Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Simmons v. Wetherall
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Supreme Court, U3.
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00 %2 JUL 10g
NUEFICE OF THE CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS,
Petitioner,
Vs.
HORACE B. WETHERALL, et al.,
Respondents.
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The Supreme Court
Of The State Of Connecticut
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Aucustus J. SIMMONS
Petitioner
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
QUESTION PRESENTED
DID THE CONNECTICUT SUPREME COURT
TRANSGRESS THE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PRO-
TECTION CLAUSES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU-
TION WHERE: WITHOUT ANY NOTICE OR SERVICE
OF PROCESS; WITHOUT ANY CONSTITUTIONAL VAL-
UATIONS OR JUST COMPENSATION; WITHOUT ANY
PLEADINGS, HEARINGS, DECISIONS, JUDGMENTS,
OR MESNE PROCESS DUE TO THE LACK OF BOTH
JURISDICTION OF THE SUBJECT MATTER AND PAR-
TIES BY THE LEGALLY ORGANIZED COURT (SUPE-
RIOR) BELOW - THE ACT OF THE STATE SUPREME
COURT GIVING A STATUTE (SPECIAL ACT #170 (1969))
A NEW CONSTRUCTION THAT DENIED RIGHTS
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION WHEN IT- TRANS-
MOGRIFIED PLAINTIFF’S - UNADDRESSED - PRIVATE
TORT ACTION (#163875) INTO A PUBLIC REAL PROP-
ERTY “F-R-E-E-Z-I-N-G” FOR A FEDERALLY-
INSTALLED, MAINTAINED, AND OCCUPIED AIR-
CRAFT NAVIGATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION SYSTEM
OF OVER THIRTY-SIX (36) YEARS DURATION ON
PLAINTIFF’S PARCEL “C,” THAT APPEARS ON THE
FACE OF THE RECORD.
ii
PARTIES TO PROCEEDING
’ Petitioner:
Augustus J. Simmons, Plaintiff/Owner
(860) 569-6714
Respondents:
James F. Sullivan, Commissioner (860) 594-3000
Connecticut Department of Transportation
2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131-7546
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General (860) 808-5000
55 Elm St.
Hartford, CT 06106
Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman
and Hirtle (860) 278-7480
1 City Place
Hartford, CT 06103
Jane F. Garvey, Administrator (202) 267-3111
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave. S.W.
Washington D.C. 20591
Robert S. Bartanowicz,
Regional Director (781) 238-7020
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
Solicitor General, ;
Seth P. Waxman (202) 51442201
950 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W., Room 5614
Washington D.C. 20530-0001
Michael DiDonato, Chief Clerk (860) 548-2700
Superior Court
85 Washington Street
Hartford, CT 06106
lil
John Malone (860) 870-3277
State Attorney’s Office
State of Connecticut Court House
Enfield, CT 06082
PARTIES TO PROCEEDING - Continued |
;
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
COUPES IIE PRICED: 66 hh ois cd icdee bel eaveerss2 i
PARTE ESD Po ees oo so oa ssn canvas taeeshas ii
TAReede Ge RA Ns 5 nes obs ed ee eee eke iv
TAB RP Pe 5 ook oss 6 a es ees Vv
yk ER EON ty ee gp Mey rer ir per 1
PAP RURIE s His eh hae Ch eekaa eas Sdieetweecuwen 1
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE......... Sibiede eae 6
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ........... 8
PIGS hos bas ceaendardececcc emis eee 14
CRIPRASIUIN cab biccd ka diedceseuChedesabeabwestel 18
Vv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Allah v. Superior Court of Cal., 871 F.2d 887 (1989) .... 18
Anselmo v. Cox, 135 Conn. 78 (1948) ............... 11
Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965)....... App. 23
Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall 223 (1863)............ App. 23
Beaird-Poulan, Inc. v. Louisiana Dept. of High-
ways, 497 F.2d 54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 990, 95 S.Ct. 1424, 43 L.Ed. 2d 670 (5th Cir.
Fg | Meaney POM Maron ray ed et Meme pec Me ere Sg 15, App. 20
Blythe & Fargo Co. v. Swenson, 15 Utah 345, 49
Ss TORE LEG) oon ei viens Auli deersienwnered App. 4
Brandriff v. Sellas, 40 Conn. Sup. 243
3s SAP ee Sy peiaep er Ary WEEN tN AS” 16, App. 8, 10
Bri v. Ulrey, 159 Conn. 371, 269 A.2d 262
(SNS Sivas era nads hen gcse task tense cae App. 18
Carter v. Carter, 147 Conn. 238, 159 A.2d 173
CRUE SN bgp ie cha ns Cpe teesh clas yanewen t¥auneuas App. 5
Case v. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 106 A 822 (1919) ..App. 19
Chicago B. & O.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S.
BO REDO) 6p need dS Cais LRA WE oa LEREETT Ob AS App. 26
Chevalier v. Wakefield, 85 Conn. 374 (1912)..... App. 9
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Fairfield Chrysler Plym-
outh, 180 Conn. 223, 429 A.2d 487 (1980) ....App. 16
City of Columbia, S.C. v. Costle, 710 F.2d 1009
CRUG Ske Vi vedas ieeaweorkareteatns 14, App. 20
Clover v. Urban, 108 Conn. 13, 142 A 389
CEOS eid vdac supose di erelseuikacSereeel App. 10
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Cohens v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 6 Wheat.
264, 5 LBs BOF CARES) kx svkndas vies tascasoacer atu 1
Coit v. Haven, 30 Conn. 190 (1861) ............. App. 8
Connecticut v. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. 2105 (1991)..... App. 24
Daley v. Board of Police Commissioners, 1333
COO, 726 TERT) io Scand cveek ie sdees You levees App. 9
Dillon v. Fabey, 88 Conn. 605 (1914) ............ App. 9
Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 US. 266 CAGES) osc cee ncvdeccuts 9
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).......... App. 26
Freund v. Burns, 131 Conn. 380, 40 A.2d 754
(EDGE) ois vc ccc ced acccwesunnistesracees ourenpaey App. 11
Frick v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 98 Conn. 251, 119 A
SEP URGED < va vicivncesenevesturanensentuneeees App. 10
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32
Led: Bak G56 (USTED. os ike scccsvateusinden App. 22
Furman v. Furman, 60 Am. St. Rep. 642 (1897)..App. 4
Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall 350 (1873) .............. App. 7
Gaylord v. Payne, 3 Conn. 258 (1820) ........... App. 9
Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914)......... App. 23
Harris v. Hardeman, 14 How. 337, 14 L.Ed. 444
(TESS) ocagccacucsepesvecasigeekice acanacunees App. 4
Hartford Nat. Bank & Trust v. Tucker, 178 Conn.
472, 423 A.2d 141 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S.
904, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63 L.Ed. 2d 309 (1980)....App. 8
Hartley v. Vitiello, 113 Conn. 74 (1931).......... App. 9
Hovey v. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409 (1896)............ App. 23
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued _
Page
Harwood v. U.S. Shipping Board Corp., 300 F.
GP CRDOG) + vir cnc sicasavess sus seeschivawhrseses App. 13
Jacobsen v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. 319, 219 Pac.
FE ROPES 6h bonccdkerccnceseetevasacseevecsen App. 17
Jepsen v. Toni Co., 20 Conn. Sup. 287 (1957) .. App. 9, 10
Kawasaki, Kissen, Kaisha Ltd. v. Indomar Ltd.,
173 Conn. 269, 377 A.2d 316 (1977).......... App. 18
Keystone Bituminous Coal v. Debenedictis, 480
U.S. 470, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed. 2d 472
ig PENT aero ae Mei es eos alee hr Se en ee OTe App. 16
Kimball Laundry v. United States, 338 U.S. 1
Bo. Pee a Srp ey Say eee re mE My pe ey App. 17
Kukanskis v. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501 (1980)..... App. 22
Lamothe v. Gordon, 15 Conn. Sup. 504 (1948)...App. 9
Lilly v. Claypool, 53 S.E. 22, 59 W. Va. 130
| ON Ee Recep Ss Se ae eg ae App. 19
Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92
ie ie eR MR a Ro. Se App. 22
Lynk v. Laporte, 789 F.2d 554 (1986) ................ 18
Marshall v. Clark, 170 Conn. 199, 365 A.2d
EE SNS G5. 56 Sis Sch dewecdcewenk so ehaas 16, App. 16
Marshall v. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589 (1891)........ App. 14
Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 14 U.S. 1 Wheat. 304,
ee ces vic bas cos be cub eee tem Cakes 1, 16
Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893,
ee ie” eo ee ee App. 24
Vili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct.
1095, 40 L.Ed. 20 406 (1974)... ccc cccciens App. 23
Morici v. Jarvie, 137 Conn. 97, 75 A.2d 47
CRDOE 66 ceca deus thn decusessad oan acn's ¥eeeeen App. 18
U.S. 306, 94 L.Ed. 865, 70 S.Ct. 652 (1950) ....App. 5
Munger v. Doolan, 75 Conn. 656, 55 Atl. 169
CROMED ses ask Saba cebu ends iaeceiadeeneraseviees App. 5
Musial v. State, 3 Conn. Supp. 159 (1935) ....... App. 9
New Haven v. East Haven, 35 Conn. Supp. 157
‘Ls igs Sener e MEP Cape eye Me mer ry Weer App. 15
New Haven Sandblast Co. v. Dreisbach, 104 Conn.
Ses Re Bhs ee I iio kn vc oan ee App. 18, 19, 26
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. DiChem Inc., 419
U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 422 L.Ed. 2d 751
4: eer ee POE Te ye rr ee er hee te py ee App. 23
O’Leary v. Waterbury Title Co., 117 Conn. 39, 166 3
Pe oe? PPE rere rrr ry TEP er meer rT App. 10
Penn. Central Transp. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104,
98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed. 2d 631 (1977), reh.
denied, 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L.Ed. 2d
Rg Pee Or EE rE pore eT UE ee App. 16
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) ............006- 16
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43
Gt. 156,67 La. 20 Sie USS) ce 0 es App. 17
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S.
GR: COTA oink ig 05 06d BARS ER EATER © URS 10
Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 11 S.Ct. 773
COINS i sok ec Ss Vedas Caney ceteadhs3vwerieen
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Rice v. Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 58 A.2d 523 (1948)... App. 10
Safford v. Morris Metal Products Co., 99 Conn.
Pe MA on oe ori enna cscs cin weneines eeaeen App. 9
Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 91 L.Ed. 2d
Say ee ce AFT LOMOEE s cc ec ccna cyewekecs cus App. 5
Shaw v. Spelke, 110 Conn. 208, 147 A 675
COE CHiN 8a kana kr end ha Ra a ae ea kes App. 18
Shelton v. Wolthausen, 80 Conn. 599 (1908).... App. 7, 44
Simmons v. Parizek, 158 Conn. 304 (1969)........... 11
Simmons v. Wetherall, #163875
tg a a ae aE ee ey 7, 12, 14, 15, App. 23
Simmons v. Wetherall, 472 F.2d 509 (1973)........... 12
Simmons v. Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 (1980)... 8, App. 18
Simon v. Southern Railway, 236 U.S. 115 (1915)... App. 14
Sniadich v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89
S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed. 2d 349 (1969)............ App. 23
Standard Oil v. Missouri, 32 S.Ct. 409 (1911)...App. 11
Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, 125 Conn. 633, 7 A.2d
DUD LENSE) isos cance Nick p eam Rhheccs wads Oks aes App. 18
Strong v. Strong, 8 Conn. 408 (1831) ........... App. 10
Textron v. Wood, 167 Conn. 334 (1974).............. 10
Trumbull v. Ehrsam, 148 Conn. 47 (1961)..... ...... 10
United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). .. -App. 18
United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S 253 (1980)..... App. 25
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917) ..... App. 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488 (1973)..... App.
United States v. General Motors, 323 U.S. 373
t. . PRESET eeee ere ee err e Pee Tee App.
United States v. 40.379 Sq. Feet Land, 58 F. Supp.
ROG CON. WEMRG BOGE 6 oes iiieancn chee ewacivee App.
United States Ex. Rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U.S.
By RRs 55 iio nos 3 58e FURKS ON a App.
Weaver v. Ives, 152 Conn. 586 (1965)... repo ae, 2
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S.Ct.
S002, OF Liki Se Cie 6 oe Faas co vee as App.
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 (1876)........ App.
Whitman v. Missouri State Hwy. Comm., 400 F.
Susp. 1000 GF. 0). BEG. ISTE) 8 nn ticnies's 15, App.
Wood v. Watkinson, 47 Conn. 500 (1879) ....... App.
Young v. Margiotta, 136 Conn. 429, 71 A.2d 924
Be Me rere re eer ee EOL SoC TT ee. App.
CONSTITUTIONS
Art. I § 11 Connecticut Constitution ................
Amendment V Constitution of United States
ia a a a ei a a 2, 9, 13, App.
Amendment XIV Constitution of United States
ine ea pe tease oe heiw tka een 2, 9, 12, 13, App. 14, 20,
STATUTES
Conn. Gen. Statute 8-129................ App. 4, 14,
Conn. Gen. Statute 196-30 ©... ccc cnscdececboess App.
24
17
17
24
11
10
Zo -
20
10
14
20
26
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Connh(oen. Biatete Geld ic. 6. tei ssa cigaei es
Conn. Gen. Statute 48-17 a, b,c ...........
Coomih. Goamh; SURO SG ooo 6
Gtr SRP Fes nk 5 665.0 0 xahed py 004si owe ee
Coe ek eae ea 4, App. 13
49 C.F.R. Part 24 Subpart B § 24.102
acid Cin nine eavievegsyesanaewe 2, 3, 8, App. 4, 13, 21
ee i eee ayes eas 4
A oe ial cou se bdasdaiadasdes 1
Re as kas acy aeepetew 14
We GA DOMES CEE ko dso kee achcen bens tues
P.L. 91-646 (42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655).............
LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1656, 91 Cong. 2d Sess. (1970)..... 14
1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad News 5853
; OTHER MATERIALS
Black on Judgments (2d Ed.) Vol. 1 § 215...... App. 19
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Vol. 3, § 27.03 .... 11
eevee eeeveee
a6¢06¢00 6
xii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Restatement, Judgments § 11 Comment C...... App. 10
47 Am. Jr. 2d Judgments §§ 752, 753.........-. App. 16
49 Am. Jr., States, Territories, Dependencies, Sec.
OPINION BELOW
Plaintiffs MOTION TO VACATE dated May 1, 2000
with sixteen (16) supporting exhibits is incorporated in
the APPENDIX at Pages 1 thru 125.
The ORDER, dated May 31, 2000 from the Chief
Clerk, Supreme/Appellate Courts reads:
The motion of the plaintiff, filed May 1, 2000, to
vacate, having been presented to the court, is hereby
ordered — DISMISSED.
It is further ordered that the plaintiff is hereby pro-
hibited from filing pleadings in this court that are related
to Docket Number CV 70-0163875.
By the Court,
Francis Drumm
Chief Clerk
JURISDICTION
The jurisdictional basis for the appeal is 28 USC
§ 1257 which had its origin in the act of September 24,
1789, 1 Stat. 73, 85, by that section, as construed in Martin
v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 1 Wheat. 304, 364, 42 L.Ed. 97
(1816), strongly reinforced by Cohens v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821), the denial of a
claim of a federal right in the final judgment of the
highest available court of a state could be brought for
review at a bar of this court.
— ¢
STATUTE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Art. I § 11 Constitution of Connecticut
The Constitution of Connecticut provides that — “no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law.”
Amendment XIV, Constitution of the United States
“é
.. nor shall any state deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.”
Amendment V, Constitution of the United States
a
. nor shali private property be taken for public
use without just compensation.”
49 CFR § 24.102 BASIC ACQUISITION POLICIES
(a) Expeditious Acquisition. The agency shall make
every reasonable effort to acquire the real property expe-
ditiously by negotiation. :
(b) Notice to Owner. As soon as feasible, the owner
shall be notified of the agency’s interest in acquiring the
real property and the BASIC PROTECTIONS, including
the agency’s obligation to secure an appraisal, provided
to the owner by law and this part.
(c) Appraisal, Waiver Thereof, and Invitation to Owner.
(1) Before the initiation of negotiations the real property
to be acquired shall be appraised, except as provided in
§ 24.102 (c) (2), and the owner, or the owner’s designated
representative, shall be given an opportunity to accom-
pany the appraiser during the appraiser’s inspection of
the property.
(d) Establishment and Offer of Just Compensation.
Before the initiation of negotiations, the agency shall
establish an amount which it believes is just compensa-
tion for the real property. The amount shall not be less
than the approved appraisal of the fair market value of
the property, taking into account the value of allowable
damages or benefits to any remaining property. Promptly
thereafter, the agency shall make a written offer to the
owner to acquire the property for the full amount
believed to be just compensation.
(e) Summary Statement. Along with the initial writ-
ten purchase offer, the owner shall be given a written
statement of the basis for the offer of just compensation,
which shall include: (1) A statement of the amount
offered as just compensation. In the case of a partial
acquisition, the compensation for the real property to be
acquired and the compensation for damages, if any, to the
remaining real property shall be separately stated. (2) A
description and location identification of the real prop-
erty and the interest in the real property to be acquired.
(3) An identification of the buildings, structures, and
other improvements which are to be considered to be part
of the real property for which the offer of just compensa-
tion is made.
(f) Basic Negotiation Procedures. The agency shall
make reasonable efforts to contact the owner or the
owner’s representative and discuss its offer to purchase
the property, including the basis for the offer of just
compensation; and, explain its acquisition policies and
procedures, including its payment of incidental expenses
in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 24.106. The owner shall be ~
given reasonable opportunity to consider the offer and
present material which the owner believes is relevant to
determining the value of the property and to suggest
modification in the proposed terms and conditions of the
purchase. The agency shall consider the owner’s presen-
tation.
(g) Updating Offer of Just Compensation. If the infor-
mation presented by the owner, or a material change in
the character or condition of the property indicates the
need for new appraisal information, or if a significant
delay has occurred since the time of the appraisal(s) of
the property, the agency shall have the appraisal(s)
updated or obtain a new appraisal. If the latest appraisal
information indicates that a change in the purchase offer
is warranted, the agency shall promptly reestablish just
compensation and offer that amount to the owner in
writing.
(h) Coercive Action. The agency shall not advance
the time of condemnation or defer negotiations or con-
demnation or the deposit of funds with the court, or take
any other coercive action in order to induce an agreement
on the price to be paid for the property.
(i) Administrative Settlement. The purchase price for
the property may exceed the amount offered as just com-
pensation when reasonable efforts to negotiate an agree-
ment at that amount have failed and an authorized
agency official approves such administrative settlement
as being reasonable, prudent, and in the public interest.
(j) Payment Before Taking Possession. Before requiring
the owner to surrender possession of the real property,
the agency shall. pay the agreed purchase price to the
owner, or in the case of a condemnation, deposit with the
court, for the benefit of the owner, an amount not less
than the agency’s approved appraisal of the fair market
value of such property, or the court award of compensa-
tion in the condemnation proceeding for the property. In
exceptional circumstances, with the prior approval of the
owner, the agency may obtain a right-of-entry for con-
struction purposes before making payment available to
an owner.
(k) Uneconomic Remnant. If the acquisition of only a
portion of a property would leave the owner with an
uneconomic remnant, the agency shall offer to acquire the
uneconomic remnant along with the portion of the prop-
erty needed for the project.
(1) Inverse Condemnation. If the agency intends to
acquire any interest in real property by exercise of the
power of eminent domain, it shall institute formal con-
demnation proceedings and not intentionally make it nec-
essary for the owner to institute legal proceedings to
prove the fact of the taking of the real property.
(m) Fair Rental. If the agency permits a former
owner or tenant to occupy the real property after acquisi-
tion for a short term or a period subject to termination by
the agency on short notice, the rent shall not exceed the
fair market rent for such occupancy.
®
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is an AIRPORT-related case that transcends
back to a 1955 Federal-Aid Grant Agreement between
federal and state agencies wherein the state agency (Con-
necticut Dept. of Transportation) was obligated under the
grant agreement to acquire “satisfactory property inter-
ests” as defined in 14 C.FR. § 152.3 for what would
ultimately become a navigational servitude imposed
upon the owner by the federal agency (F.A.A.) with the
invasion, appropriation, installation on the surface of the
real property, sophisticated navigational instrumentation
controlling ingress and egress of air traffic at Bradley
Airport, Connecticut’s premier airport in the summer of
1962.
Starting on February 28, 1962 with a tortious course
of conduct, the state agency initiated the first condemna-
tion that was negated by the courts as arbitrary, uncon-
stitutional with procedural problems (153 Conn. 351
(1966)) and was remanded.
In January, 1968 the state instituted condemnation
proceedings a second time under Conn. General Statute
§ 48-12, in lieu of C.G.S. § 15-79 and again the court ruled
the proceeding “null and void”. (160 Conn. 492 (1971))
During the 1969 session of the Connecticut Legisla-
ture a special act was passed by the general assembly
allowing Augustus Simmons to sue the state for DAM-
AGES over “loss of use of land” arising out of the bum-
bling condemnation proceedings. On January 5, 1970
Plaintiff/Owner Simmons brought such a suit Simmons v.
Wetherall, Docket #163875 which had several hearing
dates scheduled that were all aborted. To date, damages
have not been addressed and the action is still pending.
During the summer of 1974 the federal agency,
F.A.A., without having paid any compensation, intended
to upgrade the navigational servitude with the addition
of a “middle marker” on private property and in lieu of
negotiating a lease with the owner, enters into a lease
with the sponsor of the airport, notwithstanding they had
full knowledge that title reverted back to the owner on
the land records on March 24, 1972 after the second
condemnation was ruled null and void.
In December, 1977, plaintiff retained the firm of
Rogin-Hirtle,-Esq.’s to represent him upon scheduled
days for hearings in damages before referee Shapiro and
the very first act of private counsel was an attempt to
give the state (and the F.A.A.) “complete insulation from
and absolution from all of its sins” by invalidating the
hearings in damages and for which a dismissal, dis-
charge, in writing, was hand delivered on December 23,
1977. The discharge of 12/23/1977 was not sufficient to
curb the tortious course of conduct.
: Where the matter of subject matter jurisdiction and of
indispensable parties was ARGUED before the court of
competent jurisdiction, Hon. Dupont, A., on June 7, 1982
and the STATE vigorously and vehemently challenged the
superior court with lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
the court, so recognizing, denied compensation from the
slush fund to indispensable parties (VALENTE-
ALLAIRE), yet, did not, would not set aside the void
decree due to a supreme court ruling under Simmons v.
Wetherall, 180 Conn. 587 (1980).
Where the “Slush Fund” monies were allowed to
remain before the court from 1978 to 1991 before return-
ing said monies to the state treasury, signifies FEDERAL
QUESTION VIOLATIONS of the most severe nature,
extending indefinitely the original unlawful, unconstitu-
tional entry by the F.A.A. and the State of Connecticut.
*
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. Where all states, including Connecticut, must
comply with the land acquisition procedures promul-
gated under the Uniform Real Property Acquisition Act,
P.L. 91-646 (1971), 42 USC §§ 4601-4655, where major
federal airport projects and federal-aid grant agreements
were entered into by federal and state agency’s that
resulted in the owner being given a WRITTEN NOTICE
TO VACATE the farm operation (Ex. #10) making the
owner a DISPLACED PERSON under 42 USC § 4601(b)
and assured the BASIC PROTECTIONS under 49 CFR
§ 24.102 and the procedural assurances of 49 USC § 4655.
2. Where plaintiff’s claim is one arising under the
federal constitution, the question whether the plaintiff
has been accorded due process of law — using that term in
its primary sense of an opportunity to be heard and to
defend its substantive right, for, if permitted to stand,
deprivation of plaintiff's property is accomplished with-
out its ever having had an opportunity to defend against
the exaction.
3. Where the unconstitutional acts of the state led to
the legislation by the state legislature (Special Act #170
(1969)) requiring compensation for such damages having
accrued under which the VESTED PROPERTY RIGHTS of
the plaintiffs are asserted, and such legislation was but-
tressed with FEDERAL LEGISLATION, Title HI of Public
Law 91-646 (1971) (42 USC §§ 4601-4655) that is applica-
ble where federal projects and grant agreements are at
issue, such vested rights cannot be DENIED, DEPRIVED,
DESTROYED of the right so vested, by the state Supreme
Court without a violation of rights guaranteed by the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
A state statute giving compensation for consequential
damages does not merely provide a remedy but creates a
property right; to repeal, destroy, invalidate such a stat-
ute so as to affect rights actually obtained thereunder is a -
deprivation of property without due process of law as
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Ettor v. Ta-
coma, 228 U.S. 148 (1913).
4. Where the federal guaranty of due process under
federal regulations is mandated in the Federal Grant
Agreement #9-06-009-5708, Sec. 2 (b) (Ex. # 10) the spon-
sor shall:
“Carry out and complete the project in accordance
with the terms of this offer, and the Federal Airport Act
and the regulations promulgated thereunder by the
administrator in effect on the date of this offer, which act
and regulations are incorporated herein and made a part
10
hereof,” has been totally and completely ignored, disre-
garded, the federal guaranty of due process that extends
to state action through its judicial as well as through its
legislative, executive, and administrative branches of
government mandates compliance with the agreement -
“understood and agreed by and between the parties
hereto (Sec. 9)” — to the following insertion.
“The airport approach standards to be followed in
performing the covenants contained in this paragraph
shall be those established by the administrator in office of
airports drawing No. 814, dated April 26, 1950 unless
otherwise authorized by the administrator.”
Whether acting through its judiciary or through its
legislature, a state may not deprive a person of all exis-
ting remedies for the enforcement of a right, which the
state has no power to destroy, unless there is, or was
afforded to him some real opportunity to protect it. Postal
Telegraph Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 475-6.
5. The Connecticut Supreme Court has indicated on
several occasions that the Doctrine of Sovereign Immu-
nity is not available to the state as a defense to claims for
just compensation arising under ARTICLE FIRST, Section
11, of the Connecticut Constitution. Textron v. Wood, 167
Conn. 334, 342 (1974). “When possession has been taken
from the owner, he is constitutionally entitled to any
damages which he may have suffered, and if our statute
failed to provide a remedy he could, nevertheless, sue to
recover such damages, 6 Nichols, Eminent Domain, Sec-
tion 26.42[1].” Trumbull v. Ehrsam, 148 Conn. 47, 55-56.
“We have further stated that for this reason, ‘where
the state takes property no specific permission to sue is
11
necessary.” Anselmo v. Cox, 135 Conn. 78, 81, “State
officials cannot . . . shield themselves with sovereign
immunity if a party alleges and proves they took or
retained his property in a manner which was either
unconstitutional or unauthorized by statute.” Simmons v.
Parizek, 158 Conn. 304, 307. See also 49 Am. Jur., States,
Territories, and Dependencies, Sec. 113; Davis, Adminis-
trative Law Treatise, Vol. 3, Sec. 27.03.
Since the legislature granted “SPECIAL PERMIS-
SION” notwithstanding any other state statutes or federal
regulations, that the defendants have been acting ille-
gally, unconstitutionally, and in excess of any statutory
authority, the action is not to be treated as one against the
state before it can be maintained. Weaver v. Ives, 152
Conn. 586, 591. -
6. Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate presents a very sub-
stantial federal question of thirty-six (36) years of occu-
pancy without ANY just compensation where
defendant’s, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), act-
ing as trespassers, has not paid any just compensation
under the Federal Grant Agreement (Ex. #10) to the state
or the owner and the federal funds allocated for the
project were returned to their general fund and the state
agency, not having made any determinations of value, or
damages, or written statements of compensation, or
mesne process of any nature, the unconstitutional “slush
fund,” conjured up by discharged and withdrawn private
counsel, was returned to the State Treasury by the Supe-
rior Court who were without subject matter jurisdiction.
12
7. Whether the transmogrification by the state
Supreme Court of plaintiff’s tort action for damages (Sim-
mons v. Wetherall, #163875) into a federally occupied emi-
nent domain land “FREEZING” transgressed the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
8. The denial by the state Supreme Court of access
to the state courts for Docket #163875 to pursue — unad-
dressed —- damages - which the state has no power to
deny, destroy, invalidate, unless there is, or was, afforded
to him some real opportunity to protect it.
Where in plaintiff’s pursuit for just compensation in
the federal court system plaintiff has been denied access
to the federal courts on the theory of RES JUDICATA,
AFTER the Second Circuit, Court of Appeals remanded in
472 F.2d 509 (1973) plaintiff’s civil rights claim that fed-
eral instrument landing system lights were installed on
plaintiff’s Parcel “C,” WITHOUT COMPENSATION, by
the federal agency (FAA) and the state was required
under the Federal Grant Agreement to get proper TITLE
and after two (2) unsuccessful condemnations, TITLE was
restored in the owner on the land records in 1972 at Vol.
52, p. 242-243 and TAXES were again being assessed
against the owner, not withstanding the federal intrusion
and occupancy, and, TITLE remains currently in the
plaintiff / owner.
Where the government has denied petitioner eco-
nomically viable use of the land during the pendency of
all suits in both federal and state courts for a TAKING
that has been effected by a putative exercise of the
POLICE POWER, with reliance upon the unconstitutional
application of the state Supreme Court decree - VOID on
13
the face of the record, the enjoining of plaintiff from
further Federal District Court actions and imposing sanc-
tions is an abrogation of the owner’s right to seek and
determine just compensation under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
LIST OF FEDERAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
U.S. Court
of Appeals for U.S. Supreme
U.S. District Court the Second Circuit Court
a. H-81-778 )
(JAC) 1981 +)
)
b. H-83-225 )
(TEC) 1983)
Consolidated- 83-6257 (83) 83-1833
dismissed affirmed cert. denied
8/16/83 (JAC) 10/1/84
c. H-85-45 85-6087 (85) —
1985 affirmed -
dismissed Notice of future
sanctions
d. H-87-732 (JAC) 88-6093 (88) 88-693
1987 affirmed cert. denied
dismissed sanctions imposed 11/28/88
enjoined from
~ further federal
district court
actions
9. Where real property leases of plaintiff’s Parcel
“C” were entered into between the sponsor, Connecticut
Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) with navigational instrumentation
14
on the surface of the property, being fully aware there
was no action before the court for acquisition, being fully
aware the previous actions before the state court were all
ruled null and void, being aware neither federal or state
agencies paid any compensation to the land owner, being
fully aware as TRESPASSERS they were committing an
unconstitutional act, still entered into several leases (Ex.
#14) of the subject property and the attempt to “CON-
CEAL” was a misprision of a felony, and, the denial by
the state Supreme Court to pursue just compensation
(damages) under the #163875 legislative mandate is a
grossly unconstitutional federal deprivation of just com-
pensation under the federal constitution - that must be
reversed.
10. The state Supreme Court having dismissed
plaintiff's MOTION TO VACATE, sua sponte, without
deciding whether the allegations, presenting a claim
under the equal protection clause, were sustained by
proof, this court is pleaded to in prayer for reversal of the
state Supreme Court decree and remand the case for
further proceedings under federal regulations and pro-
cedures as delineated by Sec. 213 of P.L. 91-646 (42 USC
§ 4633) where the legislative history of the act, which
states that: “[I]t is immaterial whether . . . federal funds
contribute to the cost of the real property. The controlling
point is that the real property must be acquired for a
federal or federal financially assisted program or pro-
ject.” H.R. Rep. No. 91-1656, 91st Congress, 2d sess. 1970,
reprinted at 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad News 5853
giving as an example a state’s acquisition of rights-of-
way, for a federal-aid highway, with nonfederal funds.
See City of Columbia, S.C. v. Costle, 710 F.2d 1009 (1983).
15
It is unmistakable from the plain language of § 4655
of the Uniform Act that where, as a result of the real
property occupancy and the displacement of the plaintiff
from the farm operation, the states must comply with the
land acquisition procedures specified in § 4651.
It is equally undisputed in the present case that the
acquisition of the real property is/was a necessary inci-
dent to the construction of federal navigational instru-
mentation by the federal agency (FAA) for the control of
ingress and egress of air traffic to the primary runway at
the airport and such construction falls within the provi-
sions of § 4655.
The precise language of § 4655 indicates that a state
must be guided, “to the greatest extent practicable under
state law” by the § 4651 procedures. The courts have
concluded that by “practicable” Congress intended to
have the grant recipient comply with the § 4651 pro-
cedures to the fullest extent to which it is legally capable
of complying under state law. See Beaird-Poulan, Inc. v.
Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 497 F.2d 54, 58 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 990, 95 S. Ct. 1424, 43 L.Ed. 2d 670 (1974);
Whitman v. Missouri State Highway Commission, 400 F.
Supp. 1050, 1066-68.
¢
ARGUMENT
The constitutional validity of a decree by the state
Supreme Court acting under a special legislative enact-
ment (Special Act. #170 (1969), Simmons v. Wetherall,
#163875 (1970)) does not authorize such unconstitutional
conduct as was entered in this cause on the land records
16
but not with the trial court or court of first instance by
twice discharged private counsel who had officially with-
drawn from representation of the owner on April 19,
1978, prior to entering “supplemental judgments” ex parte
on June 2nd and 5th on the land records; prior to service
of process or publication of notice — that was never made.
See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), also Brandriff v.
Sellas, 40 Conn. Sup. 243 (1985), Marshall v. Clark, 170
Conn. 199 at 205 (1976), denying all rights to plaintiff
upon a seizure of federal grant agreement real property,
occupied and used by governmental agency action,
F.A.A., who were never mentioned or made a party to
any proceedings for airport navigational installations,
without condemnation or exercise in eminent domain or
payment of just compensation; where plaintiff alleged
that the omission of the name, title, and interest, of said
plaintiff by said private counsel (Rogin-Hirtle, Esq.’s), or, -
to serve upon said plaintiff any personal notice of the fact
of the filing of the said “supplemental judgment” or of
the hearing thereon were and each of them was willful,
intentional fraud and done for the purpose of defrauding
said plaintiff and depriving it of its said interest in said
premises without the basic, fundamental due process of
law; whose arbitrary, oppressive, unjust, unconstitutional
and fraudulent conduct was terminated with two (2) dis-
charges and a withdrawal from representation on April
19, 1978, prior to “freezing” governmentally occupied
real property on June 2nd and 5th without subject matter
jurisdiction or jurisdiction of the parties, and, no returns
of service to the Superior Court that would give the trial
court jurisdiction and where the statute (Special Act #
170) makes provision for damages that was invalidated,
17
destroyed was an infringement of plaintiff’s constitu-
tional rights for just compensation.
‘Where the Supreme Court dismissed the most recent
MOTION TO VACATE, dated May 1, 2000 for assessment
of damages, and, where a “TAKING” for public use with-
out compensation can be corrected by payment, while a
governmental action that violates due process require-
ments may be invalidated, without regard to whether
compensation is provided and where the highest court of
a state transmogrified plaintiff’s tort action into an emi-
nent domain action that is repugnant to the Constitution,
treaties, laws of the United States, the validity of such.
exercise is the question for review.
2
18
CONCLUSION
As the SUPREME COURT OF CONNECTICUT did
not decide whether the allegations under plaintiffs
MOTION TO VACATE (May 1, 2000) were sustained by
the proof that the state court violated federally protected
equal protection and due process rights under the federal
constitution. (Allah v. Superior Court of Cal., 871 F.2d 887)
and the litigant is stymied by the state procedural ruling
from which he cannot appeal, plaintiff prays for review
by the SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES of
that ruling (Lynk v. Laporte, 789 F2d 554), that is an
important public issue.
Respectfully submitted,
Aucustus J. Simmons, Petitioner
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
App. 1
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
SUPREME COURT
NO. HHD CV70-0163875S
AUGUSTUS J. SIMONS [sic]
v.
HORACE B. WETHERALL ET AL. : MAY 31, 2000
ORDER
THE MOTION OF THE PLAINTIFF, FILED MAY 1,
2000, TO VACATE, HAVING BEEN PRESENTED TO THE
COURT, IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE PLAINTIFF
IS HEREBY PROHIBITED FROM FILING PLEADINGS
IN THIS COURT THAT ARE RELATED TO DOCKET
NUMBER CV70-0163875.
BY THE COURT,
/s/ Francis J. Drummer
CHIEF CLERK
NOTICE SENT: MAY 31, 2000
AUGUSTUS SIMMONS, PRO SE
PAUL K. PERNEREWSKI, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY
GENERAL
ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN, LASSMAN & HIRTLE
CLERK, HARTFORD J.D.
HON. JOHN J. LANGENBACH
App. 2
SUPREME COURT
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND
MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT
DOCKET # 163875 ‘
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS. (MAY 1, 2000)
HORACE B. WETHERALL, et al
MOTION TO VACATE
Plaintiff, Augustus J. Simmons, moves the Supreme
Court to vacate its prior judgments, decrees, decisions
with respect to Simmons vs. Wetherall, Docket #163875,
VOID ON ITS FACE on account of; IRREGULARITY IN
THE JUDGMENT OR ORDER; TOTAL DISREGARD FOR
MANDATORY FEDERAL LAW WHERE FEDERAL PRO-
GRAMS, PROJECTS, AND FEDERAL FUNDS FOR AIR-
PORT PURPOSES ARE AT ISSUE; BY ITS UNJUST,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, UNCONSCIONABLE DECREES
HAS DENIED, AND CONTINUES TO DENY JUST COM-
PENSATION FOR IN EXCESS OF THIRTY-FIVE YEARS;
WITHOUT SERVICE OF PROCESS, ACTUAL OR CON-
STRUCTIVE; TRANSMOGRIFIED PLAINTIFF’S TORT
MATTER INTO AN EMINENT DOMAIN ENDEAVOR;
WHERE THE STATE SUPREME COURT BY ITS DECREE
BREACHED THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITU-
TION.
App. 3
MEMORANDUM OF LAW - AND FACT
1. The rule is formulated in Prince vs. Thomas, 11
Conn. 472, as follows: “If a warrant issues from a magis-
trate or officer of special and limited powers, who has not
jurisdiction of the person, subject matter and process, all
who are voluntarily and actively engaged in its procure-
ment and execution are trespassers.”
2. In this case the jurisdiction over the parties and
process turns on the question whether the discharged and
withdrawn private counsel (Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s) had
jurisdiction over the subject matter. “Jurisdiction of the
subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases
of the general class to which the proceedings in question
belong.” 15 Corpus Jurus, 734, and many cases cited.
3. The Supreme Court of the United States defines
jurisdiction as “the right to adjudicate concerning the
subject matter in the given case. To constitute this there
are three essentials: first, the court must have cognizance
of the class of cases to which the one to be adjudged
belongs; second, the proper parties must be present; and
third, the point decided must be in substance and effect
within the issue.” Reynolds vs. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 268,
11 Sup. Ct. 773.
VOID JUDGMENT
4. A judgment void on its face may be vacated upon
motion, no matter what length of time has interposed
since its rendition; neither is it necessary for the movant
to show any meritorious defense, nor can the court
App. 4
impose any conditions for vacating it. Harris vs. Harde-
man, 14 How. 337, 14 L. Ed. 444; Furman vs. Furman, 60
Am. St. Rep. 642-643; Blythe & Fargo Co. vs. Swenson, 15
Utah 345, 49 Pac 1027.
5. The law is thus stated in Freeman on Judgments
(4th Ed.) § 495: “A judgment pronounced without service
of process, actual or constructive, and without the defen-
dant’s knowledge that a court had been asked to adjudi-
cate upon his rights is regarded with such disfavor at law
that a variety of motions, writs, and proceedings are there
provided to overthrow it; and in many courts it is at all
times.and upon all occasions liable to be entirely disre-
garded upon having its jurisdictional infirmity exposed.
But proceedings in equity are peculiarly appropriate for.
the exposure of this infirmity. They permit of the forma-
tion of issues upon the question of service of process, and
of the trial of those issues after full opportunity has been
given to those who seek to sustain as well as those who
seek to avoid the judgment. If at such trial it satisfactorily
appears that the defendant was not summoned and had
no notice of the suit, a sufficient excuse is shown for his
neglect to defend, and equity will not allow the judg-
ment, if unjust, to be used against him, — ‘no matter what
jurisdictional recitals it contains.’ ” (italics ours)
IRREGULARITIES
6. Relief based on extrinsic evidence may be had
against a judgment rendered without notice and service
of process, whether by PURCHASE, LEASE, GIFT,
EXCHANGE, or the EXERCISE OF EMINENT DOMAIN
under C.G.S. §§ 8-129 and 52-57 (manner of service) or 49
App. 5
C.F.R., Part 24, Subpart B (24.102 — basic acquisition pro-
cedure) where federal grant agreements, projects, funds,
are at issue as in case at bar, empowering the “Supreme
Court” to vacate its own judgments, at any time, on
account of “IRREGULARITY IN OBTAINING A JUDG-
MENT OR ORDER.” It needs no extended argument to
make the point that no judgment purporting to bind the
property of a defendant has any validity unless a means
reasonably calculated to give notice to all necessary and
indisposable parties has been employed. Mullane vs. Cen-
tral Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 30b, 314 94 L. Ed.
865, 870, 70 S.Ct. 652; Schroeder vs. New York, 371 U.S. 208,
91 L. Ed. 2d 255, 83 S.Ct. 279 (1962).
7. The Connecticut statutes make detailed provision
for such notice and there is little doubt that, if the statutes
are followed, the notice requirements of due process will
be met. Strict compliance with the notice provisions of
the statutes is required under Connecticut law and not to
be — “disregarded with impunity nor waived or changed
by the courts.” Munger vs. Doolan, 75 Conn. 656, 659, 55
Atl. 169 (1903), paraphrased with approval in Carter vs.
Carter, 147 Conn. 238, 242, 159 A 2d 173 (1960).
8. That the NOTICE and SERVICE requirements
under the due process clause were totally and completely
disregarded with impunity and deliberate, malvolence
[sic] by the Supreme Court of Connecticut, acting in
concert with discharged and withdrawn private counsel
(Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s) is evidenced by the fact that the
Superior Court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction
or jurisdiction of the parties where there was NO
RETURN OF SERVICE to the Superior Court.
7
App. 6
9. Where a client has a right to discharge a lawyer,
at any time, with or without cause, per rule 1.16 of
Practice Book and after the second notice the authority,
power, right, jurisdiction to act was “surrendered” with a
withdrawal upon plaintiff’s refusal to tender any deeds
or entertain any unconstitutional “VERBAL” offers pro-
vides the answers to why there is not, was not, could not
be any service, hearings, decisions, judgments of or by
the Superior Court and the Connecticut Supreme Court
acting on the unconstitutional, fraudulent, felonious, in
violation of federal and state law post-withdrawal activ-
ity of the discharged and withdrawn private counsel
(Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s) was a breach of the federal and state
constitution. The track record to wit:
a) Written discharge on 12/23/77 — Ex. #1
b) Second notice on 4/12/78 — Ex. #2
c) Withdrawal from representation 4/19/78 — Ex. #3
| d) (PJ.R) lawsuit against owner for counsel fees
4/20/78 — Ex. #4
10. That there was no notice, service, proceedings,
judgments, docket number before the Superior Court was
illuminated, made a matter of evidence in August 1979,
prior to the Supreme Court decision of May 1980 (180 c
587), wherein Hon. Superior Court Judge John Daly after
having granted a motion of Jason Pearl, esq. representing
the withdrawn attorney’s for unconstitutional funds sub-
mitted to the Superior Court by withdrawn counsel, was,
on August 30, 1979 VACATED, RESCINDED regards any
consideration for compensation upon a submission of a
citation from the Chief Clerk of Superior Court (Lucian
App. 7
Jachomovitz) to the Hon. John Daly. The reason for re-
scinding was: “Based on Shelton vs. Wolthausen, 80 c 599
(furnished by Lucian), I would have no authority to grant
this motion. Will you kindly notify Jason Pearl regarding
this and if he wishes to argue the matter put it down.” Ex.
#5
The opening paragraph of Shelton, Supra, reads:
“Where money is paid into court in an action to deter-
mine its ownership, it is in the custody of the law, and is
to be disposed of only through the medium of proceed-
ings had in or relating to that cause.” The reason that the
unconstitutional funds were returned to the state treasury
on December 23, 1991 was the lack of proceedings and
jurisdiction by the Superior Court.
11. The land records of the town of East Granby
show the court stamp and signature of Thomas Abraham,
PREDECESSOR to Lucian Jachomovitz on certain of the
post-withdrawal activity of Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s, including
Vol. 59, p. 657-668 that contains a citation at pages
661-662 with a return date of the first Tuesday of July,
1978 that was collusion, conspiracy, a falsification of pub-
lic documents between the former clerk and the law firm
of Rogin-Hirtle. Where the Rogin-Hirtle firm acted —- “as
their own sheriff” after withdrawal and could not serve
any of the necessary parties, the listing of a return date
was an intentional, felonious falsification of public docu-
ments, an improper return day that does not give the
court jurisdiction where there was no process of service
BEFORE or AFTER the return day and such proceedings
for its enforcement may, in collateral proceedings be dis-
regarded and treated as a nullity. From Galpin vs. Page, 18
Wall. 350: “It is a rule as old as the law, and never to be
\
App. 8
respected than now, that no one shall be personally
bound until he has had his day in court, by which is
meant, until he is duly cited to appear, and has been
afforded an opportunity to be heard. Judgment without
such citation and opportunity wants all the attributes of a
judicial determination. It is judicial usurpation and
oppression and never can be upheld where justice is
justly administered. * * * “Judgment without jurisdiction
is unavailing for any purpose.”
Will the court protect and give effect to such a fraud?
From Coit vs. Haven, 30 Conn. 190 at p. 199: “They say,
with great emphasis, and.the argument is certainly a
forcible one, can it be that a clerk of the court may
fabricate a record, or an officer make a false return of
service, and yet there be no escape for one who is thus by
a judgment in the suit made heavily indebted, or found
guilty of a wrong, when in fact he is perfectly innocent,
or never owed the debt, and could show it clearly if he
had a chance? Will a court, they ask, because it has a
general jurisdiction, protect and give effect to such a
fraud?....”
12. The owner in his Motion to Vacate contends that
the discharged and withdrawn private counsel’s choice of
an improper “bogus” return day of the first Tuesday of
July, 1978 was an incurable defect that deprived the court
of subject matter jurisdiction. It cannot be disputed that
an improper return day affects the court’s jurisdiction.
Brandriff vs. Sellas, 40 Conn. Sup. 243; Hartford National
Bank & Trust Co. vs. Tucker, 178 Conn. 472, 478-79, 423 A
2d 141 (1979) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904, 100 S.Ct. 1079, 63
App. 9
L. Ed. 2d 319 (1980). Having “surrendered” their author-
ity, their right to encumber the property, the incorpora-
tion of the return day, regardless what day or month was
interjected, it was fraud against the owner, fraud upon
the court. 2
RETURN DAY
13. Section 7767 (51-347) of the general statutes
expressly provides that process in civil actions returnable
to the Superior Court - “shall be returned . . . to the clerk
of such court at least six days before the return day.” The
statute is MANDATORY and failure to return the process
to court within the time limited renders the attachment
proceedings fatally defective. Daley vs. Board of Police
Commissioners, 133 Conn. 716, 719; Hartley vs. Vitiello, 113
Conn. 74, 79; Safford vs. Morris Metal Products Co., 99
Conn. 372, 376; Chevalier vs. Wakefield, 85 Conn. 374, 375;
Dillon vs. Fahey, 88 Conn. 605, 607; Gaylord vs. Payne, 3
Conn. 258; Lamothe vs. Gordon, 15 Conn. Sup. 504; Musial
vs. State, 3 Conn Sup. 159, 160; see also Jepsen vs. Toni Co.,
20 Conn. Sup. 287, 295. See also #8 and #10 of this
motion.
Private councel [sic] (Rogin-Hirtle) having “surren-
dered” their authority, their right to encumber or dele-
gate to a sheriff the compliance with the return day
mandate, regardless of what day or month was an inten-
tional, malicious, federal and state constitutional viola-
tion with malicious overtones, that_was nullified with the
owner filing a “DISSOLUTION OF ATTACHMENTS
PURSUANT TO CGS § 52-327 on December 2, 1996. Ex.
#6
App. 10
The owner/plaintiff/defendant’s motion that the
process be vacated because it was not returned to court in
accordance with statutory requirements - APPEARS
UPON THE FACE OF THE RECORD.
Owner’s Motion to Vacate - must be granted -
because the process was not returned not later than six
days before the return day. Jepsen vs. Toni Co., Supra, at
page 294.
JUDGMENT - RETURN DAY
14. Judgment can only be entered AFTER jurisdic-
tion of the parties is acquired in the manner prescribed by
law and does not transcend, in the extent or character of
its judgment, the law which is applicable to it. O’Leary vs.
Waterbury Title Co., 117 Conn. 39, 43, 166 A 673.
The rendering of judgments prior to the return day
are, ipso facto, null and void. Brandriff vs. Sellas, 40 C.S.
243, 245.
15. No principle is more universal than that the
judgment of a court without jurisdiction is a nullity. Clo-
ver vs. Urban, 108 Conn. 13, 17, 142 A 389; Wood vs.
Watkinson, 47 Conn. 500, 503; Strong vs. Strong, 8 Conn.
408, 412; I. Freeman Judgments (5th Ed.) p.-668; 31 Am.
Jur. 72 § 409. Such a judgment, whenever and wherever
declared upon as a source of a right, may always be
challenged. Restatement, judgments, § 11 comment c; see
Frick vs. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 98 Conn. 251, 255, 119 A
229. This does not offend the full faith and credit clause
of the federal Constitution. Williams vs. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226, 229, 65 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577; see Rice vs.
App. 11
Rice, 134 Conn. 440, 445, 58 A 2d 523; Hooker vs. Hooker,
130 Conn. 41, 47, 32 A 2d 68. Nor does it violate the
principles of comity. Freund vs. Burns, 131 Conn. 380, 385,
40 A 2d 754.
16. Where the record is ultra clear the DIS-
CHARGED ATTORNEY’S ARE ENCUMBERING THE
REAL PROPERTY ON JUNE 2nd and 5th, 1978 WITH A
“BOGUS” RETURN DAY, is raw “POLICE POWER” that
the Connecticut Supreme Court cannot, should not, sub-
scribe to or sanction.
DUE PROCESS IRREGULARITIES
17. That there were NO proceedings, o’ any nature,
at the lower Superior Court level is evidenced by the
brief submitted to the Supreme Court by Atty. Ron Cassi-
dento representing the owner (plaintiff /defendant) under
STATE OF CONNECTICUT vs. AUGUSTUS SIMMONS, ‘
Docket #202121 (consolidated appeal) that was
REJECTED by Chief Appelate [sic] Clerk Francis Drumm
and Atty. Cassidento was informed he could REFILE
under AUGUSTUS SIMMONS vs. HORACE B.
WETHERALL (consolidated appeal) - BRIEF OF DEFEN-
DANTS-APPELLANTS, not withstanding the owner was
the plaintiff in the legislative enactment (Special Act
#170-1969, Simmons vs. Wetherall). Such TRANS-
MOGRIFICATION is unconstitutional and a gross abuse
of the due process clause. Ex. #7
Under federal question in Standard Oil Co. vs. Mis-
sourit, 32 Supreme Court at page 409 the court is quoted:
“Though the court may possess jurisdiction of a cause, of
the subject matter, and of the parties, it is still limited in
App. 12
its modes of procedure, and in the extent and character of
its judgments. It must act judicially in all things, and
cannot then transcend the power conferred by the law. IF
THE ACTION BE FOR LIBEL OR PERSONAL TORT, THE
COURT CANNOT ORDER IN THE CASE A SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF A CONTRACT.”
18. On March 17, 1982 AFTER the Supreme Court
decision of 1980 (180 c 587), a memorandum re “STATES
MOTION FOR ORDER OF TRANSFER OF MONIES ON
DEPOSIT WITH CLERK,” the Hon. Dupont, A. recogniz-
ing there was no proceedings or docket number before
the Superior Court through which unconstitutional funds
could be dispersed, attempted to create a COMMIS-
SIONER OF TRANSPORTATION vs. DIAMOND case and
the clerk was directed to assign a docket number. Jerome
Diamond was a lien-holder as listed on the town of East
Granby land records and referenced in the “BOGUS”
citation at Vol. 59, p. 661-2.
On July 9, 1982 Hon. Dupont, A. RESCINDED her
own order contending there is no necessity to establish a
separate docket number for Commissioner of Transportation
vs. Diamond, an appearance in the instant case has now
been filed by Leonidas D. Simmons.
What is implied by the “instant case” is uncertain,
but what is certain is there was no notice, no service, no
compensation was ever paid or made available to
Leonidas D. Simmons, notwithstanding a claim was
made, consequently the encumberance is still on the land
records. Ex. #8
19. Where the owner, Augustus J. Simmons was
intentionally, prejudically [sic], maliciously - OMITTED —
App. 13
for notice, service, or hearing before a competent tribunal
which would give the property owner an opportunity to
be heard or require the party recording lien to demon-
strate in any way the probability of prevailing on the
underlying action, there is no valid attachment of real
estate. Harwood vs. United States Shipping Board Corp., 300
F 433 (District Court of Connecticut March 24, 1924).
NEVER, in a thousand years, can title to the real
property at issue be acquired without a listing for notice,
service, and, a day in court - OF THE OWNER, and where
federal regulations, 14 CFR § 152.3 (basic acquisition
policies) requires a “satisfactory property interest,” free
of liens or encumberances, and, where federal programs,
projects, and, or assistance are involved as in case at bar
mandating, ON ALL STATES, compliance with the basic
acquisition procedures promulgated pursuant to the Uni-
form Real Property Acquisition Act (P. L. 91-646, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4651-4655, the ANSWER becomes obvious - it
was not an oversight; it was not a mistake; it was not
unfamiliarity with overriding federal law — it was inten-
tional, malicious, unconstitutional, “COERCIVE
ACTION,” prohibited under 49 C.F.R. § 24.102 (h) of
federal regulations.
20. On June 8, 1982 hearing was held before Hon.
Dupont, A., on the motions of Atty. Walter Bass repre-
senting lien-holders “Valente” and “Allaire” requesting
their liens be paid off from the unconstitutional funds
that were with the clerk of the Superior Court, using the
argument that the court had already paid Rogin-Hirtle
esq’s, Jerome Diamond, and taxes to town of East Granby.
Notwithstanding the previous payments alluded to, the
App. 14
payment of compensation to “Valente” and “Allaire” was
DENIED pursuant to the dichotomy that transpired.
The Attorney General’s office directed a challenge to
the Superior Court with lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and jurisdiction of the parties (trans. p. 17-18). Atty.
Walter Bass made a profound statement to the court at
(page 26 trans.) substantiating the lack of jurisdiction by
the court claiming: “First of all, I would object to Mr.
Feingold at this time questioning the jurisdiction of the
court to hear the case. SECONDLY, Your Honor, I forget
which paragraph he referred to in Judge Shapiro’s deci-
sion, there was to be a citation issued so that all people
would come forth and present their claims. I have a right
to inform the court that in the citation, my two clients
were listed under the care of my office. I will state to the
court that I have never been served with any citation nor
has my clients ever been served with any kind of citation
to give us any notice to come in to determine what our
priorities are in this matter.” (transcript 6/7/82) Ex. #9
A decree, judgment, order against a person on whom
no process has been served is not erroneous and void-
able, but upon principles of natural justice, and also
under the due process clause of the 14th Amendment is _
absolutely VOID. Marshall vs. Holmes, 141 U.S. 589, Simon
vs. Southern Railway, 236 U.S. 115.
21. SERVICE with the complaint is necessary under
Connecticut statutes for an action to commence in Con-
necticut. Young vs. Margictta, 136 Conn. 429, 433, 71 A 2d
924, 926 (1950). The procedural statute, C.G.S. § 8-129
imposes a statutory duty for service in accord with C.G.S.
App. 15
§ 52-57. C.G.S. § 8-129 is applicable whether by PUR-
CHASE, LEASE, GIFT, EXCHANGE, or the EXERCISE OF
EMINENT DOMAIN.
CLEARLY, such extrinsic evidence proves beyond
any shadow of doubt that the preceding documentation
of June 1982, makes the Supreme Court of Connecticut
decree of May 1980, a DECREE - VOID ON ITS FACE, a
breach of the federal aiid state Constitution.
FEDERAL OR STATE REGULATIONS
22. Where the first piece of correspondence
addressed to the owner in 1960 made reference to a 1955
agreement between the state and federal agencies and an
examination of such 1955 federal-aid grant agreement
makes very clear that acquisition must be made pursuant
to federal regulations of the “Doolittle Clear Zone” on
plaintiff’s Parcel “C.” Ex. #10 _
23. Where the legislature enacted C.G.S. 13b-50
sec(d) as the state statute that governs in the case at bar;
where the courts have previously in New Haven vs. East
Haven, 35 Conn. Sup. 157 (1977) made clear the airport,
BY FEDERAL REGULATIONS, is authorized to acquire
land to maintain airport approach zones, including clear
and transition zones (14 C.F.R. § 152.85(d) (1977)); where
NO proceedings under federal or state law were insti-
tuted to give the Superior Court jurisdiction, it was grave
unconstitutional error for the state Supreme Court to
transmogrify plaintiff's tort action, that was never
addressed, into a judgment for land confiscation.
App. 16
24. From 47 AM JUR 2d JUDGMENTS §§ 752, 753,
“It is an acknowledged principle of . . . every court in the
world, that not only the decisions, but everything done
under the judicial process of courts not having jurisdic-
tion are ipso facto VOID.” Martin vs. Hunters Lessee, 14
U.S. 1 Wheat, 304; 364, 42 L. Ed. 97 (1816); Chrysler Credit
Corp. vs. Fairfield Chrysler Plymouth Inc., 180 Conn. 223,
229, 429 A 2d 487 (1980); Marshall vs. Clark, 170 Conn. 199,
205, 365 A 2d 1202 (1976).
25. Where the federal agency, Federal Aviation
Administration (F.A.A.), through its agent, Connecticut
Department of Transportation (CDOT) used and occupied
land belonging to, and of value to, plaintiff’s Parcel “C,”
and the United States made no payments to the plaintiff,
or, to the state agency for reasons apparent at first
instance, for the use and occupance, or for any other
purpose, and under current standards is responsible for
ninety percent (90%) of the acquisition cost, and the
unconstitutional funds before the Superior Court clerk
that could not be paid for lack of jurisdiction and were
returned to the state treasury, as was the allocated federal
funds that were returned to their general fund. The
United States Supreme Court has observed whether a
claim that a particular government regulation or action
taken thereon has deprived a claimant of his property
without just compensation is an “essentially ad hoc fac-
tual inquir[y].” Penn Central Transportation Co. vs. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L. Ed. 2d 631
(1977), reh. denied, 439 U.S. 883, 99 S.Ct. 226, 58 L. Ed. 2d
198 (1978) see also Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. vs.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 473-74, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L. Ed.
App. 17
2d 472 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. vs. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L. Ed. 2d 322 (1922).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 4651 of Title III, mandatory on all
states no later than July 1, 1972 provides that, “[iJn order
to encourage and expedite the acquisition of real prop-
erty by agreements with owner, to avoid litigation and
relieve congestion in the courts, to assure consistent treat-
ment for owners in the many federal programs, and to
promote public confidence in federal land acquisition
practices” the agency seeking to acquire real property
shall - 1) make every reasonable effort to acquire prop-
erty by negotiation, 2) appraise the property before the
initiation of negotiations, with the owner present, if he
wishes, at that appraisal, and 3) make an initial WRIT-
TEN offer to the landowner to acquire the property for
- the full appraisal amount.
That there was no valuation or determination, of any
nature, no written statements of compensation submitted
to the court, the owner, the town clerk, as required by
federal regulations and state statutes is UNDISPUTED.
Since the UNITED STATES effectively appropriated the
land in question for an ascertainable period, thereby
interfering with a recognizable interest of plaintiff, the
UNITED STATES is obliged to pay plaintiff the fair rental
value of that property for the period involved. United
States vs. General iotors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 382 (1945);
Kimball Laundry Co. vs. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 7 (1949);
United States vs. 40.379 Square Feet of Land, 58 F. Supp. 246,
250-52 (D.C. Mass. 1944); Jacobsen vs. Superior Court, 192
Cal. 319, 219 Pac. 986 (1923).
App. 18
27. The loss of plaintiffs Parcel “C” involved in this
case was not merely incidental or indirect consequences
of a taking of other property, rather, it was the direct
product of the actual invasion or taking of the property
involved. United States vs. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265-66
(1946). And, “it is the character of the invasion, not the
amount of damage resulting from it, so long as the dam-
age is substantial, that determines the question whether it
is a taking.” United States vs. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
PLEADINGS, ISSUES, PRAYERS FOR RELIEF
28. WHERE THERE WAS NO NOTICE, NO SER-
VICE, NO RETURN OF PROCESS TO THE SUPERIOR
COURT, WHERE THERE ARE NO PLEADINGS, NO
HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUPERIOR COURT AND,
WHERE THERE WAS AN ACTUAL ADJUDICATION IN
THE SUPERIOR COURT on June 7, 1982 before Hon.
Dupont, A. of subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction
of the parties, a motion to vacate the decree of the
Supreme Court (180 Conn. 587) — is appropriate.
29. It is Hornbook Law that “any judgment should
conform to pleadings, issues, and prayers for relief.”
Kawasaki, Kissen, Kaisha, Ltd. vs. Indomar, Ltd., 173 Conn.
269, 377 A 2d 316; Brill vs. Ulrey, 159 Conn. 371, 269 A 2d
262; Morici vs. Jarvie, 137 Conn. 97, 75 A 2d 47; Shaw vs.
Spelke, 110 Conn. 208, 147 A 675; Steinmetz vs. Steinmetz,
125 Conn. 663, 7 A 2d 915. The Connecticut Supreme
Court had occasion to discuss this principle in New Haven
Sandblast Co. vs. Dreisbach, 104 Conn. 322, 330, 133 A 99.
In that case, the court stated:
App. 19
“A defect in a judgment arising from the fact that the
matter decided was not embraced within the issue has
not, it would seem, received much judicial consideration.
And yet I cannot doubt that, upon general principles,
such a defect must avoid judgment.”
At 133 A 102 (citation omitted), the court also stated,
quoting Blackon Judgments (2d Ed.) Vol. 1 § 215
“Besides jurisdiction of the person of the defendant
and of the general subject-matter of the action, it is neces-
sary to the validity of the judgment that the court should
have had jurisdiction over the precise question which its
judgment assumes to decide, or of the particular remedy
or relief which it assumes to grant * * * and third, the
point decided must be in substance and effect, within the
issue.
30. Finally, the court cited with approval the case of
Lilly vs. Claypool, 53 S.E. 22, 24, 59 W. Va. 130, 133: “There
is no principle better settled than that a judgment or
decree cannot be entered in the absence of pleadings
upon which to found the same.” 133 A at 102 (citations)
(see also Case vs. Bush, 93 Conn. 550, 552, 106 A 822 -
indicating that the variance between the judgment and
the issues raised is jurisdictional.)
31. It is significant that in New Haven Sandblast Co.,
Supra, the court was asked to issue a ruling based upon
stipulated, rather than actual facts. The court expressly
found that the agreement of the parties was not sufficient
to constitute a waiver and could not “confer jurisdiction
upon the trial court.”
App. 20
32. Where federal grant agreements, federal pro-
jects, federal funds are at issue as in case at bar and
subject to the regulations promulgated pursuant to the
mandate of the Uniform Real Property Acquisition Act,
P.L. 91-646 42 U.S.C. §§ 4601-4655 and Title III (42 U.S.C.
4651-4655) is binding on every state in the union, Connect-
icut is no exception. The precise language of 42 U.S.C.
§ 4655 of the act, indicates that a state must be guided,
“to the greatest extent practicable under state law,” by the
§ 4651 procedures to the fullest extent to which it is
legally capable of complying under state law. Beard-
Poulan Inc. vs. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 497 F 2d 54, 58
(5 cir.), cert. denied, 420 U. S. 990, 95 S.Ct. 1424, 43 L. Ed.
2d 670 (1974); Witman vs. Missouri State Hwy Comm., 406 F.
Supp. 1050, 1060-68 Cw. D. Mo. (1975); City of Columbia,
S.C. vs. Costle, 710 F 2d 1009 (1983).
33. Where the Connecticut legislature, at the request
of the Connecticut Department of Transportation, enacted
C.G.S. 48-17 a, b, c, in 1971 to be in compliance with the
mandates of the federal legislation (Uniform Act) and
48-17 a, b, c, - SUPERSEDES - Special Act #170 (1969),
the fact that private counsel (Rogin-Hirtle) INVALI-
DATED the hearings on damages under the special act,
the 5th and 14th Amendments of the Constitution PRO-
HIBIT such invalidation for fair and just compensation
under 48-17 a, b, c, and the Connecticut Supreme Court
cannot entertain, participate, direct, or order any FINAL
JUDGMENTS without compliance with such mandated
federal legislation under the equal protection clause of
the Constitution.
34. Inasmuch as the federal regulations are applica-
ble, binding, mandatory, where FEDERAL-AID is. assured
“eesti ee ar heer a a, or oak Ss a Boma Sa bs h zits 2s
‘ NT V7 . ¢
erties oa as
App. 21
as in case at bar, the “acquiring agency,” that was clari-
fied with an amended public law 100-17 in 1987 by the
United States Congress, was obligated under 49 C.F.R.
§ 24.102 (b), notice to owner to: As soon as feasible, the
owner shall be notified of the agency’s interest in acquir-
ing the real property and the BASIC PROTECTIONS,
including the agency’s obligation to secure an appraisal,
provided to the owner by law and this part (emphasis
ours).
35. Where the discharged and withdrawn private
: counsel (Rogin-Hirtle) was acting as “the acquiring
4 agency,” partaking in the act to DENY, DEFY the BASIC
aq PROTECTIONS, to totally and completely disregard the
mandatory federal law where federal programs, projects,
and federal funds for airport purposes are at issue, such
malicious and unconstitutional behavior - CANNOT - be
waived by the state Supreme Court.
36. Where adjudication of constitutional infirmity
requires a specific showing of personal injury, one need
look no further than plaintiff’s Exhibit #6 (Dissolution of
_ Attachments), referenced in paragraph’s #13, where, in
lieu of being paid any fair and just compensation, the
. owner is obligated to lien-holders while the Federal Avia-
q tion Administration (FAA.) enjoys a “FREE RIDE” with
the control of the airspace IN, ON, and AROUND plain-
tiff’s Parcel “C.”
Se NeA DH NS
joe “ey ees
Re iat coe cat tates:
REFEREE REPORT
37. Where Referee Shapiro was deputized by Hon.
Dannehy of Superior Court in 1976 to address damages
under Special Act # 170 that never materialized or took
$$$
App. 22
place due to the INVALIDATION by private counsel
(Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s) who “USED” referee in a deceptive
manner to put his name on documents filed on the land
recoids by discharged Rogin-Hirtle, but, never submitted
any reports, decisions, judgments or opinions back to the
Superior Court, further illuminates the IRREGULARITY
by the state Supreme Court acting with NO RECORD
before the Superior Court.
Referee Shapiro did submit a letter to Jason Pearl,
esq. representing the withdrawn Rogin-Hirtle law firm,
dated July 18, 1980 AFTER the decision by the Supreme
Court in May, 1980 wherein he expresses concern over
how to proceed legally, that there were several encum-
berances [sic] with PRIORITIES, and, acknowledging that
he is not equipped to give notice to the various creditors
— “which I believe may be necessary” and referred the matter
back to the Superior Court. Ex. # 11
CLEARLY, such extrinsic evidence of July 1980 makes
the decree of the state Supreme Court of May 1980 (180 c
587) A DECREE - VOID ON ITS FACE.
HEARINGS
38. The opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner is constitutionally
required to meet currently accepted standards of pro-
cedural due process in the area of property rights.
Kukanskis vs. Griffith, 180 Conn. 501. See e.g. Fuentes vs.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1972),
rehearing denied, 409 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 177, 342 L. Ed. 2d
165 (1972); Lynch vs. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92
S.Ct. 1611, 31 L. Ed. 2d 424, rehearing denied, 406 U.S.
App. 23
911, 92 S.Ct. 1611, 31 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1972); Sniadach vs.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L. Ed. 2d
349 (1969); Mitchell vs. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 94
S.Ct. 1895, 40 L. Ed 2d 406 (1974); North Georgia Finishing,
Inc. vs. Di-Chem. Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 95 S.Ct. 719, 42 L. Ed.
2d 751 (1975).
39. THE STATUTES OF CONNECTICUT DO NOT
ALLOW THE ATTACHMENT OF REAL PROPERTY
INDEFINITELY - WITHOUT A HEARING.
40. NO hearings were ever had or permitted, ever,
relative to the deprivations on the land records by the
Rogin-Hirtle “acquiring agency.”
For more than a century the central meaning of pro-
cedural due process has been clear: “Parties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order
that they may enjoy that right they must first be noti-
fied,” Baldwin vs. Hale, 1 Wall 223, 233. See Windsor vs.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274; Harvey vs. Elliot, 167 U.S. 409;
Grannis vs. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385. It is equally fundamental
that the right to notice and an opportunity to be heard
“must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaning-
ful manner.” Armstrong vs. Manzo, 380. U.S. 545-552.
In retrospect, how could there be any hearings when
NO MESNE PROCESS was, or could be, initiated???
In retrospect, how could the state Supreme Court,
without any mesne process in the court below, be render-
ing a decision under Simmons vs. Wetherall #163875???
The FINAL ANSWER was given to Robert King, esq.
on January 4, 1978 by Ed Rogin, Sr., esq. when asked
App. 24
about the legality of a proceeding without any determina-
tions of value or damages, Mr. King was told: “HE IS AN
ALCHOLIC [sic] - HE WON’T KNOW THE DIFFER-
ENCE.”
41. Citing Connecticut vs. Doehr, 111 S.Ct. 2105
(1991) at page 2118:
The law concerning attachments has rarely, if ever,
required defendants to suffer an encumbered title until
the case is concluded without any prior opportunity to
show that the attachment was unwarranted. Our cases
have repeatedly emphasized the importance of providing
a prompt post-deprivation hearing at the very least. See
also Matthews vs. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343, 344, 96 S.Ct.
893, 907, 47 L. Ed 2d 18 (1976).
COMPENSATION
42. The just compensation clause of the Fifth
Amendment made applicable to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment states in clear and unequivocal
terms: “[NJor shall private property be taken for public
use, without compensation.” The government may
choose formally to condemn the property or otherwise to
continue the offending; in either case the action must be
sustained by proper measures of JUST COMPENSATION.
United States vs. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490-492 (1973);
United States Ex. Rel. TVA vs. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266,
281-285 (1943).
As soon as private property has been taken, whether
through formal condemnation proceedings, occupancy,
physical invasion, or regulation, the landowner has
App. 25
already suffered a constitutional violation, on “the self
executing character of the constitutional provision with
respect to compensation,” United States vs. Clarke, 445
U.S. 253, 257 (1980), quoting J. Sackman, Nichols’ Law of
Eminent Domain § 25.41 (Rev. 3d Ed. 1980) is triggered.
43. The federal agency, F.A.A., has acknowledged to
the owner and in federal court before Hon. Cabranes that
it has not made any awards of compensation to the state
or the owner for its use and occupancy for the past thirty-
six (36) years.
44. The sponsor, Connecticut Department of Trans-
portation, has not made any awards of “legal” compensa-
tion to the owner for the past thirty-six (36) years.
45. Whatever illegal, fraudulent, unconstitutional
funds submitted to the Superior Court in 1978 by with-
drawn and discharged private counsel (Rogin-Hirtle) was
returned by the Superior Court to the state treasurer on
December 23, 1991, there not being any legal proceedings
by which the Superior Court could act. Ex. # 12
46. Itis readily apparent the “irregular” decision of
the state Supreme Court of May 1980 (180 c 587) did not
empower the Superior Court to make any kind of awards
of compensation, and, the Superior Court will not, cannot 5
act until the “irregular” decision is VACATED.
14th AMENDMENT INHIBITIONS
47. Itis established practice for the Supreme Court
to restrain, NOT SANCTION, officers, agents, individual
; App. 26
private attorney’s (Rogin-Hirtle) acting as a self-appoin-
ted eminent domain authority from doing what the Four-
teenth Amendment forbids the state to do. Chicago B. &
O.R. Co. vs. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226; Ex Parte Virginia, 100
U.S. 339, 346, 347; New Haven Sandblast vs. Dreisbach, 104
Conn. 322.
The inhibition contained in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment means that no agency of the state, or of the officers
or agents by whom her powers are exerted, shall deny
any person within her jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws. Whoever by virtue of his public position under
a state government deprives another of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law, or denies or takes
away the equal protection of the laws, violates the inhibi-
tion; and as he acts in the name of and for the state, and is
clothed with her power, his act is her act. Otherwise, the
inhibition has no meaning, and the state has clothed one
of her agents with power to annul or evade it.
48. As replacement counsel for hearing in damages
under #163875 and 48-17 a, b, c, by hocus-pocus, ipse
dixit, INVALIDATE hearing dates for damages, no sub-
missions by private counsel or Referee Shapiro are made
to Superior Court, with reckless disregard for controlling
federal law, vacate or override all existing court cases and
previous decisions, including Connecticut Supreme Court
decisions, second circuit federal decisions, usurping
power and authority which the court does not have, and,
without initiating any proceedings for land acquisition,
without complying with conditions precedent imposed
by law make the claim - all cases are consolidated -
consolidated into what???
HES SEAL OEE LEME DS POE SENN LE SOE
App. 27
49. In an excerpt from transcript of June 7, 1982 (Ex.
#9 at page 25) Victor Feingold, Asst. Atty. General
addresses the very important compensation issue of
INTEREST.
“In addition, the question of whether interest accrues
on the judgment lien and also it has to be claimed and
made certain, because the legislature in enacting the stat-
ute on execution on judgment altered the rate of interest
which previous to October 1, 1979 was six percent and
effective October 1, 1979, it became eight percent. If statu-
tory interest is due on the judgment lien, that must be
made known. Well, whether the judgment is based on
notes or a higher rate of interest, that survives the judg-
ment, and to be paid until it is fully satisfied - we have
no way of knowing.”
The owner, having refused to tender any deeds, hav-
ing spurned the unconstitutional, fraudulent, verbal offer,
could not be simultaneously claiming interest.
UNCONSCIONABLE IRREGULARITY
50. The turning back to the treasurer of unconstitu-
tional funds on December 23, 1991 by the Superior Court
illuminates the UNCONSCIONABLE IRREGULARITY
engaged in by Rogin-Hirtle, esq’s — and the state Supreme
Court. Ex. # 12
FRAUD - DURESS - DECEIT - INTIMIDATION
51. a) Upon discharge (12/23/77) of the Rogin-Hir-
tle law firm whose assistance was unwanted or undesired
and whose representation was trammeled or burdened by
. App. 28
simultaneous representation of defendants (Conn. Dept.
of Transp.), plaintiff recruited (new) counsel, Robert
King, esq of Nurenburg trial fame who WAS NOT permit-
ted to represent plaintiff on Jan. 4, 1978 was DURESS,
FRAUD, INTIMIDATION at its lowest level.
b) The “combining of cases” was a deceitful maneu-
ver to remove from court records Docket #162923 that
made reference to illegal and unlawful LEASES.
c) The INVALIDATION of hearing dates on DAM-
AGES was an unconstitutional course of conduct for the
deprivation of just compensation under the 5th & 14th
Amendments.
d) Establishing “fair market value” was totally
ignored with no determinations, valuations, appraisals, of
any nature.
e) No WRITTEN statements of compensation was
ever submitted to the owner, the court, the town clerk as
mandated by statute.
f) The vexatious march into the federal court house,
after discharge, of two federal court lawsuits remanded
by 2nd circuit. Ex. #13
g) Nocomputation of interest that must be awarded
pursuant to law. .
h) Post-withdrawal, illegal, unconstitutional
encumbering of real property. Vol. 59 p. 657-668 with
citation at p. 661-2. Ex. #14
i) Acting as “the court” and incorporating such ter-
minology on the land records AFTER discharge and with-
drawal. Vol. 59 p. 658
App. 29
j) Acting as their own sheriff on encumbering real
property — then stuffing Docket #163875 with a purported
service.
k) Submitting spurned unconstitutional funds to
the Superior Court under the false impression it was a
“condemnation case.”
1) Withdrawing funds from unsuspecting Judge
Tamborra, being last on the list of encumberers without
notice or service to more senior lienholders.
m) Deliberate concealment of illegal, unlawful,
fraudulent LEASES entered into of plaintiff’s Parcel “C”
by F.A.A. and Conn. Dept. of Transportation. Ex. #15
n) Intentional, deliberate, pre-planned, “BACKDAT-
ING” to avoid compliance with federal law and admitting
same on the record of transcript (12/13/1977). No deeds
on 4/19/78. Ex. # 16
0) Intentionally, knowingly violating the laws of
due process — even after such fact called to their attention
by Robert King, esq on January 4, 1978.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Where it is part of the judicial function to determine
JUST COMPENSATION that must be made at the Supe-
rior Court level with the Supreme Court acting in review
of final judgments, if necessary.
The IRREGULAR decision of the state Supreme
Court, acting as an unconscionable roadblock must be
vacated and plaintiff prays the Superior Court be directed
App. 30
to conclude, pursuant to appropriate statutes and regula-
tions, the Federal-Aid Grant Agreement #9-06-009-5708 of
1955.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons, Plaintiff
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff/owner, Augustus J. Simmons hereby certi-
fies a copy of this MOTION TO VACATE, and EXHIBITS,
was mailed, postage prepaid this first day of May, 2000 to
all parties listed.
Copies to:
James F. Sullivan, Commissioner
Connecticut Department of Transportation
2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131-7546
Jane F. Garvey, Administrator
Federal Aviation Administration
800 Independence Ave. S.W.
Washington D.C. 20591
Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General
55 Elm Street
Hartford, CT 06106
Michael DiDonato, Chief Clerk
Superior Court
85 Washington Street
Hartford, CT 06106
App. 31
Rogin, Nassau, Caplan, Lassman & Hirtle
1 City Place
Hartford, CT 06103
Robert S. Bartanowicz, Regional Director
12 New England Executive Park
Burlington, MA 01803
John Malone
State Attorney’s Office
State of Connecticut Court House
Enfield, CT 06082
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
APPENDIX
EXHIBIT 1
12/23/77
Dear Mr. Rogin,
I am a totally dissatisfied individual with the “GOOD
DEAL” that your firm has arranged with the Dept. of
Trans. Concerning my property at Bradley Field.
Because everyone is now in an awkward position
upon your firm’s insistence of accepting a proposal with-
out the benefit of a Market Research Study by the John
Rowlson Firm I am asking the Rogin Firm to withdraw
immediately so I can obtain other counsel.
App. 32
On my visit to your office on Thurs. Dec. 22nd, I told
you I wanted to protect my rights against your recom-
mendations. I also compiled some data wherein I showed
you and again outline a breakdown of Parcel “C”.
Asking me to yield all of Parcel “A” and all damages
for absolutely nothing is not representing my best inter-
ests.
We'll appreciate an immediate withdrawal.
O. Simmons
Parcel “C” May 1975 382,000
Rental May “76” to
May “78” @ 20,000 60,000
Out of Pocket Expense 82,00
524,000
EXHIBIT 2
; 4/12/78
Atty Ned Rogin
Received your letter this date which was dated
4/6/78 and mailed 4/11/78. Must inform you there will
be no closing on 4/19/78.
This letter is a request the (Rogin-Lassman, Hirtle)
firm withdraw from all cases involving Augustus J. Sim-
mons.
Augustus J Simmons
Copies Justice Louis Shapiro
Acct Aty General Fred Neusner
App. 33
EXHIBIT 3 _
STATE OF _ + SUPERIOR COURT
CONNECTICUT HARTFORD COUNTY
VS.
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
NO. 199230-9
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
SAMUEL KANELL, ET
AL
NO. 140965
STATE OF
CONNECTICUT
VS.
ANASTASIA SIMMONS
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
and CHARLES SIMMONS
NO. 162923
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
FRANK C. PARIZEK, ET
AL
NO. 163875 :
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
HORACE B. .
WETHERELL, ET AL
APRIL 19, 1978
App. 34
The undersigned respectfully move for the permis-
sion of the Court to withdraw as counsel for Augustus J.
Simmons in the above-captioned matters.
/s/ Robert L. Hirtle, Jr.
ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN,
LASSMAN AND HIRTLE-
/s/ David B. Salzman
DAVID B. SALZMAN, ESQUIRE
/s/ Stephen Silverman
STEPHEN SILVERMAN,
ESQUIRE
ORDER
The foregoing motion is granted/denied.
BY THE COURT
Clerk
This is to certify that the foregoing has been mailed this
day to counsel of record and to the plaintiff.
/s/ Robert L. Hirtle, Jr.
Robert L. Hirtle, Jr.
App. 35
EXHIBIT 4
DAVID B. SALZMAN, _:_ SUPERIOR COURT
ET AL , * HARTFORD COUNTY
VS. APRIL 20, 1978
AUGUSTUS J.
SIMMONS
ORDER GRANTING PRE-JUDGMENT REMEDY
(WITHOUT HEARING)
The application and Affidavit of Plaintiff(s) for Pre-
judgment Remedy pursuant to C.G.S. Section 52-278a et
seq. as amended, having been presented to the Court and
there being probable cause to sustain the validity of the
Claim of the Plaintiff(s), it is hereby ORDERED that the
Plaintiff(s) may
(a) attach to the sum of $105,000.00 the real estate stand-
ing in the name of the Defendant(s) Augustus J. Sim-
mons XXXXXXX as described in Schedule a attached
hereto.
Dated at Hartford, CT this 20th day of April 1978
Illegible
JUDGE
App. 36
[LOGO] Cleaveland Legal Blank Service, Inc.
Hartford, Connecticut
EX PARTE
P.J.R. NO.
APPLICATION FOR PRE-JUDGMENT REMEDY
TO THE SUPERIOR COURT TO BE
HELD IN HARTFORD, IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF
The undersigned represents:
1. That DAVID B. SALZMAN, STEPHEN SILVER-
MAN and ROGIN, NASSAU, CAPLAN, LASSMAN &
HIRTLE is about to commence an action against
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS of 580 Park Avenue, Windsor,
CT pursuant to the attached proposed unsigned Writ,
Summons, Complaint and Affidavit.
2. That there is probable cause that a judgment will
be rendered in such matter in favor of the applicant and
to secure such judgment the applicant seeks an order
from this court directing that the following prejudgment
remedy be issued to secure the sum of $105,000.00
a. To attach the following described real property
of the Defendant(s) to Wit:
See attached description (Schedule A)
b. To garnishee __, as he is the agent, trustee,
debtor of said Defendant and has concealed in his
hands the goods, effects and estate of said Defendant
and is indebted to him.
c. To replevy property described in Exhibit
d. To enjoin the said
App. 37
his/her/their agents, servants or employees from
selling, transferring or encumbering any interest in
and to the above-described real property pending
further order of this court.
PLAINTIFFS
By /s/ Jason E. Pearl
Jason E. Pearl Attorney
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF P.J.R. APPLICATION
I, the undersigned, do make affidavit and say that there is
probable cause to sustain the validity of the Plaintiff's
claim and
1. That the prejudgment remedy requested is for an
attachment of real property; or
2. That there is reasonable likelihood that the defendant:
Qa.
Neither resides in nor maintains an office or
place of business in this state and is not other-
wise subject to jurisdiction over his person by
the Court;
Has hidden or will hide himself so that process
cannot be served on him;
Is about to remove himself or his property
from this state;
. Is about to fraudulently dipose [sic] of or has
fraudulently disposed of any of his property
with intent to hinder, delay or defraud his
creditors;
Has fraudulently hidden or withheld money,
‘property or effects which should be liable to
the satisfaction of his debts;
App. 38
Qf. Has stated he is insolvent or has stated he is
unable to pay his debts as they mature.
I base this upon the following Statement of Facts:
Affiant is an attorney at law who rendered legal ser-
vices together with the other plaintiffs for the defen-
dant totaling $104,505.00. Defendant has not paid the
same, despite demand.
/s/ David Salzman
Plaintiff-Competent Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this April, day of 20th
1977.
/s/ Robert Hirtle
Commissioner of The
Superior Court -
App. 39
EXHIBIT 5
Law Offices
Jason E. Pearl
19 SOUTH HIGH STREET
POST OFFICE BOX 183
New Britain, Connecticut 06050
Jason E. Pearl Telephone
Kenneth J. Spayer (203) 229-1603
August 30, 1979
The Honorable John Daly
Superior Court
95 Washington Street
Hartford, CT
Re: David Salzman
Vs: Augustus Simmons
Docket No. 218559 8
Dear Judge:
First of all, welcome back from vacation.
While you were away on August 13 I received a
telephone call from one of the assistant clerks advising
me that if I wished to reargue my Motion For Turnover
dated July 25, 1979, I would have to claim it for the Short
Calendar. I was rather taken back by this announcement
inasmuch as my file indicates that you granted the
motion in open court on July 27, 1979. I recall you speak-
ing to me briefly subsequent to that time indicating that
you were going to meet with Mr. Abraham with respect
to the order, but you did not indicate to me that you had
vacated your prior decision. I would assume that for me
to be put into the position of having to “reargue” your
App. 40
prior decision would have to be revoked. Until that hap-
pens, I really do not know what there is for me to argue.
I would be most appreciative of your guidance in this
matter.
Yours very truly,
/s/ Jason E. Pearl
Jason E. Pearl, Esq.
JEP/ck
1888
Hearing set up
for 9/12/79 at 2:00 p.m.
Linda:
Based on SHELTON v WOLTHAULEN, 80C 599 (fur-
nished by Lucian) I would have no authority to grant this
motion.
Will you kindly notify Jason Pearl regarding this & if
he wishes to argue the matter put it down.
Thanks
App. 41
: EXHIBIT 6
December 1, 1996
Town Clerk
Town Hall
9 Center Street
East Granby, CT 06026
Dear Clerk,
The subject matter of this letter pertains to: DISSO-
LUTION OF ATTACHMENTS PURSUANT TO C.G.S.
§ 52-327.
1. Plaintiff-owner-interested person Augustus J.
Simmons requests the following listed encumberances
[sic] be endorsed on the record of such attachment with
the words “DISCHARGED BY OPERATION OF LAW”
pursuant to Connecticut General Statute § 52-327.
2. The attachments on the public land records under
the caption of Augustus J]. Simmons v Horace B. Wetherall,
CV-70-163875 by private counsel, without any eminent
domain proceedings in existence-or-initiated for attach-
ment purposes, without any notice or service of process
on interested parties, without any return of service to the
court of competent jurisdiction (Superior Court) prior to
or after the attachment, and, without appraisals to estab-
lish fair-market value that are mandatory, including a
transfer of title under plaintiff’s private tort action,
Docket #163875 are:
Vol. 59, p. 657-668
Vol. 59, p. 654-656
Vol. 59, p. 623-626
Map Book 17, page 853
Map Book 17, page 854
App. 42
3. Included in Vol. 59, p. 657-668 is a citation at page
661-662 of names of parties and institutions to be served
with notice with a return day of the first Tuesday of July,
1978.
4. Vol. 59, p. 661-662 DOES NOT list Augustus J.
Simmons for notice and service, however, he is still an
“interested person,” — he just happens to be the owner.
5. That there was NO officer’s service on any par-
ties, NO written return of his (officer’s) precept to the
court of competent jurisdiction (Superior Court) and NO
compensation paid is evident in a letter from Atty. Tom
Byrne, a copy being submitted as an exhibit showing an
encumberance [sic] at Vol. 55, page 731 (1974) of East
Granby land records (also listed in the citation at Vol. 59,
p- 661-2) that is still outstanding.
The listed attachments in item #2 were recorded on
June 2nd and 5th of 1978 which is a much longer period
than FIFTEEN YEARS from date of attachment.
6. The interested person (owner) submits a sworn
testimonial from Atty. Walter Bass before Hon. Dupont,
A. on June 7, 1982 representing “Valente’s” and
“Allaire’s” with outstanding liens at Vol. 58, p. 95; Vol. 58,
p. 221; 59/253; 59/263; 59/266 (trans. p. 26) that states:
“Your Honor, in Mr. Feingold’s recitation that he
gave Your Honor this morning, I forget which paragraph
he referred to in Judge Shapiro’s decision, there was to be
a citation issued so that all people would come forth and
present their claims. I have a right to inform the court
that in the citation, my two clients were listed under the
care of my office. I will state to the court that I have never
App. 43
been served any citation nor has my clients [sic] even
been served with any kind of a citation to give us any
notice to come in to determine what our priorities are in
this matter.” .
The above citations of Valente and Allaire are (also
listed in the citation at Vol. 59, p. 661-2).
7. The caption Simmons v Wetherall, #163875, a tort
action AGAINST the state, a result of Special Act #170 of
the 1969 legislature, CANNOT be TRANSMOGRIFIED
into an eminent domain action by superimposing the
Connecticut Department of Transportation as plaintiff
(Vol. 59, p. 662), by private counsel, for land acquisition
for federal navigational instrumentation projects, per fed-
eral grant agreement 9-06-009-5708 (1955), that must be
acquired pursuant to federal regulations, constituting a
fraudulent encumberance [sic].
8. Under the law of Connecticut, any lien created by
attachment continues for 60 days after judgment and no
longer. If no execution is taken out before that time, the
lien perishes. Sanford v Pond, (1871) 37 Conn. 588.
9. Where it is unambiguously clear there was no
notice, no service, or, return to the court of competent
jurisdiction, no judgment file or record of any kind before
the court of competent jurisdiction under Docket
#163875, and, the listed return day was the first Tuesday
of July, 1978 (Vol. 59, p. 661) and the attachments were
submitted on June 2nd and 5th of 1978, some of which
contained a court stamp of the Court Clerk (Thomas H.
Abraham) of Superior Court to give the appearance of
authenticity to the public is FRAUD upon the court, the
App. 44
public, and the “interested persons” named in the cita-
tion.
Court records show the succeeding Chief Clerk,
(Lucian Jachomovitz) informing Hon. Judge John Daly in
August, 1979 there were NO proceedings before the Supe-
rior Court, consequently the Superior Court was without
jurisdiction to act, referencing the citation of Shelton v
Wolthausen, 80 c 599.
10. Court records show a motion filed with Judge
Aronson by plaintiff-owner-interested person (Simmons)
that jurisdiction could not be created “sua sponte” in
December, 1991 relative to the notice from the court to
Atty. Tom Byrne, and others, and as a result of said
motion the “slush fund” monies being held under the
direction of the court were ABANDONED.
11. Unquestionably, there is [sic] years, not months
or days beyond the statutory fifteen (15) years referenced
and “DISCHARGED BY OPERATION OF LAW” is the
purpose and request of this letter.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
cc: Exhibits
App. 45
§ 52-327 CIVIL ACTIONS
Title 52
§ 52-327. Duration and release of attachment liens on
real estate
No attachment of real estate shail continue in force as
a lien for a longer period than fifteen years after the date
thereof unless within said period the action in which such
attachment was made has been prosecuted to effect and a
judgment lien filed according to law. All attachments of
real estate which have expired as a lien by the provisions
of this section shall be deemed dissolved and the real
estate shall be free from any lien or encumbrance by
reason of the same and the town clerk of the town in
which such real estate is situated shall, upon the request
of any person interested, endorse on the record of such
attachment the words “discharged by operation of law.”
(1949 Rev., § 8026.)
CERTIFICATION
Plaintiff-owner-interested person hereby certifies that a
copy of this Request of Dissolution Pursuant to C.G.S.
§ 52-327 will be — hand delivered to:
Chief Clerk ,
Superior Court (to be put in Simmons v
95 Washington St. Wetherall, #163875 file)
Hartford, CT 06106
App. 46
Will be mailed, postage prepaid, first class to:
J. William Burns, Commissioner
Connecticut Department of Transportation
2800 Berlin Turnpike, P.O. Box 317546
Newington, CT 06131-7546
Atty. Tom Byrne
2-E Farmington Commons
790 Farmington Ave.
Farmington, CT 06032
Otto P. Witt, Esq. & Associates
185 Silas Deane Highway
Wethersfield, CT 06109
Robert S. Bartanowicz, Regional Director
Federal Aviation Administration
12 New England Executive Park ;
Burlington, MA 01803
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
December 1, 1996
Chief Clerk
Superior Court
95 Washington St.
Hartford, CT 06106
Dear Michael,
The attached “Dissolution of Attachments Pursuant to
C.G.S. § 52-327” filed under the caption of Simmons v
App. 47
Wetherall, #163875 is being submitted to be made part of
the #163875 “damages” file._
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Augustus J. Simmons
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box #1
Windsor, CT 06095
(860) 569-6714
LAW OFFICES
BYRNE & BYRNE
2-E FARMINGTON COMMONS
790 FARMINGTON AVENUE
FARMINGTON, CONNECTICUT 06032
THOMAS P. BYRNE TELEPHONE
STEVEN E. BYRNE (203) 677-7355
—
a
25 November 1996
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box 1
Windsor, CT 06095
Dear Ozzie,
The only activity of which I am aware with respect to a
mortgage dated July 3, 1974 as recorded in Volume 55
Page 731 of the East Granby Land Records is notice of a
hearing to be held before Arnold Aronson, Judge of the
Superior Court, on December 23, 1991 to determine the
disposition of funds.
Enclosed herewith is a copy of the notice which I received
from the court as well as a copy of a letter to me dated
App. 48
December 19, 1991 from Attorney Walter E. Bass, Jy. I did
not attend the hearing of December 23, 1991.
No payments have been received by me on this mortgage.
* Very truly yours,
/s/ Thomas P. Byrne
Thomas P. Byrne
AUGUSTUS J SIMMONS __ VS.
WETHERALL,DEP COMR CV-70-0163875-S
ALL COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTIES ARE ORDERED
TO APPEAR BEFORE THE HONORABLE ARNOLD
ARONSON ON MONDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1991 AT 9 30
A.M. IN ROOM 111 AT HARTFORD SUPERIOR COURT,
95 WASHINGTON. ST., HARTFORD, CT. A MOTION BY
THE COURT TO DETERMINE THE DISPOSITION OF
FUNDS WILL BE HEARD.
A COPY OF SAID MOTION WILL BE SENT TO ALL
COUNSEL AND PRO SE PARTIESUNDER [sic] SEPA-
RATE COVER. .
KAREN PICKER
ASSISTANT CLERK
WALTER E BASS JR
P. O. BOX 289
App. 49
SUPERIOR COURT
95 WASHINGTON STREET
P.O. DRAWER D, STATION A
- HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06106
EAST WINDSOR CT 06088
DATED DEC 05, 1991
Law Offices of
Walter E. Bass, Jr.
P.O. Box 289
Warehouse Point, Conn. 06088
Tel. 623-8688 Juris Number 02450
December 19, 1991
Attorney Thomas Byrnes
790 Farmington Avenue
Farmington, CT 06032
RE: Augustus J. Simmons
vs.
Horace Wetherell, et al
Dear Attorney Byrnes:
Please be informed that my office represents several cred-
itors of Mr. Augustus J. Simmons. Please be informed that
Judge Arnold Arsonsor is holding a hearing on Decem-
ber 23, 1991 at 9:30 a.m. in Courtroom 111 at Hartford
Superior Court. Enclosed please find a copy of a Notice
which my office has received concerning this hearing. I
would like to inform you, that I do believe that you have
App. 50
an interest in this case. I request that you be present at
this hearing. If you have any questions, please feel free to
contact my office.
Respectfully,
/s/ Walter E. Fass, Jr.
Walter E. Fass, Jr.
WEBJr./mf
RECEIVED DECEMBER 2, 1996 AT 8:30 A.M.
BY /s/ Laura B. LaFond
ASS’T. TOWN CLERK
Received 12/2, 1976
at 8:30 A.M.
Recorded in EAST GRANBY LAND RECORDS
Volume 112 Page 001
By /s/ Laura B. LaFond
Asst. Town Clerk .
Augustus J. Simmons
P.O. Box 1
Windsor, CT 06095
App. 51
EXHIBIT 7
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
VS.
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
NO. 20 21 21 - 8
(CONSOLIDATED APPEAL)
HARTFORD COUNTY
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT - APPELLANT
OCTOBER TERM
To be argued by:
Ronald E. Cassidento, Esq.
App. 52
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Citations ........ A cccvccccceccscascoaceccccncha i, ii, iii
ATBUMONE 2... ccccccccccccccccccccccccessececs 1 and 14
Did the trial court err in refusing appellant's
Motion to Reopen the judgment in view of the
mandate of Connecticut General Statutes
Was there a conflict of interest, requiring vacation
of the trial court judgment, when a former
Assistant Attorney General for the Department
of Transportation (1965-1971) agreed to repre-
sent the appellant in negotiations with the pre-
sent Attorney General for the Department of
Transportation? .......cccccccccccccccccccccccecees
Statement of Facts
App. 53
EXHIBIT 7
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
State of Connecticut
HARTFORD COUNTY, OCTOBER TERM, 1978
9200
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
vs.
HORACE B. WETHERELL, ET AL
CONSOLIDATED APPEAL
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLAD TS
To Be Argued By:
RONALD E. CASSIDENTO, ESQ.
App. 54
NO. 163875
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS : SUPERIOR COURT
VS. ‘ JUDICIAL DISTRICT
wORAce & ‘ HARTFORD-NEW
‘ BRITAIN at HARTFORD
MARCH 17, 1982
WETHERALL, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM RE STATE’S
MOTION FOR ORDER OF TRANSFER OF
MONIES ON DEPOSIT WITH CLERK
(Filed Mar. 17, 1982)
The clerk of the Superior Court currently has posses-
sion and custody of $322,402.98, on which no interest has
been earned since July, 1981. The Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral was asked by the Federal District Court of Connecti-
cut on February 4, 1982, to apply to this court for an order
that the clerk transfer the sum to an interest bearing
account. The Attorney General seeks to have the sum, to
the extent that it is capable of being divided into denomi-
nants of $10,000, invested in Treasury Bills of the United
States for a time period not exceeding three months, with
excess monies to be invested in an interest bearing state-
ment savings account. The Attorney General seeks, fur-
ther, that the accounts be held in the name of the clerk of
the court and that the clerk be authorized and directed to
continue the same investment program from time to time
as a “roll over” until subsequent order of the court. The
clerk no longer wishes to be the stakeholder under the
present condition. The plaintiff, Augustus Simmons, has
no objection to the defendant, Attorney General’s motion,
but does not wish the money to be deposited at Connecti-
cut Bank & Trust, the bank named by the state on its
App. 55
proposed order. The plaintiff's wife who has filed a lis
" pendens, arising out of her suit for a dissolution of her
marriage to the plaintiff, on the property in dispute, seeks
to intervene in this case and seeks by motion to have the
sum of $40,000 disbursed to her from the funds being
held by the clerk. The plaintiff has no objection to her
intervention or to the disbursement. The state objects to
the intervention of plaintiff's wife but has no objection to
the placement of $42,402.98 in an interest bearing state-
ment savings account.
The plaintiff’s wife previously filed an appearance in
Commissioner of Transportation v. Diamond, et al. (a related
case) for which no docket number was ever ascribed and
in which she was named as a party.
Without objection, counsel for plaintiff's wife partici-
pated in the hearing held on March 1, 1978 on the state’s
motion which is the subject of this memorandum.
The motion of Leonidas D. Simmons to intervene in
this case is denied. The clerk is directed to assign a
docket number to Commissioner of Transportation v. Dia-
mond, et al. which was returnable in July, 1978, and to
properly file her appearance in that case, as well as all
pleadings which may belong in that file.
The following ORDER is entered:
1. The clerk of the Superior Court is directed
and authorized to transfer $280,000 to Hart-
ford National Bank & Trust Co., Hartford,
Conn., c/o Ray Scharfenberger, for invest-
ment only in Treasury Bills of the United
States for a time period not exceeding three
months, and to continue said investment
App. 56
program from time to time in the nature of a
“roll over” account until subsequent order
of this court.
The clerk of the Superior Court is directed
and authorized to transfer $42,402.98 to
Hartford National Bank, Hartford, Conn.,
c/o Ray Scharfenberger, for investment in
an interest bearing statement savings
account, the sum of at least $40,000 to
remain on deposit until such time as it has
been determined that said sum should be
disbursed to Leonidas D. Simmons.
Since investment in Treasury Bills requires a
minimal investment of $10,000, but allows —
investment thereafter in increments of
$5,000, and since such investments, in effect,
provide for the pre-payment of the interest
thereon, monies in excess of a face value of
$280,000 will be obtaimed. Such monies are
also to be invested in three month United
States Treasury Bills to the extent possible,
and to the extent of amy excess which does
not equal $5,000 are to be placed in the
interest bearing statement account to remain
on deposit until such time as such monies
together with $2,402.98, equal $5,000, at
which time they shall be placed for invest-
ment in three month Treasury Bills of the
United States.
No withdrawals or disbursements are to be
made from said accownts except upon the
further express order of this court.
App. 57
5. Title to said accounts shall be in the name of
the clerk of the Superior Court.
/s/ Dupont, J.
Dupont, J.
EXHIBIT 8
NO. 202121
STATE OF SUPERIOR COURT
CONNECTICUT
VS.
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
NO. 199230
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
SAMUEL KANELL,
ET AL.
NO. 140965
STATE OF : JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
CONNECTICUT HARTFORD - NEW
VS. BRITAIN AT HARTFORD
ANASTASIA SIMMONS,
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
AND CHARLES
SIMMONS
NO. 162923
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS
VS.
FRANK C. PARIZEK,
ET AL.
App. 58
NO. 163875
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS _ : JULY 7, 1982
VS.
HORACE B.
WETHERELL, ET AL.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
RE:
MOTIONS FOR DISBURSEMENT OF FUNDS BY CLERK
TO PATSY VALENTE AND LEONARD ALLAIRE
A Supplemental Judgment dated June 2, 1978 lists
Leonard Allaire and Patsy Valente as holders of a “Judg-
ment” and attachment, respectively. Both claimants were -_
cited to appear before the Court with proof of the amount
and validity of their claims. However, on October 15,
1981, the plaintiff, Augustus Simmons filed an action in
Federal District Court, seeking as relief, among other
things, that a Connecticut Supreme Court decision
(reported in 180 Conn. 587 (1980)) upholding the validity
of a Stipulation and Judgment pursuant thereto, be
vacated. Prior to the filing of the federal action, some of
the lienors and encumbrancers were paid pursuant to the
Supplemental Judgment. The instant motions were filed
on May 25, 1982.
The right to disbursement from the funds held by the
Clerk of the Court has been placed in question by the
federal litigation. Until such time as it is resolved, the
status quo must be preserved.
Motions to disburse denied.
/s/ Dupont, J.
_ Dupont
App. 59
EXHIBIT 9
SUPERIOR COURT
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF HARTFORD/NEW BRITAIN
AT HARTFORD
AGUSTUS J. SIMMONS,
Plaintiff, * NO. 163875
vs. -June 7, 1982
HORACE B.
WETHERALL,
Defendant.
Before:
The Honorable ANTOINETTE L. DUPONT, Judge
APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:
AUGUSTUS J. SIMMONS, Pro Se
For Allaire and Valente:
WALTER E. BASS, JR., ESQ.
VICTOR FEINGOLD, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
Harold J. Moan, Sr.
Court Reporter
[2] THE COURT: I have in front of me various
motions. Well, one is a motion for disbursement of funds
by the clerk. All of these motions relate to the case of
sete cet niall nit saad etl cn is
App. 60
Augustus Simmons versus Howard Wetherall, Et Al, Case
Number 163875.
The first motion for disbursement of funds by the
clerk is on behalf of Patsy Valente. The second motion is
on behalf of Leonard Allaire.
Now, I also have an appearance from Walter Bass,
who is present today, and Augustus Simmons who is also
present as well as Victor Feingold, who is the Assistant
Attorney General. I have affidavits of Augustus Sim-
mons, which are part of the file.
MR. BASS: Your Honor, I have a very short
request of the Court. I represent both Mr. Allaire and Mr.
Valente. They are relations to Mr. Simmons and -
THE COURT: I have an appearance for Mr. Val-
ente.
MR. BASS: There should be two, but I will sub-
mit another appearance for him.
THE COURT: Maybe the clerk has it. I don’t.
MR. BASS: Their relationship to Mr. Simmons is
that they are former brother and sister- [3] in-laws to Mr.
Simmons. The money that is being claimed this morning,
your Honor, was money that the Valentes and Allaires
have lent Mr. Simmons over a period of time to finance or
help finance his legal battles.
Mr. Simmons was never able to pay on any of these
notes that he signed with the Valentes or Allaires, and
subsequently they came to my office and we started a
App. 61
collection suit against Mr. Simmons and received judg-
ment and recorded this on the land records going back to
1977-1978.
THE COURT: That was brought in this court?
MR. BASS: Yes, your Honor. Well, two suits.
They were both brought within the Hartford County
Superior Court.
THE COURT: All right. Both of them went to
judgment?
MR. BASS: Yes, and both are recorded on the
land records.
THE COURT: There is a judgment lien on the
land records?
MR. BASS: Yes, your Honor. Well, one judg-
ment lien in 1977 and one in 1978.
\
\
THE COURT: Judgments were in the amount
[4] of $3,000?
MR. BASS: No, your Honor. The figure of 3,000
for Mr. Valente and 13,000 for Mr. Allaire includes all
interest to date, actually June 24th, 1982, your Honor. It is
a total figure and we didn’t break it down. We gave a
lump sum figure by computation.
THE COURT: That includes interest up to June
24th?
MR. BASS: Yes.
THE COURT: January 4th, ‘78?
MR. BASS: June 24, 1982, right to this moment.
’ App. 62
THE COURT: But from January 4th, ’78 to date?
=
“MIR. BASS: Yes.
It is our contention that when a state agency con-
demns anybody’s property, that they do deposit money to
the clerk, and there has been money deposited to the
clerk, according to Section 48-11 of the General Statutes.
This money is Mr. Simmons’ and is being held through
the clerk of the court to make sure that he has the funds
for the property that was taken. During the history of this
action and since it was deposited with the clerk, there
have been several withdrawals, as your Honor may be
familiar with. Well, approximately $98,000 [5] was with-
drawn from this account from the law firm of Nassau,
Rogin & Hirtle, and I forgot the complete name of all the
lawyers in there, but for legal representation to Mr. Sim-
mons. There was money set aside for Mr. Simmons’ ex-
wife, your Honor, and I believe that amount was approxi-
mately forty-some-odd thousand doliars. The Texas due
the Town of East Granby were also escrowed out of this
fund and distributed to the town, as well as money to Mr.
Diamond.
In this-situation, your Honor, I believe that with Mr.
Simmons’ consent to have this money withdrawn from
his account to pay these people, is a logical consistent act
that has been followed through in this file already, your
Honor, on three other occasions. We do have Mr. Sim-
mons’ consent, and I would ask your Honor, if you deter-
mine it so, to withdraw the money to allow us to make
this application, that is, to withdraw the money. We ask
your Honor to grant it.
App. 63
THE COURT: Would you like to say anything,
Mr. Simmons?
MR. SIMMONS: Yes, your Honor. I would ask
that somewhere, at some point, that Mr. Bass would
submit to me, to the Court, a specific amount or segregate
the amounts of interest versus principal, and the question
being a logical one, because somewhere the [6] Internal
Revenue will want to catch up with me and say how
much was principal and how much was interest. I do feel
that I told Mr. Bass, I don’t care what the numbers are or
how he arrived at them, but I de feel from my point of
view and for my protection, I must have a breakdown.
Well, however, he arrived at it, I don’t care. I am not
objecting to the total numbers, but what I am asking for is
a separation.
MR. BASS: If I may, your Honor, if the motion
is granted, we will provide Mr. Simmons with a complete
breakdown.
MR. SIMMONS: He mentioned $198,000, and as
your Honor knows, there was 113,000 paid out to the
legal firm, just what the records will show. Well, $15,000
additional, which is the figure that was granted. As long
as he had mentioned that, I am still waiting on the courts.
I know you are stuck with a tacky situation, but I do feel
that considerable time has elapsed, and I think that your
Honor should bring the gavel down.
THE COURT: Many of the motions I have heard
are really interrelated and they address the same kind of
question. Hopefully, this will be the last motion and now
I can decide the many motions which I have heard so far.
App. 64
MR. SIMMONS: Yes. Mr. Bass also mentioned
[7] $40,000. Well, I can’t let the opportunity go without
commenting that I had an opportunity to talk with Mr.
Shearenberger, who is with the Hartford National, and it
is really a travesty to leave this amount of money in at
51/2 percent in a passbook account.
THE COURT: The $40,000?
MR. SIMMONS: Yes.
THE COURT: You agreed to that.
MR. SIMMONS: I agreed, but I still think - I
mean, it is sitting there and losing an awful lot. I am
quoting Mr. Shearenberger, that it could be invested on a
daily basis in a market fund and getting more than twice
the interest at 5'/2 percent. Now, whether the adversary is
losing it or I am losing it, there are a lot of dollars being
lost here unnecessarily. Your Honor, again I suppose I got
to choose my words on how I address this problem, but it
was mentioned that it is just a travesty that this is sitting
there at 51/2 percent.
He also mentioned taxes and Mr. Diamond. Well,
taxes is another problem down the line which has to be
resolved. Your Honor, this is exactly one of the reasons
why this ball of wax is unsettled. As long as I am alive,
and as long as I got red blood corpuscles through my
veins, I am never in my lifetime going to [8] permit any
judge to award and make me pay taxes on land that I
own. I have been foreclosed for years and in my humble
estimation, this is ludicrous. Both the state statute and
federal public policy is very clear on it, and still to have
it, I say no. This is why it makes it difficult for your
App. 65
Honor. Mr. Feingold is here listening and he knows it is
wrong. He tried to put words into Judge Corrigan’s
mouth, but to no avail. So, therefore, there is something
to be settled.
THE COURT: What did Judge Corrigan handle?
MR. SIMMONS: The taxes.
THE COURT: East Granby?
MR. SIMMONS: There were three different
judges involved. Well, first Tambora and then Brennan
and the taxes was Judge Corrigan and now it is Judge
Dupont.
Getting back to Diamond, this is another dilly, if I
may use that word. In my way of reasoning, I feel that the
Court has overpaid Diamond based on the information I
submitted to the Court last week. I was not in a position
this past week to do anything because much to my sur-
prise, I gave your Honor my copy of the affidavit of debt,
thinking that I had an additional one or two, which I
usually make, and when I went through [9] my file, I
could not find a copy of that affidavit.
THE COURT: Is this one of the ones you sub-
mitted as an exhibit?
MR. SIMMONS: Yes. Exhibit A.
THE COURT: The clerk would have it.
MR. SIMMONS: i asked Frank, and he said no,
Miss Dupont has the file at home.
THE COURT: I think he has the exhibits. I do
have the file.
App. 66
MR. SIMMONS: All right. Well, if he has the
exhibit, I will get that. I need that.
THE COURT: I am sure if you see him, he can
get a copy made.
MR. SIMMONS: Fine. Well, my position has not
changed. I feel enough time has elapsed on both the
Rogin matter and the Diamond matter, where we are
going into the third month, and I have been pursuing this
well over six or seven months officially, since I sent him
the letter asking for removal of the lien. I filed the
motions to compel and I am still waiting.
My overall position, your Honor, as far as the funds
are concerned, which Mr. Bass is referring to, is that no
matter how this thing goes, no matter where it ends up,
all the monies that are there presently are still going to
end up with Mr. Simmons, even if I [10] lose. However, if
I prevail with all of the measures that are before the
Court presently, then I think Mr. Feingold will have to
turn Bradley Field over to Mr. Simmons.
What I am saying to the Court at this point, the Court
cannot be jeopardized by making any award either to Mr.
Bass, the $40,000, or the monies that have been paid out,
if it is an obligation that I have and that I owe, fine. I
objected strenuously to the taxes. I felt they should not
have been paid. I objected very vigorously against the
payment to the attorneys, and still it was paid. Well,
maybe it is a lawsuit down the road, I don’t know, but the
monies came out of the fund over my objection, and they
should not have been paid. I am not objecting to this
because I owe it. The monies are there and I feel it should
be paid. Why should these people be left hanging and
App. 67
these people are getting old and I recognize that. Well,
senior citizens and who knows how much longer they
will live. They would like to get a few dollars back and I
am fully in accord. I just feel that when I am in accord,”
and it is my monies, that the Court is not jeopardized by
making a favorable decision.
THE COURT: Mr. Feingold.
MR. BASS: Before Mr. Feingold starts, [11] may
I be allowed to ask him two questions?
You have no objection to the disbursement of this
money to Mr. Allaire and Mr. Valente?
MR. SIMMONS: I have no objection what-
soever. Well, I just forgot to make one note, your Honor. I
did ask Mr. Bass in accordance with what your Honor has
done, that he put a date of June 24th, on or before June
24th, and the reason being that these monies are down
there at Hartford National and the turnover date is June
24th. This is the reason I asked and the reason for the
date there. Now, keeping in mind, even if these monies
were paid out tomorrow, the amount of loss that would
occur in relation to the amount of loss for the period of
time, that $330,000 was sitting for eight months with no
interest, which was in the neighborhood of between
thirty-five and $40,000 that went down the drain with no
interest, all because of somebody’s bullheadedness. Well,
when you get two forces who wouldn’t move, and I
wouldn’t until the Federal judge said why can’t they be
an [sic] interest-bearing accounts, of course, Mr. Feingold
had to move. June 24th was at my suggestion, and I think
that your Honor would be in accord with that date. I
App. 68
don’t think it would matter to him whether he gets it
tomorrow or June 24th. I am fully in accord.
[12] MR. BASS: Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Feingold.
MR. FEINGOLD: Your Honor, I am Victor
Feingold, Assistant Attorney General. I have appeared
before your Honor on other motions, and in the past I
have resisted any further order of the Court which would
direct the payment of any monies now in the custody of
the Court. I again object to any order of the Court which
would direct the clerk to disburse any of the funds now
on deposit in the Court. My reasons for the taking of this
position are now being set forth by me today before your
Honor. I am now going to introduce a new element,
which might affect the decision of your Honor, and that is
the jurisdiction of your Honor to-act on the motion of Mr. |
Allaire and Mr. Valente, who are seeking each indepen-
dently an order for disbursements of funds.
Now, the first point I want to make is that the basis
for the deposit itself is found in a practice or procedure
new to this state and not known to our practice. The
office of the Attorney General was confused with how to
effect compliance with this stipulated judgment. The
Supreme Court of the State of Connecticut in Simmons
against Wetherall, and in that case the spelling in the
recorded opinion was [13] W-e-t-h-e-r-e-l-l, which is a
mistake. Well, it arises out of the case of Simmons against
Wetherall, which your Honor recited at the opening of
this hearing.
App. 69
In the Supreme Court opinion, at 180 Conn. 587, the
case of Simmons against Wetherall, as reported by the
opinion, referred to an appeal by the plaintiff, Augustus
J. Simmons, from the denial of a motion to open a judg-
ment. The judgment was recited in the opinion of the
Supreme Court as a judgment on stipulation. At page 588
of 180 Conn., the Supreme Court commented on the
nature of the case and some of the background, and
indicated after extensive litigation, all cases were consoli-
dated. The Supreme Court referred, particularly to a
number of pending state cases and the examination of the
records and briefs of the Supreme Court opinion will also
show that there was pending some federal cases in the
United States District Court for the District of Connecti-
cut. The Supreme Court then stated that the parties nego-
tiated a settlement of all cases. I now quote, wherein the
plaintiff agreed to sell the land to the State for an agreed-
upon price. Our reading of the stipulation and the judg-
ment which purportedly conformed to the stipulation,
does result in an uncareful analysis to a simple agreement
to sell land for a price certain. Now, thereafter, no action
was brought to even enforce [14] this agreement. If the
stipulated judgment is viewed, as I claim it must, as an
executory contract for the sale of real estate, the statute of
limitations have passed and the State of Connecticut is
barred from enforcing the agreement by specific perfor-
mance. Well, I believe the statute is 47-33A. When I
discovered in my view that specific performance of an
agreement to sell real estate is unenforceable, then ail
proceedings in accordance with the order of Judge Sha-
piro regarding the removal of encumbrances that fol-
lowed this stipulated judgment, are null and void and
App. 70
cannot properly be even considered. The State can never
obtain voluntarily a deed from Mr. Simmons which was
contemplated by the parties. The State was ready, able
and willing, as the record will show, to pay the agreed-
upon price. Mr. Simmons has resisted furnishing the State
with an executed deed. Furthermore, Mr. Simmons has
made every effort to resist the proceedings in the State
court which gives rise to the stipulated judgment. Well,
the stipulation and the agreement by bringing an action
in the United States District Court attacking the validity
of the State court judge.
Now, I have previously furnished to your Honor, a
certified copy of the complaint from Mr. Simmons pend-
ing in the United States District Court. This [15] morning
Attorney Bass is present on his motion, and I do not
know if he has actual or constructive knowledge of the
fact that there is pending in the United States District
Court, a very important civil action, in part a civil rights
action, which if tried to conclusion could very well result
in a judgment for Mr. Simmons that the State court pro-
ceedings violated his rights. I am speaking of the State
court proceedings that led to the judgment on stipulation.
Now, using that as a piece of evidence, I cannot, in good
conscience, ever or anticipate that Mr. Simmons would
ever deliver to the State a deed of the specific land within
the stipulation for the agreed-upon price. If he will not
deliver the deed, and there is no deed of Mr. Simmons in
the custody of the court for delivery to the State, as there
is money on deposit, then I cannot see why the State
funds should be used to start paying his obligation and
his bills, because that is all this thing amounts to. Well, to
use this money to pay his bills where Mr. Simmons,
App. 71
himself, resisted it, quid pro quo, and has no intentions of
ever delivering a deed to the State for the agreed-upon
price.
Now, since this judgment on stipulation is defined by
me, and I believe as a matter of law must be defined as an
executory agreement for the sale of the [16] land on an
agreed-upon price, and unenforceable because of the stat-
ute of limitations, the Superior Court cannot entertain an
action or specific performance on behalf of the State.
Well, the entire matter must be left for further proceed-
ings in an effort to adjust the differences of the parties.
The action for the judgment on stipulation cannot be
characterized as an equitable claim. It is in no way a
condemnation matter brought under any procedures of
the State of Connecticut to condemn land for airport
purposes or any other purposes.
THE COURT: Excuse me.
(There was a discussion off the record.)
MR. FEINGOLD: I was arguing now that in no
way any of the proceedings that gave rise — none of the
proceedings following the judgment on stipulation were
undertaken in accordance with any of the provisions of
48-11. Now, 48-11 is a statute specifically applicable to
proceedings in imminent [sic] domain, whether it is by
state agency or the State of Connecticut or any munici-
pality or any condemnor who has the power of imminent
[sic] domain. So, 48-11, which gives the Court jurisdiction
of monies on deposit, and also upon application to dis-
bursement of funds on a hearing, in no way applies to
any of the proceedings in the case of Simmons against
Wetherall and related cases. It is true [17] that some of the
App. 72
consolidated cases did involve efforts by the State to
exercise imminent [sic] domain powers for purposes of
acquisition of land of Mr. Simmons’ for airport purposes.
Those efforts were aborted and failed as prior decisions
of the Supreme Court will show. So, the funds that are
now on deposit do not relate to those earlier cases. In
fact, any funds that were on deposit in those cases have
since been either paid out or returned to the State treas-
ury. So, as a point of law in this matter, Mr. Bass in no
way as he claims to seek disbursements of funds, relied
on 48-11.
Now, I am going to the question of another matter
that Judge Shapiro seems to assume that he had the
power to exercise authority when he entertained a motion
of Assistant Attorney General McQueeney for execution
of the judgment.
I now direct your Honor, and invite your Honor’s
attention to another element of jurisdiction in the entire
matter of Simmons against Wetherall. I might say that
whenever I call your Honor’s attention to the question of
jurisdiction, in accordance with the law of the State, if
lack of jurisdiction is brought to your Honor’s attention, I
mean subject matter jurisdiction, no matter in what form
or in what way, your Honor cannot proceed on any of the
proceedings until you [18] resolve the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction. If per chance the jurisdiction question
is interwoven now with many other prior motions that
have not been acted upon, and it has happened, that is
arises on the motions of a claimed predictor of Mr. Sim-
mons, it does not matter so long as this Court, the ques-
tion of jurisdiction is called to your Honor’s attention.
The second point on lack of jurisdiction that I call your
Honor’s attention to, is that when Assistant Attorney
App. 73
General McQueeney came in with a motion for execution
of an unsatisfied judgment, a concern of the State Referee,
Judge Shapiro, was how to execute it. The judgment was
not for money damages. As I recited before, the judgment
on stipulation —
MR. SIMMONS: What was that? Would you
please repeat that?
MR. FEINGOLD: The judgment was not for the
payment of money damages insofar as the State was
concerned. It was in favor of Mr. Simmons for the pay-
ment of an agreed-upon price for the sale of land. I do not
believe that this judgment resulted in the payment of
money damages. Consequently, Mr. Simmons could not
get execution against the State, nor could the State get
execution in the normal way that executions are given
under the statute for judgment. So, Jusge [sic] Shapiro
heard [19] the stalemate that arose here, and Mr. Sim-
mons stated he was ready, willing and able and agreed to
pay the agreed-upon price and refusing to execute and
deliver a deed to the State. So, the Honorable Louis
Shapiro, State Referee, acting under whatever he believed
his statutory pewers were as a State Referee, with all the
powers of a judge of the Superior Court, undertakes to
declare by court order, that title to the land is automat-
ically vested in the State of Connecticut in accordance
with the judgment. I refer your Honor to paragraph one
of an order of Judge Shapiro, that is found in the case that
your Honor recited by docket number in the Superior
Court, Simmons versus Wetherall, and also found on
page 37 of the Supreme Court records and briefs relating
to 180 Conn. at 587. Paragraph one of what purports to be
an order of Judge Shapiro contained in four numbered
App. 74
paragraphs recite prior — paragraph one there is a recita-
tion of a number of matters apparently furnished Judge
Shapiro from the Land Records, in East Granby under the
name of Augustus J. Simmons. Now, included in the list
of matters was the mortgage and agreement of Mr. Dia-
mond, a mortgage of Thomas P. Byrne, a lis pendence of
Leonidas Simmons, a judgment of CBT, an attachment of
Hartford National Bank, a judgment of the applicant
today, Leonard Allaire, [20] Et Al, an attachment of what
purports to be an application of the applicant today,
Valente, a lease to Angelo Roncari and judgment, lien
registration of the applicant today, Patsy Valente, Et Al,
and a lis pendence of Patsy Valente, Et Al, another lis
pendence of Leonard Allaire, Et Al. Well, in addition, a
lease seemingly recorded on March 16, 1978 to Westfield
Vallet Parking, Incorporated, and an attachment of David
B. Salzman. It appears that in view of all of these matters
called to Judge Shapiro’s attention, what the state of the
title was, Judge Shapiro undertook without any motions
before him, and without any proceedings, to enter an
order other than the appearance of Mr. Simmons and the
State, directing that all encumbrances be removed and
that title to the premises described in Exhibit A attached
hereto, together with covenance described in Exhibit B
attached hereto, against the land described in said Exhibit
B is and are vested in the State of Connecticut in accor-
dance with the judgment entered herein.
In no way do I understand that the terms of the
judgment on stipulation empower any court to sum-
marily invest title in the State of Connecticut. I take the
position that Judge Shapiro had no statutory or any other
authority, either as a State Referee, Judge [21] of the
App. 75
Superior Court or acting as a Judge of the Superior Court,
to pass title in this case to the State of Connecticut. It
would appear that Judge Shapiro believed he had that
power, and in doing so believed that he could now exe-
cute in his fashion as a judge, that he had previously
entered in accordance with the stipulation. There is noth-
ing in the terms of the stipulation, as I read it, that even
obligated Mr. Simmons to execute a deed. Therefore, I
come back to what I mentioned before. It is simply an
executory agreement for the sale of real estate. Imperfect
as it is, and maybe it didn’t really accomplish what the
parties intended it to do, it now has developed an unen-
forceable thing in my view. It may very well be that all of
the cases that were supposed to have been consolidated
and settled in the Superior Court, are not truly settled,
and that all cases go back to the status quo they were in
including the United States District Court pending cases
that Mr. Simmons still will have to litigate in the Supreme
Court, his title to the Bradley Field. He still will have to
litigate his claim for money damages that was given to
him by the Special Act of this Legislature where various
defenses have been asserted. We are back with Mr. Sim-
mons battling now in the Superior Court. Well, that is the
turn of the screw on this type [22] of case, because I
cannot see the way the proceedings have gone at this
stage that this judginent can properly be enforced by
either party.
Now, another matter was the fact paragraph two,
where Judge Shapiro directed the State pay to the clerk
these funds. Now, this is a burden on the clerk and that is
nowhere statutory and no proceedings to my knowledge
that can place a burden on the clerk of the Superior Court
App. 76
to take money under and executory agreement for the
sale of land, even if the State was one of the parties to the
agreement. There is no jurisdiction for him to even hold
this. As far as item three, that Mr. Simmons vigorously
resisted, it was an order that the clerk pay to the tax
collector of Granby. Well, paragraph three, and quoting,
that the clerk of said court pay to the tax collector for the
Town of East Granby the sum of $8,761.29 together with
accrued interest, lien in releases from the sum deposited.
This order was without due process and there was no
notification to the tax collector or the clerk, and there was
no notification to Mr. Simmons that such an order would
be entered. There was no opportunity for the parties to
appear in open court and agree or to present evidence on
the nature of this order. The validity of this proceeding
thereafter were had in accordance [23] with this order
that Mr. Simmons vigorously opposed and Judge Corri-
gan ruled he must follow the directions of the Superior
Court acting through Judge Shapiro.
I submit again, as I believe I did to Judge Corrigan,
that if Judge Shapiro had no jurisdiction of the subject
matter in the first instance, then his order directing the
clerk to release monies and to pay what purportedly was
tax bills against the list in the name of Mr. Simmons, that
it was illegal, null and void, and Mr. Simmons could very
well be right in that the payment of that money was not
justified.
Coming to paragraph four -
THE COURT: I believe you have made these
before, Mr. Feingold. I wonder if you could maybe
App. 77
address yourself to your objection to this motion or these
two motions, which are for disbursements.
MR. FEINGOLD: Yes. Coming to that last one,
the order that would bring anybody into this court, if
these orders had any validity, was found in paragraph
four of Judge Shapiro’s order, where he stated that pur-
suant to Section 52-484 and/or Section 47-31 of the Gen-
eral Statutes, as the Court may deem applicable, the
parties, encumbrances and lienors described herein, be
and are cited to appear before the Court with proof of the
amount and validity of their [24] liens or encumbrances,
that the clerk make payment to said parties in accordance
with the equities in said balance as determined by further
order of the Court and that the balance thereafter, if any,
be paid to the plaintiff.
Now, while the citation that was issued by the Assis-
tant Attorney General was made and was supposed to
have been certified by a deputy sheriff, and Mr. Simmons
was not even named as a party on that proceeding, the
citation itself does not have any of the allegations neces-
_ Sary to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Section
52-44, which is an action to acquire title, nor does that
citation have any of the elements necessary to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 47-31, which is an
action of interpleader, and none of the parties apparently
have been served, according to the sheriff’s return. Well,
upon examination of the citation, which is now on file in
the Superior Court, and somewhere in this Simmmons
against Wetherall, Superior Court case, without having its
own docket number, have never been defaulted out and
their priorities and their equities have never been deter-
mined. This simple effort by a motion of both of these
App. 78
named creditors to seek a disbursement of funds, it
doesn’t follow any of the requirements for an action, title
or interpleader, it [25] must fail. It doesn’t address itself
properly to enable the Court to even determine the
amount and validity of the claim. In addition, the proof
would be required more than a motion practice and, at
least, there should have been testimony, if not the parties,
then a certified copy of the land records indicating indeed
that a judgment lien exists on the land records, which is
entitled to a priority and also testimony regarding what
aspects or what amount of the judgment lien, if any, has
been satisfied should be required. In addition, the ques-
tion of whether interest accrues on the judgment lien and
also it has to be claimed and made certain, because the
Legislature in enacting the statute on execution on judg-
ment altered the rate of interest, which previous to Octo-
ber 1, 1979 was six percent, and effective October 1, 1979,
it became eight percent. If statutory interest is due on the
judgment lien, that must be made known. Well, whether
the judgment is based on notes or a higher rate of inter-
est, that survives the judgment, and to be paid until it is
fully satisfied, we have no way of knowing. Since there is
no proof at all of the amount and validity of the claim,
without even testimony or certified copies of records, I do
not see how you can proceed, even if your Honor should
overrule the prior claims that I have made. That is all.
[26] THE COURT: Thank you.
MR. BASS: A very short rebuttal, your Honor.
First of all, I would object to Mr. Feingold at this time
questioning the jurisdiction of the Court to hear this case.
Secondly, your Honor, in Mr. Feingold’s recitation that he
gave your Honor this morning, I forget which paragraph
App. 79
he referred to in Judge Shapiro’s decision, there was to be
a citation issued so that all people would come forth and
present their claims. I have a right to inform the Court
that in the citation, my two clients were listed under the
care of my office. I will state to the Court that I have
never been served any citation nor has my client ever
been served with any kind of a citation to give us any
notice to come in to determine what our priorities are in
this matter. Secondly, perhaps Section 48-11 is not appli-
cable. I would request that the Court — excuse me. I will
withdraw that.
The reason why we may reference to this statute,
because it is the only way that the clerk’s office could
handle disbursements and through their advice on how
to try to present a motion for disbursement of these
monies, and that is why we made reference to it. My
feeling is that this case is a very old case [27] and it has
seen many, many motions and actions. There seems to be
a substantial problem with the State’s end of this case.
Now, whether the problems are due to Mr. Simmons or
the State, I don’t know, your Honor. I have two people
that are looking for money that are entitled to money, and
there are funds available. I would ask your Honor to
weigh all the equities. The Court has a responsibility to
all the people and not just the State. If the State has gone
over any statute of limitation for any action they may
have, that is not a concern of this Court. If the Court has
jurisdiction and if all parties submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the Court, I do not feel jurisdiction is a
problem at this time.
I would like the Court to realize my clients as well as
myself, pursuant to whatever paragraph it was in Judge
App. 80
Shapiro’s decision, that Mr. Feingold referred, were never
cited and never served. We had no knowledge of this.
THE COURT: I think I have enough under-
standing of it. Did you want to say something further?
MR. SIMMONS: I should cap it off, I think,
your Honor. I find myself in a very difficult position to
follow Mr. Feingold’s remarks, because he was vacilating
[sic] all the way from left field to center [28] field to right
field to home plate. I sort of feel like I have been led out
to the woods somewhere and left there. First he said that
they don’t have any authority and they don’t have any
jurisdiction, and then he turns around and in the next
breath they are entitled - automatically vested to the
State. What I want to have your Honor look at is — well,
there are so many statutes and so many motions and
everything that has been thrown out here and what is
happening, I think, Mr. Bass put it correctly, the State has
gone out in high water and found itself in the middle of
the stream and found itself in trouble. It says maybe we
should back up and turn around and try to reach shore
again. Their records show, your Honor, there is no denial
by anybody that the State has been there for over 20
years. They have not put any monies up for the use of
this land for over 20 years and they are still there. The
liability is accumulating. As I said in my opening
remarks, not only is the money there, but if they are
wrong, if they have not defended themselves, there is a
hell of a lot more at stake. Well, your Honor would not
put yourself in jeopardy by making a decision to favor
these people and let them have their money. He said the
State funds should not be used to pay the bills. Well,
before they put foot on that [29] property, your Honor,
App. 81
they are supposed to put money up first before that. Here
we are 20 years later and how much money there is. He is
trying to say we are here and we are staying there and
there is no money and your Honor doesn’t have the
jurisdiction to dispose of any of this money. How ludi-
crous can this be?
Now, I am preparing a brief for the Supreme Court
over a very minimal $8,000, because I was denied a
condemnation in ‘68. I want to read this for the record
and into the record. In addition to reasonable and neces-
sary expenses and disbursements due the owner, the
obligation becomes more apparent and obviously where
the condemnor cannot restore to the owner in an as-
before and re-establish the status quo position, such as
cutting of trees, bulldozing terrain, obtaining legal
injunctions against the owner from enjoying the use of |
real property for profit, removal of thousands of dollars
worth of material without payment, without owner’s per-
mission, being ordered by the court to pay taxes on
property which the owner was denied access borders on
the ludicrous.
THE COURT: Is that an appeal you are taking?
MR..SIMMONS: A decision where I was denied
$8,000.
THE COURT: Is that another case?
[30] MR. SIMMONS: Yes.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SIMMONS: They have tried it so many
times and it is about time they do something right. The
attempt here is to come into court and confuse your
App. 82
Honor, and no matter who the judge, if he says yes, no,
and they say yes or no, and first he said we are wrong.
He admits the Attorney General’s office got so confused. I
grant you they didn’t know which way to go. I have been
with this through the proceedings and at one point the
Attorney General’s office, everybody was going to the
clerk’s office to ask for some direction. It is a sad state of
affairs when they don’t know who is on first base.
Now, as far as proof of the validity, I don’t think that
is Mr. Feingold’s responsibility. That is my responsibility.
If he wants to charge me 20 percent interest and I am
agreeable, that is my responsibility and that is none of his
business. Those are my funds that are being allocated and
not theirs.
Now, 48-11, your Honor, is the statute that is applica-
ble. If not applicable, then there has to be another statute.
The State has no authority to proceed under any under-
taking unless they are following some given statute. If
48-11 is not applicable, then I [31] want to know what is
applicable, because they cannot operate without operat-
ing under the General Statutes. When he said there is no
equity in this case, none of the proceedings were under
48-11. It is just back and forth. He has been vacilating
[sic] and I couldn’t make rhyme or reason of his state-
ments. He said that they didn’t have statutory — that
Judge Shapiro did not have the statutory authority to
pass title. What are they doing there? If these funds are
not available, your Honor, to dispense and Judge Shapiro
did not have the authority to pass title, then as I said in
Federal Court, they have a 24-hour notice off the prop-
erty. You can’t keep going on it for 20 years and using my
property and say, hell, you are not going to use the
App. 83
money either. I think your Honor, you ought to put
blinkers on and forget all of these statutes and double
talk by the State and look at it from a practical aspect.
Well, what has happened and what is happening? I am
not going to be redundant. The liability is accumulating.
He is very well aware of what happened and aware of the
problems confronting the State. There is a means and
method. The statutes are very clear. Well, the thing will
be resolved. Well, if there was no statute applicable, then
it would be a horse of a different color. I grant you I do an
awful lot of [32] research myself and I find it very diffi-
cult to find a situation where what happens when they
fail in condemnation or fail in their attempts in imminent
[sic] domain. It is a unique situation. I did find one in
New York State and I will give your Honor the quote and
you can look at it, too, Mr. Feingold. Well, 205 2d, New
York, 626.
THE COURT: Does this have anything to do
with these motions which are in front of me today?
MR. SIMMONS: Only in the respect that he is
attempting to put a roadblock, before all payments. It is a
paradoxical situation. Originally they were the ones that
triggered the payment and claimed the debt off in the
land records. They started it. Well, now we have a turn-
around and they are saying, wait, we are not going to pay
anybody any more. It is not his money or supposedly not
his, it is the State’s. That is the only relationship, your
Honor. I say that money is mine or equivalent and they
have to put a deposit up before they can put a foot on my
property. It has not been done and I am treating this as
though it were a deposit against the liability that is con-
tinuing. These payments should be made and these other
App. 84
matters should be cleared up. Somebody will have to
make a decision.
THE COURT: You say the money that is [33]
there has to do not with payment for the land, but a
deposit toward whatever future liability may be found?
MR. SIMMONS: That is correct.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. SIMMONS: A portion of the land, your
Honor, common sense dictates there is considerable dam-
age here. As I read to you, they took all of the building
material and they cut the trees and never paid five cents
for it. Then to have Attorney Feingold come in and say
none of the money was for damages, and put that on the
record, I mean, my God, how much more incriminating
can it be? I ask your Honor to act favorably on all of these
motions.
THE COURT: Thank you very much.
MR. BASS: If your Honor grants the motion I
have prepared the order.
THE COURT: Do you have copies?
MR. BASS: Yes. 3
THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
* + *
App. 85
[34] CERTIFICATE
STATE OF : SUPERIOR COURT
CONNECTICUT : JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASE NO. 163875 : AT HARTFORD,
AUGUSTUS SIMMONS : CONNECTICUT
VS. : JUNE 7, 1982
HORACE WETHERALL
I hereby certify that the within and foregoing (33)
pages constitute a true, complete and accurate transcript
of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter, heard
before Hon. Antoinette L. Dupont, Judge in the Superior
Court, Judicial District of Hartford, at Hartford, Connect-
icut, on June 7, 1982.
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut, this 18th day of
April, 1984.
/s/ Harold J. Moan, Sr.
Harold J. Moan, Sr.
Certified Court Reporter
App. 86
EXHIBIT 10
December 15, 1960
Mrs. Ignace Simmons
Route 20
East Granby, Connecticut
Dear Mrs. Simmons:
It is our understanding that a representative of the Joseph
P. Kennedy & Company called on you and your son,
relative to negotiating a price for the acquisition by the
State of your property located adjacent to Route 20. At
that meeting, your son requested that the state indicate
the need for this proposed acquisition.
This land, totaling approximately 13.5 acres lies within
the approach zone to our instrument runway at Bradley
Field. The width and length of this approach zone is
established by the State in conjunction with the Federal
Government. Under an agreement entered into in 1955,
the State and the Federal Government agreed to acquire
this parcel of land in the interest of public safety. This
agreement was not entered into until all parties had
investigated this area and deemed it most necessary that
this tract of land be acquired to protect the public.
We hope this information will help to clarify the situa-
tion.
Very truly yours,
Donald J. Lynch
Deputy Director
DJL/D
cc: Joseph P. Kennedy & Company
App. 87
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Crvit AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON 25
GRANT AGREEMENT
Part I -— Offer
CONTRACT NO. CICA Date of Offer
36-A January 12, 1955
Bradley Field Airport
Project No.
09-06-009-507
TO: STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(herein referred to as the “Sponsor”)
FROM: The United States of America (acting through the
Administrator of Civil Aeronautics, herein
referred to as the “Administrator”)
WHEREAS, the Sponsor has submitted to the Administra-
tor a Project Application dated December 2, 1954 for a
grant of Federal funds for a project for development of
the Bradley Field Airport (herein called the “Airport”)
together with plans and specifications for such project,
which Project Application, as approved by the Adminis-
trator, is hereby incorporated herein and made a part
hereof; and
~
WHEREAS, the Administrator has approved a project for
development of the Airport (herein called the “Project”)
consisting of the following described airport develop-
ment:
“Acquisition of land for ‘Doolittle’ clear zones
both ends Runway 6-24; acquisition of land and
App. 88
navigation easements for protection of
approaches 6-24, 19, 33”.
all as more particularly described in the property map
and plans and specifications incorporated in the said
Project Application;
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to and for the purposes of
carrying out the provisions of the Federal Airport Act (60
Stat. 170; Pub. Law 377, 79th Congress), and in consider-
ation of (a) the Sponsor’s adoption and ratification of the
representations and assurances contained in said Project
Application, and its acceptance of this Offer, as hereinaf-
ter provided, and (b) the benefits to accrue to the United
States and the public from the accomplishment of the
Project and the operation and maintenance of the Airport,
as herein provided.
THE ADMINISTRATOR, FOR AND ON BEHALF OF THE
UNITED STATES HEREBY OFFERS AND AGREES to pay,
as the United States’ share of the cost in accomplishing
the project, 50 percent of all allowable project costs sub-
ject to the following terms and conditions:
1. The maximum obligation of the United States
payable under this Offer shall be $37,000.00
2. The Sponsor shall
(a) begin accomplishment of the Project within a
reasonable time after acceptance of this
Offer, and
(b) carry out and complete the Project in accor-
dance with the terms of this Offer, and the
Federal Airport Act and the Regulations pro-
mulgated thereunder by the Administrator
in effect on the date of this Offer, which Act
App. 89
and Regulations are incorporated herein and
made a part hereof, and
(c) carry out and complete the Project in accor-
dance with the plans and specifications and
property map incorporated herein as they
may be revised or modified with the
approval of the Administrator or his duly
authorized representatives.
The Sponsor shall operate and maintain the Air-
port as provided in the Project Application incor-
porated herein.
The maximum amounts of building space which
the Sponsor shall be obligated to furnish civil
agencies of the United States for the purposes
and on the terms and conditions states in
Paragraph 9 of Part III of the Project Appli-
cation dated May 18, 1949, for Project No.
9-06-009-906-009-801 shall be as set forth in the
attached schedule of maximum space require-
ments which is incorporated herein and made a
part hereof.
Any misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact by the Sponsor concerning the Project or the
Sponsor’s authority or ability to carry out the
obligations assumed by the Sponsor in accepting
this Offer shall terminate the obligation of the
United States, and it is understood and agreed by
the sponsor in accepting this Offer that if a mate-
rial fact has been misrepresented or omitted by
the Sponsor, the Administrator on behalf of the
United States may recover all grant payments
made.
The Administrator reserves the right to amend or
withdraw this Offer at any time prior to its accep-
tance by the Sponsor.
App. 90
7. This Offer shall expire and the United States shall
not be obligated to pay any of the allowable costs
of the Project unless this Offer has been accepted
by the Sponsor within 60 days from the above
date of Offer or such longer time as may be
prescribed by the Administrator in writing.
8. It is understood and agreed that the areas delin-
eated on Exhibit “A” as ‘Doolittle’ clear zones at
each of the Runway 6-24 will be maintained by
the Sponsor completely free from all structures
except these required for aids to air navigation,
unless otherwise authorized by the Administra-
tor.
9. It is further understood and agreed by and
between the parties hereto that the Project Appli-
cation dated May 18, 1949 for Project No.
9-06-009-801 is hereby amended by deleting the
last sentence of Paragraph 7 of Part III thereof
and inserting in lieu thereof the following:
“The airport approach standards to be
followed in performing the covenants
contained in this paragraph shall be
those established by the Administrator
in Office of Airports Drawing No. 814,
dated April 26, 1950, unless otherwise
authorized by the Administrator”.
The Sponsor’s acceptance of this Offer and ratification
and adoption of the Project Application incorporated
herein shall be evidenced by execution of this instrument
by the Sponsor, as hereinafter provided, and said Offer
and acceptance shall compromise a Grant Agreement, as
App. 91
provided by the Federal Airport Act, constituting the
obligations and rights of the United States and the Spon-
sor with respect to the accomplishment of the Project and
the operation and maintenance of the Airport. Such Grant
Agreement shall become effective upon the Sponsor’s
acceptance of this Offer and shall remain in full force and
effect throughout the useful life of the facilities devel-
oped under the Project but in any event not to exceed
twenty years from the date of said acceptance.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF CIVIL
AERONAUTICS
By /s/ Ora W. Young
Regional Administrator,
Region One
Part II — Acceptance
The STATE OF CONNECTICUT does hereby ratify and
adopt all statements, representations, warranties, cove-
nants, and agreements contained in the Project Applica-
tion and incorporated materials referred to in the
foregoing Offer and does hereby accept said Offer and by
such acceptance agrees to all of the terms and conditions
thereof. .
Executed this 1st day of February 1955.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
(Name of Sponsor)
By /s/ K.H. Ringrose
Title Director of Aeronautics
(SEAL)
Attest: /s/ Mildred P. Allen
App. 92
Title: | Secretary of State
CERTIFICATE OF SPONSOR’S ATTORNEY
I, Jack Rubin, acting as Attorney for STATE OF
CONNECTICUT, ge-here-te-certify: (herein referred to as
“Sponsor”), to hereby certify:
That I have examined the foregoing Grant Agreement
and the proceedings taken by said Sponsor relat-
ing thereto, and find that the Acceptance thereof by said
Sponsor relating thereto, and find that the
Acceptance thereof by said Sponsor has been
duly authorized and that the execution thereof is in all
respects due and proper and in accordance with the laws
of the State of Connecticut __, and further that, in
my opinion, said Grant Agreement constitutes a legal and
binding obligation of the Sponsor in accordance
with the terms thereof.
Dated at HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT this ist day of
February, 1955.
/s/ Jack Rubin
Title Assistant Attorney
General
App. 93
EXHIBIT 11
STATE OF CONNECTICUT
LOUIS SHAPIRO SUPREME COURT BUILDING
STATE REFEREE P.O. DRAWER N. STATION A
HARTFORD, CONN. 06106
July 18, 1980
Jason E. Pearl, Esquire
19 South High Street
P.O. Box 183
New Britain, CT 06050
Re: No. 16 38 75
Augustus J. Simmons v.
Horace B. Wetherell, et al
Dear Mr. Pearl:
This will acknowledge receipt of your Motion For Dis-
bursement of Funds by Clerk dated July 16, 1980 and
received by me this morning.
Since your phone call to me, I am not certain as to what
steps should be taken in order to make disbursement as
requested by you. Since the amount attached by Atty.
Salzman et als was accomplished by bringing suit, it
would seem to me that before distribution could be made,
that this claim be reduced to a judgment. If there is a
more expeditious way to proceed, I would appreciate
hearing from you as soon as possible.
I’m also concerned about the order of distribution since
the land records, according to your memorandum
attached to your letter, show a list of encumbrances prior
to the date of the Salzman attachment.
App. 94
Also, is view of the-
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