Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Cunningham v. United States

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Supreme Court, U.S.

‘7 rFELEeP

~ 97-88 JUL 1 4 1997

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 97-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1997

REX W. CUNNINGHAM, JR.,

THOMAS FERRIS, and BRIAN HOYLE

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

AND APPENDIX

Wendy Hanna Sibbison

Counsel of Record

26 Beech Street

Greenfield, MA 01301

(413) 772-0329

Attomev for Petitioners

July 11, 1997

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. (a) Can a facially deficient electronic surveillance warrant

under Title III's particularity provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(b) and

(c), be corrected by importing judge-made exceptions to the Fourth

Amendment’s exclusionary rules into Title III’s exclusionary rules, 18

U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a)?

(b) In reversing the district court’s Title III suppression order on

legally novel grounds not raised below, did the court of appeals exceed

its “plain error” jurisdiction set forth in United States v. Olano, 507

U.S. 725 (1993)?

2. Was it objectively unreasonable for a state prosecutor to delay

sealing electronic surveillance materials in 1992 for the sole reason

that he had "never read the federal statute" and had "never heard of"

United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990)?

TABLE OF CONTENTS'

CURES TINGS PUREE oe cc cee cw ecsececes i

LAST GP ALD: PRO bons oe ee ree ahs lin

| er ee re) er ere iil

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES.............. rete eee iv

RRR. 2 os eee eel eee eae l

ti i oo ret l

FES CO ns 65k en ee eee Sh 2

STATUTES DOUG VE ical screed see een cee an se 2

STATERGENT OF Ties Ge oo os es ee ee ween le a 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ................ 6

I. Whether courts may incorporate judge-made Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence into Title III's statutory exclusionary

rules presents an important question of federal law on which the

courts of anponis ave tp GUNG ac cds kc dansnensesdvesdcies 6

a. Based on dictum from a single, inapposite case from the D.C.

Circuit, the panel held that violations of central provisions of Title

III do not always require suppression................... 6

, LIST OF ALL PARTIES

The caption of the case in this court contains the names of all parties to

this petition.

ul

b. Based on a single, inapposite Fourth Amendment case, the

court of appeals mistakenly concluded that a facially defective

Title III warrant may be saved by extrinsic evidence of the

knowledge of the issuing judge and executing officer........ 8

II. In reversing the district court on legally novel grounds not

raised below, the court of appeals acted outside the scope of its

"plain error" jurisdiction as circumscribed in United States v.

SY GI MEP EEPEED oo nce ccaveedessovcesvescere 13

III. A state prosecutor's ignorance-of-federal-law excuse is not an

‘objectively reasonable" explanation for a seven-day sealing delay

under United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990)...... 14

I a 16

INDEX TO APPENDIX

A. Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First

Ne eee nc le oi hh gy % ne. pide s Al-Al3

B. Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

denving petition for rehearing.......................... Al4

C. Memorandum and Order of the United States District Court

allowing motion to suppress evidence........... _... .AL5-Ad44

D. Order of the United States District Court denving the government's

motion for reconsideration........................ A45-A47

E. Memorandum and Order of the United States District Court

reaffirming suppression order on reconsideration....... . A48-A5 1

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Federal Cases

Boi Selim, :

codes Montini ;

Keating v. Sec. of Health and

ah I ss aye cag ee Bbw veel o Peale 13

Macau Shemttt

nk og bla oes Hee ee 10 n.5

Thomas v. Am,

WO, POPUNOIIODS 5 oa ccc ven vunvecccvsuavsiuns 13

United States v. Abrams,

615 F.2d 541 (Ist Cir. 1980)...................... 0... 11

SE OT. oe. 8

T2 F.3d 9 (2d Cir _, ee 14

889 F.Supp.177

Wb tees cee: 10

“85 F.3d 1305 (8th Cir. AID 5.5 0a tN, 14

United States v, Baranek,

903 F.2d 1068 (6th Cir. 1990)........................ 10

United States v. Bianco,

998 F.2d 1112 (2nd Cir. 1993),

cert. denied,

S11 US, O60 (1908). ... 0... ec ccc ec cece es 910n.5

IV

808 Fad Soa tle Ge 1986)... 5, 7n3,8,9,11,12

416 US. 562 (1974). 6,704

113 F.3d 289 (Ist Cir. 1997).

867 F.2d 36 (Ist Cir. 1989)... 9

429US. 413 (1977)... 6,8

771 F. Supp. 1266

(D. Mass. 1991) ara a' pias S/n ade ea eee ned eee 10

938 F.2d 502 (2nd Cir. 1976). 15

A16US SS Fee, 5, ei ot eae 7,8,12

uate |

"= GO6 Fad 11S ee Ci PG oo bel ee 8

v0 Fd 66d ie 97). I4

519 F.2d 1068 (Sth Cir. 1975).

‘cert, denied, 424U.S.909(1976).. 8

wd68 US. 897 (1984) BON, aa ee 9-12

~~

We ink lons

SP MOW ae 1996). ‘3

United States v. Moore

41 F.3d 370 (8th Cir. 1994)... 7

BDL 24860 (Ist Cit 1987) ooo ces vecevee 15,16

P98 US 287 (1990). eco cease 4-16

ems07 US. 725 (1993) Veer ore eee nee 13,14

Ree lon

vm 6ld F24 lst Cir 1980) E cukwavuey vate nee eee r

v0 F24292 2nd Cit 1986). occ cease 0

vs 26 F.2d 14700 Cir Tc, ROR ee koe 7

So ae ”

crs oe

‘cert denied, 493 US. 821 (1989). ce 7

GTR F 24 376 (it Cit 1982). eee 13

United States v. Vest,

SiS F.20 477 (tet Car. 1967)... ec ceenwtavcases 9

United States v. Vigi,

515 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.),

cert, denied,

423 U.S. 912 (1975)... ccc ee 7

United States v. Ward,

808 F. Supp. 803

(S.D. Ga. 1992)... 000 ee. eT a 10 n.5

United States v. Webster,

84 F.3d 1056 (8th Cir. 1996)... .................2.... 14

State Cases

Chan v. State,

552 A.2nd 1351

(MS. App. 1989)..................0.00......... 10 n.5

367 Mass. 224(1975),.......__- ere ee ee eee we) 16

State v, Garcia,

547 So.2d 628 (Fla. 1989)... 10 n.5

State v. Neisler,

655 So. 2d 252 (La. 1995),.......__. -10n5

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1)... 2 2

USL. 8DNS..........;....... Ee tras en 12

18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)...... 7n.2

redid cte t,o xen, TOE 4-6

18 U.S.C. § 2518(8Mfa)... 5,15

I8 U.S.C. § 2518(10Ma)....... Pel naa ee 3,6,12,15

IS U.S.C. § 2520(d)...... 0. 12

MISCELLANEOUS

S. Rep. No. 1097. 90th Cong.,

2d Sess., 1968

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2153,2191........ Pepe.

Fed. R.Crim.P.520).................

Clifford S. Fishman.

. 13.13 n.9

a L111 n.6

James G. Carr,

$6.3A (1996 Supp.)................... 1111.6

Vii

Senate Report (Judiciary Committee)

No. 1097 at 96, 1968 U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin. News

eS ere cs sos ck chee see eee eeeaee 12

2 LaFave, Search and Seizure,

es ba ea pues ww eek 11

Sutherland Statutory Construction,

ee Me ME esc sa wins oa c8 oe Ova eek 12

Vili

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

: October Term, 1997

REX W. CUNNINGHAM, JR.,

THOMAS FERRIS, and BRIAN HOYLE

Petitioners,

We

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

REX W. CUNNINGHAM, JR., THOMAS FERRIS AND

BRIAN HOYLE respectfully petition for a writ of certiorari to review

the judgment and opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit reversing an order of the United States District Court,

District of Massachusetts, suppressing evidence.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit is published as United States v. Cunningham, 113 F.3d 289

(Ist Cir. 1997). It is Appendix A to this petition. The Order of that

court denying a petition for rehearing is Appendix B. The order of the

United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, allowing

petitioner's motion to suppress evidence is Appendix C. That court’s

denial of the government's motion for reconsideration is Appendix D.

Its refusal to change its suppression order after reconsideration is

Appendix E.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on May 19,

1997. Its order denying Petitioners’ petition for rehearing was entered

on June 4, 1997. Petitioner invokes this court's jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1254(1)(1997).

STATUTES INVOLVED

Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act

of 1968. Pub.L. 90-351, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521, as

amended by Pub. L. No. 99-508 (1986), provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2515. Prohibition on use as evidence of intercepted wire or

oral communications.

Whenever any wire or oral communication has been intercepted,

no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence

derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial ... in or

before any court of the United States ... if the disclosure of that

information would be in violation of this chapter.

§ 2518. Procedure for interception of wire, oral or electronic

communications.

**

(4) Each order authorizing or approving the interception of any

__ wire. oral. or electronic communication under this chapter

shall specify--

*** x

(b) the nature and location of the communications facilities as

to which. or the place where, authority to intercept is granted:

[and]

(c) a particular description of the type of communication

sought to be intercepted. and a statement of the particular offense

to which it relates[.]

***

(10)(a) Any aggrieved person in any trial ... before any court ...

of the United States ... may move to suppress the contents of any

Wire or oral communication intercepted pursuant to this chapter.

or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that--

(i) the communication was unlawfully intercepted;

(1i) the order of authorization or approval under which it was

intercepted is insufficient on its face: or

(iui) the interception was not made in conformity with the order of

authonzation or approval.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The opmions below contain all the facts and rulings relevant to the

issues presented in this petition. A2-A4, Al5-A22. A45-A46, A50-

A351. We summarize those facts and rulings.

Between May 20, 1992. and November |, 1992, possessed of

electronic surveillance orders issued by a Massachusetts Superior

Court judge, state police monitored the defendants’ oral

communications by means of a bug installed in Mr. Cunningham's

Springfield place of business, Dillon's Tavern. The United States

sought to use this state-gathered evidence in the present RICO

prosecution.

On Mav 17, 1996, the district court (Freedman, S.J.) granted the

defendants’ motion to suppress this evidence on the grounds that the

primary order. on which all subsequent orders depended, was

"insufficient on its face." 28 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii). A42-A43.

The government filed an interlocutory appeal and, on May 19,

1997. a panel of judges reversed the suppression order. On June 4.

1997. petitions for rehearing and for rehearing in banc were denied.

The motion to suppress was grounded solely in Title III's statutory

exclusionary rules. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(10)(a). and not on any

judge-made exclusionary rules applicable to Fourth Amendment

violations.

Every judge who has reviewed this Order concluded that it is

facially defective. since an objective reader could not reasonably

determine whether it authorized a wiretap or a bug.

The district court ordered the Dillon's interceptions and all

derivative evidence suppressed because:

[the court] cannot state that a reasonably prudent officer. reading

the warrant with some diligence, would conduct the mental

gymnastics that the government undertakes in eighteen pages of

rationalizing and conclude that oral interception, and not wire

interception, was authorized. . . .

Nor does the court believe that the sloppy wording . . . amounts

to a mere technical violation of Title II. Rather. the Court cannot

help but to wonder whether [the issuing judge] was misled as to

the tvpe of communications which were to be intercepted. .

A.D.A. Picknally's application contained numerous references to

wire communications.... Moreover, District Attorney Bennett's

attestation at the end of the application declared, "The proposed

use of electronic surveillance relative to telephones (413) 531-

4994 and (413) 531-3188 is consistent with the overall policy

followed in Hampden County to eliminate this type of illegal

gaming combine. ." Finally, the Court cannot accept that [the

issuing judge] fully understood that the surveillance was limited

to oral communications in light of the fact that she ordered New

England Telephone Company to provide law enforcement

personnel the technical assistance they needed in regard to the

telephone at Dillon's Tavern with assigned number (413) 739-

9212. A42.

As a preliminary matter, the appellate panel agreed that the

primary order was facially defective, as follows:

By referring randomly to oral communications and wire

communications or wiretaps. the warrant is garbled on the verv

questions posed by [18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(4)(b) and (c)]. Taken as

a whole--but taken alone and without extrinsic evidence--the

warrant does not tell the objective but ignorant reader just what

interceptions are to be targeted. .. [T]he confusion is serious.

and despite the government's linguistic acrobatics, this is not a

warrant that we would deem adequate if it were signed by a judge

and executed by a police officer having no other knowledge of the

background and objectives... . [S]tanding alone, the bare

inconsistent words of the warrant fail to create reasonable

assurance that the signer or reader would know Just what was

intended. A4-A9.

The panel thus recognized that the order lacked particularity both

as to "the nature. . .of the communications facilities as to which. .

authority to intercept is granted" and as to "the type of communication

sought to be intercepted." 18 U.S.C. $§ 2518(4)(b) and (c).

Applying the reasoning of a single Fourth Amendment case--

, 808 F.2d 864 (Ist Cir. 1986)--to Title III's

exclusionary rules, the panel found that this facially defective order.

lacking the requisite Statutory particularity, was nonetheless

acceptable under Title III because of its conclusion (contrary to that

of the district court, A42) that "the judge and the executing officer

knew what had been proposed and authorized." A8-Al 1.

Additionally, the panel created this significant and far-reaching

new Title [II law under the rubric of “plain error." A6-A7.

It also endorsed a seven-day sealing delay based solely on a state

prosecutor's confessed ignorance of this court's jurisprudence. 18

U.S.C. § 2518(8)a). Al3, A36.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

I. Whether courts may incorporate judge-made Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence into Title III's statutory exclusionary

rules presents an important question of federal law on which the

courts of appeals are in conflict.

a. Based on dictum from a single, inapposite case from the

D.C. Circuit, the panel held that violations of central

provisions of Title III do not always require suppression.

Congress provided for mandatory suppression of intercepted oral

communications where, as here, “the order of authorization or

approval under which it was intercepted is insufficient on its face." 18

U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a)(ii).

The court of appeals recognized that this order "standing alone"

and "without extrinsic evidence" was deficient since it did "not tell the

objective. . . reader just what interceptions [were] to be targeted." A8-

A9. This problem is "serious," the court realized; but for certain

extrinsic evidence, it held that "this is not a warrant that we would

deem adequate." A5, A8.

In holding that the issuing judge's and executing officer's

knowledge rescued a facially bad Title II] order, the panel

misapprehended the law surrounding Title III's exclusionary rules.

In addition to the provisions requiring suppression for facially

deficient orders. these rules also require suppression when a

"communication was unlawfully intercepted." 18 USC. §

2518(10\a)i). This subsection requires suppression for all violations

of provisions which "play ‘a central, or even functional, role in

guarding against unwarranted use of wiretapping or electronic

surveillance." United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 437 (1977),

quoting United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 578 (1974). Title Ill

demands "strict adherence” to its central provisions. Donovan, supra,

at 440.

As the district court noted, the government has never disputed that

Section 2518(4)(b) is such a central provision of Title III, A43 n.7.

and the court of appeals evidently concluded that Section 2518(4)(c)

was likewise "intended to play a central role in the statutory scheme.”

United States v, Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528 (1974). A7-A8. By all

previous caselaw, suppression was thus proper here.

Nonetheless, relying on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence--in

which the court of appeals had once deemed it permissible to look

outside the four corners of an ordinary search warrant for

particularity’—it rewrote that portion of Title III requiring suppression

where an order is "insufficient on its face." 18 U.S.C. §

2518(10Xa)(ii). The statute does not mean what it says, the decision

holds: instead, it means that an order "insufficient on its face" with

respect to particularity can be made sufficient with extrinsic evidence.

No other court of appeals has ever held that a facial deficiency in

a Title [Il order which violates central particularity provisions can be

cured by extrinsic evidence. Contrast, United States v. Moore, 41

F.3d 370, 374-376 (8th Cir. 1994) (absence of judge's signature on

Title If order was mere "technical defect" since central provision of

the statute requires judicial approval. which was given, and does not

require a signed order): United States v. Traitz, 871 F.2d 368, 379

(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 821 (1989) (failure to identify Justice

official who authorized application. Chavez*-type defect): United

States v. Swann, 526 F.2d 147. 149 (9th Cir. 1975) (Chavez-tvpe

defect): United States v. Joseph, 519 F.2d 1068, 1070 (5th Cir. 1975),

cert, denied, 424 U.S. 909 (1976) (same): United States v. Vigi, 515

F.2d 290, 293 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975) (same);

“This is indisputably correct. Cf. S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,

1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2153, 2191 (analogous provisions of § 2518(3) "are intended

to meet the test of the Constitution that electronic surveillance techniques be used

only under the most precise and discriminate circumstances, which fully comply

with the requirement of particularity”).

"United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864 (Ist Cir. 1986)

“United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974) (wiretap application

misidentified authonzing Justice official suffered trom mere “technical detect” and

did not violate "central provision").

United States v. Acon, 513 F.2d 513, 517-519 (3d Cir. 1975) (same)

The court of appeals’ decision rested on the legally mistaken belief

that "violations of even . . . central requirements [of Title III] do not

mandate suppression if the government demonstrates to the court's

satisfaction that the statutory purpose has been achieved despite the

violation.” A8-A9, quoting United States vy. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115,

121 (D.C. Cir. 1982).

This is a novel and legally unsupported statement of Title III law.

The language from Johnson is dictum: Johnson concerned

electronic surveillance authorized under the District of Columbia

Code. not Title III. 696 F.2d at 116-117. The statutes contain

significant differences. Id. at 122 n.45.

Not another federal court in the country has ever suggested. even

in dictum. that there are circumstances under which "violations of

even. . . central requirements fof Title III] do not mandate

suppression.” All this court's jurisprudence is to the contrary. United

States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433 n.22 (1977): United States v.

Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-528 (1974).

On this basis alone, certiorari is appropriate.

b. Based on a single. inapposite Fourth Amendment case, the

court of appeals mistakenly concluded that a facially defective

Title III warrant may be saved by extrinsic evidence of the

knowledge of the issuing judge and executing officer.

Based on United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864 (Ist Cir. 1986),

the court of appeals held that a Title III order lacking the requisite

Statutory particularity does not require suppression if extrinsic

evidence shows that the judge and the executing officer both knew the

true intent of the order. While purporting not to reach the issue, A8-

All. the court of appeals thus injected a new. hybrid "good faith"

exception into Title [II's exclusionary rules.

The court misapprehended the law in several respects.

First. the court's importation of Fourth Amendment law into Title

[II goes bevond any ordinary "good faith" exception to the statute's

exclusionary rules. As the district court properly held. even if a

Fourth Amendment "good faith" exception were incorporated into Title

III, it would not apply here since "no officer reading the facially

defective warrant could have reasonably presumed it to be valid."

A51; United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984): Massachusetts v.

Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 (1984).

Second, Bonner’s judge-made Fourth Amendment law is

inapposite to Title III's exclusionary rules. Assuming arguendo that

the Fourth Amendment permits a reviewing court to look outside the

four comers of a search warrant for particularity as to the place to be

searched, this is not germane to the proper inquiry: Congress’ intent in

drafting Title [I's exclusionary rules. This court has repeatedly held:

[T]he availability of the suppression remedies for these statutory,

as Opposed to constitutional violations . . . turns on the provisions

of Title III rather than the judicially fashioned exclusionary

rule aimed at deterring violations of Fourth Amendment rights.

United States v. Donovan, 429 US. 413, 433 n.22 (1977),

emphasis added: accord, United States v. Chavez, 416 US. 562,

574-575 (1974): United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 524-

529 (1974).

Because Title III's exclusionary rules include no good faith

exception, this same court of appeals has "refus[ed] to apply a good-

faith exception to allow . . . illegally-obtained evidence [under Title

III] to be used at trial." United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44-45

n.8 (1st Cir. 1989). The First Circuit has also refused to incorporate

into Title III's exclusionary rules the "innocent recipient" exception

derived from Fourth Amendment law and set forth in United States v.

Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113-118 (1984). United States v. Vest, $13

F.2d 477, 481-482 (1st Cir. 1987).

Other courts of appeals are in conflict on whether Fourth

Amendment jurisprudence can be grafted onto Title III's statutory

exclusionary rules.

In United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 1112 (2nd Cir. 1993), cert.

denied, 511 U.S. 1069 (1994), the Second Circuit affirmed the lower

court's incorporation of the good faith prong of the Franks test into

Title III's exclusionary rules. Id. at 1127-28, affirming a Connecticut

district court's adoption of United States v. Ferrara, 771 F. Supp.

1266, 1304-05 (D. Mass. 1991). A judge in the Southern District of

New York has now extrapolated from Bianco that "even in light of the

statute's exclusionary rule, the good faith exception to the probable

cause requirement, as set forth in Leon, should also apply to wiretap

warrants. United States v. Ambrosio, 889 F. Supp. 177, 188

(S.D.N.Y. 1995).*

On the other hand, a different panel of the same court refused to

incorporate the Fourth Amendment good faith exception announced in

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) into a state wiretap

statute, after careful statutory construction. United States v.

Spadaccino, 800 F.2d 292, 296 (2nd Cir. 1986).

A panel of the Sixth Circuit split on another Fourth Amendment-

Title III question. United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068, 1071-

1072 (6th Cir. 1990) (incorporating good faith "plain hearing"

exception into Title III's exclusionary rules, based on Coolidge v. New

Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971)); and Id. 1072-1073 (Jones, J.,

dissenting) (urging strict construction of Title III's exclusionary rules).

The commentators. too, sharply disagree on whether Title III's

exclusionary rules include a Fourth Amendment-derived good faith

exception. Clifford S. Fishman, Wiretapping 2nd Eavesdropping §

‘In Bianco the Second Circuit did not squarely address the applicability

of Leon to Title III's exclusionary rules. The District Court below had found Leon

applicable. 771 F. Supp. at 1297-98.

Other District Courts have disagreed, finding no good faith exception in

Title I. United States v. Ward, 808 F. Supp. 803, 807-808 (S.D. Ga. 1992),

United States v. McGuinness, 764 F. Supp. 888, 897 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United

States v, Orozco, 630 F. Supp. 1418, 1521-22 (S.D. Cal. 1986); City of Oakland by

Kuhn v. City of Detroit, 610 F. Supp. 364, 369, n.10 (D. Mich. 1984).

A number of state courts have also refused to apply Fourth Amendment

good faith exceptions to state statutory exclusionary rules. State v. Neisler, 655 So.

2d 252, 267-270) (La. 1995). State v. Garcia, 547 So.2d 628, 629 (Fla. 1989), Chan

v, State, 552 A.2nd 1351, 1360 (Md. App. 1989) (dictum). See also, Id. at 1358

(dictum: Title [II's exclusionary rule “invulnerable to good faith exception").

10

eked

pal ih Mal ale tat Py ;

22:5(a) (1996) (Leon "good faith" exception to probable cause

requirement inapplicable to Title III); James G. Carr. The Law of

Electronic Surveillance, § 6.3A (1996 Supp.) (Leon applicable to Title

III).°

Bonner is also factually inapposite. There, although the street

address of the place to be searched was omitted from the warrant, the

premises were nonetheless sufficiently described so that police were

left with no unconstitutional discretion about where they might search.

Here, similarly, the balance of the order left no doubt about where

the interception was to take place.’ Instead, it lacked particularity as

to what was to be intercepted or seized: wire or oral communications.

Even under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, where, as here, a

warrant lacks particularity as to what may be seized, a reviewing court

may not consider an unincorporated, unattached affidavit, nor is the

executing officer's subjective knowledge or belief relevant. United

States v. Roche, 614 F.2d 6, 8 (Ist Cir. 1980): United States v.

Abrams, 615 F.2d 541, 544 (1st Cir. 1980): 2 LaFave, Search and

Seizure, 559-560 (1996).

The necessary inquiry here, which the First Circuit failed to

conduct, was to determine Congressional intent. There is no evidence

that Congress ever intended any expansion of Fourth Amendment

“Judge Carr's analysis of the 1986 amendments to Title II, from which he

concludes that Congress grafted a broad good faith exception onto Title II's

exclusionary rules, is based on an inattentive reading of the amendments. His

argument, based on the addition of § 2518( 10Xc), fails to reckon with the fact that

this section concerns only “electronic communications,” which are distinct from

“oral communications” and “wire communications” under Title MI, 18 U.S.C. §

2510 (1), (2) and (12); and that Congress expressly did not amend Title II's main

exclusionary rules, §§ 2515, 2518(10 a), to include "electronic communications.”

Congress obviously intended that “electronic communications” be treated with less

caution than oral and wire communications. See Fishman, supra, §§ 22.4, 22.5(a).

‘The Order authorized interception to occur within “Dillons Tavern’

which is located within a concrete type structure located at || Tapley Street in the

City of Springfield at the corner of Tapley Street and St. James Avenue... ." A4-

AS.

1]

jurisprudence into Title III's exclusionary rules and substantial

evidence to the contrary.

In 1968, Congress stated its intent that its statutory exclusionary

rule would "reflect existing law." Senate Report (Judiciary

Committee) No. 1097 at 96, 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News

2112, 2185; United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 528-529 and

n.17 (1974). It would thus be surprising if Congress intended a

retroactive reading of an unusual (and factually inapposite) Fourth

Amendment case--United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864 (ist Cir.

1986)--into this provision .

Further, in 1986—after both Leon and Franks narrowed the Fourth

Amendment exclusionary rule--Congress amended 18 U.S.C. §

2520(d) of Title I1I* and expressly provided for a good faith defense

"against any civil or criminal action brought under this chapter or any

other law." 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d). By contrast, it did not enact any

new good faith exception to Title III's exclusionary rules, 18 U.S.C.

§§ 2515, 2518(10)(a). Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 47.23

(5th ed. 1992). -

The line separating the statutory exclusionary rules controlled by

Congress from the judicially-crafted Fourth Amendment exclusionary

rule is a paradigm for the core principle of separation of powers and

must remain inviolate.

Certiorari is thus necessary to preserve the separate integrity of

the courts and Congress and to foster a unified system of law

throughout the federal courts on an important federal question.

*P_L. 99-508, Title I, § 103, 100 Stat. 1854 (1996).

12

II. In reversing the district court on legally novel grounds not

raised below, the court of appeals acted outside the scope of its

“plain error" jurisdiction as circumscribed in United States y.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).

As the court of appeals acknowledged, the government never

argued below—before the magistrate judge or the district court judge--

that the order could be saved by extrinsic evidence of the judge's or

executing officer's knowledge: on the contrary, the government had

pushed hard for an analysis limited to the order’s "four corners." A5-

A6.

Until this case, the court of appeals had consistently held that the

failure to comply with Rule 3(b) of the Rules for United States

Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District of

Massachusetts "precludes review" in the court of appeals. United

States v. Mitchell, 85 F.3d 800, 803 (1st Cir. 1996); Keating v. Sec.

of Health and Human Services, 848 F.2d 271, 275 (Ist Cir. 1988):

Borden v, Sec, of Health and Human Services, 836 F.2d 4, 6 (Ist Cir.

1987); United States v. Vega, 678 F.2d 376, 379 (Ist Cir. 1982).

By the present decision, the court decided that an issue defaulted

under Rule 3(b) may be considered under the "plain error" standard of

Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).? A7. Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 155 and

n.15 (1985).

In ruling that a facially defective Title III order, violating central

provisions of the statute, may be cured by extrinsic evidence, the court

of appeals misapplied this standard of review. An error is only "plain"

if it is "obvious" and "clear under current law." United States v,

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 123 L. Ed.2d 508, 518-519

(1993).

As shown in the first section of this petition, the panel's view of

Title [II law is hardly "obvious." Its belief that violations of central

provisions of Title III do not always require suppression is based on

dictum in a single case from another circuit and is contrary to this

’Rule 52(b) provides: “Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights

may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court."

13

court's-and all other circuit courts’--jurisprudence. Its belief that the

knowledge of the judge and executing officer can save a defective Title

III warrant from suppression is based on a single Fourth Amendment

case from the First Circuit, which has refused in other cases to import

Fourth Amendment law into Title III's exclusionary rules. The court

itself acknowledged that the "Bonner argument is not intuitively

evident." A7.

We are aware of no other decision, from any court of appeals,

which interprets Olano to allow creative law-making in this manner.

United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668,671, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS

4617, 8-9 (6th Cir.) (plain error inapplicable where caselaw is

sparse," "divergent and conflicting"); United States v. Alli-Balogun,

72 F.3d 9, 12 (2nd Cir. 1995) (plain error inapplicable "when the

Supreme Court and this court have not spoken on the subject, and the

authority in other circuit courts is split"), followed in United States v.

Thompson, 82 F.3d 849, 854-856 (9th Cir. 1996) (plain error

inapplicable "[b]ecause of the circuit split, the lack of controlling

authority, and the fact that there is at least some room for doubt about

the outcome of this issue"); United States v. Baumgartner, 85 F.3d

1305, 1308 (8th Cir. 1996) and United States v. Webster, 84 F.3d

1056, 1066-1067 (8th Cir. 1996) (plain error applicable where law

made "clear" by U.S. Supreme Court after trial).

Because the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction to reverse the

district court, certiorari is urgently needed.

III. A state prosecutor's ignorance-of-federal-law excuse is not an

"objectively reasonable" explanation for a seven-day sealing delay

under United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990).

On April 8, 1992, seven days after the final order terminated, the

original tape recordings were delivered to the judge and sealed.

The state prosecutor testified that the sole reason he waited seven

davs was because the Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute did

not require sealing and allowed him "a minimum of seven davs.

probably more" to make his return. At the time, he testified, he was

"not familiar with Title III;" had "never read the federal statute" nor

14

tried to find out what the federal sealing requirements were: and had

“never heard of" the Supreme Court's decision on Title III's sealing

requirements, United States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257 (1990).

The district court excused the delay here for the following reason,

accepted by the court of appeals, A12-13:

Trooper Alben acknowledged that the tapes could have been

prepared and returned within a day or two. . . . However, the

retum was not made for seven days because of law enforcement

personnel's belief that the law entitled them to a full seven days.

. . [SJeven days is the outside limit [for return under the

Massachusetts statute], and the government was within this

timeframe. . . Equally compelling is the fact that "in responding

sluggishly to his. . . responsibilities vis-a-vis presentation of the

evidence for judicial sealing [the prosecutor] acted in ignorant

bliss and negligently, but . . he was not consciously or deliberately

failing to perform his duty, nor was he acting in bad faith. See

(United States v.] Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 870 (Ist Cir. 1987). .

The integrity of the tapes was unaffected: the tardiness neither

benefitted the government nor disadvantaged the defendants: and

there was no deliberate flouting of the law. See Id; cf. United

States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 504-507 (2nd Cir. 1976). A35-

A36.

The district court and the panel thus relied on legal standards

which are no longer applicable.

This court has now ruled, "To hold that proof of nontampering is

a substitute for a satisfactory explanation is foreclosed by the plain

words of the sealing provision." Ojeda Rios, supra, at 264-265.

Further, the prosecutor's "ignorant bliss"--i.e., his subjective good

faith—-was also legally beside the point: the legal issue was whether his

excuse was "objectively reasonable at the time of the delavs." Ojeda

Rios, supra, at 266 (1990); 18 U.S.C. § 2518(8)(a).

In establishing a reasonable excuse for the delay. the government

was "required to prove. . . that its interpretation [of the law] was

objectively reasonable at the time." Id. at 266. The prosecutor's belief

15

that he had a grace period of seven days or more was just not

"objectively reasonable" in April, 1992. It was then elementary that

Title III governs state prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(10)(a). State

and federal caselaw had already warned prosecutors against reading

the Massachusetts statute "as sanctioning a delay. . .if it is practicable

that a return be made before expiration of the seven-day period."

Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 267, 327 N.E. 2d 819, 844

(1975): United States v. Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 863-867 (Ist Cir.

1987). This court had left no room for doubt that Title III required

prosecutors to seal wiretap materials "immediately" or risk

suppression. Ojeda Rios, supra.

It is an affront to federal law to accept a state prosecutor's

careless ignorance of Title III and Supreme Court jurisprudence--

especially in the sensitive area of electronic surveillance--as an

"objectively reasonable” basis for violating it.

Certiorari is thus appropriate on this point as well.

CONCLUSION

For each of the foregoing reasons, Petitioners pray that this Court

grant their petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment and

opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit

reversing the allowance of their motion to suppress.

Respectfully submitted,

Wendy Hanna Sibbison

Counsel of Record

26 Beech Street

Greenfield, MA 01301

(413) 772-0329

Attomey for

Rex W. Cunningham, Jr.

Thomas Ferris, and

Bnan Hoyle

16

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant,

Vv.

REX W. CUNNINGHAM, et al, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 96-1828

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST

CIRCUIT

1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11632

113 F.3d 289

May 19, 1997, Decided

PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES

DISTRICT COURT FOR THE _ DISTRICT OF

MASSACHUSETTS. Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District

Judge.

DISPOSITION: Reversed.

COUNSEL: Wendy Sibbison for appellees.

Todd E. Newhouse, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom

Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for the United

States.

JUDGES: Before Boudin, Circuit Judge, Bownes, Senior Circuit

Judge, and Lynch,

Circuit Judge.

OPINION BY: BOUDIN

Al

In the district court, the defendants in this criminal case moved to

suppress evidence as illegally seized and, based on the magistrate

judge's report, the district court granted the motion. The government

filed an interlocutory appeal from the suppression order. We reverse.

I.

In late February 1992, Carmen Picknally, an assistant district

attorney in Hampden County, Massachusetts. applied to the state

Superior Court for a warrant, pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272,

sec. 99(F). to authorize the interception of telephone calls to or from

two specified cellular car telephone numbers. The car telephones in

question were located in cars controlled by

defendant Rex W. Cunningham, Jr., and the offenses under

investigation were suspected violations of state anti-gambling statutes.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 271, sec. 17.

A supporting 109-page affidavit by state trooper Timothy Alben

described evidence that Cunningham had used threats in attempting to

collect gambling debts for bets that he had taken. The affidavit also set

forth information from five confidential informants about a

large-scale gambling organization allegedly controlled by

Cunningham. including specifics as to how the organization worked,

the names of employees, telephone numbers, and the location of

records and cash.

On February 28, 1992, Justice Constance Sweeney, of the state

Superior Court, issued the requested warrant. and signed ancillary

orders directed to two carriers. Several incriminating calls were

intercepted between Cunningham and others and were described in

another affidavit of Alben in support of a requested extension sought

by Picknally on or about March 17, 1992. Justice

Sweeney granted the requested extension. Surveillance of the two

telephones ended on April 1, 1992. On April 17, 1992, Picknally

applied to the Superior Court for a new warrant, this time (according

to the application's caption) "authorizing the interception of oral

communications of .. . Cunningham within an establishment known

as Dillons (sic) Tavern.” The application identified Dillon's Tavern at

a street address in Springfield, Massachusetts, and said that it was on

property controlled by Cunningham and his relatives. Incorporating a

A2

new Alben affidavit, the application referred to loansharking, Mass.

Gen. Laws ch. 271, sec. 49, as well as gambling, as suspected

offenses. Although the caption referred to interception of oral

communications "within . . . Dillons (sic) Tavern," the first paragraph

described the application as one for a warrant "to intercept certain

wire and oral communications," and there are later references to

“wiretaps” and, separately, to "oral communications . . . within Dillons

(sic) Tavern.” The affidavit also asked for authority for Alben to make

secret entries into Dillon's Tavern "for the purpose of installation and

activation of oral interception devices." This application, it appears,

was a poorly edited markup of the original wiretap application.

Immediately below Picknally's signature was a paragraph signed

by the district attorney for the county, saying that he had reviewed the

application and affidavit and that the proposed use of electronic

surveillance relative to two specified telephone numbers was consistent

with county policy. The two listed telephone numbers were the cellular

telephone numbers specified in the original application. Apparently the

paragraph had been copied from the original warrant application

without change.

The supporting Alben affidavit, this time 62 pages in length but

attaching the original affidavit as well, described Cunningham's

caution in using the telephone and provided reasons for believing that

Cunningham and others were using Dillon's Tavern for meetings in aid

of gambling and loansharking. The affidavit described Cunningham's

regular use of a particular table in Dillon's Tavern to conduct his

business. It also explained why oral interceptions were needed to

supplement other evidence.

Alben's affidavit did not contain the confusing jumble of

references to wiretaps and oral communications that marred the

Picknally application. It asked for approval to intercept oral

communications within Dillon's Tavern, specifying that interception

would be limited to only such times that physical surveillances of this

DILLONS TAVERN and Rex W. CUNNINGHAM Jr. can

reasonable (sic) place CUNNINGHAM within this location and that

interceptions will take place only at or near the particular table within

the dining area which has been identified within this affidavit as being

A3

consistently used by CUNNINGHAM or his associates.

It also asked approval to enter Dillon's Tavern to install technical

equipment to achieve the interceptions.

The warrant signed by Justice Sweeney had a caption similar to

the application, specifically referring to interception of oral

communications: but--like the application--the warrant also referred

confusingly to wire communications. It approved the secret entry to

install equipment, and imposed various safeguards. The warrant was

extended numerous times, and assault and battery was added as a

suspected offense. Surveillance ended on November 1, 1992. By then

125 cassette tapes had been accumulated and were sealed by the

Superior Court.

On April 21. 1995, a federal grand jury in Springfield indicted

Cunningham on RICO violations, loansharking, illegal gambling

activities, and conspiracy to commit those offenses, 18 U.S.C. secs. 2,

892. 894. 1955, and 1962 (c)and(d). Co-defendants Brian Hoyle and

Thomas Ferris were charged with loansharking conspiracy. Most of

the evidence against Cunningham, and all of the evidence against the

co-defendants, derived from the electronic surveillance and from

searches conducted under state-court issued warrants at various sites

shortly before the surveillance terminated.

By joint motion filed on December 15, 1995, the defendants

moved to suppress materials acquired by electronic surveillance under

Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

18 U.S.C. secs. 2510-20. That statute governs interception of both

wire communication and oral communication, laying down detailed

standards and procedures. Id. secs. 2516-18. It also provides for

exclusion from evidence of interceptions taken in violation of the

statute. Id. sec. 2515. After a two-day evidentiary hearing, including

testimony from Picknally, Alben, and Hampden County District

Attorney William Bennett, the magistrate judge issued a report on

March 28. 1996. In it, he recommended that the motion to suppress be

allowed as to all electronic interceptions of conversations at Dillon's

Tavern. He said that the confusion in the warrant meant that it did not

comply with statutory requirements as to specificity, 18 U.S.C. sec.

2518(4), nor--assuming a good faith exception existed--was reliance

Ad

on the warrant objectively reasonable.

On May 17, 1996, the district court approved the magistrate

judge's recommendation. Its analysis tracked that of the magistrate

judge and his rejection of a "good faith" defense was adopted by cross

reference. In memoranda dated June 13 and July 12, 1996, the district

court addressed two successive government motions for

reconsideration but stood by its earlier conclusion. The government

then brought the case to us by interlocutory appeal. 18 U.S.C. sec.

3731.

II.

On review of a suppression order, we defer to the factfinder's

findings of raw fact unless clearly erroneous, and we consider issues

of law de novo. United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 680 (Ist Cir.

1992). In the past, there has been deference accorded to the factfinder’s

judgment in applying general standards to particular known facts; but

the Supreme Court has recently stressed our responsibility, in a related

Fourth Amendment context, to review "mixed questions" from an

independent vantage. Omelas v. United States, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 116

S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996) (reasonable suspicion and probable cause).

The government offers two alternative reasons for reversal. The

first is its claim that the warrant adequately, although not perfectly.

identified oral communications as its target--especiallv since Justice

Sweeney and Trooper Alben as executing officer knew that this was

its purpose. The second argument is that the so-called good-faith

exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 82 L. Ed. 2d 677,

104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), is available under the statute in this case and

applies on the present facts.

At the threshold, defendants object that neither basis for appeal

was sufficiently preserved. Because we consider only the first ground

on the merits, our discussion of this threshold objection is similarly

limited. To decipher that objection, it is necessary to understand how

the government's defense of its warrant evolved on the path from the

magistrate judge to the district court and finally to us.

Before the magistrate judge, the government defended its warrant

on the ground that, analyzing the wording in detail, the errors were

technical or clerical. The government did not expressly assert that the

A5

personal knowledge of the authorizing judge and executing officer

were pertinent; but, the magistrate judge touched obliquely on the

issue, saying that the government's "excuse" would, if accepted, "allow

agents to conduct searches so long as they understood what was

intended by the orders which their attorneys drafted for signatures bv

the court.”

In its district court brief, the government again analyzed the

warrant's language, arguing that it referred several times to

interception of oral communications at Dillon's Tavern and that no

reasonable officer would read it to approve wiretaps, especially

because no telephone numbers were listed in the warrant. The

government did not mention the knowledge of the judge or executing

officer: indeed, in its first petition for reconsideration, the government

complained that the district court had looked "beyond the four corners

of the warrant."

The government's first attempt to emphasize what Justice Sweeney

and Trooper Alben knew at the time came only in its appellate brief

where, for the first time, it also cited to United States v. Bonner, 808

F.2d 864 (1st Cir. 1986), and similar cases making such knowledge

relevant. Whether this new emphasis is a separate "ground" or merely

a new twist, the government clearly did not offer it below and instead

steered the magistrate judge and district court toward a strict linguistic

analvsis of the warrant. If these judges erred, it was surely error

"invited" by counsel.

But whether we should ignore Bonner is a more difficult question.

The government sought timely review of the magistrate judge's ruling,

and it filed a timely appeal to us from the district court's ruling. True,

local rules war that failing to list grounds for reviewing the

magistrate judge's report may be fatal;' but we do not read this

warning to counsel as preventing a reviewing court--where timely

1 Compare Rule 3(b), Rules for U.S. Magistrates in U.S. District Court in

Massachusetts with Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146 & n.4, 88 L. Ed. 2d 435,

106 S. Ct. 466 (1985) (declining to treat such rules as jurisdictional). See generallv

ISA C. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure sec. 3901.1, at 42 (2d ed.

1992).

A6

review is sought at each stage—from noticing on its Own arguments not

developed below.

The ability of a reviewing court to decide the case properly is

fundamental. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120-21, 96 S. Ct.

2868.49 L. Ed. 2d 826 (1976). Indeed, the rules expressly preserve

our ability to notice "plain errors" that affect "substantial rights," Fed.

R. Crim. P. 52(b), especially where failure to do so would work a

substantial injustice. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 123 L. Ed.

2d 508, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993): see also Johnson v. United States, S.

Ct., 1997 WL 235136 (U.S. May 12, 1997). The threat of substantial

injustice is not limited to the interests of defendants. United States v.

Krynicki, 689 F.2d 289, 292 (Ist Cir. 1982).

In this case, Bonner and similar decisions show that the issue of

knowledge is not wholly distinct from the claim of clerical error;

whether an error is forgiven as clerical depends, at least in some

situations, on whether in context it actually threatened privacy

interests; and this in tum may be affected by the executing officers’

knowledge. The Bonner argument is not intuitively evident; but it is

"plain" enough once the cases are consulted.

A final reason for refusing to cabin the analvsis here is that the

defendants are not prejudiced, because their ability to meet the

government's Bonner argument is not affected by the delay. The

knowledge of the state judge and executing officer is readily inferred

from documents and from testimony taken at the magistrate judge

hearing, where defense counsel cross-examined the witnesses.

Defendants have not pointed to any evidence lost or foregone due to

the government's tardiness in making its knowledge argument.

Il.

Turning then to the merits, we face at the outset a statutory ban

on use in court of the contents of an intercepted wire or oral

communication, or "evidence derived therefrom,” where disclosure

would violate Title III. 18 U.S.C. sec. 2515. There is no violation if

the interception was "authorized by" Title III. Id. sec. 2517. The

authorizing provisions, 18 U.S.C. secs. 2516-18, elaborately set forth

the crimes to be investigated, the application process for authorizing

orders, and the standards to be met.

A7

Pertinent here is 18 U.S.C. sec. 2518(4), which governs each

order authorizing an interception and requires that the order specify

five different items. Three items (subsections (a), (d) and (e)) are not

in dispute: the identity of the target, the identity of the agency and the

authorizing official, and the time period. The other two items which

must be included are as follows: (b) the nature and location of the

communications facilities as to which, or the place where, authority to

intercept is granted; [and] (c) a particular description of the type of

communication sought to be intercepted, and a statement of the

particular offense to which it relates[.]

The defendants invoked both provisions; the magistrate judge and

the district judge focused upon (b), as the government seeks to do here.

In truth, we think that both provisions need to be read together. Their

thrus. ‘isregarding the final clause of (c), is to identify the type of

communication and to narrow the targeted communications by location

of "facilities" (e.g., identifying a particular telephone) or "place" (e.g.,

where a "bug" is to be located to intercept oral communications).

In a literal sense, the warrant does describe both type and place:

it refers expressly to oral communications and to Dillon's Tavern. But

this is an extreme example of missing the forest for the trees. By

referring randomly to oral communications and wire communications

or wiretaps, the warrant is garbled on the very questions posed by

subsections (b) and (c). Taken as a whole—but taken alone and without

extrinsic evidence—the warrant does not tell the objective but ignorant

reader just what interceptions are to be targeted.

Now, the extent of confusion is a matter of degree. Any reader can

see that the warrant has been misdrafted; whether a reasonable (but

otherwise uninformed) _ police officer would solve the puzzie correctly

is probably a matter of percentages. In all events, the confusion is

serious, and despite the government's linguistic acrobatics, this is not

a warrant that we would deem adequate if it were signed by a judge

and executed by a police officer having no other knowledge of the

background and objectives.

The inadequacy is not because of any high likelihood that an

otherwise uninformed officer would tap a telephone or would intercept

Cunningham's oral communications at some other location than

A8

Dillon's. No telephone number is given in the body of the warrant, and

no other "place" of interception is mentioned. Rather, standing alone,

the bare inconsistent words of the warrant fail to create reasonable

assurance that the signer or reader would know Just what was

intended.

But this is not the end of the story. The Supreme Court has made

clear that suppression is not automatically required for every Title III

violation; rather, as a sister circuit summed up the Supreme Court's

precedents in United States v. Johnson, 225 U:S. App. D.C. 33, 696

F.2d 115, 121 (DC. Cir. 1982), "violations of even .. . central

requirements do not mandate suppression if the government

demonstrates to the court's satisfaction that the statutory purpose has

been achieved despite the violation. See also

Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433-34, 50 L. Ed. 2d 652. 97 S. Ct. 658

(1977); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-75, 40 L. Ed. 2d

380, 94 S. Ct. 1849 (1974).

Title III is designed to protect privacy interests similar to those

reflected in the Fourth Amendment. Whether or not Leon's good faith

exception should be interpolated into the statute--an issue we do not

decide--Fourth Amendment precedent is highly relevant in deciding

whether an authorizing order is valid and whether a defect in wording

is of a kind that threatens the central interests sought to be protected.

Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has relied upon Fourth Amendment

precedent in implementing Title III. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S.

238, 254-59, 60 L. Ed. 2d 177, 99 S. Ct. 1682

(1979).

A substantial body of Fourth Amendment precedent akin to

Bonner, representing most circuits, permits a reviewing court to

consider the knowledge of the officials who approved the warrant and

executed it. The reason is fairly straightforward: such knowledge may,

on particular facts, show that there was in fact no real threat to

legitimate privacy interests. Examples include the judge approving the

warrant but forgetting to sign, or the warrant's omission of an address

A9

known both to the judge and executing officer.”

In calling such mistakes "clerical," courts do not mean that they

are all unimportant typographical errors. What is meant is that they

are wording mistakes introduced by accident or lack of care rather

than wilfully or with a sinister purpose. Cases like Bonner often

involve, and forgive, very serious clerical mistakes, depending upon

the risk that they posed in fact. E.g., Bentley, 825 F.2d at 1109

(personal knowledge of officers saved warrant that listed wrong office

number). In this sense, the term "clerical" is highly misleading.

Such an approach is not cost free. In an individual case, a defect

may pose no threat (we will show that this is so here); but exclusion

of evidence in that case will still make the police more careful next

time and so may prevent a different mistake that does pose such a

threat. But there are costs either way: excluding reliable evidence and

possibly freeing the guilty is also a cost. And cases like Bonner

represent a balance between competing objectives. In any event, such

is the law of this circuit and many others. _ In sustaining the warrant

in this case. we rely upon two major elements. First, the flaw in this

case, although serious, was a discrete set of clerical mistakes in a

process that in all other important respects complied with the statute.

An application to a judge was made; it demonstrated probable cause

and other requisites for the interceptions proposed; it identified place

and type (although in a confusing language), a warrant was signed;

and the authorizing judge and executing officer knew just what they

were doing. Second, because the judge and the executing officer

knew what had been proposed and authorized, there was no

substantial threat that this officer would intercept communications

other than as authorized. Thus, despite the seriously confusing

2 See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1162, 1168-69 (6th Cir. ), cert.

denied, 133 L. Ed. 2d 301, 116 S. Ct. 377 (1995), United States v. Owens, 848

F.2d 462, 465 (4th Cir. 1988). United States v. Bentley, 825 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th

Cir.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 901, 98 L. Ed. 2d 198, 108 S. Ct. 240 (1987), United

States v. Tumer, 770 F.2d 1508, 1511 (9th Cir. 1985). An extensive collection of

federal cases, by circuit, is contained in 84 Geo. L.J. 717, 734 n.78 (1996). Some

additional case authority, including state cases, is contained in 2 LaFave, Search

and Seizure sec. 4.5(a) (3d ed. 1996).

Al0

language, the error here presented far less of a threat to civil liberties

than, say, a facially coherent warrant that mistakenly inverted the

numbers of a street address and was executed by an officer who did

not know the actual address.

It is the combination of these two elements that, as in Bonner,

persuades us that the warrant should be treated as valid and, as in

Johnson, that "the statutory purpose [of Title ITI] has been achieved

despite the violation." 696 F.2d at 121. And, as always, substantial

compliance and risk from error are matters of degree. Knowledge

would not save the interception if, for example, Alben had made out

the affidavit but then neglected to present it to a judge to secure

judicial approval. Similarly, nothing in what we say offers any

comfort to an officer who fails to comply with the true object of the

warrant.

It is also worth stressing that the knowledge of Justice Sweeney

and of Trooper Alben are established by a paper-trail record that was

created before the search. The affidavits submitted to secure the

telephone taps and then to authorize oral interceptions show beyond

serious dispute just what the judge and the executing officer

understood. The hearing record before the magistrate judge does help

knit the events together, but there is no threat here of recollections

being invented after the event.

This hard evidence lessens, although it does not eliminate, the

problems associated with any resort to personal knowledge. But proof

of the knowledge possessed by the police is the critical issue for most

warrantless arrests and searches, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399

U.S. 42, 47-48, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, 90 S. Ct. 1975 (1970); and, of

course, knowledge is scrutinized in warrant cases as well where (for

example) there is a charge of fabrication or of invented information.

The Supreme Court's cases do express a special concern where

subjective motivation rather than knowledge is involved. Thus, the

Court has held as a matter of law that malignant motive is irrelevant

where objectively reasonable conduct is proved to make out a defense

of governmental qualified immunity, Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.

635, 641, 97 L. Ed. 2d 523, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987), or where

probable cause exists but a search is challenged as pretext. Whren v.

All

United States, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). But

the special concerns about overturning reasonable conduct because of

bad motive have nothing to do with this case.

One final word on this issue is in order. Where, as here, the

government seeks to rescue a defective warrant based partly on

knowledge of the judge or officer, the burden is upon it to prove such

knowledge--just as it would be the defendant's burden if the warrant

were facially valid but sought to be impugned by proof of perjury. It

is fortunate for the government that in this case, the evidence is

overwhelming and available from the existing record. This piece of

luck does not make the mishandling of the matter look any more

attractive.

IV.

The defendants advance an alternative ground for upholding the

suppression of the Dillon's Tavern tapes. They claim that the

government failed to comply with the sealing requirement of Title III,

18 U.S.C. sec. 2518(8)(a), with respect to the cellular phone tapes.

And, since the Dillon's Tavern surveillance derived from this allegedly

tainted evidence, defendants say that it must be suppressed. Id. sec.

2515. The district court ruled that the brief delay in sealing was not

material.

The statute authorizing an interlocutory appeal from an order of

suppression, 18 U.S.C. sec. 3731, gives only the government a right

to appeal, and for good reason. If evidence is suppressed, the

government cannot appeal the suppression order after trial for double

jeopardy reasons, whereas the defendant(if convicted) can always

appeal from the district court's earlier refusal to suppress.

It is well-established that appellate courts can uphold a judgment

based on a ground rejected by the district court. This general principle

has been applied to section 3731 appeals. United States v. Moody,

485 F.2d 531, 534 (3d Cir. 1973). But the government objects in this

case that the defendants’ alternative ground would not only support the

order suppressing the Dillon's Tavern tapes but also undermine the

different order declining to suppress the cellular phone tapes. Thus, it

argues that the alternative ground is really a Trojan-horse effort to

review an unappealable order.

Al2

The argument is clever but unpersuasive. The fact that the sealing

issue may have implications for two different orders does not prevent

us from considering that issue so far as it pertains to a reviewable

order. The cases cited by the government, e¢.g., United States v.

Shameizadeh, 41 F.3d 266, 267 (6th Cir. 1994), are not on point.

Indeed, if we thought that the suppression order were clearly valid, but

on a ground different than that offered by the district court, it would

be bizarre to overturn it.

In this instance, however, the magistrate judge and the district

court amply justified their action in treating the brief sealing delay as

"satisfactorily explained." 18 U.S.C. sec. 2518(8)(a). See United

States v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257, 265, 109 L. Ed. 2d 224, 110S.

Ct. 1845 (1990). There was no bad faith by the police, no claim of

alteration to the tapes, and no other prejudice even suggested. Given

these circumstances and the brevity of the delay, we think no extended

discussion is required in this case.

Reversed,

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APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellant,

V.

REX W. CUNNINGHAM, et al, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 96-1828

Before

Tortuella, Chief Judge

Bownes, Selya, Boudin, Stahl and Lynch, Circuit Judges

ORDER OF THE COURT

Entered: June 4, 1997

The panel of judges that rended [sic] the decision in this case

having voted to deny the petition for rehearing and the suggestion for

the holding of a rehearing en banc having been carefully considered by

the judges of the Court in regular active service and majority of said

judges not having voted to order that the appeal be heard or reheard by

the Court en banc.

It is ordered that the petition for rehearing and the suggestion for

rehearing en banc be denied.

By the Court

WILLIAM N. NG, CLERK

By Janice M. O’Neil

Chief Deputy Clerk

[cc. Messrs. Sibbison, Silver, St. Clair, Chaitowitz, Stern

and Newhouse]

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APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )Crim No.

v. )95-30009-FHF

)

REX W. CUNNINGHAM. JR.., )

BRIAN HOYLE, and )

THOMAS FERRIS, )

Defendants )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

May 17, 1996

FREEDMAN, S.J

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants Rex Cunningham, Brian Hoyle, and Thomas Ferris

("defendants") filed a joint motion to suppress wire and oral

communications intercepted by electronic surveillance. Magistrate

Judge Kenneth P. Neiman ("Magistrate Judge") issued a report and

recommendation that the Court grant the motion to suppress in part

and deny it in part. See Report and Recommendation With Regard to

Defendants’ Joint Motion to Suppress Wire and Oral Communications

Intercepted by Electronic Surveillance (D. Mass. March 28, 1996)

(Neiman, U.S.M.J.) ("Report and Recommendation"). Defendants and

the United States of America ("the government") object to various

portions of the Report and Recommendation.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The parties do not contest the Magistrate Judge's summation of

the factual background of the case. As a result, the Court will

adopt that summation for purposes of this Memorandum and Order.

Cf 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (district court judge reviews de novo

those sections of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to

which a party has specifically objected):

Al5

A hearing on Defendants’ motion was held over the

course of three days, two of which entailed the presentation

of witnesses. The Government and Defendants, through

counsel, stipulated to the following documentary evidence:

(I) exhibits submitted by Defendants in three volumes . . .

(hereinafter

"Vol. _, at __"): (ii) four affidavit exhibits attached to the

Government's memorandum in opposition to the motion to

suppress . . . ; (iii) the Government's affidavit of Trooper

Timothy P. Alben. together with exhibits attached thereto . .

_, and, (iv) four exhibits introduced by Defendants during the

course of the hearing... .

A. Cellular Telephone Intercepts

On February 28, 1992, upon application of Carmen

Picknally. specially designated Assistant District Attorney of

the Hampden District ("A.D.A. Picknally"), Associate Justice

Constance M. Sweeney, of the Superior Court Department of

the Trial Court of Massachusetts, issued a warrant, pursuant

to Massachusetts General Laws c. 272, [section] 99(F),

authorizing the interception of wire communications over

cellular telephones number (413) 531-4994 and (413) 531-

3188, located within motor vehicles in the possession of or

under the control of Defendant Rex W. Cunningham. Jr.

("Cunningham"), with regard to violations of [Massachusetts

General Laws c. 271, section 17], illegal gaming. Vol. III, at

649. Related orders were issued to Metromobile Cellular

Telephone Service and New England Telephone. Vol. III, at

649B-649C. A.D.A. Picknally’s application, Vol. III, at 650,

was supported by the affidavit of Massachusetts State Police

Trooper Timothy P. Alben ("Trooper Alben"), Vol. III, at

666, et seq.

As part of his affidavit, Trooper Alben described the tale

of a Springfield attorney, Steve Linial ("Linial"), who

Al6

vread>

EE

apparently owed thousands of dollars in gambling losses to

Cunningham, and how Cunningham used threats in an

attempt to collect. Vol. III, at 688-89. Linial's own

statement—which included details on how he placed bets with

Cunningham and, later, with other persons, and on the

methods Cunningham used to try to collect on the debt. Vol.

III, at 666 and Attachment | thereto (starting after 774)--

became part of the state's ongoing investigation into illegal

gaming in Springfield. At the time Linial came forward,

Cunningham had prior state gaming convictions. Vol. III. at

687-88.

Trooper Alben's affidavit described how, in 1991, police

received information from five separate confidential

informants about a large scale gaming organization allegedly

controlled by Cunningham. Three of the informants provided

details about the organi-zation and Cunningham, including

how the organization worked, the names and addresses of

various employees and their roles in the organization,

telephone numbers over which bets could be placed, the

location of gaming records, and two locations where

Cunningham allegedly kept large amounts of cash. Vol. III,

at 689-94, 695-703. The other two informants provided

corroborating details about the scope and operation of the

organization, including the location of an illegal card game,

the connections between this game and organized crime and

illegal sports betting. Vol. III, at 703-05.

Intelligence from these informants led to further

investigations by the police, who discovered the corporate

structure of Rexco. Inc., a corporation controlled by

Cunningham, the name of the "contact" person for the

corporation, Richard Stambovsky, the telephone records of

two of Cunningham's alleged employees, Brian Collins and

Robert LaFountain. documentary connections between these

individuals and Cunningham and two more alleged

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employees, Timothy Adams and Ronald Geagan, and

addresses and telephone numbers showing associations

among these individuals and Cunningham. Vol. III, at 707-

15. Additionally, the informants confirmed that four persons

arrested in 1991 for gaming offenses worked for

Cunningham's organization. Vol. III, at 715-22 and

Attachment 2 thereto, at 5. Further information was obtained

through direct surveillance by police of a party and golf

tournament allegedly organized by Cunningham in honor of

Adolfo Bruno, a person described by [Trooper Alben] as

having RICO and state gaming convictions. Vol. III, at 722-

26.

Trooper Alben's affidavit also describes how

investigating officers subpoenaed the records of two cellular

telephones used by Cunningham. The records yielded

hundreds of telephone numbers dialed between August, 1991,

and January, 1992. together with a list of the most frequently

dialed numbers. Some of the individuals subscribing to these

numbers had gaming or RICO convictions, and some of the

locations were associated with past gaming convictions and

had been the subject of past search warrants. Vol. III, at

726-61.

On or about March 17, 1992, A.D.A. Picknally

submitted an application, Vol. III, at 783-97, seeking an

extension of the initial warrant, supported by another

affidavit of Trooper Alben. Vol. III, at 798-817. In his

affidavit, Alben asserted that the two cellular telephones had

been monitored for thirteen days, fourteen hours a day,

resulting in the interception of twenty-one complete calls. Of

these. he asserted that three were "of an incriminating nature

relating to the designated offense of illegal gaming or

conspiracy to commit illegal gaming offenses." Vol. III, at

803.

Alg

a v—_"

cea

The first "incriminating" call, intercepted on March 4,

[1992], between Cunningham and a Brian Collins, was

alleged to be "heavily cloaked in covert terms and hidden

meanings,” which Trooper Alben interpreted as follows:

[I]t is my opinion that the above referenced telephone

conversation . . . is focused around money that is

owed to this organization by an individual who is

referred to as "that kid" and "my friend."

CUNNINGHAM iis telling COLLINS that this

individual should have half the money by tomorrow

and the balance by Saturday and he explicitly tells

COLLINS that if he doesn't meet this criteria that

COLLINS "knows what to do." CUNNINGHAM

further tells COLLINS that if there is difficulty to

“just put him to the side." The conversation displavs

a supervisorv/subordinate relationship between

CUNNINGHAM AND COLLINS im that

CUNNINGHAM is clearly giving COLLINS

directions as to how to handle this matter.

Vol. III, at 805-06. The second call, intercepted on March

12, 1992, between Cunningham and a person identified as

"Brian," was summarized by Trooper Alben as follows:

Rex explains to Brian the details of some event this

afternoon in which he, CUNNINGHAM, and others

were attempting to (sic) invoke physical violence

against a group of people at some unknown location.

CUNNINGHAM explains that a traffic accident

occurred nearly which [sic] resulted in the police

appearing which allowed these persons to escape. . .

Vol. III, at 807. The third intercepted call, on March 16,

revealed that the alleged purpose of this foiled event was "to

Al9

intimidate ‘crack’ dealers." Vol. III, at 808 and 812-13. The

only other intercepted conversations cited by Trooper Alben

in support of the extension application were (1) a message

left by Cunningham for a Joe Marino that the accountant had

some work for Tuesday and that he should call Felix; and (2)

a conversation between Cunningham and a Frank about

money owed by Frank to Cunningham. Vol. III, at 808-09,

810-11.

A.D.A. Picknally's application for the extension asserted

that there was probable cause to believe that Cunningham and

others named in the application, together with other unknown

persons, were committing offenses involving gaming (M.G.L.

c. 271, § 17), usury (M.GLL. c. 271, § 49), assault and

battery by means of a dangerous weapon (M.G_L. c. 265, §

15A) and conspiracy to commit the same. Vol. III, at 784.

The designated offenses set forth in the initial warrant did not

include usury and assault and battery by means of a

dangerous weapon. Judge Sweeney granted the application

for an extension on March 17, 1992, finding that there was

probable cause to believe that the offenses were being

committed. Vol. III, at 775.

Electronic surveillance of the two cellular telephones

terminated on April 1, 1992. No further extensions were

sought. Seven days later, on April 8, 1992, the original tape

recordings, pen register tapes and daily logs were delivered to

Judge Sweeney, who caused them to be sealed and turned

them over to the custody of Trooper Alben. Trooper Alben

then delivered the sealed items to the office of the chief justice

of the Superior Court. Vol. III, at 821A-H. See M.G.L. c.

272, § 99N(1).

B. Dillon's Tavern Intercept/[s]

On Apmi 17, 1992, A.D.A. Picknally applied for a

A20

= ese

warrant authorizing the interception of communications of

Cunningham and others occurring within an establishment

known as Dillon's Tavern. Vol. I, at 8. The supporting

affidavit from Trooper Alben relied in part on evidence

obtained directly and indirectly from the prior cellular

telephone interceptions. Vol. I, at 81-82. That same day,

Judge Sweeney issued a Warrant and Order, the import of

which is at issue at this time, that referred to both oral and

wire communications and authorized the interception of

communications involving illegal gaming and usury. Vol. I,

at |. A separate order directed the New England Telephone

Company to provide "such technical assistance as is

necessary [to] accomplish the oral interceptions of the

communications from this stated location unobtrusively and

with a minimum of interference with the service that you are

according to the telephone customers." Vol. I, at 7A.

On May 14, 1992, A.D.A. Picknally applied to Judge

Sweeney for an order granting the state an additional seven

days to make secret entry into Dillon's Tavern to install the

necessary interception equipment. Vol. I, at 86. As set forth

in the supporting affidavit of Trooper Alben, the state police

were unable to install the necessary equipment within the time

permitted by the April 17, 1992 warrant. Vol. I, at 88.

Judge Sweeney granted the application for additional time

and gave the State Police until May 24, 1992 to install such

equipment. Vol. I, at 85.

After the interception equipment was installed in Dillon's

Tavern and interception had begun, A.D.A. Picknally applied

for ten consecutive extensions of the warrant. Vol. I, at 102.

144, 198, 242, 292: Vol. II at 350, 405, 464, 534, 589. Each

application for a subsequent extension was accompanied by

an affidavit of Trooper Alben setting forth the results of the

prior interceptions. Judge Sweeney granted each application

for an extension. As with the initial warrant, the first four

A21

extension warrants authorized the interception of

communications involving illegal gaming and usury. Vol. I,

at 94, 136, 190, 234. The fifth through tenth extension

warrants authorized, in addition, the interception of

communications involving assault and battery by means of a

dangerous weapon. Vol. I, at 284: Vol. II, at 342, 397, 456,

526, 581.

Pursuant to the tenth extension, surveillance at Dillon's

Tavern terminated on November 1, 1992. Four days later, on

November 5, 1992, 125 cassette tapes and all documents

relative to the surveillance at Dillon's Tavern were returned

to Judge Sweeney. That same day, the Chief Justice of the

Superior Court ordered the materials sealed in his office in

Boston. Vol. II, at 642LL.

C._Indictment

On Apnil 21, 1995, a grand jury sitting in the Federal

District of Massachusetts, Springfield Division, returned an |

indictment charging Cunningham with RICO and RICO i

conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1962© and (d), as well as

loansharking and loansharking conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. §§ 892

and 894. Co-Defendants Brian Hoyle ("Hoyle") and Thomas

Ferns ("Ferris") were charged with loansharking conspiracy.

Report and Recommendation at 2-9.

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A district court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate |

judge's report and recommendation to which a party has specifically |

objected. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Upon review, the court may

accept, reject or modify the recommended decision, receive further

evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with

instructions. Id.

A22

IV. DISCUSSION

Before the Court is defendants’ motion to suppress the evidence

obtained as a result of the surveillance of the two cellular telephones

and at Dillon's Tavern. As stated above, the Magistrate Judge

recommended that the Court grant defendants’ motion in part and deny

it in part. Specifically, he recommended that the evidence obtained as

a result of the surveillance at Dillon's Tavern should be suppressed,

while the evidence obtained as a result of the cellular telephone

interceptions should stand. Objections to the Magistrate Judge's

rulings have been lodged regarding both batches of evidence--the

cellular telephone intercepts and the Dillon's Tavern intercepts—so the

Court will review each lot of evidence separately, while considering

the parties otfections as they arise.

A. Ihe Interception of Communications Over the Two Cellular

Telephones

Defendants raise various objections to the Magistrate Judge's

recommendation that their motion to suppress be denied with respect

to the interception of communications over the two cellular telephones.

The Court will address their objections, seriatim.

1. “Necessity” Requirement

The procedures for interception of wire, oral or electronic

communications is set out in 18 U.S.C. § 2518 ("section 2518").'

Each application for an order authorizing an interception must contain

a full and complete statement as to whether or not other

investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why

they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to

be too dangerous. . . .

l While the evidence at issue in this case was obtained by Massachusetts

law enforcement personnel under state warrants, defendants’ motion to suppress is

analyzed under federal law since this is a federal prosecution. See United States

v. Sutherland, 929 F.2d 765, 771 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822 (1991).

A23

18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c). Moreover, the judge issuing the order must

make an independent determination that this standard has been met.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). These safeguards are "designed to assure that

wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional

investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime." United

States v. Ashley, 876 F.2d 1069, 1072 (1st Cir. 1989), quoting United

States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n.12 (1974).

Here, defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's reasoning that

the warrant application and affidavit supporting it need not show that

conventional investigative techniques "have been wholly

unsuccessful." See Defendants' Objections to Report and

Recommendation with Regard to Defendants’ Joint Motion to

Suppress Wire and Oral Communications Intercepted by Electronic

Surveillance (Docket no. 84) ("Defendants' Objections") at 2.

Defendants also assert that the Magistrate Judge erred in determining

that Trooper Alben's affidavit, filed in support of the wiretap

application, showed the limitations, inutility, or unavailability of other

investigative techniques. See id. Lastly, defendants object to the

Magistrate Judge's conclusion that the facts detailed in the application

were more than adequate to support Judge Sweeney's determination

that normal investigatory procedures reasonably appeared to be

unlikely of further success. See id, at 3.

In support of their objections, defendants maintain that the

traditional investigatory techniques employed by law enforcement

personnel had been "extraordinarily successful." See id, at 4. Steve

Linial detailed Cunningham's gaming operation while confidential

informants kept the police apprised of Cunningham's moves. See id.

at 4-5. Officers executed "a slew of search warrants, found a pile of

gaming evidence, and arrested a slew of people allegedly working for

Cunningham." [d, at 5-6.

The Court rejects defendants’ objections. The First Circuit has

declared:

Nor is the government forced to run outlandish risks or to

exhaust every conceivable alternative before requesting

authorization for electronic surveillance. ... [T]he issuing

court may take into account affirmations which are founded

A24

in part upon the experience of specially trained agents. .. .

Ashley, 876 F.2d at 1072 (internal citations omitted). Moreover, the

authorizing court may consider the nature of the alleged crimes as well

as the craftiness and wariness of the intended targets when deciding

whether to authorize electronic surveillance. See id, at 1072-73.

According to his affidavit, Trooper Alben had extensive

experience investigating illegal gaming and organized crime. See Vol.

Il, at 666-70. He understood, and conveyed to Judge Sweeney via his

affidavit, the intricacies of an illegal gaming hierarchy. See Vol. III,

at 670-81. Trooper Alben's affidavit Suggested that the targets of the

investigation were savvy, having been under scrutiny for years. See

Vol. III, at 682-89. In fact, as defendants acknowledged in their

memorandum, notwithstanding the heat that was coming down on

Cunningham, Alben's affidavit "showed that he was continuing to

conduct business as usual." See Defendants' Objections at 5-6.

Because of the layers allegedly involved in the organization here.

the Court believes that any criminal activity was "inherently difficult

to detect and present[ed] formidable problems in pinning down the

participants and their roles[; therefore] investigative personnel must be

accorded some latitude in choosing their approaches." See United

States v. David, 940 F.2d 722, 728 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504

U.S. 955 (1992). To this end, Trooper Alben expressly dismissed, for

various reasons, alternative investigatory techniques. These included

locating witnesses to testify against defendants. placing an undercover

officer into the organization, interviewing subjects of the investigation.

and empaneling a grand jury. See Vol. Ill, at 767-69. And while

other techniques had been employed with some success--subpoenaing

telephone records, conducting physical surveillances and spot checks,

executing search warrants--Trooper Alben acknowledged that these

were insufficient to ensure conviction for the criminal activities under

investigation. See Vol. III, at 769-71: see also David, 940 F.2d at

727-28 (government must make reasonable, good faith effort to run

gamut of normal investigative techniques).

In sum, the Court concludes that Trooper Alben's affidavit

sufficiently indicated "a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that alternative

A25

techniques would fail to expose the crime." Ashley, 876 F.2d at 1073.

Accordingly, Judge Sweeney's findings that, "Normal investigative

procedures either have been tried without success or reasonably

appear unlikely to succeed if tried" were well-supported. See Vol. III

at 645, 777. Therefore, section 2518's necessity requirement was met.

2. Interception of Other Crimes

Illegal gaming and conspiracy to commit the same were the

offenses specified in the original warrant of February 28, 1992. See

Vol. III, at 646. The Magistrate Judge found that the interception of

evidence of crimes not named in the original warrant was incidental to

the lawful interception of evidence of illegal gaming and conspiracy.

Report and Recommendation at 17. Defendants object to this finding.

See Defendants’ Objections at 6. Also, defendants contest the

Magistrate Judge's conclusion that Judge Sweeney was informed of the

essential facts of the unspecified violations when A.D.A. Picknally

sought an extension of the warrant on March 17, 1992, and Judge

Sweeney therefore implicitly found that the contents of the "other

offense" conversations were intercepted in accord with Title III.

See id. at 6-7. In addition, defendants oppose the Magistrate Judge's

rejection of their argument that the extension warrant could not

constitute retroactive judicial approval since the extension warrant

itself was defective. See id.

In support of their objections, defendants argue that none of the

conversations intercepted during the period of the February 28, 1992

warrant had anything to do with gaming. See id, at 7. For example,

the police intercepted a conversation on March 4, 1992 concerning

collecting money owed on a debt. See Vol. III, at 804-05. Defendants

maintain that nowhere in the conversation is there any indication—

cloaked, veiled, covert or otherwise--that the debt was connected with

gaming. See Defendants' Objections at 8. Trooper Alben's attempt to

connect the conversation with gaming, so defendants assert, is

extremely tenuous. See id.

Continuing, conversations dated March 12, 1992 and March 16,

1992 involved, by Trooper Alben's own statement, an attempt by

Cunningham "to intimidate ‘crack’ dealers and keep them away from"

a particular location in Springfield. See Vol. III, at 807-08. Again,

A26

defendants challenge Trooper Alben's effort to connect. this

conversation to gaming: "[T]he fact that [Cunningham] can organize

and deploy persons quickly for the sole intent in [sic] assaulting and

intimidating others for some obvious self interest is consistent with

activities surrounding _ illegal gaming and _‘loansharking.”"

See Defendants' Objections at 8: see also Vol. III, at 808.

There was a March 13, 1992 interception, which, according to

defendants, has no relevance. See Defendants’ Objections at 9. In the

March 13, 1992 conversation, Cunningham leaves a message for Joe

Marino to pick up some work on Tuesday from "Dickie the

accountant" and to "call Felix." See Vol. III, at 808-09. F inally, there

was a March 14, 1992 intercepted conversation dealing with a debt.

Defendants observe that Trooper Alben conceded that the conversation

Suggests practices consistent with loansharking, an offense for which

officers did not have authority to wiretap. See Vol. III, at 810-11.

Trooper Alben's attempt to connect this conversation to gaming--

loansharking "is a practice which is commonly employed by persons

who are involved in the upper levels of organized illegal gaming

enterprises"—is, in defendants’ words, "hardly enough to bring it within

the scope of the warrant." See Vol. Il], at 811-12; Defendants'

Objections at 9.

The Court believes that defendants’ arguments miss the point.

Defendants focus on the intercepted communications’ relation to

gaming, the targeted offense. However, provided certain safeguards

are met, Title III clearly allows for the interception of crimes other

than those specified in the warrant:

Congress intended that evidence relating to unauthorized

offenses should be given retroactive judicial approval under

[18 U.S.C_] section 2517(5) if the "original [wiretap warrant]

was lawfully obtained,

.. . Was sought in good faith and not as a subterfuge search,

and that the communication was in fact _ incidentally

intercepted during the course of a lawfully executed order."

United States v. McKinnon, 721 F.2d 19, 22 (Ist Cir. 1983)

(emphasis supplied) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.

A27

reprinted in 1968 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2112, 2189).

Here, there is no suggestion that the warrant in question, authorizing

investigation of gaming, was a subterfuge designed merely to sanction

an investigation of loansharking, usury, assault and battery, or any

other crime. In fact, any intimation that the warrant was a subterfuge

is non-sensical since extortion is an enumerated offense for which law

enforcement personnel could have sought a warrant in the first

instance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(f); see also United States v.

London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1234 (Ist Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 64

U.S.L.W. 3704 (1996); 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-894 (defining extortionate

credit transaction as combination of usury and violence).

As for whether the communications regarding non-targeted

offenses were intercepted incidentally to a lawfully executed order, the

Court concludes that they were. The First Circuit has declared that

something need not be unanticipated to be incidental. See McKinnon,

721 F.2d at 22-23. Evidence of crimes other than those authorized in

a wiretap warrant are intercepted incidentally when they result from

a bona fide investigation of crimes specified in a valid warrant. See

id. at 23. Here, because the warrant authorizing the interception of

gaming communications was valid, the interception of communications

regarding other crimes was incidental. See United States v. Gambale,

610 F. Supp. 1515, 1531 (D. Mass. 1985).

The Court's analysis does not end there. Whether non-targeted

crimes were intercepted incidentally to a lawful warrant is only half

the question. The government may only disclose the contents of the

incidentally intercepted offenses when the interception is subsequently

approved or authorized by a judge of competent jurisdiction. 18

U.S.C. § 2517(5). Specifically, Title [II provides that when law

enforcement personnel, while engaged in authorized surveillance.

intercept

communications relating to offenses other than those specified

in the order of authorization or approval, the contents and

evidence derived therefrom . . . may be used . . . when

authorized or approved by a judge of competent jurisdiction

where such judge finds on subsequent application that the

contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the

A28

provisions of this chapter. Such application shall be made as

soon as practicable.

18 U.S.C. § 2517(5). The judicial finding that the interception was

otherwise in accord with Title III may be implicit, such as when a

judge “grants a renewal of a wiretap after being advised of the

essential facts of the unspecified violation." McKinnon, 721 F.2d at

23-24. In other words.

[T]he disclosure in subsequent affidavits to the issuing judge

of material facts constituting or clearly relating to other

offenses satisfies the Government's obligation to seek judicial

authorization for the disclosure and use of evidence

inadvertently intercepted.

London, 66 F.3d at 1235 (quoting McKinnon, 721 F.2d at 24).

Judge Sweeney gave implicit authorization here. The extension

warrant expressly found probable cause to believe that usury and

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon were occurring;

whereas the original warrant only cited probable cause regarding

gaming and conspiracy to commit gaming. Compare Vol. III, at 775-

76 with Vol. III, at 643-44. Moreover, when the government sought

the March 17, 1992 extension, Trooper Alben's attached affidavit

advised the court of interceptions suggesting loansharking:

These above stated practices of paying money to third parties,

leaving money at various locations (with Lori, at Dillons and

at the Orange Cafe) is consistent with the practices of

loansharking. ... This conversation lends itself to believe

that probable cause exists to believe this is a loansharking or

usury situation. .. .

Vol. Ill, at 811. Additionally, transcripts of the recorded

conversations, and Trooper Alben's interpretation of the conversations.

were before Judge Sweeney when she reviewed the application for the

extension warrant. Vol. III, attachments starting after 817: cf.

A29

Gambale, 610 F. Supp. at 1531 (judge need not engage in

conversation-by-conversation analysis when authorizing disclosure

under section 2517(5)).

At bottom, the Court finds that the interception of crimes not

specified in the February 28, 1992 warrant was incidental to the

lawful interception of evidence relating to gaming and conspiracy to

commit gaming. Also, the Court believes that Judge Sweeney was

informed of the essential facts regarding the non-targeted offenses

when she issued the extension warrant on March 17, 1992, so she

implicitly found the incidental intercepts to be in compliance with Title

III. As for defendants’ claim that the extension warrant could not

constitute retroactive judicial approval pursuant to section 2517(5)

because the extension warrant itself was invalid, the Court turns to

consider that now.

3. The Extension Warrant

Finding probable cause to exist with respect to gaming, usury, and

assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, Judge Sweeney

issued an extension warrant on March 17, 1992. See Vol. Ill, at 775-

76. The Magistrate Judge concluded that Judge Sweeney was justified

in finding probable cause, and defendants now object to the Magistrate

Judge's conclusion. See Report and Recommendation at 21; see also

Defendants’ Objections at 10. Also, defendants take issue with the

Magistrate Judge's statements that,

First. given the initial affidavit, a fair inference could well

have been drawn by Judge Sweeney that the debt collection

concerned a gambling debt. Second, even if the conversations

intercepted during the period of the February 28, 1992

warrant did not pertain to gaming, such a conclusion would

not preclude a finding of probable cause with respect to

gaming for the extension warrant.

Report and Recommendation at 21-22; see Defendants’ Objections at

10.

Defendants hinge their argument on the fact that the original

cellular telephone interceptions vielded no evidence of gaming. See

A30

Supra (discussing intercepts dated March 4, 1992: March 12, 1992;

March 13, 1992; March 14, 1992: March 16, 1992). They contend

that since Cunningham did not discuss gaming during the period of

time covering the first warrant, there was no probable cause to

continue to eavesdrop in an effort to intercept gaming conversations.

See Defendants’ Objections at 11. While defendants’ position is

attractive, the Court is not convinced.

Section 2518 requires that extension warrants, like original

surveillance warrants, can be issued only if the judge determines that

(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is

committing, has committed, or is about to commit a

particular offense enumerated in [Title III];

(b) there is probable cause for belief that particular

communications concerning that offense will be obtained

through such interception:

(d) . . . there is probable cause for belief that the facilities

from which, or the place where, the wire, oral or electronic

communications are to be intercepted are being used, or are

about to be used, in connection with the commission of such

offense, or are leased to. listed in the name of, or commonly

used by such person.

18 U.S.C. § 2518(3): see also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (referring to

subsection (3) for extension warrants). The quantum of probable

cause needed in the electronic surveillance context is the same as that

for a standard search warrant. See United States v. Gambino, 734 F.

Supp. 1084, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). Therefore, review of the law that

has developed with respect to search warrants, in general, is

instructive. See id, at 1098.

Probable cause is "a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of

probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even

A31

usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Illinois v. Gates, 462

U.S. 213, 232 (1983). Probable cause consists of facts and

circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent person to believe

that criminal activity was afoot. See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91

(1964). The existence of probable cause is to be determined in a

pragmatic, non-technical way based on the totality of the

circumstances. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 230-32. The reviewing court's

task is to "ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for

concluding that probable cause existed." Id, at 238-39. The

determination of whether probable cause existed is to be given "great

deference" on review. Id, at 236.

Judge Sweeney had a substantial basis for concluding that

probable cause existed. As discussed earlier, Trooper Alben's

affidavit contained written transcripts of intercepted conversations

which, in the Court's view, establish probable cause by themselves.

For example, the following dialogue between Cunningham ("RC") and

Brian Collins ("BC") would lead a reasonably prudent person to

believe criminal activity was afoot:

RC: See, I figure like more than half by tomorrow

... balance Saturday.

BC: Well, I should have three quarters in my hand by

tomorrow.

RC: OK . . . If you don't you know what to do.

BC: Right .. . Oh Yea.

RC: I mean... that's... ya know... we're hoking

.. . we're letting him slide on the rest.

BC: He said there should be no .. . difficulty.

RC: No, but if there is, just put him to the side.

A32

Pe ee ee aa

Vol. Ill, at Attachment B (after pg. 817). Another conversation

between Cunningham ("RC") and "Brian" further suggests illegal

activity:

Brian: Nothing happened this afternoon{?]

RC: Well we went there, we had it perfect.

Brian: What happened{?]

RC: Well we followed them around the corner,

right[?]

Brian: Ya.

RC: And ah had them perfect, we gave them a

couple of good .... We were going to grab one and

bang him.

Vol. III, at Attachment C (starting after 817). Fortunately for the

"them" in this dialogue, a traffic accident ensued, bringing the police

and foiling Cunningham's attempts to "grab one and bang him."

The Court need not continue, as these conversations alone suggest.

at a minimum, the use of violence to secure money from people. When

considering the rest of Trooper Alben's affidavit, there was more than

ample evidence to merit a finding of probable cause regarding usurv

and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.

And, the fact that the original wiretap revealed little in the way of

illegal gaming is not, to defendants’ disappointment, dispositive.

Rather, "the past success of the wiretap is but one factor in

determining whether probable cause continued to exist that evidence

might be gathered in the future." Gambino, 734 F. Supp. at 1104.

Trooper Alben's affidavit in support of the extension warrant

expressly incorporated by reference his affidavit in support of the

original warrant. Vol. III, at 801. The facts and circumstances

detailed in his original affidavit sufficiently established probable cause

A33

to believe that illegal gaming was occurring, and those facts and

circumstances applied with equal force at the time of the extension

warrant. See United States v. Rivera, No. 90-CR-137, 1990 WL

153969, *3 (N.D.N.Y.) ("[A]s the first warrant was adequately

supported by probable cause. the evidence obtained as a result of the

extension warrant will not be suppressed"). Given all the

circumstances in this case, when Judge Sweeney issued the March 17,

1992 extension warrant, probable cause existed with respect to

gaming, usury, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous

weapon.

4. Sealing of the Evidence

The wiretaps on the cellular telephones ended on April 1, 1992.

Seven days later, on April 8, 1992, the tape recordings of the

intercepted conversations, the pen register tapes, and the daily logs

were presented to, and sealed by, Judge Sweeney. Defendants argued

before the Magistrate Judge that the seven-day delay was a violation

of section 2518(8)(a), thereby requiring suppression. See Report and

Recommendation at 22. The Magistrate Judge disagreed, and now

defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's reasoning and conclusion.

Id, at 25-26; Defendants’ Objections at | 1-16.

Section 2518(8)(a) provides, in pertinent part:

Immediately upon the expiration of the period of the order, or

extensions thereof, such recordings shall be made available to

the judge issuing such order and sealed under his directions.

... The presence of the seal provided for by this subsection,

or a satisfactory explanation for the absence thereof, shall be

a prerequisite for the use or disclosure of the contents of any

wire, oral, or electronic communication or evidence derived

therefrom. . . .

In construing this subsection, including its self-contained exclusionary

tule. the Supreme Court has concluded that it “applie(s] to a delay in

sealing, as well as to a complete failure to seal, tapes." United States

v. Ojeda Rios, 495 U.S. 257. 264 (1990).

Because the Massachusetts electronic surveillance statute does not

A34

require sealing, the Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") has held that

sealing "should be utilized in order to conform the State provision to

that of [section] 2518(8)(a)." Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass.

224, 267-68, 327 N.E.2d 819, 844 (1975). Further, in order to

reconcile the federal statute's requirement that, on expiration of the

order, tapes must be made "immediately" available to the issuing judge

with the state statute's requirement that return be made "within seven

days,” the SJC has held, "[S]even days is the outside limit on return of

the warrant and is not to be read as sanctioning a delay in return if it

is practicable that a return be made before expiration of the seven-day

period.” Id. Compare 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(8)(a) with Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 272, § 99(M). Responsivelyv,

the First Circuit has stated that, "[T]here is no untenable conflict

between the state scheme and the federal scheme." United States v.

Mora, 821 F.2d 860, 863 n.3 (Ist Cir. 1987).

Where, as here, sealing is other than immediate, the recordings

and all derivative evidence must be suppressed unless the government

can establish a "satisfactory explanation" for the delay. 18 U.S.C. §

2518(8)(a). In this regard, the government must first show, by clear

and convincing evidence, that the tapes have not been compromised.

See Mora, 821 F.2d at 867. Then the government must "explain not

only why a delay occurred but also why it is excusable." Ojeda Rios,

495 U.S. at 265. In clearing this hurdle, the government must

establish that it has acted in good faith; that is, the government cannot

have benefitted unduly from the delay, and the delay cannot have

prejudiced the defendants. See Mora, 821 F.2d at 868. Finally, the

Court also considers the length and the cause of the delay. See id, at

868-69.

Here, there is no suggestion that the tapes were sullied. Nor do

defendants contend that the delay prejudiced them or unduly benefitted

the government. As for the length of the delay, seven davs elapsed

before the seal was affixed. As stated above, although this length of

time is not to be sanctioned if an earlier return is practicable, seven

days is the outside limit. See Vitello, 367 Mass. at 267-68. 327

N.E.2d at 844; see also Mora, 821 F.2d at 863 n.3.

The Court turns to what it believes is the dispositive factor, the

A35

cause of the delay. In this case, Trooper Alben acknowledged that the

tapes could have been prepared and returned within a day or two. See

Hearing Before Magistrate Neiman, Dated February 29, March 1,

March 6, 1996, Log II, at 395 (hereinafter "Log __, at __"). However,

the return was not made for seven days because of law enforcement

personnel's belief that the law enabled them to a full seven days. See

Log I, at 192 (A.D.A. Picknally believed he had seven days to return

the tapes for sealing).

Defendants maintain that the government's excuse for the delay,

a belief that it had seven days to make the return, must be rejected

because it was not objectively reasonable at the time. See Ojeda Rios,

495 U.S. at 266. That is, caselaw clearly established that a delay

should not be sanctioned if an earlier return is practicable. See

Vitello, 367 Mass. at 267, 327 N.E.2d at 844. However, the Court

reiterates that seven days is the outside limit, and the government was

within this timeframe. See id, Equally compelling is the fact that,

in responding sluggishly to his . . . responsibilities vis-a vis

presentation of the evidence for judicial sealing, [A.D.A.

Picknally] acted in ignorant bliss and negligently but . . . he

was not consciously or deliberately failing to perform his

duty, nor was he acting in bad faith.

See Mora, 821 F.2d at 870 (internal quotations omitted).

In the end, the Court believes that the seven-day delay in seeking

the judicial seal does not necessitate suppression. The integrity of the

tapes was unaffected; the tardiness neither benefitted the government

nor disadvantaged the defendants; and there was no deliberate flouting

of the law. See id.; cf, United States v. Gigante, 538 F.2d 502, 504-

07 (2d Cir. 1976) (suppression ordered when delays ranged from eight

to twelve months).°

In sum, the Court concludes that the evidence gathered as a result

2 Defendants also argue that the government failed to comply with the

sealing procedures in regard to the Dillon's Tavern intercepts. The Court will

address this issue, infra, when reviewing the Dillon's Tavern surveillance.

A36

ee ee a ee ee ee ee ee ee - ~ .

of the interception of communications over the cellular telephones

comported with Title III. Defendants’ motion to suppress that

evidence will, therefore. be denied.

ey enn ee pant

Defendants raised various challenges to the legality of the Dillon's

Tavern intercepts. In reviewing defendants’ attacks, the Magistrate

Judge concluded that Title [I's particularity requirements, as provided

in section 2518(4)(b), were not met. See Report and Recommendation

at 36-40. Therefore, he recommended that the interceptions recorded

as a result of the April 17, 1992 warrant. and its ten extensions, be

suppressed. See id, at 40, 48. The government has filed timelv

objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation of suppression.’

See Government's Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and

Recommendation with Regard to Defendants’ Joint Motion to

Suppress Wire and Oral Communications Intercepted by Electronic

Surveillance ("Government's Objections").

1. Particularity Requirements

Section 25 18(4)(b) states:

Each order authorizing or approving the interception of anv

wire, oral, or electronic communication under this chapter

shall specifv—-

the nature and location of the communications facilities as to

which, or the place where, authority to intercept is granted. .

In analyzing these requirements, the Magistrate Judge found that the

April 17, 1992 warrant failed to adequately describe "the nature . . .

3 Defendants have also objected to various findings of the Magistrate Judge

in regard to the Dillon's Tavern interceptions. However, the Court will only address

these objections if it does not adopt the Magistrate Judge's recommendation of

suppression.

A37

of the communications facilities as to which . . . authority to intercept

is granted." See Report and Recommendation at 36.‘ In particular,

the Magistrate Judge concluded that it was unclear whether the

warrant authorized the interception of oral communications occurring

inside Dillon's Tavern or of wire communications occurring over a

telephone inside Dillon's Tavern. See id, at 36-40. The government

objects to these findings.

Although the government objects to the Magistrate Judge's

conclusion, the government agrees with the standard of review

announced by the Magistrate Judge. See Government's Objections at

3-4. The Magistrate Judge reasoned that a court reviewing a warrant

through the lens of section 2518(4)(b) should use an objective

standard:

The Court must look at the warrant to determine if a

reasonably prudent law enforcement officer, reading the

warrant with some diligence, would understand . . . the nature

and location of the communication facilities or the place

where communications were to be intercepted, as required by

18 U.S.C. [section] 2518(4){b). Nothing should be left to the

discretion of the officer executing the warrant.

Report and Recommendation at 35 (citing Marron v. United States,

275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)). The government urges the Court to apply

this standard and determine that the warrant does indeed sufficiently

particularize the nature of the communication facilities as to which

authority to intercept was granted. See Government's Objections at 4-

5.

The Court turns to the warrant. Its title is unambiguous:

IN RE: THE APPLICATION OF THE HAMPDEN

4 The Magistrate Judge also found that the warrant adequately

particulanized the type of communication sought to be intercepted. See Report and

Recommendation at 35-36; see also Vol. I, at 4-5 (authorizing interception of

communications relating to various offenses). Moreover, he determined that the

warrant sufficiently detailed the location of the communication facilities which

were to be the subject of the electronic surveillance. See Report and

Recommendation at 36; see also Vol. I, at 4 (detailing location of Dillon's Tavern).

A38

COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY FOR AN ORDER

AUTHORIZING THE INTERCEPTION OF ORAL

COMMUNICATION OF REX W. CUNNINGHAM JR

AND OTHERS KNOWN AND UNKNOWN WITHIN AN

ESTABLISHMENT KNOWN AS DILLONS TAVERN

Vol. I, at | (emphasis added). Moreover, the warrant clearly speaks

of oral communications. See Vol. I. at 1-7. That is, the warrant was

sought to authorize "the interception of oral communications:"

probable caused existed to believe that “oral communications"

regarding named offenses would be obtained; and "these oral

communications will concern the details of the [illegal gambling]

system... ." Vol. I, at 1-2.

However, after page two of the warrant, there is no further

mention, at least explicitly, of oral communications. Instead, wire

communications appears. "[T]he interception of communications from

these telephones will provide evidence of these violations." Vol. I, at

3. Further on, the warrant expressly orders the Hampden County

District Attorney and law enforcement officers to "proceed forthwith

. . . With the necessary interception equipment to intercept wire

communications of Rex W. Cunningham Jr." Vol. I, at 4. Later,

"{T]his authorization to intercept wire communications shall be

executed as soon as practicable... ." Vol. I. at 5. Finally, the

penultimate sentence of the warrant orders that A.D A. Picknally shall

keep Judge Sweeney apprised of the progress that has been made

towards the goal "of this wiretap... ." Vol. I, at 7.

The government rightly contends that, notwithstanding these

references to wire communications, other language in the warrant is

consistent with oral interception. For example, the warrant states.

"There is probable cause to believe that Dillons Tavern and locations

within Dillons Tavern are being used by Rex W. Cunningham Jr. _ .

“" Vol. I, at 2-3. Similarly, the title of the warrant speaks of

interceptions "within an establishment known as Dillons Tavern."

Vol. I, at 1. The government maintains that oral communications

occur at or “within” a certain location while wire communications

A39

occur over specified telephone lines.’ See Government's Objections at

9.

Continuing, the government points to the warrant's language that

cavesdropping was limited to "such time that physical surveillances

place Rex W. Cunningham within said building involved in

communications with others known and unknown. ___" See

Government's Objections at 12: see also Vol. I, at 4. If the warrant

were directed at wire communications, the argument goes, this

limitation would not have dealt with observations of Cunningham

merely conversing at Dillon's Tavern, but rather would have been

further limited to times when C unningham was inside Dillon's Tavern

using a telephone. See Government's Objections at 12. Likewise, the

government claims that if a wire intercept were intended, the warrant's

order that "the identities of all parties who communicate within this

establishment shall be reduced to writing . . ." would have specified

communications over telephones. See Government's Objections at 15-

16: see also Vol. I, at 6A. And, the government looks to the warrant's

restriction that "interceptions are to occur only at those times when

police surveillances can place Rex W. Cunningham Jr. at the location

known as Dillons Tavern where the intercepting device is installed."

Vol. I, at 6. "[W]here the intercepting device is installed" clearly, in

5 A comparison of the definitions of wire communications and oral

communications seems to bear out the government's distinction. Wire

communications is defined, in part, as

any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of

facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of

wire, cable, or other like connection between the point of origin

and the point of reception... .

18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). Oral communications is defined, in part, as

any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an

expectation that such communication is not subject to

interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.

18 U.S.C. § 2510(2).

the government's view, references Dillon's Tavern.

Perhaps the government's sharpest arrow is its asseveration that

the warrant here is simply inconsistent with a warrant authorizing a

telephone tap. First, the warrant contains a lengthy description of the

location of Dillon's Tavern. Vol. I, at 4. Such wording, the

government argues, is only necessary for an oral intercept since the

Statute requires a description of the "place where, authority to intercept

is granted." See Government's Objections at 10; see also 18 U.S.C.

§ 2518(4)(b). For wire intercepts, the government continues, the

Statute mandates specification of "[T]he nature. ___ of the

communications facilities as to which _. authority to intercept is

granted." See Government's Objections at 10-11: see also 18 U.S.C.

3 2518(4)(b). The nature of the communications facilities, the

government asserts, is the telephone number of the targeted wire. See

Government's Objections at 10-11. The warrant here was devoid of

any telephone numbers.

Next, the government juxtaposes the Dillon's Tavern warrant with

the warrant authorizing the cellular telephone intercepts. There. the

language merely stated that surveillance was authorized for,

wire communications of Rex W. Cunningham Jr and others

yet unknown. occurring over the telephone numbered (413)

531-4994 and (413) 531-3188, which are located within

motor vehicles in the possession of or under the control of

Rex W. Cunningham ... .

Vol. III, at 646. Again. the government maintains that no description

of the location of the telephones is necessary when tapping a

telephone. See Government's Objections at 11. Rather, the telephone

number alone suffices. Moreover. when tapping the cellular

telephones. like with all telephone taps, entry into the car where the

cellular telephones were located was not necessary. See Vol. III. at

646. Here. however. the warrant authorized a secret entry into

Dillon's Tavern "in order to install the necessary interception

equipment." Vol. I. at 4.

After review, the Court has no doubt that the law enforcement

personnel intended to secure a warrant authorizing an oral intercept.

Ad]

However, the Court reiterates that the warrant is to be reviewed to

determine what a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer, reading

the warrant with some diligence, would understand that he was

authorized to intercept, oral communications or wire communications.

Although the Court agrees with most of the reasoning proffered by the

government, it cannot state that a reasonably prudent officer, reading

the warrant with some diligence, would conduct the mental gymnastics

that the government undertakes in eighteen pages of rationalizing and

conclude that oral interception, and not wire interception, was

authorized. In fact, Trooper Alben--certainly a reasonably prudent

law enforcement officer--testified that, in regard to the application for

the warrant, "I don't deny the fact that the words become confusing."

Log II, at 398. The Court sees no less confusion with the warrant

itself.

Nor does the Court believe that the sloppy wording--what the

government labels “clerical errors"--amounts to a mere technical

violation of Title III. Rather, the Court cannot help but to wonder

whether Judge Sweeney was misled as to the type of communications

which were to be intercepted. Cf United States v. Shields, 783 F.

Supp. 1058, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (any deficiency was minimal

because situation at hand was not type where issuing judge was

misinformed or misled). Although Trooper Alben's affidavit may not

have spoken of wire intercepts, A.D.A. Picknally's application

contained numerous references to wire communications. See Vol. I.

at 8-21. Moreover, District Attorney Bennett's attestation at the end

of the application declared, "The proposed use of electronic

surveillance relative to telephones (413) 531-4994 and (413) 531-3188

is consistent with the overall policy followed in Hampden County to

eliminate this type of illegal gaming combine. . . ."° See Vol. I, at 21.

Finally, the Court cannot accept that Judge Sweeney fully understood

that the surveillance was limited to oral communications in light of the

fact that she ordered New England Telephone Company to provide law

enforcement personnel the technical assistance they needed in regard

6 This declaration was clearly “cut and pasted” from the application for the

warrant for the cellular telephone intercepts. See Vol. III, at 664.

A42

to the telephone at Dillon's Tavern with assigned number (413) 739-

9212. See Vol. I, at 7A.

At bottom then, the Court concludes that the April 17, 1992

warrant authorizing electronic surveillance at Dillon's Tavern did not

satisfy Title III's particularity requirements. Therefore, defendants’

motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the April 17,

1992 warrant, as well as the derivative evidence obtained as a result

of the ten extension warrants, will be granted.’ See 18 U.S.C. §

2518(10)(a) (if motion to suppress is granted, contents from

intercepted communications, or evidence derived therefrom, shall be

treated as having been obtained in violation of Title III).

2. Remaining Issues

Because the Court will grant defendants’ motion to suppress with

regard to the Dillon's Tavern intercepts, it need not reach defendants’

alternative arguments--lodged in the form of objections to the Report

and Recommendation--that the sealing of the tapes of the intercepts

was improper: see Defendants’ Objections at 16; that District Attorney

Bennett did not properly authorize the interception; see id, at 19: that

the application for the April 17, 1992 warrant failed to establish a

reasonable likelihood that alternative investigative procedures would

fail: see id. at 25; that the Magistrate Judge's suggested remedy for

minimization violations was inappropriate; see id, at 27: that

intercepted conversations regarding assault and battery went bevond

the scope of the warrant: see id.; and that state officials failed to seek

7 The government does not object to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that

section 2518(4\b) is a “central provision” of Title II, so that a violation of that

section requires suppression. See Report and Recommendation at 40: see also

United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433-34 (1977). See generally United

States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562

(1974). Nor does the government quarrel with the Magistrate Judge's analysis of

the good faith exception in the Title [I context. See Report and Recommendation

at 41. Accordingly, the Court need not address these issues.

Because Title II requires that evidence derived from improperly

intercepted communications should be suppressed, any evidence that the

government intends to use in this case that is arguably derived from the Dillon's

Tavern intercepts should be subject to a taint hearing.

A43

retroactive authority for use of the intercepted conversations regarding

assault and battery. See id. Likewise, the government addresses

certain issues left undecided by the Magistrate Judge. namely the

munimization and assault and battery issues. The government filed a

motion to reconsider these issues that was denied by the Magistrate

Judge. See United States of America v. Rex. W. Cunningham. Jr.

Bnan Hoyle and Thomas Ferns, CR 95-30009-FHF (D. Mass. May

8, 1996) (Neiman, U.S.M.J.). The Court views these additional

asseverations as objections to the Report and Recommendation. As

with defendants’ additional objections, the Court need not reach these

arguments.

V. CONCLUSION

For the above-stated reasons, the Court ACCEPTS the Magistrate

Judge's Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, defendants’

motion to suppress with respect to all electronic intercepts at Dillon's

Tavern is ALLOWED, and defendants’ motion to suppress with

respect to the cellular telephone intercepts is DENIED.

It is So Ordered.

Senior United States

District Judge

Ads

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

yCnm No.

v. )95-30009-FHF

)

REX W. CUNNINGHAM. JR.. )

BRIAN HOYLE, and )

THOMAS FERRIS, )

Defendants )

ORDER

June 13, 1996

FREEDMAN, S.J.

In a Memorandum and Order dated Mav 17, 1996, this Court

granted, in part, defendants’ eee > seggees wine and oral

eg yey ma sy ay — 17, 1996)

(“Memorandum and Order”). The government has now filed a motion

for reconsideration of the Memorandum and Order, and defendants

oppose the motion. Also. the government has moved, ex parte, to file

an affidavit of Sergeant Timothy P. Alben. and to have the affidavit

reviewed im camera and subsequently sealed.

In the Memorandum and Order, the Court held “that the warrant

is to be reviewed to determine what a reasonably prudent law

enforcement officer. reading the warrant with some diligence, would

understand that he was authorized to intercept. oral communications

Or wire communication.” Memorandum and Order at 32. The thrust

A45

of the government's motion to reconsider is that, in determining what

a reasonably prudent law enforcement officer would understand that

he was authorized to intercept, the Court went beyond the four corners

of the warrant. As examples of the Court looking past the warrant, the

government cites the Court’s reliance on Trooper Alben’s confession

that the words of the application became confusing: the Court's

observation that District Attorney Bennett’s attestation in the

application related to telephones with assigned numbers (413) 531-

4994 and (413) 531-3188; the Court's statement that A.D.A. Carmen

Picknally’s application contained numerous references to wire

communications; and the Court’s concern that Judge Constance M.

Sweeney may have been misled as to the type of surveillance she was

authorizing. See Memorandum and Order at 32-33.

The government’s argument for reconsideration misses the point.

The decision to suppress hinged upon the Court’s review of the

warrant. After conduct that review, the Court declared the following

[The Court] cannot state that a reasonably prudent officer,

reading the warrant with some diligence, would conduct the

mental gymnastics that the government undertakes in eighteen

pages of rationalizing and conclude that oral interceptions,

and not wire interception, was authorized.

Id. at 32. In moving for reconsideration, the government never

addresses the issue of what a reasonably prudent law enforcement

officer would believe he was authorized to intercept.

To the extent that the Court’s Memorandum and Order discussed

the points now raised by the government, those issues were not

dispostive. The Court looked to Trooper Alben’s statement that the

application's language was confusing merely to inferentially drive

home the confusion of the warrant’s language. As for the Court's

reference to A.D.A. Picknally’s application, and D.A. Bennett's

attestation at the end of the application, the Court was demonstrating

that the persuasiveness of the errant language suggested that the

warrant’s sloppy wording reflected more than mere clerical errors.

Finally, to the extent that the Court questioned Judge Sweeney's

A46

mindset, the Court was juxtaposing United States v. Shields, 783 F.

Supp. 1058, 1087 (N.D. Ill. 1991), where a district court held that any

Title III violation was de minimis since the issuing judge was not

misinformed or misled. In any event, Judge Sweeney's mindset did-not

supply the basis for the Court’s ruling.

In the end, the Court is satisfied that its Memorandum and Order

is sound in all respects. Accordingly, the government's motion for

reconsideration is DENIED. The government’s motion to file an

affidavit of Sergeant Alben is also DENIED.

It is So Ordered

Senior United States

District Judge

A47

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA )

yCrim No.

v. )95-30009-FHF

)

REX W. CUNNINGHAM, JR., )

BRIAN HOYLE, and )

THOMAS FERRIS, )

Defendants )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

July 12, 1996

FREEDMAN, S.J.

In a Memorandum and Order dated May 17, 1996, this Court

granted, in part, defendants’ motion to suppress wire and oral

wee ag Rag Sms United States

30009- FHF, yo (D. Mass. May 17, 1996) ("Memorandum and

Order"). In an Order dated June 13,

1996, the Court denied the government's motion for reconsideration of

the Memorandum and Order. Now the government moves a second

time for reconsideration of the Memorandum and Order. Defendants

oppose the motion.

In recommending suppression, Magistrate Judge Kenneth P.

Neiman ("Magistrate Judge") concluded that even if Title III's

exclusionary rule contained a good faith exception. it did not apply to

this case. See Report and Recommendation With Regard to

Defendants’ Joint Motion to Suppress Wire and Oral Communications

Intercepted bv Electronic Surveillance (D. Mass. March 28, 1996)

(Neiman, U.S.M.J.) at 41-44. Because the government failed to object

A48

to the Magistrate Judge's findings regarding the good faith exception,

the Court did not address the issue in its Memorandum

and Order. See Memorandum and Order at 33-34 n.7. The

government now urgés the Court to reconsider its decision to suppress

in light of the good faith doctrine.

Objections to a magistrate's report and recommendation must be

filed with the clerk of the court within ten days of the party's receipt

of the report and recommendation. See Rule 3(b), Rules for United

States Magistrates in the United States District Court for the District

of Massachusetts. Failure to object to a report and recommendation

generally precludes further appellate review when the issue is

undecided by the district court. See United States v, Valencia-Copete,

792 F.2d 4, 6 (ist Cir. 1986). Here, even though the government

failed to object to the Magistrate Judge's good faith analysis within the

proscribed ten days, the Court will nonetheless consider the issue since

the remedy of suppression is drastic and since the existence of a good

faith exception to the warrant requirement in the context of Title III

has yet to be addressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the

First Circuit.

Caselaw is split as to whether a good faith exception exists in the

Title Il context. Compare United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376

(8th Cir. 1994) (reasoning that good faith exception applies because

Title III's legislative history expresses intent to adopt Fourth

Amendment suppression principles), cert, denied, 115 S. Ct. 1985

(1995) and United States v. Malekzadeh, 855 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th

Cir. 1988) (applying good faith exception to Title III electronic

surveillance), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1029 (1989) with United States

v. McGuinness, 764 F. Supp. 888, 897 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (doubting

whether good faith exception applies to wiretaps since exclusionary

rule for wiretaps is explicitly commanded by statute). The Court,

however, does not need to decide whether the exception applies

because, even assuming that it does, the Court is convinced that the

exception would not save the evidence based upon the facts of this

case

In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme

Court held that evidence need not be suppressed when police obtain

A49

the evidence through good faith reliance on a subsequently invalidated

search warrant. See id.; see also Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468

U.S. 981 (1984). The Court reasoned that the exclusionary rule is a

deterrent measure designed to ensure compliance with the Fourth

Amendment. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906. Since there would often be

no deterrent effect when police seize evidence in reliance on a warrant

that is subsequently found to be defective, the exclusionary rule serves

no purpose in those situations. See id, at 921. However, the

exclusionary rule did not lose all of its teeth. Suppression is still

warranted when the law enforcement officers knew, or should have

known, that the search was improper. See id. at 919.

The practical application of Leon's good faith exception boils

down to an evaluation of all the attendant circumstances. While

emphasizing that the officer's reliance on the warrant must be

"objectively reasonable," the Leon Court also noted that "[ijt is

necessary to consider the objective reasonableness, not only of the

officers who eventually executed a warrant, but also of [those] . . .

who provided information material [to its issuance]." See id, at 922

& 923 n.24.

Here, the Court does not believe that the officers who provided

information to the issuing judge, as well as the officers who executed

the defective warrant, acted reasonably. Assistant District Attorney

Carmen Picknally and Trooper Timothy Alben prepared the

application and warrant for the issuing judge's signature, so the errors

in the warrant's language were largely attributable to them. See

United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 16 (Ist Cir. 1993) (refusing

to find objective good faith when warrant's defects were attributable

to the agents): see also Memorandum and Order at 5-6. Moreover, the

lack of particularity of the warrant was “glaring and easily

correctable" by the law enforcement personnel involved. See

Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 16 (warrant's facial defect should have been

noticed by experienced officers). That is, the warrant contained

numerous inconsistencies, amounting to more than technical defects,

that were readily observable to experienced law enforcement

personnel. See id.; see also Memorandum and Order at 28 (detailing

inconsistencies on face of warrant); cf, Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 984,

A50

990-92 (evidence may be used if warrant's defectiveness results from

technical errors); Moore, 41 F.3d at 374-76 (judge's failure to sign

electronic surveillance order was mere technical defect not meriting

suppression).

The First Circuit has cautioned that the good faith exception "will

not be applied unless the officers executing search warrants, at the

very minimum, act within the scope of the warrants and abide by their

terms." United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44 (Ist Cir. 1989),

quoting United States v. Fuccillo, 808 F.2d 173, 177 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 482 U.S. 905 (1987). Here, because the terms of the warrant

were so ambiguous, the Court does not believe that any officer could

abide by the warrant's terms. As the Court concluded in its

Memorandum and Order, "it cannot state that a reasonably prudent

officer . . . would . . . conclude that oral interception, and not wire

interception, was authorized." Memorandum and Order at 32. In this

vein, the Court finds Leon's language precisely on point:

[D]epending on the circumstances of the particular case, a

warrant may be so facially deficient--i.e., in failing to

particularize the place to be searched or the things to be

seized—that the executing officers cannot reasonably presume

it to be valid.

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. Such is the case here; the Court believes that

no officer reading the facially defective warrant could have reasonably

presumed it to be valid.

For the above-stated reasons, the government's second motion for

reconsideration is GRANTED. However, after reconsidering the facts

in light of Leon's good faith exception, the Court stands by its earlier

Memorandum and Order granting defendants’ motion to suppress in

part.

It is So Ordered.

Senior United States July 7, 1997

District Judge

A51

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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