Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Maher v. Long Island University
Supreme Court brief1998
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
¢ Supreme Court, U.&
\ FILED
wo, 221 412 FEB 26 tog
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1997
Petitioner
LONG ISLAND UNIVERSITY: DAVID STEINBERG
WALTER JONES AND GEORGE SUTTON
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Appeals Court For
The Second Circuit
DORIS MAHER PRO SE
2337 MARLBORO STREET
EAST MEADOW, N.Y. 11554
4 516 781-4629
Plaintiff’s rights were lawfully
denied for Trial By Jury» Equal
Protection and Contract Clauses, and Due
Process of law, violating the United
States Constitution Amendments VII and
XIV» Age Discrimination In Employment Act
of 1967 ("ADEA") and Civil Riahts Act of
1964 Title VII.
1. May demands for Trial By Jury
lawfully denied after demanded
to Court and Counsel before
Hearing on Consent Award, Court
Decision made on case, Court
then-raised Question on Sex
Discrimination in Complaint too
late, excluded from Summary
Order, unrelated to violations
of Amendments VII and XIV?
©. May rights of Equal Protection,
Contract Enforcement and Due
Process lawfully denied, by
enforcing only items eliminating
senior from work forces in Consent
Award, failed ADEA waiver,
excluding items of economic gains
and losses, material factors
breached and defrauded allegedly;
unrelated to violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment?
a
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE :
Questions Presented For Review.... i
Table of Authorities........22026- iii :
Citations of the Official and :
Unofficial Reports..... ecccecccee 1
Statement of Basis of Jurisdiction
in Supreme Court.....22c2cceee0- 1
i
Citations of Statutes and
U.S. Constitution Amendments.... =
Statement of the Case.......... eee 3
Statement of the Facts........22.-. 4
Reasons for Granting the Writ..... 8
Cone luSiaomeaeccccsccecocscsscsacececes te | .
Appendix (Special Booklet For U.S.
Supreme Court)..... ---A-1 through A-19
ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITES
STATUTES CITED
Age Discrimination In Employment Act
(ADEA). 1967, 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 621-634 2,859,
10,13,15,16,18,19,22,23,24 ,25
Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).»
2g u.S.C. Sec. 626 4,5
Title VII Civil Rights Act
1964 42 U.S.C.
Sec. 2000 et seg 2»8»9>»
19,22,23;25
Title VII Civil Rights Act.
42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e-5 239
Title VII Civil Rights Act.
42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000-5 (gq) 259
The New York General Obligations Law.
Sec. 15-501 (McKinney’s 1989) 22,25
The United States Constitution,
Amendments VII 2,8,12,
13,15,19,22
The United States Constitution,
Amendment XIV 2,8,14;
15,19,22
The Federal Law (COBRA) Extend Medical
Insurance to Discharged
Emp loyees 7,290
Booklet: AARP-The Age Discrimination
in Employment Act Guarantees You
Certain Rights. Washington, D.C. 24%;25
112
CASES CITED
Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
B01 F.2d 38,42
({2@nd Cir. 1986)
Bormann v. AT&T
Comminications,
Inc. 5
875 F.2d 399, 401, 403
(2nd Cir. 1989), cert.
denied»,
493 U.S. 924 (1989)
Cerbone v. International Garment
Workers’ Union, 768 F.2d 45>,
1985)
49, SO (2nd Cir.
Cirillo v. Arco Chemical Co.,
B62 F.2d 448, 454
{3rd Cir. 19868)
1S
13,15,
16,17
16,19,
21
13
Coventry v. United States Steel Corp. ,»
8656 F.2d 514
(3rd Cir. 1988)
Delaware State College v. Ricks,
499 U.S. 250, 101
S.Ct. 489 (1980
Dillman v. Engineering,
)
784% F.2d 57 (2nd Cir.
Miller v. International Telephone
and Telegraph Corp. »
F.2d 20, 21 (2nd
Seedman v. Alexander’s Inc.»
Cir.
683 F. Supp. 9724,
(SDNY 1987)
Zipes v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S.
385, 102 S.Ct. 1127 (1982)
i
Vv
926
i3
16
25
18,21
18,19
14
OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
United States Court Of Appeals For The
Gecond Circuit Summary Order Filed
December 2+ 1997.
United States District Court Eastern
District Of New York Judament Filed
July 29, 1996.
limited States District Court Eastern
District Of New York Transcript Of
Opinion and Decision July 9,» 1996.
Filed February 7» 1997.
STATEMENT OF BASIS OF JURISDICTION
IN SUPREME COURT
Plaintiff Doris Maher (hereinafter :
"Plaintiff") is a resident of Nassau
County» L.I.» N.Y. The principal place
of business of the Defendants: David
Steinberg» Walter Jones and Georoe Sutton
is Long Island University {hereinafter :
"! TU"), located in Nassau County.
Jurisdiction is conferred on the
Supreme Court of the United States.
Washington D.C. to review a Summary
Order issued December 2. 1997 bv the
tnited States Court of Appeals For the
Second Circuit, 40 Foley Square, New
Yorks N.Y. (A-1) affirming the Judgment,
Eastern District Court, Brooklyn, N.Y.
adverse Decision filed July 29, 1996.
A-2. Oral arguments by plaintiff pro se
and Neil Sparber, Esq. for defendants
were heard November 17. 1997. Piaintiff
filed a Petition For Rehearing en banc
dated December 8» 1997 in the Appeals
Court December 9. 1997 and a Motion to
Stav the Mandate dated December 15. 1997
until decisions are made on Rehearing en
banc and Writ of Certiorari.
& Petition For Rehearing was denied
by same Judges in error February 2, 1998
i
because plaintiff had filed a Petition For
Rehearing en banc. To be given tec
correct panel of Judges. No answer yet.
The statutory provisions to confer on
the Supreme Court are Titie VII of Civil
Rights Act of 196% 2 U.S.C. Sect.
2000e-5. Equitable and other relief is
sought under 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000e (Qq)
and the Age Discrimination In Employment
Act ("ADEA"). 29 U.S.C. Sect. 621-634.
The United States Constitution Amendments
VII and XIV.
CITATIONS OF STATUES AND
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AMENDMENTS
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section 621 et seg
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section 623 (a 1.2)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section 623 (d)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1976 29 U.S.C.A. Section 623 (f 2)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section 623 (a 1)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section &26 (b)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section 626 (c 1.2)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section 626 (d 2)
Age Discrimination In Employment Act of
1967 29 U.S.C.A. Section 626 (e 2)
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII
42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000e-5
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII
42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000-5 (e 1.2)
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII
42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000-5 (ao 1,.2A)
Civil Rights Act of 1964 Title VII
42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000-5 (}j)
United States Constitution Amendment VII
United States Constitution Amendment XIV
2
—
ea
NO cll Cal Plas that nas
a a ee
ery
an
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The basis for jurisdiction in the
United States Eastern District Court,
Uniondale, N.Y. where original complaint
was filed by plaintiff pro se on July 31,
1992 with demand for Trial By Jury on
alleged Age Discrimination, Unequal terms
and conditions of employment, Retaliation
citing a Consent Award dated June 24>.
1988, Sex Discrimination, Harrassment,
Conspiracy, Fraud, Damaging plaintiff’s
Professional Career and Health. After
finding Robert Wagner, Esq. at a Senior
Citizens Legal Assistance Clinic, an
Amended Complaint was entered on December
ii, 1992. A-3. After years of
postponement by the defense, the case
was moved to the Eastern District Court,
Brooklyn, N.Y. and Judge Frederic Block,
November 1994.
The jurisdiction in District Court
was conferred by Title VII of Civil
Rights Act of 1964 42 U.S.C. Sect.
2000e-5. Equitable and other relief was
sought under 42 U.S.C. Sect. 2000-5 (gq)
and the ADEA , 29 U.S.C. Sect. 621-634.
Judgment was entered July 29,» 1996 (A-2)
granting Defendants LIU Summary Judgment,
July 9, 1996 dismissing case in entirety.
Judge Block denied plaintiff ten (10)
days extension to obtain his twenty (20)
pages Transcribed Opinion and Decision
delivered on July 9» 1996 after about
twenty (20) minutes of recess. A-4.
Judge Block reviewed and edited the same
and finally denied plaintiff’s letter
for extension dated August 8, 1996 for a
Motion to Reconsider the Case signed
September 13, 1996. entry September 20,
1996. Notice of Appeal was timely filed
August 8, 1996, entry date August 21,
1996 by plaintiff pro se.
3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
—-
The ultimate discriminatory acts by
1IU, precipitating the second Human
Rights and EEOC Charge on alleged Age and
Sex Discrimination and Retaliation,
timely filed November 15, 1990, occurred
August and September 1990. The Right-
to-Sue letter was issued by the EEOC on
May 4% 1992. Plaintiff filed lawsuit on
July 31, 1992. The time tolled for the
Himan Rights and EEOC was one (1) year
and half. The Human Rights held
Plaintiff’s case for one (1) year to
November 1991. No Hearing was held, no
attorney was provided for plaintiff and
a ten (10) minute meeting was held. On
the day before, the moderator admitted
to plaintiff that the file had not been
read and she knew nothing about the case.
She continually left the room. The time
was wasted. The final decision was the
case was out of Jurisdiction. Dates and
events were erroneous so plaintiff
followed-up the EEOC Charge timely filed
November 15, 1990.
Plaintiff was employed by LIU as a
full time faculty member for eight years
only. (1976-78 and 1984-90).
Plaintiff was sought out by LIu
Administrators and Nurse Faculty to leave
anurse job in 1984 and come back to LIU
to teach and get the CW Post Nursing
Program National League For Nursing (NLN)
Accreditation. Plaintiff had the highest
ranks Associate Professor, highest salary
of five nurse faculty (1984 $30,000 with
increments $46,000 1990), highest nurse
credential: Doctorate in Nursing
Education, Masters of Education in
Maternal-Child Nursing (Teachers College,
Columbia University, NY) and Master of
Science in Computer Education (LIU).
Plaintiff was the senior untenur ed
4
faculty (1984-90) with seniority over
the other four (4) untenured nurse
faculty. The stage was set to eliminate
a senior and tenure younger faculty.
After receiving NLN accreditation,
plaintiff’s contract was not renewed in
April 1986. LIU administrators had
violated plaintiff’s contract and through
Union grievance procedures of due process
plaintiff’s contract was renewed. LIU
defendants excluded violations in facts
of plaintiff’s case in LIU’s Argument and
Briefs. George Sutton testified to LIU
violations as only procedural but there
was much more discrimination against the
senior faculty member with seniority.
Plaintiff applied for tenure twice,
once was denied, May 1987 and violations
by LIU administrators were cited by the
Union. The second time plaintiff applied
for tenure February 1986, plaintiff was
recommended for tenure by the Nursing
Personnel Committee and the Cw Post
Faculty Personnel Committee. Excluded in
LIU’s facts, Argument and Brief.
Plaintiff had filed the first Human
Rights and EEOC Charge on Age and Sex
Discrimination on June 3,» 1987 citing
continual harassment in the workplace and
unequal terms and conditions of
employment with continual violations to
plaintiff’s contract and denial of tenure
May 1987 by LIU male administrators.
The Consent Award was initiated by LIU
to rid a senior.from the workplace. A-S.
George Sutton defendant testified and
stated in his affidavit dated April 26,
i995 that LIU thought plaintiff would
continue to grieve year after year 50 the
Consent Award was contrived. Plaintiff
was not retiring and could not do soa
because of economic reasons as head of
the household. Both the Union and LIU
knew that. Plaintiff should have
5
automatically received tenure after seven
years of employment in academia. A-186.
There was only one Consent Award dated
June 24, 1988. There was only one
Hearing for the Consent Award on June 20,
1988. The first Hearing on April 22,
1988 was for denial of the first
application for tenure, and violations to
Pplaintiff’s contract by administrators
were cited by the Union. Plaintiff was
recommended for tenure February, 1988.
Then LIU initiated with the Consent Award
and the second meeting set for June 20,
1988 was used for the Consent Award. LIU
male Administrator, Walter Jones denied
tenure right before the meeting in ietter
dated May 24%, 1988, received June 6,
1988 coercive behavior ,» even after
favorable annual review and promised by
Dean Stephen Gross’ letter to Richard
Griffith, Chairperson of C.W. Post
Faculty Personnel Committee.
The June 20, 1988 meeting for the
Consent Award was incomplete because
there was no recorder and Arbitrator
Eisenberg complained that he could not
listen and write at the same time. Ralph
Knopf » President CW Post Collegial
Federation (CWPCF) and plaintiff were
asked to leave (A-11) the LIU law team
Douglas Catalano, Esq. and George Sutton,
defendant volunteered to help write the
Arbitrator’s notes. Ms. Litzky>» New
York State United Teachers New York
State United Teachers (‘(NYSUT) remained
but did not have plaintiff’s permission
to act on her behalf to alter the
material factors in the Consent Award.
* No notes of the Consent Award were read
in plaintiff’s present. and plaintiff was
not at any meeting on June 24, 1988. The
Record is devoid of any notes to make
this a fact and the Consent Award is too
technically written to have been read in
6
eer mT eT ee ae eT eT
this meeting as claimed by defendants.
After many requests to Ms. Litzky
(NYSUT) to review the Consent Award,
plaintiff received it on September ce;
1988 from Ms. Litzky (3 months later).
Plaintiff protested the contents
immediately to Ms. Litzky and George
Sutton who promised to straighten it
out. Plaintiff called Ms. Litzky back to
tell her that George Sutton (LIU)
promised to straighten out the Consent
Award to plaintiff’s understanding. Item
#11 provides for Arbitration toa settle
disputes. All parties were bound to item
#11. #This was the lawful safety clause
by the Arbitrator to stop unlawful acts.
Many of the eleven items had never been
heard or seen before by plaintiff. At
the meeting, plaintiff objected to the
word “retires” being put in the Consent
Award. George Sutton urged plaintiff to
withdraw the first Human Rights and EEOC
Charge of June 3» 1987 on September ce»
1988 and then he would straighten out the
Consent Award. (see Item #6). Plaintiff
was bound to item #11 and = expected
Arbitration. Ralph Knopf (CWPCF) told
plaintiff that he had requested
Arbitration to George Sutton, defendant.
Lith stalled continually misleading
plaintiff and then in September 1990
blatantly refused Arbitration, refused
any medical benefits,item #5 and COBRA,
refused a job, refused unemployment
insurance and any adjustment to error
in pension agreement, item #4. These
are discriminatory unlawful acts by
Lit} defendants.
Reasons for Granting the Writ
Plaintiff was lawfully denied Trial By
Jiny where plaintiff demanded Trial By
Jury to Court and Counsel before Hearing
on Consent Award. Piaintiff never gave
up constitutional right to Trial By Jury
at any time but right was lawfully denied
by the Court on the Consent Award Hearing
and on alleged Age and Sex Discrimination
and Retaliation. violating United States
Constitution Amendments VII and XIV, ADEA
of 1967 and Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Piaintiff swears to that.
After the Hearing had ended on July 9,
1996 and Judge Block, Eastern District
Court returned in about twenty (20)
minutes with Court’s twenty (20) pages
Opinion and Decision completed and ready
to read, Court only then-—r aised
Pplaintiff’s ser ious Federal Question
never raised during the Consent Award
Hearing, negatively phrased about alleged
Sex Discrimination in plaintiff’s
Complaints and Affidavit (A-3, A-&) on
Record including a list of names of
older female nurse teachers who plaintiff
personnally knew. They were fired or
let-go by LIu without Tenure or
Continuing Appointment previous to i990
and there were more females besides this
group in the CW Post Nursing Department,
LIU fired or let-go,s known to plaintiff.
it was too late for Judge Biock to raise
the alieged Sex Discrimination Question,
he had already made the Court’s decision
on the case. This was a Court error.
This improper action of the Court
proves there were preconceived biases and
the case should not have been dismissed
in entirety on the grounds that the Judge
granted Summary Judgment because the
Court had not examined the alleged Sex
Discrimination Question during the
8
Le ee ae en
Hear ing. An analysis of alleged Sex
Discrimination must be included in the
entire analysis of facts and not excluded
from the totality of circumstances. It
was unreasonable to then ask Counsel
Wagner to agree with him after the
Hearing had been concluded, recessed and
Judge Block returned with twenty (20)
pages of his Decision on page 2. A-4.
Plaintiff was denied a fair and
impartial fact finding of crucial
evidence on alleged Sex Discrimination
where he had preconceived biases about
Sex Discrimination and did not make a
fair and lawful decision based on 2&2
totality of facts denying plaintiff
equal protection and due process under
the law.
The Question of Sex Discrimination was
appealed and facts referred to in oral
argument November 17>» 1997 and was
completely excluded from the Court Below
Summary Order issued December 2. 1997.
The Court Below never referred to the
Civil Rights Act of 196% Title VII in
affirming the decision of the District
Court and omitted plaintiff’s claims to
alleged Sex Discrimination and related
Retaliation Title VII of Civil Rights
Remedies of 1991 denied plaintiff
inappropriately by the Court. The ADEA
Statute of Limitations date of June 24,
1988 of the Consent Award, failed ADEA
waiver, used by the Court Below to
affirm the Opinion and Decision of the
District Court, omitted alleged Sex
Discrimination and related Retaliation
in the Human Rights and EEOC Charge filed
timely November 15, 1990 by plaintiff.
The ultimate alleged Age and Sex
Discrimination and Retaliation culpable
and unlawful practices engaged in by
three (3) male LIU defendants against a
senior female, clearly occurred in
9
September 1990.
Plaintiff’s understanding was the
Hearing July 8 and 9, 1996 was not a
trial as stated in the Court Below
Summary Order issued December 2» 1997.
The Court Below has denied plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Plaintiff prays
the United States Supreme Court uses the
Court’s Supervisory powers over the Court
Below and honors plaintiff rights to a
fair and impartial Trial By Jury. The
Constitution framers gave this right to
people because they wanted a jury to be
the fact finder not one Judge or
Magistrate. In principle, a jury group
of twelve (12) people are better than one
(1) person in fact-finding. Juries are
free from preconceived biases and
considered to be good fact-finding
bodies and a way to avoid some of the
improper actions experienced by people
in cases of this sort.
The Court Below Summary Order states
that plaintiff’s then-counsel Wagner gave
up rights to a Trial By Jury immediately
before Judge Block began the matter of
the Consent Award Hearing only on July 6,
1996. Ms. Litzky (NYSUT), witness and
other people were present in the Open
Court. Plaintiff never gave Counsel
Wagner permission to give up rights to a
jury trial. Judge Block or Counsel
Wagner did not tell plaintiff that the
Consent Award Hearing was a trial. In
fact. Counsel Wagner told plaintiff that
the Hearing was not a trial. Plaintiff
was told by Mr. Wagner that the Hearing
was only on the Consent Award, ordered by
Judge Block and not on Age and Sex
Discrimination and Retaliation. A-7.
On June 25. 1996. plaintiff was order
by Judge Block to appear in Brooklyn
Court in two hours or “suffer the
consequences”. Plaintiff tad asked to
10
Pa = se,
be excused because of grieving Mother ’s
recent death. Plaintiff did appear in
Open Court. None of the three (3) male
LIU defendants were ordered to appear.
Neil SGparber, Esq- defendants’ Counsel
appeared in Court. There was no oral
argument (Civil Docket date error).
Junige Block ordered plaintiff to attend
a Settlement Conference with Visiting
California Judge Real presiding», in
Brooklyn Court on the next day» June 26,
1996 at 9 AM. Defendants were not
ordered to appear and Counsel Sparber
had no authority to settle the case.
Judge Block ordered plaintiff to appear
on July 8, 1996 with witnesses for a
Hearing. (A-@ p.10 line 11). Defendants’
Counsel asked Judge Block if the Hearing
was on the Consent Award and he said
“yes”. Judge Block asked plaintiff
during Gpen Court. with both Counsels»
plaintiff’s family and other people
present, if plaintiff wanted a Jury Trial
and plaintiff said "yes". Plaintiff told
him that plaintiff demanded a jury trial
in Court papers filed on record with the
case on July 31>, 1992 in the Eastern
District Federal Court. Uniondale, N.Y.
Judge Block responded to plaintiff in
Gpen Court, just because you want a jury
trial doesn’t mean that you will get it.
Plaintiff heard no more from Judge Block
or Robert Wagner, Esq. on notifying the
Judge any further on plaintiff’s demand
for a jury trial. Plaintiff’s statement
demanding a jury trial in Open Court to
Judge Block before a Courtroom audience
must be on Record June 25, 1996. A-7.
The next day June 26, 1996,» plaintiff
brought copies of plaintiff’s Court
papers with demand for a jury trial to
the Settlement Conference scheduled for
9 AM in the Brooklyn Court. Before
meeting with Visiting California Judge
11
Real, plaintiff Qave copies of these
papers to Robert Wagner, Esq.» telling
him again that plaintiff demanded a jury
trial, but plaintiff tad told him that
many times before this day. He knew
that and so did Judge Block. @-7.
Once again during the Conference,
Judge Real affirmed Plaintiff’s demand
for a jury trial in the presence of all.
In fact, Neil Sparber, Esq. wanted to see
the Court papers demanding a jury trial
and Robert Wagner Esq. gave the Papers to
him to review. Plaintiff never gave up
constitutional rights to a jury trial,
Plaintiff swears to that and Robert
Wayner Esq., Neil Sparber, Esq. and Judge
Block were informed of this demand in
Gpen Court on June 25, 1996. A-7.
Additionally, a copy of the original
Court papers’ on alleged Age and Sex
Discrimination and Retaliation was Given
to Counsel Wagner and he Qave the Court
papers to Counsel Sparber to review. The
United States Constitution Amendment VII
states that plaintiff has a right to a
Trial By Jury. Plaintiff was denied
rights by Judge Frederic Block, Robert
Wagner Esq. and Neil Sparber Esq. who
concealed and denied intentionally
Plaintiff’s right to a fair and impartial
jury trial. There is no justice in a
Court system, where Officers of the Court
pray on i innocent victims using Court
verbiage to avoid a Trial By Jury and
denying plaintiff’s constitutional rights
by treating plaintiff differently than
other people where Plaintiff made it
known to all of these Court Officers,
Pplaintiff’s demand for a Jury Trial. It
is noteworthy to note that only one (1)
of the male LIU defendants were in Court
for the Hearing, George Sutton, and ail
three (3) male LIU defendants were
charged in plaintiff’s lawsuit. This is
ie
a ee eee ee
another biased act of the Court where
these male defendants were charged with
being responsible for the charges of
alleged Age and Sex Discrimination and
Retaliation against a senior female.
The Court denied plaintiff’s rights to
a fair and impartial jury trial. In
plaintiff’s case, evidence was in the
Record: Complaints,» Affidavits,
Testimonies and Exhibits. Clearly, there
was enough evidence of alleged Age and
Sex Discrimination and Retaliation with
genuine material facts and breach
allegedly, in the eleven €11) items
Consent Award. which were never examined
excluded in the Consent Award Hearing as
continual discriminatory unlawful
practices of LIwU. All the evidence
disclosed triable issues to be examined
by a jury trial. The Court’s decision
strained the ADEA of 1967 law. The
Consent Award failed the ADEA waiver
criteria including the Bormann v. AT&T
Communications, Inc. 875 F.2d 399
(end Cir. 1989). cert. denied, 493
U.S. 924 (1989) Standard of eight (8)
items used by the District Court excluded
in the Court Below Decision when
affirming the District Court Decision
where triable genuine material issues and
points of law were clearly overlooked by
the Court Below. See Id. at 4035
Coventry v. United States Steel Corp.
656 F.ed 51% (3rd Cir. 1988) and
Cirillo v. Chemical Co., 826 F.2d 446,
454 (3rd Cir. 1988). Errors in law were
committed by the Court which deprived
plaintiff of rights to a fair jury trial.
i3
Plaintiff’s rights to Equal Protection,
Contract Enforcement and Due Process were
lawfully denied by the Court Below only
enforcing retroactively two (2) items of
the Consent Award dated June 24, 1988,
failed ADEA waiver, to eliminate a senior
female from the work force on September 1,
1990, who had seniority. These two (2)
items are: item #1 Plaintiff’s performance
of two (2) years of employment and item #7
Plaintiff’s waiver of claim to tenure and
faculty rights where both items are
conditional on performance of each of
eleven (11) items of a conditional
agreement, the Consent Award. The
operation and effect of the Consent Award
were dependent upon the performance of
conditions and the existence of a supposed
set of facts. A-5.
Plaintiff performed as demanded by LIU
defendants in the Consent Award but LIU
defendants’ did not. The conditional
Consent Award date of June 2%. 1988 is
inappropriate to be used by the Court Below
for the ADEA Statute of Limitation running
time, as a matter of law. The running time
is tolled until September 1, 1990 and the
filing of the second Human Rights and EEOC
Charge by plaintiff on @lleged Age and Sex
Discrimination and Retaliation was timely
filed November 15, 1990. A timely EEOC
charge of discrimination is not
prerequisite of jurisdiction for bringing
an action in Federal Court. Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 655 U.S. 385,
G2 §.Ct. 1127 (1982). Similar to a
statute of limitation, a timely charge is a
requirement that is subject to waiver,
estoppel and equitable tolling. id. at
393.
The LIU motion for Summary Judgment
was granted inappropriately by Judge Block
excluding genuine material facts, breach
and fraud allegedly by LIU in the Consent
14
Award. The Court Below excluded the other
conditional nine (9) items of plaintiff’s
economic gains and losses, material factors
breached and defrauded allegedly, in the
Consent Award September 1990, in reckless
disregard of the ADEA of 1967, Civil Rights
Act of 1964 Title VII and the United States
Constitution Amendments XIV and VII. In
the Araqus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 801
F.2d 38. G2 (2nd Cir. 1986), the record was
reviewed and no genuine issue of fact was
found. In plaintiff’s case there is
evidence of an eleven (11) items
conditional Consent Award. signed by an
Arbitrator, obviously containing genuine
material facts excluded by the District
Court and the Court Below only examining
item #1 and #7 and not the alleged
fraud and breach by LIU defendants in items
#5 and #11. #\No reasonable trier of facts
would exclude examining all eleven items
when the decision was based on the
conditional Consent Award. This did happen
on July 8 and 9, 1996 and again on November
17, 1997 by both Courts.
The aggregate of reported cases in the
Court Below Summary Order (A-1) does
not cite a conditions! agreement of eleven
(11) items as the Consent Award where the
ADEA law can be ew denced. The conditional
Consent Award dated June 24, 1988 failed to
pass the ADEA waiver criteria of the ADEA
of 1967. The Bormann id at 403 Standard
used by the Eastern District Court to
substitute the Consent Award dated June 24,
1988 for an ADEA waiver failed to pass the
Standard of eight (8) items that was proved
in plaintiff’s Appeals Brief dated May 6,»
1997. The Court Below then excluded the
Bormann Id. case completely from the
Summary Order’s reported cases. Th.s
reason was that the District Court focused
on the Bormann Id. case soley to try to
prove the Consent Award was valid,
iS
enforceable and lawful, and the Court
failed to pass the eight (8) item Standard
of the case. The body of jurisprudence or
adjudged cases then-used by the Court Below
Jo not interpret the ADEA law in final
terms of a conditional Consent Award of
eleven (11) items which LIU blatantly
breached in September 1990. In the
Bormann Id. at 403. the Court states,
"22. the need to examine carefully any
Situation ...an older worker bargains away
the statutory rights to be free from age
discrimination.” Plaintiff was coerced
and suffered economic duress and not free
of Aae and Sex Discrimination and
Retaliation by LIU’s three (3) male
defendants and if plaintiff were a male
instead of a older female, these males
would not have treated Plaintiff in such
discriminatory ways.
Additionally, in Delaware State
College v. Ricks» 449 U.S. 250, 258 101
S.Ct. 489 (1980). the United States Supreme
Court urges, "The application of the
general principles...must be made on a
case-by-case basis." The Court Below
overlooked the conditions of the novel
Consent Award, breached by LIU defendants.
There was no conditional eleven (11) items
Consent Award breached and defrauded
allegedly by Delaware College.
The Consent Award was unenforceable.
Plaintiff tried to enforce the conditions
of expected employee benefits of Awards and
A bitration. LIU refused to comply with
item #5. Blue Cross Blue Shield primary
hospital insurance and Ma jor Medical
secondary insurance and item #11
Arbitration to settle disputes in the
Consent Award. Defendants were estopped
in items #5 and #11 and are liable for
breaking their promises in the Consent
Award because plaintiff relied on the
employee awards. All parties were bound
16
to the conditions in eleven items of the
Consent Award not only items #1 and #7.
In Bormann, Id. Judge Brieant, United
States District Court for the Southern
District of New York» gave full discovery
to the plaintiffs, Bormann et al» on the
issue of the enforceability of the
separation agreement and release used as an
ADEA waiver. But. Judge Block’s use of the
Bormann, Id. in his Decision did not
prove the enforceability of the Consent
Award although he made inferences in his
Decision: "...if the consent Award is
enforceable and lawful....and if the
Consent Award is unenforceable...” (A-4S>s
Transcribed Opinion and Decision July 9,»
i996, Pp. 68-9). These inferences were
never resolved by Judge Block. He noted,
"...if the Consent Award is unenforceable,
then the claim accrued in August 1990...
would be timely brought." (A—-4.Transcribed
Decision July 9s 1996, Pp. 8-9). Judge
Block intented to exclude "and unlawful”
when referring to “unenforceability”. The
reasons are the Consent Award as written is
unenforceable and unlawful. Judge Block
dec ided the Consent Award was valid
and lawful and did not prove his inference
of enforceability of the Consent Award.
This action deprived plaintiff of a fair
and impartial fact finding by the trier of
facts on inferences of enforceability.A-18.
Ttem #5 is fraud and unenforceable. LIu
refused plaintiff item #5, September i,
1990 and item #11 Arbitration. The Court
Below overlooked Sex Discrimination, points
of ADEA law and enforceability, and only
enfoiced items #1 and #7 for LIU defendants
which prevents granting LIv Summary
Judgment and dismissal of plaintiff’s
alleged Age and Sex Discrimination and
Retaliation lawsuit.
Judge Brieant, Southern District Court,
N.Y.» in the Bormann Id. case examined
i7
genuine issues of material facts before
granting Summary Judgment. But Judge Block
of the Eastern District Court overlooked
plaintiff’s gains of Awards and losses
which LIU had breached September 1, 1990
in the conditional Consent Award. Clearly,
George Sutton, defendant misled plaintiff
by leading plaintiff to expect that LIU
would participate in Arbitration, item #11
of the Consent Award to settle disputes.
The Statute of limitations was not intended
to run against a plaintiff unaware that a
cause of action existed. Cerbone v.
International Garment Workers’ Union»,
768 F.2d. 45 (2nd Cir. 1985). The
equitable principle should be applied when
employer’s behavior misleads the employee
to make the employee unaware of cause of
action. Id. LIU and the CWPCF were
bound to all eleven (11) items of the
conditional Consent Award. Plaintiff as
well as Arbitrator Eisenberg (deceased)
expected that LIU defendants would act in
g00d faith and participate in Arbitration
and award plaintiff’s expected employee
benefits in the conditional Consent Award.
The running time is tolled under equitable
tolling when plaintiff was unaware that she
had a claim for age discrimination.
Seedman v. Alexander’s Inc., 683 F. Supp.
at 926. LIU did not comply and unlawfully
discriminated against plaintiff in
September 1990, precipitating the second
thiman Rights and EEOC Charge of alleged Age
ami Sex Discrimination and Retaliation
timely filed November 15, 1990.
In Miller v. International Telephone &
Telegraph Corp., 755 F.2d 21 (1985), time
can’t be tolled unless employer misled
employee, denied rights in "extraordinary
way" er asserted rights”"...in the wrong
forum,..-tolling of time bar...permitted
as a matter of fairness. ADEA of 675 & 7
fed€1,2) as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. & 626
18
(ed)(1,2)." Item #11 provided for an
Arbitration Hearing (Forum) to settle
disputes. George Sutton, defendant,»
continued his theme of Arbitration to
settle disputes and in his letter dated
March 7, 1990. A-8. Plaintiff expected
Arbitration as clearly stated in item #11.
This is the extraordinary circumstances
where all parties were bound, as a matter
of law. Then September 1, 1990, LIU
blatantly refused Arbitration. Plaintiff
exhausted ail attempts to enforce the
Agreement and could not, then plaintiff
filed the second Human Rights and EEOC
Charge on alleged Age and Sex
Discrimination and Retaliation timely
filed November 15, 1990 against the LIU
three (3) male defendants. The principle
of equitable estoppel should be applied if
an employee misrepresented the length of
the filing period or in another way "lulled
the plaintiff into believing that it was
not necessary for him to commence
Litigation.” Cerbone, 768 F.2d at 50%
GSeedman, 683 F. Supp. at 926.
The Court Below treated plaintiff less
than equal to defendants by denying
plaintiff’s gains in items of genuine
material factors in the Consent Award that
plaintiff, a senior female had looked
forward to with personal joy and security
in hospital and major medical insurance for
a life-time. These items were breached by
three (3) male LIU defendants who would not
comply to the Consent Award on September 1»
1990 and violated the ADEA of 1967, Civil
Rights Act of 1964 Title VII and the United
States Constitution Amendments XIV and VII.
The Court Below violated plaintiff’s
constitutional rights by arbitrarily and
unreasonably treating plaintiff differently
than other people under the law. The
Summary Order barred personal claims and
rights from finality» equal protection,
19
contract enforcement and due process of
lawful resolution of the whole Consent
Award, as a matter of law. A-1.
Plaintiff thas been denied redress of
wrongss equal protection in the enjoyment
of personal rights» similar treatment under
the law, contract enforcement and due
process of liaw. The economic gains and
losses,» and total} costs of genuine material
factors to plaintiff are about $530,386 in
January 1998 excluding Plaintiff’s
suffering of personal damages to: teaching
career, economic duress and health.
The economic gains and losses, and
genuine material factors in September i990
are LIU wrongfully refused plaintiff item
#5 of Consent Award Blue Cross Blue Shield
primary hospital insurance and Ma jor
Medical secondary insurance. ($16,700 cost
January 1998). LIU wrongfully refused
plaintiff any medical insurance violating
Federal law (COBRA) to Extend Group Medical
Insurance. (Benefit). LIU wrongfully
never returned any of plaintiff’s personal
belongings stripped from faculty office
without warning before contract expired.
(Disparate Treatment and Cost $500). LIU
wrongfully prevented employee benefit of
unemployment insurance. (Cost $7,800). LIU
wrongfully cancelled plaintiff’s group life
insurance policy. (Cost $85,000). Liu
wrongfully did not comply to plaintiff’s
understanding of item #4, pension
contribution by LIw. It was plaintiff’s
understanding that plaintiff would receive
16 1/2 % over what plaintiff was already
earning. Plaintiff earned 16 % (11 K LIU
plus 5 4% plaintiff’s salary) all faculty
earned 16 4%. All faculty got 1/2% more in
i991. LIU should have paid $4,386 more in
fall of i989, employee benefit, protested
to personnel and Walter Jones by Iletter
dated January 23, 1990 but no answer. A-9.
{Is wrongfully fired plaintiff September 1,
20
ee ee .
1990 and refused to rehire plaintiff.
Waiter Jones, defendant told plaintiff that
plaintiff was sixty-five (65) and had to
retire. He said that Medicare was enough
insurance for plaintiff. (Disparate
treatment and Cost of faculty salary
$46,000 retroactive January 1998, about
$420,000). LIU hired a younger nurse
candidate,» Ms. Sandra Ceslowitz on
September 1, 1990 for less salary, ilower
rank, less experience and liess education,
and less qualifications than plaintiff.
(Disparate treatment). LIU recommended and
then tenured a younger nurse faculty member
Ms. Theodora Grauer for iess salary» not
recommended by the same Nursing Personnel
Committee February 1988 at the sametime
plaintiff was recommended for tenure in the
CW Post Nursing Department. (Disparate
treatment). LItu wrongfully refused
Arbitration to settle disputes. (item #11).
George Sutton misied plaintiff by
agreeing with item #11 and then refusing
Arbitration. Equitable tolling should be
applied to relieve a plaintiff actively
misied by an employer or who was prevented
someway from timely utilizing their
personal rights, this being heid as a
matter of fairness to client. Cerbone »
768 F.2d at 493 Miller, 755 F.2d at co.
Plaintiff expected the Consent Award would
be straighten out as George Sutton told
plaintiff because of item #11 in the
Consent Award. LIU wrongfully denied
senior nurse teacher with Doctorate in
Nursing Education to teach nursing but
allowed younger less qualified nurse
teachers to teach plaintiff’s nursing
courses. (Item #2. Disparate treatment).
Plaintiff was loaned to teach Computer
Education. Item #3. plaintiff was no
longer sub ject to violations by
Administration to faculty contract by an
annual review in 1989. LIU wrongfully
ei
demanded in item #6, plaintiff withdraw
Plaintiff’s first Human Rights and EEOC
Charge v. LIU dated June 3, 1987 on alleged
Age and Sex Discrimination. (Disparate
treatment). Item #10 was added by LIU’s
law team and was never heard or seen by
plaintiff until September 1988 and
protested by plaintiff. Item #9 was
added and never heard or seen by plaintiff
until September 1988 excusing LIU of any
wrong doing but can not protect LIU from
breaching the Consent Award and defrauding
Plaintiff thus breaking the Federal law and
N.Y. State Law. This item was never
discussed in the Hearing and excluded by
the Courts.
This alleged Age and Sex Discrimination
and Retaliation against plaintiff, are in
violation of Civil Rights Act 1964, 42
U.S.C.A. Sec. 2000 et seq (Title
VIIdD and ADEA of 1967, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec.
621 et seq. New York General
Obligations Law Sec. 15-501 (McKinney’s
1989), LIU & CWPCF Aareement 1985-88 and
United States Constitution Amendments VII
and XIV.
The Court Below Summary Order relates
that LIU was permitted to fire plaintiff
and had been attempting to do so for some
time. The Court Below overlooked the
reasons why LIU was unable to do so because
of plaintiff’s faculty rights to due
process, the grieving process including
evidence of exhibits, witnesses and
testimonies. According to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between os Post
Collegial Federation and LIU. the grieving
process and Arbitration are the normal
route in academia to prove faculty contract
rights were violated by LIU and plaintiff’s
faculty rights were violated by LIU
Administration. A-1.
The phaseology used by the Court, "The
University had been attempting to fire
27
Maher for sometime and was permitted.”,»
excluded points of the ADEA and Civil
Rights laws, statutes enacted by Congress
to protect plaintiff and prevent continual
wiliful violations of ace and sex
discrimination violating senior faculty
member’s contract. The Courts denied
plaintiff equal protection and due process
by not examining ali evidence on record and
concealing genuine material facts in the
Consent Award and by making a Decision on
less than ali the evidence on record
including Complaint of Sex Discrimination.
The Court Below Summary Order (A-1)
excluded the charge of Sex Discrimination
completely. The Court Below made a
Decision without even rational scrutiny in
reckless disregard of the ADEA and Civil
Rights statutes where no employee should be
fired without equal protection and due
process.
The Court Below relates that there is no
clear error in item #1, plaintiff’s two
(2) years of employment as written in the
Consent Award. But the Court Below
over looked that Arbitrator Eisenberg
(deceased) signed the total of eleven (11)
items in the Consent Award, not only
item #1 which is conditional toa the other
ten (10) items. The case law used by the
Court Below failed to use any Consent Award
for precedential authority. There are
plaintiff Awards which are personal claims
and rights signed in law by an Arbitrator.
The Court Below grants firing "AT WILL"
by an employer, without due process of iaw.
There has been alleged Sex Discrimination
in LIU’s past employment practices not
examined by the Court in plaintiff’s
Complaint and affidavit. A-3, A-6, A-7.
The Court Below stated that plaintiff
testified "..-that it was her ‘hope’ that
she would be reappointed...". (A-10,
plaintiff’s testimony Pp .64-65). The
23
question asked of plaintiff was referring
to Continuing Appointment. Plaintiff said
"Yes. That is my hopes." Plaintiff’s
answer was based on Continuing Appointment
if the Nursing Department was Viable and
not closing (George Sutton told Plaintiff
on Jimne 20, 1988 that the Nursing
Depar tment eas closing, to coerce
plaintiff into the Consent Award) and if
the faculty-student ratio in the Computer
Education Departmert that Plaintiff was on
loans was good. There was an opening.A-10.
The Consent Award failed to Pass the
ADEA of 1967 criteria for a legal ADEA
waiver from employment. The ADEA criteria
are: 1. the ADEA waiver may not include
rights and claims that arise after the date
the waiver is signed. Item #5 gives
plaintiff rights to Blue Cross Blue Shield
primary Hospital insurance and Ma jor
Medical secondary insurance September 1,
1990. 2. in an ADEA waiver, the emp loyee
mast be advised, in writing, to consult
with an attorney Prior to signing’ the
agreement. This never happened. Plaintiff
was never advised, in writing or otherwise,
to consult an attorney and plaintiff never
Signed the Consent Award. 3. in an ADEA
waiver, the employee must be Given at
least twenty-one (21) deys to consider the
agreement before signing it. This never
happened. Plaintiff was not Qiven the
Consent Award to review until about three
(3) months later in September 1988, after
many requests to Ms. Litzky (NYSUT).
Clearly, Plaintiff never signed at.
Arbitrator Eisenberg signed it dated June
24, 1988, not plaintiff. Plaintiff was
not at any meeting on June 24, 1988.
Plaintiff was not given the Consent Award
to review before it was issued. GS. in an
ADEA waiver the employee must be able to
revoke the agreement within seven (7) days
of signing the agreement. Plaintiff never
24
Signed the Consent Award and never received
the final written form from Ms.Litzky until
September 1988, protested it and never
agreed with the final written form.
According to the ADEA criteria for an ADEA
leyal waiver, the conditional Consent Award
dated June 24, 1988 failed to pass all four
(4) of the ADEA criteria. (AARP-The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act
Guarantees You Certain Rights,Pp.10-11).
Piaintiff could not have known or
predicted LIU would vivulate Federal laws
and New York General Obligation law in
September 1990 by unlawful practice of
non-compliance of items #5 and #11 of the
Consent Award. This did happen.
Arbitrator Fisenberg did not know or
predict LIU would unlawfully not comply to
the Consent Award in September 1990 when he
Signed the Consent Award dated June 24,
1988. Arbitrator Eisenberg was a member of
the Amer ican Arbitrators Association
("AAA"). He was bound by the AAA rules and
regulations and plaintiff believes a person
with integrity. Unfortunately, he trusted
the LIU law team and the CW Post Collegial
Federation to comply and perform eleven
(11) items of the Consent Award dated June
24. 1988, in September 1990 or he could not
have signed the Consent Award. The
Arbitrator and plaintiff did not know that
LIU would not comply. The limitation
periods are subject to equitable tolling
and estoppel. Dillmann v. Engineering,
Inc.» 7A4 F.2d. S?7 (2nd Cir.1986).
The Court Below overlooked testimonial
evidence in the Consent Award Hearing July
8 and 99, 1996 as follows: Ms. Litzky
(NYSUT) testified and admits knowing that
pDiaintiff did not receive medical
insurance September 1990. Plaintiff did
not know until Liu refused medical
insurance September 1990. Then Ms.
Litzky admits to no Blue Cross-Blue Shield
25
(Primary Hospital Insurance). Plaintiff
could not enforce it. But, Item #5 of the
Consent Award states Blue Cross-Blue Shield
and Major Medical. This is fraud by LIU.
Ms. Litzky admits to fraud and breach.
But, there is Blue Cross Blue Shield only
if currently employed. Medical coverage
went from $250,000 to $1 million i1988-
81991 . Then Ms. Litzky admits to putting
the word “retires” in item 5S of the
Consent Award without plaintiff’s
authority. Ms. Litzky admits that
Plaintiff objected to the word "retires”.
A-11, A-12. A-13- A-14%. Ms. Litzky states
in her letter that LIU told her that LIU
would not agree to guarantee anymore than
two (2) years of employment. LIU did not
tell plaintiff that. But whether it was
two (2) or three (3) years, George Sutton
and Ms. Litzky both knew that plaintiff
would not be at LIU for ten years in
September 1990 as stated in item #5 of the
Consent Award. Plaintiff was at LIU only
Bight (8) years. on September is 1990.
This is fraud in item #5.
George Sutton testified July 9, 1996
ani admits to plaintiff objecting to the
word "retires". LIU refused Arbitration
to clarify, item #11. (A-18, A-6). He
continues in his letter, the theme of
Arbitration to settle disputes. LIU
refused Arbitration. (A-15: Richard
Rapport’s, Esq. letters to David Steinberg
(President LIU. defendant, August 1990 and
September 1990). He refused to answer and
Lith refused arbitration. The National
Labour Relations Board ("NLRB") understood
by plaintiff’s letter, September 21, 1990,
the medical issues unresolved. A-i6. The
NiRB related that the Union was willing to
go to Arbitration to clarify. But, LIU
backed-out. (A-1i2: letter to James Gaspari
(NYSUT) dated August 15, 1990). George
Sutton states inhis affidavit February 24,
26
it Soa NAO On mia tint ASIP 5
a
é
x
1995 that plaintiff was at negotiating
meetings with Ralph Knopf (CWPCF), Ms.
Litzky and him. They shuttled back and
forth to plaintiff. He belies. Then
George Sutton changes and reverses his
affidavit in his testimony and admits that
plaintiff was rot there and gives Ms.
Liteky authority. Then he admits
negotiating on the telephone with Ms.
Litzky then he admits that he can’t recall
meetings. Ms. Litzky testifies that she
would not do anything without Ralph Knopf.
But, Ralph Knopf told plaintiff that the
Consent Award was fraud and Ms. Litzky did
not know. These are three (3) conflicting
testimonies and affidavits. A-17, A-18.
George Sutton testified that plaintiff
had to sign that plaintiff had retired from
LIU) September 1, 1990 to get Biue Cross
Blue Shield (Primary Hospital Insurance)
and Major Medical (Secondary Insurance).
He belies. THAT IS FRAUD and the Court
agreed with him. (item #5 Consent Award).
A-5.A-18. Plaintiff was not a "Retiree" of
LIU September 1, 1990. They knew that. Ms.
Litzky testified and admits LIU would not
use the Consent Award against plaintiff.
But LIU did September 1, 1990, plaintiff
was "fired" September 1, 1990 in reckless
disreygard of the ADEA of 1967. Liv
breached the Consent Award and defrauded
plaintiff and refused Arbitration September
1990. (Cost to plaintiff $530,000). A-11.
George Sutton testified and stated in
his affidavit April 25, 1995 that LIU knew
plaintiff would continue to grieve year
after year so LIU contrived the Consent
Award dated June 24, 1986. A-11. LIU knew
plaintiff was not retiring. This was LIU’s
scheme to get rid of a senior, oldest
nursing faculty member (all of five (5)) in
the CW Post Nursing Department in 1990.
George Sutton testified that the CW Post
Nursing Department was still in trouble.
27
He continues his coercive theme as in the
June 20, 1988 Consent Award meeting with
Arbitrator. He belies. It ais public
information the Nursing Department has two
(2) Masters Nurse programs and
Baccaluareate programs in Brunrkville and
Southhampton, LIU. Walter Jones states in
a LIU publication that he had openings for
one hundred-fifty (150) faculty positions
at that time. Letters to plaintiff from
LIU relate that LIU is in great financial
state at this time and expanding areas.
Ms. Litzky testified that LIU would not
precinude plaintiff from a job September i,
1990. But in the meeting June 20, 1988 for
the Consent Award, she used the word
“opening” in September 1, 1990, omitted in
the Consent Award. item #1. However, LIU
refused plaintiff a job and there was an
opening. (Disparate treatment). A-11,A-11.
tiU got Federal grants worth millions of
dollars. The Health Sciences got $80,000
for Gerontology - study of the aged. But
refused plaintiff a senior a jub September
i, 1990. (Disparate treatment).
George Sutton testified and admits he
would like to rewrite the Consent Award.
He contimies his theme of clarification but
refused Arbitration to settle the material
factors of the Consent Award. A-18. A-8.
An alternative argument then is the
United States Supreme Court must order LIU
to comply and give plaintiff the Awards of
the Consent Award that are rightfully and
legally owed to plaintiff by Arbitrator
Eisenberg’s signature on the Consent Award
dated June 24, 1988. Awards of personal
claims and rights that plaintiff had looked
forward to with joy on September 1, 1990
but LIU refused. Plaintiff was unable to
enforce the Consent Award, September 1990.
Since the Court Below has lawfully enforced
items #1 and #7 of the Consent Award dated
June 24, 1988 retroactively in the Summary
28
Order and affirmed the Court of first
instance’s Decision dated July Fs» i996 then
the Court Below has automatically lawfully
enforced retroactively the remaining awards
of plaintiff in the Consent Awara. The
Court can not deny plaintiff personal
rights and equality of rights. Plaintiff
is entitled to item #5 Blue Cross Blue
Shield primary hospital insurance and Major
Medical worth $i million for plaintiff’s
life-time.
LIU owes plaintiff $16,700 cost to
piaintiff for Biue Cross Blue Shield
prima: vy hospital Insurance premiums
retroactive to January 1998 plus future
premium payments of medical coveraae.
Plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed for
personat belonaings that LIU stripped
plaintiff’s office of and never returned
worth $500.00 or LIU should return them to
plaintiff. LIU owes plaintiff %7,.800
unemployment insurance for 26 weeks because
accordina to the Consent Award,» plaintiff
was LIU’s retiree and plaintiff was not.
(see item #5). The Consent Award, item #4
pension agreement should be $4386.00 more.
fhe total cost to plaintiff is about
$30,000 excluding salary. life insurance
amd personal damages: to teaching careers
economic duress and health.
For all the foregoing reasons» it 1s
respectfully submitted that this Petition
For @ Writ Of Certiorari should be granted.
Respectfully Submitted Doris Maher pro se
Da tTabtay 3/95€ Siqned: Abra dL fae. de
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.