Opposition Brief — Halbman v. St. Louis County

.

(>) [Supreme Court, 0S. |

No. 00-1023 \27 FILED

JAN 16 200

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Unite Statey

Ae A

RICH HALBMAN,

Petitioner,

v.

ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MISSOURI, et al.,

Respondents.

On PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE om

UNITED STATES CourT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR RESPONDENTS

ST. LOUIS COUNTY AND W. DUDLEY

McCARTER, TRUSTEE

RoserT H. GRANT

Counsel of Record

PATRICIA REDINGTON

County Counselor

CYNTHIA L. HOEMANN

Associate County Counselor

41 South Central

Clayton, Missouri 63105

(314) 615-7042

Attorneys for Respondents

St. Louis County and

W. Dudley McCarter, Trustee

164603 @ Counsel! Press LLC

(800) 274-3321 + (800) 359-6859

RT ot eee eet ee eee ere

i

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF

QUESTION PRESENTED

Respondents respectfully suggest that the issue framed

by petitioner is more accurately stated as follows:

Did the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals correctly affirm

the decision of the district court dismissing Halbman’s

second amended complaint where the complaint fails to state

a claim for relief, the claims are barred by traditional

res judicata principles, the claims are inextricably intertwined

with the state court judgment, and Halbman, who is in privity

with the state court plaintiffs and had ample opportunity to

bring his claims in state court, awaited the state court’s

adverse ruling before attempting to bring his substantively

identical challenge in federal court?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Counter-Statement of Question Presented ........

Tee OR CIS 685 a

A.

AMM CEES

The Decisions of the Federal District Court

and Court of Appeals ...................

Reasons for Denying the Writ .................

I.

Certiorari Should Be Denied Because The

Rooker-Feldman Issue Is Not Outcome

Detereinetive so. ee

A. Because Halbman’s First Amendment

and Equal Protection Arguments are

Flawed, the Federal Complaint Fails To

State a Claim For Relief ............

B. Because Halbman is in Privity with the

State Plaintiffs and had Ample

Opportunity to Participate in the State

ili

Contents

Page

Court Action, the Federal Claims are

Barred by Traditional Res Judicata

PUN 55 6 LE lsc a os RS 10

II. Certiorari Should Be Denied Because This

Case Is Not The Appropriate Vehicle To

Resolve Whether The Rooker-Feldman

Doctrine Applies To A Nonparty ......... 13

ERO Ree manic a recon Sey inti Mic 15

iv

TABLE OF CITED AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases:

Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 OOO 65 kk: 10

Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) ..... 7

Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1970) ;

Buckley v, anid Constitutional Law Foundation,

FO. CL OMI... 8,9

Burdick v. Takushi, $04 U.S. 428 (1992) ......... 7, 8,9

Cherry v. City of Hayti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72

CO Bn 10 ce 11,14

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

400 US: 0021908). Passim

Dobrovoiny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 1997),

cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1188 cS Ses ce. 8

Drainage Dist. No. 1 Reformed, of Stoddard County

v. Matthews, 234 S.W.2d 567, 361 Mo. 286

| ath iegs! ARETE PTET TE Coe 11, 14

King Gen. Contr., Inc. y. Reorganized Church of

Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, 821 S.W.2d 495

(Mo. 1991 PS Ee 10

Vv

Cited Authc;vities

Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973)

Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) ............

Missouri Real Estate and Insurance Agency, Inc. v.

St. Louis County, 959 S.W.2d 847 (Mo. App.

cg Ripe eres Cree rye Re Or ray epyere erry ae 10

Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) ... 4

Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793 (1996)

Peer oe rr Ose re rer es Per Ter ree passim

Seibert v. City of Columbia, 461 S.W.2d 808

COE, ONS FTE he ovo a oad bch cep nne scence 11,14

Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449 (8" Cir. 1996), cert.

denied, 117 S. Ct. 1427 (1997)... 0. eee cne 12, 13

Statutes:

RGR Ge ce ee ogee en eran ere ee 10

i Re NE Fer nr eee . + passim

vi

Cited Authorities :

Page

United States Constitution:

First Amendment ...................... 2, 6, 8, 9, 10

Fourteenth Amendment

ie oes ee eh ee ee ee a

l

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

After extensive litigation in the state courts by parties

closely aligned with Petitioner Halbman, the disincorporation

of Peerless Park became effective in May of 1999. Pet. App.

16a. The former city is now a part of St. Louis County,

Missouri (“County”). Jd. Halbman, an official of the city at

the time of its disincorporation, appeals the decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit finding

that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this federal action to

void the disincorporation because Halbman’s federal claims

are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.

Pet. App. 2a-13a. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals

v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity

Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923).

A. Lemonds’ and Halbman’s Federal Court Action.

Shortly after the Missouri Court of Appeals issued its order

affirming the state trial court decision upholding the

disincorporation, Rich Lemonds brought this federal action

to reverse the disincorporation. Pet. App. 4a, 16a, 34a-35a.

The state appellate mandate was issued one week after this

action was commenced. Pet. App. 16a. One week after the

mandate issued, the first amended complaint was filed listing

Halbman as an additional plaintiff. The next day, before

hearing evidence on Lemonds’ motion for a preliminary

injunction, the district court struck the first amended

complaint. On June 9, 1999, the district court denied

Lemonds’ motion for a preliminary injunction. That same

day, the district court granted leave to file the second

amended complaint adding Halbman as a plaintiff. Both

Lemonds and Halbman were city officials of Peerless Park

up until its dissolution, and they were well aware of the state

2

proceedings. Pet. App. 12a. Lemonds himself sponsored the

bill to hire an attorney for the city in the state court litigation

and received regular reports of the progress of the case.

Pet. App. 12a-13a. Yet, rather than pursuing their claims

before the state court, Lemonds and Halbman awaited that

court’s adverse ruling before attempting to challenge the

disincorporation in federal district court. Pet. App. 13a.

The federal complaint alleged that the Statutory scheme

permitting disincorporation without an election violates both

the First Amendment and the equal protection clause, in that

the secrecy of the petition process effectively “silenced”

them, suppressing “core political speech” by preventing them

from conveying a political message against the

disincorporation of the city. Pet. App. 8a. In addition, because

qualified but unregistered voters were not counted toward

the total number of city residents for purposes of determining

whether the requisite signatures of two thirds of the

population had been recorded, Lemonds and Halbman rely

on the equal protection clause to argue that the secret petition

process denied them an “equal opportunity to win votes.”

Pet. App. 8a.

B. The City Officials’ State Court Action. Like the

federal complaint, the state complaint challenged the

constitutionality of the Statutory scheme permitting

disincorporation without an election. In addition to

raising state law arguments not at issue in this federal

action, the former city and several of its former officials

(“state plaintiffs”) sought to invalidate the County’s

disincorporation order in state court on the basis of the federal

due process clause. Pet. App. 4a, 6a. The complaint alleged

3

that section 79.495 R.S. Mo.' violates federal substantive

and procedural due process principles by failing to ensure

that all residents of a fourth class city receive adequate notice

prior to the circulation of a disincorporation challenge. Jd.

The state court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,

found that Lemonds was not a voter under Missouri law

because he was not registered to vote, and found that the

statute’s requirements had been met. Pet. App. 28a-31a.

Resolving the federal constitutional challenge, the state court

held: ora

Because relators have no “life, liberty or property”

interest in the continued existence of Peerless

Park, Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 52

L. Ed. 151, 28 S. Ct. 40 (1907) there is no

constitutional right to notice or a hearing. State

law provides, and Relators received, more process

than Relators were due. There is no constitutional

right to vote on disincorporation of a fourth class

city.

Pet. App. 28a.

1. Section 79.495, R.S. Mo. (1994) provides:

Disincorporation without election allowed, when. —

The county governing body of any county in which a

city of the fourth class is located shall have the power

to disincorporate such city upon petition of two-thirds

of the voters of such city, without an election in such

city, provided that the petition requests disincorporation

without an election, and provided that the population

of such city is less than one hundred.

4

_ ., The Decisions of the Federal District Court and

Court of Appeals. On June 9, 1999, the federal district court

denied Lemonds’ request for a preliminary injunction to void

the disincorporation. On October 15, 1999, the court

dismissed all of Lemonds’ and Halbman’s claims with

prejudice. Pet. App. 14a. The court found that the complaint

failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted

and the suit was barred by-res judicata principles and the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed,

finding that Rooker-Feldman bars the federal claims.

Pet. App. 2a-13a.

Turning to the federal complaint, the Court of Appeals

noted that the relief sought — to enjoin the disincorporation

of Peerless Park — would directly nullify the final judgment

of the state court upholding disincorporation. Pet. App. 7a.

In addition, the Court of Appeals found that the federal

complaint did no more than restate the claim for relief that

was rejected on the merits by the state court, noting that “both

suits challenge the basic fairness of the petition process based

on the concept of lack of notice” and “the first amendment

and equal protection arguments presented to the district court

appear to be nothing more than creative attempts to reclothe

the failed due process claim in new constitutional garb.”

Pet. App. 8a. Therefore, “a decision favorable to appellants

could ‘only be predicated upon a conviction that the state

court was wrong.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 2

25 (1987) (Marshall, J. concurring).”

Turning to the parties, the Court of Appeals noted that

“the key inquiry, as always, must be whether the federal

plaintiff's interest in having a state rule set aside is

inseparable from his interest in upsetting a particular state

court judgment based on that rule. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at

—

5

482-486.” Pet. App. 11a. Applying this principle, the Court

of Appeals decided that Lemonds’ and Halbman’s claims

are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment

because their general constitutional challenge to section

79.495 “is inseparable from their desire to reverse the

disincorporation of Peerless Park,” and, “because the entire

upshot of a favorable decision in this case would be to unwind

the decision of the state court, granting the requested relief

would have only retrospective effect.” Pet. App. 12a.

The Court of Appeals also noted that Lemonds and Halbman

had ample opportunity to bring their first amendment

and equal protection claims in state court, but awaited that —

court’s adverse ruling before attempting to bring their

substantively identical challenges in federal district court.

Pet. App. 12a-13a.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Because Halbman is in privity with the state plaintiffs

and had ample opportunity to participate in the state action,

the judgment does not raise the broad question that Halbman

sets forth in his Petition — whether the court below erred in

applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to a nonparty.

~_This Court “reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.”

Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292, 297 (1970) That

the Court of Appeals decided that the Rooker-Feldman

doctrine bars the claims of a nonparty who had ample

opportunity to bring his claims in state court and awaited

the state court’s adverse ruling before attempting to bring

his substantively identical challenge in federal court is mere

fortuity; it could as easily have held that this case is barred

by traditional res judicata principles or that the petition fails

to state a claim for relief because Halbman’s constitutional

arguments are flawed. Because Halbman’s claims are barred

6

by traditional res judicata principles and his First Amendment

and equal protection arguments are flawed, the Rooker-

Feldman issue is not outcome determinative. Moreover, the

decision correctly applies the principles set forth in this

Court’s decisions in Rooker and Feldman to the particular

facts of this case in finding that Halbman’s federal claims

are inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.

Because Halbman is in privity with the state plaintiffs and

had ample opportunity to participate in the state action, this

case is not the appropriate vehicle to resolve whether the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to a nonparty to an earlier

state action. Therefore, this Court should deny Halbman’s

Petition for Certiorari.

I. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE

THE ROOKER-FELDMAN ISSUE IS NOT

OUTCOME DETERMINATIVE

A. Because Halbman’s First Amendment and Equal

Protection Arguments are Flawed, the Federal

Complaint Fails To State a Claim For Relief

In the Second Amended Complaint, Halbman asserts

a constitutional right either to vote on the city’s

disincorporation or to advance notice of the petition for

disincorporation, so that he might have registered to vote

and then be counted in the numerical calculation of whether

there were sufficient signatures on the petition to constitute

the two-thirds required by the applicable Missouri statute,

§ 79.495 R.S. Mo. (1994). Pet. App. 8a. The district court

correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim

because Halbman did not have any constitutional right to

vote on the disincorporation or to notice that a petition was

being circulated.

7

Halbman’s equal protection arguments are flawed.

As noted by the district court, no-form of discrimination

requiring strict scrutiny is present under the facts of this

case. Pet. App. 19a. The procedure set forth in 79.495 for

disincorporating a small fourth class city upon petition of

two thirds of the registered voters cannot be equated with an

election, since registered voters who oppose the petition are

not required to go to the polls to cast their ballot. In the non-

election procedure set forth in 79.495, the lack of notice has

no effect on the voting rights of the electors, since registered

voters who do not sign the petition are counted as “no” votes.

Any burden on voters’ choice is borne only by those who

fail to register to vote until after a petition for

disincorporation is circulated and filed with the County.

The appropriate balancing test for voting regulations is

set forth in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992):

A regulation must be narrowly drawn to advance

a state interest of compelling importance only

when it subjects the voters’ rights to “severe”

restrictions. But when a state election

law provision imposes only reasonable,

nondiscriminatory restrictions upon the First and

Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the

State’s important regulatory interests are

generally sufficient to justify the restrictions.

Id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,

788-89 (1983).

Since it is relatively easy to register to vote, the

registration requirement in the non-election procedure set

forth in 79.495 is reasonable and is similar to the brief

8

residency requirement which was found to be permissible in

Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973) (50 day residency

requirement permits county recorder time to certify

correctness and completeness of registrations). Missouri’s

voter registration requirement serves the important purpose

of providing a speedy and efficient means for determining

whether a petition for disincorporation satisfies the two-thirds

super majority requirement of 79.495 and eliminates the

confusion and increased opportunities for voter fraud which

would inevitably result from lengthening the “window of

opportunity” to accommodate persons who claim to be

eligible voters, but who did not bother to register. Applying

the balancing test set forth in Burdick, the state’s interest in

providing a speedy and administratively efficient method for

disincorporating a small fourth class city where two-thirds

of its voters seek to dissolve it outweighs Halbman’s limited

interest in waiting until the eleventh hour to register to vote.

Likewise, Halbman’s First Amendment arguments are

flawed. There is nothing in 79.495 which reduces the voices

available to convey political messages or which reduces the

size of the audience. Halbman was free to communicate his

political views and to circulate a petition or conduct a voter

registration drive. Since 79.495 does not restrict core political

speech or impose severe burdens on speech or association,

_ there is nothing to trigger the strict scrutiny test applied in

Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation,

119 S. Ct. 636 (1999); See Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d

1111 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1188 (1998)

(there was no First Amendment violation because appellants’

inability to know in advance the exact number of Signatures

required in order to place their initiative measures on the

ballot in no way restricted their ability to circulate petitions

or otherwise engage in political speech.) A requirement that

9

the petition circulators present the petition to their opponents

would inhibit the freedom of circulators to engage in

one-on-one association with those who share their same goals

and ideals. Such a requirement would be the kind of “required

speech” that violates the First Amendment. See Buckley

(where the state’s name badge requirement was invalidated).

Moreover, the additional time and other resources made

necessary by such a requirement would restrict the number

of individuals capable_of circulating petitions. Such a

restriction would reduce the number of voices who could

convey the messages of the proponents and opponents of

disincorporation and thus violate the First Amendment.

See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988) (petition circulation

is “core political speech” for which First Amendment

protection is “at its zenith”); Buckley, 525 U.S. at 182

(restrictions which limit the number of voices which will

convey the petition circulator’s message are subject to

exacting scrutiny under the First Amendment.) If 79.495

resulted in any burden on Halbman’s First Amendment

rights, the proper level of scrutiny is the balancing test set

forth in Burdick. Applying the Burdick test, the state’s

interest in providing a speedy and administratively efficient

method for disincorporating a small fourth class city

outweighs Halbman’s limited interest in waiting until the

eleventh hour to conduct a voter registration drive or

otherwise convey his opposition to the disincorporation.

Because Halbman’s complaint fails to state a claim for

relief, the Rooker-Feldman issue is not outcome

determinative. Accordingly, this Court should deny

Halbman’s Petition for Certiorari.

10

B. Because Halbman is in Privity with the State

Plaintiffs and had Ample Opportunity to

Participate in the State Court Action, the Federal

Claims are Barred by Traditional Res Judicata

Principles

The Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738

(1994), requires that federal courts give state court judgments

the same preclusive effect that such a judgment would be

given in the courts of the state rendering the judgment. Allen

v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). Thus, it is necessary to

look to state law to determine the preclusive effect of the

final state court judgment. The Missouri courts recognize

that when two lawsuits present the same cause of action, res

judicata precludes consideration of matters that were actually

decided and matters that could properly have been raised

and decided in the earlier lawsuit. King Gen. Contr., Inc. v.

Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints,

821 S.W.2d 495, 501 (Mo. 1991). In order to have identity

of the cause of action, the actions do not have to be identical,

but the claims must have arisen out of the same act, contract

or transaction. Missouri Real Estate and Insurance Agency,

Inc. v. St. Louis County, 959 §.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo. App.

1997). This case presents the same cause of action as the

state court litigation because both cases seek to redress the

same alleged wrong — the disincorporation of Peerless Park

without an election and without prior notice to voters. As

noted by the Court of Appeals, the First Amendment and

equal protection arguments presented to the district court

appear to be nothing more than creative attempts to reclothe

the failed due process claim in new constitutional garb.

Pet. App. 8a.

el

11

In the Missouri courts, a final judgment disincorporating

a city cannot be collaterally attacked by anyone, even by

persons who were not parties in the proceeding. See Cherry

v. City of Hayti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Banc 1978)

(holding that the county court’s finding that a petition for

incorporation was filed in accordance with statute was

conclusive in subsequent collateral attack by private

individual who was not a party to the earlier proceeding.)

Moreover, under the principles of virtual representation

applied by the Missouri courts, Halbman is bound by the

State court’s rejection of the constitutional challenge to

79.495. See Drainage Dist. No. 1 Reformed, of Stoddard

County v. Matthews, 234 S.W.2d 567, 361 Mo. 286

(Mo. 1950) (“Drainage District”) (The doctrine of virtual

representation is applicable, with respect to defense of res

judicata, if the interest of the represented and the

representative are so identical that the inducement and desire

to protect the common interest may be assumed to be the

same in each and if there can be no adversity of interest

between them.); and Seibert v. City of Columbia, 461 S.W.2d

808 (Mo. Banc 1970) (Absent fraud or bad faith, all residents

and taxpayers must be bound by result of litigation of public

nature carried on by one in similar circumstances and having

a common interest.) The city officials who were plaintiffs in

the state court action had the same interest as Halbman in

voiding the disincorporation. In the Missouri courts,

Halbman’s federal claims are barred by traditional

res judicata principles.

The application of Missouri preclusion principles to

Halbman does not violate the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment. Because of Halbman’s virtual

representation by the state plaintiffs, Halbman has

vicariously had his day in court. As this Court noted in

12

Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 797 (1996), there

is an exception to the general rule that res judicata principles

only apply to parties to a judgment when there is “privity”

between a party to the second case and a party who is bound

by the earlier judgment. /d. at 798. Although there are

constitutional limits on the “privity” exception, the term

“privity” is now used to describe various relationships

between litigants that would not have come within the

traditional definition of that term. Jd. Constitutional

principles do not require one to have been a party to a

judgment in order to be bound by it where one’s interests

are adequately represented by someone with the same interest

who is a party. Jd. Adequacy of representation is best viewed

in terms of incentive to litigate. See Tyus v. Schoemehl,

93 F.3d 449, 455-56 (8" Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.

1427 (1997). No one could have a stronger incentive to

reverse the disincorporation than the former city, its mayor

and two of its aldermen. See Pet. App. 35a. Halbman was

adequately represented by, and thus in privity with, the state

plaintiffs. See Tyus. Therefore, application of Missouri

preclusion principles to Halbman falls squarely within the

privity exception set forth in Richards.

Although virtual representation may be used in the

private law context, its use is particularly appropriate for

. public law issues. Tyus at 456. In public law cases, the

number of plaintiffs with standing is potentially limitless.

If parties were allowed to continually raise issues already

decided, public law claims “would assume immortality.” Jd.

There is another important consideration: in the public law

context, if the plaintiff wins, by definition, everyone benefits.

Holding preclusion inapplicable in this context would

encourage fence-sitting, because nonparties would benefit,

if the plaintiffs were successful but would not be penalized

13

if the plaintiffs lost. /d. If the state plaintiffs had prevailed,

all of the opponents of disincorporation would have

benefitted. Without virtual representation, a loss by the state

plaintiffs would cause no harm to Halbman and the other

opponents of disincorporation who chose not to participate

in the state court action. In such a situation, there is no

incentive to intervene, See Tyus at 457. As noted by the Court

of Appeals, Halbman was well aware of the state proceedings

and had ample opportunity to participate. Pet. App. 12a.

Halbman should not be given the chance to obtain a second

determination simply because he chose to be a “fence sitter.”

Because Halbman is in privity with the state plaintiffs

and had ample opportunity to participate in the state court

action, the federal claims are barred by traditional res judicata

principles. The Rooker-Feldman issue is not outcome

determinative. Halbman’s Petition for Certiorari should be

denied.

Il. CERTIORARI SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE

THIS CASE IS NOT THE APPROPRIATE

VEHICLE TO RESOLVE WHETHER THE

ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE APPLIES TO A

NONPARTY

Because Halbman is in privity with the state plaintiffs

and had ample opportunity to participate in the state action,

the judgment does not raise the broad question that Halbman

sets forth in his Petition — whether the court below erred in

applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to a nonparty.

The decision of the Court of Appeals correctly applies the

principles set forth in this Court’s decisions in Rooker and

Feldman to the particular facts of this case in finding that

Halbman’s federal claims are inextricably intertwined with

14

the state court judgment and that Halbman, who was well

aware of the state proceedings and awaited that court's

adverse ruling before attempting to challenge the

disincorporation in federal district court, had ample

opportunity to bring his substantively identical challenge in

state court. This case does not, as Halbman claims, raise grave

issues concerning a nonparty’s right to a day in court under

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

(Petition, p. 10) Halbman was adequately represented by,

and thus in privity with, the officials of the former city who

brought the state court action. See Richards, 516 U.S. at 798.

Because Halbman was in privity with the state plaintiffs,

Halbman vicariously had his day in court. This case is not

the appropriate vehicle to resolve whether the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine applies to a nonparty to an earlier state

court action.

Halbman argues that the view taken by leading

commentators and several circuits is that the Rooker-

Feldman doctrine should be narrowly construed to reduce

the occasions that require a federal court to give greater effect

to a state judgment than would be recognized in the state

courts. Petition, at 17. Even under the narrow view proposed

by Halbman, his claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman since

his claims are barred by traditional res judicata principles

applied by the Missouri courts. See Drainage District, Seibert

and Cherry. This case is not the appropriate vehicle to resolve

whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is coextensive with

preclusion or extends beyond it. The Petition should be

denied.

15

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, this Court should deny

Halbman’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

Ropert H. Grant

Counsel of Record

PATRICIA REDINGTON

County Counselor

CynTHIA L. HOEMANN

Associate County Counselor

41 South Central

Clayton, Missouri 63105

(314) 615-7042

Attorneys for Respondents

St. Louis County and

W. Dudley McCarter, Trustee