Opposition Brief — Jones v. Bates

No. 97-472

&..

4

In the =

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1997

Lo

vv

Bill Jones, Secretary of State of California,

Petitioner,

V.

Tom Bates, et al.,

Respondents.

in

vv

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

or Writs of Prohibition and Mandamus

to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

sé

.

BRIEF OF PETER F. SCHABARUM

AND LEWIS K. UHLER IN SUPPORT OF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OR WRITS OF PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS

*ANTHONY T. CASO

SHARON L. BROWNE

DEBORAH J. LA FETRA

*Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation

2151 River Plaza Drive,

Suite 305

Sacramento, California 95833

Telephone: (916) 641-8888

Attorneys for Peter F.

Schabarum and Lewis K. Uhler

a

ha ee

ae

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Under our federal system, are states free to reform

their governments by limiting the number of terms an elected

official may hold office?

2. May a federal Circuit Court of Appeals exercise

appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of a state court of

last resort?

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED. .........-...... iil

ye Oe es ee ee ere ]

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............ 6

I. THE VALIDITY OF TERM LIMITS

UNDER THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH

AMENDMENTS WILL AFFECT TERM

LIMIT PROVISIONS IN AT LEAST 40

STATES AND IN THOUSANDS OF

LOCAL GOVERIGIUED ................... 6

II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S INVITATION

TO INTERVENE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED

BY 46 INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING

PARTIES BOUND BY THE CALIFORNIA

SUPREME COURT’S JUDGMENT IN

PUP akg hobo ba-n dg ss oh eee 10

(EEE oo bi ncn cus eed pee iu neeeee ae eee 1]

iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Page

Cases

ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605

eA i ooo aes ace oes 6,11

Cawdrey v. Redondo Beach, 15 Cal. App.

Co. a ee 9

Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654

I ee ee le ek Sa rans 7

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) ................. 6,11

Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F.

Me eee GO OE, Oe. 9

League of Women Voters v. Diamond,

923 F. Supp. 266 (D. Me.), aff'd per

curiam, 82 F.3d 546 (Ist Cir. 1996) ............... 8

League of Women Voters v. Secretary of

State, 683 A.2d 769 (Me. 1996) .................. 8

Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991),

cert. denied, 503 U.S. 919 (1992) ........... 4-7,10-11

Lowe v. Kansas City Board of Election

Commissioners, 752 F. Supp. 897 (W.D.

IEE as CSE il a a 9

iV

Maddox v. Fortson, 226 Ga. 71, 172 S.E.

595, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 149 (1970) ............. 8.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361

Ps ok es Ce aac os cis wr es 7

Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F.

Supp. 816 (S.D. Ohio 1993), affd,

QS F3G Ree GE, BD we eke eb. 9

es a RR re ar gene mene

Nevada Judges Association v. Lau,

112 Nev. 51, 910 P.2d 898 (Nev. 1996) ............ 8

New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392

eR ST AGEN Serer ee eee 9 7

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413

GE ke eee vee es ty ny Shas oe 6,11

Roth v. Cuevas, 82 N. Y.2d 791,

624 N.E.2d 689, 604 N.Y.S.2d 551

(N.Y. 1993), aff g and adopting opinion

in 158 Misc. 2d 238, 603 N.Y.S.2d 962

‘8 Re eS Pee ee 9

State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney,

223 S.E.2d 607 (W.Va. 1976), appeal

dismissed for want of substantial federal

question sub nom. Moore v. McCartney,

GRP UIte. DP COP is 8a ie is sf bck 8

U.S. Term Limits v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349

Ss Hs 6d Fork ic ek cae ee wees 8

Vv

Page

U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779,

SUP Wh ey CPI gnc skp chee doi cece chee 8

United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683

cig CCE RR pe BEIGE reper dng iy i Ct ine asa Ob arid 7

United States v. United Mine Workers of

Amenca, 330 U.S. 256(1947) ................... 7

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,

PAP PON shes Boek ee eee civ Ee. 7

Statute

OE re eee eee eee 6,11

United States Constitution

PUL ot ee oes 4,7-8

Fourteenth Amendment ........................ 4-5.8

California Constitution

aC ca carer cup ee ae tee 2

MTOR hiss sca st akceee rh eeet OC one 2

as ks oe foe ee ee ee 2

Page

Rules

| a re rane ars l

gs eee ee 12

I ee ES oe irae MOE a a 6a 6K l

Miscellaneous

Associated Press, Text of Robbins’ Letter

of Resignation from Senate, L.A. Times,

cat ua Wow ek e440 ok Aso 0 3

Fagre, Microcosm of the Movement: Local

Term Limits in the United States,

4 Term Limits Outlook Series (U.S.

Term Limits Foundation) 1 (1995) ................ 9

]

Peter F. Schabarum and Lewis K. Uhler, nominally

respondents pursuant to this Court’s Rule 12.6, submit this brief

in support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari or Writs of

Prohibition and Mandamus, filed by California Secretary of

State Bill Jones. Schabarum and Uhler, the official proponents

of the California Term Limits initiative under attack in this

case, were granted intervention as defendants pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Along with petitioner

Jones, they participated as full parties defending the

constitutionality of the initiative in both the District Court and

the Court of Appeals.

Although this case concerns the constitutionality of a

provision of the California Constitution, the impact of this case

goes far beyond the boundaries of California, implicating the

validity of the thousands of term limit laws applicable to state

officers, state legislators, and local officeholders nationwide.

Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s invitation to plaintiffs to

round up legislators and voters--including parties to the

previous California Supreme Court litigation upholding the

constitutional validity of Proposition 140--has now resulted in

applications for intervention by 20 legislators and 24 voters

arguing the unconstitutionality of term limits, and 1 legislator

and a term limits organization seeking to defend term limits.

The Ninth Circuit’s apparent intention to permit the addition of

these 46 parties to the lawsuit after oral argument on appeal is

beyond the lower court’s jurisdiction.

For the reasons set forth below, the petition for writ of

certiorari should be granted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Against the backdrop of an entrenched politician class

and attendant political corruption, the people of California

approved Proposition 140 on November 6, 1990, amending the

California Constitution. The initiative implements structural

reforms to state government, particularly the state Legislature,

mandating a cut in the Legislature’s budget, terminating the

legislative pension plan, and imposing term limits. It limits the

terms of members of the Assembly to three two-year terms and

members of the Senate to two four-year terms. Cal. Const.

Art. IV, § 2.)

These reforms were not enacted in a vacuum. For the two

decades prior to the passage of Proposition 140, incumbency

2

had acted as a virtual guarantor for reelection:

Election Years

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

% of Assembly

Incumbents

Reelected

94.1

91.6

90.6

87.5

89.7

93.2

98.7

100.0

94.8

93.1

96.2

88.0

% of Senate

Incumbents

Reelected

100.0

84.2

81.8

78.7

94.1

80.0

94.4

100.0

100.0

94.4

100.0

87.5

1

Statewide officers similarly are limited to two four-year

terms, Art. V, § 2 (governor), § 11 (other statewide offices), as

are members of the State Board of Equalization, Art. XIII, § 17.

3

Clerk’s Record (CR) 130 (Def. Exh. 69), Table 5. The state

Legislature was also the scene of scandal. In the 1980s the

Federal Bureau of Investigation had conducted a wide-ranging

sting operation designed to net corrupt California state

politicians. The sting operation, nicknamed “Shrimpscam” for

the bogus special interest bill to finance a shrimp-processing

plant that was the focus of vote-selling, revealed a corruption

endemic in the state Legislature. Former Senator Alan

Robbins, a 19-year veteran of the Legislature, resigned on

November 19, 1991, after three years of investigations. In his

letter of resignation, Robbins made the connection between his

longtime service in a powerful position and his ultimate

downfall:

Over a period of years, as I drank the heady

wine of power and influence, my priorities

in office became distorted. Success and

recognition were foremost; honesty and

adherence to the law were not at the center of

ny focus. Like some others before me, I placed

undue emphasis on raising funds, on achieving

political status and on impressing my friends.

Associated Press, Text of Robbins’ Letter of Resignation from

Senate, L.A. Times, Nov. 20, 1991, at A23. The Shrimpscam

scandal resulted in prison sentences for former Senators Joseph

Montoya, Alan Robbins, and Paul Carpenter and former

Assembly members Pat Nolan and Frank Hill. Reporter’s

Transcript (RT) at 3-403-04. In the wake of these scandals and

in an attempt to end perpetual incumbency, the people of the

State of California adopted Proposition 140.

Immediately after Proposition 140’s passage, the

Legislature and a group of legislators, voters, and others

petitioned the California Supreme Court to strike down the

reforms as unconstitutional. Exercising its original jurisdiction

4

over the writ proceeding, the California Supreme Court upheld

term limits on legislators and state officers as fully

constitutional under both the state and federal constitutions.

Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S.

919 (1992). The court also upheld the budget reduction and the

elimination of the pension plan (except to the extent it applied

to legislators first elected before 1990 who continued to serve

after 1990). This Court declined to review the California

court’s ruling. Legislature v. Eu, 503 U.S. 919.

Term limits thereafter became an integral part of

California’s political landscape. In 1994, David Roberti, the

former President Pro Tempore of the Senate, was the first

legislator to be termed out. RT at 2-362. Several others,

anticipating the ends of their political careers in a particular

house of the Legislature, voluntarily resigned from their seats

either to run for a different office, to continue to serve the

public in appointive office, to return to the private sector, or

simply to retire. CR 130.

Notwithstanding the judgment of the California

Supreme Court, Assemblyman Tom Bates and several of his

supporters launched a second court challenge to the measure on

July 20, 1995, by suing the Secretary of State, Bill Jones, and

Alameda County Registrar Bradley Clark in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of California. CR 1.

The District Court subsequently granted leave to intervene to

Peter F. Schabarum and Lewis K. Uhler, the official proponents

of Proposition 140. CR 66. Bates and his supporters asserted

two causes of action: first, the voters alleged that, under the

First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, they have a right to vote for whomever they

please, for as long as they please, and that this right is violated

by the term limits in the California Constitution. Bates asserted

the alleged corollary right to be a candidate in perpetuity.

Second, both groups alleged that term limits violate the Equal

5

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it

discriminates against termed-out incumbents and those voters

who would choose to support such termed-out incumbents.

CR 1.

Schabarum and Uhler, the initiative proponents, and

Jones, moved to dismiss the case on the grounds of res judicata

and on the merits of the case. CR 20, 31. The District Court

denied those motions. CR 66. Jones later moved for summary

judgment on res judicata grounds when it was discovered that

Bates had financially supported the Legislature v. Eu litigation.

CR 83. Bates filed a simultaneous motion to amend the

complaint to add Assemblywomen Barbara Friedman and

Martha Escutia and their supporters as plaintiffs and Conny

McCormack, Los Angeles County Registrar, as a nominal

defendant. CR 93. The District Court denied the motion for

summary judgment and granted the motion to amend on May 3,

1996. CR 103. The District Court conducted a bench trial from

October 15-24, 1997 (CR 127-131), and issued its Judgment

striking down California’s term limits on April 23, 1997.

CR 139. The court modified its findings on May 8, 1997, to

include some findings related to res judicata. CR 148.

The proceedings in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

from Bates’ initial notice of appeal to the extraordinary order

of September 2, 1997, inviting intervenors into the lawsuit are

fully described by petitioner Jones and will not be repeated

here.

6

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I

THE VALIDITY OF TERM LIMITS UNDER

THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS

WILL AFFECT TERM LIMIT PROVISIONS IN

AT LEAST 40 STATES AND IN THOUSANDS

OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

Without immediate action by this Court, California’s

1998 elections for state legislators will be in complete disarray.

The Ninth Circuit’s invitation to incumbents to intervene after

oral argument on appeal is unprecedented. Its obvious motive--

to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the

California Supreme Court in Legislature v. Eu--is an abuse of

federal judicial power that cannot be sanctioned. Only this

Court has such jurisdiction. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.

605, 622-23 (1989); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); 28 U.S.C. § 1257. The

Ninth Circuit’s determination to cut as wide as swath as

possible when it strikes down California’s term limits will have

devastating effects, not only in California, but throughout the

Ninth Circuit and the rest of the country. As shown below,

every state in the Ninth Circuit has term limits on some or all

of its state and local officials. A decision by the Ninth Circuit

striking down California’s term limits on First and Fourteenth

Amendment grounds will undoubtedly be followed by

incumbents filing lawsuits in every federal District Court in the

Western United States. The only way orderly 1998 elections

remain possible given the Ninth Circuit’s action is for this

Court of last resort to grant the petition for writ of certiorari

before judgment.

7

Certiorari before judgment, while unusual, is justified

in cases that present issues of national importance. See, e.g.,

United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U:S.

258, 268 (1947) (unilateral termination of union agreement and

illegal strike); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vy. Sawyer,

343 U.S. 579, 584 (1952) (seizure of steel companies); New

Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 418 (1970) (railroad

consolidation); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 690

(1974) (compelled production of presidential tapes); Dames &

Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660 (1981) (attachment of

Iranian assets after hostages taken); and Mistretta v. United

States, 488 U.S. 361, 362 (1989) (lower federal courts in

“disarray” applying sentencing guidelines). These cases share

the same fundamental, nationwide importance as the case at

bar. Just as this Court previously granted certiorari before

judgment in a case which “touch{[es] fundamentally upon the

ma([nnjer in which our Republic is to be governed,” Dames &

Moore, 453 U.S. at 659, this case presents issues that will

similarly impact the manner in which Americans in the vast

majority of states are governed.

In California, the immediate impact of a Ninth Circuit

ruling overturning term limits and ruling that parties to the

Legislature v. Eu case are no longer bound by the state

Supreme Court’s judgment, will be to throw the entire 1998

election cylce into chaos. Declarations of candidacy are due in

only four short months, and campaign organization is necessary

before a declaration of candidacy

The full impact of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, however,

will extend far beyond the 30 million Californians directly

impacted. Term limits are, quite simply, ubiquitous for state

executive Officers and legislatures. Every state in the Ninth

Circuit has term limits on state officials. And with the sole

exception of the District Court in this case, no state or local

term limits laws have ever been invalidated under the First and

8

Fourteenth Amendments. In addition to California, states with

term limits on state officials and legislators include Alabama,

Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas (upheld in U.S. Term Limits v. Hill,

872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994)),? Colorado, Delaware, Florida,

Georgia (upheld in Maddox v. Fortson, 226 Ga. 71, 172 S.E.

595, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 149 (1970)), Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana,

Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine (upheld in League of

Women Voters v. Diamond, 923 F. Supp. 266 (D. Me.), aff'd

per curiam, 82 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1996); League of Women

Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769 (Me. 1996)),

Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,

Nebraska, Nevada (upheld in Nevada Judges Association v.

Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 910 P.2d 898 (Nev. 1996)), New Jersey,

New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma,

Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South

Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington,’ West Virginia

(upheld in State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607

(W.Va. 1976), appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal

question sub nom. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976)),

and Wyoming.‘

First and Fourteenth Amendment challenges to term

limits would be identical regardless of the level of the limited

office. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s anticipated ruling striking

2 These term limits for state officers were not at issue in the

action before this Court, U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,

514 U.S. 779, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).

* Washington’s term limits are under attack in an original writ

proceeding in the Washington Supreme Court. Gerberding v. }

Munro, Washington Supreme Court Docket No. 65059-4.

* Identification of the particular state constitutional provisions

and statutes providing for consecutive or permanent term limits

is appended to this brief as Appendix A.

9

down term limits as a violation of the United States

Constitution places in jeopardy even term limits on city council

members and county supervisors across the country. From

Florida to Alaska, from New York to California, over 58

million Americans live in localities with limits of various sorts,

and more than 14,000 politicians serve in 2,791 term limited

cities, counties, and towns. Fagre, Microcosm of the

Movement: Local Term Limits in the United States, 4 Term

Limits Outlook Series (U.S. Term Limits Foundation) 1 (1995)

(numbers accurate as of July 17, 1995).

At least some local governments, including virtually all

major cities, in every state in the Ninth Circuit have term limits.

Id. at Appendix: City List, showing Alaska--12 cities with term

limits, including Anchorage; Arizona--4 cities, including

Phoenix; California--41 cities, including Los Angeles, San

Francisco, and San Diego; Hawaii--the City of Honolulu; Idaho

with a constitutional provision requiring term limits for all 199

incorporated cities and 53 counties; Montana--2 cities,

including Billings; Nevada with a constitutional provision

requiring limits in all 18 incorporated cities; Oregon--10 cities;

and Washington--4 cities, including Spokane and Tacoma.

Local term limits have uniformly survived challenges

based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g.,

Miyazawa v. City of Cincinnati, 825 F. Supp. 816, 822 (S.D.

Ohio 1993), aff'd, 45 F.3d 126 (6th Cir. 1995) (city council);

Lowe v. Kansas City Board of Election Commissioners, 752 F .

Supp. 897 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (city council); Roth v. Cuevas,

82 N.Y.2d 791, 624 N.E.2d 689, 604 N.Y.S.2d 551 (NY), aff’g

and adopting opinion in 158 Misc. 2d 238, 603 N.Y.S.2d 962

(N.Y. 1993) (New York City council); Cawdrey v. Redondo

Beach, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1212 (Calif. 1993) (city council); and

Dutmer v. City of San Antonio, 937 F. Supp. 587 (W.D. Tex.

1996) (city council).

10

Because the constitutional validity of term limits

impacts the governing structure of literally thousands of state

and local governments, this Court should grant Jones’ petition

for writ of certiorari to make a timely, final determination of

this issue.

I

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S

INVITATION TO INTERVENE

HAS BEEN ACCEPTED BY

46 INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING PARTIES

BOUND BY THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME

COURT’S JUDGMENT IN LEGISLATURE v. EU

In response to the Ninth Circuit’s unprecedented order

requesting legislators and voters to intervene after oral

argument on appeal (Order dated September 2, 1997), the

plaintiffs rounded up 20 legislators and 24 voters. A national

term limits organization and an incumbent legislator who

supports term limits also seek to intervene. Three of the

applicant-legislators (Bill Lockyer, Kenneth Maddy, and Diane

Watson) were named petitioners in Legislature v. Eu. Under

any rational interpretation of res judicata, these three

individuals would be bound by the California Supreme Court’s

decision. Four other applicant-legislators financially supported

Legislature v. Eu: Leroy Greene contributed $10,000; Henry

Mello contributed $10,000; Teresa Hughes contributed $1,500;

and Herschel Rosenthal contributed $10,000 with a notation on

the check reading: “Our share of court costs to fight Prop.

140.” Declaration of Ruth Fridhandler in Response to

Subpoena Duces Tecum, Exh. A, appended to Secretary of

State Bill Jones’ Motion for Summary Judgment, CR 83. The

fact of their substantial financial interest in the litigation, plus

the fact that each of them benefited from the California court’s

ruling on the pension issue, should place them all in privity

ee |

il

with the named parties in Legislature v. Eu. Each of these

legislators seeks a second bite at the apple, in violation of the

doctrine of res judicata.

Only this Court has authority to review judgments of

state courts of last resort. ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 622-23;

Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16;

28 U.S.C. § 1257. This Court specifically declined to exercise

its discretion to review the California court’s judgment in

Legislature v. Eu. 503 U.S. 919. Should the Ninth Circuit

allow intervention of parties who are bound by the judgment in

Legislature v. Eu, it will make a mockery of the limits on

appellate jurisdiction and threaten to rend the fabric of our

federal system of government. As the only court with the

jurisdiction to resolve the conflict over California’s term limits

in time for orderly 1998 elections, this Court should grant the

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

CONCLUSION

Using the necessarily blunt weapon of the citizen

initiative, the people of California sought to regain their

legislature from permanent incumbents and install a

government of citizen-legislators. The California Supreme

Court, when it upheld the constitutional validity of California’s

term limits, suggested that if the experiment does not work out

to the people’s satisfaction, they could always propose another

initiative to reverse course. Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d

at 512. In seven years, during which time the membership of

the entire California Assembly, and most of the membership of

the California Senate has been termed-out, there has been no

movement to amend the state constitution to eliminate term

limits. The only movement to alter the scope of term limits has

been by dethroned legislators and the federal courts below. The

people, however, seem quite content with the changes term

limits have wrought.

12

Rule 11 of the Supreme Court Rules contemplates early

action by this Court in the circumstances presented by this case:

the case is of such imperative public importance as to justify

deviation from normal appellate practice and it requires

immediate settlement in this Court. Only this Court can avoid

the impending conflict and dueling federal and state court

injunctions that are the certain consequence of the Ninth

Circuit’s actions. To stave off this potential constitutional

crisis, this Court should grant the writ before judgment to

resolve the extremely important issues presented.

DATED: September, 1997.

Respectfully submitted,

*ANTHONY T. CASO

SHARON L. BROWNE

DEBORAH J. LA FETRA

*Counsel of Record

Pacific Legal Foundation

2151 River Plaza Drive,

Suite 305

Sacramento, California 95833

Telephone: (916) 641-8888

Attorneys for Peter F. Schabarum

and Lewis K. Uhler

A-1

APPENDIX A

State Provisions Limiting Terms or Ballot

Access to Incumbents After a Set Period of

Terms or Years in a Particular Office

Alabama: Alabama Constitution Article V, § 116 (1901 &

Supp. 1993) (governor, lieutenant governor, attorney general,

state auditor, secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent

of education, commissioner of agriculture and industries cannot

succeed himself or herself).

Alaska: Alaska Constitution Article III, § 5 (1993) (governor

who served two consecutive terms may not run again until one

term has intervened).

Arizona: Arizona Constitution Article V, § 1 (1910 & Supp.

1993) (governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, attorney

general, and superintendent of public instruction cannot serve

more than two consecutive terms); Article IV, pt. 2, § 21 (no

state senator nor any state representative shall serve more than

four consecutive terms in one office).

Arkansas: Constitutional Amendment 73 (state senators

limited to two terms; state house members limited to three

terms). Term limits on state officials upheld in U.S. Term

Limits v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994).

California: California Constitution Article V, § 2 (1879 &

Supp. 1994) (governor cannot serve more than two terms);

Article V, § 11 (same for lieutenant governor, attorney general,

controller, secretary of state, state treasurer); Article IV, § 2

(state senators may serve no more than two terms,

assemblymembers may serve no more than three terms). Term

limits upheld in Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal. 3d 492 (1991), cert.

denied, 503 U.S. 919 (1992); struck down in Bates v. Jones,

A-2

___F. Supp. (N.D. Cal. 1995), appeal pending, Docket

Nos. 97-15864, 97-15914 (9th Cir.).

Colorado: Colorado Constitution Article IV, § 1 (1973 &

Supp. 1993) (governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state,

state treasurer, and attorney general cannot serve more than two

consecutive terms in the same office); Article V, § 3 (state

senators cannot serve more than two consecutive terms; state

representatives cannot serve more than four consecutive terms).

Delaware: Delaware Constitution Article III, § 5 (1897 &

Supp. 1992) (governor may not serve third term).

Florida: Florida Constitution Article IV, § 5 (1968 & Supp.

1994) (no person who served as governor for more than six

years in two consecutive terms shall be elected governor for the

succeeding term);° Article VI, § 4(b) (state representative, state

senator, lieutenant governor, and any officer in Florida cabinet

may serve no more than eight consecutive years).

Georgia: Georgia Constitution Article V, § 1, | 1 (1982 &

Supp. 1993) (governor and lieutenant governor can serve no

more than two consecutive terms). Term limits upheld in

Maddox v. Fortson, 226 Ga. 71, 172 S.E.2d 595, cert. denied,

397 U.S. 149 (1970).

Hawaii: Hawaii Constitution Article V, §§ 1, 2 (1985 & Supp.

1993) (governor and lieutenant governor can serve no more

than two consecutive terms).

> The 1885 and 1938 Florida constitutions limited the governor

to only one four-year term, although the governor could run |

again if one full term had intervened. Florida Constitution |

Article IV, § 5 (commentary) (1968 & Supp. 1994).

TT EF

A-3

Idaho: Idaho Stat. 34-907(1)(c)(d) (state officials and

legislators denied ballot access if they have served in same

office for 8 or more of previous 15 years).

Indiana: Indiana Constitution Article V, § 1 (1851 & Supp.

1994) (governor may not serve more than eight years in any

period of 12 years); Article VI, § 1 (same for secretary of state,

state auditor, state treasurer).

Kansas: Kansas Constitution Article I, § 1 (1859 & Supp.

1993) (no more than two successive terms as governor or

lieutenant governor).

Kentucky: Kentucky Constitution § 71 (1891 & Supp. 1992)

(governor ineligible for succeeding four years after expiration

of current term); § 82 (same for lieutenant governor); § 93

(same for treasurer, auditor of public accounts, secretary of

state, commissioner of agriculture, labor, and statistics, attorney

general, superintendent of public instruction, and register of the

land).

Louisiana: Louisiana Constitution Article 4, § 3(B) (1974 &

Supp. 1994) (governor cannot serve term following two

successive terms).

Maine: Maine Constitution Article V, § 3 (1983 & Supp.

1993) (governor cannot serve term following two consecutive

terms); 21-A M.R.S.A. § 553 (limits consecutive number of

te-ms for state senators, representatives, the secretary of state,

state treasurer, attorney general and state auditor). Term limits

upheld in League of Women Voters v. Diamond, 923 F. Supp.

266 (D. Me.), aff'd per curiam, 82 F.3d 546 (1st Cir. 1996);

League of Women Voters v. Secretary of State, 683 A.2d 769

(Me. 1996).

A-4

Maryland: Maryland Constitution Article II, § 1 (1867 &

Supp. 1993) (governor cannot serve term following two

consecutive terms).

Michigan: Michigan Constitution Article V, § 30 (1963 &

Supp. 1994) (no person shall be elected more than twice to

offices of governor lieutenant governor, secretary of state, or

attorney general); Article IV, § 54 (state representatives may

not serve more than three times; state senators may not serve

more than twice).

Mississippi: Mississippi Constitution Article V, § 116 (1890

& Supp. 1993) (governor cannot be his or her own immediate

successor); Article V, § 128 (same for lieutenant governor).

Missouri: Missouri Constitution Article IV, § 17 (1945 &

Supp. 1994) (no person shall be governor or treasurer twice);

Article III, § 8 (no one shall be elected or appointed to serve

more than eight years total in any one house of the General

Assembly, nor more than 16 years total in both houses of the

General Assembly).

Montana: Montana Constitution Article IV, § 8(b), (c) (1889

& Supp. 1994) (governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of

state, attorney general, superintendent of public instruction, and

state legislators limited to eight years in any 16 year period).

Nebraska: Nebraska Constitution Article IV, § 1 (governor

inelligible to run for four years after serving two consecutive

terms); Article IV, § 3 (treasurer inelligible to run for two years

after serving two consecutive terms).

Nevada: Nevada Constitution Article V, § 3 (1864 & Supp.

1993) (no person can be elected governor more than twice);

Article 5, § 19 (secretary of state, treasurer, controller, attorney

general); Article IV, §§ 3, 4 (state legislators may serve no

A-5

more than 12 years in same office); Article VI, § 11 (state

judges limited to single six year term). Judicial term limits

upheld in Nevada Judges Association v. Lau, 112 Nev. 51, 910

P.2d 898 (Nev. 1996).

New Jersey: New Jersey Constitution Article V, § 1, 9 5 (1947

& Supp. 1994) (governor must let term intervene after serving

two consecutive terms).

New Mexico: New Mexico Constitution Article V, § 1 (1911

& Supp. 1994) (governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of

state, state auditor, state treasurer, attorney general, and

commission of public lands who have served two consecutive

terms cannot serve again until one full term has intervened); see

also Article X, § 2 (same term limits for county officials).

North Carolina: North Carolina Constitution Article III, § 2(2)

(1970 & Supp. 1993) (neither governor nor lieutenant governor

can serve more than two consecutive terms of same office).

North Dakota: Constitution Article V, § 12 (treasurer limited

to two consecutive terms).

Ohio: Ohio Constitution Article III, § 2 (1851 & Supp. 1993)

(governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer,

attorney general, and auditor limited to two successive terms);

Article II, § 2 (state senators limited to two consecutive terms:

state representatives limited to four consecutive terms).

Oklahoma: Oklahoma Constitution Article VI, § 4 (governor

limited to two successive terms); Article V, § 17A (state

legislators may serve no more than 12 years).

Oregon: Oregon Constitution Article V, § 1 (governor limited

to eight years in twelve year period); Article II, § 19 (members

of state legislature limited to a total of 12 years; state senators

A-6

and statewide officers limited to 8 years; members of state

house of representatives limited to six years).

Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania Constitution Article IV, § 3

(1874 & Supp. 1994) (governor eligible to succeed himself or

herself for only one additional term); Article IV, § 4 (same for

lieutenant governor); Article IV, § 4.1 (attorney general limited

to two successive terms); Article IV, § 18 (same for auditor

general and treasurer).

Rhode Island: Rhode Island Constitution Article IV, § 1 (1986

& Supp. 1993) (governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of

state, attorney general, and treasurer cannot serve consecutively

in same office for more than two full terms).

South Carolina: South Carolina Constitution Article IV, § 3

(1895 & Supp. 1993) (governor cannot serve more than two

consecutive terms).

South Dakota: South Dakota Constitution Article IV, § 2

(1889 & Supp. 1994) (governor and lieutenant governor limited

to two consecutive terms); Article IV, § 7 (same for attorney

general, secretary of state, auditor, treasurer, and commissioner

of school and public lands); Article III, § 6 (no person may

serve more than four consecutive terms or a total of eight

consecutive terms in the state senate or state house of

representatives).

Tennessee: Tennessee Constitution Article III, § 4 (1870 &

Supp. 1993) (governor can serve no more than two consecutive

terms).

Utah: Utah Elections Code § 20A-10-201(1) (governor,

lieutenant governor, attorney general, auditor, and treasurer

limited to 12 consecutive years in office); Utah Elec. Code

A-7

§ 20A-10-201(2)(3) (same for state representatives and

senators).

Virginia: Virginia Constitution Article V, § 1 (1971 & Supp.

1994) (governor cannot serve consecutive terms).

Washington: Washington Revenue Code Ann., § 43.01.015

(1984 & Supp. 1994) (governor and lieutenant governor may

not have their names printed on the ballot if they have served

in same office for eight of previous 14 years); § 44.04.015

(house of representatives members may not have their names

printed on the ballot if they have served during six of previous

12 years; state senators may not have their names printed on the

ballot if they have served during eight of previous 14 years; no

candidate for state legislature may have their name printed on

the ballot if they have served for 14 of previous 20 years).

Term limits currently under legal challenge in an original writ

proceeding in the Washington Supreme Court in Gerberding v.

Munro, docket no. 65059-4.

West Virginia: West Virginia Constitution Article VII, § 1

(1872 & Supp. 1994) (governor cannot serve more than two

consecutive terms). Term limits upheld in State ex rel.

Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607 (W. Va. 1976),

appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question sub

nom. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976).

Wyoming: Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-5-103 (1977 & Supp. 1993)

(candidate may not be elected or serve in same office if served

eight or more years in any 16 years in offices of governor,

secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer, and state

superintendent of public instruction; if served six years in any

12 year period as state representative; if served 12 years in any

24 year period as state senator).