Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cheyovich v. San Marino School District

~~ Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

02 234 AUC 1 3 2002

G-FICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the Gnited States

¢

MILAN CHEYOVICH; DIANA CHEYOVICH,

individually and as Court Appointed Guardian for Daniel

Milan Lucien Cheyovich Joye and Nicolas Marc David

Cheyovich Joye, minors,

Petitioners,

¥.

SAN MARINO SCHOOL DISTRICT; JOHN

BEUGELMAN, a.k.a. Jacques Beuglemans, et al.,

Respondents.

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

DIANA CHEYOVICH

MILAN CHEYOVICH

1858 South Euclid Avenue

San Marino, California 91108

(626) 799-4193

1}

ee

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Are elderly grandparents, who obtained legal and

physical custody of their deceased daughter’s two minor

sons, both American and California citizens, living then

with the grandparents in California, entitled to bring

federal claims under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42

U.S.C. sections 1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), 1986 and 1988, for

their grandsons being kidnapped from their public schools,

whose principals, administrators and teachers knew of

their legal guardianship status, copies of such having been

served them and their being warned of the possible kid-

napping of their grandsons by their French citizen father,

which school officials engineered, conspired with, planned

and accomplished such kidnapping with the father, his

private California attorney, and all of whom were further

joined in such conspiracy of a cover-up, obstruction of

justice, complicity, acts of perjury, falsification and manu-

facture of evidence, etc., with and by the grandparents

first retained trial counsel, and the school district’s own

private and trial counsel, resulting in ongoing violations of

the Hague Convention Treaty, numerous criminal statutes

of the United States and California, plus preventing

frustration and destroying familial relationship, direct

contacts, visits, legal and private communication with

their grandsons and the perfection of their and their

grandsons’ legal rights and claims, the grandparents also

' Their ages being 78 & 70 when grandsons kidnapped; now 88 &

80.

ii

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW - Continued

being guardians ad litem in two state court actions and

their federal court action?

2. Is a California Appeal Court’s “NOT TO BE PUB-

LISHED DECISION,” upholding a trial judge’s reversal of

a jury's judgment on only a negligence claim in favor of the

grandparents for $1,400,000.00, to be given claim or issue

preclusion per a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion when not

all named parties in the federal action were named in the

state action, no federal claim issues nor conspiracies, etc.,

were tried in the state action, the federal action was

abated until after the state court decision, and no proce-

dural/substantive rights of due process or equal protection

were accorded the grandparents via the judicial notice

requested of the nonpublic appellate decision?

3. Do the California Statute of Limitations doctrines of

(a) discovery of conspiracy facts and (b) the last overt act

doctrine, suspend or toll such statute running while such

conspiracies are ongoing/continuing?

iii

LIST OF PARTIES

PETITIONERS:

1. MILAN CHEYOVICH —

In Pro se

2. DIANA CHEYOVICH —

In Pro se

RESPONDENTS:

1. JACQUES BEUGELMANS

2. SAN MARINO SCHOOL

DISTRICT & Employees

and attorneys JUDITH

ANDERSON, Esq. and

J. MICHAEL DECLUES,

Esq.

3. JAMES A. SHALVOY

MILAN CHEYOVICH

1858 Scuth Euclid Ave.

San Marino, CA 91108

Phone: (626) 799-4193

DIANA CHEYOVICH

1858 S. Euclid Ave.

San Marino, CA 91108

Phone: (626) 799-4193

LAW OFFICE OF

RICHARD COMESS

944 Princeton Dr.

Marina Del Rey, CA 90292

Richard D. Comess, Esq.

Phone: (310) 745-2260

(WALSH & DECLUES) now

DECLUES & BURKETT

Six Hutton Centre Dr.

Ste 1050

P.O. Box 22021

Santa Ana, CA 92702-2011

Phone: (714) 436-1776

JEFFREY A. EVANS, Esq.

SEDGWICK, DETERT,

MORAN & ARNOLD

801 S. Figueroa St.,

18th Floor

Los Angeles, CA 90017-5556

Phone: (213) 426-6900

se aeans chien naianeseinaiaiemmaemmnaiaaaaiail — a > . aba

iv

LIST OF PARTIES — Continued

4. BIGELOW, MOORE AND ROBERT C. JENKINS,

TYRE Esq.

MANNING & MARDER

660 S. Figueroa St.

# 2300

FIRST INTERSTATE

TOWER

Los Angeles, CA 90017

Phone: (626) 624-6900

5. JACKY BERNARD JOYE JACKY BERNARD JOYE

— In Pro Per Le Haut Sers

32600 Lisle Jourdain

France

Vv

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW.............. i

EE Ge ED Sacicdssinigbatdicciceninrndesassineusaisepcencets iii

PAE GF DT nev hinds iicntacca dncovicviesenisnsisicecss v

PAE OF AU Eee casccctecncctsesseescovssscccseseseses vii

CITATIONS OF OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL RE-

PO oc cetiintithiiniaittageeantpscchudbdecnaphchatebiceh petledesdiires 1

STATEMENT OF BASIS OF JURISDICTION.......... 1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES

INVOLVED IN PETITION................cccsesseeeeeeeeeeeees 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.............. sevtaskpavubeahaiiibian 2

RTOS ba vctecnnntcinentiiiebinntieciiatsingimancitakeniaiateases 6

1. PETITIONERS HAD PROPERLY AVERRED

VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER

THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT SEC-

TIONS 1983, 1983(2), 1985(3), 1986 AND

1988, AS WELL AS OF THE CALIFORNIA

CIVIL RIGHTS, UNRUH, ACT, CALIFOR-

NIA CIVIL CODE SECTIONS 51-53 AND

GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 12948 ...... 6

2. NO LAW OF THE CASE NOR CLAIM OR

ISSUE PRECLUSIONS APPLIED TO DIS-

MISS PER RULE 12(b\6) PETITIONERS’

COMPLAINT, WHO WERE FURTHER DE-

NIED BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTAN-

TIVE DUE PROCESS OF ANY EVIDENTIARY

HEARING PER FEDERAL RULES OF EVI-

DENCE, RULE 201, ESPECIALLY SUBPART

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

3. THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE NINTH

CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS DELIBER-

ATELY IGNORED AND FAILED, IF NOT

REFUSED, TO APPLY THE CALIFORNIA

LAW OF DISCOVERY OF FACTS OR THE

LAST OVERT ACT DOCTRINE OF CONSPIR-

ACY, EITHER WHICH NOT ONLY TOLLED

THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

ON PETITIONERS AND THEIR GRANDSONS’

CLAIMS BUT FURTHER, ESTABLISHED

THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS’ CONSPIR-

ACY AVERMENTS OF ALL THEIR CLAIMS. ..... 14

CONCEIUGSION ..cccecscsccccrseseccscencovessescsseeonssnnsesetesseecs 15

vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES:

Al-Kvazraji v. St. Francis Coliege, 784 F.2d 505................ 9

Anthony v. Baker, 767 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1985)................ 8

Avitia v. Metro Club of Chicago, 924 F.2d 689 (7th

EST A OD WR eC Ta Se eT ae 13

Bell v. City of Milwaukee, 498 F.Supp. 1339

a ED wiisiliehsasicdlbtiaih endian edb ibitiaibuiitiaddicitentsannnnichiniesinatinnnn 8

Billings v. U.S., 57 F.3d 797 (9th Cir. 1995)...................00. 7

Brock v. Williams Enterprises of Georgia, Inc., 832

i a euhnapnenaeneunanonan 13

Conley v. Gibson, 353 U.S. 41 (1957)............cccccccccseseseseeeees 7

Crawford v. Houston, 396 F. Supp. 187 (S.S. Tex.

| a intel tlt Mt AR Rh AES RAP As CREA, rN 8

Delew v. Wagner, 142 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1998),

cert. den., 525 U.S. 1015 (1998)................cccceceeeeeeenees 7,28

Fobbs v. Holy Cross Health Systems, 29 F.2d 1439

I a hii 7

Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v.

American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d

A STE TE ASO 13

Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 489 (1998)................... 7, 8,11

Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 119 S.Ct. 710 (1999) ................. 11

Hutchins v. TNT /Reddaway Truck Lines, Inc., 939

I. San IGENS CIE: SUPINE ccccccosnceccnseccnsccssenesertecssaceees 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

In re Hopkins, 146 F.3d 729 (9th Cir. 1998) ..............cecceees 10

Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept, 839 F.2d 621 (9th

EEE RE es Le a 7

Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983) ..........cccccceeeeeeeeeeees i)

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelli-

gence & Coordination, 507 U.S. 163 (1993).................0. 6

Mendocino Environment Center v. Mendocino .

County, 14 F.3d 457 (9th Cir. 1994)... eeeeeeeeeee 9

Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 US.

RE Ca wctlicdiisieinsnciestilitisdateeataccbeeiashiaididbbithiadinidatindbticttinitithiseas 10

Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147, 99 S, Ct. 970, 59

L.Ed.2d 210 (1979)...........ceecees ssevceseesesesoncesessesesscesensecees 10

O’Neal v. Garrison, 263 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2001)....... 8,11

Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (19785) .............sseccssssssresssveeees 8

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195................cccceseeeeeeeeeeees 8

Sanders v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 190 F.3d 1080 (9th

Ry i wecieeesitcincnicha titers tcadaiamaatara ta aaa 12

Sea-Land Serv. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974) ................ 11

Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1982).......... 9

U.S. v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th Cir. 1999) ....................... 11

Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (C.A. 4th Va., 1981),

COE. GR. GER ites Pe CD ctecncesesnsiscnsvcnscccssosnesecenenses 9

Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 C.3d 773 (1974)............. 14

ix

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -— Continued

Page

CONSTITUTIONS

First Amendment to the United States Constitution .....2, 9

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-

GBOID wrnccicicdhsbioccdcsncsticscnsscccccccscnsvennevesosnnvecsseesooneveconcsesonee 2

STATUTES AND RULES

18 UG.C. sections 1681-1GBD .....sccccccccosesccsccveccscccecsececoseees 2

18 U.S.C. section 1965(a), et SEQ. .........cccccsssescecseerreeees 1

BB UEB.G., GONE TBE in ccctcseticcccscccesccesecccoseccvcvevecscenscesccoeess 1

i, BID BIG cccescccscevsctecensoosessnvescorenvosievencstonsinnesse 1

IN BIO o ccssnncticcceicrcssevenncccscneecersctsescsesecsecnenes 1

BE UTE). GRRREI BGS cemrccsvccecsnvscssevevvescceveccsvssesevcnee 1, 2, 3, 7

42 U.S.C. section 1985(2)..............0-ccccrerssserrereees 1, 2, 3,9

42 U.S.C. section 1985(3)...........cscccseeeeeeeerreeeeees 1, 2, 3, 8, 9

I wicsclidacictanccdasiceestedseniinctiasenctee 1, 2, 3, 9

Be Es TIEN TIEN Cccdanactonacsnncstrbeccenesconstevesencconss 1, 2, 3,9

California Civil Code sections 51-53............::ccccsssserseeeeeeeees 4

BUIIIIE HII TITIITT ovo snssnnstiionsnsbhannsenesoseneeownvsovaptopenosseoonnceses 1

STII TIT 00 sana ccnshdeboniepinenbennsortionsuatonerineneianurnonnnee 6

BN EI iiiisnnsienisisisetccssetonsbicnesssbnesbidseeesebocceuinonncseoeuns 10

Se EE MII tnccehassctcsceceretvocssvecevcvscsccescoseveseners 2,9, 10

Fed. R. Evid. 201(c) and (€)..........cscscccsssssrsessesseeereees 2,5, 10

Government Code section 12948 ..............csscsssessenrseeeeeeeees 4

Sup. Ct. B. 10(a) amd (€)....ccrccccccscorcssescoscocccovccscossvscoesvecesees 1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

ee SR: BE RE GD inesin resist iesesittienininraiocianiiniiviancapinicta 1

OTHER AUTHORITIES

18 Moore’s Federal Practice, Sec. 132.01, 132.02, et

seq. (Matthew Bender 3rd ed.) ..........ccceeeeeeeeeeeeeees 10, 13

1

CITATIONS OF OFFICIAL AND

UNOFFICIAL REPORTS

The short orders from the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals denying Petitioners’ Appeal and Petition for

Rehearing En Banc were not to be published and only

their respective Docket Numbers identify them, No. 00-

56905 and 00-56937.

,

v

STATEMENT OF BASIS OF JURISDICTION

1. Appeal Jurisdiction to the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals was per 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1367, 1391, 18

U.S.C. sections 1965(a), et seq., and 42 U.S.C. sections

1983, 1985(2), 1985(3), 1986 and 1988.

2. Petition for Rehearing En Banc timely filed January

15, 2002, was FRAP, Rule 35(b), CR 35-1.

3. Order denying Petition for Rehearing En Banc, May

15, 2002 extended time to file this Petition for Certiorari

with Petitioners being given through August 13, 2002 to

file this Petition. SCR, Rule 13(1) and (3).

4. Basis of Jurisdiction and Considerations of Review per

this Petition are SCR, Rule 10(a) and (c). The Ninth

Circuit by its “NOT FOR PUBLICATION” Memorandum,

and orders of denial “has so far departed from accepted

and usual course of judicial proceedings, or sanctioned

such departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise

of this Court’s supervisory power” and “has decided impor-

tant federal questions ... conflict{ing] with relevant

decisions of this Court.”

Sd

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND

STATUTES INVOLVED IN PETITION

FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CON-

STITUTION

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION

FEDERAL STATUTES

18 U.S.C. § 1631-1639

42 U.S.C. § 1983

42 U.S.C. § 1985(2)

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

42 U.S.C. § 1986

42 U.S.C. § 1988

TREATY —- THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHILD

ABDUCTION, ETC.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 12(b\6)

FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE

Rule 201(c) and (e)

4

v

STATEMENT OF CASE

Petitioners are two of four original plaintiffs, the other

two plaintiffs being their minor grandsons, who filed on April

3, 1996, their verified complaint before the United States

3

District Court for the Central District of California, No.

96-2381 HLH (BQR) against a number of defendants for

violations of their rights per the Federal Civil Rights Act,

42 U.S.C. sections 1983 through 1988. Defendants immedi-

ately moved for abstention of said complaint, although some

defendants moved to dismiss, which motions were granted

and not part of this petition. However, abstention was

granted, awaiting the resolution of a state court action

initiated by petitioners via their first trial counsel, Bige-

low, Moore and Tyre, in Los Angeles Superior Court, Case

GC 01040, which then had a trial date set for June 3,

1996. Petitioners’ federal complaint alleged that on and

after July 4, 1995 they discovered the conspiracies, fraud

and collusion of the remaining defendants therein to

obstruct justice before said federal court, to destroy their

rights and the rights of their two minor grandsons of

whom they were legal guardians and ad litem guardians

in both said state action and their federal complaint.

The remaining defendants who awaited the reactiva-

tion of the federal complaint after the resolution of the

state action were: The grandsons’ French citizen father,

Jacky Bernard Joye, who kidnapped them; Joye’s private

California attorney, Jacques Beugelmans, who directed,

advised and assisted Joye in kidnapping said grandsons;

petitioners’ former state action trial attorneys, James A.

Shalvoy, Franklin T. Bigelow, Jr., and their law firm,

Bigelow, Moore and Tyre; the San Marino School District,

the principal, Charles Johnson, Mary A. Meye, Perta

Santley, Jeanne Lipps, teachers and school personnel.

Petitioners had terminated their representation by Bige-

low, Moore and Tyre in September 1995, after discovering

on July 4-7, 1995 that they were conspiring against them

to eliminate not just their state claims but their federal

3

civil right claims against said defendants as named in

their federal complaint, which also included claims of

violation of the California Unruh Act, said state’s civil

rights statute, Cal. Civ. Code sections 51-53 and Cal.

Government Code section 12498. Their grandsons, Daniel

and Nicholas, ages 12 & 8 at the time of their kidnapping

as students for the school district's Huntington and

Valentine Schools, had experienced the untold grief of

their mother, Joan Cheyovich dying in her sleep in the

spring of 1992, while all three were living with their

grandparents, Milan and Diana Cheyovich. Their mother

had a French Divorce and Custody Decree which granted

her full custody to raise the minor sons in California, as

they were U.S. and California citizens and all three had

been abused by the father and former husband, Jacky

Joye. Diana Cheyovich had obtained an order appointing

her temporary legal guardian of said grandsons, who lived

with her and Milan in San Marino, the same house in

which they had lived with their mother for almost three

years preceding her death.

Their federal complaint alleged that they were dis-

criminated against by all said remaining defendants, due

to the plaintiffs Montengerin Orthodox religious beliefs,

practices and ethnic family origins, activities and upbring-

ing, and that due to the Serbian, Yugoslavia’s wars of so-

called and charged “ethnic cleansing” said defendants

conspired and collaborated together to have their grand-

sons kidnapped from them, taken and kept in France,

precluding all contacts, communication and relationships

with them, such relationships not only being familial but

legal, as to the legal guardianship and ad litem guardian

status which Diana Cheyovich occupied and held valid

court orders; Jacky Joye had been served with all proper

5

notices but not only defaulted in contesting such guardi-

anship proceedings, but had been in contact with the

court’s mediator and investigator who made a report

recommending Diana’s appointment as general guardian

and Joye had further sent derogatory letters and commu-

niques to the guardianship court, criticizing and castigat-

ing it for using it’s jurisdiction over him and his sons.

The federal district court granted defendants’ motion

for abstention until the state court action was resolved.

Such resolution came via a Not to Be Published decision

from the California Court of Appeals, Second District,

which affirmed the trial court’s reversing a jury’s verdict

and judgment in the grandparents’ favor of some $1.4

million dollars, and the eventual dismissal of all the

grandparents and even their grandsons’ claims on the

basis that said grandsons were with their father and the

grandparents could not have obtained permanent legal or

physical custody of their grandsons beyond their school

year which ended some three days after their kidnapping.

Upon such California appeal’s court decision being

final, when the State Supreme Court denied the grand-

parents’ petition for Review a Hearing, said defendants

remaining in the federal action moved for dismissal on the

purported basis of law of the case and some forms of res

judicata; defendant Beugelman also moved for dismissal

that the claims against him had exceeded the one year

California statute of limitations which he claimed was not

tolled by any acts of his deception or fraud from not being

discovered as a co-conspirator, aider, abettor and advisor

to and in securing the grandsons’ kidnapping; said defen-

dants’ motions were granted, no evidentiary nor due process

or equal protection hearing granted nor held per Federal

Rules of Evidence, Rule 201, especially subpart (e) thereof

6

regarding the issues of what was to be judicially noticed

and applied from said appeal’s court non-public decision.

The grandparents moved to amend their complaint

seeking appropriate leave of court to do so, but their

motion was denied almost perfunctorily. Their appeal to

the Ninth Circuit followed, and their petition for re-

hearing en banc.

In granting defendants’ motions the federal court did

so with prejudice, stating that these petitioners could not

plead any federal civil rights claims and their claims on

other grounds were barred/precluded by said California

appeal’s court decision as the law of the case. All of said

district court’s and the upholding granted thereof by the

Ninth Circuit are egregiously contrary not only to the

decisions of this Honorable Supreme Court, but the appro-

priate, controlling case decisions of the Ninth Circuit

Court of Appeals.

¢

ARGUMENT

1. PETITIONERS HAD PROPERLY AVERRED

VIOLATION OF THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE

FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACT SECTIONS 1983,

1983(2), 1985(3), 1986 AND 1988, AS WELL AS OF

THE CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS, UNRUH,

ACT, CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTIONS 51-

53 AND GOVERNMENT CODE SECTION 12948.

This Supreme Court has held in Leatherman v.

Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination, 507

U.S. 163, 168 (1993) that except as provided in FRCP,

Rule 9b) there are no heightened rules of pleading,

especially as to claims per the federal civil rights acts,

7

sections 1983, et seq., Conley v. Gibson 353 U.S. 41, 48

(1957) (“The Federal Rules reject the approach that

pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by counsel

may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle

that the purpose of pleading is to facilitate a proper

decision on the merits.”

The Ninth Circuit’s own case decisions of Karim-

Panahi v. L.A. Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.

1988) holds that a claim is sufficient on nothing more than

a bare allegation that an individual’s official’s conduct,

actions, etc., conformed to official policy, custom, usage or

practices under color of law. Further, in Fobbs v. Holy

Cross Health Systems, 29 F.2d 1439, 1449 (9th Cir. 1994),

plaintiffs can aver more than one conspiracy, multiple

conspiracies, joint union of actions, efforts and ventures.

Such multiple conspiracies include obstruction of justice,

withholding or manufacture/presentation of false, con-

trived arid deceptive evidence as part of a coverup, re:

federal court claims and proceeding. Delew v. Wagner, 142

F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. den, 525 U.S. 1015

(1998). Delew applies significantly to sustain petitioners

sections 1983 and 1985(2) claims, but although cited to the

Ninth Circuit in said appeal, such decision along with the

aforesaid were ignored.

The district court’s statement that petitioners could

not join non-state actors under section 1983 claims is

wholly erroneous. That Circuit’s decision in Billings v.

U.S., 57 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1995), holds that not only

state employees acting under color of law, authority or title

can be subject to section 1983 claims but so can both private

individuals and even federal employees who act along

with, in conjunction or conspiracy with, such state actors.

See also this Court’s decisions in Haddle v. Garrison, 525

8

U.S. 489 (1998); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1975).

In Haddle, supra, this Court upheld section 1985(2) and

1985(3) claims of conspiracy to intimidate or retaliate

against witnesses in federal court proceedings, etc. The

petitioners’ minor grandsons were kept in France and

brainwashed by their criminally disposed father, were

further illegally contacted and their attorney client and

other privileges or confidentiality with their grandparents’

legal guardians and ad litem guardians, prevented wholly,

intimidated and obstructed from any communications or

opportunities, let alone actualities, of contact with the

grandparents and all their counsel they retained for them

and said grandsons’ federal claims. The San Marino

School’s attorneys conspired with the grandparents’ and

grandsons’ initial attorneys, to obtain false declarations

for the grandsons after being taken to France, where such

grandsons’ depositions were constantly disrupted by their

father, the grandsons were unwilling to talk with the

grandparents, in English or otherwise, although they had

been able to converse fluently before in English with their

California teachers and said grandparents, their cousins

and Montenegrin family members. Such discovery of

obstruction of justice and fraud averred against all defen-

dants per said conspiracy are supported by the cases of

Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195; Anthony v. Baker,

767 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1985); Bell v. City of Milwaukee,

498 F.Supp. 1339 (E.D.Wis. 1980); and Crawford v. Hous-

ton, 396 F.Supp. 187 (S.S. Tex. 1974). See also O’Neal v.

Garrison, 263 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2001), citing and

following Haddle, supra, 525 U.S. 489.

Petitioners’ grandparents had also averred viable and

proper 1985(3) claims against all defendants. The animus

class requirement under said section was properly met by

9

their averments of religious, ethnic and race origins

discriminations and of their First Amendment Rights

discriminations inflicted and perpetrated upon them by all

defendants. Taylor v. Gilmartin, 686 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir.

1982) (Religious discrimination is actionable under

1985(3).); Al-Kyazraji v. St. Francis College, 784 F.2d 505,

514-18 (Even race classification as Caucasians are to be

treated equally without regard to race or ethnicity.); Ward

v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (C.A. 4th Va., 1981), cert. den., 455

U.S. 907 (1982) (Injuries suffered per conspiracy based

upon membership in Unification Church stated class-

based animus of 1985(3). See and Cf. Kush v. Rutledge,

460 U.S. 719, 103 S.Ct. 1483, 75 L.Ed.2d 412 (1983); and

Mendocino Environment Center v. Mendocino County, 14

F.3d 457, 465 (9th Cir. 1994). Even if the district court had

doubt as to such claims, petitioners should have been

allowed leave to amend their complaint.

None of the defendants made any motions for a more

definite statement, but only motions for dismissal per Rule

12(bX6) and in considering such averments of the com-

plaint and all reasonable inferences to be deduced there-

from must be accepted/taken as true. The district court not

only departed from such rules and principles of construing

the complaint but fashioned unsupported rules and princi-

ples of the law of the case and res judicata, in relying upon

the nonpublic opinion of the California appeal’s court in

dismissing the complaint entirely.

Since petitioners in their complaint stated viable

claims under sections 1985(2) and 1985(3), they also

stated a viable claim under section 1986, and their claim

for prevailing attorneys fees and other legal costs per

section 1988 was more than viable and proper.

10

2. NO LAW OF THE CASE NOR CLAIM OR

ISSUE PRECLUSIONS APPLIED TO DISMISS

PER RULE 12(b)(6é) PETITIONERS’ COM-

PLAINT, WHO WERE FURTHER DENIED

BOTH PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS OF ANY EVIDENTIARY HEAR-

ING PER FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE,

RULE 201, ESPECIALLY SUBPART (E).

The defendants’ claims of law of the case, claim

preclusion or issue preclusions, i.e., res judicata or collat-

eral estoppel, are effirmative defenses which not only must

be sufficiently plead, but the entire burden of proving each

of said affirmative defenses apply as a matter of fact and

law to each claim against each defendant in petitioners’

grandparents’ complaint. Both the district court and the

Ninth Circuit not only blended and combined such af-

firmative defenses per said Rule 12(bX6) motions to

dismiss, but further eviscerated petitioners’ rights of

procedural and substantive due process per Federal Rules

of Evidence, Rule 201(c), (e) and F.R.C.P., Rule 56. Mer-

coid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 670-71

(1944); In re Hopkins, 146 F.3d 729 731-32 (9th Cir. 1998);

Hutchins v. TNT/Reddaway Truck Lines, Inc., 939

F.Supp. 721 (N.D. Cal. 1996). See 18 Moore’s Federal

Practice, Sec. 132.01, 132.02, et seq. (Matthew Bender 3rd

ed.).

This Court has held in Montana v. U.S., 440 U.S. 147,

159, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979), citing Moore’s

Federal Practice, that if there are different pertinent facts

in two seemingly like cases, issue preclusion, res judicata

is inapplicable, in a subsequent action even raising the same

legal issues. More so, where, as pled in petitioners federal

complaint new evidence, facts and even intervening changes

11

in the law, has shown new wrongful acts by the defen-

dants in said federal action, and where, separately, clear

error has been committed in the first case or if injustice

will result therefrom, plaintiff in the subsequent action is

free to litigate such issues there presented. Sea-Land Serv.

v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 593 (1974). No issues were

litigated in the first action of the conspiracies among the

defendants to violate petitioners’ federal civil rights, no

issues were litigated about the petitioners’ discovery

during the state action discovery of the fraud, deception

and complete complicity of Beugelmans, their own dis-

charged attorneys and the school district attorneys, in

such conspiracies, such obstruction of justice and perpe-

tration of perjury, subornation thereof as well as presenta-

tion of manufactured and false evidence. The law and

intervening case decision of Haddle, O’Neal and others

supra, Delew v. Wagner, etc., were all decided after the

jury’s verdict being overturned in said state action. See

also this Court’s enunciations of the law principles in

Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, 119 S.Ct. 710 (1999), and the

Ninth Circuit’s decision in U.S. v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793 (9th

Cir. 1999). |

There were serious issues of absolute lack of jurisdic-

tion, subject matter and over the grandparents’ persons of

said state court judge and even the California appeals

court in its decision to allow any order to be upheld of

dismissal of said state action when the trial judge was not

only disqualified, but pending his disqualification hearing,

he made ex parte contact with the school district’s attor-

ney re: how to act while in suspended disqualification and

then held a secretive hearing without notice to or the

participation of the grandparents or their counsel, whereby

he granted defendants’ motion for a new trial and also to

12

dismiss the state action entirely. In doing so, said state

judge further impinged upon a family court guardianship

judge saying that his granting of guardianship to petition-

ers was based upon fraudulent evidence when in fact not

only had that court the report of a family case worker and

investigator who had interviewed the minor grandsons

before their abduction, such grandsons stating unequivo-

cally that they wanted to stay with and live with their

grandparents, but had investigated both the grandparents

and had telephone and written communications with the

grandsons’ father in France; such investigator as a court

official and officer strongly recommended such guardianship

be granted to petitioners and it was so. Moreover, no trial

court judge, without any basis of affirmative defenses pled,

can so nonjudicially intrude upon the lawfully and exclu-

sive jurisdiction of said guardianship court judge and his

orders. Lastly, the only person who could have had stand-

ing or capacity to so challenge or change such guardian-

ship order was Jacky Joye and he completely defaulted his

rights and remained in France, not directing his private

California counsel, Jacques Beugelmans to so appear and

represent him; the same Beugelmans who directed and

counseled Joye to kidnap his sons and take them from any

court’s jurisdiction in California. Completely misstated by

said state appeals’ court’s decision was that petitioners

were not the guardians nor guardians ad litem of their

minor grandsons when they were and continued to be up to

such grandsons’ majority. See the Ninth Circuit’s decision

in 1999; Sanders v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 190 F.3d 1080,

1081 (9th Cir. 1999), holding that a judge’s acts of proceed-

ing without jurisdiction, are not only “renegade ultra

vires” acts but deprive such judge of any judicial immunity

citing this court’s decisions.

13

Nothing more can be egregiously unacceptable nor a

blemish of improper protectionism given such state court

judge’s actions; then when the federal courts, try to keep

from the public’s knowledge and even from the bar, the

fact and notoriety of judicial errors, biased jurist’s mindset

and the utter neglect of duty and responsibility to apply

the laws and decisions fair, equally and contemporane-

ously, especially when the petitioners are elderly, frail and

health affected individuals who can be buried or left to die

along the judiciary’s graveyard of misdeeds and unsup-

portable rulings.

No hearing was allowed nor provided, for such unpled

affirmative defenses, in the district court’s taking of

whatever wrongful judicial notice it did of said state

court’s appellate decision. See also Brock v. Williams

Enterprises of Georgia, Inc., 832 F.2d 567, 574 (11th Cir.

1987); Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v.

American Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534, 550-

552 (6th Cir. 2001); 18 Moore’s Federal Practice, section

182.03 (Matthew Bender, 3rd ed.). The district court’s

failure to comply with all standards of due process and

equal protection in supposedly taking such judicial notice

and granting defendants’ motions for dismissal with

prejudice. Avitia v. Metro Club of Chicago, 924 F.2d 689,

691 (7th Cir. 1991).

14

38. THE DISTRICT COURT AND THE NINTH CIR-

CUIT COURT OF APPEALS DELIBERATELY IG-

NORED AND FAILED, IF NOT REFUSED, TO

APPLY THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF DISCOVERY

OF FACTS OR THE LAST OVERT ACT DOC-

TRINE OF CONSPIRACY, EITHER WHICH NOT

ONLY TOLLED THE ONE YEAR STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS ON PETITIONERS AND THEIR

GRANDSONS’ CLAIMS BUT FURTHER ESTAB-

LISHED THE VALIDITY OF PETITIONERS’ CON-

SPIRACY AVERMENTS OF ALL THEIR CLAIMS.

This court has held, as has the Ninth Circuit, that the

applicable statute of limitations as to federal civil rights

claims is the statute of limitations of the state in which

such violations are alleged to have occurred. In California, .

such statute is one (1) year from the date of such occur-

rence or one (1) year from the actual date of discovery. But

more important is that the California Supreme Court, in

Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co., 24 C.3d 773, 782-786 (1974),

held such statute of limitations never begins to run at all,

when the last overt act per such alleged conspiracy has not

yet occurred but is in fact alleged to still be continuing or

ongoing. The Wyatt decision has not been overturned nor

modified to alter either of said doctrines, and both applied

herein to allow petitioners to pursue all their claims

against Jacques Beugelmans. However, it was difficult for

the district court and the Ninth Circuit to apply Wyatt

when it has been in application for over 28 years and

allowed petitioners’ claims as to all other defendants as

well.

*

CONCLUSION

This Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be granted

upon all grounds, basis or points raised and those inher-

ently included herein or part thereof.

DATED: August 13, 2002

MILAN CHEYOVICH

DIANA CHEYOVICH

OO EE

App. 1

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MILAN CHEYOVICH; DIANA| Nos. 00-55905

CHEYOVICH, individually 00-56937

and as Court Appointed 1 DC.No

Guardian for Daniel Milan CV-96-02381-HLH

Lucien Cheyovich Joye and :

Nicolas Marc David Cheyovich | MEMORANDUM

Joye, minors, (Filed Dec. 27, 2001)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

V.

SAN MARINO SCHOOL

DISTRICT, JOHN

BEUGELMAN, a.k.a.

Jacques Beuglemans, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Harry L. Hupp, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2001”

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, TROTT and PAEZ,

Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be

cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as may be provided by 9th

Cir. R. 36-3.

~ The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision

without oral argument, and denies appellants’ request for oral argu-

ment. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

App. 2

Milan Cheyovich and Diana Cheyovich appeal pro se

the district court’s orders dismissing for failure to state

a claim their action alleging that defendants engaged in

a conspiracy with their grandchildren’s biological father

to kidnap the grandchildren. We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo, Monterrey Plaza

Hotel, Ltd. v. Local 483, 215 F.3d 923, 926 (9th Cir.

2000), and we affirm on the ground that the district

court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, Steel Co. v.

Citizen for a Better Environment, 532 U.S. 83, 94-95

(1998).

Despite appellants’ attempts to raise claims sepa-

rate from the prior state court custody action, the two

are inextricably intertwined. Because federal courts do

not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions, we

affirm the district court’s dismissal of appellants’ action.

See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888,

890-93 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)).

We have considered appellants’ remaining conten-

tions and reject them for lack of merit. We grant appel-

lants’ motion to file a late reply brief and order that the

reply brief received on April 11, 2001 be filed.

AFFIRMED.

App. 3

JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NO. 00-55905

CT/AG#: CV 96-02381-HLH

MILAN CH YOVICH; DIANA CHEYOVICH,

individually and as Court Appointed Guardian for Daniel

Milan Lucien Cheyovich Joye and Nicolas Marc David

Cheyovich Joye, minors

Plaintiffs Appellants

v.

DAN MARINO SCHOOL DISTRICT

Defendant

and

JOHN BEUGELMAN,

aka Jacques Beuglemans

Defendant Appellee

NO. 00-56937

CT/AG#: CV 96-02381-HLH

MILAN CHEYOVICH; DIANA CHEYOVICH,

individually & as Court Appointed Guardian

for Daniel Milan Lucien Cheyovich Joye &

Nicholas Marc David Cheyovich Joye, minors

Plaintiffs-Appellants

v.

SAN MARINO SCHOOL DISTRICT, JACKY

BERNARD JOYE; JUDITH D. ANDERSON,

individually dba Law Firm of Walsh & Declues

App. 4

dba Law Firm of Liebman, Reiner & Walsh;

MICHAEL J. DECLUES, individually dba

Law Firm of Walsh & Declues dba Law Firm of

Liebman, Reiner & Walsh; JAMES A. SHALVOY,

individually dba Law Firm of Bigelow, Moore &

Tyre; FRANKLIN T. BIGELOW, JR.., individually

dba Law Firm of Bigelow, Moore & Tyre; CHARLES

JOHNSON, individually & an agent for Focus on the

Family; MARY A. MEYE; PERTA SANTLEY

Defendants-Appellees

APPEAL FROM the United States District Court for

the Central District of California, Los Angeles.

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the Transcript

of the Record from the United St,.tes District Court for the

Central District of California, Los Angeles, and was duly

submitted.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now here

ordered and adjudged by this Court, that the judgment of ©

the said District Court in this cause be, and hereby is

AFFIRMED.

Filed and entered December 27, 2001

App. 5

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES — GENERAL

Case No. CV 96-2381 HLH (RMCx) Date Sept. 25, 2000

Title Cheyovich et al. v. San Marino Unified School

District, et al.

DOCKET ENTRY

PRESENT

HON. HARRY L. HUPP Not Present

JUDGE Cynthia L. Mizell

on Court Recorder

, Deputy Clerk

ATTORNEYS PRESENT ATTORNEYS PRESENT

FOR PLAINTIFFS: FOR DEFENDANTS:

Patricia J. BerryY J. Michael DeClues

/s/ G. WilleY

Randall A. Miller

Michael McCarthy

/s/J. Evans —

/s/ R. JenkinsY

PROCEEDINGS: SAN MARINO SCHOOL DISTRICT,

ET AL'S, MOTION TO DISMISS FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AND

MOTION TO STRIKE; BIGELOW

MOORE & TYRE’S MOTION TO DIS-

MISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A

CLAIM; JAMES SHALVOY’S MO-

TION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO

STATE A CLAIM AND REQUEST FOR

JUDICIAL NOTICE

App. 6

ORDER (also if applicable, findings and memorandum

opinion):

The motions to dismiss of (1) James Shal-

voy (hereafter Shalvoy) and of Franklin T. Bige-

low, Jr. and Bigelow, Moore & Tyre (hereafter -

collectively Bigelow), and (2) San Marino Uni-

fied School District, Charles Johnson, Mary E.

Meye, and Perta Stanley (hereafter collectively

SMUSD), and (3) Judith Anderson and Walsh

& DeClues (hereafter collectively W&D) are

each granted without leave to amend and the

action is dismissed against each of said defen-

dants (without prejudice as to Bigelow and

W&D'and with prejudice as to SMUSD. The

motions to strike are denied as moot in view of

dismissal of action on the motions.

The court notes that the action has already been

dismissed as to Jacques Beugelmans and no further action

needs to be taken as to him.

The court further notes that no service of the sum-

mons and complaint appears to have been made as to

defendant Jacky B. Joye and that he has otherwise not

appeared in this action. He is dismissed from this action

for failure to prosecute under FHCP 4(m).

As to the Bigelow defendants, there is no federal

jurisdiction against them and they are dismissed without

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction. The Bigelow defendants

are alleged to have been attorneys for plaintiffs in the

state court action but were dismissed as attorneys by the

Cheyovichs in 1995 or 1996. They are accused of commit-

ting malpractice in their handling of the Cheyovich’s state

court lawsuit..This, of course, is an action arising under

state law since and there is no diversity or a federal

question to give this court jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue

App. 7

that the court should retain the case under the doctrine of

supplemental jurisdiction (28 USC § 1367). However, the

charges against the Bigelow defendants do not arise out of

the same set of facts as does the lawsuit against SMUSD,

a prerequisite for the exercise of supplemental jurisdic-

tion. Further, as stated below, the action against SMUSD

will be dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata,

leaving no federal action for the Bigelow case to be sup-

plemental to.

Judicial notice is taken of the pleadings and decisions

in the state court action as requested. As to the SMUSD

defendants, the result is the state court action is res

judicata of all the claims asserted in this action. The state

court action asserted violations of 42 USC § 1983 and also

various state law torts. The action ended with a State

Court of Appeal decision vindicating SMUSD and its

employees on all grounds charged following a complete

trial on the merits of the case. The branch of res judicata

called “bar” prevents litigation of any of the causes of

action that were raised and tried or of issues which could

have been raised and tried in the state court. The opinion

of the Court of Appeal leaves it clear that there is nothing

that is alleged here which does not come within the scope

of the state court action. There is no possible basis for

amendment; thus the action against SMUSD and its

employees is dismissed without leave to amend and the

action dismissed against them.

The action against W&D must also be dismissed,

partly on res judicata grounds insofar as a conspiracy to

violate § 1983 is alleged, and partly for lack of jurisdiction

insofar as state law torts are alleged. W&D were not

defendants in the state court action. Therefore, res judicata

could only apply if W&D were alleged to be in conspiracy

Pe ee ee Ee pS eg ee et ee age

App. 8

with the state actor (meaning SMUSD). In this action,

they are alleged to have conspired with SMUSD to violate

§ 1983. The holding in the state court action that § 1983

was not violated by SMUSD renders this part of the

complaint against W&D subject to the res judicata de-

fense, since in that the state actor did not violate § 1983,

or conspire to do so, any action by W&D (not a state actor)

could not have been in conspiracy with SMUSD to violate

the section. The other claim against W&D is a state law

tort (tortious interference with custody). Since there is no

defendant left with a federal claim against it (SMUSD

being dismissed), the matter is dismissed for lack of

federal jurisdiction under 28 USC § 1367(c)(3). The motion

to dismiss as to W&D is granted without leave to amend

on the conspiracy charges under § 1983 and the balance of

the action is dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction.

There being no undismissed claims, the action is

dismissed by order signed and filed this date.

The status conference scheduled for this date is off

calendar as moot.

App. 9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CHEYOVICH, et al., ) No. CV96-2381-HLH (RMCx)

Plaintiffs, » ORDER DISMISSING

‘ ) ACTION

SAN MARINO ) (Filed Sep. 25, 2000)

SCHOOL DISTRICT, ?

et al., )

)

Defendants. )

This action is dismissed as follows:

Without Prejudice: James Shelvoy, Franklin T.

Bigelow, Jr., Bigelow, Moore & Tyre, Judith Anderson,

Walsh & DeClues and Jacky B. Joye;

With Prejudice: San Marino Unified School District,

Charles Johnson, Mary E. Meye and Perta Stanley.

This Order is a final judgment for purposes of Fed. R.

Civ. P. 54(a). It shall be entered pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P. 58 and 79(a), and served upon the parties.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: September 25, 2000.

/s/ Harry L. Hupp

HARRY L. HUPP

Senior United States

District Judge

App. 10

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MILAN CHEYOVICH; DIANA | Nos. 00-55905

CHEYOVICH, individually and; § 00-56937

as Court Appointed Guardian ~ D.C. No

for Daniel Milan Lucien Chey- CV-96-02381-HLH

ovich Joye and Nicolas Marc Central California

David Cheyovich Joye, minors,

ORDER

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

(Filed May 15, 2002)

SAN MARINO SCHOOL

DISTRiCT, JOHN

BEUGELMAN, a.k.a.

Jacques Beugleman, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees

Before: SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, TROTT and PAEZ,

Circuit Judges

The panel has voted to deny appellants’ petition for

panel rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the petition for

rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote on

whether to rehear the matter en banc. See Fed. R. App. P.

35.

No further filings shall be accepted in this closed appeal.

App. 11

U.S. CONST. AMENDMENT I - FREEDOM OF

RELIGION, SPEECH AND PRESS; PEACEFUL

ASSEMBLAGE; PETITION OF GRIEVANCES

Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-

ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or

abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the

right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition

the Government for a redress of grievances.

U.S. CONST. AMENDMENT XIV - CITIZENSHIP;

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE

PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION;

APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION;

DISQUALIFICATION OF OFFICERS; PUBLIC

DEBT; ENFORCEMENT

: Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are

citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they

reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall

abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of

life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor

deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-

tion of the laws.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Civil action for deprivation of

rights

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-

nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Terri-

tory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be

es

App. 12

subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-

tion and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for

redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Con-

gress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia

shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Co-

lumbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1985. Conspiracy to interfere with

civil rights

* * *

(2) Obstructing justice; intimidating party, wit-

ness, or juror

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire to deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any

party or witness in any court of the United States from

attending such court, or from testifying to any matter

pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure

such party or witness in his person or property on account

of his having so attended or testified, or to influence the

verdict, presentment, or indictment of any grand or petit

juror in any such court, or to injure such juror in his

person or property on account of any verdict, presentment,

or indictment lawfully assented to by him, or of his being

or having been such juror; or if two or more persons

conspire for the purpose of impeding, hindering, obstruct-

ing, or defeating, in any manner, the due course of justice

in any State or Territory, with intent to deny to any

citizen the equal protection of the laws, or to injure him or

App. 13

his property for lawfully enforcing, or attempting to

enforce, the right of any person, or class of persons, to the

equal protection of the laws;

(3) Depriving persons of rights or privileges

If two or more persons in any State or Territory

conspire, or go in disguise on the highway or on the prem-

ises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly

or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immuni-

ties under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or

hindering the constituted authorities of any State or

Territory from giving or securing to all persons within

such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or

if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimi-

dation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to

vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal man-

ner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully

qualified person as an elector for President or Vice Presi-

dent, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or

to injure any citizen in person or property on account of

such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set

forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged

therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of

the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured

in his person or property, or deprived of having and

exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United

States, the party so injured or deprived may have an

action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such

injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the

conspirators.

App. 14

42 U.S.C. § 1986. Action for neglect to prevent

Every person who, having knowledge that any of the

wrongs conspired to be done, and mentioned in section

1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having

power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of

the same, neglects or refuses so to do, [illegible] such

wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party

injured, or his legal representatives, for all damages

caused by such wrongful act, which such person by rea-

sonable diligence could have prevented; and such damages

may be recovered in an action on the case; and any num-

ber of persons guilty of such wrongful neglect or refusal

may be joined as defendants in the action; and if the death

of any party be caused by any such wrongful act and

neglect, the legal representatives of the deceased shall

have such action therefor, and may recover not exceeding

five thousand dollars damages therein, for the benefit of

the widow of the deceased, if there be one, and if there be

no widow, then for the benefit of the next of kin of the

deceased. But no action under the provisions of this

section shall be sustained which is not commenced within

one year after the cause of action was accrued.

42 U.S.C. § 1988. (b) Attorney’s fees

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of

sections 1981, 198la, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this

title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C.A. § 1681 et

seq.], the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 [42

U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.], the Religious Land Use and

Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc

et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42

U.S.C.A. § 2000d et seq.], or section 13981 of this title, the

App. 15

court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,

other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee

as part of the costs, except that in any action brought

against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in

such officer’s judicial capacity such officer shall not be held

liable for any costs, including attorney's fees, unless such

action was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.