Opposition Brief — Abrams v. Office of Bar Counsel for the District of Columbia

oupreme Court,

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YUN 6 1992 |

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IN THE

Supreme Court Of Che United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

In re ELLIOTT ABRAMS, ESQUIRE

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

BRIEF FOR OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL

IN OPPOSITION

LEONARD H. BECKER*

MICHAEL S. FRISCH

JULIA L. PORTER

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR

COUNSEL

515-Sth St., N.W., Room 127

Washington, D.C. 20001

(202) 638-1501

*Counsel of Record for Respondent

Office of Bar Counsel

Balmar Legal Publishing Services, Washington, D.C., (202) 682-9800

eee eee

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

correctly imposed a public censure of Petitioner, notwithstanding

his presidential pardon for criminal offenses, based upon his

dishonest conduct in testifying falsely on three occasions before

Committees of Congress.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS. .....ccccccccccccccceccscccccosseseses 2

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page(s)

Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915). ....ccccsseesesseeeees 11

Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914)............0ccscssssssessseesees 9

Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147 (1872).........csseseceseeeeees 9

Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)...............000+. 8

oe OR FOUN, BT CIB. DP (RAD ove csvececnnsnsvcennavicascsnesvasscrens 7

Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 {i ) Se 6

Goldfarb v. Virginia Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) ........:.sssec0e0002: 6

Hudson v. United States, 92 F.3d 1026 (10" Cir. 1996),

cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. April 14, 1997)

EPs ENT TITTIED “stevia olinlba ielsiiasindiichinbigesnnbnbnntieninionsdibiaanisbianpacsisesenbition 7

Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149 (1877) ........:csccsceseeseeseeeees 9

Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).......ccccceee000 6

Osborn v. United States, 91 U.S. 474 (1875)......ccccssssesseseeeeees 9

Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457

a nn anaes ceinssicnbsdninessihteiainsatnisktieibalcipnsinadatenicenehisondel 6

Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) ......cccsecsseseeeseeees 7

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1871) .......cccccscesesseseseeeeees 9

In re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1987) (en banc).......... 7

In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226 (D.C. 1986)..............c..ccsssssssssesees 7

In re Steele, 630 A.2d 196 (D.C. 1993) ...........ccccsscescsssesceeeesees 7

In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203 (D.C. 1993).............scsccsessseeesees 7

Statute and Rules:

District of Columbia Code, § 11-2501 .0...........cccccccccceccceeeeeeeees 6

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule X

Sa aac sssnas telapraaiitacacioiatinteonadssimsennsaiinclansdanenihoniel 6

iV

Cases Page(s)

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule XI Governing

CO TRE, TRG. Fi sriseceneevivecsesansesecineanheuitinentiinrevenneehsuinicemnniaatabniinsaiaasiaen 8

District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility,

EIUUCHMURRTY TRAC 3 - TOA NS) nn csicinevesnsicrciscnsasnsneenonecvisonssoonininn 4,6

Other Authorities:

St COD, FRG RABE, BF Cie icsetiscnienssicietneevinsibciationesan 10

PF UD. FURY GIO, SIS Co eicensemvierisesiontinitivesccninnnanen 10

SPD. PAR Y CIR, Bs Cee i rictierrensierntiacmodnain 10

eID. CR A SRIF iD tiie neetstenlcttceninatiabiomaitns 10

Donald T. Weckstein, “Maintaining the Integrity

and Competence of the Legal Profession,”

Se FOS. 6... REV. FOs (80 Ptinnksisittiininanaimud 6

No. 96-1778

IN THE

Supreme Court Of The United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

In re ELLIOTT ABRAMS, ESQUIRE

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals

BRIEF FOR OFFICE OF BAR COUNSEL IN

OPPOSITION

The opinion of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals, imposing a public censure of Petitioner (Pet. App.

la), is reported at 689 A.2d 6 (D.C. 1997).

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals for which review is

a _AS@ught was entered February 5, 1997. Petitioner filed a

<— petition for writ of certiorari on May 6, 1997.

STATUTE AND RULES

The pertinent statute conferring jurisdiction on the court

of appeals to discipline members of its Bar and relevant rules

of professional conduct prescribed by the court are set out in

an Appendix to this brief.

2

STATEMENT OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Petitioner, a member of the District of Columbia Bar,

served as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American

Affairs in the Reagan Administration.’ In three appearances

before Congressional committees in 1986, he testified falsely

concerning his knowledge of the government’s efforts to

arrange third-party support for the Nicaraguan Contras. On

October 10, 1986, when asked about the nature and extent of

such efforts, Mr. Abrams told the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations that “we have been kind of careful not to

get closely involved with it and to stay away from it”; that

“we do not encourage people to [provide aid to the Contras], .

.. we don’t have conversations, we don’t tell them to do this,

we don’t ask them to do it”; and that such assistance as might

be provided by others was “without any encouragement or

coordination from us, other than a public speech by the

President, that kind of thing, on the public record.” 689 A.2d

at 8 (Pet. App. 5a). That testimony was false, because Mr.

Abrams knew that Lt. Col. Oliver North had been in contact

with suppliers to the Contras and that Col. North had

encouraged such activity. Moreover, Mr. Abrams had met

with a representative of the Sultan of Brunei in London in

August 1986 -- two months before his Congressional

testimony -- to request a $10 million contribution to the

Contras, had been informed in mid-September 1986 that the

Sultan had agreed to make the contribution, and had been told

at the end of September 1986 -- about two weeks before his

Congressional testimony -- that the contribution had been

forwarded to a numbered Swiss bank account. /d.

On October 14, 1986, in an appearance before the House

Intelligence Committee, Mr. Abrams was asked by the

Committee Chair whether he knew if any foreign government

had helped to supply the Contras. Mr. Abrams responded that

Petitioner is referred to as “Respondent” throughout the

proceedings below. To avoid confusion, we refer to him by name in this

brief in opposition.

3

for the period 1985-86, during his tenure at the State

Department, the report of such assistance was false

concerning both the Saudi and other governments. 689 A.2d

at 8 (Pet. App. 6a). This testimony likewise was false

because, as noted above, Mr. Abrams recently had solicited a

multi-million dollar contribution from the Sultan of Brunei

and had just been advised that the contribution had been

deposited in a Swiss bank account in favor of the Contras. /d.;

R. 14, at 24-25 (hearing committee report).

On November 25, 1986 -- the day that Attorney General

Meese disclosed the Iran-Contra matter at a press conference --

Mr. Abrams appeared before the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, where Senator Bradley asked him a series of

questions concerning the Administration’s financial aid to the

Contras. Mr. Abrams testified: “I was, until today, fairly

confident that there was no foreign government contribution

to this. But I knew nothing, still don’t know anything about

the mechanisms by which money was transferred from private

groups that have been raising it, to the Contras.” 689 A.2d at

8 (Pet. App. 7a). Mr. Abrams’ statement that he did not

believe that foreign governments had contributed to such

support was false, because he personally knew that the Sultan

of Brunei had agreed to contribute $10 million and, so far as

Mr. Abrams was aware, had done so. Mr. Abrams’ further

volunteered statement that he did not know about the transfer

mechanisms from private groups also was false, as the hearing

committee subsequently determined. Jd. n.4.

Thereafter, Mr. Abrams came under investigation by the

Independent Counsel appointed to investigate the Iran-Contra

affair. In October 1991, Mr. Abrams pleaded guilty in the

United States District Court for the District of Columbia to a

two-count information charging misdemeanor violations of 2

U.S.C. § 192, relating respectively to the first and second

Congressional appearances described above. 689 A.2d at 9

(Pet. App. 7-8a).

* Section 192 provides pertinently:

4

Pursuant to the rules of the District of Columbia Court of

Appeals governing the Bar, Bar Counsel reported Mr. Abrams’

criminal conviction to the court of appeals, which referred the

matter to the Board on Professional Responsibility to

recommend appropriate professional discipline. The Board in

turn referred the matter to a hearing committee. Bar Counsel

filed a three-count petition for discipline against Mr. Abrams,

charging that each of the three testimonial episodes described

above had given rise to a violation of Disciplinary Rule (“DR”)

1-102(A)(4) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the

“Code”).’ The hearing committee received Mr. Abrams’

testimony and relevant exhibits in a formal proceeding.

On December 24, 1992, while the disciplinary matter

was pending decision before the hearing committee, President

Bush extended a “full, complete and unconditional pardon” to

Mr. Abrams, among others, relating to all offenses charged by

the Independent Counsel or that might have been charged by

him. 689 A.2d at 9 (Pet. App. 8a). On April 8, 1993, the

hearing committee issued its report, finding that Mr. Abrams

had violated DR 1-102(A)(4) on each of the three occasions,

as charged, and recommending that he be suspended from the

practice of law for one year. 689 A.2d at 9 (Pet. App. 9a).

The committee concluded that the pardon did not preclude the

imposition of professional discipline. Mr. Abrams took an

exception before the Board, where he conceded that the

pardon did not bar the imposition of discipline. However,

when the Board issued its report on July 26, 1993, upholding

“Every person who having been summoned as a witness by

the authority of either House of Congress to give testimony . .

. upon any matter under inquiry before either House. . . or

any committee of either House of Congress . . . refuses to

answer any question pertinent to the question under inquiry,

shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor... .”

DR 1-102(A)\(4) provided: “A lawyer shall not . . . engage in

conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.” The

Code applied in the District of Columbia to conduct occurring before

January 1, 1991. After that date, the Code was superseded by the

District’s version of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

3

ih a ce i cia le er el

>

the hearing committee’s report and recommendation, Mr.

Abrams took a further exception to the court of appeals,

contending that the pardon did foreclose the imposition of

sanction. Id.

On July 10, 1996, a three-judge panel of the court of

appeals sustained Mr. Abrams’ contention that the

Presidential pardon foreclosed the imposition of professional

discipline, vacated the Board’s report, and dismissed the

disciplinary proceeding. On petition of the Board and Bar

Counsel for rehearing, the court of appeals, en banc, upheld

the Board’s report and imposed a public censure based upon

the Board’ s finding of professional misconduct (Pet. App.

1a).* The present petition for writ of certiorari followed.

ARGUMENT

1. The Court previously has had occasion to note that

each State

“has an extremely important interest in maintaining

and assuring the professional conduct of the

attorneys it licenses. ... The judiciary as well as

the public is dependent upon professionally ethical

conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant

interest in assuring and maintaining high standards

of conduct of attorneys engaged in practice.”

Middlesex Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n,

457 U.S. 423, 434 (1982). Accord: Florida Bar v.

Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995); Ohralik v.

Ohio Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978);

Goldfarb v. Virginia Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).

4

The five judges of the court of appeals who composed the

majority were unable to agree among themselves concerning the proper

sanction. Three judges would have imposed a six-month suspension; one

judge, a one-year suspension; and one judge, a censure. The five judges

acquiesced in the censure as the least common sanction that would

command a majority and permit disposition of the proceeding (Pet. App.

49-S0a).

6

The court of appeals below is empowered by Congress to

“make such rules as it deems proper respecting the

examination, qualification, and admission of persons to

membership in its bar, and their censure, suspension, and

expulsion.” D.C. Code § 11-2501(a). Pursuant to that

authority, the court has promulgated rules of professional

conduct, applicable to members of the District of Columbia

Bar, including Mr. Abrams. D.C. App. R. X (promulgating

former Code and present Rules).

The rule of professional conduct at issue here -- DR 1-

102(A)(4) -- sets forth a core requirement of honesty that

constitutes a longstanding provision of the Model Code of

Professional Responsibility. The rule properly extends

beyond purely professional activity in order “to protect the

public . . . by withholding the trust placed in members of the

profession from those whose’ conduct’ evidences

characteristics of dishonesty, faithlessness, or other inability

to exercise fiduciary responsibilities.” Donald T. Weckstein,

“Maintaining the Integrity and Competence of the Legal

Profession,” 48 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 275 (1970).

2. The court of appeals correctly determined that Mr.

Abrams’ presidential pardon did not displace the Court’s

settled authority to impose discipline on the basis of Mr.

Abrams’ professional misconduct. The effect of the pardon,

the court held, was to bar the imposition of punishment in

respect of Mr. Abrams’ criminal offense. The court properly

concluded that the pardon did not foreclose a prospective

assessment of Mr. Abrams’ continued fitness to hold out as a

licensee of the court and as a member in good standing of the

Bar, based upon the proof of his professional misconduct.

(a) As recently as Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,

232 (1993), this Court has said that “the granting of a pardon...

is [a]n executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment

for a crime.” “Jd. at 232 (emphasis in original). The imposition

of professional discipline does not constitute punishment,

whether as a matter of constitutional law or as a component of

attorney ethics. In Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 273 (1882), the

7

Court, quoting Lord Mansfield, characterized attorney discipline

as “not by way of punishment, but . . . the exercise [of] . . .

discretion, whether a [person] whom [the courts] . . . have

formerly admitted is a proper person to be continued on the roll

or not.” The court below affirmed its precedents that the

“purpose in conducting disciplinary proceedings and imposing

sanctions is not to punish the attorney; rather, it is to offer the

desired protection by assuring the continued or restored fitness

of an attorney to practice law.” 689 A.2d at 12 (Pet. App. 16a),

citing Jn re Steele, 630 A.2d 196, 200 (D.C. 1993) (footnote and

citation omitted). See also, e.g., In re Temple, 629 A.2d 1203,

1209 (D.C. 1993); In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 231 (D.C. 1986)

(en banc); Jn re Hutchinson, 534 A.2d 919, 924 (D.C. 1987) (en

banc).°

(b) The court of appeals properly distinguished Mr.

Abrams’ criminal conviction from his underlying misconduct.

The disciplinary charges filed by the Bar Counsel before the

Board on Professional Responsibility rested on the fact of Mr.

Abrams’ professional misconduct -- his repeated acts of

dishonesty before three Committees of Congress -- and the

consequent violations of the Disciplinary Rule prohibiting

such misconduct.°

A contrary holding by this Court would have grave consequences

under the double jeopardy clause for the settled practice whereby

disciplining courts throughout the country routinely impose discipline

upon attorneys convicted of crimes. See Hudson v. United States, 92 F.3d

1026 (10" Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. April 14,

1997) (No. 96-976).

* To be sure, Mr. Abrams’ conviction was relevant to the disciplinary

proceeding in that the conviction triggered the disciplinary investigation

that led to the Bar Counsel’s ethical charges, Mr. Abrams’ plea of guilty

constituted an admission of the charges in the criminal information filed

against him by the Independent Counsel, and, by operation of Rule XI,

§10(f) of the court of appeals’ Rules Governing the Bar, the judgment of

conviction conclusively established his commission of the crime.

However, the proofs at hearing--consisting of the transcripts of Mr.

Abrams’ congressional testimony, the information, plea, and judgment of

conviction from the criminal proceeding, and Mr. Abrams’ own testimony,

8

The court of appeals properly distinguished Ex parte

Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), the case principally

relied upon by Mr. Abrams. 689 A.2d at 16-18 (Pet. App. 27-

33a). There the Reconstruction Congress sought to visit

collective punishment upon Garland and others who, like him,

had served as officers of the Confederacy or had lent support

to its cause. Congress, by legislation, purported to strip such

persons of their right to appear as counsel before this Court.

President Johnson’s pardon operated to “release [Garland’s] .

. . punishment and blots . . . out of existence the guilt, so that

in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had

never committed the offence.” 71 U.S. at 380-81. The

pardon thereby foreclosed the imposition of the “punishment”

sought to be visited upon Garland in respect of his

retroactively declared “offence” against the United States.

Here, by contrast, the court’s imposition of discipline, which

prospectively protects the public interest in the ongoing

integrity of the Bar, does not constitute “punishment” in either

a constitutional or a disciplinary sense, and the basis of the

court’s action is the underlying professional misconduct

rather than the bald fact of conviction of a criminal offense.

None of the other post-Civil War decisions of the Court

invoked by Mr. Abrams before the court of appeals and in his

petition for a writ of certiorari approaches the circumstances

presented below, in which the highest court of the jurisdiction

imposed professional discipline pursuant to its undoubted

authority to regulate the membership of its bar. Rather, those

post-Civil War cases involved the efforts of former

Confederate supporters or sympathizers pardoned by

President Johnson to recover properties seized by the Union

forces in the war or the proceeds of sale. The Court reiterated

in each of the cases that the pardon had removed the “penal

consequences” of the underlying “offence,” thereby

confirming both the punitive nature of the predicate disability

and the limited scope of the presidential act. Knote v. United

provided free-standing evidence of the commission of the ethical

misconduct proscribed by DR 1-102(A)(4).

9

States, 95 U.S. 149, 153 (1877); Osborn v. United States, 91

U.S. 474, 477 (1875); Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147,

153 (1872); United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 147 (1871).

In Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51 (1914), the Court,

without suggesting that it had departed from Garland, ruled

that a state court lawfully could enhance the criminal sentence

imposed under a multiple-offender statute even where the

defendant’s predicate conviction had been the subject of a

presidential pardon. Whatever the merits of the holding in

Carlesi, the Court’s reasoning -- that the heightened sentence

did not impose punishment for the pardoned earlier offense so

as to run afoul of the presidential pardon -- forecloses Mr.

Abrams’ argument that the court below somehow infringed

upon the immunity conferred on him by his pardon.

3. The Department of Justice recently opined that the

presidential pardon does not foreclose the imposition of

professional discipline. In 1995 the Assistant Attorney

General for the Office of Legal Counsel wrote:

“There may be instances where an individual’s

conduct constitutes not only a federal offense, but

also a violation of a separate code of conduct or

ethics that the individual is obligated to comply

with by virtue of his or her professional license.

Discipline associated with the breach of the

conditions of a professional license, where the

disciplinary action is not triggered merely by the

fact of commission or conviction of a federal

offense, generally would not be barred by a

pardon.” 689 A.2d at 16 (Pet. App. 27-28a).

In so writing, the Assistant Attorney General followed a

settled line of Departmental opinions, some dating back to the

turn of the century.’

” See Op. Att’y Gen. No. 78-84, reprinted in 2 Op. O.L.C. 370 (1997)

(“while a pardon relieves the offender of all disabilities imposed by way

of punishment, it does not relieve an offender of disabilities that attend a

conviction”); “Effect of Pardon on Statute Making Persons Convicted of

10

4. The court of appeals, in rejecting Mr. Abrams’

invocation of the pardon, hypothesized the case of an

alcoholic surgeon who botches a surgery, is convicted of

manslaughter and subsequently is pardoned. 689 A.2d at 10-

11 (Pet. App. 13a). “The proposition that the alcoholic but

pardoned surgeon . . . cannot be disciplined,” said the court,

“is, In Our view, altogether unacceptable and even irrational . .

.” “Td. at 11(Pet. App. 13a). Mr. Abrams’ principal rejoinder

is that the surgeon’s alcoholism is the product of a “disabling

condition or status that exists, and can be demonstrated,

wholly apart from the surgeon’s . . . involvement in the

specific conduct constituting the pardoned offense.” Pet. 29.

Whether or not the hypothesized surgeon’s alcoholism would

be the proper subject of professional discipline wholly

divorced from his professional misconduct, Mr. Abrams’

position appears to be that, by virtue of the presidential

pardon, the court below somehow was disabled to take

cognizance of his professional shortcomings -- in specific, his

propensity to deal in falsehoods on matters of grave public

importance -- because his ethical misconduct had occurred in

circumstances that also gave rise to criminal consequences

and the subsequent pardon. Mr. Abrams’ view of the limited

scope of regulation of the bar, if adopted by the Court, would

stand the concept of professional discipline on its head,

permitting the imposition of ethical sanctions in the absence

Felonies Ineligible for Enlistment in the Army,” 39 Op. Att’y Gen. 132

(1938) (“whilst the President’s pardon restores the criminal to his legal

rights and fully relieves him of the disabilities legally attaching to his

conviction, it does not destroy an existing fact, viz, that his service was not

honest and faithful”); “Offenses Committed under Section 504,” 30 Op.

Att’y Gen. 193 (1930) (pardon remits penalties consequent upon

comission of offense, including forfeiture of statutory benefits);

“Pardon -- Removal of Disabilities -- Pension,” 27 Op. Att’y Gen. 178

(1909) (pardon does not operate to undo separation from service so as to

create fiction of honorable discharge entitling former serviceman to

federal pension).

11

of specific instances of misconduct giving rise to criminal

liability but not in their presence.*

5. The court of appeals assumed, but did not decide,

that Mr. Abrams properly had preserved his challenge to the

disciplinary proceeding notwithstanding his affirmative

representation before the Board on _ Professional

Responsibility that the pardon did not foreclose the imposition

of professional discipline. 689 A.2d at 10 (Pet. App. 10-11a).

In the Bar Counsel’s view, expressed to the court below when

it requested supplemental briefing on this issue, Mr. Abrams

properly could invoke the pardon before the court -- if, as he

contended, the pardon ousted the court of jurisdiction to

entertain a disciplinary proceeding against him. However,

we acknowledged that under Burdick v. United States, 236

U.S. 79 (1915), the recipient of a presidential pardon may

accept or reject it, as he chooses. ‘If Burdick applies to one

who embraces his pardon (as does Mr. Abrams here) as well

as to one who repudiates it (as did Burdick), Mr. Abrams

likely failed to preserve his claim for appellate review, and

the lower court’s decision not to rest its adoption of the

Board’s recommendation of discipline upon the alternate

procedural ground of waiver does not bind this Court to

consider Mr. Abrams’ petition on the merits. 689 A.2d at 10

(Pet. App.1 1a).

«

Mr. Abrams’ further argument that in all likelihood the president

would not grant a full and unconditional pardon to the alcoholic surgeon,

but only a limited and incomplete pardon, does not address either the

hypothetical question posed by the court below or the pardon that Mr.

Abrams in fact received.

12

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

LEONARD H. BECKER*

MICHAEL S. FRISCH

JULIA L. PORTER

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR

COUNSEL

515-5TH ST., N.W., ROOM 127

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

(202) 638-1501

*Counsel of Record for Respondent

District of Columbia Bar Counsel

Dated: June 1997

l-a

STATUTES AND RULES

District of Columbia Code, Sec. 11-2501:

“The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall

make such rules as it deems proper respecting the

examination, qualification, and admission of

persons to membership in its bar, and their censure,

suspension, and expulsion.” (July 29, 1970, 84 Stat.

521, Pub. L. 91-358, title I, Sec. 111; 1973 Ed., Sec.

11-2501.)

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule X Governing the

Bar:

“The District of Columbia Rules of Professional

Conduct and any amendments thereto, appearing as

Appendix A, shall provide the standards governing

the practice of law in the District of Columbia.

Appendix B of this rule sets forth the requirements

and provisions of the Interest on Lawyers Trust

Account (IOLTA) program which has_ been

approved by the court.”

District of Columbia Court of Appeals Rule XI Governing the

Bar, Sec. 3:

“(a) Any of the following sanctions may be imposed

on an attorney for a disciplinary violation: . . . (3)

Censure by the Court... .”

District of Columbia Code of Professional Responsibility,

Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(4):

“A lawyer shall not . . . engage in conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”