Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Shieh v. Supreme Court of California

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97-35 8 JUN 26 199

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1996

L. H. SHIEH,

Petitioner,

vs.

THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA,

AND THE STATE BAR COURT OF THE

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA,

Respondents.

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The Supreme Court Of California And

The State Bar Court Of The State Bar Of California

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Law Offices OF SHIEH LIANG-HoUH

A Professional Association

Attorneys for Petitioner

P. O. Box 84-453

Taipei, Taiwan

(011-886-2) 394-0530

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Petitioner was disbarred by the Respondents the

Supreme Court of California and the State Bar of Califor-

nia, after the action was removed to the federal courts

and is still pending in the federal courts, through Respon-

dents’ (1) perjured declarations that Petitioner was served

in Taipei, Taiwan, Republic of China, by certified mail

return receipt requested, while the State Bar of California

admitted that the United States Postal Office prohibited

all certified mail return receipts requested from sending

outside the United States, and that no certified mail

return receipts were ever returned to senders (the State

Bar of California and its State Bar Court); (2) destruction

of virtually all of petitioner’s filings, and consistent

refusals to review any of petitioner’s pleadings filed in

response to the action; (3) use of forged and perjured

documents as sole evidence and the denial of discovery

on the issue of service; (4) definition of an “attorney” to

include a “party” represented by lawyers, (5) consistent

refusals to serve Petitioner by air mail with sufficient

postage and with sufficient time to respond, and (6)

deceitful and corrupt contents of the default judgments.

1. Do the above actions of the Respondents violate

the requirements of the taking, due process and equal

protection clauses of the Amendments to the United

States Constitution, and the Treaty of Friendship, Com-

merce And Navigation Between the Republic of China

and the United States?

2. Do Respondents have jurisdiction over Petitioner

after the removal of this Action to the federal courts, and

does the Supreme Court of California have jurisdiction to

QUESTIONS PRESENTED - Continued

disbar Petitioner on April 2, 1997, (1) when the motions to

vacate improperly entered default judgment and default,

and motion for reconsideration of the default judgment

was filed on October 21, 1996, where the default was

reopened through the amended notice to show cause filed

by the State Bar of California on May 1, 1996, are still

pending before the Hearing Department, and Petitioner

has not exhausted the Reviewing Department of the State

Bar Court of the State Bar of California and (2) after the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia

entered defaults against Respondents on December 7,

1996 for declaratory and injunctive relief and for setting

aside the default and default judgment in this Action?

3. Do Respondents violate Petitioner’s due process

right to have neutral and detached judges who are free

from criminal and unethical misconduct to determine his

case as protected by the Constitution of the United States

of America and by the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce

And Navigation Between the Republic of China and the

United States?

4. Are Rules 60(b), 101(b)(4), 200(a)(4), (b) & (c),

461(e) and 462 of the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar

of California and §§ 6007(c) and 6068 the State Bar Act,

also known as Business And Professions Code, relied

upon by the Respondents, as applied to Petitioner in

Taipei, constitutional and consistent with the require-

ments of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce And Navi-

gation Between the Republic of China and the United

States?

Se Pe ee eee ae

lil

QUESTIONS PRESENTED - Continued

5. Is the term “attorney” under Section 6068 of the

State Bar Act of the State Bar of California, which was

specifically made applicable by the Respondents to a

“party,” who is represented by lawyers, because of his

race, color, national origin and religion, vague, ovebroad,

overincluded and discriminatory as applied to petitioner

as a class of one and violate the Treaty of Friendship,

Commerce and Navigation between the Republic of

China and the United States of America and thus is

unconstitutional?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

onan WOW... ee cee

i eae a ee

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATY AND

ts MELEE ee Cee ee eee ee ree

PRPS GA SIE a0 9 6 dk nes oa ong aan ee sacanns

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT.................

I. THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT

QUESTION AS TO WHETHER JUDICIAL

DETERMINATIONS OF DISBARMENT ARE

SUBJECT TO DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL

PROTECTION CLAUSES AND THE TREATY

OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE AND NAVI-

GATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES.........

A. RULES 60(b), 200(b) & (c), AND 461(e) OF

RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE

BAR OF CALIFORNIA ARE UNCON-

STITUTIONAL AND CONFLICT WITH

PUBLISHED DECISIONS OF THIS

COURT, UNITED STATES COURTS OF

APPEALS, AND CALIFORNIA ..........

r a

NN eee cc we

Seventh Circuit Case — If Taiwan Is

Part of People’s Republic of China...

Second And Ninth Circuits — If Taiwan

is Part of. Republic of China.........

If Taiwan Is Not Part of People’s Repub-

lic of China or Republic of China, But An

Independent Country .................

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

5. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.....

RESPONDENTS’ EXERCISE OF JURIS-

DICTION AFTER REMOVAL, AND

REFUSAL TO VACATE DEFAULT AND

DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHEN DEFAULT

SHOULD HAVE NOT BEEN ENTERED

AND AFTER THE DEFAULT WAS

REOPENED CONFLICT WITH ALL DECI-

SIONS OF ALL COURTS IN THIS

UES 4 2c bees Laval hh 044c0s don ee¥u Ss

RESPONDENTS’ ENTRY OF DEFAULT

AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHEN THE

MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO STAY

WERE PENDING BEFORE THEM CON-

FLICT WITH ALL DECISIONS OF ALL

COURTS IN THIS NATION .............

RESPONDENTS’ ACTIONS CONSTITUTE

A TAKING AND ARE IN VIOLATION OF

DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTEC-

be Pen Rpm Peng ae an rE ee

THE STATE BAR ACT §§ 6068 & 6007(c) AND

RULES 101(b)(4), 200(a)(4), 300(c) AND 462,

AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER IN THE

REPUBLIC OF CHINA AS A CLASS OF ONE,

ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND DISCRIMI-

WEE ii kon s Kame 4 tare nainena de ceeden ss

A. THE STATE BAR ACT §6068 ARE UNCON-

STITUTIONAL AND DISCRIMINATORY AS

APPLIED TO PETITIONER AS A CLASS OF

So Perr rrr rt ree Er er ey ee

ane Ne

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued

Page

B. THE STATE BAR ACT §6007(c) AND

JUDGE OBRIEN’S ORDER ARE UNCON-

STITUTIONAL AND IN VIOLATION OF

FCN TREATY AS APPLIED TO PETI-

TIONER AS A CLASS OF ONE.......... 23

C. RULES 101(b)(4), 200(a)(4), 300(c) AND

462 ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND

ARE DISCRIMINATORY AS APPLIED TO

PETITIONER AS A CLASS OF ONE..... 24

CONCLUSION .........00000cccceeeeeeeeeeeeeeeees 30

APPENDIX .......2...0cccceceeeeeeeeeceeeeeeees App. 1

‘ccna

ee ee a Te iM

Vii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASEs:

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct. (1982) 132 CA3d 670,

SR EN oi bniea anak scone he od dceie adden ae uaeaac 18

In Re Anschuetz & Co. (5th Cir. 1988) 838 F.2d 1362.... 11

Armentor v. General Motors Corp., 399 So. 2d 811

(Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit,

Sy OU Sot 00545444 ucddee dene odediccdens 19

Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court

(1987) 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026................ 11

Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Northwest Airlines,

796 F.Supp. 1188 (E.D. Wis. DG wiivedeniwetce dou 13

Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Northwest Airlines,

We ME ico cov ca chink ee 6lSoe kde biecee 13

Aurelio Fregoso Jara v. Municipal Court of San An-

tonio Judicial District (1977) 137 Cal. 533, 68 Cal.

Us NING ho x Ghee bee kdvb ddvwwensas 30

Barragan v. Banco BCH (4th Dist. 1987) 188 Cal.

App. 3d 283, 232 Cal. Rptr. 758................... 20

Beighly v. FDIC (5th Cir. 1989) 868 F.2d 776......... 18

Butner v. Neustadter (9th Cir. 1963) 324 F.2d 783..... 18

Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, et al., (1963)

ore Us Sem, OF SCP. OFS... on coc ceccacn... ore 10

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780

A a ia re ga ee eh te 25

Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52

Re, i i a roe 30

viii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,

ee Re | nr ere rtoes ee ee 25, 30

Chu v. Republic of China, et al., 93-15537 (July 29,

SOG, CUR A oii Wane ba Aas ep Lek caeandnees «4 15

Compagnie Francaise D’Assurance Pour Le Commerce

Exteriur v. Phillips Petroleam Company, 105 F.R.D.

WO Ce Oy, IE a Kone a Geena teas bene ae esas 11

Castro v. United States of America, 775 F.2d 399 (2nd

CR DOE: sew nces Gane c ese bed neer esas anes sees 26

Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 28

SAS. SG, FTE GR. POD CE i ve cecieesccdetet yess: 25

Concrete Pipe v. Pension Trust (1993) 113 S.Ct. 2264,

SS Ee OE a Kv esse he died eeNOR Ses RAST OTe 29

Engebretson & Co., Inc. v. Harrison (1981) 125 CA3d

Me By PEEL TT ee eee eT Urey vi Ty ere 19

Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir.

i OTP EE RES CEE TOPE TCL ETE Tee LT OTOP COE 14

Harrelson v. The United States, 613 F.2d 114 (5th Cir.

RAE err rere ery Poe pe ores er crn rt 26

Dr. Ing. H.C.F. Porsche, A.G. v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 123

we. Go ke EG Ser err ee 14

International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S.

Sa Gs HIPS Fo ade ence o ober ene¥ewstess ctce’ 11

Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188 CA3d 375, 233

PP ECE re ee ee ee eT rT eee eee 19

Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr.

PP CEE ibis Nad ca Ven bees vba ve detealbersd esdhi 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Laguna Village v. Laborers Intern. Union, 197 Cal.

oe A ae ae ne ee ee 20

Los Angeles County Bar Association v. Secretary of the

State of California, et al., (9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d

GE A Nek Gabe Wind's WER SGC CR OR hv x ovo AE Ae wooo 30

Madison Anderson v. Walter Sheppard, et al., (1988)

INL a NGA hd neha Got oe dee kine Ge otk ood a's 29

Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc. (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 100

a 8) sO 29

Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams (1983) 462

NE sb Fie ob bn OR Vs 0 oh sR Ea decks 10

Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950)

Pe NC i 6 hak Place h 0k Ads SW c nleess cds’ 10

Murray v. Ford Motor Co. (5th Cir. 1985) 770 F.2d

ir 561 oe Wadlade haGl dG i chs Ca od kath 0% sale Rade ice sida 18

New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enter-

prises, Inc., 954 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1992)......... 15, 16

In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 446 (3rd Cir. 1982) ......... 25, 26

Original Appalachian v. Troops, 642 F. Supp. 1031

I rs bone ude el ctuac errs deliccuily. 29

Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 132

Re NG SED I van bce bd RueeWlensd eereeeoLelseek. 30

Pavilions v. King, 626 F.2d 1075 (1st Cir. 1980)....... 25

Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 108

ate I a dn 5 Sir ha Wik cil Ais bh eka de Aa 22

Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) .... 27

Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S. Ct. 1970 (1984) .... 20

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Reyes v. Marine Management & Consulting, 544 So.

2d 1259 (Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth

CAPR, TE Ub SUS cer oudbnckurencsttaad caches 19

Robinson v. Marion, 879 F.2d 863 (4th Cir. 1989)...... 27

Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1972) .... 25

Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) ..... 21

Sire v. Gabriel, 748 F.2d 49 (1st Cir. 1984)............ 26

Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United

States Dist. Ct., (1987) 482 U.S. 522, 107 S. Ct.

A ee ee eer rene ae eee Pe ree 11

St. of New Mexico ex rel., Village of Los Ranchos De

Albuquerque, et al. v. City of Albuquerque (Ct. of

App., NM 1994) 119 N. M. 169, 889 Pac. Rptr.2d

i 46 adnan whe uk ededn bake steee eee ancaunaeasates 20

Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351 (10th Cir. 1989) ...... 26

Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497 (D.C. Cir.

Ps + < cn bcd cashes puuciee cabs saws ee ena ekhadaves 27

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk (1988)

Sb UD. GRE, BOE B. Ge Baia ias nc ccccasivecss 13, 14

Wilson v. Watt (9th Cir. 1993) 703 F.3d 395.......... 29

OTHER AUTHORITIES:

Chinese Criminal Law, Section 215.................. 29

Chinese Criminal Law, Section 216.................. 29

California Code of Civil Procedure § 391.1.......... 29

The Constitution of the State of California

a. Fee ee hb ce ee rec ee cnx coe a 8, 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

FCN Treaty: The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and

Navigation Between the Republic of China

and the United States of America

Ps INS Ol ek in er tity 2S rs an

Ree Fee NN Oa Se re 21, 28

8 Te a eee tein SP 21

oe co shee ei REE COE OC ET MEET PROUT ER COT Samy 21

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule Se 17

Guidelines of the State Department (“Guidelines”) .... 10

Hague Conventions (“HC”)........... 13, 14, 15, 16, 21

The Law Governing Extension of Assistance To

Foreign Court (“Assistance”)..................., 10, 16

ok I RS acai ACAI eal Danaea etree 1

eI I sii 5a iu 53 ope 4k Sock Sade deak ke ee 18

pe ES 65.60 6556s oyu oO avenncduue cares 18

aE SN aa S60 be 554 Sons aes da caubeds 26

California Rules of Court §952(e) ................. 7, 18

Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States (“USSC”)

WN EN Fee in yc kya ca dese Set eee oe 1

ae Perens ep mee on.) rae 1

MN i604 chu baeaavarcuanaeusaeuekc eu ce 1

xii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Rule of Procedure of the State Bar of California

eas BE i ond i komnneneccnns coneecdas come 2, 4, 9, 19

eins FORTE oc oc onc de ccd sctcssacmeigestbaren 22, 24

Beinn FE: 5 inn o's vce ve cdcnecnubugssdip ere 22, 24

BS TI ooo ccc ccccccccccceesaneasesmenean 2, 4,9

RE BD oo own cccccsccccccseingsnargueial 2, 4, 6, 9

Ritle FOIE) ai. occ cécccspacavcedénsvistncnaepasinvars 6

Phe SIDE onc vos cvwenee seudidevegderdnd taken 22, 24

ete BG ons bcvcccdvessvcccteeceeieemeeeasaeeesane 7

athe FID io visin din cnn cb swasdbude cededeensakeetad obs 8

eg | ee Peer rr rere rer ee ere) 18

atin GEG oo oo b:06 0 0 dvs base snboseebasewnnes 2, 4,9

; Se ME. dks oncccoeéenuasehsetdsaeeueeeeee 22, 24

ae The State Bar Act

CODING o.oo. on cede cdsessceseernecesasanseseses 22, 23

Ns 6 vnc is rdvecechscdasusbsvawennas omens saad 22, 23

Gee BE ct cnddunvasncensdeseaceansnneuaneneanee 14

TE, Wades 04 bck sos cotacccnesdsccapmennnecenel 14

ef PPPerrTerrTiT tT Torre rT er 14

Rat: Ovi cinna cus ddan eVikredssketasbesseneenssaers 14

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of California was

not reported. App. 1. The Reviewing Department of the

State Bar Court of the State Bar of California (“RD”) has

no ruling and no opinion since the Hearing Department

of the State Bar Court of the State Bar of California

(“HD”) has not ruled on Petitioner’s Motion To Vacate

Improperly Entered Default and Default Judgment Of

October 10, 1996, Motion for Reconsideration of HD’s

default judgment and Motion To Dismiss Or To Stay,

since October 21, 1996. The opinion of the HD on the

default judgment was not reported. App. 7.

JURISDICTION

The decision of the Supreme Court of California was

filed on April 2, 1997. This Court’s jurisdiction is invoked

under Title 28, U.S.C. §§ 1257, and under the Rules of the

Supreme Court of the United States (“USSC”), Rules 10(b)

& (c), and 13.1.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATY

AND RULES INVOLVED

1. Amendments VI, and XIV to, and Article VI, Sec-

tion II of, the United States Constitution are set forth in

App. 47, D.

2. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-

tion Between the Republic of China and the United States

of America are set forth in App. 47, F.

3. The California Constitution, Art. VI, § 11, is set

forth in App. 47, E.

4. Law Governing Extension of Assistance To For-

eign Court is set forth in App. 49, G.

5. The State Bar Act is set forth in App. 50, H.

6. The Rules of Procedure of the State Bar of Califor-

nia is set forth in App. 52, I.

STATEMENT OF CASE!

Petitioner was disbarred by Respondents (1) without

service of investigation, application for inactive enroll-

ment, Notice To Show Cause, motion for entry of default

and notice of default by certified mail return receipts

requested upon Petitioner in Taipei pursuant to Rules

60(b), 200(b) & (c), and 461(e) et al. of the Rules of

Procedure of the State Bar of California (“RP”), (2) with-

out a hearing, (3) without a trial, (4) without a meaning-

ful opportunity to litigate and (5) without neutral and

1 All volume and page numbers of the excerpts of record

(“ER”) referred to herein are the volume and page numbers of

the ER filed in Shieh v. Gilbert, the State Bar of California, the

Supreme Court of California, the Court of Appeal of California, the

Superior Court of California, et al., CV-96-2530 CKK [previously

RCL] pending before the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia (hereinafter cited as “DC Action”). The

same ER filed in the DC Action were also filed with the

Respondents. Respondents have wilfully destroyed or

concealed all ER filed by Petitioner. This Court is requested to

take judicial notice of the existence of the ER, fact and law filed

in that court.

detached judges, because of Petitioner’s race, color,

national origin and religion, and because of the criminal

conspiracy to commit criminal RICO, anti-trust, and

unfair competition by the Respondents and their conspir-

ators.

In a group conspiracy among the employees of

Respondents, the Supreme Court of California (“SCC”),

and the State Bar of California (“SBC”), and large and

powerful Caucasian law firms, led by William F. High-

berger to take away and to destroy all of Petitioner’s

several billion dollars business and clients, the SBC com-

menced the alleged disciplinary actions against Petitioner

when Petitioner was in Taipei at all time relevant to this

action.

As Highberger admitted: “We have the name of the

person in the Office of Trial Counsel who is working on

the preparation of the case . . . It’s moving with all

deliberate speed2.”

Pursuant to the SBC regulations, the Office of Investi-

gation of the SBC must serve Petitioner in Taipei with the

alleged facts and evidence for discipline, and must con-

duct an investigation before filing a notice to show cause

(“NTSC”) by the Office of Chief Trial Counsel (“OCTC”)

of the SBC. No service of investigation from the Office of

Investigation of the SBC was made upon petitioner in

Taipei and no investigation was made by SBC.

? See Highberger, Kakita, Spencer & Turner MAF Corp., et al. v.

Highberger, Castellano, Hollingsworth, et al., United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California

(“USBC”), LA94-21873-BR, November 29, 1994, Transcript of

Proceeding (“TP”), at 7, lines 12-14, 19-20.

Pursuant to Rules of Procedure of the SBC (“RP”)

Rules 60(b), 200(b) & (c), and 461(e), the service of appli-

cation for inactive enrollment, the service of the NTSC,

the service of “the motion for entry of default” and the

service of “the notice of entry of default” on the peti-

tioner “shall be made by certified mail, return receipt

requested.” App. 52, I. As admitted by SBC, no certified

mail return receipt requested was ever made upon Peti-

tioner in Taipei.

Cydney Batchelor of the Office of the OCTC admitted

that “the green return receipt requested card was never

returned to OCTC>.” In the overseas telephone conversa-

tion between the Howard Wistrich, the Manager of the

State Bar Court of the SBC (“BC”) and Petitioner, where

the telephone conversation was tape recorded, Mr. Wist-

rich admitted on or about August 9, 1996 that (1) he had

checked with the United Stated Postal Office and con-

firmed that “certified mail return receipt requested” is

prohibited from sending outside the United States, (2) he

had checked the petitioner’s two actions, 93-0-14106

(“this Action”) and 95-TE-10040 (“TE Action”), no certi-

fied mail return receipt has ever returned to BC and there

was no record of the existence of the certified mail return

receipt, and (3) no decision on the motion to dismiss and

to stay filed by Petitioner was ever made between March

20, 1995, the date Petitioner filed the motion to dismiss

and to stay and the removal action, and April 18, 1995,

the date the default on this Action was entered, and April

3 See “Office of The Chief Trial Counsel’s Motion To Strike

Respondent’s Motion For Reconsideration . .. And Opposition”,

dated February 26, 1996, at 5, lines 13-14.

21, 1995, the date the default judgment for the involun-

tary inactive enrollment was entered in TE Action. DC

Action 1 ER 133.

When Petitioner was informed through other sources

that OCTC and HD‘ were conspiring with Highberger to

enter default against Petitioner, Petitioner, on March 20,

1995, filed a (1) motion to dismiss5, and motion to stay®,

and (2) a removal, among other papers, with the HD and

the United States District Court for the Central District of

California.

Judge Robbins of HD admitted that “A few minutes

before the scheduled hearing on March 20, 1995, the

Court received a letter and several pleadings [motion to

dismiss and stay, removal, et al.] from Respondent [Peti-

tioner]. These were not filed or entered into evidence,””

* Notwithstanding the facts that Steedman of OCTC and

Robbins of BC admitted in the ex parte communications that

Petitioner did not receive any of the certified mail return receipt

requested, as such method of service is prohibited by the U.S.

Post Office.

5 For lack of subject matter jurisdiction, lack of service,

forum non conveniens, and other grounds.

criminal prosecutions, as well as civil actions against Cydney

Batchelor, and Steedman of OCTC, and Highberger, Castellano,

et al. for perjury, forgery, corruption, collusion, and obstruction

of justice, et al., because all documents submitted to the BC are

forged and perjured. The Taiwan Court of Appeal, by 85 [1996]

Writ nos. 2054 and 3338, had issued final and non-appealable

orders prohibiting the BC and CSC, et al. from using or

revealing such documents and information.

7 See Judge Robbins’ default judgment in 95-TE-10040-JER,

dated April 21, 1995, at 4, lines 16-18. A copy of it is attached to

ae sialic ]

but were destroyed by Judge Robbins. A default in this

action was entered on April 18, 1995, without “service of

the entry of default on” Petitioner by certified mail return

receipt requested. RP, Rule 200(c). App. 51, H. A default

judgment for inactive enrollment was entered on April

21, 1995. Before such default judgment, HD wilfully and

maliciously refused to send a letter “again warning the

member of the consequences of failing to file an answer”,

and to give Petitioner 15 days to file an answer. The State

Bar Act § 6007(e)(1)(C). App. 52, I.

Motions to vacate defaults and default judgments

were filed with HD at the end of April and earlier May,

1995 in this Action and in TE Action. Pursuant to RP Rule

203(e), “[a] motion to set aside or vacate default shall be

decided on an expedited basis.” BC wilfully and inten-

tionally refused to rule upon any of the motions for

approximately one year so as to destroy Petitioner’s law

practice as a California lawyer. Many other pleadings

were destroyed and concealed by Hearing Department

(“HD”) and Reviewing Department (“RD”) of BC.

In 1996, Judge Obrien of the RD prohibited petitioner

from filing any and all papers with either HD or RD and

effectively deprived all of Petitioner’s constitutional and

FCN Treaty rights to respond. Judge Obrien instructed

DC Action, 1 ER 82. Please note that virtually all, if not all,

filings of Petitioner with the BC and CSC were destroyed and/

or concealed by BC and CSC through their conspiracy with

Highberger. The Federal Express Company could prove the

filings, which were received and signed by the clerks of the BC

and CSC. Accordingly, those who are involved in the

destruction of the petitioner’s filings were indicted.

clerks of the HD and RD not to file any and all of

petitioner’s pleadings by destroying and/or concealing

them. Judge Obrien’s criminal intent was to cover up the

over 100 perjured declarations filed under his instruc-

tions and conspiracy, and over five criminal indictments

and criminal prosecutions against him and his conspira-

tors.

On or about May 1, 1996, Batchelor and Steedman of

OCTC amended the NTSC and reopened the default. DC

Action, App. 10. The amended NTSC was never served

upon Petitioner in Taipei. Nevertheless, on October 10,

1996, Judge Brott of HD entered default judgment and

recommended to disbar Petitioner. App. 7.

On or about October 21, 1996, Petitioner filed,

through the Federal Express Company, (1) the “Motions

To Vacate Improperly Entered Default Judgment and

Default, Motion For Reconsideration of the October 10,

1996; Motion To Dismiss or to Stay” and (2) “Sixth Veri-

fied Proposed Response” (collectively “Motions And

Response”) with HD. DC Action, 1 ER 153. As of today,

no decision was made by HD.

Pursuant to California Rule of Court § 952(e) and

other provisions, the Respondent SCC has no subject

matter jurisdiction to disbar Petitioner until and unless

the “review within the State Bar Court has been

exhausted.” In other words, the sequences are: (1) the HD

must make decision upon Petitioner’s Motions And

Response first, (2) Petitioner must then file a “request for

review” with the RD pursuant to RP, Rule 301, if HD

denied the Motions And Response, and (3) RD must

review and “shall decide matters before it in bank” pur-

suant to RP Rule 305(c). All of the above three procedures

were not followed by the HD and RD. The Respondent

SCC has no subject matter jurisdiction to disbar peti-

tioner.

The decisions of Respondents conflict with all deci-

sions of all state courts of last resort, of the United States

Court of Appeals and of this Court. Pursuant to the

constitutions of all states and of the United States, includ-

ing the State of California, Art. VI, § 11, which reads as

follows: “[t]he Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction”

and has no original jurisdiction. App. 47, E.

In retaliating Petitioner’s filing and serving of the DC

Action against Respondents for declaratory and injunc-

tive relief, and the criminal indictments and criminal

prosecutions filed in the Criminal Court and the Offices

of Prosecutors, the HD filed the “Transmittal of State Bar

Court Recommendation [of October 10, 1996]” with

Respondent SCC, dated November 11, 1996. App. 2. Peti-

tioner filed an opposition to that Transmittal because the

HD and RD have not reviewed the Motions And

Response as well as the request for review, as described

above.

CSC refused to file any and all of Petitioner’s plead-

ings, except the opposition. After the SBC filed an answer

to Petitioner’s Opposition, Petitioner filed a verified

reply brief with the CSC on or about February 24, 1997.

The verified reply brief was destroyed or concealed by

SCC and was never filed or considered. On or about

December 7, 1996, the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia entered defaults against Respon-

dents for declaratory and injunctive relief and for setting

aside the default and default judgment in this Action. On

April 2, 1997, the SCC disbarred Petitioner.

Except the facts set forth in this Petition, all state-

ments made by Judges Brott and Robins of Respondents

SBC and by judges of SCC are false and malicious. They

were indicted for forgery, perjury, obstruction of justice,

and corruption, among other felonies. See Republic of

China v. Robbins, Brott, Highberger, Castellano, et al., 86

[1997] Indictment no. 110.

REASONS FOR GRANTING WRIT

I THIS CASE PRESENTS AN IMPORTANT QUES-

TION AS TO WHETHER JUDICIAL DETERMINA-

TIONS OF DISBARMENT ARE SUBJECT TO DUE

PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSES

AND THE TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP, COMMERCE

AND NAVIGATION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF

CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES

A. RULES 60(b), 200(b) & (c), AND 461(e) OF

RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR

OF CALIFORNIA ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL

AND CONFLICT WITH PUBLISHED DECI-

SIONS OF THIS COURT, UNITED STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS, AND CALIFORNIA

The only method of service upon Petitioner in Taipei

provided by the Rules 60(b), 200(b) & (c), and 461(e) of

the Rules of Procedures of the State Bar of California

(“RP”) is: it “shall be made by certified mail, return

receipt requested”. Certified mail is prohibited from

sending outside the United States and from serving upon

Petitioner in Taipei, as admitted by the SBC. Such provi-

sions allow SBC to commit perjury and to deprive Peti-

tioner due process and equal protection rights to fair

notice, fair hearing, fair trial and fair opportunity to

litigate.

Secondly, certified mail service violates the Hague

Conventions (“HC”), the Guidelines of the State Depart-

ment (“Guidelines”) and the Law Governing Extension of

Assistance To Foreign Court (“Assistance”), as mandated

by the Second And Seventh Circuits.

Due process of law requires that Petitioner be

afforded “notice” of proceedings involving his interests

and an “opportunity” to be heard. Basically, this requires

“... Notice reasonably calculated, under all the circum-

stances, to appraise interested parties of pendency of the

action and afford them opportunity to present their objec-

tions.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950)

339 U.S. 306, 314, and Mennonite Board of Missions v.

Adams (1983) 462 U.S. 791.

Under the doctrine of international comity, the sover-

eign act of an independent country must be respected

and cannot be questioned in a state court. Banco National

de Cuba v. Sabbatino, et al. (1963) 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923.

The Respondents not only wilfully and criminally

violate Petitioner’s right under due process, equal protec-

tion and FCN Treaty, but violate the principals of Act of

State Doctrines and Foreign Sovereignty by refusing to

comply with even the Assistance.

In Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United

States Dist. Ct., (1987) 482 U.S. 522, 543, 107 S. Ct. 2542,

2555-2556 and In Re Anschuetz & Co. (5th Cir. 1988) 838

F.2d 1362, 1364, the courts held that “Special concern

must be given to” “the demand of international comity.”

“[I]nternational comity requires American courts to exer-

cise ‘special vigilance’ . . . American courts must give

‘most careful consideration’ to the policies and interests

of whatever country is involved, and to any problem

confronted by the foreign litigant.”

The principle of international comity requires that

Respondents recognize the necessity that litigants in the

United States who are seeking to serve persons and enti-

ties located in foreign countries must comply with the

law of the foreign country, in this case, the ROC. Compag-

nie Francaise D’Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exteriur v.

Phillips Petroleum Company 105 F.R.D. 16, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y.

1984) (“American courts should refrain, whenever it is

feasible, from ordering a person to engage in activities

that would violate the laws of a foreign nation”).

The Supreme Court of the United States has long

time established the principle that the structures of the

Due Process Clauses forbid a state court to exercise per-

sonal jurisdiction over a foreign litigant under circum-

stances that would offend “traditional notions of fair play

and substantive justice”. One of the fair play and sub-

Stantive justice under Due Process Clause is to give the

party a fair notice and due day in the court. International

Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct.

154, 158; Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court

(1987) 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026.

The issue of the status of Taiwan for the purpose of

service and discovery has not been, and should be, set-

tled by this Court. No court in the United States knows

exactly what law should be applied to serve residents in

Taiwan and to conduct discovery upon them. Two pub- |

lished decisions of the Second and Seventh Circuits, a

published decision of California, a non-published deci-

sion of the Ninth Circuit, and the provisions of the Fed-

eral Rules of Civil Procedure present conflicts.

No matter what the status of Taiwan might be, a part

of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”), a part of the

Republic of China (“ROC”) or an independent country

from PRC and ROC, the following results are always the

same: all service and discovery must be translated into

Mandarin Chinese and made through the diplomatic

channel. The only difference are: which law, treaty, or

convention should apply and govern, which language

(simplified or traditional Mandarin Chinese, or Tai-

wanese) should be used, and which diplomatic channel

should be gone through, PRC, ROC, or Taiwan.

If Taiwan is part of PRC, a simplified Mandarin Chi-

nese translation must be served. If Taiwan is part of ROC,

a traditional Mandarin Chinese translation must be

attached. If, however, Taiwan is an independent country,

a Taiwanese (Fujianese) translation must be attached. The

Respondents have complied with nothing.

1. California Case

“[A]t a minimum a defendant should be informed in

the language of the jurisdiction in which he is served .. . that a

legal action of a specific nature is pending against him at

a particular time and place.” Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App.

3d 325, 328, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 798 (1972). This translation

requirement is applicable to Petitioner residing in Taipei,

regardless of the status of Taiwan.

2. Seventh Circuit Case - Taiwan Is Part of

People’s Republic of China

In Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Northwest Airlines,

796 F.Supp. 1188, 1191 (E.D. Wis. 1992), the court held

that Taiwan was bound by the Warsaw Convention even

though it did not sign that document because Taiwan is

part of the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and PRC

was a member of that convention. For the same reason,

the Respondents shall serve Petitioner pursuant to the

Hague Convention (“HC”).

The Seventh Circuit held that “the status of Taiwan

and the meaning of the Taiwan Relations Act. . . . is open

to decision in a case where it matters to the outcome.”

Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co. v. Northwest Airlines, 24 F.3d

958, 962 (1994).

“By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const., Art.

VI, the Convention preempts inconsistent methods of

service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it

applies.” Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk

(1988) 486 U.S. 694, 108 S. Ct. 2104. “The Hague Conven-

tion provisions are mandatory, so that failure to comply

voids the attempted service.” Id., 486 U.S. at 698, 108 S.Ct.

2108.

Failure to comply with the Hague Convention

(“HC”) procedures void the servies. even though it was

made in compliance with the state iaw, and even though

the Petitioner has actual notice of the lawsuit. Dr. Ing.

H.C.F. Porsche, A.G. v. Sup. Ct. (1981) 123 CA3d 755, 177

CR 155.

As summarized by the Supreme Court, the Hague

Service Convention has been interpreted to

require [] each [nation] to establish a central

authority to receive requests for service of docu-

ments from other countries. U.S.T. 362, T.LA.S.

6638, Art. 2. Once a central authority receives a

request in the proper form, it must serve the

documents by a method prescribed by the inter-

nal law of the receiving state or by a method

designated by the requester and compatible

with that law. Art. 5. The central authority must

then provide a certificate of service that con-

forms to a specified model. Art. 6.~

Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. at

698-699.

Respondents’ circumvention of the procedures for

service of process mandated by the Hague Convention

constitutes “contumacious conduct by the[m]” and there-

fore their NTSC and Application For Inactive Enrollment

(“AIE”) should be dismissed with prejudice for defective

service of process. Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097,

1105-1106, fn. 20 (5th Cir. 1983).

3. Second And Ninth Circuits - Taiwan is Part

of Republic of China

In New York Chinese TV Programs, Inc. v. U.E. Enter-

prises, Inc., 954 F.2d 847, 852 (2d Cir., 1992), the court

recognized the Republic of China and the Treaty of

Friendship, Commerce And Navigation Between the

Republic of China and the United States of America

(“FCN Treaty”) is still “a valid and enforceable treaty”

binding upon the United States of America (“USA”).

The FCN Treaty, as a Supremacy Law of Land, man-

dates the USA to let the nationals of the ROC not to

“receive treatment with respect to such rights and privi-

leges less favorable than the treatment which is or may

hereafter be accorded to the nationals of any third party.”

Article II, Section 3. App. 48

Petitioner must be treated no less favorable than any

third party, which is a member of the HC. Thus, FCN

Treaty mandates the result of application of the HC. The

FCN Treaty requires ROC and the United States to guar-

antee privileges of their own laws to citizens of the other

nation and was held to be enforceable despite the United

States’ recognition of PRC. N.Y. Chinese TV Programs,

supra, 954 F.2d at 852.

In Chu v. Republic of China, et al. 93-15537 (July 29,

1994, 9th Cir.), the Ninth Circuit held that the Republic of

China (“ROC”) is an independent country and enjoys the

protection of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, and

that the ROC and its branches, Executive Yuan, and Tai-

wan Provincial Government, and its government owned

company, Taiwan Tobacco & Wine Monopoly Bureau

(“TTWMB”) are immune from lawsuits in the United

States. This case was not reported.

Recognition of the ROC in 1994 has the same mean-

ing and effect as the recognition of the FCN Treaty by the

Second Circuit in New York TV case. HC is thus applicable

to both Respondents.

Respondents did not comply with HC or letter roga-

tory.

USA and Respondents estopped from claiming that

ROC or Taiwan is not signatory of the HC. Both Taiwan

and ROC were willing and ready to join the HC. But, the

USA prohibited them from joining. In part, the USA

refused to recognize either ROC or Taiwan. Now, USA

cannot profit from its unclean hand and waiver. HC is

applicable to service in the ROC or Taiwan.

4. If Taiwan Is Not Part of People’s Republic

of China or Republic of China, But An

Independent Country ,

The United States State Department announced the

“Guidelines,” which requires that all services must com-

ply with the “Law Governing Extension of Assistance to

the Foreign Court of the Republic of China” (“Assis-

tance”), which is in the essence the same as the HC. App.

49, G. There is a Central Authority (“CA”) in Taiwan, as

well, to accept and effect the service of summons and

complaint and the service of discovery.

The Assistance mandates that Respondents serve

Petitioner through diplomatic channels with “true Chi-

nese translation.” See Art. 3 & 7 of Assistance, in App. 49,

G. Respondents did not go through any diplomatic channels

in Taiwan, did not translate into Chinese, and the attempted

service is not effective on Petitioner. App. 1, 5, 45-46.

5. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

FRCP Rule 4(f) provides as follow:

“(f) Service Upon Individuals in a For-

eign Country.

Unless otherwise provided by federal law, ser-

vice upon an individual from whom a waiver

has not been obtained and filed, other than an

infant or an incompetent person, may be effec-

ted in a place not within any judicial district of

the United States:

(1) by any internationally agreed means

reasonably calculated to give notice, such as

those means authorized by the Hague Convention

on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudi-

cial Documents; or

(2) if there is no internationally agreed

means of service or the applicable international -

agreement allows other means of service, pro-

vided that service is reasonably calculated to

give notice: :

(A) in the manner prescribed by the law

of the foreign country for service in that coun-

try in an action in any of its courts of gen-

eral jurisdiction; or

_ (B) as directed by the foreign author-

ity in response to a letter rogatory or letter of

request”.

Respondents have complied with nothing.

B. RESPONDENTS’ EXERCISE OF JURISDIC-

TION AFTER REMOVAL, AND REFUSAL TO

VACATE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDG-

MENT WHEN DEFAULT SHOULD HAVE NOT

BEEN ENTERED AND AFTER THE DEFAULT

WAS REOPENED CONFLICT WITH ALL

DECISIONS OF ALL COURTS IN THIS

NATION

On March 20, 1995, Petitioner removed this Action

and TE Action to the federal courts, and filed motions to

dismiss and stay. The removals of this Action and TE

Action are still pending in the federal courts as of today.

Filing the removal notice in the federal courts ousted

Respondents’ jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) & (e), Mur-

ray v. Ford Motor Co. (5th Cir., 1985) 770 F.2d 461. Thus,

any later Respondents’ action is void, even if the removal

is ultimately held improper. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sup. Ct.

(1982) 132 CA3d 670, 676, 183 CR 330.

Since the removals were timely, the federal court,

including this Court, has jurisdiction to vacate default

judgment entered by the Respondents. Beighly v. FDIC

(Sth Cir., 1989) 868 F.2d 776, 780; Butner v. Neustadter (9th

Cir., 1963) 324 F.2d 783, 785.

Pursuant to California Constitution Art. VL § 11,

California Rules of Court § 952(e), and RP, Rule 311,

Respondent SCC has no jurisdiction to disbar Petitioner

because the Motion To Vacate Default and Default Judg-

ment and Motion For Reconsideration are still pending

before the HD of Respondent SBC. App. 47, G.

The OCTC of the SBC amended the NTSC substan-

tially, as admitted by HD of SBC: “The State Bar also

submitted additional documentary evidence, to which

Respondent is deemed to have waived any objec-

tion . . . The Court bases its findings of fact on both the

deemed admissions and the additional evidence submit-

ted.” App. 10. Such amendment of NTSC, without serv-

ing upon Petitioner pursuant to RP, Rule 60(b), reopened

the default, even assuming that the default was properly

entered. Engebretson & Co., Inc. v. Harrison (1981) 125

CA3d 436, 178 CR 77; Jackson v. Bank of America (1986) 188

CA3d 375, 233 CR 162.

C. RESPONDENTS’ ENTRY OF DEFAULT AND

DEFAULT JUDGMENT WHEN THE MOTION

TO DISMISS AND TO STAY WERE PENDING

BEFORE THEM CONFLICT WITH ALL DECI-

SIONS OF ALL COURTS IN THIS NATION

Even assuming that the federal courts remanded this

action to Respondents, since Petitioner filed (1) the

motion to dismiss and to stay with the federal courts and

with the Respondents, and (2) the appeals and petitions

for certiorari with the federal courts, no default and

default judgment shall be entered. Armentor v. General

Motors Corp. 399 So. 2d 811, 812-813 (Court of Appeal of

Louisiana, Third circuit, May 27, 1981) (holding that “it

would recognize the answer GMC filed in federal court”);

Reyes v. Marine Management & Consulting, 544 So. 2d 1259,

1260 (Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Fourth circuit, May

25, 1989) (holding that “Relators each filed a responsive

pleading coupled with a special defense of lack of per-

sonal jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure ... A party who properly avails

himself of such a procedural device while his case is

pending in federal court should not be penalized upon

remand to the state court because of the procedural

pleading differences between state and federal courts”);

Laguna Village v. Laborers Intern. Union, 197 Cal. Rptr. 99

(Cal.1983) (holding that “motion to dismiss timely filed in

federal court was sufficiently similar to a demurrer to

constitute a responsive pleading for purpose of avoiding

entry of default”); Barragan v. Banco BCH (4th Dist., 1987)

188 Cal. App. 3d 283, 232 Cal. Rptr. 758 (the California

Court concluded that the motion to dismiss filed in the

federal court was sufficiently similar to a demurrer to

constitute a respo~~ive pleading for the purpose of avoid-

ing entry of defaui.); and St. of New Mexico ex rel., Village

of Los Ranchos De Albuquerque, et al. v. City of Albuquerque

(Ct. of App., NM 1994) 119 N. M. 169, 889 Pac. Rptr.2d

204 (holding that “It is generally recognized that plead-

ings filed in the federal court, while the federal court has

jurisdiction, become part of the state court record on

remand.”)

D. RESPONDENTS’ ACTIONS CONSTITUTE A

TAKING AND ARE IN VIOLATION OF DUE

PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Petitioner’s gross income from his law practice in

California has been several million dollars annually since

1990. The disbarment of Petitioner by the Respondents

was in the furtherance of the criminal conspiracy to cover

up the anti-trust and unfair competition of Highberger

and his group. Respondents were “in league with those

who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected

rights” (Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 539, 104 S. Ct. 1970,

1979 (1984)). The disbarment was made through perjury,

forgery, corruption, collusion, and obstruction of justice®.

Such practice not only deprives Petitioners’ fundamental

rights, but constitutes a taking of property without due

process of law and without just compensation in violation

of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. App. 47, D.

The property right protected by the Fifth and Four-

teenth Amendments includes intangible products of a

party’s service. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,

1003 (1984).

Article VI, Section 4, and Article VII of the FCN

Treaty clearly state that Petitioner “shall enjoy freedom of

access to the court of justice” and shall be treated by the

USA as the best without “discriminatory treatment.”

App. 48, F. See also Article XV. The FCN Treaty expressly

state that Petitioner shall enjoy the provisions and protec-

tion of the HC, because all members of the HC receive

such protection, and because Petitioner shall not receive

“rights and privileges less favorable than the treatment

which is or may hereafter be accorded to the nationals of

any third party.” The same languages are repeated all

over the Treaty. DC Action, 1 ER 59-61. Petitioner is

afforded equal protection of the laws of the United States

according to the FCN Treaty. See e.g., Article II, Section 3.

App. 48, F.

8 The bribery, corruption, collusion, and ex parte

communications practice between Highberger and the State Bar

of California and Supreme Court of California have been fully

described in DC Action and several criminal indictments

against them. Most of the files of the DC Action were filed with

the Supreme Court of California and HD and RD of the SBC as

thirteen volumes of the excerpts of records.

Respondents have deprived Petitioner of all constitu-

tional rights and privileged guaranteed by the United

States Constitution and its amendments as well as the

FCN Treaty.

Since no valid service of summons (NT SC), the judg-

ment violates due process of law; it is void and can be set

aside at any time. Respondents have no right to claim

that Petitioner “had no adequate defense on the merits.”

Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr. (1988) 485 U.S. 80, 108 S.Ct.

896.

In light of the corrupt nature of the Respondents in

the past several years, this Petition must be granted in

order to order the Respondents to vacate the default

judgment.

Il. THE STATE BAR ACT §§ 6068 & 6007(c) AND

RULES 101(b)(4), 200(a)(4), 300(c) AND 462, AS

APPLIED TO PETITIONER IN THE REPUBLIC OF

CHINA AS A CLASS OF ONE, ARE UNCON-

STITUTIONAL AND DISCRIMINATORY

A. THE STATE BAR ACT § 6068 ARE UNCON-

STITUTIONAL AND DISCRIMINATORY AS

APPLIED TO PETITIONER AS A CLASS OF

ONE

The State Bar Act § 6068 provides: “It is the duty of

an attorney to do all of the following:”

The Respondents, based on perjured declarations and

forged, non-final and reversed documents, commenced

this Action against Petitioner. All allegations made by

Respondents and their conspirators referred to Petitioner

as a “party,” when Petitioner was represented by attor-

neys, in the litigations. Petitioner’s attorneys were not

disciplined for the alleged actions, but Petitioner was

disciplined as a “party.”

The State Bar Act § 6068 was enacted specifically

applicable to an attorney representing his client. It was

not made applicable to an attorney who is a “party” and

who is represented by attorneys. When petitioner’s Cau-

casian attorneys were not disciplined, but petitioner was

disciplined for no act is unconstitutional and is a viola-

tion of the FCN Treaty.

The State Bar Act § 6068 is vague and overbroad and

is thus unconstitutional. The citizen of the ROC was

discriminated and retaliated and had no right to access to

the courts of justice. The State Bar Act § 6068, as applied

to Petitioner is unconstitutional.

B. THE STATE BAR ACT § 6007(c) AND JUDGE

OBRIEN’S ORDER ARE UNCONSTITU-

TIONAL AND IN VIOLATION OF FCN

TREATY AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER AS A

CLASS OF ONE

Respondents applied § 6007(c) to enroll Petitioner as

an inactive status simply because Respondents’ conspira-

tors Highberger, Castellano and others were indicted and

prosecuted for felonies, and were sued for their profes-

sional misconduct in civil actions. Respondents reasoned

that their conspirators are subject to criminal indictments

and prosecutions, as well as subject to civil actions, and

thus Petitioner’s revealing of the above poses a substan-

tial threat of harm to the public.

Respondents did not reason why their conspirators

were indicted and prosecuted for commission of felonies,

why defaults were entered against them for declaratory

and injunctive relief by the DC Action, why Respondents

and their conspirators are subject to final and non-

appealable preliminary injunctions and why all decisions

of Respondents and their conspirators were in effect

reVersed. To the contrary, it is Respondents and their

conspirators who pose a substantial threat of harm to the

public. Because they are Caucasians, they are immune

from disbarment.

The right to sue and to access to the court is pro-

tected by the Constitution. Respondents prohibited Peti-

tioner to file pleading to respond to the frivolous charges

and thus allow the default judgment to take away Peti-

tioner’s license. Respondents enrolled Petitioner in an

involuntary inactive enrollment in order to totally

deprive Petitioner’s right to sue and right to access to the

court.

C. RULES 101(b)(4), 200(a)(4), 300(c) AND 462 ARE

UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ARE DISCRIMI-

NATORY AS APPLIED TO PETITIONER AS A

CLASS OF ONE

Rules 200(a)(4) and 462 provide that Petitioner “shall

have ten (10) days from the date of service” to file a

response to the motion for entry of default and to the

application for inactive enrollment.

Rules 101(b)(4) mandates Petitioner to file a response

to the disciplinary charge within twenty (20) days from

the date of service. Rule 300(c) mandates petitioner to file

25 sg

a petition for interlocutory review within fifteen (15) days

from the date of service.

The service is complete upon the mailing.

The international mail would certainly take seven

days to 60 days from the United States to Taipei. In many

occasions, Petitioner received this court’s mail 60 days

from the date of postmark. The most visible problem is

that when Petitioner receives the mail, the ten days time

to act or to respond was over. There are over 200

envelops proving that Respondents’ orders and corre-

spondences were delivered to Taipei from the United

States after 10 days of service, if they were not lost.

The right of access to the courts has long been held

as: (1) “a vital constitutional right.”9 (2) a “general

rule”!°. (3) a fundamental tenet of our judicial system is

that legitimate claims should receive a full and fair hear-

ing no matter how litigious the Petitioner’s counsel may

be,1! and (4) “protected by the First Amendment.”12

The decisions of Respondents are conflict with these

of the federal courts, which can be summarized as fol-

lows:

9 In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446 (3rd Cir. 1982).

10 Pavilions v. King, 626 F.2d 1075, 1079 (1st Cir. 1980).

1! In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443; Pavilions v. King, supra at 1079;

Ruderer v. United States, 462 F.2d 897, 899 (8th Cir. 1972).

12 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404

U.S. 808, at 517 (1972). See also Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R.,

207 U.S. 142, 148, 28 S.Ct. 34, 35, 52 L.Ed. 143 (1907); Boddie v.

Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374, 91 S.Ct. 780 (1971).

. 26

(1). 5th Circuit “Orders enjoining future lawsuits are

generally unnecessary because the doctrine of res judicata

or collaferal estoppel usually suffice to protect defendants

from repetitious lawsuits.”13

(2). Ist Circuit “We stress that where access to the

courts is concerned, an injunction should be drawn as

narrowly as possible.” 14

(3). 3rd Circuit “The court of appeals narrowly tai-

lored the injunction to closely fit the specific vice encoun-

tered.”15

(4). 2nd & 10th Circuit “If an injunction against

future litigation issued under 28 U.S.C.A. 1651(a) were

couched in overly broad terms, this impermissible infringes

upon a litigator’s right of access to the courts.”16

13 [Emphasis added]. Harrelson v. The United States, 613 F.2d

114 (5th Cir. 1980).

14 [Emphasis added]. Sire v. Gabriel, 748 F.2d 49 (1st Cir.

1984).

15 [Emphasis added] Gabriel; Castro v. The United States of

America, 775 F.2d 399 (2nd Cir. 1985); Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d.

1027 (3rd Cir. 1993). “The broad scope of the District Court’s

power is limited by two fundamental tenets of our legal system -

the litigant’s right to due process and access to the courts.”

[Emphasis added] Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d. 1027 (3rd Cir. 1993).

Imposing an injunction “is an extreme remedy, and should be

used in exigent circumstances.” [Emphasis added]. In re Oliver,

682 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1982). “Litigiousness alone will not

support an injunction restricting litigant’s filing activities.” In re

Oliver, 682 F.2d 443 (3rd Cir. 1982).

16 [Emphasis added] Castro v. United States of America, 775

F.2d 399 (2nd Cir. 1985); Tripati v. Beaman, 878 F.2d 351 (10th Cir.

1989).

(5). 4th & Ilth Circuit “A court imposing such an

injunction must be careful not to order conditions that

effectively deny access to the courts.”17

(6). D.C. Circuit “A court must take great care not to

unduly impair a litigant’s constitutional right of access to

the courts.”18

Petitioner hereby request this Court take judicial

notice that no United States Post Office can guarantee

that the delivery of mail to Taipei in less than 10 days

with “insufficient” postage - Respondents often fail to

post air mail postage. See e.g., App. 5 & 45 (service by

first class mail, not air mail), see also DC Action, 4 ER 646,

652-656, 5 ER 749-750, 764, 770-773, 775, 780-786, 788-789

for evidence of insufficient postage. Even with sufficient

postage, there is absolutely no guaranty that the mail will

reach Taipei in less than ten days. Often the mail went to

another country before reaching Petitioner. DC Action, 3

ER 617, 5 ER 787. There is no way to guarantee the receipt

of American mail in ten days.

The above rules of RP are unconstitutional because

by the time Petitioner received the Respondents’ charges,

applications and orders, the time to act or respond was

over. Such rules effectively deprive Petitioner of the right

to access to the court and right to respond.

In light of the above, by statutes, the courts in Taiwan

have always extended the maximum courtesy to the

17 [Emphasis added] Robinson v. Marion, 879 F.2d 863 (4th

Cir. 1989); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986).

18 [Emphasis added] Urban v. United Nations, 768 F.2d 1497,

1500 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

American litigants by adding 44 days to act or to

respond, from the date of “receipt”, not from the date of

“mailing.” DC Action, 3 ER 318. In an action against

Respondents, the courts in Taiwan has given the Respon-

dents an additional time of four months and-20 days, in

the first time, and an additional time of five months, in

the second time, to respond and to act. Such practice

proves that the Respondents wilfully and maliciously

deprived Petitioner of all constitutional rights and vio-

lated the FCN Treaty for the equal treatments of the

nationals and corporations in both countries.

Moreover, all documents served upon Respondents

were translated into English and through the diplomatic

channel. It is more than clear that Respondents are dis-

criminating against Petitioner in violation of the FCN

Treaty,!° the U.S. Constitution and international comity.

To avoid perjury and forgery, as committed by

Respondents in this Action, the courts in Taiwan allow

only the neutral and detached clerks to serve the orders

and pleadings through registered mail with return receipt

requested. However, both Respondents allow and in fact

encourage their judges and clerks in this Action to com-

mit perjury and forgery.

Respondents have repeatedly filed several hundreds

and thousands of perjured declarations for service by

mail. The first class mail, as opposed to the air mail,

cannot be mailed outside the U.S. either, for insufficient

postage. See e.g., App. 5 & 45. If the envelope does not

19 See Article VI, Section 4 of the FCN Treaty. See App. 48, F.

contain Petitioner’s Chinese name and address, the deliv-

ery would be unreliable. There are many other reasons,

known or unknown, which might have prevented Peti-

tioner from receiving the mail. Therefore, the mail should

have not been completed on mailing, but should have

been completed upon “receipt” as practiced in the Taiwan

courts.

The issuance of preliminary injunctions by the Tai-

wan Court of Appeal against Respondents and their con-

spirators proves that Petitioner has reasonable

probability to prevail against Respondents and their con-

spirators. See Wilson v. Watt, (9th Cir., 1993) 703 F.2d 395;

Original Appalachian v. Troops, 642 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (ND

GA 1986); CCP § 391.1. Moreover, the defaults in DC

Action have been entered against Respondents. Accord-

ingly, the contents of the default judgments, based solely

upon perjured declarations and forged documents, are

corruptive and false.

The members of OCTC as well as judges, and clerks

of Respondents have been indicted and prosecuted for

their perjury, obstruction of justice, forgery,2° and other

felonies. They must be disqualified in the first place

pursuant to the holdings in Concrete Pipe v. Pension Trust

(1993) 113 S.Ct. 2264, 12 L.Ed.2d 539, 560. Madison Ander-

son v. Walter Sheppard, et al., (1988) 856 F.2d 741; Marshall

20 Under Chinese Criminal Law, the omission of

Petitioner’s filing from the docket sheet constitutes one of the

forgery categories. Under Criminal Law Sections 215, and 216,

such crimes are felonies. These criminals could be punished up

to three years imprisonment.

v. Jerrico, Inc., (1980) 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64

L.Ed.2d 182.

The destruction and concealment of Petitioner’s

pleadings and filings, the refusals to set the hearing dates

and refusals to rule on Petitioner’s motions and requests

for review constitute a deprivation of Petitioner’s right to

access to the court.?!

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Petitioner respect-

fully requests that certiorari be granted and that the case

be set down for briefing and oral argument; or in the

alternative, that certiorari be summarily granted.

Dated: June 24, 1997

Respectfully submitted,

Law Orrices OF SHIEH _LIANG-HouH

Attorney for Petitioner

21 See Los Angeles County Bar Association v. Secretary of the

State of California, et al., (9th Cir. 1992) 979 F.2d 697, 705; Bounds

v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1494, 52 L.Ed.2d 72

(1977); California Motor Transp. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S.

508, 510, 92 S.Ct. 609, 611, 30 L.Ed.2d 642 (1972); Wolff, 418 U.S.

at 579, 94 S.Ct. at 2986; Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d

908, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405; Aurelio Fregoso Jara v. Municipal Court of

San Antonio Judicial District (1977) 137 Cal. 533, 68 Cal. App.3d

673.

App. 1

SO57359

SBC # 93-O-14106

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

IN BANK

IN RE LIANG-HOUH SHIEH ON DISCIPLINE

(Filed April 2, 1997)

The supplemental petition for writ of review received

December 9, 1996, is ordered filed. Permission to file

subsequently submitted supplemental petitions is denied.

The petition for writ of review is DENIED.

It is hereby ordered that Liang-Houh Shieh be dis-

barred from the practice of law and that his name be

stricken from the roll of attorneys. He is also ordered to

comply with rule 955, California Rules of Court, and to

perform the acts specified in subdivisions (a) and (c) of

that rule within 30 and 40 days, respectively, after the

date this order is effective.* Costs are awarded to the

State Bar.

*See Business and Professions Code section 6126,

subdivision (c).

George, C.J. did not participate.

/s/ Mosk

Acting Chief Justice

App. 2

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Office of the Clerk

State Bar Court

1149 South Hill, 5th Floor

Los Angeles, California 90015

(213) 765-1400

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Transmittal of State Bar

)

IN THE MATTER OF __)

LIANG-HOUH SHIEH} g

A Member of the State Bar )

)

Court 4

Recommendation

State Bar Court No.

93-0-14106

[] Conviction proceeding (rule

951(a), Cal. Rules of Ct.)

[] Rule 955 proceeding (rule 955,

Cal. Rules of Ct.)

[X] Original proceeding (Bus. and

Prof. Code § 6081)

[] Other proceeding

To the CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT:

RECOMMENDATION. The State Bar Court hereby

transmits its recommendation in the above-entitled

matter, as reflected in the enclosed proposed order

subject to review by the Supreme Court.

RECORD ENCLOSED. DUE TO THE VOLUMINOUS

NATURE OF THIS PROCEEDING WE ARE FILING

ONLY THE PERTINENT DOCUEMENTS [sic] AT

i App. 3

THIS TIME. ALL OTHER PLEADINGS AND

EXHIBITS AVAILABLE UPON THE COURT'S

REQUEST.

[] State Bar Exhibits

{] Respondent Exhibits

[ ] Transcript(s) of State Bar Court Hearings

IMPOSITION OF COSTS. Pursuant to Section 6086.10,

Business and Professions Code statutorily authorized

costs of this disciplinary proceeding should be

awarded the State Bar of California. Enclosed are the

Certificate of Costs and Statement of Costs pursuant

to rule 280-284, Rules of Procedure for State Bar Court

Proceedings.

MEMBER’S ADDRESS:

State Bar records list the following current address for

the above memberr

P.O. Box 84-861

Taipei, Taiwan R.O.C.

INFORMATION GIVEN MEMBER. We have this day

mailed to the member information about:

rule 951, California Rules of Court

re: Authority of the State Bar Court

rule 952, California Rules of Court

re: review of State Bar Court decision

rule 953, California Rules of Court

re: effective date of Supreme Court Order

rule 954, California Rules of Court

re: grounds for review of State Bar Court deci-

sions in Supreme Court

App. 4

rule 955, California Rules of Court

re: duties of disbarred, resigned or suspended

members

Business & Professions Code Section 6083

re: petition to review State Bar Court decision

Business & Professions Code Section 6086.10 and

6140.7

re: costs of disciplinary proceeding

6. [X] OTHER INFORMATION TO ASSIST THE

SUPREME COURT:

This attorney has not had prior discipline imposed.

However, on April 25, 1995, Mr. Shieh was ordered

inactive pursuant to Business and Professions Code

Section 6007(c) in 95-TE-10040.

We would like to bring to the Court’s attention that

Mr. Shieh currently has no matters pending with the

Supreme Court.

Judy Duffield

Clerk of the State Bar Court

Dated: By /s/ Charles Nettles

November 15, 1996 Charles Nettles

Deputy Court Clerk

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

[Rule 62, Rules Proc. for State Bar Ct. Proceedings;

Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Deputy Court Clerk of the State Bar Court. I

am over the age of eighteen and not a party to the within

proceeding. In the City and County of Los Angeles, on

the date shown below, I deposited a true copy of the

following document

———Eee aaa eee

App. 5

TRANSMITTAL OF STATE BAR COURT RECOMMEN-

DATION DATED NOVEMBER 12, 1996 AND PROPOSED

ORDER

in a sealed envelope as follows:

[X]

(]

[X]

with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid in a

facility regularly maintained by the United States

Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed

as follows:

LIANG-HOUH SHIEH ESQ

PO BOX 84-861

TAIPEI TAIWAN ROC

LIANG-HOUH SHIEH ESQ

PO BOX 84-453

TAIPEI TAIWAN ROC

by certified mail, with a return receipt requested, in

a facility regularly maintained by the United States

Postal Service at Los Angeles, California, addressed

as follows:

in an interoffice mail facility regularly maintained

by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

Cydney Batchelor, Esq.

Donald Steedman, Esq.

App. 6

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of

the State of California that the foregoing is true and

correct. Executed at Los Angeles, California, on Novem-

ber 15, 1996.

/s/ Charles Nettles

Charles Nettles

Deputy Court Clerk IV

App. 7

STATE BAR COURT

STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

HEARING DEPARTMENT - LOS ANGELES

In the Matter of ) Case No. 93-O-14106-EEB

LIANG-HOUH SHIEH, : DECISION

No. 128034,

) (Filed

A Member of the State Bar. ) October 10, 1996)

)

INTRODUCTION

Liang-Houh Shieh, the Respondent in this matter,

through his litigation in California state courts, federal

courts, and the State Bar Court, may be considered, as

one of his opposing attorneys characterized him, as “the

benchmark by which all vexatious litigants in the state of

California will be judged.” As a result of his actions, the

State Bar has charged Respondent with committing acts

of moral turpitude, failing to report substantial sanctions

imposed against him, failing to show proper respect for

courts, pursuing unjust litigation, commencing or con-

tinuing legal actions from a corrupt motive of passion or

interest, and engaging in actions which constitute an

offensive personality. After reviewing this substantial

record, the Court agrees with the State Bar that Respon-

dent has engaged in serious misconduct, has greatly

harmed individuals and the administration of justice,

lacks any insight into his misconduct, expresses no

remorse, and, based on the standards and case law,

Should be disbarred from the practice of law in Califor-

nia.

App. 8

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Notice to Show Cause in this matter was filed on

December 30, 1994.1 The Notice was served on Respon-

dent by the State Bar at his membership records address

on January 11, 1995. Respondent did not file anything

with the State Bar Court in response to the Notice.

On March 9, 1995, the State Bar filed with the Court

and served on Respondent a Notice for Entry of Respon-

dent’s Default for his failure to file a response to the

Notice. The motion warned Respondent that the State Bar

would be seeking his disbarment. The motion was served

at Respondent’s membership address.

Thereafter, Respondent attempted to remove the dis-

ciplinary proceeding to federal district court. By order

filed April 10, 1995, the federal court found Respondent's

removal petition defective and summarily remanded the

case to the State Bar Court for further proceedings. On

April 18, 1995, Respondent’s default was entered pur-

suant to rule 200(c), Rules of Procedure of the State Bar.

On May 9, 1995, Respondent filed an ex-parte applica-

tion for, among other relief, an order to vacate his default

in this matter. On May 12, 1995, former State Bar Court

Hearing Department Judge JoAnne Earls Robbins, the

judge then assigned to handle this proceeding, issued an

1 Originally Respondent was charged in the Notice along

with attorneys Richard R. Hopkins, and Henry M. Guy Rollins.

Both Hopkins and Rollins are currently on inactive status. By

Order dated December 22, 1995, former State Bar Court Hearing

Department Judge David S. Wesley severed Respondent’s case

from the others.

— ae ee

App. 9

order indicating Respondent’s motion had been filed but

not properly served, and required Respondent to refile

and reserve the motion before any response would be

required from the State Bar. Thereafter, on June 7, 1995,

the Court issued an order staying the disciplinary pro-

ceedings because Respondent had filed an appeal from

the federal district court’s April 10 remand order and

Respondent claimed he had filed a second notice of

removal in the federal district court. By order dated June

16, 1995, the federal district court struck from the record

the second set of removal papers.

On December 21, 1995, Judge Wesley, then assigned

to replace Judge Robbins as the hearing judge, issued an

order lifting the June 7, 1995 stay. Thereafter on February

6, 1996, Judge Wesley granted the State Bar until March .

1996 to file its opposition to Respondent’s motion to

vacate the default. By order filed April 22, 1996, Respon-

dent’s motion to vacate the default was denied.

Respondent took Judge Wesley’s April 22, 1996 order,

among others, to the Review Department, on May 21,

1996 seeking interlocutory review. The Review Depart-

ment took judicial notice of two orders of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, one filed on

June 2, 1995, and a second on October 13, 1995, denying

removal of the case to federal court and remanding the

matter to the State Bar Court. In its order denying, inter

alia, Respondent's Petition for Interlocutory Review of

the Motion for Relief from Default, the Review Depart-

ment ordered that the State Bar Court would no longer

accept from Respondent any further motions for relief

from default or petitions for review of denials of such

motions.

App. 10

This case was assigned to this judge on May 1, 1996.

On that same day, the State Bar filed its evidence in

written form, waived the right to a hearing on the matter,

and submitted the case on the admitted facts from the

default, its trial brief and accompanying written evi-

dence, constituting sixty-five binders of exhibits. The

matter was submitted for decision on May 3, 1996.7

FINDINGS OF FACT

Because of Respondent's default, the facts alleged in

the Notice are deemed admitted. On that basis, no further

proof is required to establish the truth of those charges.

(In the Matter of Hazelkorn (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State

Bar Ct. Rptr. 602, 605.) The State Bar also submitted

additional documentary evidence, to which Respondent

is deemed to have waived any objection. (Barnum v. State

Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 104, 110.) The Court bases its find-

ings of fact on both the deemed admissions and the

additional evidence submitted.

Jurisdiction

Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in

California on June 17, 1987, and has been a member of the

State Bar at all times.

—

2 Respondent filed one motion for reconsideration on April

30, 1996 and nineteen Motions for Reconsideration on May 21,

1996. The State Bar filed its responses on June 19, 1996 and the

motions for reconsideration were denied by orders filed July 12,

1996.

App. 11

Background

Respondent is a native of Taiwan, and a graduate of

Yale University School of Law. In the mid-1980’s he

worked at the law firms of O’Melveny & Myers and

Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher. From June 1988 until April

1989, Respondent was a senior counsel in the firm of

Graham & James. From April 1989 until January 1991,

Respondent had been a partner at the law firm of Lewis,

D’Amato, Brisbois & Bisgaard. Beginning in January 1991,

Respondent was a partner at the law firm of Fulbright &

Jaworski.

Respondent’s partnership was terminated at Ful-

bright & Jaworski at the end of May 1991 amid much

rancor. Among the issues in dispute was a lawsuit filed

by Respondent which was then pending in Los Angeles

County Superior Court against the law firm of Graham &

James. Controversies also arose over which client files

should remain at the law firm or be transferred to

Respondent and Respondent's conduct while he was with

the firm. As part of this dispute, Respondent filed an

action, Shieh v. Ebershoff et al. (case no. BC0270441), in Los

Angeles Superior Court, in which he unsuccessfully

sought an injunction prohibiting Fulbright & Jaworski

from communicating with his former clients. After a

series of demurrers to successive versions of his com-

plaints were sustained, Respondent dismissed the case-

while another demurrer was pending.

The Ebershoff Federal Case

After dismissinghis state court action, in October

1991, Respondent filed a federal court lawsuit against

| App. 12

hundreds of individual attorneys and numerous law

firms, alleging essentially the same causes of action

raised in the state court action. On July 13, 1992, Federal

District Judge William J. Rea heard argument by the

defendant law firms on motions to stay the federal court

action pending payment of costs of the prior state court

action, and motions to dismiss the complaint for

improper service and for failure to prosecute. The Court

filed an order staying the proceedings pending payment

of the costs of the prior state court action, and dismissing

the action with prejudice against the defendants Lewis,

D’Amato for improper service and for failure to pros-

ecute. The Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction

over Respondent’s state law claims, and reserved the

issue of Respondent’s remaining RICO claims. The judg-

ment was entered on August 5, 1992. By order entered

August 31, 1992, Judge Rea dismissed Respondent’s RICO

claims with prejudice.

Respondent took two actions in response to the fed-

eral court action. On July 31, 1992, Respondent filed a

180-page lawsuit against numerous lawyers and law

firms in Los Angeles Superior Court (Shieh v. Ebershoff, et

al., case no. BC061170), reiterating the causes of action

against Lewis, D'Amato which had been dismissed with

prejudice by the federal district court. (See infra.) Respon-

dent also appealed the federal court orders to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In a mem-

orandum filed December 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals

affirmed all of the district courts orders, and by order

filed March 28, 1994, denied the petition for rehearing

and rejected the suggestion for rehearing.

‘ec aaee

App. 13

By order entered January 15, 1993, the federal court

set the costs of the prior state court action in the amount

of $125,421.00 in favor of Graham & James and $37,236.00

in favor of he Fulbright & Jaworski defendants. On May

27, 1994, the federal defendants moved to dismiss the

federal case with prejudice because Respondent had not

paid the costs of the state court action. Respondent filed

an opposition to the motion to dismiss on June 7, 1994,

and in that motion requested reconsideration of the dis-

-. trict court orders which had been affirmed by the Ninth

Circuit. On June 20, 1994, the federal court dismissed the

action and issued an order to show cause why Respon-

dent and his attorney, James Andion, should not be sanc-

tioned under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 11

and 28 United States Code §1927 for bringing an

improper and frivolous motion for reconsideration. By

order entered July 15, 1994, the Court found that Respon-

dent opposed defendant’s motion to dismiss on frivolous

grounds and requested reconsideration of an issue previ-

ously decided by the Ninth Circuit. It concluded that the

Opposition was “filed in bad faith, or at a minimum, with

conscious disregard for counsel’s duty to the court.” It

ordered that Respondent and his attorney, Mr. Andion,

pay sanctions in the amount of $1,000.00 under Rule 11.

Fulbright & Jaworski Lawsuit

As a result of their dispute with Respondent, on

November 5, 1991, Fulbright & Jaworski filed a lawsuit

(Fulbright & Jaworski v. Liang-Houh Shieh, et al., case no.

BC41515), alleging that Respondent and others had

engaged in numerous tortious acts of misconduct during

and after his employment with that firm. Counsel for

App. 14

Fulbright & Jaworski, the firm of Quinn, Kully and Mor-

row, noticed deposition of a number of third party wit-

nesses who were purported clients of Respondent,

beginning in January 1992. Respondent served objections

to the depositions, stating that noneof the individuals

would attend the proposed depositions. Fulbright & Jaw-

orski filed a motion to compel, and on February 25, 1992,

Superior Court Judge Edward Kakita ordered Respondent

and the other deponents to appear at their depositions.

The depositions were noticed for April 2, 1992, and

Respondent filed objections and indicated that neither he

nor the other deponents would appear. Fulbright & Jaw-

orski filed another motion to compel, and on May 4, 1992,

Respondent was ordered to pay sanctions of $1,500 to

Fulbright for disregarding the court’s February 25, 1992

order and for acting without reasonable justification.

A default judgment was entered on June 18, 1992, in

favor of Fulbright & Jaworski. On September 11, 1992,

Judge Robert M. Mallano found that this case was related

to three other proceedings then pending in the Superior

Court, Shieh v. Christopher, et al. (case no. BC054981),

Araiza v. Shieh, et al. (case no. GC004191), and Say & Say v.

Castellano, et al. (case no. BC059833), within the meaning

of Los Angeles Superior Court local rule 1303.6. All the

cases were assigned to Judge Kakita and the proceedings

which flowed therefrom will be discussed post.

Ebershoff State Court Proceeding

a. D’Amato demurrer

As noted earlier, on July 31, 1992, Respondent filed a

180-page lawsuit against his former law firms and all the

NN — — ——<<«_e« es

App. 15

partners therein, as well as the law firms who had repre-

sented the defendant law firms in other actions filed by

Respondent. (Shieh v. Ebershoff, et al. (case no. BC061170).)

The complaint was served on Lewis, D’Amato by Respon-

dent’s counsel on December 4, 1992. On January 5, 1993,

Lewis, D’Amato filed a demurrer and requested sanctions

against Respondent and his counsel, contending that the

state court complaint sought to assert claims and allega-

tions which Respondent had raised in his prior federal

action, which he was barred from relitigating after its

dismissal with prejudice. Lewis, D’Amato sought sanc-

tions from Respondent and his counsel claiming that

pursuing the allegations and causes of action after they

had been dismissed in federal court constituted frivolous

and bad faith tactics within the meaning of Code of Civil

Procedure section 128.5. In its pleading, Lewis, D’Amato

noted that the allegations in the state complaint were

word for word those alleged in the federal matter, down

to misspellings and typographical errors.

On January 29, 1993, the trial court sustained the

demurrer without leave to amend as to all claims against

Lewis, D’Amato and imposed sanctions of $2,750 under

section 128.5, finding that Respondent's actions were friv-

olous and without merit. Respondent filed a motion for

reconsideration, which was denied and additional sanc-

tions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(d) of

$975 were ordered against Respondent and his attorney.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the rulings in an

unpublished opinion filed on March 7, 1995. Respondent

has never reported these sanctions to the State Bar.

App. 16

b. Respondent Declared Vexatious Litigant

As to the remaining defendants in Shieh v. Ebershoff,

et al. (case no. BC061170), three groups of defendants

moved to have Respondent declared a vexatious litigant

under Code of Civil Procedure section 391 and for an

order requiring him to post a bond pursuant to section

391.1. After the filing of such a motion prior to trial, the

litigation is stayed. (Code Civ. Proc, § 391.6.) Notwith-

standing the pending motion and resulting stay, Respon-

dent and his attorney filed on January 19, 1993 a motion

to (1) request a continuance of the vexatious litigant

hearing until Respondent had completed his discovery,

(2) compel depositions of 32 of the defendants and pro-

duction of documents, (3) stay defendants’ discovery

until the completion. of his discovery, (4) award sanc-

tions, and (5) order defendants to show cause re: con-

tempt.

At a hearing held on February 18, 1993 and by order

filed March 16, 1993, the motions to declare Respondent a

vexatious litigant were granted. The action remained

stayed, and security was to be posted within 30 days or

the Court would entertain a motion to dismiss. Respon-

dent’s motion was denied. The Court found that “the

motion [was] frivolous and brought without substantial

justification, .. . ” and ordered that Respondent and his

attorney be sanctioned, jointly and severally, and pay

opposing counsel a total of $4,500. Respondent filed six

3 Graham & James and Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro

was one; Fulbright & Jaworski, Quinn, Kully and Morrow,

Robert Toms, and Eric Lunquist was the second, and Sheppard,

Mullin, Richter & Hampton the third.

App. 17

motions for reconsideration, as well as requesting other

relief from the Court. On March 22, 1993, the Court

denied the motions for reconsideration with prejudice,

found that the motions were frivolous and without justi-

fication, and ordered that Respondent and his attorney

pay an additional $3790 in sanctions. In its ruling, the

Court reiterated that the Proceeding remained stayed as

to all defendants until 10 days after Respondent provided

the security ordered in the March 16, 1993 ruling.

On April 2, 1993, Respondent filed 12 motions seek-

ing “vacation, clarification, modification, and recon-

sideration” of the Court's rulings on February 18 and

March 22. New counsel for Respondent filed voluminous

documents in support of the 12 motions. Further, on May

18, 1993, Respondent filed a voluminous first amended

complaint, adding as a new plaintiff, Say & Say. This

filing was in violation of the stay order issued on Febru-

ary 18 and reiterated in the March 22 ruling. On June 3,

1993, the Court denied the 12 motions, found that they

were identical to the six motions for reconsideration pre-

viously denied, and that no new or different facts were

alleged. It ruled that “the twelve Motions for Recon-

sideration were brought in bad faith and were frivolous,

unnecessary and brought for purposes of delay.” The first

amended complaint was struck as well. The Court sanc-

tioned Respondent and his attorneys, jointly and sever-

ally, a total of $4,810, to be paid by June 23, 1993.

In a separate order filed June 3, 1993, the Court found

that Respondent had not filed the required security

ordered on February 18, 1993, and therefore dismissed

the action in its entirety with prejudice as to all remaining

defendants. Respondent and Say & Say appealed the

App. 18

dismissal and the vexatious litigant determination to the

Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed

Respondent's appeal on October 23, 1993, after finding he

was subject to a prefiling order as a vexatious litigant in

other proceedings (discussion infra) and after according

him the opportunity to explain why his appeal had merit.

The Court concluded that his appeal in the instant case

was maintained for the purpose of harassment. (Say &

Say, Inc. v. Ebershoff (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1759,

1761-1762.) The Court also concluded that Say & Say, Inc.,

is an alter ego of Respondent which had been used by

Respondent to circumvent the provisions of the vexatious

litigant statute. Say & Say, Inc. would be held responsible

for the acts of the individual who controlled it. The Court

concluded that Say & Say, Inc. was a vexatious litigant.

Rehearing was denied, as well as three petitions for

review to the California Supreme Court. (Id. at p. 1770.)

Layman Federal Court Lawsuit

a. Background

Respondent employed attorney Francisca N. Araiza

in March 1991 to represent him and his wife in litigation,

including litigation involving his former law firm, Ful-

bright & Jaworski. By June 1991, a dispute arose; Ms.

Araiza withdrew as counsel of record and left Respon-

dent’s employ. In August 6, 1991, Ms. Araiza filed in Los

Angeles Superior Court a lawsuit against Respondent for,

among other claims, wages owed to her. (Araiza v. Shieh,

et al., case no GC 004191.)

Respondent responded by filing suit on December 6,

1991, in federal district court against Ms. Araiza, Bill

App. 19

Layman [Araiza’s boyfriend], Gemma Sanchez [Araiza’s

sister], Imperial Savings, a savings and loan association,

and Household Bank, a bank which had acquired Impe-

rial Savings. (Say & Say, et al. v. Layman, et al., civil action

no. C-91-6690-JGD (TX).) The complaint asserts both state

and federal causes of action arising from events which

are alleged to have occurred in May and June 1991. The

complaint charges Araiza with breaching her oral agree-

ment to render legal services as assigned by Respondent,

mishandling cases, cooperating with her codefendants to

steal files and other property, and conspiring with Impe-

rial Savings regarding funds held in a trust account in

that institution. Respondent listed himself and Gary Hol-

lingsworth as attorneys for the plaintiffs. Mr. Hol-

lingsworth, then employed by Respondent, had urged

Respondent not to file the federal lawsuit. Upon learning

that his name was listed as attorney of record, Hol-

lingsworth petitioned the court in late February 1992 to

withdraw his unauthorized appearance as an attorney for

the plaintiffs.

A copy of the summons and complaint in the Layman

lawsuit were slipped under Mr. Hollingsworth’s door on

February 29, 1992, while he was away from home. Hol-

lingsworth was not identified as a “Doe” defendant in the

summons and complaint and the unsigned note which

accompanied the documents indicated without naming

Hollingsworth that suit had been filed by Say & Say and

Respondent and that an answer should be filed. The

complaint had not been amended at the time of this

attempted service of Hollingsworth. The operative facts

in the complaint occurred before Hollingsworth’s

employment by Respondent.

App. 20

Another former employee of Respondent’s, Andrew

Castellano, received a copy of the summons and com-

plaint in the Layman lawsuit in a similar attempt to serve

hin on February 29, 1992. A package of documents was

left on Castellano’s doorstep, containing the summons

and complaint, the same general notice of suit, and a

proof of service indicating personal service by hand to

the offices of the Hollingsworth and Castellano. Cast-

ellano had worked for Respondent between December 30,

1991, and January 20, 1992. Upon quitting, Castellano

filed a claim with the state labor commissioner for unpaid

wages on January 22, 1992. Late in the evening on March

2, 1992, on the eve of a settlement conference on the wage

claim, someone knocked on Castellano’s door and left

behind another package of documents, again including

the summons and complaint in Layman, as well as a

notice of taking Castellano’s deposition as a defendant in

the Layman case. The complaint was signed by Respon-

dent on March 3, 1992, and was accompanied by an

unsigned proof of service. Again, the complaint had not

been amended at the time of the attempted service of

Castellano and the operative facts in the complaint

occurred before Castellano’s employment by Respondent.

Araiza’s attorney in the federal case noticed Respon-

dent’s deposition for January 29, 1992. Respondent then

noticed Araiza’s deposition for January 28, 1992, and

argued that he had the right to complete her deposition

before his commenced because she had refused without

cause to complete her deposition in the state court action.

Araiza and her attorney were present in Respondent's

office for her deposition but Respondent refused to go

forward or meet with Araiza or her counsel. Respondent

App. 21

claimed in a note offered by one of his staff that Araiza’s

attorney had failed to confirm their appearance by noon

the prior day (the confirmation was faxed at 12:13 p.m)

and refused to go forward with his noticed deposition the

following day until the Araiza deposition was completed.

b. Sanction Order

Araiza, Hollingsworth, and Castellano all filed

motions to dismiss and for sanctions. Araiza requested as

alternative relief an order compelling Respondent's atten-

dance at his deposition. In an order filed April 14, 1992,

Federal District Court Judge John G. Davies dismissed

the motions of both Hollingsworth and Castellano as

premature in light of Respondent's failure to amend the

complaint to add Castellano and Hollingsworth and

thereafter to serve them properly. However, the Court

found that Respondent’s attempts to serve Castellano and

Hollingsworth and in opposing the motions were not

taken in good faith and that his actions were “frivolous,

unreasonable, and reckless, meriting the imposition of

sanctions.” On Araiza’s motion, the Court compelled

Respondent to give his deposition, warned that failure to

comply could result in sanctions, including possible dis-

missal, and ordered sanctions of $2,490.50 payable to

Araiza based on the Court’s conclusion that Respondent

had no legal or reasonable factual basis for his failure to

cooperate in discovery.

On April 23, 1992, Respondent filed a motion for

reconsideration of the sanction order. Responses were

filed, and Respondent responded through counsel on

June 2, 1992, with a pleading entitled “Plaintiff’s Replies

App. 22

to Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration of Sanc-

tions.” In this document, Respondent asserted‘, among

other charges, that Judge Davies was conspiring with

counsel in other Shieh-initiated litigation then pending in

federal court, Judge Davies was willing to be used by

“white people against non-white people”, Judge Davies

was biased against Respondent as a non-white person

and that his rulings reflect that bias. The Court combined

this motion with a motion filed by Respondent on April

25, 1992 to dismiss his complaint without prejudice and

to seal the record of the proceedings. By order filed June

9, 1992, the Court denied Respondent’s motion for recon-

sideration and his motion to seal the record. The motion

to dismiss was granted with prejudice. The Court did so

because the state law claims had been dismissed on April

16, 1992, the federal civil rights claim had been dismissed

on May 20, 1992, and the RICO claim was abandoned by

Respondent. The Court also issued an order ‘to show

cause why Respondent should not be sanctioned under

Rule 11 for filing the complaint in the first instance, and

under 28 U.S.C. § 1928 for the memorandum filed on June

2, 1992. Respondent’s counsel was also subject to the

order because he signed and filed the June 2 memoran-

dum.

Prior to the hearing on the order to show cause,

Respondent sought to disqualify Judge Davies. His

* In its brief, the State Bar states in a footnote that James

Andion, Respondent’s attorney who signed this document,

“contends that the document was changed after he signed it and

was filed without his knowledge and consent.” The State Bar

does not indicate where Mr. Andion has made this statement

and whether it was under oath or under penalty of perjury.

App. 23

request was construed as a motion to disqualify and by

order filed July 29, 1992, the motion was denied by Judge

Richard A. Gadbois.

The hearing regarding sanctions was held on August

31, 1992, and an order issued the following day. In it, the

Court found that Respondent violated Rule 11, which

provides that the signatory of a document filed with the

federal court represents to the Court that after reasonable

inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact, warranted

by existing law, and not interposed for an improper pur-

pose. In this case, the Court stated

An objective review of plaintiffs’ complaint

reveals the paucity of their federal claims. The

allegations concerning civil rights and RICO are

completely insufficient to support those causes

of action. Plaintiffs admitted as much by failing

to amend their civil rights claim and by failing

to file a RICO case statement. Thus plaintiffs’

complaint was not well grounded in fact nor

warranted in existing law. The complaint was

frivolous and was filed with this Court to

harass, and to frustrate the progress of a state

court action previously filed by Ms. Araiza.

The Court sanctioned Respondent $7500 for filing the

complaint and ordered that Ms. Araiza and her attorneys

be paid within 20 days.

As to the reply filed on June 2, 1992, the Court found

that it contained inflammatory, disparaging, and uncivil

remarks directed at the Court and opposing parties. For

filing the reply in bad faith and for vexatious reasons, the

App. 24

Court sanctioned Respondent $2,500 as both a party and

as attorney of record in the matter®.

The district court’s actions were affirmed by the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on December 29,

1993, Respondent’s petition for rehearing was denied,

and the suggestion for rehearing en banc was rejected.

None of the sanctions were reported by Respondent to

the State Bar.

Ariaza State Court Action [Catellano case]

After dismissal of his federal court action, Shieh v.

Layman, et al., in June 1992, Respondent filed an identical

lawsuit in Los Angeles County Superior Court on July 15,

1992, Say & Say, el al. v. Castellano, et al. (case no.

BC059833). As noted earlier, this case was found to be a

related case to three others then pending in the Los

Angeles Superior Court and it, along with the others, was

assigned to Judge Edward Y. Kakita on September 11,

1992. Motions were filed by the defendants in all the

cases to have Respondent declared a vexatious litigant,

and to require Respondent to post security before pro-

ceeding further. While the motion was pending and a stay

was in effect, Respondent attempted to serve another

possible defendant and filed an amendment to his com-

plaint naming another Doe defendant. After hearing on

November 17, 1992, the Court found Respondent to be a

vexatious litigant under Code of Civil Procedure section

*> Respondent’s counsel, James Andion, was also

sanctioned $2,500 payable to the Clerk of the Court, as the

attorney responsible for signing and filing the reply.

App. 25

391(b)(3) and (4), ordered Respondent to post bond in the

amount of $100,000 each for the benefit of Araiza, Cast-

ellano, and Hollingsworth, stayed all proceedings in the

case pending the posting of security, entered a prefiling

order under section 391.7, prohibiting Respondent from

filing any new litigation in California state courts without

first obtaining leave of the presiding judge in the applica-

ble court, and, finally, ordering Respondent to show

cause why the lawsuits subject to the order should not be

dismissed if security were not furnished by December 17,

1992.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration on

December 1, 1992. On January 15, 1993, Respondent filed

a motion to strike documents submitted in support of the

vexatious litigant motion which had been granted on

November 17. In fact it sought reconsideration of the

vexatious litigant ruling, although the December 1

motion was still pending. It was filed after the statutory

deadline for requesting reconsideration, was improperly

served, and was set for the wrong department in superior

court (in an attempt to have a judge other than Judge

Kakita rule on it). On May 24, 1993, the motion was

denied, and Respondent and his counsel were sanctioned

$687.50.

Christopher Litigation

Respondent filed suit in federal district court on

December 23, 1991, against two large law firms who had

formerly employed him, O’Melveny & Myers and Gibson,

Dunn, & Crutcher, along with all of the partners in the

firms, a number of financial institutions, and an attorney

App. 26

who formerly represented Respondent, charging them

with various state and federal causes of action, including

RICO, wrongful termination, invasion of privacy, breach

of contract, and discrimination. The claims were volun-

tarily dismissed without prejudice by order filed May 7,

1992.

Respondent then filed the identical lawsuit in supe-

rior court on May 11, 1992°. (Shieh v. Christopher, case no.

BC054981.) As noted earlier, this case was reassigned, on

September 11, 1992, to Judge Kakita along with a number

of other Shieh-related lawsuits then pending in the supe-

rior court. On December 11, 1992, Respondent was

declared to be a vexatious litigant in both the Christopher

and Castellano cases, and the cases ordered stayed pend-

ing posting of security. Notwithstanding the stay,

Respondent and his attorneys filed two motions to com-

pel discovery, a motion for leave to file an amended

complaint, and a motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint. They commenced a new identical

lawsuit in Orange County Superior Court on June 2, 1993

(Say & Say v. O'Melveny and Myers, et al. (case ‘no. 711620),

the day before the dismissal motion was scheduled to be

heard. The action was dismissed with prejudice on June

‘ According to the Court of Appeals, many of these claims

were the subject of two prior lawsuits filed by Respondent in

superior court, A. Shieh v. Michael Newman, et al. (case no.

NEC53509) and L.C. Shieh v. David I. Thompson, et al., (case no.

NEC54381). Respondent’s appeals regarding the dismissal of

those cases was pending in the Court of Appeals at the time of

the filing of the Christopher case in superior court. (See In re

Shieh, supra, 17 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1162-1163.)

ee — e

App. 27

3, 1993, when Respondent failed to post the required

security. :

Challenges to Judge Kakita

a. Superior Court Proceedings

Respondent filed a peremptory challenge to Judge

Kakita on November 18, 1992, which was rejected as

untimely. Respondent then filed a “Notice of Related

Case and Request for Replacement of Judge Kakita” on

December 10, 1992. In a further statement of disqualifica-

tion filed December 17, 1992, Respondent accused Judge

Kakita of being in a conspiracy with and serving as the

“instrumentality” of opposing counsel. Respondent fur-—

ther alleged that as a conspirator, Judge Kakita was a

witness in the actions pending before him; that Judge

Kakita was brainwashed by one opposing counsel; and

that his actions in the proceedings constituted obstruction

of justice. On February 26, 1993, Assistant Presiding

Judge Ted Millard denied the disqualification motion’,

finding that it was “wholly frivolous, a sham, and outra-

geous” and further found Respondent to be “a vexatious

litigant whose campaign of litigation terror appears to

accuse nearly every judge who has ever ruled against him

of being ‘biased’ or a ‘racist.’” Respondent was prohib-

ited from filing any future challenges for cause unless he

first sought and received approval from the presiding

judge.

7 Respondent filed two other disqualification challenges to

Judge Kakita in two of the other related cases before Judge

Kakita.

App. 28

Respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandate

with the Court of Appeals on March 15, 1993, which was

denied on March 24, 1993. The Supreme Court denied

review on April 21, 1993.

On March 16, 1993, Respondent filed with Judge

Millard three motions for “clarification, modification and

reconsideration” of his February 26 order. Judge Millard

denied the motions by minute order filed March 22, 1993.

On March 29, 1993, Respondent filed three more motions

entitled “New and Supplemental Request for Clarifica-

tion, Modification, and Reconsideration Re: Disqualifica-

tion of Honorable Judge Kakita,” which Judge Millard

found to be identical to the motions filed and denied the

week before. He found the new motions to be untimely,

not supported by new facts, “frivolous, a sham, and

outrageous.” He struck them from the record and ordered

that no further motions of that type could be filed by

Respondent without leave from the Presiding Judge.

Respondent filed a second petition for a writ of man-

date with the Court of Appeals on March 30, 1993, again

seeking review of his attempts to disqualify Judge Kakita.

He added as new grounds that Judge Millard should have

granted his requests for reconsideration. On April 9, 1993,

the Court of Appeals issued an order to show cause why

Respondent, his fellow plaintiffs, and Respondent's coun-

sel should not be sanctioned for the filing of the second

petition for writ of mandate. Respondent did not appear

but his counsel filed a written response.

In an opinion filed June 30, 1993, the Court found the

second writ petition to be untimely, repetitive, frivolous

and part of a pattern of relitigating settled issues. In its

App. 29

view, “[T]here can be no reason for having filed the

instant petition other than to cause respondents further

unnecessary delay and expense.” The Court sanctioned

Respondent and his counsel $5,000 each. The Supreme

Court denied review. These sanctions were not reported

to the State Bar.

b. Appeals of Vexatious Litigant Ruling

While pursuing his effort to disqualify Judge Kakita,

Respondent filed three different notices of appeal of the

vexatious litigant ruling with the Court of Appeals. On

September 9, 1993, defendant Hollingsworth moved for

consolidation of the appeals and dismissal. Respondent's

opposition to the motion to dismiss was voluminous but

largely unresponsive. On December 2, 1993, the Court of

Appeals ordered Respondent and his counsel to show

cause why the appeals should not be dismissed and why

they should not be sanctioned.

In the Court’s opinion, in Say & Say v. Castellano

(1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 88, two of the three appeals were

dismissed because there were no appealable orders or

judgments rendered or entered within the scope of the

notices of appeal filed by Respondent’. The Court found

that there was an improper purpose for filing the notices:

“[P]laintiffs typically file these notices of appeal from

8 The third order was found to be appealable. The dismissal

of the appeal was sustained on the grounds that in April and

May 1993, just prior to filing the appeal, Respondent had been

adjudged in contempt of court on three occasions and was not

entitled to seek court assistance until the contempts were

purged. (Say & Say v. Castellano, supra, 22 Cal.App. 4th 88, 94.)

App. 30

nonappealable orders immediately after the superior

court indicates it is considering a course of action, and

then contend that the court lacks jurisdiction to take the

action considered due to the pending appeal or appeals.”

(Id. at pp. 92-93.) As to Respondent's opposition to the

motion to dismiss, the Court indicated that only one

paragraph in its 131-page brief dealt with the appeal-

ability of the orders and one page discussed the issues

raised in the dismissal motion. Instead, the Court found

the opposition attempted to obscure the real issues and

was wholly frivolous. In light of Respondent's failure to

change his conduct after the imposition of lesser sanction

awards, the Court imposed on Respondent a total of

$50,000 in sanctions, all but $4,000 of which was to be

paid to the Court of Appeals, Second Appellate District,

and the balance divided among the defendants /

movants®. Respondent has not reported these sanctions to

the State Bar.

On February 14, 1994, Respondent filed a petition for

rehearing of Say & Say v. Castellano, supra, 22 Cal.App. 4th

88, along with two other Court of Appeal orders. In his

pleading, Respondent accused the justices of having col-

luded with and been corrupted by large law firms, and of

discriminating against him as a minority. The petition for

hearing was denied without comment. (Say & Say v. Cast-

ellano, supra, 22 Cal.App. 4th 88, 95.)

° Respondent’s counsel, James Andion, was also

sanctioned a total of $50,000, on the same terms imposed on

Respondent.

App. 31

Sanctions in Christopher and Castellano Cases

a. Sanctions in Christopher Case

After motions were filed seeking to declare Respon-

dent a vexatious litigant in the Christopher case, Respon-

dent violated the automatic stay repeatedly and engaged

in other improper litigation tactics. In response, the

defendants filed two motions seeking sanctions. The first

was filed on January 19, 1993, and was heard on June 28,

1993. In its order filed September 24, 1993, the Court

found Respondent’s entire action to be a sanctionable

activity and noted, “this judge in more than 13 years of

judicial service on this-court has never seen more frivo-

lous, bad-faith lawsuit and litigation tactics conducted

solely for the purpose of harassment and unnecessary

delay, ...” By way of example, the Court noted seven-

teen specific acts by Respondent or his counsel which

were grounds for sanctions. Included were Respondent's

many frivolous disqualification motions against Judge

Kakita, and Respondent's service of three sets of form

interrogatories requiring responses from each of the 340

defendants, and two attempts to set depositions of party

defendants — these latter filings all in violation of the

automatic stay. The Court ordered sanctions against

Respondent and his various attorneys, jointly and sever-

ally, in favor of defendants totaling $94,785.99. An addi-

tional $7,500 for the five violations of the automatic stay,

was ordered payable to the superior court.

The second sanction motion in the Christopher case,

filed July 21, 1993, was scheduled before Judge Kakita in

November 1993. Before he could rule on the motion, he

recused himself from the case because Respondent filed

App. 32

suit against him in federal district court. Thereafter the

motion was combined with parallel contempt and sanc-

tion proceedings in the Castellano case. A multi-day hear-

ing was held.

In Christopher, the Court filed a 64-page decision on

May 31, 1994, addressing Respondent's actions clarify

since January 19, 1993. Thirty specific findings were made

by the Court?®, reflecting, among other matters, violations

of the Court’s stay order, frivolous and outrageous plead-

ings filed in attempts to disqualify Judge Kakita, docu-

ments filed with incorrect or backdated proof of service

declarations, repeated pleadings seeking Judge Kakita’s

disqualification in violation of Judge Millard’s order

requiring leave of the Presiding Judge to file them, and

numerous premature writs to the Court of Appeals to

stymie actions in the superior court. The Court found that

Respondent's actions were knowing, made in the face of

numerous warning letters sent to his attorneys (and cop-

ied to him), and demonstrated Respondent’s bad faith,

particularly in Respondent's efforts to disqualify Judge

Kakita. The Court found that Respondent was “at war”

with the courts, individual judges, his former law firms,

and attorneys who were his ex-employees. Three tactics

were used primarily by Respondent in directing his attor-

neys. First, he moved between federal and state court

when he felt that the judge in a given case was inclined to

rule against him - dismissing the case in one court and

refiling it in the other jurisdiction. Second, he filed

peremptory challenges or recusal motions. Third, he filed

premature notices of appeal. In his efforts to disqualify

10 These are set forth in the State Bar’s brief at pages 54-57.

App. 33

Judge Kakita, Respondent did not hesitate to accuse him

of judicial misconduct without any basis in fact or law,

but “as purely a vindictive matter.” The Court ordered

that Respondent be sanctioned $237,000 ($37,000 to the

Los Angeles Superior Court and the rest to the defen-

dants). His counsel were sanctioned lesser amounts.

b. Sanctions in Castellano Case

On May 31, 1994, on the same day as the Christopher

decision, the Court filed its 64-page decision and orders

in the Castellano matter. As in Christopher, Judge Kakita

had recused himself. Judge C. Bernard Kauffman heard

the motion. The decision covered the period from August

20, 1992 through July 29, 1993. Unlike the Christopher

case, there had been no prior sanction orders.

The Court found that in filing his lawsuit, Respon-

dent acted from improper motives and a desire for mali-

cious retaliation. Castellano was named in the suit

because he had filed a wage claim and had secured

sanctions against Respondent in the federal court action.

Hollingsworth was targeted in retaliation for notifying

the federal court that Respondent had improperly listed

Hollingsworth as attorney of record in the federal court

action, for obtaining sanctions against Respondent in the

federal court action, and for filing a wage claim against

Respondent. Ivy Yuen was named only because she was

Hollingsworth’s wife - and to further harass Hol-

lingsworth. Wesley Rusch, another ex-employee, was

sued because he made a wage claim against Respondent.

Respondent sued Francesca Araiza because she had filed

suit to prevent Respondent from using her name and for

App. 34

payment for legal work performed for him. The Court

found that the superior court action was frivolous and

intended to harass the defendants.

The Court found that Respondent's assertions that he

was not acting in pro per were made with the intent to

mislead the Court. Further, Respondent was found to be

at all times in control of the litigation. Actions of his

counsel were ratified by him. He had been warned as

early as August 1992 about the risk of possible sanctions

for continuing his frivolous lawsuit.

In pursuing their litigation goals, Respondent and his

counsel violated both the automatic stay in effect after the

first vexatious litigation motion was filed on September 3,

1992, and Judge Kakita’s order of November 17, 1992,

declaring Respondent a vexatious litigant and staying all

proceedings until bond was posted. Activities such as

serving several deposition notices and two sets of inter-

rogatories, filing two motions to compel depositions and

a motion to file an amended complaint, attempting to

serve the complaint on Ivy Yuen during both stays, were

grounds for the Court to conclude that Respondent and

his attorneys had decided to ignore the stay order.

Finally, all of Respondent's efforts to disqualify Judge

Kakita were designed for the sole purpose of delaying the

inevitable dismissal of the case.

The Court sanctioned Respondent a total of

$122,749.35, plus costs. Again, Respondent's counsel were

sanctioned in lesser amounts, with Respondent made

jointly and severally liable. Respondent has not reported

these sanctions to the State Bar.

App. 35

Contempt Proceedings

These proceedings originated when Respondent

failed to personally appear as ordered at a hearing on

April 22, 1993, on a motion by defendant Ivy Yuen to

have him declared a vexatious litigant. The Court issued

an order to show cause re: contempt, returnable on June

28, 1993, based on Respondent's failure to appear, and

violations of the stays. The Court identified three viola-

tions of the stay: a motion to compel discovery filed May

4, 1993, and a motion for leave to file first amended

complaint filed May 12, 1993, both in the Castellano case,

and a motion for leave to file a second amended com-

plaint filed in the Christopher matter on April 27, 1993.

Although his attorney did file written opposition on

his behalf, Respondent did not appear at the June 28

hearing. An attachment for default was issued for

Respondent, and on July 19, 1993, bail was set at $100,000

for each of the Christopher and Castellano matters. Respon-

dent was taken into custody in February 1994, his motion

to quash the attachment was denied, and he posted bail.

A further order to show cause re: contempt was filed on

February 10, 1994.

The contempt hearing was held on March 31, 1994.

The Court found beyond a reasonable doubt that Respon-

dent had notice of the Court’s order, had the ability to

comply with the Court’s order, failed to comply with the

Court’s order, and that the failure to comply was willful.

The Court found Respondent guilty of one count of con-

tempt in the Christopher case and two counts of contempt

in the Castellano case, and ordered him to appear for

sentencing on April 21, 1994. Respondent did not appear

App. 36

for sentencing. His failure to appear and his disobedience

of the Court’s order were found to be in contempt of

court, his bail was forfeited, and a bench warrant was

issued for his arrest. Respondent remains at large.

Bankruptcy Filing

In early 1994, Respondent filed for bankruptcy. In a

filing with the Court, Respondent indicated that he did

not recognize any of the decisions of the California state

courts or the federal courts. He accused California judges

generally of committing bribery, lying, and forging docu-

ments. The California Court of Appeal for the Second

District was described as a “crime family” and a “Judicial

Mafia.” Specific judges were accused of being wholly

owned and controlled by large law firms and derogatory

descriptions of judges, opposing counsel, and witnesses

were used throughout.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Business and Professions Code section 6068(f)! [offen-

sive personality]

At the outset, the Court will dismiss the charges in

counts two, three, and twenty-one, that Respondent vio-

lated section 6068(f), consistent with the decision of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in

U.S. v. Wunsch (9 Cir. 1996) 84 F.3d 1110. The State Bar

decided not to seek review of that decision in the United

States Supreme Court. Since that decision, the State Bar

11 Unless otherwise indicates, all references to section(s)

are to the sections of the Business and Professions Code.

App. 37

has, in many pending cases, withdrawn charges of

“offensive personality” under section 6068(f).

Section 6106 [acts of moral turpitude]

Section 6106 applies to Respondent's conduct, even if

he acted in a private capacity and not as an attorney.

(Maltaman v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 924, 951.) The State

Bar argues three bases for finding Respondent culpable of

committing acts of moral turpitude contrary to section

6106. The Court finds that the first two theories are

sufficient to support violations of the statute.

Respondent is charged with deliberately violating

court orders. These can be divided into two groups: those

which were the subject of contempt citations (counts 15

and 19) and those included in the sanction orders (counts

4, 10, 16, 18 and 20). A contempt citation alone is not

sufficient ground for attorney discipline. (Maltaman v.

State Bar, supra, at p. 953.) However, if circumstances

establish “bad-faith” disobedience, then discipline is war-

ranted under section 6106. (Ibid.) Here, two of the three

counts of contempt concerned Respondent's filing docu-

ments in violation of stay orders and in furtherance of

what the superior court found to be unmeritorious and

vexatious litigation. The third was for Respondent's vio-

lation of the court’s order to appear at proceedings in

which he was both party and attorney. Further Respon-

dent did not submit to the contempt proceedings will-

ingly. In fact, he had been at large for a number of

months, was taken into custody pursuant to the court

order, and appeared after posting bail. Respondent's fail-

ure to appear thereafter at his contempt sentencing, the

App. 38

forfeiture of his bail, and the current warrant for his

arrest all corroborate his bad faith. This is clear and

convincing evidence of moral turpitude.

Respondent’s violation of court orders in the Ful-

bright case [count 4 — $1500 sanction for disobeying court

order to attend deposition without reasonable justifica-

tion], Castellano case [count 16 - numerous filings in

deliberate disregard of stay order], and Christopher case

[count 18 — $7,500 sanction to court for 5 filings in viola-

tion of stay order; count 20 - unspecified sanctions for

numerous filings in deliberate disregard of stay order and

order requiring leave of court] were all specified grounds

for sanctions by the courts involved. In each instance

Respondent was found to have acted in bad faith or

without reasonable justification. However, in the Ebershoff

state court action (count 10), the court struck the pleading

filed in violation of the stay order but did not consider

whether the filing constituted grounds for sanctions or

was done in bad faith. The focus of the court’s June 3

order in the Ebershoff case was Respondent's multiple,

meritless motions for reconsideration of the vexatious

litigant ruling, not violation of the stay. Therefore, the

“bad faith” test required under Maltaman has not been

met. (Id. at p. 951.) We conclude that Respondent violated

section 6106 in willfully disobeying court orders as

alleged in counts 4, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20.

Respondent was also charged in count 22 with engag-

ing in a pattern of misconduct which, seen as a whole,

amounted to moral turpitude. Unfortunately, count 22

read alone does not specify the acts or elements in

Respondent's conduct charged in the preceding 21 counts

App. 39

which support the finding of moral turpitude!2. However,

Respondent was informed by the charges in counts 4, 10,

15, 16, 18, 19, and 20 that his conduct in violating these

orders involved moral turpitude. In these counts Respon-

dent is charged with violations of numerous court orders.

These violations were grounds for sanctions or contempt

proceedings against Respondent, and together constitute

a pattern of serious, habitual abuse of the judicial system

consistent with a finding of moral turpitude. (In the Mat-

ter of Varakin (Review Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct.

Rptr. 179, 186.) On this narrower ground, the Court finds

culpability on count 22.

The State Bar also charges in count 21 that Respon-

dent’s filing of a bankruptcy pleading containing state-

ments which were outrageous, demeaning, and

slanderous to judges, opposing counsel, and witnesses

was so serious as to amount to moral turpitude. Aside

from citing cases where there is wide discretion in defin-

ing the term “moral turpitude,” the State Bar has not

provided any case law to support a finding of moral

turpitude in this context. Coupled with First Amendment

concerns in this area, particularly in attorney disciplinary

proceedings (see Standing Committee v. Yagman (9 Cir.

1995) 55 F.3d 1430, 1438-1442), we do not find clear and

convincing evidence that such conduct constitutes moral

turpitude under section 6106.

2 An example of a proper notice pleading consistent with

these charges was set forth by the Review Department in

footnote 3, of its opinion in In ihe Matter of Varakin (Review

Dept. 1994) 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 186.

App. 40

Section 6068(c) [maintaining unjust litigation]

Counts 1, 2, 5-14, 16, 17, 18, and 20 charge Respon-

dent with violating his duty under section 6068(c) by

repeatedly filing and pursuing baseless and vexatious

litigation. This is confirmed by the designation of

Respondent as a vexatious litigant in all the state court

actions discussed in this proceeding. Further, in Layman,

Ebershoff, Castellano and Christopher, each court found that

Respondent initiated frivolous and meritless lawsuits

with no basis in fact or law. In the Ebershoff, Castellano

and Christopher matters, Respondent was sanctioned

repeatedly for pursuing meritless, duplicative, and frivo-

lous motions and appeals. Culpability on these counts is

amply supported by the record.

Section 6068(g) Uitigation pursued for corrupt motive or

passion of interest!

In count 24, Respondent is charged with violating

section 6068(g), which provides that an attorney has a

duty “[nJot to encourage either the commencement or the

continuance of an action or proceeding from any corrupt =

motive of passion or interest.” The count does not iden-

tify the litigation at issue, but by incorporating counts 1

through 21 by reference, it can be read to charge that all

the lawsuits discussed in the prior counts were pursued

by Respondent for a purpose prohibited by the statute.

This charge is sustained by the record as a whole, as to

every lawsuit filed by Respondent and covered by this

‘’ This argument as to adequate notice would be more

difficult to sustain in the cases of Respondent's former co-

respondents, who were not involved in all the lawsuits at issue.

App. 41

disciplinary case. As discussed earlier Respondent was

sanctioned repeatedly for filing lawsuits to harass his

opponents. Even in the two matters briefly discussed

which were not subjects of a sanction order, Shich v.

Ebershoff et al. (case no. BC0270441) ani the federal case

against O’Melveny & Myers, et al, the subsequent history

in both cases confirms that all Respcndent’s litigation

against his former law firms and ex-emloyees was moti-

vated by spite and vindictiveness, motives which run

contrary to the statute. (Sorensen v. Sate Bar (1991) 52

Cal.3d 1036, 1042.)

Section 6068(0) (3)

Respondent failed to report any of the over $500,000

in sanctions imposed in the many lawsuits-at issue in this

case.

Section 6068(b) [respect for courts}

There is ample evidence to suppot the charges in

counts 4, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20 tha by deliberately

disobeying court orders, Respondent ilso violated his

duty under section 6068(b) to maintain he respect due to

the courts of justice and judicial officrs. (Maltaman v.

State Bar, supra, 43 Cal.3d 924, 951.) Addtional violations

of the statute resulted from Respondeit’s campaign to

disqualify Judge Kakita. As set forth incounts 5, 13, 16,

17, 18, and 20, it was, as Judge Millarc characterized it

“wholly frivolous, a sham, and outrageois.” Judge Kauff-

man, in sanctioning Respondent for these tactics, con-

cluded that Respondent acted in a purely vindictive

manner in seeking Judge Kakita’s disqualification.

App. 42

As to the remaining charges under section 6068(b),

these involve allegations that Respondent failed to show

proper respect for judges by filing various pleadings

which contained unjustified and demeaning allegations

concerning judges and the judicial system. This kind of

charge has been sustained in the past by the California

Supreme Court in Ramirez v. State Bar (1980) 28 Cal.3d

402, by a bare majority of justices. The dissent in that

case, written by Justice Newman and joined by Chief

Justice Bird and Justice Tobriner, discussed the First

Amendment and free speech implications of the statute -

punishing attorneys for comments made demeaning the

judiciary, issues which were studiously avoided by the

majority. These principles have been discussed and

applied more recently in a case previously cited, Standing

Committee v. Yagman, supra, 55 F.3d 1430, in the context of

the constitutional protections accorded to attorneys who

make statements which impugn the integrity of the judi-

ciary. While it may be instructive at some future date to

compare and contrast these two cases in circumstances

where the outcome might have real import, this is not the

case here. Therefore, the Court will dismiss these counts

without prejudice.

MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING

CIRCUMSTANCES

Mitigating Circumstances

The only mitigating circumstance from the record is

Respondent's lack of a prior record of discipline. How-

ever, under the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Pro-

fessional Misconduct, the absence of a prior record of

discipline is mitigating only if coupled with misconduct

App. 43

which is not serious. (Standard 1.2(e)(i).) We find that

Respondent's conduct was of a most serious nature such

that standard 1.2(e)(i) does not apply.

Aggravating Circumstances

We find that Respondent’s misconduct is aggravated

by clear and convincing evidence of numerous aggrava-

ting factors. There was a pattern of repeated abuse of the

judicial process and multiple acts of wrongdoing (stan-

dard 1.2(b)(ii). Significant harm resulted to the many

defendants involved in Respondent's vexatious litigation

“war” who, because of Respondent's flight and conceal-

ment of assets, will never recover the sanctions and costs

owed to them. (Standard 1.2(b)(iv) The judicial system

was stymied by Respondent’s wasteful and meritless liti-

gation, and he proceeded undeterred by enormous sanc-

tions and stay orders. (Ibid.) His actions were in bad faith

and motivated by base and improper aims. (Standard

1.2(b)(iii).) His tactics as a whole are devoid of any con-

sideration for the victims of his “war.” (Standard

1.2(b)(vi).) He is defiant and unrepentant. (Standard

1.2(b)(v).)

Standards

Under Standard 1.3, the purpose of State Bar disci-

plinary proceedings is to protect the public, to preserve

public confidence in the legal profession, and to maintain

' the highest possible standards of conduct for attorneys.

In cases of attorneys who commit acts of moral turpitude,

standard 2.3 calls for imposition of actual suspension or

disbarment depending on the harm to the victims, the

App. 44

magnitude of the misconduct, and the degree to which

the acts relate to the member’s practice of law. Standard

2.6 requires either suspension or disbarment, dictated by

the gravity of the offense and the harm to the victim.

DISCIPLINE RECOMMENDATION

In another case regarding an attorney unjustly defi-

ant in the face of multiple contempt citations, the

Supreme Court said, “Other than outright deceit, it is

difficult to imagine conduct in the course of legal repre-

sentation more unbefitting an attorney.” (Barnum v. State

Bar, supra, 52 Cal.3d 104, 112.) Another attorney at war

with the courts, Betsy Lebbos, was disbarred by the

Supreme Court after it found that “[i]t is evident that

[Lebbos] has no appreciation that her method of practic-

ing law is totally at odds with the professional standards

of this state.” (Lebbos v. State Bar (1991) 53 Cal.3d 37, 45.)

Although the following quote described a different abu-

sive litigant, Walter Alexander Varakin, his misconduct in

pursuing four lawsuits is far outstripped by the magni-

tude and scope of Respondent's actions,

Respondent’s repeated acts of moral turpitude

demonstrate that he is no longer worthy of

membership in the bar. Nothing the attorney

discipline system can do will prevent respon-

dent from continuing to abuse the legal system

as a litigant, if he so chooses. But disbarring

respondent will at least prevent him from con-

tinuing his abusive course of conduct under the

cloak of authority conferred on him by his mem-

bership in the bar. (In the Matter of Varakin,

supra, 3 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 179, 191.)

App. 45

These conclusions are no less true of Respondent.

Respondent's disbarment is required under the case law,

the Standards, the facts, and the equities.

RECOMMENDED DISCIPLINE

Based on the foregoing, the Court recommends that

Respondent, Liang-Houh Shieh, be disbarred from the

practice of law in the State of California.

COSTS

It is also recommended that the costs be awarded to

the State Bar pursuant to Business and Professions Code

section 6086.10.

DATED: /s/ Eugene E. Brott

OCTOBER 10, 1996 Eugene E. Brott

Judge of the State Bar Court

DECLARATION OF SERVICE

[Rule 62(b), Rules Proc.; Code Civ. Proc., § 1013a(4)]

I am a Case Coordinator of the State Bar Court. I am over

the age of eighteen and not a party to the within proceed-

ing. In the City and County of San Francisco, on October

10, 1996, I deposited a true copy of the following docu-

ment(s) .

DECISION filed October 10, 1996

in a sealed envelope as follows:

[XX] with first-class postage thereon fully prepaid in a

facility regularly maintained by the United States

App. 46

Postal Service at San Francisco, California,

addressed as follows:

LIANG-HOUH SHIEH

P O BOX 84-861

TAIPEI

TAIWAN ROC

[] by certified mail, with a return receipt requested,

in a facility regularly maintained by the United

States Postal Service at San Francisco, California,

addressed as follows:

[XX] in an interoffice mail facility regularly maintained

by the State Bar of California addressed as follows:

DONALD STEEDMAN

OFFICE OF TRIAL COUNSEL - SF

I hereby certify that the foregoing is true and correct.

Executed in San Francisco, California, on October 10,

1996.

/s/ Lauretta a Cramer

Lauretta Cramer

Case Coordinator

State Bar Court

App. 47

D. The United States Constitution, Art. VI, Section

II: “ . . . all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under

the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme

Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be

bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of

any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

Fifth Amendment: “. . . nor be deprived of life, lib-

erty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall

private property be taken for public use, without just

compensation.”

Fourteenth Amendment: “ . . . No State shall make or

enforce any law which shall abridge the privilege or

immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law; nor deny to any person

within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”

E. The California Constitution, Art. 6, § 11: “The

Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction .. . ”

F. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce And Navi-

gation Between the Republic of China and the United

States of America ~-

App. 48

ARTICLE II ~—

3. The nationals of either High Contracting Party

shall not in any case, in the enjoyment of the rights and

privileges . . . receive . . . less favorable than the treat-

ment which is or may hereafter be accorded to the

nationals of any third country.

ARTICLE VI

1. Throughout the whole extent of the territories of

each High Contracting Party the nationals of the other

High Contracting Party shall receive the most constant

protection and security for their persons and property,

and shall enjoy in this respect the full protection and

security required by international law.

2. The property of nationals, corporation and asso-

ciations of either High Contracting Party shall not be

taken within the territories of the other High Contracting

Party without due process of law and without the prompt

payment of just and effective compensation.

4. The nationals, corporations and associations of

either High Coatracting Party shall enjoy freedom of

access to the courts of justice and to administrative tribu-

nals and agencizs in the territories of the other High

Contracting Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction estab-

lished by law, toth in pursuit and in defense of their

rights; shall be a liberty to choose and employ lawyers,

interpreters and representatives in the prosecution and

defense of their ights before such courts, . . . and shall be

permitted to execise all these rights and privileges, in

conformity with the applicable laws and regulations, if

App. 49

any, which are or may hereafter be enforced by the duly

constituted authorities, on terms no less favorable than

the terms which are or may hereafter be accorded to the

nationals, . . . of such other High Contracting Party and

no less favorable than are or may hereafter be accorded to

the nationals, . . . of any third country.

G. Law Governing Extension of Assistance to For-

eign Court

Article 2

Such assistance shall not violate the statutes and

ordinances of the Republic of China.

Article 3

The substance of each case commissioned by a for-

eign court shall be stated in writing and transmitted

through diplomatic channels.

Article 4

The foreign country where the foreign court requests

for an assistance from the court of the Republic of China

must state that it would provide a reciprocal assistance if

a court of the R.O.C. requests for an assistance under the

same or similar circumstance.

Article 5

Each foreign court requests for the assistance from

the court of the Republic of China shall set forth in its

commission [power of attorney] the name, nationality,

App. 50

and domicile, residence, or office address, business

address of the person to be served.

Article 6

Each court shall effect discovery [investigation of

evidence] according to the theme of the foreign court's

commission and in accordance with the provisions gov-

erning the discovery under the Code of Civil Procedure

and the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Each foreign court requests for the assistance from

the courts in the Republic of China for the discovery

shall, in its commission, set forth the names of the parties,

the device of discovery [kinds of evidential methods], the

names, nationality, domicile, residence, or office address,

business address of the responding party or third party,

and set forth the matters subject to the discovery [to be

investigated].

Article 7

If the commission [power of attorney] requesting for

the assistance from the courts of the Republic of China

and other relevant documents of a case are in a foreign

language, true Chinese translations shall be attached with

a certificate that the translation is true and correct.

H. STATE BAR ACT

§6007. Involuntary Enrollment as an Inactive Member

(c)(1) The board may order the involuntary inactive

enrollment of an attorney upon a finding that

the attorney’s conduct poses a substantial

App. 51

threat of harm to the interests of the attor-

ney’s clients or to the public...

(e)(1)...

passed, a letter has been served on

the member through regular mailing

again warning the member of the

consequences of failing to file an

answer, and the member has not

filed an answer within 15 days after

the letter was served.

(2) The board shall terminate the involun-

tary inactive enrollment of a member

under this subdivision when an answer

to the notice is filed on behalf of the

member, or when a proposed answer is

filed with a request to set aside the mem-

ber’s default.

(3) The enrollment and termination under

this subdivision are administrative in

character and no hearing is required.

§ 6068 “It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the

following: ... ”

App. 52

I. RULES OF PROCEDURE OF

THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA

Rule 60 (b) SERVICE OF INITIAL PLEADING.

(b) Service upon a member who is the subject of a

proceeding shall be made by certified mail, return

receipt requested, addressed to the member at the

latest address shown on the official membership

records of the State Bar.

Rule 101. NOTICE OF DISCIPLINARY CHARGES.

(b) The notice of disciplinary charges shall:

(4) Contain the following notice in prominent type:

“NOTICE - DEFAULT PROCEDURE. Your default

may be entered for failure to file a written response

to this notice of disciplinary charges within twenty

(20) days after service. Your default may also be

entered for failure to appear at trial.

Rule 102. MOTIONS WHICH EXTEND TIME TO FILE

RESPONSE.

If, on or before the date on which a party’s response must

be filed, including extensions, that party files and serves

a motion to dismiss under rule 262(b), (c), (d), or (e), then

the party’s obligation to file the response shall be post-

poned as follows:

(a) If the Court denies the motion or postpones its dis-

position until the trial on the merits, the response

shall be filed and served within ten (10) days after

service of the Court’s order;

(b) If the motion was made under rule 262(b), the

response shall be filed and served within ten (10)

days after service of the initial pleading is properly

made;

App. 53

If the motion was made under rule 262(c) and the

Court directs or permits the filing of an amended

initial pleading, the response shall be filed and

served within ten (10 days after service of the

amended initial pleading.

Rule 200. DEFAULT PROCEDURE FOR FAILURE TO

FILE TIMELY RESPONSE.

(a)(4) the following in prominent type: “YOUR

(b)

(c)

DEFAULT WILL BE ENTERED IF NO RESPONSE

IS FILED WITH THE CLERK OF THE STATE BAR

COURT WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS OF SERVICE OF

THIS MOTION FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT.

Service of the motion for entry of default shall be as

provided in the rule for service of initial pleadings

(rule 60).

Service of the notice of entry of default on the

respondent shall be as provided in the rule for ser-

vice of initial pleadings (rule 60).

Rule 203(b) Motion to Vacate Improperly Entered

Default. Any party may move to vacate any default on

the ground that it was not properly entered. The Court

may vacate an improperly entered default on its own

motion. An improperly entered default may be vacated at

any time while the State Bar court has jurisdiction of the

matter.

Rule 300. PETITION FOR INTERLOCUTORY REVIEW.

(c)

Time for Filing Petition. Where review is provided

for under paragraph (a) of this rule, any aggrieved

party may petition the Review Department for

review of the order within fifteen (15) days of the

service of a written order by a judge of the Hearing

App. 54

Department, or of the making of an oral order on the

record, whichever is later.

Rule 461. APPLICATION FOR INVOLUNTARY INAC-

TIVE ENROLLMENT.

(e) Within three (3) court days after filing the applica-

tion, the deputy trial counsel shall serve on the

member, pursuant to the rule for service of initial

pleadings. (rule 60).

Rule 462. MEMBER’S RESPONSE TO APPLICATION;

WITHIN TEN DAYS TO PROTECT RIGHT TO HEAR-

ING.

The member against whom an application or order to

show cause under these rules is directed shall have ten

(10) days from the date of service of the application or

order to show cause to file with the Clerk a verified

response and a request that the hearing which has been

set pursuant to rule 461 be held.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.