Amicus Curiae Brief — NACCO Industries, Inc. v. Tracy
Supreme Court brief1998
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No. 97-868 Oy
Jn the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
NACCO INpbusTRIES, INC., PETITIONER
v.
ROGER W. Tracy, On1I0 TAX COMMISSIONER
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LORETTA C. ARGRETT
Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
KENT L. JONES
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
ERNEST J. BROWN
DAVID ENGLISH CARMACK
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Ohio impermissibly discriminates against
holders of federal obligations by requiring gains from
the sales of United States bonds to be included in
state taxable income while excluding from tax gains
from sales of Ohio state and local bonds.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Interest of the United States ..............cccccsccssecseseesseeeees l
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund,
So ene ME A IE wins tasdsiniatevvasvpeideintakinnienenscieiinceeie 5
Doneski v. Comptroller, 605 A.2d 649 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054
FE cichccaibissatticteyssenspcerditetuasanhthnmcaaventicnapieeninnqeiucsineiress ll
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S.
ST a sccdiliniattibiinbcbiaaicennetidniiintnidevvivnieiaseevententas 6, 7
Moses Lake Homes, Inc. v. Grant County,
Be As PIN EED shtssecascsovineswesnercnndbestseserneseoseseces 6
Nebraska Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein, 513
es BE IED dicctb te cebinsansebuitldnntninoncedsenssdutveideasrens 8
New Jersey Realty Title Ins. Co. v. Division of
Tax Appeals, 338 U.S. 665 (1950) .............cseeeeeeeee 6
Phillips Chem. Co. v. Dumas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
SE rs EEE CRIED i dicincnccnseescenctsnsancesovicsecasnseeseviwons 7
Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue,
Be re tt CED Sc ccctetntniensecensexsecnnennbeeevensndsngene 8
Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U.S. 113
III cl iia nin ca das baanaatesdninadbentninbnenbenewnsinsniones 6
Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931) ................... 7
Constitution and statutes:
U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause) ........ 5
Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C.):
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(II)
IV
Statutes—Continued: Page
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Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.04(1)(6) (Anderson
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Jn the Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1997
NACCO INbusTRIES, INC., PETITIONER
Vv.
ROGER W. TRACY, OHIO TAX COMMISSIONER
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE SUPPORTING PETITIONER
INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
Substantial amounts of United States bonds are
owned by taxpayers who reside in Ohio and who are
subject to the tax laws of that State. In this case, the
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a state
tax on gains realized from sales of United States
bonds even though the tax is not imposed on gains
realized from sales of Ohio state and local bonds. This
discrimination in treatment between holders of fed-
eral obligations and holders of state obligations vio-
lates the intergovernmental immunity doctrine of the
Constitution. The United States markets its secu-
rities throughout the Nation and has an important
interest in assuring that the holders of its obligations
are not subject to discriminatory state taxation.
(1)
STATEMENT
1. In 1982, petitioner paid $6,100,003 to purchase a
fifteen-year U.S. Treasury Bond with a principal
amount of $8,000,000 (Pet. App. la). Because this bond
was backed by the full faith and credit of the United
States government, petitioner was certain to realize a
gain of $1,899,997 if the bond were held to maturity.’
Petitioner could have incurred a loss from ownership
of the bond only if interest rates increased after the
date the bond was acquired and the bond was sold
before it reached maturity.
Petitioner sold the bond in 1989 for $7,694,071. The
sales proceeds included (i) a return of petitioner’s in-
vestment of $6,100,003, (ii) accrued but unpaid interest
on the bond in the amount of $126,575 and (iii) a real-
ized gain from ownership of the bond in the amount of
$1,467,493 (Pet. App. 1a).
2. Ohio imposes a corporate franchise tax that is
computed on both a net worth and net income basis.
Corporations are to pay “whichever produces the
' The discount that petitioner paid from the face value of
the bond was not “original issue discount” of the type that is
treated as imputed interest income under the Internal Revenue
Code. See 26 U.S.C. 1271-1275. The discount instead resulted
from the operation of ordinary economic principles on the fact
that market interest rates increased between the time that the
bond was first issued and the time that it was purchased by
petitioner. The difference between the purchase price of the
bond and the price at which it was sold would therefore ordi-
narily be treated as a capital gain under the Internal Revenue
Code. See 26 U.S.C. 1001(a). The fact that the gain was cer-
tain to occur if the bond had been held to maturity, however,
makes the enhanced value obtainable from holding the bond to
maturity analogous to additional interest payments on the
bond.
3
greater tax” (Pet. App. 2a). In calculating the tax due
on the net income basis, “[t]he initial base * * * is
federal taxable income” (ibid.). From that initial
base, corporations are permitted to “[aldd any loss or
deduct any gain resulting from the sale, exchange, or
other disposition” of Ohio state and local bonds (ibid.,
quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5733.04(1)(6) (Anderson
1996)). Ohio law does not, however, permit a similar
adjustment for the gains included in federal taxable
income that are attributable to the sale, exchange or
other disposition of United States bonds. As the Ohio
Supreme Court recognized in this case, the result is
that the “gain from the sale of an Ohio obligation is
exempt from the Ohio franchise tax, while gain from
the sale of a federal obligation is not” (Pet. App. 2a).
3. In reporting taxable income on its Ohio return
for 1990, petitioner did not include the $1,467,493 gain
that it realized that year from the sale of the federal
bond. Petitioner asserted that tie state tax statute
violated the constitutional intergovernmental immu-
nity doctrine, and 31 U.S.C. 3124(a), by discrimina-
torily imposing a tax on the gain from the sale of
federal bonds while exempting from tax any similar
gain on state bonds.* The Tax Commissioner of Ohio
2 31 U.S.C. 3124(a) provides that:
Stocks and obligations of the United States Government
are exempt from taxation by a State or political subdivision
of a State. The exemption applies to each form of taxation
that would require the obligation, the interest on the
obligation, or both, to be considered in computing a tax,
except—
(1) a nondiscriminatory franchise tax or another non-
property tax instead of a franchise tax, imposed on a
corporation; and
4
rejected petitioner’s claim. The Ohio Board of Tax
Appeals affirmed, noting that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider any constitutional objections to the state tax
(Pet. App. 12a-20a).
4. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed (Pet. App. la-
lla). The court first rejected the contention that the
state tax violates 31 U.S.C. 3124(a). That statute gen-
erally prohibits state taxation “that would require
the [federal] obligation, the interest on the [federal]
obligation, or both, to be considered in computing a
tax” (81 U.S.C. 3124(a)). The court concluded that
this statute does not apply to the Ohio tax because the
value of the federal bonds did not have to be considered
in computing the tax (Pet. App. 5a). The court
reasoned that the gain taxed by Ohio is determined by
comparing the purchase and sale prices of petitioner’s
private transactions, not by considering the “obliga-
tion” of the United States under the bonds (ibid.).
In concluding that 31 U.S.C. 3124(a) is inapplicable
to the challenged state tax, the court also relied
on the difference in the language of that statute and
31 U.S.C. 3124(b). The court noted that 31 U.S.C.
3124(a)—which precludes various types of state taxa-
tion of federal obligations—makes no explicit refer-
ence to gains from transactions in federal obligations;
by contrast, 31 U.S.C. 3124(b)—which provides for
federal taxation of federal obligations—contains an
explicit reference to gains from transactions in such
obligations. The court reasoned that Congress acted
“intentionally and purposely” by including the refer-
ence to gains from such transactions in one subsec-
tion while omitting it in the other (Pet. App. 4a,
(2) an estate or inheritance tax.
5
quoting City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense
Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 388 (1994)). The court concluded
that, if Congress had “intended Section 3124(a)
immunity to extend to gains from the sale of federal
obligations, it would have expressed that intent in the
statute” (Pet. App. 5a).
The Ohio Supreme Court further held that the Ohio
statute does not unconstitutionally discriminate
against the holders of federal obligations (Pet. App.
6a-lla). The court stated that a state tax that dis-
criminates against the holders of federal obligations
does not violate the Supremacy Clause if Congress
has authorized the discrimination (Pet. App. 9a). The
court held that by expressly precluding the States
from imposing taxes on the principal or interest
received from federal bonds under 31 U.S.C. 3124(a)—
and not expressly precluding state taxation of gains
realized from the sales of such bonds—Congress im-
plicitly authorized the States to discriminate in their
tax treatment of the latter (Pet. App. 9a).
The court further held that, even if it “must con-
sider whether the tax is discriminatory,” the Ohio
tax would be valid (Pet. App. 9a). The court noted that
an expert witness had testified at trial that “exclu-
sion of gain from the sale of state obligations but not
federal obligations would place federal obligations at
a disadvantage in the market” (id. at 10a). The court
stated, however, that the Ohio statute (by incorporat-
ing federal taxable income) permits losses, as well as
gains, from sales of federal bonds to be considered in
computing the state tax (ibid.). The court stressed
that the expert witness had not expressed “an opinion
on the relative marketability of the obligations when
accounting for both gains and losses from the sale of
federal obligations but not on state obligations”
6
(ibid.). The court stated that it was therefore “mere
conjecture or speculation” whether Ohio’s discrimi-
natory treatment of holders of federal obligations
affected “the relative marketability” of federal bonds
(:bid.). The court held that such “speculation” could
not support a conclusion that the Ohio statute
violates the Constitution (id. at 11a).
ARGUMENT
1. The Ohio franchise tax unconstitutionally dis-
criminates against the holders of federal obligations.*
“A state tax that imposes a greater burden on holders
of federal property than on holders of similar state
property impermissibly discriminates against federal
obligations.” Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner,
459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983). See also Moses Lake Homes,
Inc. v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961); Schuylkill
Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 U.S. 113 (1935). By
3 The existence of “discrimination” in the state tax scheme
is a required element for both the constitutional and statutory
theories urged by petitioner. A state tax that falls within the
scope of 31 U.S.C. 3124(a) is not invalid if it is “a nondis-
criminatory franchise tax * * * imposed on a corporation”
(ibid.). In cases in which the statutory and constitutional prohi-
bitions both turn on the existence of discrimination, this Court
has focussed on the extensive constitutional precedent that
elaborates the nondiscrimination requirement. See, e.g., Mem-
phis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 397 (1983);
New Jersey Reaity Title Ins. Co. v. Division of Tax Appeals,
338 U.S. 665, 672 (1950). The Court’s decisions “have treated
{the statute] as principally a restatement of the constitutional
rule.” Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. at 397.
We therefore address only the constitutional issue in this brief.
4 “(T}t still remains true, as it has from the time of
M’Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, that a state tax may not
discriminate against the Government or those with whom it
NE ee eee ee Rae Re Te ES REE Sige Re a
7
taxing gains realized from sales of federal obligations
but exempting similar gains realized from sales of
state obligations, the Ohio tax “imposes a greater
burden on holders of federal property than on holders
of similar state property” and thus “impermissibly
discriminates” against federal obligations (Memphis
Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. at 397).
a. The Ohio Supreme Court erred in concluding
that, to establish the existence of discriminatory
state taxation, the taxpayer has the burden of show-
ing that the tax actually hinders the marketing of
federal securities (Pet. App. 10a). The decisions of
this Court do not support that proposition.
The Ohio Supreme Court noted that, in Willcuwts v.
Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931), this Court stated that a
tax on gains from the sale of government bonds does
not necessarily disadvantage the marketing of such
bonds if “there is also a deduction for losses on sales”
(Pet. App. 8a, quoting 282 U.S. at 231). In upholding
application of the federal income tax to gains realized
from sales of state bonds in Willcuts, the Court
rejected the assertion that such a tax unconstitution-
ally interfered with “a function of government” (Pet.
App. lla). The Court emphasized, however, that
the federal tax involved in Willcuts was “non-
discriminatory” because it applied equally to gains
from sales of federal and state bonds. 282 U.S. at 227.
In upholding such nondiscriminatory taxation, the
Court did not suggest in Willcuts that the victims of
discriminatory taxation would be required to estab-
lish that the tax adversely “affects a function of
deals.” Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas Independent School
District, 361 U.S. 376, 387 (1960).
8
government” (Pet. App. lla), as the court erroneously
held in this case.°
The Ohio Supreme Court also erred in relying (Pet.
App. 10a) on Rockford Life Insurance Co. v. Illinois
Department of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182 (1987). In that
case, this Court upheld application of a nondiscrimi-
natory state property tax to bonds that were issued
by private institutions and guaranteed by the United
States. The Court stated that the possibility that the
United States would have to honor its guarantee was
too speculative to warrant the conclusion that such
bonds were “obligations” of the United States to
which constitutional immunity attaches. /d. at 190.
That holding does not support the conclusion of the
court below that the evidence in this case is insuffi-
cient “speculation” (Pet. App. 10a) to support a find-
ing of discrimination.
b. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court acknowledged
that the evidence in this case establishes that the
state tax on gains realized on federal bonds, and its
®° The question whether a state tax “discriminates against
federal obligations” (Nebraska Dep't of Revenue v. Loewenstein,
513 U.S. 123, 135 (1994)) is separate from the question whether
the state tax violates “the intergovernmental tax immunity
doctrine” by “taxing federal obligations in a manner which has
an adverse effect on the United States’ borrowing ability” (id.
at 136). In Loewenstein, the Court rejected a claim of discrimi-
nation because the State treated income derived from state and
local obligations no differently than it treated income derived
from federal obligations. Jd. at 135-136. The Court then re-
jected the further claim that the state tax unconstitutionally
interfered with “the borrowing power” of the United States
because there was “no evidence in the record that the taxation
at issue will impair the market in federal securities or other-
wise impair the borrowing ability of the Federal Government.”
Id. at 137.
9
exemption for gains realized on state bonds, discrimi-
nates against holders of federal bonds (Pet. App. 10a).
Nothing about that evidence involves “mere conjec-
ture or speculation” (ibid.). What is merely “conjec-
ture or speculation,” however, is the state court’s
suggestion that a compensating benefit to the holders
of federal bonds might occur because state law per-
mits losses on sales of federal bonds to be recognized
under the state tax but does not allow losses on sales
of state bonds to be so recognized.
In the first place, there is no authority for the
court’s proposition that an established discrimination
against a holder of federal property may be permitted
because of the speculative possibility that a compen-
sating advantage might exist elsewhere in the state
tax scheme in some other year or for some other
holder of federal property. Such an unmanageable
proposition has never been adopted by this Court.
Indeed, as petitioner notes (Pet. 19-20), similar propo-
sitions have been rejected by the Court in analogous
constitutional contexts involving state taxation.
Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court erred in assum-
ing that a state taxpayer would, by incorporating
federal taxable income under the state statute, obtain
a compensating advantage from any “losses” realized
from sales of federal bonds. Net losses from the sales
of government bonds would not be a component of
federal taxable income for corporate taxpayers be-
cause the Internal Revenue Code specifies that, “[{i]n
the case of a corporation, losses from sales or ex-
changes of capital assets shall be allowed only to the
extent of gains from such sales or exchanges” (26
10
U.S.C. 1211(a)).© The concept of federal taxable in-
come that is incorporated for state tax purposes
under Ohio law thus may include a net gain from
transactions in capital assets but, under 26 U.S.C.
1211(a), it will not include a net loss. The Ohio Su-
preme Court thus erred in concluding that a taxpayer
would, by incorporating federal taxable income under
the state statute, obtain an advantage from net losses
that could offset the disadvantage incurred by dis-
criminatory state taxation of net gains on the sales of
federal bonds.
Both for corporate and individual taxpayers (see
note 6, supra), the state tax discriminates directly
against the holders of federal bonds by requiring
inclusion of gains on sales of federal bonds while
excluding gains on state bonds. There is no compen-
sating advantage “when accounting for both gains and
losses” (Pet. App. 10a). Even if it were conceptually
possible for a State to justify discriminatory treat-
ment of federal obligations by some compensating
advantage otherwise provided under state law—a
conclusion that this Court has never reached—the
State has not sustained its burden of doing so on the
record of this case.’
6 Losses from such transactions for corporations may be
carried back three years and carried forward five years to be
offset against gains in other periods. 26 U.S.C. 1212(a). A net
loss is not reflected in federal taxable income, however, for any
period. By contrast, individuals may report a net loss from
such transactions, but only up to the amount of $3000 in any
year. 26 U.S.C. 1211(b).
7 For the reasons summarized by petitioner (Pet. 14-15), the
Ohio Supreme Court plainly erred in suggesting (Pet. App. 9a)
that, in enacting 31 U.S.C. 3124(a), Congress implicitly author-
11
2. The decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in this
case is of broad recurring importance. Other States
either have imposed, or could impose, similar tax
schemes that advantage their own obligations by
disadvantaging those of the United States. See Pet.
20. In holding a similar state tax provision uncon-
stitutional, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals
recognized that taxing gains from federal obligations
while exempting gains from state obligations “dimin-
ish[es] the investment attractiveness of the United
States obligations in favor of state obligations.”
Doneski v. Comptroller, 605 A.2d 649, 653 (1992), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 1054 (1993). A state tax that dis-
criminates against the holders of federal bonds
interferes with the extraordinarily important federal
function of marketing trillions of dollars of United
States obligations. Review by this Court is war-
ranted to ensure that States are not permitted to
favor their own obligations by discriminating against
those of the National government.
ized discriminatory state taxation of gains from sales of federal
securities.
12
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
LORETTA C. ARGRETT
Assistant Attorney General
LAWRENCE G. WALLACE
Deputy Solicitor General
KENT L. JONES
Assistant to the Solicitor
General
ERNEST J. BROWN
DAVID ENGLISH CARMACK
Attorneys
DECEMBER 1997
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