Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Simmons v. Connecticut

Supreme Court, U.S

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

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AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF CONNECTICUT,

Respondent.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Court Of Appeals

Of The State Of Connecticut

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Aucustus J. SIMMONS,

Petitioner

P.O. Box #1

Windsor, CT 06095

(860) 569-6714

QUESTION PRESENTED

The rule announced by this Court in United States v.

Throckmorton, 98 US 61 (1878) has been applied in crimi-

nal cases as often as the occasion for its application has

arisen and where the substantial federal constitutional

claims by the owner, with title, against decades of unlaw-

ful and unconstitutional TRESPASSING and

ENCROACHMENT(S) by both federal and state agency’s,

without the award of any legal or just compensation, in

total disregard for a damage action (#163875 (1970))

against previous TRESPASSING and ENCROACH-

MENT(S), were given NOTICE TO QUIT three (3) times

of a specific Parcel “A” that is not, has not been put to a

public purpose, the question turns not on the sufficiency

of the evidence but on whether this conviction of criminal

trespass, criminal mischief and imprisonment by the tres-

passers against the owner rests upon any evidence or

record before the court of competent jurisdiction - AT

ALL. (See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 US 199

(1878).)

VII.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

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OPINIONS BELA occcccccecsecvcceeesseses 1

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STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVI-

SIONS INVOLVED)... cscsssccccesscccecsacess 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.......cccccccscce 8

SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR GRANTING

THE WRIT . ..<.s<<snececes Vaueeeeeeesanesese 10

THE FEDERAL QUESTION JS.........ccceee. 15

CONCLUSIAM ....ssctaseseseckegansbeeankedes 21

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iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United States, 261 US

SEL CAGTS) .. oc ccccccssccccsccccccccscccscccecesese

Beard v. State, 99 S.W. 837 (1907). ........-0 eee eee eee

Bollenbach v. United States, 326 US 607 (1946)........

Carter v. Texas, 177 US 442 (1900) ......2.-.s2seeeees

Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 427 (1988) ...........-+55:

Chapman v. California, 386 US 47 (1967)........-.---.

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 US 226

SD onc 66h badcbeaeiecccccessecsecenncocansacene

Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 US 85 (1963)......cccccccees

Frank v. Mangrum, 237 US 309 (1915)......--+-+++++>

Heiser -v. Morgan Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563 (1963).....

Howard v. State, 58 Ark. 229 (1929)..........---0005-

Kirby Forest Industries v. United States, 467 US 15

SN cc SGaewaseeeccarcdccnsevsacccesesasssoceses

Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 US 544 (1972).....

Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US 112 (1935) .......----++-:

Moore v. Dempsey, 261 US 86 (1923) ......-----++-+-

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937) ............--.

Powell v. Alabama, 278 US 45 (1928) ..........---+5:

Rogers v. Alabama, 192 US 226 (1904)........-----++:

Simmons v. Wetherall, #163875 (1970) ...... 9, 12, 13, 16

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Springstein v. Saunders, 182 Ia. 658 (1918)............ 19

State v. Asbell, 62 Kan. 209 (1900)............... Scan ae

State Ex Rel. Davis v. Superior Court, 15 Wash. 339

ry ee ey ry Pen rr pee ry rrr rst 19

Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 US 199 (1960)..... 15

United States v. Throckmorton, 98 US 61 (1878)....... 18

CONSTITUTIONS

Art. 1 § 11 Connecticut Constitution ................. 2

Amendment V Constitution of United States ......... 2

Amendment XIV Constitution of United States .. 2, 17, 21

STATUTES AND OTHER MATERIAL

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CARR BRE 6 onset euncecacaretsacnoswachscowiaxns 2

C.G.S. § 15-79... 1. cece cece eee e eee ete e eee eee ees 8

Re BE hoe ced s bckweneeewcadnguscetoueeencuenen 8

CRAB. © GTI onc in ic ones ckad Sans iccnnandusepaanaces 6

ak ED | POP reeeTT TTT ery rey ere or rer rye 3

P.L. 91-646 Sec. 4653 and 4654 (Title 111, 1/2/71 84

DU, TEs ok vebe canadenkesannsansccivendss saa caess 12

Fels SERS TE. Ge Gia Ge 6 a oc kc bnceweecccasivnses 6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Connecticut Practice Book (1980) Sec. 347 ............ 7

Connecticut Practice Book (1980) Sec. 348 ............ 7

Special Act @ 170 (1969) ...2...cnccceccwsssavesses 11, 13

10) Are 18 Rete:

I. PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF

CONNECTICUT ;

Petitioner Augustus Simmons requests that this

Court issue a Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of

the Court of Appeals of the State of Connecticut, which

became final on July 13, 2000 when the Connecticut

Supreme Court denied review (Appendix A).

Il. OPINIONS BELOW

Augustus Simmons, owner with title to three (3) sep-

arate and distinct parcels of real property (“A,” “C,” “D”)

both on and adjacent to Bradley Airport was found guilty

of criminal mischief, first degree; criminal trespass in the

third degree; tampering with airways; criminal trespass

in the first degree; interfering with a police officer; crimi-

nal mischief in the second degree; (transcript of Enfield

Superior Court on the 5th day of June 1998, pages 730-738

- certified) (Appendix B). The Court of Appeals of the

State of Connecticut affirmed in a decision of May 10,

2000 that was certified the 12th day of June, 2000 (Appen-

dix C).

Ill. JURISDICTION

The Connecticut Supreme Court's final decision was

filed on July 13, 2000. This petition is timely filed. This

Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 USC § 1257(a).

IV. STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVI-

SIONS INVOLVED

The due process and equal protection provisions

applicable to the states are contained in U.S. Const.

Amend. XIV § 1 which provides:

All persons born or naturalized in the

United States, and subject to the jurisdiction

thereof, are citizens of the United States and of

the state wherein they reside. No state shall

make or enforce any law which shall abridge the

privileges or immunities of citizens of the

United States; nor shall any state deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due —

process of law; nor deny to any person within

its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

ART. I § 11 CONSTITUTION OF CONNECTICUT

The Constitution of Connecticut provides that - “No

person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property with-

out due process of law.

AMENDMENT V, CONSTITUTION OF THE

UNITED STATES

“

. . nor shall private property be taken for public

use without just compensation.”

CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTE § 8-129

AGENCY TO DETERMINE COMPENSATION AND

FILE WITH SUPERIOR COURT AND TOWN CLERKS;

NOTICE TO OWNERS AND INTERESTED PARTIES.

POSSESSION OF LAND. CERTIFICATE OF TAKING.

Pe eee Cee eS

The Redevelopment Agency shall determine the com-

pensation to be paid to the persons entitled thereto for

such real property and shall file a Statement of Compen-

sation containing a description of the property to. be

taken and the names of all persons having a record inter-

est therein and setting forth the amount of such compen-

sation, and a deposit as provided in Section 8-130, with

the Clerk of the Superior Court for the judicial district in

which the property affected is located. Upon filing such

Statement of Compensation and Deposit, the Redevelop-

ment Agency shall forthwith cause to be recorded, in the

office of the Town Clerk of each town in which the

property is located, a copy of such Statement of Compen-

sation, such recording to have the same effect as and to

be treated the same as the recording of a lis pendens, and

shall forthwith give notice, as hereinafter provided, to

each person appearing of record as an.owner of property

affected thereby and to each person appearing of record

as a holder of any mortgage, lien, assessment or other

encumbrance on such property or interest therein (a) in

the case of any such person found to be residing within

the state, by causing a copy of such notice, with a copy of

such Statement of Compensation to be served upon each

person by a sheriff, his deputy or a constable or an

indifferent person, in the manner set forth in Section

52-57 for the service of civil process and (b), in the case of

any such person who is a nonresident of this state at the

time of the filing of such Statement of Compensation and

Deposit or of any person whose whereabouts or existence

is unknown, by mailing to each such person a copy of

such notice and of such Statement of Compensation, by

registered or certified mail, directed to his last-known

address, and by publishing such notice and such State-

ment of Compensation at least twice in a newspaper

published in the judicial district and having daily or

weekly circulation in the town in which such property is

located. Any such published notice shall state that it is

notice to the widow or widower, heirs, representatives

and creditors of the person holding such record interest,

if such person is dead. If, after a reasonably diligent

search, no last-known address can be found for any inter-

ested party, an affidavit stating such fact, and reciting the

steps taken to locate such address, shall be filed with the

Clerk of the Superior Court and accepted in lieu of mail-

ing to the last-known address. Not less than twelve days

nor more than ninety days after such notice and such

Statement of Compensation have been so served or so

mailed and first published, the Redevelopment Agency

shall file with the Clerk of the Superior Court a Return of

Notice setting forth the notice given and, upon receipt of

such Return of Notice, such clerk shall, without any delay

or continuance of any kind, issue a Certificate of Taking

and the names of the owners and of all other persons

having a record interest therein. The Redevelopment

Agency shall cause such Certificate of Taking to be

recorded in the office of the Town Clerk of each town in

which such property is located. Upon the recording of

such certificate, title to such property in fee simple shall

vest in the municipality, and the right to just compensa-

tion shall vest in the persons entitled thereto. At any time

after such Certificate of Taking has been so recorded, the

Redevelopment Agency may repair, operate or insure

such property and enter upon such property, and take

whatever action is proposed with regard to such property

5

by the Project Area Redevelopment Plan. The notice

referred to above shall state (a) that not less than twelve

days nor more than ninety days after service or mailing

and first publication thereof, the Redevelopment Agency

shall file with the Clerk of the Superior Court of the

. judicial district in which such property is located, a

return setting forth the notice given, (b) that upon receipt

of such return such clerk shall issue a certificate for

recording in the office of the Town Clerk of each town in

which such property is located, (c) that upon the record-

ing of such certificate, title to such property shall vest in

the municipality, the right to just compensation shall vest

in the persons entitled thereto and the Redevelopment

Agency may repair, operate or insure such property and

enter upon such property and take whatever action may

be proposed with regard thereto by the Project Area

Redevelopment Plan and (d) that such notice shall bind

the widow or widower, heirs, representatives and credi-

tors of each person named therein who then or thereafter

may be dead. When any Redevelopment Agency acting in

behalf of any municipality has acquired or rented real

property by purchase, lease, exchange or gift in accor-

dance with the provisions of this section, or in exercising

its right of eminent domain has filed a Statement of

Compensation and Deposit with the Clerk of the Superior

Court and has caused a Certificate of Taking to be

recorded in the office of the Town Clerk of each town in

which such property is located as herein provided, any

judge of such Court may, upon application and proof of

such acquisition or rental or such filing and deposit and

such recording, order such clerk to issue an execution

commanding the sheriff of the county or his deputy to

put such municipality and the Redevelopment Agency, as

its agent, into peaceable possession of the property so

acquired, rented or condemned. The provisions of this

section shall not be limited in any way by the provisions

of Chapter 832.

CONNECTICUT GENERAL STATUTE § 48-17a

REIMBURSEMENT OF OWNER FOR COSTS, DIS-

BURSEMENTS AND EXPENSES ON FAILURE OR

ABANDONMENT OF CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING

The state Court having jurisdiction of a proceeding

instituted by a state agency to acquire real property by

condemnation shall award the owner of any right, or title

to, or interest in, such real property such sum as will in

the opinion of the Court reimburse such owner for his

reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including

reasonable attorney, appraisal and engineering fees, actu-

ally incurred because of the condemnation proceedings, if

(1) the final judgment is that the state agency cannot

acquire the real property by condemnation; or (2) the

proceeding is abandoned by the state. (1971, P. A. 518, § 1,

eff. June 23, 1971)

P.L. 91-646; 42 USC § 4655

REQUIREMENTS FOR UNIFORM LAND ACQUISI-

TION POLICIES; PAYMENTS OF EXPENSES INCIDEN-

TAL TO TRANSFER OF REAL PROPERTY TO STATE;

PAYMENT OF LITIGATION EXPENSES 1N CERTAIN

CASES

Notwithstanding any other law, the head of a federal

agency shall not approve any program or project or any

ann

grant to, or contract or agreement with, a state agency

under which federal financial assistance will be available

to pay all or part of the cost of any program or project

- which will result in the acquisition of real property on

and after January 2, 1971, unless he receives satisfactory

assurances from such state agency that -

(1) In acquiring real property it will be guided, to

the greatest extent practicable under state law, by the

land acquisition policies in Section 4651 of this title and

the provisions of Section 4652 of this title, and

(2) Property owners will be paid or reimbursed for

necessary expenses as specified in Sections 4653 and 4654

of this title. (P-L. 91-646, Title III § 305, Jan. 2, 1971, 84

stat. 1906)

CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK, SEC. 347

ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER

Within thirty days after being notified of the filing of

such “Offer of Judgment,” the defendant or his attorney

may file with the Clerk of the Court a written “acceptance

of Offer of Judgment” agreeing to a stipulation for judg-

ment as contained in the plaintiff’s “Offer of Judgment.”

Upon such filing, the Court shall render judgment forth-

with on the stipulation. (1980)

CONNECTICUT PRACTICE BOOK, SEC. 348

OFFER NOT ACCEPTED

If such “Offer of Judgment” is not accepted within

thirty days, such “Offer of Judgment” shall be considered

8

rejected and not subject to acceptance unless refiled.

(1980)

V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is an AIRPORT-related case that transcends

back to a 1955 Federal-Aid Grant Agreement between

federal and state agencies wherein the state agency (Con-

necticut Dept. of Transportation) was obligated under the

grant agreement to acquire “satisfactory property inter-

ests” as defined in 14 C.F.R. § 152.3 for what would

ultimately become a navigational servitude imposed

upon the owner by the federal agency (F.A.A.) with the

invasion, appropriation, installation on the surface of the

real property, sophisticated navigational instrumentation

controlling ingress and egress of air traffic at Bradley

Airport, Connecticut’s premier airport in the summer of

1962.

Starting on February 28, 1962 with a tortious course

of conduct, the state agency initiated the first condemna-

tion that was negated by the courts as arbitrary, uncon-

stitutional with procedural problems (153 Conn. 351

(1966)) and was remanded.

In January, 1968 the state instituted condemnation |

proceedings a second time under Conn. General Statute

§ 48-12, in lieu of C.G.S. § 15-79 and again the court ruled

the proceeding “null and void”. (160 Conn. 492 (1971))

During the 1969 session of the Connecticut Legisla-

ture a special act was passed by the general assembly

war tals)

ei esinct. iSelten, th! mate ce hs

allowing Augustus Simmons to sue the state for DAM-

AGES over “loss of use of land” arising out of the bum-

bling condemnation proceedings. On January 5, 1970

Plaintiff /Owner Simmons brought such a suit Simmons v.

Wetherall, Docket #163875 which had several hearing

dates scheduled that were all aborted. To date, damages

have not been addressed and the action is still pending.

During the summer of 1974 the federal agency,

F.A.A., without having paid any compensation, intended

to upgrade the navigational servitude with the addition

of a “middle marker” on private property and in lieu of

negotiating a lease with the owner, enters into a lease

with the sponsor of the airport, notwithstanding they had

full knowledge that title reverted back to the owner on

the land records on March 24, 1972 after the second

condemnation was ruled null and void.

In December, 1977, plaintiff retained the firm of

Rogin-Hirtle, Esq.’s to represent him upon scheduled

days for hearings in damages before referee Shapiro and

the very first act of private counsel was an attempt to

give the state (and the F.A.A.) “complete insulation from

and absolution from all of its sins” by invalidating the

hearings in damages and for which a dismissal, dis-

charge, in writing, was hand delivered on December 23,

1977. The discharge of 12/23/1977 was not sufficient to

curb the tortious course of conduct.

Where the matter of subject matter jurisdiction and of

indispensable parties was ARGUED before the court of

competent jurisdiction, Hon. Dupont, A., on June 7, 1982

and the STATE vigorously and vehemently challenged the

superior court with lack of subject matter jurisdiction and

10

the court, so recognizing, denied compensation from the

slush fund to indispensable parties (VALENTE-

ALLAIRE), yet, did not, would not set aside the void

decree due to a supreme court ruling under Simmons v.

Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 (1980).

Where the “Slush Fund” monies were allowed to

remain before the court from 1978 to 1991 before return-

ing said monies to the state treasury, signifies FEDERAL

QUESTION VIOLATIONS of the most severe nature,

extending indefinitely the original unlawful, unconstitu-

tional entry by the F.A.A. and the State of Connecticut.

VI. SUMMARY OF REASONS FOR GRANTING THE

WRIT

A. This Court has ruled concerning the acts or

omissions of any one, or of any group of persons, for no

matter from what source, whether it be official or other-

wise, an act or omission emanates, if it operates to

deprive the defendant of notice or of an opportunity to be

heard, then there has been a denial of due process of law.

Such is the effect of this Court’s decision in Moore v.

Dempsey, 261 US 86; Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 US

at 544.

This court has also ruled where an act or omission

operates so as to deprive him of an opportunity to pre-

sent such evidence as he has, that it can be said that due

process of law has been denied. Frank v. Mangrum, 237 US

309; Powell v. Alabama, 278 US 45; Moore v. Dempsey, supra.

Nor does it make a particle of difference from what

source the act or omission complained of emanates, for it

is not the act or omission itself but its effect upon the

_ dah. teen os

11

hearing accorded by the Court to the defendant that

results in, or does not result in, a denial of due process of

law.

The federal question presented to this Court on the

civil side, Docket #0072 (2000), is equally applicable to

the criminal trial court that reads: “Did the Connecticut

Supreme Court transgress the due process and equal

protection clauses of the federal Constitution where: -

without any notice or service of process; without any

constitutional valuations or just compensation; without

any pleadings, hearings, decisions, judgments or mesne

process due to the lack of both jurisdiction of the subject

matter and parties by the legally organized Court (Supe-

rior) below — the act of the state Supreme Court giving a

statute (Special Act #170 (1969)) a new construction that

denied rights under the Constitution when it trans-

mogrified plaintiff's - unaddressed - private tort action

(#163875) into a public real property “F-R-E-E-Z-I-N-G”

for a federally installed, maintained, and occupied air-

craft navigational instrumentation system of over thirty-

six (36) years duration on plaintiffs Parcel “C” that

appears on the face of the record.

In the case of Parcel “C” the United States (FAA)

physically entered into possession and ousting the owner,

relying on its agent, Connecticut Dept. of Transportation

(sponsor) to acquire title and pay just compensation.

In the case of Parcel “A,” after the two condemna-

tions by the state were ruled NULL and VOID, Parcel “A”

was, after the second condemnation, ABANDONED

(1971).

12

No later than July 31, 1971 the government's selec-

tion and implementation of acquiring property is gov-

erned by the Uniform Relocation and Real Property

Acquisition Act of 1970, 42 USC § 4601 et seq. That statute

enjoins federal agencies, inter alia, to attempt to acquire

property by negotiation rather than condemnation, and

whenever possible not to take land by physical appro-

priation, §§ 4651(1)(4)(8). In addition the statute requires

a court with jurisdiction over a condemnation action that

is dismissed, or abandoned, or ruled null and void by the

government to award the landowner an amount that will

reimburse him for “his reasonable costs, disbursements,

and expenses incurred in contesting the suit,” § 4654(a).

Petitioner’s private counsel (Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s)

were specifically retained for the action addressing this

issue and hearing dates previously scheduled before the

referee were “knocked out of the box,” the first order of

business was to INVALIDATE and not address this man-

datory federal and state statute, and, not establish any

kind of value whatsoever for the land previously seized

and occupied by the government for its federal naviga-

tional instrumentation, the only weapon, the only

recourse for petitioner was a dismissal, a discharge hand

delivered on 12/23/77.

Any subsequent contracts, coercion, conspiracies,

“selling-out” of the client; intentional and deliberate dis-

regard for Simmons v. Wetherall, #163875; intentional and

deliberate disregard for state statute 48-17 a, b, c; inten-

tional and deliberate disregard of federal regulation

§ 4654(a), in concert with the previous discharge was of

|

;

|

13

such substantial unconstitutional conduct and fraud, illu-

minates why the offer was “VERBAL” and could not be

submitted to the court of competent jurisdiction. Where,

even after a second discharge on 4/12/78 the counsel

attempted to coerce petitioner into providing deeds) and

give title to the government — counsel was told to go

pound sand - on the beach.

The power to act under Special Act #170 (Simmons v.

Wetherall - #163875) by private counsel and referee Shap-

iro were limited to exercise jurisdiction only “ ‘under the

precise circumstances and in the manner particularly pre-

scribed by the enabling legislation.’ Heiser v. Morgan

Guaranty Trust Co., 150 Conn. 563, 565, 192 A 2d 44

(1963).” Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. at 427-28.

Where the unconstitutional acts and behavior contin-

ued, even after withdrawal from representation and suit

against the owner by placing liens on the property on 6/2

and 6/5 of 1978, without any NOTICE, SERVICE, HEAR-

INGS in violation of petitioner’s basic, fundamental,

Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights to some

form of hearing; before or after the encumbrance, inten-

tionally, maliciously OMITTING the owner in the

encumbrances on the land records, clearly shows the

INTENT was to unconstitutionally tie up the property —

without resolution - in retaliation for not giving away

title to the property.

Were this the normal run-of-the-mill illegal and

unconstitutional encumbrance, no great emphasis would

be noted, however, where the mandatory obligation

under Federal Grant Agreement #9-06-009-5708 was to

acquire a “satisfactory title,” free of liens and

14

encumbrances (14 CFR § 152.3) the fraud and unconstitu-

tional conduct take on tremendous added significance.

Where petitioner’s Parcel “C” has been put to a pub-

lic purpose differs altogether from petitioner’s Parcel

“A,” abandoned after the second condemnation, in that

Parcel “C” was a taking that has occurred previously in

actuality (1962) and the JUST COMPENSATION remains

to be determined under some standard, either the current

market value or the value as of date of first condemnation

and interest until title is acquired.

This Court has observed and ruled that ” ‘the owner

is protected by the rule that title does not pass until

compensation has been ascertained and paid...’ ” id., at

284-285 (quoting Albert Hanson Lumber Co. v. United

States, 261 US 581, 587 (1923). Quoting from Kirby Forest

Industries v. United States, 467 US at 15 (1984) — “until title

passed to the United States, (or the state), petitioner was

free to make whatever use it pleased of its property”

(emphasis added).

Regards Parcel “A” petitioner intended to develop

the land, has made commitments to develop all of Parcel

“A,” THREE (3) separate “Notices to Quit” were sent to

the sponsor of the airport and associated agencies to

remove — put the encroachment fence back on its own

property where it was formerly located and/or as of a

given date the illegal, unlawful, uncompensated fence -

WILL BE REMOVED.

Having given three (3) notices to quit Ex. # D, the

state and/or the federal agency were prompted to quit or

15

exercise its authority under state statute or federal regu-

lation to file a declaration of taking and thereby peremp-

torily to appropriate the tract in order to protect it from

alteration. It is part of the record that Parcel “A” is not

necessary for a public purpose and notwithstanding the

fence encroachment, was not, has not, been put to use for

a public purpose.

VII. THE FEDERAL QUESTION IS

Can a trespasser charge the owner with criminal

trespass — criminal mischief —- tampering with an airport -

and substantial imprisonment where the owner has an

insurmountable liability of FIFTEEN (15) lien holders

against the property.

B. In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 US 199 (1960)

this Court ruled that the ultimate question presented is

whether the charges against petitioner were so totally

: devoid of evidentiary support as to render his conviction

: unconstitutional under the due process clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment.

Before putting on his defense against unlawful and

unconstitutional encroachment, petitioner’s counsel

(Geoffrey Naab) moved for a dismissal of the charges

against him on the ground that a judgment or conviction

on “NO RECORD” before the court of competent jurisdic-

tion would deprive him of liberty, property, and compen-

sation without due process of law in that -

(1) As in Thompson v. Louisville, supra, the substan-

tial federal constitutional claims by the owner of this

question turns not on the sufficiency of the evidence but

16

on whether this conviction rests upon any evidence or

record before the court of competent jurisdiction, AT

ALL.

(2) That the motion by the owner, with citations, to

the prosecuting attorney to “PACK HIS BAGS” prior to

trial was a challenge to the authority, and jurisdiction to

proceed against the owner. (Trans. p. 229) Ex. # E.

(3) That there was never any notice or service of

process against the owner and/or several lien-holders,

fifteen (15) to acquire the subject property.

(4) That there was, and still is, a tort action (Sim-

mons v. Wetherall — #163875) since 1970 for previous intru-

sions, seizures, encroachments that was never addressed,

totally disregarded, scheduled hearing dates invalidated

and at page 353 of transcript Hon. Harrelson, Patricia

asked the owner: Mr. Simmons, how much have you been

paid for this property? Mr. Simmons: NOT - ONE -

DOLLAR.

(5) That there is a thirty-five (35) year history of

seizures and encroachments (several) — without compen-

sation.

(6) That the “STATE” argued several years ago (1982)

the trial court was without jurisdiction of the subject mat-

ter or of_the parties regarding the intrusions, seizures,

encroachments (Trans. p. 211, 212). SEE EX # F & G.

(7) That the most recent encroachment, is not, was

not, has not been put to use for a “public purpose.”

Photographs in evidence.

(8) That the most recent encroachment of extending

a fence on private property, (Parcel “A”), was made with

17

the knowledge of not one (1), not five (5), not ten (10), but

fifteen (15) lien-holders against the property. (Trans. p.

358-362).

(9) That petitioner has been subject to continuing

arbitrary, unlawful, unconstitutional arrests, and

imprisonment with felony convictions without the state

ever acquiring a legal interest for the several intrusions,

seizures, encroachments; without ever having paid one

(1) dollar of just compensation.

(10) There is currently an allied - civil - case before

this court, Docket #0072 (2000) on the same subject mat-

ter, the ownership, the due process and equal protection

clauses of the federal constitution.

C. A criminal conviction procured by state pros-

ecuting authorities solely by the use of extra-judicial

unconstitutional decrees of discharged private counsel

for real property acquisition, without jurisdiction of the

subject matter or parties, without notice or service of

process, or authority, known by them to be fraudulent,

known by them there is “NO RECORD” of such decree

before the trial court or court of competent jurisdiction,

and, knowingly used by them in order to procure the

conviction, is without due process of law and in violation

of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Where the acts or omissions of a prosecuting attorney

“have the effect of withholding from a defendant, the

notice which must be accorded him under the due pro-

cess clause, or if they have the effect of preventing a

defendant from presenting such evidence as he possesses

in defense of the accusation against him, then such acts or

18

omissions of the prosecuting attorney may be regarded as

resulting in a denial of due process of law. Ex. # H.

wer aKaewr

As cited in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 US at p. 112: “It is

only where an act or omission operates so as to deprive a

defendant of notice or so as to deprive him of an oppor-

tunity to present such evidence as he has, that it can be

said that due process of law has been denied.

It is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be

satisfied if a state has contrived a conviction through the

pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of

depriving a defendant of liberty, AND PROPERTY,

through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the

presentation of unconstitutional excerpts, and, of [extra

judicial fraudulent actions] by discharged private counsel

of defendant that was never made a matter of trial court

record. Such a contrivance by a state to procure the

conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as incon-

sistent with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the

obtaining of a like result by intimidation. And the action

of prosecuting officers on behalf of the state, like that of

administrative officers in the execution of its laws, may

constitute state action within the purview of the Four-

teenth Amendment. That amendment governs any action

of a state “whether through its legislature, through its

courts, or through its executive or administrative offi-

cers.” Carter v. Texas, 177 US 442, 447; Rogers v. Alabama,

192 US 226, 231; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. Co., 166

US 226, 233, 234.

The rule announced by this Court in United States v.

Throckmorton, 98 US 61, has been applied in criminal cases

as often as the occasion for its application has arisen.

bie | itniaiiiitaiiiiiaiiiaiaiaiasialil |

:

5

q

19

Springstein v. Saunders, 182 Ia 658; State v. Asbell, 62 Kan.

209; Beard v. State, 99 S.W. 837; State Ex Rel. Davis v.

Superior Court, 15 Wash. 339; Howard v. State, 58 Ark. 229.

The appellate court adopting the opinion of the crim-

inal court below, concluded that the judgment could not

be set aside, notwithstanding material evidence was con-

cealed or suppressed; the! the fraud in such a case was

not such fraud as was “extrinsic to the record” and that it

was only in cases of extrinsic fraud that the relief sought

could be had.

Excerpts from transcript, pages 211, 212 [JURY OUT]

Court: But I have already told you we are not hav-

ing a trial about the state acquiring the land. That's

already a matter of record.

Defense Counsel Naab: But you told me that I can

prove that the land is Mr. Simmons’ or attempt to prove

that. That’s in the long run, what I am going to try to do.

Court: Uh-uh no. I didn’t mean to say that. The land

is not Mr. Simmons’. The land does not belong to Mr.

Simmons.

Naab: Your Honor, I protest most vigorously to your

saying the land is not Mr. Simmons’. THE ISSUE IN THIS

CASE IS WHETHER IT IS THE STATE’S OR MR. SIM-

MONS’.

Court: No that’s not the issue in this case. That’s the

problem, that is not the issue in this case.

Naab: Is the court taking judicial notice the land

belongs to the state? /

20

Court: At some point I am sure I will. It is a matter

of record the property does not belong to Mr. Simmons.

Naab: Your Honor, the state itself through the Attor-

ney General’s office has admitted in court the state did

not acquire the property. If Mr. Simmons’ - that’s an issue

and | submit that if Your Honor precludes me from even

raising that issue that a grave injustice will be done here.

Court: That may be marked as a full exhibit. Defen-

dant’s “E” in evidence.

Naab: Your Honor, may I have a standing objection

to this procedure.

Court: Yes.

Court: I am changing my ruling. The objection was

sustained. There is no foundation for that map.

Excerpts from transcript p. 229 [JURY OUT]

Naab: Your Honor, I submit that whether the state

acquired the property from Mr. Simmons or not certainly

is an issue: He certainly cannot be guilty of criminal

trespass on his own land. So whether or not he is the

owner of that property is an issue in this case.

Court: This jury is not going to be called upon to

decide the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the

acquisition of that property. That document has nothing

to do with what the jury has to decide.

Naab: I submit, Your Honor, that it does and at least

- at least, perhaps the court would permit me to, since the

jury is out, to refer to those matters within the document

which I think are particularly relevant.

21

Court: You asked the court to take judicial notice

of -

Prosecuting Atty. Malone: We did that some time ago.

I did during argument during Mr. Simmons’ motion to -

whatever it was — for me to PACK MY BAGS, I think. I

gave the court the citations and I will ask the court at the

proper time - we haven't even got to the point where it is

necessary for you to take judicial notice of anything at

this point. But I will ask the court, once again, to take

judicial notice of cases I cited to the court on an earlier

occasion.

Motion to “pack the bags.” Ex. # E.

VIII. CONCLUSION

An error in not admitting plainly relevant evidence

which possibly influenced the jury adversely to a litigant

cannot under Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 US 85 (1963) be

conceived of as harmless.

When the jury is instructed in an unconstitutional

presumption, the conviction must be overturned. Bollen-

bach v. United States, 326 US 607, 614-615 (1946).

The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees individuals

against invasions by the states of fundamental rights.

Palko v. Connecticut, 302 US 319 (1937), and under more

recent decisions of this Court some of the specifics of the

Bill of Rights as well, Chapman v. California, 386 US at p.

47 (1967).

Was the refusal of the State Supreme Court to hear

the case a reasonable one or was the harmless error rule

applied arbitrarily to evade the underlying constitutional

22

mandate of fundamental fairness from infractions “of

federally guaranteed rights.”

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of October,

2000.

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS,

Petitioner

P.O. Box #1

Windsor, CT 06095

(860) 569-6714

*Defendant’s counsel at the trial level (Geoffrey Naab) is

not eligible to argue before the United States Supreme

Court.

G.

H.

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ISSUE OF WRIT TO REVIEW - DENIED...App.

PAGES 730-738 (ENFIELD SUPERIOR COURT

pg PET Per CE herr uewr penny tary App.

COURT OF APPEALS PROCEEDINGS (MAY 10,

PT rey T eer ee TT Tee T rr rer TTT App.

PURPA NE Pe NE sks ocdunn ede cccsuns es App

MOTION TO “PACK THE BAGS”.......... App

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDIC-

| Se rs oper ran re mene Ane ene e T App.

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS FOR

LACK OF FURIIOSCTION, . 00.2. .ccsesccese App.

RELEVANT EXCERPTS FROM TRAN-

I bec ro eas eee eee App.

1

App. 1

EXHIBIT A

SUPREME COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

NO. PSC-99-0381

State of Connecticut

v.

Augustus J. Simmons

ORDER ON PETITION FOR

(Filed Jul. 17, 2000)

On consideration of the petition by the defendant for

certification to appeal from the Appellate Court (58 Conn.

App. 903 [AC 18814]), it is hereby ordered that said

petition be, and the same is hereby denied.

Borden, J. did not participate in the consideration or

decision of this petition for certification

BY THE COURT,

/s/ Cynthia M. Gwouk

ASSISTANT —CLERK-APPELLATE

Dated: July 13, 2000

Notice sent: July 14, 2000

Clerk, Superior Court, Hartford at G.A. 13, CR97 104930

Clerk, Appellate Court

Reporter of Judicial Decisions

SAO

LaBelle, LaBelle, Naab & Horvath, P.C.

John A. East III, Assistant State’s Attorney

Geoffrey Naab in support of petition; John A. East III,

Assistant State’s Attorney, in opposition.

App. 2

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

SUPREME COURT

NO. HHD CV70-0163875S

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS

v.

HORACE B. WETHERALL ET AL. : MAY 31, 2000

ORDER

THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, FILED MAY 1,

2000, TO VACATE, HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE

COURT, IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE PLAINTIFF

IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM FILING PLEADINGS

IN THIS COURT THAT ARE RELATED TO DOCKET

NUMBER CV70-0163875.

BY THE COURT,

/s/ Francis J. Drumund

CHIEF CLERK

NOTICE SENT: MAY 31, 2000

AUGUSTUS SIMMONS, PRO SE

PAUL K. PERNEREWSKI, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY

GENERAL

ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN, LASSMAN & HIRTLE

CLERK, HARTFORD J.D.

HON. JOHN J. LANGENBACH

mI Carmenere

App. 3

EXHIBIT B

ENFIELD SUPERIOR COURT 6/5/98

* * *

[730] THE COURT: I received another note. It

says, your Honor, we have reached a verdict on all

counts.

THE SHERIFF: Juror No. 1, Juror No. 2, Juror

No. 3, Juror No. 4, Juror No. 5, Juror No. 6.

THE COURT: Thank you. Parties stipulate to

the presence of all jurors?

~MR. MALONE: Yes, your Honor.

MR. NAAB: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Madam Clerk.

THE CLERK: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury,

as your names are called, please answer here and rise and

remain standing.

Juror No. 1, June Sponzo; Juror No. 2, Roland Harris;

Juror No. 3, Myriam Velezquez; Juror No. 4, Jose Ribeiro;

Juror No. 5 Norman Noble; and Juror No. 6, Debra

Vacante.

Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, on the State v.

Augustus Simmons have you agreed upon a verdict?

THE FOREPERSON: Yes.

THE CLERK: Would the defendant, Augustus

Simmons, please rise and face the jury. In file No.

CR97-104930, on the first count, criminal mischief in the

first degree, foreman, what is your verdict?

App. 4

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the second count, criminal

trespass in the third degree, what is your verdict?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

[731] THE CLERK: On the third count, tamper-

ing with airways, what is your verdict?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: In the Docket No. CR97-105048,

on the first charge of tampering with airways, what is

your verdict?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the second charge, criminal

trespass in the first degree, what is your verdict?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the third charge, ae

with a police officer?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The third Docket No.

CR97-106221, on the first count, criminal mischief in the

second degree?

MR. MALONE: Third degree. The lesser

include — sorry.

THE CLERK: Your verdict?

THE FOREPERSON: Second degree?

THE CLERK: Uh-huh.

App. 5

THE FOREPERSON: Not guilty.

THE CLERK: Then in the lesser included

offense ~ what do you say in the lesser included offense

of criminal mischief in the third degree?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Tampering with airways on the

second [732] count?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE COURT: The verdict may be accepted and

ordered recorded.

THE CLERK: You may be seated.

MR. NAAB: Your Honor, may the jury be

polled?

THE COURT: Yes. Madam Clerk, please poll the

jury.

THE CLERK: Juror No. 1, June Sponzo, please

stand. In Docket No. CR97-104930, the charges - State

against Augustus Simmons, in the first count, criminal

mischief in the first degree, what is your verdict?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: In the second count, criminal tres-

pass in the third degree, what is your verdict?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: And third count, tampering with

airways, what is your verdict?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

App. 6

THE CLERK: In CR97-015048, State against

Augustus Simmons, tampering with airways, first count,

what is your verdict?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass in

the first degree, what is your verdict?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

[733] THE CLERK: Interfering with a police

officer, the third count?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: In Docket CR97-106221, in the

first count, criminal mischief in the second degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: No.

THE JUROR: I am sorry. That’s not guilty.

MR. MALONE: Just do the lesser included.

THE CLERK: I will just do the lesser included

charge, criminal mischief third degree?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: And tampering with airways, last

count?

THE FOREPERSON: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Thank you. You may be seated.

Mr. Harris, in Docket No. CR97-104930, State against

Augustus Simmons, the first count, criminal mischief in

the first degree?

App. 7

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The second count, criminal tres-

pass third degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The third count, tampering with

airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: And Docket CR97-105048, the

first [734] count, tampering with airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass in

the first degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Third count, interfering with a

police officer?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Docket CR97-106221 the lesser

included charge, criminal mischief in the third degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: And finally, second count, tam-

pering with airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: You may be seated.

ne

Third juror, Miriam Velezquez, in Docket

CR97-104930, State v. Augustus Simmons, the first count,

criminal mischief first degree?

=a

App. 8

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass

third degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The third count, tampering with

airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: In Docket No. CR97-105048, first

[735] count, tampering with airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass

first degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Third count, interfering with a

police officer?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Finally, Docket CR97-106221, on

the lesser included charge of criminal mischief third

degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the second count, tampering

with airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: You may be seated.

Ree Oe ee ee eee MI yO kOe EL FD OTe ae ese

Third juror, Jose Ribeiro, Docket No. CR97-104930,

first count, criminal mischief first degree?

App. 9

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass

third degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

_ THE CLERK: Third count, tampering with air-

ways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second file, State against

Augustus Simmons, in CR97-105048, first count tamper-

ing with [736] airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass

first degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The third count, interfering with

a police officer?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the final file, CR97-106221, on

the lesser included charge, criminal mischief in the third

degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the second count, tampering

with airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

App. 10

THE CLERK: Norman Noble, Juror No. 5 in

State v. Augustus Simmons, CR97-104930, first count,

criminal mischief first degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the second count, criminal

trespass third degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: On the third count, tampering

with airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second file, CR97-105048, first

count, tampering with airways?

[737] THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass in

the first degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Third count, interfering with a

peace officer?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Final file, CR97-106221 in the

lesser included charge, criminal mischief third degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, tampering with air-

ways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

App. 11

THE CLERK: You may be seated.

Debra Vacante, Juror No. Number 6, State against

Augustus Simmons, CR97-104930, first count, criminal

mischief in the first degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, criminal trespass

third degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The third count, tampering with

airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second file, CR97-105048, crimi-

nal tampering with airways?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

[738] THE CLERK: Second count, criminal tres-

pass in the first degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Third count, interfering with a

peace officer?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The third file, CR97-106221, on

the lesser included charge, criminal mischief in the third

degree?

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: Second count, tampering with air-

ways?

App. 12

THE JUROR: Guilty.

THE CLERK: The jury has been polled.

THE COURT: Thank you, Madam Clerk. Ladies

and gentlemen of the jury, we thank you for your service

in this case.

MR. MALONE: Could they be excused before

discharged, your Honor, please?

THE COURT: I ask you be excused.

(Jury was excused:)

MR. MALONE: Can I confer with counsel for a

minute?

THE COURT: Yes. (A discussion was held off

the record.)

THE COURT: You want a recess?

MR. MALONE: Yes, short recess, please, your

* * *

App. 13

EXHIBIT C

AC18814 : APPELLATE COURT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT : STATE OF

VS. CONNECTICUT

AT HARTFORD

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS

MAY 10, 2000

BEFORE:

JUSTICE SIDNEY S. LANDAU

JUSTICE WILLIAM J. LAVERY

JUSTICE PETER T. ZARELLA

William H. Juall

Court Monitor

[2] MR. NAAB: Good morning, Your Honor.

May it please the court, I’m Jeffrey Naab, I represent the

defendant and apppellant, Augustus J. Simmons.

This is a little bit unusual case in the way it comes

down and the appellant’s claims. The appellant claims

that he was wrongfully convicted because of misapplica-

tion of the law to the facts.

JUSTICE LAVERY: He admits to all the acts

though, right?

MR. NAAB: Absolutely, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LAVERY: All right. All the acts were

admitted?

App. 14

MR. NAAB: No question about that. He admit-

ted that right up front before the trial began, at the start

of the trial and repeatedly during the trial.

This was a case which was a difficult one for the jury

because he did admit that he did it. This was not a case

where the jury had to figure out whether he did it or

somebody else did it or whether it was done or not done.

It was a case where under instructions from the court the

jury had to figure out whether what he did constituted

the crimes charged. We submit that what he did did not

constitute the crimes charged.

I’ll start at the end with tampering with airports,

airways, airport equipment and so on and [3] so forth,

which was constantly described by the prosecution and

by -

JUSTICE LAVERY: Isn’t the fence a part of the

security arena for the airport?

MR. NAAB: Yes, Your Honor. There’s no ques-

tion about it.

JUSTICE LAVERY: And he cut the fence.

MR. NAAB: He did cut the fence, but it wasn’t

the airport’s fence, it was the National Guard’s fence, it

was the federal government's fence. That piece of prop-

erty which Mr. Simmons claims he owns and which in

equity he does own, in our view, was leased by the state

to the federal government. That is, to -

JUSTICE LAVERY: The state owns the property.

MR. NAAB: The state owns the property, that’s

correct.

App. 15

JUSTICE LAVERY: And they share the airport

facilities with the Air National Guard?

MR. NAAB: They do.

JUSTICE LAVERY: And it’s part of the security

encirclement of the airport, is it not?

MR. NAAB: Yes it is, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LAVERY: All right.

~ MR. NAAB: That fence was not on the airport

property, that fence was on the property which the

Department of Transportation, that is the airport, [4]

leased to the National Guard, that is, the federal govern-

ment. The fence was erected by the federal government.

The fence, when Mr. Simmons cut it down, was repaired

and replaced by the federal government. It was patrolled

by Air National Guard people, not by the state. The state

patrolled their own fence but they didn’t patrol that

particular fence, the hundred and twenty-four feet that

Mr. Simmons cut down, that was not, we submit, airport

property. It did not fall within the definition or did not

fall within the wording of the statute, which is — excuse

me — any airport, heliport, landing field or airway or the

equipment thereof. We submit that it was not the airport,

not the airway, not the equipment of the airport but the

equipment of the National Guard. And therefore he

should not have been convicted on those counts.

With respect to criminal trespass and criminal mis-

chief. Criminal trespass requires that the person who is

trespassing, that is, is on the property which belongs to

somebody else, is there when he knows that he is not

licensed or privileged to be there.

App. 16

JUSTICE LAVERY: Well, wasn’t there a fence

around the property?

MR. NAAB: There was a fence. Well he cut

down the fence. That’s the point, actually. He cut down

[5] the fence. But it was his property. That’s what was in

his head. He knew, and indeed in colloquy just before

sentencing Judge Harleston essentially agreed with me

that Mr. Simmons knew that it was his property, that it

was not the state’s property, it was his property. It was

his property because it had never, ever been taken from

him properly with due process by the State of Connecti-

cut or by the federal government. The federal govern-

ment for years, for many years had used his property for

airport purposes, the Federal Aviation Administration.

The state had fenced off his property previously. In this

case the National Guard in 1991 had fenced off his prop-

erty, but it was his property -

JUSTICE LAVERY: Didn’t Judge Shapiro order -

MR. NAAB: Yes, Your Honor?

JUSTICE LAVERY: Wait a minute. Didn’t Judge

Shapiro order that transferred to the state and it was

affirmed by the Supreme Court of the State of Connecti-

cut?

MR. NAAB: Yes he did, Your Honor, and that is

correct.

JUSTICE LAVERY: Well, isn’t that the law of the

land? Of the state land anyway?

MR. NAAB: Well, to the extent that a ruling of

the Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut speaks [6]

App. 17

then of course it is the law of the State of Connecticut. But

the distinction which Judge Harleston -

JUSTICE LAVERY: I mean, if I certified the title

to that land I’m certify it was owned by the State of

Connecticut, wouldn’t I?

MR. NAAB: You would certify that record title

is in the State of Connecticut, Your Honor. But I submit

first that that title is subject to myriad clouds with all of

the encumbrances on it. Encumbrances of record. Which

are pre — many of which predate the date of those pro-

ceedings back in 1978.

And also I submit that equitable title is in Augustus J.

Simmons, from whom the property was taken without

due process. And without his consent. The stipulated

judgment of 1970 - of January, 1978, was, as viewed by

the state’s own attorney two years later or four years

later — two years after the Supreme Court’s decision in a

hearing before Judge Dupont, was viewed as nothing

more than an executory contract for the sale of land,

which Mr. Simmons -

JUSTICE LAVERY: That wasn’t admitted - is

that in evidence?

MR. NAAB: No, it is not in evidence because —

[7] JUSTICE LAVERY: Is that an evidenciary

error you're appealing?

MR. NAAB: It is, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LAVERY: All right.

MR. NAAB: It’s one of the specifications of

error, both in the trial court and here is the failure or the

App. 18

refusal of the trial court to permit testimony of what the

assistant attorney general said in that hearing back in

1982.

JUSTICE LAVERY: Was that assistant attorney

general subpoenaed?

MR. NAAB: No he was not, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LAVERY: So it was hearsay you were

asking the court -

MR. NAAB: That’s correct.

JUSTICE LAVERY: All right.

MR. NAAB: If the court please I'll simply state

~ and this is also in the brief — that I had intended to put

in a certified copy of the transcript. I was unable to obtain

a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings

because the court reporter’s notes had been destroyed

and he would not certify the xerox copy which I had. And

therefore I proposed to put the evidence in by way of Mr.

Simmons’ testimony, because he was there and heard it

all and he could use the transcript to refresh his recollec-

tion.

[8] Nevertheless, we do not view the action by Justice

Shapiro and the action by the Supreme Court as saying

anything more than that stipulated judgment should be

enforced. It did not, should not have had the effect of

transferring title to the state. But that’s not the point,

Your Honor. The point is not what actually happened,

what the legal effect of the Supreme Court's action in ©

1980 was. The point is what was in Mr. Simmons’ head.

The criminal statute bars him from going on property or

harming property in the case of criminal mischief, when

paren

a iE ia

App. 19

he does not believe that he has a right to do so. And he

believed that he had a right to do so because it was on his

property, that fence was a trespass on his land and he had

a right to remove it.

JUSTICE LANDAU: Does that belief have to be

reasonable or it doesn’t have to be reasonable?

MR. NAAB: With respect to the criminal mis-

chief statute, Your Honor -

JUSTICE LANDAU: Yes.

MR. NAAB: It has to be reasonable. With

respect to the criminal trespass statute there is no require-

ment in the wording of the statute of reasonability.

JUSTICE LANDAU: So if I go into that other

gentleman’s house, and I just say that’s my house, I [9]

believe it to be my house, I cannot be convicted of crimi-

nal trespass?

MR. NAAB: No, Your Honor, not if you hon-

estly believe it is yours. Now, if you destroy something in

the house -

JUSTICE LANDAU: No, no, I’m not talking

about that.

MR. NAAB: But for criminal trespass no, you

can’t, not if you honestly believe it’s yours. I can see a

number of ways that can happen. In the fifties, of course,

we built the Levitowns where kids were constantly going

home from school to the wrong house because they all

looked the same. We don’t have that problem so much

anymore, but it does happen from time to time.

App. 20

JUSTICE LANDAU: If I was to keep going back

to the same house and the person kept saying look,

Landau, it’s not your house, and then he took me to court

and the Supreme Court of the jurisdiction I was in said

look, Landau, it’s not your house. Now I keep going back.

MR. NAAB: I see. I submit, Your Honor, that

the person might very well be liable in civil trespass but

should not be liable, if he honestly believed. And that’s

what we’re talking about here. If it’s an honest belief.

And that’s why the [10] exclusion of evidence in this case

is sO important. Because -

JUSTICE LANDAU: Straighten me out on this.

MR. NAAB: I’m sorry.

JUSTICE LANDAU: So if the belief is honest

but not reasonable it’s still a — it’s still — it still can’t be

convicted of criminal trespass?

MR. NAAB: He can’t be convicted or should

not be convicted of criminal trespass if it’s an honest and

even unreasonable belief, yes, Your Honor. Criminal mis-

chief the belief has to be reasonable, and that’s the way

the statute is written, with a reasonable belief.

I submit, Your Honor, that the belief in his case is

reasonable. It’s got to be reasonable if it’s based on the

state’s utter failure to follow all of the procedures that

were supposed to be followed, the federal government’s

utter failure to follow all of the procedures that were

supposed to be followed as set out in the uniform prop-

erty acquisition act, the federal law. And in section 8-129

of the Connecticut General Statutes, which are in the

appendix.

App. 21

They didn’t follow any of those procedures. Mr. Sim-

mons was taken advantage of. And when he realized he’d

been taken advantage of he said no, I’m not going to go

through it, and he refused to [11] sign a deed. And he

fired his attorneys and his attorneys nevertheless contin-

ued to purport to represent him for two months more,

including right up to this so called supplemental judg-

ment filed by Judge Shapiro in June of 1980.

Under those circumstances I submit it’s not unrea-

sonable for Mr. Simmons to believe that the property is

rightfully his. And if he hears an assistant attorney gen-

eral in a hearing regarding the same property and then

the money involved in that property saying to a court, to

the Superior Court, in this case Judge Dupont, that he

believes that there was nothing but an executory contract

for the sale of land and that no title could possibly vest in

the state because no deed had been transferred — what's

what Mr. Goldstein said and that’s what we offered to

prove, and Judge Harleston would not allow - it’s cer-

tainly going to be reasonable for the - for the defendant

in this case, a layperson, to believe that the property is

his and the title has not in fact passed, even though the

Supreme Court has said in effect that it did. And of

course the Supreme Court didn’t actually - I’m sorry -

say that, what they simply said was that they affirmed

the judgment. And then they ruled on two things, they

ruled that section 13b-64 didn’t apply to that particular

[12] situation and they ruled that Mr. Simmons had been

adequately represented by counsel before Judge Shapiro.

That is all they ruled on in their per curiam opinion,

nothing else.

App. 22

Your Honor, if I may I’d like to reserve up to eight

minutes. I don’t know how much time I’ve got left

because I wasn’t watching my watch.

JUSTICE LAVERY: You have about six minutes.

MR. NAAB: Okay. I'd like to reserve the rest of

it, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LAVERY: Okay.

MR. EAST: Good morning, Your Honor. May it

please the court, my name is John East, I’m an assistant

state’s attorney with the appellate bureau of the Chief

State’s Attorney’s Office, representing the appellee State

of Connecticut in this appeal.

Your Honors, I’d like to open up by stating that

although the factual history of this case, the underlying

factual history is complex and even convoluted, the ques-

tions for this court here today are rather and simple and

straightforward. Primarily, did the trial court abuse its

discretion in its evidenciary rulings or did it mislead the

jury in its instructions? I think that an objective examina-

tion of the record will show that the trial court acted

properly in both instances.

[13] And I should - going right to the crux of the

defendant’s claim is that even if the trial court abused its

discretion in its evidenciary claims, which the state

wholeheartedly — the state said it did not, or mislead the

jury in its instructions, the defendant still was able to

testify forcefully and repeatedly at trial as to his belief

that he either owned or was licensed or privileged to

enter the property. His defense was not short cut or

truncated at all by the rulings or the instructions the trial

App. 23

court delivered. And on that point, unless this court has

specific questions or inquiry on particular points the state

is content to rely on its brief and urge an affirmance of

this conviction. Thank you, Your Honors.

JUSTICE LAVERY: Okay.

MR. NAAB: May it please the court. Did the

trial court mislead the jury in its instructions. I’ve briefed

the issues but there’s one that I haven’t mentioned so far

today and perhaps the court may have some question on

it. And that is my exception to the court’s defining license

without defining privilege for the jury in connection with

a criminal trespass statute.

Mr. Simmons never made a claim of license. That is,

he never made a claim that the owner of the property had

given him a special permission. He [14] claimed that he

was privileged to be on the property because it was his

property, and the definitions of the two words are really

very, very different.

JUSTICE LANDAU: If I may interrupt you,

counsel, I have somewhat of a problem. That was not, as I

understand it, taken and discussed by the state. Now

you're seeking to rebut an argument of the state?

MR. NAAB: He said that the issue was very

simple, did Judge Harleston mislead the jury, that’s what

I’m addressing, Your Honor. I'll desist if you like.

JUSTICE LANDAU: No, I don’t like anything. I

mean, it’s not what I like. You’ve convinced me.

MR. NAAB: I would - in that regard, Your

Honors, I simply refer you, if I may, to a source which I

did not cite in my brief, to with, Black’s Law Dictionary,

App. 24

the definitions of license, the real property law definition

of license, which is pretty much what Judge Harleston

told the jury and the definition of privilege. Which is a

very different, very different definition.

Privilege: A particular and peculiar benefit or

advantage enjoyed by a person, company or class beyond

the common advantages of other citizens. The privilege of

an owner to do what he or she wants with his property, in

essence.

[15] With respect to Mr. Simmons’ testimony being

extensive and unfettered. His testimony was extensive

but it was not unfettered by any means. Most of his

testimony that was heard by the jury was on cross-exam-

ination by the state. Most of his direct testimony was in

offers of proof outside the presence of the jury for Judge

Harleston alone, and he was not permitted to testify to a

great deal that he wanted to.

But more importantly, his testimony came in exceed-

ingly disjointedly and broken up because of the way the

trial went forward, with the objections by the state and

Judge Harleston’s rulings. He was not permitted to put in

his story in a coherent, orderly manner so that the jury

could understand the rationality of his sincere belief that

that property was his. Thank you, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LAVERY: Thank you both.

HERE END THE PROCEEDINGS OF MAY 10, 2000.

OIA i BE Sot GA AE Me VY, “

ISTE Sa eee HAD

App. 25

[16] AC18814

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

VS.

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS

CERTIFICATION

I, William H. Juall, do hereby certify that the forego-

ing is a true and accurate transcription of the tape in the

above-captioned matter, heard before the Appellate Court

of the State of Connecticut on May 10, 2000, in Hartford,

Connecticut.

Dated this day of June 12, 2000, in Hartford, Connect-

icut.

/s/ William H. Juall

William H. Juall

Court Monitor

iii

App. 26

EXHIBIT D

April 11, 1998

Robert Juliano, Director

Airports & Ports

Department of Transportation

State of Connecticut

2800 Berlin Turnpike

Newington, CT 06131-7546

Re: Security Fence

Bradley International Airport

a

Dear Robert,

The State of Connecticut, Department of Transportation

(Airports and Ports), owners and operators of the airport

of which you are currently director was notified by certi-

fied mail dated September 18, 1996 and again on May 19, |

1997 that further encroachments upon claimant’s land as

a TRESPASSER on Parcel “A” as designated on a map

that was submitted with the letter of September 18, 1996

was an act of spite, ill-will, fraud and malicious harass-

ment, another police power action, not withstanding that

the entry upon plaintiff's Parcel “C” wherein federal

instrumentation is located is a continuing trespass, hav-

ing appropriated the land for public purposes without

ever acting under legislative authority or federal regula-

tions and to make compensation therefor.

TRESPASSING

1. The letter to landowner from F.A.A., dated 26

May 1971 (Ex #1) acknowledges that the failure to obtain

an adequate property interest over the several attempts of

App. 27

the state to condemn the necessary land interests, WITH-

OUT COMPENSATION, was tantamount to an admission

that not only was the state agency a TRESPASSER, but,

the FA.A. having already intruded upon the property,

having made navigational installations of a permanent

nature, WITHOUT COMPENSATION, was accomplished

by virtue of a TRESPASS.

DELIBERATE MALEVOLENCE

2. The Rogin-Hirtle law firm having been retained

specifically for hearings in damages, against the state,

engages in a course of fraudulent conduct, in concert

with and full knowledge of the Airports and Ports Divi-

sion of the Connecticut Department of Transportation to

nullify all liability for damages with the “combining of

cases” on a sua-sponte basis on December 13, 1977 (date

of appearance) in violation of practice book and court

procedures, that included Docket #162923, an ejectment

action that had gone to judgment after thirty (30) trial

days, recorded with the Superior Court clerk on January

17, 1977, was made with the express fraudulent purpose

of DENYING, DEPRIVING plaintiff of just compensation

and concealment of fraud. The judgment (#162923) con-

tained rental for Parcel “C” for the years 1964-1969, and,

also EXPOSED the fact that leases by the state to the

F.A.A, of the subject property (Parcel “C”) should not be

renewed. Such deprivations of just compensation, guar-

anteed by the fifth and fourteenth amendments was suffi-

cient cause to hand deliver a written DISCHARGE,

TERMINATION, WALKING PAPERS, to the Rogin-Hirtle

law firm on December 23, 1977.

App. 28

3. The imposition upon plaintiff by deceit, duress,

fraud to sign a waiver not to pursue two (2) federal court

actions, one of which, 472 F2d 509 was on remand from

the second circuit on December 12, 1977, BEFORE an

appearance was filed in state court on December 13, 1977

on the pretense that withdrawal had to be signed before

an offer can be submitted was deliberate, corrupt, deceit-

ful, pre-planned conduct to DEPRIVE, DENY plaintiff of

just compensation, made with the tacit approval of the

Airports and Ports Division of the Connecticut Depart-

ment of Transportation and was further cause to imme-

diately dispense with such unwanted and trammeled

representation with a hand delivered discharge on

December 23, 1977.

4. Where appraisals are mandatory under federal

and state law to establish “fair-market value,” are a pre-

requisite to any negotiations, the failure to address dam-

ages, mandated by federal law and state statute and

Special Act #170 with the hearing dates previously sched-

uled were — “pigeon-holed,” “squirreled-away” was even

further cause to REJECT all offers with a DISCHARGE,

TERMINATION on December 23, 1977. Where the state

agency, in collusion and concert with the private law firm

creates a “slush fund” that they fully understood was in

violation of federal law and state statute, contributed to

bargaining in bad faith, deprivation of constitutionally

mandated compensation with a fund that the Attorney

General’s office (Feingold, V.) stated only “Jesus Christ”

knew where or how the numbers came from.

5. The attempt to bargain, without a written state-

ment of compensation, mandatory under federal and

state law, where the Airports Division of the Connecticut

ieised Sad has

5 5 a

os

Piel SW 4 SR A ed gle aa

oe

ere a

fiat oye Forgery ee ra

Withee ee DIA SAL TS REA DE ie at ee Zinilad

App. 29

Department of Transportation gave ASSURANCES to the

F.A.A. that federal and state laws would be complied

with where federal funds and/or projects were involved

proved conclusively that the course of conduct was so

corrupt that it could not be put down on paper, rendering

the proceeding a FRAUD with excessive coercion.

6. The return to the general fund by the F.A.A. of

funds allocated under the grant-agreement (9-06-009-5708

(1955)) for the acquisition of “clear zones” on the subject

property (Parcel “C”) is admission of trespassing, a depri-

vation of just compensation as guaranteed by the fifth

and fourteenth amendments and engaging in blatant

fraud by entering into leases from the state, having full

knowledge no proceedings were instituted, no compensa-

tion paid.

7. The return to the state treasury of the “slush-

fund” by the Superior Court on December 23, 1991 for

reasons that the court was without subject matter juris-

diction, none of the necessary parties having been served

or given notice, constructive or implied, is proof positive

that the Airports and Ports Division of the Connecticut

Department of Transportation has been engaged in CON-

TINUOUS TRESPASSING. Where C.G.S. 48-21 mandates

all lien-holders, must be paid first, before the owner, and

the (twice) fired, discharged, terminated private counsel

had NO AUTHORITY to proceed after discharge, after

submitting a withdrawal from all Simmons matters on

April 19, 1978, after sending a sheriff to attach plaintiff's

property on the public land records for attorney fees on

April 20, 1978, had NO AUTHORITY to submit monies to

the court as withdrawn and discharged counsel.

App. 30

NOTICE —- SERVICE - “BLACK-EYE”

8. The “black-eye,” for lack of a better term, applies

to Simmons v Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 for the reasons to

wit:

A. From Windsor v McVeigh, 93 US 274 (1876) court

said: “A proceeding” continued the court “professing to

determine the right of property, where no notice, written

or constructive, is given, whatever else it might be called,

would not be entitled to be dignified with the name of a

judicial proceeding. It would be a mere arbitrary edict,

not to be regarded anywhere as the judgment of a court.”

B. From Case v Humhrey, 6 Conn 130, 139 (1826)

court said: “The deficiency of service in Case v. Humphrey,

supra, arose from an inadequate affidavit relative to the

deputation of an indifferent person who left purported

process with the defendant. Since there was no actual

service of process, the ensuing judgment was - extra

judicial and void” 6 Conn AT 139. “Because of this no

determination by the court of the respective rights of the

parties was entitled to legal validity, regardless of when

the defendant appeared to apprise the court of lack of

jurisdiction. Where a writ is a nullity, so that judgment

thereon would be incurably erroneous, it is de facto

abated, and even the explicit admission of its validity by

the party, never concludes the court.”

C. It is a basic tenet of our judicial system that

unless a duly authorized and directed officer makes ser-

vice and return of a writ of summons (or attachment) and

complaint there is no mesne process (citations omitted).

App. 31

D. The Connecticut Supreme Court has consistently

held that: “It is a principle of natural justice of universal

obligation, that before the rights of an individual be

bound by a judicial sentence he shall have notice . . . of

the proceedings against him” Parsons v Lyman, 32 Conn

566, 576, quoting Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in the Mary,

13 US (9 Cranch) 126, 3 L.Ed 678. Fundamental tenets of

due process, moreover, require that all persons directly

concerned in the result of an adjudication be given rea-

sonable notice and the opportunity to present their claims

or defenses (citations omitted).

E. The Supreme Court of United States in Shaffer v

Heitner 433 US 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53 L.Ed 2d 683 (1977)

enunciated both a new rule and its rationale - that new

rule: “All assertions of state court jurisdiction must be

evaluated according to the standards set forth in [Interna-

tional Shoe Co. v Washington 326 US 310, 66 S.CT 154, 90

L.Ed 95 (1945)] and its progeny. Those standards require

certain minimum contacts with it such that the mainte-

nance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of

fair play and substantial justice. Those standards apply to

judgments in personam, and to judgments against a natu-

ral person, as well as to judgments against a corporation.

The standard for determining whether an exercise of

jurisdiction over the interests of persons is consistent

with the due process clause is the minimum - contacts

standard elucidated in International Shoe (excerpted

from 178 Conn 308 AT p. 318 (1979)).

App. 32

FEDERAL PUBLIC LAW 91-646

9. It is abundantly clear the Connecticut Depart-

ment of Transportation, your division, and your prede-

cessors also appealed to the state legislature in 1971 for

legislation (48-17 a, b, c,) (Ex #2), designed to comply

with Title III of Federal Public Law 91-646 and where the

division you represent, or its predecessors, ABANDONED

proceedings against Parcel “A” after several years of

tortious condemnation conduct, substantial costs, attor-

ney fees, fraud, entering into leases of Parcel “C” to the

F.A.A., after the condemned property reverted back to the

owner (Vol. 52, p. 242-243, E.G.L.R.), without notice or

compensation to the owner, in total disregard of federal

law and the state legislation that you, your division, or

your predecessors appealed to the legislature to enact,

that was approved on June 23, 1971 and the federal law

was mandatory on all states no later than July 1, 1972,

plaintiff is entitled and required to recover his damages,

past, present and future in one action (but not necessarily

in one count). (Docket #163875)

POLICE POWER

10. The resort to police power, in lieu of proceeding

under constitutional statutes has departed so far from the

original intent of the obligations of the Airports Division

to acquire “satisfactory property interests” as defined in

14 C.F.R. 152, 3 of federal regulations as to make a

“sham” of the regulations promulgated by the United

States Department of Transportation, mandated by the

Uniform Real Property Acquisition Act — by attempting to

BACKDATE a taking to November 12, 1964. It was

Oe tt Haare’ &

App. 33

obvious FRAUD to try and relieve defendants from lia-

bility for the damages resulting to the plaintiffs from the

prior and continuing trespassing.

11. The owner is being “polite” in serving notice

after notice. The fence on Parcel “A” will be removed

without further notice.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons

Augustus J. Simmons

P.O. Box #1

Windsor, CT 06095

(860) 569-6714

cc: Exhibits

Copies to:

David R. Hinson, Administrator

Federal Aviation Administration

800 Independence Ave. S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20591

Robert S. Bartanowicz, Regional Director

12 New England Executive Park

Burlington, MA 01803

Vincent A. Scarano, Director of Airports, N.E.

12 New England Executive Park

Burlington, MA 01803

William Sullivan, Commissioner

Connecticut Department of Transportation

2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546

Newington, CT 06131-7546

Alan N. Ponanski, Asst. Atty. Gen.

55 Elm St., Third Floor Annex

Hartford, CT 06106

App. 34

Otto Witt, Esq. & Associates

185 Silas Deane Highway

Wethersfield, CT 06109

Chief Clerk, Superior Court

Michael DiDonato

(to be made part #163875 file)

85 Washington St.

Hartford, CT 06106

State Attorney’s Office

State of Connecticut Court House

Enfield, CT 06082

Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle

1 CityPlace

Hartford, CT 06103

(Exhibit 1)

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

New England Region

154 Middlesex Street

Burlington, Mass. 01803

Tel. (617) 223-2271

[seal]

26 May 1971

Mr. Augustus J. Simmons

580 Park Avenue

Windsor, Connecticut 06095

Dear Mr. Simmons:

Your letter of 28 April 1971 has been referred to this office

for reply to the question concerning the status of federal

VERA RL ADA AERO ALE IANA DB EYED ERENT OLAS,

ig EN ARK Sr Ce BN MOTO SPT EINE

App. 35

funding insofar as it relates to Bradley Field, Windsor

Locks, Connecticut. The State of Connecticut, under a

Grant Agreement issued under Federal Aid Airport Pro-

gram, Project No. 9-06-009-5708 has been obligated to

acquire your property in addition to other properties

under separate ownerships. The State has acquired ail

other properties but has, to date, not succeeded in obtain-

ing adequate interest in your property due, of course, to

the litigation arising over the several attempts of the State

to condemn the necessary land interests.

This agency has not withheld funds from the State under

the project. We have, in fact, participated to the fullest

extent under our regulations in all other costs incurred

except, of course, costs related to the acquisition of your

property. We have administratively determined to reserve

rights for the State of Connecticut to request federal

participation in the costs of acquiring your land after it

has been accomplished successfully.

While we understand your anxiety to retain possession of

your land, the acquisition for the benefit of Bradley Field

has been considered to be overriding. Consequently, our

agency favorably reviewed the State’s request for federal

aid. The material submitted with your correspondence is

returned herewith.

Sincerely,

/s/ [Illegible]

for J. B. Komich

Acting Chief, Airports Division, NE-600

Enclosures

App. 36

Exhibit 2

TUESDAY MARCH 9, 1971

JUDICIARY COMMITTEE

For your information, H.B. #7038 —- An Act Concerning

Relocation Assistance was introduced by the Chairman of

this Committee in order that the Transportation Depart-

ment could comply with the provisions of public law

91-646. Mr. Knurek has also drafted a substitute for H.B.

#7038 which will be presented at the Hearing on that Bill.

He also has included here a statement which will be

presented at the Hearing which I will leave for your

information and we ask your support for substitute H.B.

#7038 as being in compliance with Public Law 91-646 in

order to obtain Federal Aid for highways.

Also comment on subsitute Bill #6892.

H.B. #6892 - AN ACT CONCERNING A UNIFORM REAL

PROPERTY ACQUISITION POLICY.

H.B. #6892 was introduced at the request of the

Department of Transportation as a hold bill

designed to comply with Title III of the Federal

Public Law 91-646 which establishes a uniform

policy of real property acquisition practices. I

have copies here for the committee of Title III of

that Public Law which I will leave for the mem-

bers of the Committee.

As written, Bill #6892 requires all governmental

agencies, State and Town, to comply with Sec-

tions 303 and 304 of the Public Law mentioned

and requires that said governmental agencies

shall be guided by the real acquisition policies

in Section 301 and the provisions of Section 302.

idiots tsa wle beans

REE eee eae

App. 37

As far as the Department of Transportation is

concerned, it is presently authorized to pay or

reimburse property owners for the necessary

expenses specified in these Sections except for

the provision paying reasonable attorney,

appraisal and engineering fees if the final judg-

ment by a court is that the Department cannot

acquire a particular piece of real property by

condemnation or 2) the condemnation proceed-

ing is abandoned by the Transportation Com-

missioner. The Transportation Department is

guided by and coniplies with the land acquisi-

tion policies in Section 301 and Section 302 of

said Federal Public Law 91-646.

I would like to submit a substitute Bill for 6892

which would authorize the Transportation

Department to comply with the only provision

of Title III of Public Law 91-646 which is not

authorized by Statute to do at the present time.

Thank you.

Rep. Carrozzella: Would you leave those statements with

the girl so that she can use them in transcribing. Com-

missioner Carey — oh, you have already spoken. Attor-

ney Carrigan.

Mr. Garrison: Mr. chairman, Members of the Committee

my name is John Garrison. I am an attorney in Hartford

but I am here today representing the New England

Land Title Association. I am the Chairman of their

Judiciary Committee and I am here speaking on behalf

of the Executive Committee of the New England Land

Title Association - for those who don’t know what the

Association is, it is an Association made up of the title

companies doing business in the New England States

and many of the attorneys who deal primarily with the

conveyancing aspects of real Estate.

App. 38

June 3, 1971

payment will, must be made so that the State Department

of Transportation can comply with Section 304, Title 3 of

the United States Code. And so, that the State Depart-

ment will not lose Federal Funds for highways.

For those who may be interested, in inverse condem-

nation is where you have land locked piece of land, and

you would have an opportunity to bring an action to

force the state to bring condemnation proceedings.

THE CHAIR:

Question is on passage, will you remark further? If

not all those in favor of passage signify by saying, “aye”.

Opposed, “nay”. Bill is passed.

THE CLERK:

CAL. NO. 971. File No. 1360. Favorable report of the

joint Committee on judiciary. Substitute House Bill 7486.

An Act Concerning Retirement of a Judge of Probate.

SENATOR JACKSON:

Mr. President, I move acceptance of the joint commit-

tee’s favorable report and passage of the bill. This bill

spells out the length of service required for retirement of

Probate court Judges. I urge passage.

THE CHAIR:

Will you remark further? If not, all those in favor of

passage signify by saying, “aye”. Opposed, “nay”. The

ayes have it. Bill is passed.

I Re a at ee ae Ee ae Le ee NS Nl RET I TE Re ot ae

App. 39

THE CLERK:

CAL, NO, 972, File 1966, Favorable report of the joint

committee on Appropriations, Substitute Senate Bill S70,

An Act Concerning Provision for bus Tranaportation for

children Attending Private Schools,

SENATOR HOULBY:

Mr. President, I move the acceptance of the joint

committee’s favorable

* * *

Substitute House Bill No. 6892

PUBLIC ACT NO, 518

AN ACT CONCERNING A UNIFORM REAL PROPERTY

ACQUISITION POLICY,

He it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa

tivea in General Assembly convened:

Section 1, The atate court having jurisdiction of a

proceeding instituted by a state agency to acquire real

property by condemnation shall award the owner of any

right, or title to, or interest in, such real property such

sum as will in the opinion of the court reimburse such

owner for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and

expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal and

engineering fees, actually incurred because of the con-

demnation proceedings, if (1) the final judgment is that

the state agency cannot acquire the real property by

App. 40

condemnation; or (2) the proceeding is abandoned by the

atate,

See, 2, The atate court rendering a judgment for the

plaintiff in an inverse condemnation proceeding brought

againat the state by the owner of real property, or the

attorney general effecting a settlement of any such pro=

ceeding, shall determine and award or allow to such

plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such

sum as will in the opinion of the court or the attorney

general reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs,

disbursements and expenses, including reasonable attor-

ney, appraisal and engineering fees, actually incurred

because of such proceeding.

Sec. 3. Any award made pursuant to section 1 or 2

of this act shall be paid by the head of the state agency

for whose benefit the condemnation proceedings was

instituted,

See, 4, This act shall take effeet from ite passage,

Approved June 23, 1971

*

ie

&:

4

r:

¥

App. 4T

EXHIBIT EB

No, CR9?7-106221 SUPERIOR COURT

No, CRYP-0104990

No, CRY9?7-0108048

STATE OF JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

CONNECTICUT HARTFORD/ NEW

BRITAIN AT ENFIELD

VS.

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS

Attn.: Chief Clerk

MOTION TO DISQUALIFY, DISMISS, “PACK THE

BAGS” OF THE STATE ATTORNEY’S OFFICE WHO ARE

- OR REPRESENT - THE WORLD RECORD TRES-

PASSERS OF THIRTY-FIVE (35) YEARS = AND COUNT-

ING, FROM EXECUTING VOID WARRANTS UPON

ADDITIONAL TRESPASSING,

It followa that where the court has no jurisdiction of

the real property, or the person(s), treapasa will lie

againat the officer for a selgure of the owner under the

pretense of a purported judgment that ia not voidable,

not void, but NON-EXISTENT on the court recorda,

The court and the officer are all trespassers, Wise e

Withers, 7 U.S, 331, 2 L.Ed 457,

MAY 8, 1998

RECORD

1. A quarter of a century ago, the courts, federal

and state, the Connecticut legislature, the land records

clearly established trespassing (failure to pay compensa-

tion) had transpired the previous ten (10) years.

App. 42

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals (federal) 472

F2d 509 (1973),

The Connecticut Supreme Court (state) 160 Conn. 492

(1971).

The Connecticut legislature enactment of Special Act

# 170 (1969),

The public land records of the town of East Granby,

CT wherein all previously condemned real property

revert and pass to and vest in plaintiff at Vol. 52, page

242-243 (March 24, 1972) (Defendant Ex. #1).

2. The actor’s failure to remove from land in the

possession of another a structure, chattel, or other thing

which he has tortiously erected or placed on the land

constitutes a continuing trespass for the entire time dur-

ing which the thing is wrongfully on the land and confers

on the possessor of the land an option to maintain a

succession Of actions based on the theory of continuing

trespass or to treat the continuance of the thing on the

land as at. AGGRAVATION of the ORIGINAL TRESPASS.

4, The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is

ituminated by the twice (2) discharged private counsel

(Rogin-Hirtle), acting as judicial officers, UNSUCCESS-

FUL exploit to acquire title to the property, with a court

reporter making a record of proceedings (Defendant Ex.

#2).

4. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is

extended with the submission of a WITHDRAWAL to the

owner on Apri] 19, 1978 (Defendant Ex. #3).

5. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is

further extended with the private counsel sending sheriff

Sp eee

Baits

Bey wee

eT ee ene Pte

Chain ee cay ae Le

OBA PUM NAR ENS act aunt ndbleca Oat

®

a :

ae

e

*:

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*.

App. 43

after owner for counsel fees, recording same on East

Granby, CT public land records at Vol. 59, page 419

(Defendant Ex. #4).

NO MESNE PROCESS —- NON-EXISTENT JUDGMENT

6. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is

manifest from the submission by the (honest) Chief Clerk

of the Superior Court in Hartford in August, 1979 of the

citation Shelton v Wolthausen, 80 c 599 to the Hon. John

Daly making evident there were NO purported judg-

ments or proceedings, of any nature, before ‘the court.

(Defendant Ex. #5 & #5a). Linda (Cohen) was first assis-

tant in 1979 to Chief Clerk Lucian (Jachomovitz). As the

“undated” note indicates, NO monies was paid to

“Rogin-Hirtle-Salzman” esquires. This notice preceded

Simmons v Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 (1980).

7. The Superior Court record shows Hon. Judge

Arnold Aronson returning the funds before the court

back to the state treasury on December 23, 1991 for rea-

sons the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and no

notice or service was ever made on the SEVERAL neces-

Sary parties.

NO NOTICE - NO SERVICE

8. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is

manifest from a letter to Jason Pearl, Esq. (representing

Rogin-Hirtle-Salzman) from referee Shapiro, dated July

18, 1980, calling attention to the fact “SEVERAL” encum-

berances are on the land records prior to the date of the

Salzman attachment, acknowledging the fact the Superior

App. 44

Court had no proceedings before it, acknowledging that

notice to the various creditors may be (IS) necessary. This

letter was post Simmons v Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587.

(Defendant Ex. #6)

LAND RECORDS - EAST GRANBY, CT 1996

9. The AGGRAVATION of the original trespass is

manifest from the recording on the public land records

that NO compensation has been paid to one of several

lien-holders (Thomas P. Byrne, Esq.) whose lien dates

back to 1974, a full quarter of a century, and evidenced at

Vol. 112, page 001-008 (Defendant Ex. #7). Connecticut

eminent domain statute C.G.S. § 48-21 mandates all lien

holders must be paid first, BEFORE the owner.

COMPENSATION

10. Failure to pay compensation is TRESPASSING.

“Adequate provision for obtaining compensation” must

exist prior to any seizure, condemnation, physical intru-

sion, constitutional deprivation, Cherokee Nation v South-

ern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641, 659, 10 S. Ct. 965, 34 L.Ed. 295

(1890); see Bragg v Weaver, 251 U.S. 57, 62, 40 S. Ct. 62, 64

L.Ed. 135 (1919); Pumpelly v Green Bay Co., 80 U. S. (13

Wall) 166, 175, 20 L.Ed. 557 (1871).

11. Damages, a vested property right (see Ettor v

Tacoma, 228 U.S. 148), having accrued over the past thirty-

five years, and CONTINUING, were cast in complaint in

tort (Docket #163875), on file with the Superior Court in

Hartford, cannot be destroyed or ignored by the state

attorney’s office, or any other judicial officer, without a

i ORS iat ak pas

RRR GGA STNG

ie eet ee ame ie mali ce esnips eon

A dsl BOT WABI RAIS. GER Gtk . SAR ESA EIA SIREE LN Hine a RD GEIR ae

:

=

a

-

&

bon

=

App. 45

violation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-

ment.

CONCLUSION

12. The allegations and exhibits do set forth an

undeniable, unquestionable, TRESPASS.

NOTICE

13. On April 11, 1998 correspondence was

addressed to Robert Juliano, Director, Airports and Ports

concerning this trespassing with copies to several neces-

sary parties and ERROR was made at the very top of the

page with a date of April 11, 1997. Copies of this motion

are being sent to the same parties requesting a CORREC-

TION of the date to April 11, 1998.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons

Augustus J. Simmons

P.O. Box #1

Windsor, CT 06095

(860) 569-6714

cc: Exhibits

Copies to:

David R. Hinson, Administrator

Federal Aviation Administration

800 Independence Ave. S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20591

Robert S. Bartanowicz, Regional Director

12 New England Executive Park

Burlington, MA 01803

App. 46

Vincent A. Scarano, Director of Airports, N.E.

12 New Ehgiand’ Execunve fark

Burlington, MA 01803

William Sullivan, Commissioner

Connecticut Department of Transportation

2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546

Newington, CT 06131-7546

Alan N. Ponanski, Asst. Atty. Gen.

55 Elm St., Third Floor Annex

Hartford, CT 06106

Otto Witt, Esq. & Associates

185 Silas Deane Highway

Wethersfield, CT 06109

Chief Clerk, Superior Court

Michael DiDonato

(to be made part #163875 file)

85 Washington St.

Hartford, CT 06106

State Attorney’s Office

State of Connecticut Court House

Enfield, CT 06082

Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle

1 CityPlace

Hartford, CT 06103

App. 47

Exhibit 1

VOL 52 — PACE 242

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

No. 156899

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS, : | SUPERIOR COURT

OF WINDSOR

VS. : COUNTY OF HARTFORD

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS, -

OF WINDSOR

“ APRIL 16, 1971

FRANK C. PARIZEK, OF

WILLINGTON; and

EDWARD J. COADY, OF

WEST HARTFORD; and

KINGSLEY GILLESPIE,

OF STAMFORD; and

HUGH C. CURRAN, OF

BRIDGEPORT; and

ARTHUR S. SACHS, OF

ORANGE; and E.

DONALD WALSH, OF

WATERTOWN, all duly _ .

appointed members of the -

Aeronautics Commission

of the State of

Connecticut

JUDGMENT

PRESENT HON. JOHN CLARK FITZGERALD,

JUDGE:

This action, by Writ and Complaint, dated July 15,

1968, as amended December 11, 1968 and December 20,

App. 48

1968, and by a Substituted Complaint, dated June 4, 1969,

claiming a temporary and permanent injunction and

other relief, as on file, came to this Court on the first

Tuesday of August, 1968, when the parties appeared, and

thence to September 18, 1969 when the plaintiff filed his

Reply to the defendants’ Answer and Special Defense,

and the parties were at issue as on file.

Said cause thence came to the present time when the

Court entered Judgment in accordance with paragraphs 2

and 5 of the plaintiff’s Substituted Complaint.

Whereupon, it is adjudged that the Certificate of

Taking filed in the Land Records of the Town of East

Granby in Volume 46, Page 113, is null and void, and that

It is further adjudged that title to the premises

described in the aforesaid Certificate of Taking, as owned

by the plaintiff, revert and pass to and vest in the plain-

tiff.

/s/ Fitzgerald

Judge

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )

) ss.

Hartford County, )

[SEAL] I, Thomas H. Abraham, Clerk of the Supreme

Court of said State within and for said County.

HEREBY CERTIFY the foregoing to be a true copy of

record, of the Judgment in No. 156899, Augustus J. Sim-

mons vs Frank C. Parizek, et al.

App. 49

In Testimony WuerEFOR, I have hereunto set my hand and

the seal of said Supreme Court, at Hartford, in said

County, this 7th day of September, 1971

/s/ Thomas H. Abraham, Clerk.

[ILLEGIBLE]

Received March 24, 1972 at 2:35 P. M. By /s/ Miriam

W. Vieta, Town Clerk.

Vol. 52 — Page 243

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That the

Society for Savings, a Corporation chartered by the State

of Connecticut, and doing business in the Town and City

of Hartford, County of Hartford, in said State, does

hereby release and discharge a certain mortgage from

ROGER J. GAGNON and DIANNE E. GAGNON

to the said SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS, dated July 23, 1962

and recorded in the Land Records of the Town of East

Granby in the County of Hartford, and State of Connecti-

cut, in volume 36 at page 275 at which reference may be

had:

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Society for Savings, by

CLARENCE W. HAMSTEDT its Assistant Vice-President,

duly authorized, has hereunto set its hand and seal this

22nd day of March 1972.

SOCIETY FOR SAVINGS,

By /s/ Clarence W. Hamstedt L.S.

CLARENCE W. HAMSTEDT

Assistant Vice-President

App. 50

Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of

/s/ Renee B. Hills

Renee B. Hills

/s/ William A. [Illegible]

William A. [Illegible]

STATE OF CONNECTICUT )

) ss.

COUNTY OF HARTFORD _)

Hartford, March 22, A. D. 1972

Personally appeared CLARENCE W. HAMSTEDT,

ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT, AS AFORESAID, signer

and sealer of the foregoing instrument, and acknowl-

edged same to be his free act and deed, and the free act

and deed of the Society for Savings before me.

Received March 24, 1972

at 3:20 P. M.

By /s/ Miriam W. Vieta, Town Clerk.

/s/ William A. [Illegible

William A. [Illegible)

My Commission Expires

Mar. 31, 1974

Notary Public

Exhibit 2

CLOSING REMARKS of proceedings held on April

19, 1978, at the offices of ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN,

App. 51

LASSMAN and BORDEN, ESQUIRES, 111 Pearl Street,

Hartford, Connecticut.

APPEARANCES:

Augustus (Ozzie) Simmons John Kataja

David Salzman, Esq.

Stephen Silverman, Esq.

Ned Rogin, Esq.

Phillip Robbins, Esq.

F. D. Neusner, Esq.

Dennis Cemeriva, Esq.

Robert L. Hirtle, Esq.

Reported by:

William G. Crampton

Certified Shorthand Reporter

Notary Public

* we *

[8] delivery of the deeds, of course. -

MR. HIRTLE: Mr. Simmons, as I understand it

you don’t want to proceed further with the closing, is that

correct?

MR. SIMMONS: Bob Hirtle, I have the highest

respect for you just like I sent you the letter, I have the

highest and utmost respect for Referee Shapiro and I

further qualified it by saying that I am not going to be a

party to any deal which is going to be coming out and

being made public whereby the Rogin firm and my good

friends here, Dave Salzman and Steve, who I have been

very prone to pick on. It is just not fair to everybody to

have this kind of an arrangement and I am not going to

be a party to it. What the State is attempting to do here is

to say okay let’s date this thing back so their skirts are

App. 52

clean. They want me to go back and do battle with the

Town over the taxes and I say bullshit to that. We are

going to clear that matter up before there will be any

Goddamned closing. We are going to get that cleared up

and they are going to be open and above board. I don’t

care if it is Referee Shapiro. Hell, it is everybody and I’m

telling you, everyone at the table, everything is going to

be above board and no dealing is going back to Novem-

ber of ’64.

MR. HIRTLE: You will not sign a deed today to

consummate the closing, is that what I understand?

MR. SIMMONS: Because the agreement states

and [9] I have to say if any portion of it is a nullity then it

is a nullity and I am not going to be a party to anything

that is a nullity.

MR. NEUSNER: Is that a definite negative

answer?

MR. HIRTLE: You are instructing counsel not to

proceed with the closing because you consider it to be a

nullity?

MR. SIMMONS: I am going to answer you Bob

by saying that I sent you a certified letter expressing my

position and when I talked to you on the phone, I said to

myself, at least I am going to give them the courtesy of

putting in an appearance today. I think that is a sufficient

answer.

MR. HIRTLE: So I am not to proceed to closing

and you will not sign the deeds today?

MR. SIMMONS: That is correct.

App. 53

MR. HIRTLE: And the meeting is adjourned.

(Whereupon at 11:44 o'clock a. m. the closing was

adjourned),

Kahibit 3

NO, 20212 Let

STATE OF | SUPERIOR COURT

CONNECTICUT | HARTFORD COUNTY

| APRIL 19, 1978

VS,

AUGUSTUS J, SIMMONS

NO, 199230-9

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS

vs.

SAMUEL KANELL, ET

AL

NO. 140965

STATE OF

CONNECTICUT

VS,

ANASTASIA SIMMONS

AUGUSTUS J, SIMMONS

and CHARLES SIMMONS

NO, 162928

AUGUSTUS J], SIMMONS

V5.

FRANK C, PARIZEK, ET

AL

App. 54

NO. 163875

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS

VS.

HORACE B,

WETHERELL, ET AL

MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL

The undersigned reapeetfully move for the permis:

sion of the Court to withdraw aa counsel for Auguatua J,

Simmona in the abovercaptioned mattera,

/a/ Robert L. Mirtle

ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN,

LASSMAN AND HIRTLE

/s/ David B, Salzman

DAVID B. SALZMAN, ESQUIRE

/s/ Stephen Silverman

STEPHEN SILVERMAN,

ESQUIRE

ORDER

The foregoing motion is granted/denied.

BY THE COURT

Clerk

Thia ia to certify that the foregoing haa been mailed thia

day to counsel of record and to the plaintiff,

/a/ Robert L, Mirtle, 4

obert L, Mirtle, |r,

App. 55

Exhibit 4

[LOGO] Cleaveland Legal Blank Service, Inc.

Hartford, Connecticut

EXPARTE

DAVID B. SALZMAN, | SUPERIOR COURT

BT AL HARTFORD COUNTY

V8,

APRIL 20, 1978

AUGUSTUS J, SIMMONS

ORDER GRANTING PREJTUDGMENT REMEDY

(WITHOUT HEARING)

The Application and Affidavit of Plaintiff(a) for Pre-

judgment Remedy purauant to C.G.S, Section 52-278a et

seq, as amended, having been presented to the Court and

there being probable cause to sustain the validity of the

Claim of the Plaintiff(s), it is iets ORDERED that the

Plaintiff(s) may

(a) attach to the sum of $105,000.00 the real estate stand-

ing in the name of the Defendant(s) Augustus J. Sim-

mons

tecated-at as described in Schedule A attached hereto.

(b) garnishee as the agent, trustee and debtor of the

Defendant(a) and ha _ concealed in _ handa, the

gooda, effecta and eatate of the Defendant(a) and —_

indebted to the Defendant(a),

(c) cause to be replevied to the Plaintiff(a) the cere

tain goods and chattela described in Exhibit attached

hereto and made a part thereof,

App. 56

Dated at Hartford, CT this 20th day of April 1978

/s/ [Illegible]

Judge

[logo] Cleaveland Legal Blank Service, Inc.

Hartford, Connecticut

BX PARTE

PER, NO

APPLICATION FOR PRE-JUDGMENT REMEDY TO

"ih SUPERIOR COURT TO BE HELD IN HART-

FORD, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

he uncderiigned represents:

1, that DAvIp B. SALZMAN, STEPHEN SILVER-

MAN and ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN, LASSMAN &

HIRTLE of 580 park Avenue, Windsor, CT pursuant to

the attached Proposed unsigned Writ, Summons, Com-

plaint and Affiqavit.

2. that there js probable cause that a judgment will

be rendered in such matter in favor of the applicant and

to secure such judgment the applicant seeks an order

from this court directing that the following prejudgment

remedy be issued to secure the sum of $105,000.00

a, To attach the following described real prop-

erty Of the Defendant(s) to Wit:

See attached description (Schedule A)

b. TO Balhishee ___, as he is the agent, trustee,

debtor of said Defendant and has concealed

int Nie hands the goods, effects and estate of

said Defendant and is indebted to him.

¢, TO fPlevy property described in Exhibit

App. 57

d. To enjoin the said __ his/her/their agents,

servants or employees from selling, trans-

ferring or encumbering any interest in and

to the above-described real property pend-

ing further order of this court.

PLAINTIFFS

/s/ By Jason E. Pearl

Jason E., Pearl Attorney

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PJ.R. APPLICATION

I, the undersigned, do make affidavit and say that there is

probable cause to sustain the validity of the Plaintiff’s

claim and

1. that the prejudgment remedy requested is for an

attachment of real property; or

2. that there is reasonable likelihood that the defen-

dant:

{ ] a. Neither resides in nor maintains an

office or place of business in this state

and is not otherwise subject to jurisdic-

tion over his person by the Court;

{ ] b. Has hidden or will hide himself so that

process cannot be served on him;

[ ] c. Is about to remove himself or his prop-

erty from this state;

[ ] d. Is about to fraudulently dispose of or

has fraudulently disposed of any of his

property with intent to hinder, delay or

defraud his creditors;

App. 58

[ ]e Has fraudulently hidden or withheld

money, property or effects which

should be liable to the satisfaction of

his debts;

[ ] f. Has stated he is insolvent or has stated

he is unable to pay his debts as they

mature.

I base this upon the following Statement of

Facts:

Affiant is an attorney at law who rendered legal ser-

vices together with the other plaintiffs for the defen-

dant totaling $104,505.00. Defendant has not paid the

same, despite demand.

/s/ David Salzman

Plaintiff-Competent Affiant

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4/20 day of __

1978

/s/ Robert Hirtle

Commissioner of the Superior Court -

Notary Public

App. 59

Exhibit 5

Law Offices

Jason E. Peral

19 SOUTH HIGH STREET

POST OFFICE BOX 183

New Britain, Connecticut 06050

Jason E. Pearl Telephone

Kenneth J. Spoyer (203) 229-1603

August 30, 1979

The Honorable John Daly

Superior Court

95 Washington Street

Hartford, CT

Re: David Salzman

Vs: Augustus Simmons

Docket No. 218559 8

Dear Judge:

First of all, welcome back from vacation.

While you were away on August 13 I received a

telephone call from one of the assistant clerks advising

me that if I wished to reargue my Motion For Turnover

dated July 25, 1979, I would have to claim it for the Short

Calendar. I was rather taken back by this announcement

inasmuch as my file indicates that you granted the

motion in open court on July 27, 1979. I recall you speak-

ing to me briefly subsequent to that time indicating that

you were going to meet with Mr. Abraham with respect

to the order, but you did not indicate to me that you had

vacated your prior decision. I would assume that for me

to be put into the position of having to “reargue” your

App. 60

prior decision would have to be revoked. Until that hap-

pens, I really do not know what there is for me to argue.

I would be most appreciative of your guidance in this

matter.

Yours very truly,

/s/ Jason E. Pearl, Esq.

Jason E. Pearl, Esq.

JEP/ck

1888

Hearing set up

for 9/12/79 at 2:00 p.m.

Exhibit 5

Linda,

Based on SHELTON V WOLTHAUSER, 80C 599 (fur-

nished by Lucian) I would leave no authority to grant this

motion. Will you kindly notify Jason Pearl regarding this

& if he wishes to argue the matter put it down.

Thanks

App. 61

Exhibit 6

STATE OF CONNECTICUT

LOUIS SHAPIRO SUPREME COURT BUILDING

STATE REFEREE P.O. DRAWER N. STATION A

HARTFORD, CONN. 06106

July 18, 1980

Jason E. Pearl, Esquire

19 South High Street

P.O. Box 183

New Britain, CT 06050

re: No. 16 38 75

Augustus J. Simmons v. Horace B. Wetherell, et al

Dear Mr. Pearl:

This will acknowledge receipt of your Motion For Dis-

bursement of Funds by Clerk dated July 16, 1980 and

received by me this morning.

Since your phone call to me, I am not certain as to what

steps should be taken in order to make disbursement as

requested by you. Since the amount attached by Atty.

Salzman et als was accomplished by bringing suit, it

would seem to me that before distribution could be made,

that this claim be reduced to a judgment. If there is a

more expeditious way to proceed, I would appreciate

hearing from you as soon as possible.

I’m also concerned about the order of distribution since

the land records, according to your memorandum

attached to your letter, show a list of encumbrances prior

to the date of the Salzman attachment.

Also, in view of the many complications which I antici-

pate, would it not be better to have this issue handled by

App. 62

the Superior Court? I am not equipped, as a referee to

give notice to the various creditors which I believe may

be necessary. It would seem that your motion could kz

handled properly by the Superior Court.

Very truly yours,

Louis Shapiro

State Referee

LS:med

cc: Ronald Cassidento, Esquire

William A. McQueeney, Esquire

Enc.: Copy of Mot. or Disbursement of Funds by Clerk

Exhibit 7

December 1, 1996

Town Clerk

Town Hail

9 Center Street

East Granby, CT 06026

Dear Clerk,

The subject of this letter pertains to: DISSOLUTION

OF ATTACHMENTS PURSUANT TO C.G.S. § 52-327.

1. Plaintiff-owner-interested person Augustus J.

Simmons requests the following listed encumberances be

endorsed on the record of such attachment with the

words “DISCHARGED BY OPERATION OF LAW” pur-

suant to Connecticut General Statute § 52-327.

2. The attachments on the public land records under

the caption of Augustus J. Simmons v Horace B. Wetherall,

App. 63

CV-70-163875 by private counsel, without any eminent

domain proceedings in existence-or-initiated for attach-

ment purposes, without any notice or service of process

on interested parties, without any return of service to the

court of competent jurisdiction (Superior Court) prior to

or after the attachment, and, without appraisals to estab-

lish fair-market value that are mandatory, including a

transfer of title under plaintiff’s private tort action,

Docket #163875 are:

Vol. 59, p. 657-668

Vol. 59, p. 654-656

Vol. 59, p. 623-626

Map Book 17, page 853

Map Book 17, page 854

3. Included in Vol. 59, p. 657-668 is a citation at page

661-662 of names of parties and institutions to be served

with notice with a return day of the first Tuesday of July,

1978.

4. Vol. 59, p. 661-662 DOES NOT list Augustus J.

Simmons for notice and service, however, he is still an

“interested person,” — he just happens to be the owner.

5. that there was NO officer’s service on any par-

ties, NO written return of his (officer’s) precept to the

court of competent jurisdiction (Superior Court) and NO

compensation paid is evident in a letter from Atty. Tom

Byrne, a copy being submitted as an exhibit showing an

encumberance at Vol. 55, page 731 (1974) of East Granby

land records (also listed in the citation at Vol. 59, p. 661-2)

that is still outstanding.

App. 64

The listed attachments in item #2 were recorded on

June 2nd and 5th of 1978 which is a much longer period

than FIFTEEN YEARS from date of attachment.

6. The interested person (owner) submits a sworn

testimonial from Atty. Walter Bass before Hon. Dupont,

A. on June 7, 1982 representing “Valente’s” and

“Allaire’s” with outstanding liens at Vol. 58, p. 95; Vol. 58,

p. 221; 59/253; 59/263, 59/266 (trans. p. 26) that states:

“Your Honor, in Mr. Feingold’s recitation that he

gave Your Honor this morning, I forget which paragraph

he referred to in Judge Shapiro’s decision, there was to be

a citation issued so that all people would come forth and

present their claims. I have a right to inform the court

that in the citation, my two clients were listed under the

care of my office. I will state to the court that I have never

been served any citation nor has my clients even been

served with any kind of a citation to give us any notice to

come in to determine what our priorities are in this

matter.”

The above citations of Valente and Allaire are (also

listed in the citation at Vol. 59, p. 661-2).

7. The caption Simmons v Wetherall, #163875, a tort

action AGAINST the state, a result of Special Act #170 of

the 1969 legislature, CANNOT be TRANSMOGRIFIED

into an eminent domain action by superimposing the

Connecticut Department of Transportation as plaintiff

(Vol. 59, p. 662), by private counsel, for land acquisition

for federal navigational instrumentation projects, per fed-

eral grant agreement 9-06-009-5708 (1955), that must be

acquired pursuant to federal regulations, constituting a

fraudulent encumberance.

App. 65

8. Under the law of Connecticut, any lien created by

attachment continues for 60 days after judgment and no

longer. If no execution is taken out before that time, the

lien perishes. Sanford v. Pond, (1871) 37 Conn. 588.

9. Where it is unambiguously clear there was no

notice, no service, or, return to the court of competent

jurisdiction, no judgment file or record of any kind before

the court of competent jurisdiction under Docket

#163875, and, the listed return day was the first Tuesday

of July, 1978 (Vol. 59, p. 661) and the attachments were

submitted on June 2nd and 5th of 1978, some of which

contained a court stamp of the Court Clerk (Thomas H.

Abraham) of Superior Court to give the appearance of

authenticity to the public is FRAUD upon the court, the

public, and the “interested persons” named in the cita-

tion.

Court records show the succeeding Chief Clerk,

(Lucian Jachomovitz) informing Hon. Judge John Daly in

August, 1979 there were NO proceedings before the Supe-

rior Court, consequently the Superior Court was without

jurisdiction to act, referencing the citation of Shelton v

Wolthausen, 80 c 599.

10. Court records show a motion filed with Judge

Aronson by plaintiff-owner-interested person (Simmons)

that jurisdiction could not be created “sua sponte” in

December, 1991 relative to the notice from the court to

Atty. Tom Byrne, and others, and as a result of said

motion the “slush fund” monies being held under the

direction of the court were ABANDONED.

11. Unquestionably, there is years, not months or

days beyond the statutory fifteen (15) years referenced

App. 66

and “DISCHARGED BY OPERATION OF LAW” is the

purpose and request of this letter.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons

Augustus J. Simmons

P.O. Box #1

Windsor, CT 06095

(860) 569-6714

cc: Exhibits

§ 52-327 CIVIL ACTIONS

Title 52

§ 52-327. Duration and release of attachment liens on

real estate

No attachment of real estate shall continue in force as

a lien for a longer period than fifteen years after the date

thereof unless within said period the action in which such

attachment was made has been prosecuted to effect and a

judgment lien filed according to law. All attachments of

real estate which _have expired as a lien by the provisions

of this section shall be deemed dissolved and the real

estate shall be free from any lien or encumbrance by

reason of the same and the town clerk of the town in

which such real estate is situated shall, upon the request

of any person interested, endorse on the record of such

attachment the words “discharged by operation of law.”

(1949 Rev., § 8026.)

App. 67

Plaintiff-owner-interested person hereby certifies that a

copy of this Request of Dissolution Pursuant to C.G.S.

§ 52-327 will be —- hand delivered to:

Chief Clerk (to be put in Simmons v

Superior Court Wetherall, #163875 file)

95 Washington St.

Hartford, CT 06106

Will be mailed, postage prepaid, first class to:

J. William Burns, Commissioner

Connecticut Department of Transportation

2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546

Newington, CT 06131-7546

Atty. Tom Byrne

2-E Farmington Commons

790 Farmington Ave.

Farmington, CT 06032

Otto P. Witt, Esq. & Associates

185 Silas Deane Highway ~

Wethersfield, CT 06109

Robert S. Bartanowicz, Regional Director

Federal Aviation Administration

12 New England Executive Park

Burlington, MA 01803

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons

Augustus J. Simmons

P.O. Box #1

Windsor, CT 06095

(860) 569-6714

App. 68

December 1, 1996

Chief Clerk

Superior Court

95 Washington St.

Hartford, CT 06106

Dear Michael,

The attached “Dissolution of Attachments Pursuant to

C.G.S. § 52-327” filed under the caption of Simmons v.

Wetherall, #163875 is being submitted to be made part of

the #163875 “damages” file.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons

Augustus J. Simmons

P.O. Box #1

Windsor, CT 06095

(860) 569-6714

LAW OFFICES

BYRNE & BYRNE

2-E FARMINGTON COMMONS

790 FARMINGTON AVENUE

FARMINGTON, CONNECTICUT 06032

THOMAS P. BYRNE - TELEPHONE

STEVEN E. BYRNE (203) 677-7355

25 November 1996

Augustus J. Simmons

P.O. Box 1

Windsor, CT 06095

Dear Ozzie,

The only activity of which I am aware with respect to a

mortgage dated July 3, 1974 as recorded in Volume 55

App. 69

Page 731 of the East Granby Land Records is notice of a

hearing to be held before Arnold Aronson, Judge of the

Superior Court, on December 23, 1991 to determine the

disposition of funds.

Enclosed herewith is a copy of the notice which I received

from the court as well as a copy of a letter to me dated

December 19, 1991 from Attorney Walter E. Bass, Jr. I did

not attend the hearing of December 23, 1991.

No payments have been received by me on this mortgage.

Very truly yours,

od

/s/ Thomas P. Byrne

Thomas P. Byrne

AUGUSTUS J SIMMONS VS.

WETHERALL, DEP COMR CV-70-0163875-S

ALL COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTIES ARE ORDERED

TO APPEAR BEFORE THE HONORABLE ARNOLD

ARONSON ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1991 AT 9 30

A.M. IN ROOM 111 AT HARTFORD SUPERIOR COURT,

95 WASHINGTON ST., HARTFORD, CT. A MOTION BY

THE COURT TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF

FUNDS WILL BE HEARD.

A COPY OF SAID MOTION WILL BE SENT TO ALL

COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTIES UNDER SEPARATE

COVER.

KAREN PICKER

ASSISTANT CLERK

App. 70

SUPERIOR COURT WALTER E BASS JR

95 WASHINGTON P. O. BOX 289

STREET EAST WINDSOR CT

P.O. DRAWER D, 06088

STATION A

HARTFORD,

CONNECTICUT 06106

DATED DEC 05, 1991

Law Office of

Walter E. Bass, Jr.

P.O. Box 289

Warehouse Point, Conn. 06088

Tel. 623-8688 Juris Number 02450

December 19, 1991

Attorney Thomas Byrnes

790 Farmington Avenue

Farmington, CT 06032

RE: Augustus J. Simmons

vs.

Horace Wetherell, et al

Dear Attorney Byrnes:

Please be informed that my office represents several cred-

itors of Mr. Augustus J. Simmons. Please by informed

that Judge Arnold Aronson is holding a hearing on

December 23, 1991 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 111 at

Hartford Superior Court. Enclosed please find a copy of a

Notice which my office has received concerning this hear-

ing. I would like to inform you, that I do believe that you

App. 71

have an interest in this case. I request that you be present

at this hearing.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact my

office.

Respectfully,

/s/ Walter E. Bass, Jr.

Walter E. Bass, Jr.

WEBjr. / mf

RECEIVED DECEMBER 2, 1996 AT 8:30 A.M.

BY /s/ Laurie B. LaFind

ASS’T. TOWN CLERK

Received 12/2, 1996

at 8:30 A.M.

Recorded in EAST GRANBY LAND RECORDS

Volume 112 Page 001

By /s/ Laura B. LaFind

Asst. Town Clerk

Augustus J. Simmons

P.O. Box 1

Windsor, CT 06095

App. 72

Exhibit F

No. CR97-0104930 SUPERIOR COURT

No. CR97-0105048 JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT , OF HARTFORD/

VS NEW BRITAIN AT

ENFIELD

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS MAY 12, 1997

Attn.: Chief Clerk,

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

The defendant moves that the court dismiss this

action because: '

SPECIAL ACT #170 (1969)

The defendant, Augustus J. Simmons, in the above

criminal actions was the plaintiff in the Simmons v

Wetherall, #163875 tort action, transmogrified by private

parties into a “confiscatory” eminent domain action with-

out any notice to any parties, without any return of

service to the courts of competent jurisdiction (Superior

Court), without “adequate provision for obtaining just

compensation” that must be made pursuant to statute,

and, secured in an action to the court, are “jurisdictional

facts” upon which the LACK OF JURISDICTION was put

squarely before the Superior Court on June 7, 1982 by the

Atty. General’s office (Feingold, V.) before Hon. Dupont,

A., Judge.

Sworn testimonial regard jurisdiction of the subject

matter, Victor Feingold, Esq. Asst. Atty. Gen., transcript

June 7, 1982 at page 17 reads: — “I now direct Your Honor,

and invite Your Honor’s attention to another element of

jurisdiction in the entire matter of Simmons v Wetherall. I

App. 73

might say that whenever I call Your Honor’s attention to

the question of jurisdiction, in accordance with the law of

the state, if lack of jurisdiction is brought to Your Honor’s

attention, I mean subject matter jurisdiction, no matter in

what form or in what way, Your Honor cannot proceed on

any of the proceedings until you resolve the issue of

subject matter jurisdiction. If, per chance, the jurisdiction

question is interwoven now with many other prior

motions that have not been acted upon, and it has hap-

pened, that it arises on the motions of a claimed predictor

of Mr. Simmons, it does not matter so long as this court,

the question of jurisdiction is called to Your Honor’s

attention.”

Neither in form or substance does this special act,

printed among the special acts, resemble the ordinary

grant of the exercise of the power of eminent domain —

for jurisdiction purposes. (see State v McCook, 109 Conn.

621).

The purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of

the special act was to determine the amount of damages

to be paid the owners of real property that was the

subject of condemnation in 1964 and 1968 that were ruled

“null and void” by the Supreme Court in 1971 (160 Conn.

492) without just compensation having been first made

and secured making a travesty of the constitutional pro-

visions protecting rights of property.

The validity of this act as an exercise of the power of

eminent domain lacks the principles which are applicable

to all statutes which provide for the taking of land by

eminent domain. Neither the attorneys nor the referee

App. 74

acted within their authority, for no valid taking by emi-

nent domain was given by this act. It’s claimed grant of

authority to acquire by seizure proceedings, land that

was never described in the act was wholly inoperative.

As stated in State v McCook, Supra, at 634, the court is

without judicial power to conclude that an act of seizure

(not condemnation) can be legally operative which

ignores the time honored judicial procedure for taking

property by eminent domain and provides no means for

determining just compensation for the property seized.

PARTIES

Where it is exceedingly clear All interested parties

are not before the court, and, CANNOT be brought before

the court, and, the court acquires jurisdiction only when

return of service is made to the court, a landowner is

entitled to bring successive damage actions for a continu-

ing TRESPASS for each successive period involved. The

trespasser, having no right to remain on the land, is

required to cease his trespass and until he does so is

liable for damages on a continuing basis.

JURISDICTION

Plaintiff's /defendant’s memorandum of law on juris-

diction, dated November 28, 1995 pertains to the subject

property for both civil and criminal courts. Copies of the

memorandum (minus exhibits) to the Clerk of the Court

and State Attorney’s office is attached and made part of

the Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. CONDEM-

NATION, exercised twice, and, bungled twice is still

App. 75

available as an appropriate legal proceeding to acquire

the “satisfactory property interests” mandated by Grant

Agreement 9-06-009-5708 (1955) with the United States of

America by which the jurisdiction question could not be

raised by the landowner’s - if exercised properly.

DISSOLUTION OF ATTACHMENTS

Plaintiff /defendant submits for the record, as further

evidence that this court lacks jurisdiction, a copy of disso-

lution of attachments, pursuant to C.G.S. § 52-327 at Vol.

112, p. 001 to 008 on the land records of the town of East

Granby, CT, received December 2, 1996 at 8:30 a.m.

Wherefore he prays judgment dismissing this action.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons

Augustus J. Simmons

446 Main St.

E. Hartford, CT 06118

(860) 569-6714

cc: Exhibits

ccc: Copies of motion and exhibits

to State Attorney’s office -

hand delivered 5/12/1997

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons

Augustus J. Simmons

App. 76

Exhibit G

No. CR97-0104930 SUPERIOR COURT

No. CR97-0105048 JUDICIAL DISTRICT

STATE OF CONNECTICUT OF HARTFORD/

VS NEW BRITAIN AT

ENFIELD

AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS JULY 8, 1997

Attn.: Chief Clerk,

SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION TO DISMISS

FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

The defendant moves that the court dismiss this

action because:

1. Regardless of the phraseology in the nature of a

conclusion employed by the pleader, if the face of the

record indicates that the court is without jurisdiction, the

complaint must be dismissed. Horak v State, 171 Conn.

257 at 260, 368 A2d 155 (1976).

2. In Kinney v State, 213 Conn. 54, 58, 566 A2d 426

(1989), the Supreme Court most recently stated as fol-

lows:

“Once an issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised,

the court must dispose of this legal question as a thresh-

old matter,” (citing cases). “Whenever a court discovers

that it has no jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the

case...” (citing cases.)

“Whenever the absence of jurisdiction of the court is

brought to its attention, the matter must be decided

before any further action is taken,” East Side Civic Assn. v

Planning and Zoning Commission, 161 Conn. 558, 559, 290

App. 77

A2d 348 (1971), or, as the Supreme Court stated in Bald-

win Piano & Organ Co. v Blake, 186 Conn. 295, 297-298, 441

A2d 183 (1982).

Whenever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to

the notice of the court or tribunal, cognizance of it must

be taken and the matter passed upon before it ‘can move

one further step in the cause; as any movement is neces-

sarily the exercise of jurisdiction’ (citing cases).

3. Where subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction of

the parties, AND THE LACK THEREOF, was actually

adjudicated before the Superior Court, Hon. Dupont, A.

on June 7, 1982, by - the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S

OFFICE, — (Feingold, Victor, A.A.G.), pages 12 thru 25 inc.

of transcript are submitted to supplement the two (2)

exhibits attached to motion on jurisdiction, dated May 12,

1997.

4. The Supreme Court of Connecticut had jurisdic-

tion in order to determine whether the trial court, or, in

case at bar, private counsel had jurisdiction, however, in

attempting to “construe the legal effect of the undertak-

ing in question involving LEGAL TITLE and trespassory

consequences,” the Supreme Court cannot go outside of

the record before the court and consider a ground not

existing at the time the motion to set aside the ‘ex-parte’

judgment was made to the court.” Dunnebacke v Detroit

G.H. & M. RY. Co., 248 Mich., 450, 456, 227 N.W. 811.

Where there is not, has not been any pleadings, judgment

file, written statement of compensation, summons of ser-

vice, assessment of datnages against Docket #163875

record before the court of competent jurisdiction (Supe-

rior Court), the existence of a substantial question of

App. 78

constitutionality continues to accrue to the detriment of

the owner where the Supreme Court has adjudged a

legislative enactment (Special Act #170 - 1969) in a way

not complying with the requirements of the due process

clauses of the state and federal constitutions.

An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken only

from a final judgment. General statutes § 52-263; practice

book § 600; Tough v Ives, 159 Conn. 605, 606, 268 A2d 371;

Howarth v Northcutt, 152 Conn. 460, 462, 208 A2d 540. The

absence of a final judgment goes to the jurisdiction of the

court. Any appeal which is not from a final judgment

must be rejected even though that issue has not been

raised by the parties. Hoberman v Lake of Isles, 138 Conn.

573, 574, 87 A2d 137.

The test whether a judgment is “final” in the sense

that an appeal may be taken from it, lies not in its nature,

for the case may still remain in the trial court for further

proceedings, but in its effect as concluding the rights of

some or all of the parties. Banca Commerciale Italiana Trust

Co. v Westchester Artistic Works Inc., 108 Conn. 304, 307,

142 A. 838.

5. Where federal funds are involved, as in case at

bar, the courts have ruled that as a — condition precedent

to jurisdiction - , the public entity may acquire real

property only if it first makes offer to property owner

and provides him with written statement explaining why

offer is just, establishes “mandatory” requirements which

must be observed by any public entity planning to initiate

eminent domain proceedings through resolution of neces-

sity. See City of San Jose v Great Oaks Water Co., 237 Cal.

App. 79

Rptr. 845 (Cal. App. I Dist. 1987). Also, 49 C.FR. 24,

102(d).

6. Where federal law and public policy of State of

Connecticut mandate appraisals as a - condition prece-

dent to jurisdiction - the public entity may acquire real

property only after an appraiser has been appointed who

shall provide to owner of land an opportunity to accom-

pany appraiser. Courts have held: that a county would be

enjoined from further prosecution of lawsuits for con-

demnation of real property until county had complied

with federal statutes requiring the acquiring agent to

appoint an appraiser. Bethune v United States, 376 F. Supp.

1074 (1972). Also, 49 C.F.R. § 24.102.

7. Jurisdiction over the person(s) is a separate

essential element of the jurisdiction of the court. Facts

showing the service of process in time, form and manner

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of mandatory stat-

utes in that regard are essential to jurisdiction over the

person. Such fundamental existence under “jurisdictional

facts” must be shown for the power of the court to

entertain and prosecute a proceeding on the merits. See

Castro v. Viera, 207 Conn. 420 (1988) at Page 433.

Wherefore he prays judgment dismissing the action.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons 7/8/97

Augustus J. Simmons

446 Main St.

E. Hartford, Ct 06118

(860) 569-6714

cc: Exhibits

App. 80

ccc: Copies of motion and exhibits

to State Attorney’s office -

also

Arnold Shimelman, A.A.G.

2800 Berlin Turnpike

P.O. Box 317546

Newington, CT 06131-7546

/s/ Augustus J. Simmons 7/8/97

Augustus J. Simmons

App. 81

EXHIBIT H

Ex. # Did the trial court, and the Court of Appeals

mislead the jury by refusing to allow any evidence or testi-

mony that Mr. Simmons WAS - and still is — the owner of

Parcel “A”

P. 206 Mr. Robert Juliano, Airport Administrator

Naab: Q. P. 206: And Mr. Simmons has sent you

some correspondence in connection with those disputes,

correct?

Ans: That is correct.

Naab: Quite a, quite a bit of correspondence as I

understand it.

Ans: Yes.

P. 211, 212

Naab: History of fence — if the state acquired the

land of Mr. Simmons by the state.

Court: But I have already told you we are not hav-

ing a trial about the state acquiring the land. That's

already a matter of record.

Naab: But you told me that I can prove that the land

is Mr. Simmons’ or attempt to prove that. That’s in the

long run, what I am going to try to do.

Court: Uh-uh no. I didn’t mean to say that. The land

is not Mr. Simmons’. The land does not belong to Mr.

Simmons.

App. 82

Naab: Your Honor, I protest most vigorously to you

saying the land is not Mr. Simmons’.

THE ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS WHETHER IT IS THE

STATE’S OR MR. SIMMONS’.

Court: No that’s not the issue in this case. That’s the

problem. That is not the issue in this case.

Naab: Is the court taking judicial notice the land

belongs to the state?

Court: At some point I am sure I will. it is a matter

of record, the property does not belong to Mr. Simmons.

Naab: Your Honor, the state itself through the Atty.

General’s office has admitted in court the state did not

acquire the property.

If Mr. Simmons - that’s an issue and I submit that if

Your Honor precludes me from even raising that issue

that a grave injustice will be done here.

Court: That may be marked as a full exhibit. Defen-

dant’s E in evidence.

Naab: Your Honor, may I have a standing objection

to this procedure.

Court: Yes.

Court: I am changing my ruling. The objection was

sustained. There is no foundation for that map.

* * *

P. 229

Naab: Your Honor, I submit that whether the state

acquired the property from Mr. Simmons or not certainly

App. 83

is an issue. He certainly cannot be guilty of criminal

trespass on his own land. So whether or not he is the

owner of that property is an issue in this case.

Court: This jury is not going to be called upon to

decide the issue of the propriety or impropriety of the

acquisition of that property. That document to do with

what this jury has to decide.

Naab: I submit, Your Honor, that it does, and at least

— at least, perhaps the court would permit me to, since the

jury is out, to refer to those matters within the document

which I think are particularly relevant.

Court: You asked the court to take judicial notice of

Mr. Malone: We did some time ago. I did during

argument during Mr. Simmons’ motion to — whatever it

was — for me to PACK MY BAGS, I think. I gave the court

the citations and I will ask the court at the proper time —

we haven’t even got to the point where it is necessary for

you to take judicial notice of anything at this point. But I

will ask the court, once again, to take judicial notice of

cases I cited to the court on an earlier occasion. MOTION

TO PACK THE BAGS - Ex. #E

P. 233

Naab: Mr. Juliano, have you received from time to

time letters from Mr. Simmons with respect to the fence

between his land and the National Guard area in East

Granby?

Ans: Yes.

App. 84

Naab: I am going to show you three letters, or

copies of three letters and ask you if those copies of

letters which you received from Mr. Simmons and which

are in the file of Dept. of Transportation.

Ans: Yes.

Naab: And did you have an opportunity this morn-

ing to compare these copies to the originals in your file?

Ans: I did.

Naab: And are they accurate copies of the originals

in your files?

Ans: Yes.

Naab: Your Honor, I offer these letters.

* * +

P. 236

Court: Disallowed.

* + *

P. 246

Naab: Mr. Juliano, did Mr. Simmons notify you that

he intended to cut down the fence before he did it?

Ans: Yes.

Naab: And did he notify you of that in writing?

Ans: Yes.

Naab: So you knew that was his intention?

Ans: Yes.

App. 85

Naab: And did he, as part of that notification, did he

tell you the reason was because the property was his, and

the state was encroaching?

Malone: Objection.

Court: Sustained. Leading question. Ask him what

the reason was. Leading question.

Naab: What reason did Mr. Simmons give you for

saying that he was going to cut down the fence?

Ans: That the fence was on his property.

Naab: In the whole time you have known Mr. Sim-

mons or known of Mr. Simmons, has he ever - has he .

consistently maintained it was his property?

Ans: Yes.

* * *

MISLEADING THE JURY PERTAINING TO LAND

RECORDS UPON DISSOLUTION OF ATTACHMENTS

P. 343

Naab: Just for identification purposes, I will repre-

sent to the court this is a certified copy of documents

from the East Granby Land Records, vol. 112 pages 001

thru 008.

Malone: Objection.

Court: Objection sustained. The document is not

going to be made an exhibit.

© * *

App. 86

MISLEADING THE JURY REGARDING DAMAGES

p. 353

Naab: Showing you Ex. “W” for identification Mr.

Simmons which appears to be a letter from Referee Shap-

iro’s secretary to Atty’s Salzman and Feingold dated

April 5, 1977 in Simmons v. Wetherall, No. 163875.

Ans: This letter dated April 5 sets dates for hearings

on damages in December of 1977 and January 1978.

Naab: And were any such hearings held?

Ans: No such hearings were ever held on any of the

dates.

Court: Objection sustained.

Naab: Offer Ex. “Y” which appears to be handwrit-

ten letter from you to Rogin dated 4/12/78. Is this

another discharge letter?

Ans: Yes it is.

Malone: Objection.

Court: Sustained.

Naab: Offer Ex. “Z” certified copy of papers in

Superior Court file of Simmons v. Wetherall of two page

citation, submitted by Atty. Gen. McQueeney listing

encumberances.

Court: Objection sustained.

Naab: Offer letter from Referee Shapiro to Jason

Pearl dated 7/18/80 which was after Supreme Court

decision of May 1980.

App. 87

Court: Objection sustained.

* * *

P. 358

Naab: Your Honor, I am going to offer the next quite

a few exhibits in Groups CC to GG inc. CC is a lis

pendens from Leonidas Simmons, DD an attachment by

Valente, EE is a judgment by Roisman, FF is a mortgage

by Mikulske, and GG is a judgment lien by JBS Inc.

Mr. Simmons, do you recognize these documents?

Ans: They are all liens on the public land records,

Town Clerk, Town Hall, Town of East Granby all on the

land records.

Naab: Were these liens on the property on February

1, 1991 when National Guard entered on property with

fence erecting? | -

Ans: Yes, these liens were all on the property.

Court: Objection sustained.

* * *

P. 362

Naab: Offer Group (10), HH thru RR, certified

copies from the East Granby Land Records of judgment in

favor of Allaire, Massow, C.N.B., Ed Kernan, John Kataja,

Margaret Dean, Ronald Cassidento, 2nd mtg. to John

Kataja, Destito, Bensinger, tax lien to Town of East

Granby for list of 1987, tax lien grand list 1988.

Naab: Mr. Simmons, were these liens all on Parcel

“A” at the time the fence was put up?

App. 88

Ans: Yes.

Naab: And when I say the fence, I mean the fence

that you took down in 1997.

Ans: That is correct.

Malone: Objection.

Court: Sustained.

7 * *

P. 364

Naab: The next packet consists of three exhibits

which are certified copies of encumberances on the land

records of Town of East Granby, mortgage “TT” is a

mortgage to Rosenblitt; “UU” is a judgment lien to For-

misano; “VV” is a mortgage to Stackpole.

Naab: Are these liens on the property of Parcel “A”?

Ans: Yes.

Naab: Were these put on before or after the fence

went up?

Ans: These I believe, were after the fence went up.

Malone: Objection.

Court: Sustained.

Naab: Showing you what's been marked Ex. “YY”.

What does that appear to be?

Ans: This is C.G.S. 48-21.

Naab: What is the significance?

App. 89

Ans: Pretty much in essence says each and every

individual lien-holder must be paid first, BEFORE the

owner, in any real property encumberance situation.

Naab: Have you been paid for any of this land the

state has taken?

Ans: Well, I think it is almost a self-answering ques-

tion which, NO, I have not been paid.

Naab: Are there lien-holders that haven’t been paid?

Ans: There are several.

Naab: I will be submitting a written request to

charge as such, Your Honor.

Court: Okay. Well it is a general statute. The court

can certainly take judicial notice of it. It WILL NOT be

submitted to the jury. It will not be marked as a full

exhibit.

P. 367

Naab: Mr. Simmons, I am showing you exhibits

“ZZ” (48-12) and “AAA” (8-129); what is the significance

of these?

Ans: TO ACQUIRE PROPERTY. As I said, whether it

is by purchase, lease, exchange, gift, or eminent domain

this is the procedure you have got to follow.

Naab: Has this procedure been followed in the case

of Parcel “A” or any of your other land in East Granby?

Ans: Absolutely not.

App. 90

Malone: Objection.

Court: Sustained.

Naab: Mr. Simmons, showing you what has been

marked previously as def. exhibits “BBB” (48-17 a, b, c);

“CCC” a copy of Uniform Real Property Acquisition Pol-

icy and “DDD” (C.G.S. 13b-50).

Naab: Have the procedures specified in these stat-

utes, federal and state statutes been followed in acquiring

your land, including Parcel “A.”

Ans: They never acquired it.

Court: OBJECTION SUSTAINED.

These documents are not relevant. This is a civil -

this has to be done in a civil court, not relevant to these

proceedings. They will not be marked as exhibits. They

are not to be read to the jury and will not be referred to in

any arguments to the jury.