to amend, and summary judgments:

1. On October 2, 2K02, Pro Se Plaintiff

filed a summary judgment motion, with all the

supporting documents. See Appellant's Brief,

Appendix: "Docket Sheet,” P. 37, Items #14-18.

2. On February 13, 2K02, the Defendants

filed a motion to amend their "Answer." Ibid.,

#35. On September 30, 2K02, the District Court

granted the Defendants' motion to amend. Ibid.,

P. 40, #83. Also see current Appendix B, P.

13., 978.

3. On March 8, 2K02, the Defendants'

motion for summary judgment was filed. Ap-

pellant's Brief, Appendix, P. 38, Items #52-56.

4. On April 1, 2K02, the Defendants filed a

motion to correct their defective affidavits. Ibid.,

P. 39, #66. On September 30, 2K03, the District

Court granted the above motion. Ibid., P. 40, #83.

Also see current Appendix B, P. 11, 1 4.

5. After granting the Defendants’ motions

to amend, the Defendants’ summary judgment mo-

tion was then granted, and the Plaintiff's was

denied. See Appellant's Brief, Appendix, P. 41;

and, current Appendix B, P. 26 & 27. :

3.

.

6. In Gaines v. White River Environmental

Partnership, et al., IP-98-1741-C-M/S; the De-

fendants caused the Plaintiff to suffer an on-the-

job, "Irreparable Injury" on June 2, 1999. On

June 10, 1999, the Plaintiff: (1) filed a motion to

amend; (2) he was not allowed to amend his i

Complaint before July 9, 1999, the day in which /

the Defendants’ summary judgment motion was :

filed; and, (3) he was not allowed to amend after

July 9, 1999, either. See Appellant's Brief, P. 6.,

to include reference to medical documentation.

Also see current Appendix D, P. 34., and other

relevant evidence on PP. 32-38.

7. On March 23, 2001, the Seventh Court

affirmed the summary judgment for the De-

fendants in ..., 98-1741-C-M/S. See Appendix D.,

PP. 38-9. ;

8. On May 17, 2001, the Seventh fined Pro

Se Plaintiff $1,000.00 for filing a "frivolous

appeal," as determined by the Seventh Court.

Ibid., P. 41.

9. On April 4, 2K03, the Seventh Court

affirmed the summary judgment for the De-

fendants in ..., IP-01-1158-C-H/K. Ibid.,

Appendix A., P. 3.

10. In its "Order" of April 4, 2K03, the

Seventh Court issued another warning to Pro Se

Plaintiff, about bringing "frivolous arguments" to

the Seventh Court. Ibid., P. 8.

11. On May 12, 2K03, Pro Se Plaintiff's

Petition for a Rehearing was denied. Ibid.,

Appendix C., P. 30.

EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803:

1. Charge alleged unlawful Age and Race

discrimination.

2. As early as June, 1997, the Plaintiff

attempted to get the Defendants to allow him to

serve as a replacement for a Shift Supervisor. See

Appellant Reply Brief,, Appendix, P. 28.

3. In April or May 2K, the Defendants

secretly, or very selectively, notified Mr. G.

Sawyer, 33, and "White," that they were looking

for someone to serve as a temporary Shift

Supervisor. The Defendants also withheld the

same information from the Plaintiff, 55, and

"Black." See Appellant's Brief, PP. 9-10.

4. On May 11, 2K, the Defendants used E-

mail to widely announce Mr. G. Sawyer's selec-

tion. See Appellant's Reply Brief, Appendix, P.

30: Ex. #307.

5. On May 11, 2K, Pro Se Plaintiff

opposed Mr. Sawyer's selection to serve as a

temporary Shift Supervisor. Ibid.. Appendix, P.

31: Ex. #308.

6. On May 12, 2K, the Defendant issued a

hostile reply to Pro Se Plaintiff. Ibid.. Appendix,

P. 32: Ex. #309. |

7. Also on May 12, 2K, the Defendants

"Silenced" Pro Se Plaintiff by writing, "Louis, ..., I

expect to hear no more from you on this subject."

Ibid., Appendix, P. 33: Ex. #310.

8. After being "Silenced" on May 12, 2K,

the Plaintiff was discouraged from competing with

Mr. Sawyer for this employment opportunity.

See Appellant's Brief, P. 10, f Three, Item Seven.

Also see Appellant's Reply Brief, P. 9, 1 21.

9. Between the period of May 12, 2K, and

October 1, 2K, Mr. Sawyer released information,

in the presence of the Plaintiff, that he, Mr.

Sawyer; has already been promoted, but not

officially. Appellant's Reply Brief; P. 9 {| 22.

10. On October 1, 2K, the Defendants

promoted Mr. G. Sawyer to the position of Shift

Supervisor, or Supervising O & M Specialist, by

another name. _Ibid.. Appendix, P. 36: Ex.

#315, Second Page.

11. After promoting Mr. Sawyer on October

1, 2K, this same position was then posted on

October 24, 2K, for others to apply or bid. See

10, above.

12. In its "Order " of April 4, 2K03, the

Seventh Court did the following: (1) determined

that EEOC Charge #240-A1-0803 was timely; (2)

that Pro Se Plaintiff is not entitled to any relief,

because he failed to apply for the position that

Mr. Sawyer was promoted to; (3) that the Plaintiff

has not suffered any adverse treatment; and, (4),

affirmed the ruling of the District Court to this

extent. See Appendix A., PP. 5-7.

13. On May 12, 2K03, and to the extent of

the above, Pro Se Plaintiff's Petition for a Re-

hearing was denied. Ibid.. Appendix C, P. 30.

ONS BRD AY MOAN MES gE BL. ts

EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879

1. Charge was filed on January 29, 2K01,

alleging unlawful Race discrimination, and

Retaliation. See Complaint, P. 17. Also see

Appellant's Brief, PP. 11-13, starting with 1 9.

2. For the "Date Discrimination Took

Place," the Plaintiff listed "12/26/2000 ," and

"1/11/2001;" and "Continuing. Complaint, P. 17.

3. In granting the Defendants’ motion for a

summary judgment, on September 30, 2K02, the

District Court completely overlooked this charge,

or failed to address it. See Appendix B., PP. 15-

28. Also see Appellant's Brief, P. 13.

4. The Seventh Court, in its "Order" of

April 4, 2K03; denied all relief on the claim that

EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879 was untimely filed.

Ibid.. Appendix A., P. 5. Also see 111 & 2

above.

5. In a step-by-step approach, with sup-

porting exhibits, Pro Se Plaintiff attempted to

reveal to the Seventh Court that EEOC Charge

#240-A1-0879 was timely filed in every respect.

See Appellant's Petition for a Rehearing En Banc,

PP. 4-6.

6. On May 12, 2K03, all relief was denied

by the following standard. Ibid., P. 30:

ORDER

On consideration of the petition

7.

a

for rehearing en banc filed by plain-

tiff, no judge in active service has

requested a vote on the petition for

rehearing en banc, and all the judges

on the original panel have voted to

deny rehearing. The petition is

theref. -e DENIED.

EEOC Charge #240-A1-1110:

1. Charge alleged unlawful Age and Race

discrimination, and Retaliation. See Complaint,

P.20. Also see Appellant Brief, PP. 13-14.

2. On January 25, 2K01, the Defendants

told the Plaintiff that a "Verbal" agreement had

been reach with the local union to allow the

Operation Specialist to perform "Union Duty."

3. When the Plaintiff requested a written

Statement to document the above Claim, the

Defendants denied the request. Ibid,

4. Forcing the Plaintiff to perform "Union

Duty," placed him at a greater risk of being ]

injured on-the-job; the assignment discouraged

continued employment, and it lowered the status

of the "Operation Specialist.” Ibid,

5. The Seventh Court determined the

following: (1) the Plaintiff has not suffered

adverse treatment, and (2) the Plaintiff has failed

to establish prima facie discrimination. See

Appendix A., PP. 3 & 6.

8.

6. The Petition for a Rehearing was also

denied to this extent. See Appendix C., P. 30.

Plaintiff's "Irreparable Injury:"

1. See P. 4.,16.

2. Since June 10, 1999, Pro Se Plaintiff has

been trying to hold the Defendants accountable for

the above injury; however, such attempts have

failed. Ibid., P. 4.

3. Under no circumstance, and under no

authority has Pro Se Plaintiff been able to hold the

Defendants responsible for his on-the-job, "Ir-

reparable Injury,” which needlessly took place on

June 2, 1999,

4. EEOC Charge #240-99-1616, May 7,

1999; for example, does not contain any language

relating to an "Irreparable Injury,” because the

foregoing injury occurred on June 2, 1999. See

Complaint, P. 12. Also see Appellant's Brief,, PP.

7-9; see Appellant's Reply Brief, PP. 3-8: see

Appellant's Petition For A Rehearing En Banc, PP.

2-4; and, see Appendix D., PP. 32-37.

Time limitations:

In its "Order" of April 4, 2K03, the Seventh

Court wrote the following. See Appendix A., PP.

4-5:

... Title VII and the ADEA, however,

require plaintiff to meet strict dead-

lines: in Indiana, EEOC charges must

be filed within 300 days of the alleged

incident of race or sex discrimination,

and within 180 days of the alleged in-

cident of age discrimination.

ARGUMENT

Summary: The evidence fairly and sufficiently

show that the lower courts have consistently used

a standard of review that is inconsistent with the

relevant standards of the United States Supreme

Court, and the intent of the United States

Congress. In other words, Pro Se Plaintiff has

been categorically denied due process and equal

protection of the law; therefore, the review of the

Supreme Court is necessary for: (1) the benefit of

all, (2) providing a standard in which the Plaintiff

can be granted all due relief; and (3) preventing

the Defendants from being allowed to willfully

violate the Plaintiff's civil and constiéstion rights

and then escape all accountability or punishment

for such unlawful conduct.

I. Pro Se Plaintiff Has Been Denied Due

Process & Equal Protection Of The Law, As

It Applies To Motions To Amend, And

“ummary Judgment Procedure

A. Legal standards

1. United States Constitution, Fifth Amendment;

10.

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1981(c); Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c) & 56(e). See Appen-

dix E, PP. 43-8.

2. Court cases:

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct.

2505; 1986:

2. Federal Civil Procedure

Substantive law will identify which

facts are material for purpose of sum-

mary judgment, as only disputes over

facts that might affect the outcome of

suit under the governing law will prop-

erly preclude the entry of summary

judgment; factual disputes that are ir-

relevant or unnecessary will not be

counted. Federal Rules Civ. Proc.

Rule 56(c), 28 U.S.C.A.

Gilbert vy. Homar, 138 L Ed 2d 120, 121:

1997:

Constitutional Law

4. Due process is not a technical con-

ception with a fixed content unrelated

to time, place, and circumstances;

rather, it is flexible and calls for such

procedure protections as the particular

Situation demands.

B: Argument: One, the evidence shows that

11.

when the Defendants were the first to file a mo-

tion for summary judgment, Pro Se Plaintiff was

not allowed to amend on any authority, or under

any circumstances. See P. 4. Two, when the

Plaintiff was the first to file a summary judgment

motion, the Defendants were allowed to freely

amend, or such motions were freely granted. See

P. 3. Three, the Defendants’ motions to amend

were designed to affect the outcome of the case,

and they did. See P. 3., 1 5. Four, based on

the foregoing, the Defendants’ summary judgment

motion was inappropriately granted, and the Plain-

tiffs was inappropriately denied. Five, the

Plaintiff is entitle to all due relief. See PP. 3-4.

II. Once An Unlawful Employment Practice Is

Reasonably Opposed - The Adversely Treated

Employee Is Not Required To Suffer Additional

Discrimination, Humiliation, Retaliation, Or

Threats; In Order To Obtain Judicial Relief

A. Legal standards:

1. United States Constitution, the Fifth, Eighth,

and Thirteenth Amendments; Title 29, U.S.C., 8

623(a), and 623(d); Title 42, U.S.C., 88 1981,

1981(c), 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(k)(c)(2), 2000e-

3(a); and, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules

56(c) & 56(e). See Appendix E., PP. 43-8

2. Court cases: See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., and Gilbert v. Homar; P. 11. Also see the

following cases:

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 126 L Ed -

12.

2d 295; 1993:

Civil Rights § 7.6, 7.7

...» Title VII comes into play, however,

before the harassing conduct leads to a

nervous breakdown, and (2) ..., the

very fact that the discriminatory con-

duct was so severe or pervasive that it

created a work environment abusive to

employees because of their race, gen-

der, religion or national origin offends

Title VII's broad rule of workplace

equality.

O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers

Corp., 134 L. Ed 2d 433; and, 116 S.Ct. 1307,

1308; 1998:

Decision: In suit under Age Discrimi-

nation in Employment Act, (1) replace-

ment by person under 40 held not oro-

element of prima facie case. and (2)

fact that replacement is substantially

younger held to be morse reliable in-

dicator.

3. Civil Rights

The ADEA prohibits discrimination

on the basis of age and not class mem-

bership Age Discrimination Act of

1967, § 2 et seq., as amended, 29 U.S.-

C.A., § 621 et seq. :

13.

TL ee

J

:

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 93 ;

S.Ct. 1817, 1818; 1973.

a

4. Civil Rights

In implementation of employment and

personnel decisions, Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 tolerates no

racial discrimination, subtle or other-

wise. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 701

et seq., 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000 et seq.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 5-6. Two, any

form of unlawful discrimination in employment -

is an act of "Adverse Treatment; and, the victim is

entitled to reasonable relief at that point. Three,

once an unlawful employment practice is rea-

sonably opposed, the complaining employee, or

the victim, is not required to suffered additional

discrimination, humiliation, or threats - in order

to obtain judicial relief. Four, Pro Se Plaintiff

reasonably and timely opposed the Defendants’

unlawful Age and Race discrimination against

him. Five, afterwards, the Defendants became

"Hostile" toward the Plaintiff, and he was

"Silenced." Six, the Defendants used an unlawful

selection procedure that discriminated against the

Plaintiff on the basis of Age and Race. Seven,

since the Defendants' summary judgment motion

was inappropriately granted, and since the Plain-

tiff's was inappropriately denied - it follows that

the Plaintiff is entitled to all due relief.

II. EEOC Charge #240-A1-0879 Was Very

Timely Filed

14.

A. Legal standards:

1. See P.9., "Time limitations."

2. See United States Constitution, Fifth Amend-

ment; Title 42, U.S.C., § 1981; and the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Appendix E.,

PP. 43-8.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 7-8. Two, the

Lower Courts could not reasonably ask for a more

timely filing. Three, to the extent of the fore-

going, Pro Se Plaintiff has been denied due

process and equal protection of the law; and, the

summary judgment for the Defendants was in-

appropriately entered, and the Plaintiff's was in-

appropriately denied.

IV. Pro Se Plaintiff Is Entitled To Protection

Of "Continuing Violation Doctrine," Too

A: Legal standards:

1. See United States Constitution, Fifth Amend-

ment; Title 42 U.S.C., § 1981; and, the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56; Appendix E.,

PP. 43-8.

2. See the case of Gilbert v. Homar, P.11. Also

see the following cases:

McCormick v. City of Chicago, 30 F.3d 319

(7th Cir. 2000):

5. Federal Civil Procedure

15.

Pro se complaints are to be liberally

construed and not held to the stringent

standards expected of pleadings

drafted by lawyers.

povic v. K & R Express Systems, Inc.,

176 F.3d 390, 391 (7th Cir. 1999):

2. Civil Rights

Continuing violation doctrine allows a

Title VII complainant to obtain relief

for time-barred act of discrimination

by linking it with acts that fall within

the statutory limitations periods;

courts will then treat the series of acts

as one continuous act ending within

limitations period. Civil Rights Act of

1964, § 706(d), as amended, 42 U.S.-

C.A. § 2000e-5(e).

3. Civil Rights —

Courts will consider three factors in

determining whether employee has

established continuing violation un-

der Title VII: (1) whether the acts

involve the same subject matter; (2)

the frequency at which they occur;

and (3) the degree of permanence of

alleged acts of discrimination, which

should trigger an employee's aware-

ness of and duty to assert his or her

rights. Civil Rights Act of 1964, §

706(d), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §

2000e-5(e).

16.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 1-17. Two, the

Defendants continually and willfully violate the

Plaintiff's civil and constitutional rights, but

absolutely nothing is ever done by the Lower

Courts to hold them accountable. Three, the

Defendants are not above the law. Four, the

Defendants must be made to comply with the

requirements of "Equal Employment Opportunity.”

Five, Pro Se Plaintiff is entitled to the protection

of the "Continuing Violation Doctrine,” like all

other members of a protected class. Six, in at

least one instance, the Seventh Court found one

EEOC charge timely filed. See P. 6., 9 12.

Seven, to the extent of the above, the Defendants'

summary judgment was inappropriately entered,

and the Plaintiff's was inappropriately denied.

Eight, Pro Se Plaintiff is entitled to all due relief.

V. Pro Se Plaintiff's Petition For A Rehearing

En Banc Was Denied In Error

A. Legal standards

1. See the United States Constitution, Fifth

Amendment; Title 42, U.S.C., § 1981; and, the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56;

Appendix E., PP. 43-8.

Zz. See the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Rule 35. Ibid., P. 42:

Rule 35. En Banc Determination

(b)(1)(A) the panel decision conflicts

with a decision of the United States

Supreme Court or of the court to which

17.

)

the petition is addressed (with citation

to the conflicting case or cases) and

consideration by the full court is there-

fore necessary to secure and maintain

uniformity of the court's decisions; or

(b)(1)(B) the proceeding involves one

or more questions of exceptional im-

portance, each of which must be con-

cisely stated; for example, a petition

may assert that a proceeding presents a

question of exceptional importance if

it involves an issue on which the panel

decision conflicts with the authorita-

tive decisions of the United States

Court of Appeals that addressed the

issue.

(f) Call fora Vote. A vote need not

be taken to determine whether the case

will be heard or reheard en banc un-

less a judge calls for a vote.

3. Also see the case of Gilbert v. Homar, P. 11.

dd ee ee ee ee ee eee ae ee ee eS Tee ee

B. Argument: One, see PP. 7-8. Two, to

allow all the existing errors to stand against the

Plaintiff, a panel of the Seventh Court denied the

Petition for a Rehearing En Banc, by presenting or

writing a "Standard" which is contrary to the

published standard of the Seventh Court, and the

United States Congress. See P. 7., 7 6, and

compare it with Rule 35(f), as quoted above!

Three, one "Standard" is clearly different than

the other!

18.

VI. Pro Se Plaintiff Is Entitled To Fair

Monetary Relief For The On-The-Job,

"Irreparable Injury" That The Defendants

Have Willfully Caused Him To Suffer

A. Legal standards:

1. See the United States Constitution, the Fifth,

Eighth, and Thirteenth Amendments; Title 29,

US.C., §$ 623(d); Title 42, U.S.C., §§ 1981, and

2000e-3(a); and, the Federal Rules of~ Civi?

Procedure, Rule 56 - Appendix E., PP. 42-8.

2. See the court cases of Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., & Gilbert v. Homar, P. 11.; Harris

v. Forklift Systems, Inc., PP. 12-3; McDonnell

' Douglas Corp. v. Green, P. 14.; and, Filipovic v.

K & R Express Systems, Inc., P. 16.

3. Also see the following cases:

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.Ct

2130, 2131; 1992:

7. Federal Civil Procedure

At the pleading stage, general factual

allegations of injury resulting from de-

fendant's conduct may suffice to estab-

lish standing; in response to s

judgment motion, plaintiff can no

longer rest on mere allegations but

must set forth by affidavit or other evi-

dence the specific facts which will be

taken as true for purpose of summary

judgment; at the final stage, those

19.

facts if controverted, must be support-

ed adequately by evidence adduced at

trial. Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule

56(e), 28 U.S.C.A.

Curtis 1000, Inc. v. Suess, 24 F.3d 941 (7th

Cir. 1994):

3. Torts

Tort of intentional interference with

advantageous business relations no

longer requires that relation inter-

fered with be one embodied in formal

contract.

Kolstad v. American Dental Ass'n, 119

S.Ct. 2118, 2119; 1999:

6. Damages

Egregious or outrageous acts may

serve as evidence supporting inference

of evil motive required to impose

punitive damages.

B. Argument: One, see PP. 3-4, and P. 6.

Two, a double-standard has surely been main-

tained against Pro Se Plaintiff, which has pro-

duced a "Substantial Injustice” against him.

Three, the Defendants are guilty of a willful on-

the-job, "Irreparable Injury" against the Plaintiff.

Four, every summary judgment for the Defendants

should be reversed, because such judgments were

20.

inappropriately entered. Five, the Defendants are

not above the "Law." Six, the Plaintiff is entitled

to all due relief.

Conclusion

The evidence fairly and sufficiently show that

the Lower Courts have entered judgments that are

in conflict with relevant rulings of the United

States Supreme Court, and the intent of Congress.

Beneath the foregoing rulings lies the constant and

real threat that Pro Se Plaintiff will be sanctioned

by the Seventh Court for trying to defend, and

protect his civil and constitutional rights against

the Defendants, who are willful violators of the

laws of "Equal Employment Opportunity." See

PP. 1-21; Appendix A., P. 8; and, Appendix E., P.

47, " Rule 406." Clearly, the review of the

Supreme Court is needed - in light of all the

above. Pro Se Plaintiff is entitled to all due

relief. See PP. 10-21, and Appendix E., PP. 43-

48; for the authority to grant such relief.

Sincerely,

¢

\ pte

LOUIS F. /GA

Pro Se Plaintiff,

, July 31, 2K03

21.