Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Hampton v. Illinois

PTL ED (1)

961305 DEC 3 1 19%

No. office Ur tHe CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

JOSEPH W. HAMPTON,

Petitioner,

Wi

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Appellate

Court of Illinois, Second Judicial District

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DAVID E. CAMIC

Counsel of Record

MARVIN BLOOM

CAMIC, JOHNSON, WILSON

& BLOOM, P.C.

546 West Galena Boulevard

Aurora, Illinois 60506

(630) 859-0135

Counsel for Petitioner

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60610, (312) 321-0220

i

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether defendant was denied his right to defend

against the cnarges against him and the right to the

effective assistance of counsel when the trial judge

declared him guilty without affording him an oppor-

tunity to present closing argument?

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Question Presented for Review ............... i

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i.

THE APPELLATE COURT IN THIS CASE

HAS DEPRIVED MR. HAMPTON OF HIS

RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED UNDER

THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION BY FINDING THAT

THIS COURT’S OPINION IN HERRING v.

NEW YORK, 422 U.S. 858, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 95

S.Ct. 2550 (1975) ALLOWS FOR WAIVER OF

THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PRESENT

CLOSING ARGUMENT MERELY BECAUSE

THE OPINION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY

REJECT WAIVER. ADDITIONALLY, EVEN

IF THIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT CAN BE

WAIVED, WAIVER WAS WRONGLY AP-

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 858, 45 L.Ed.2d

ee a ee 4,5

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S.Ct. 1404,

BP Sete GOk CIGOD) oo ccc ccccccndcccwsece 6

People v. Coleman, 212 Ill. App. 3d 997, 571 N.E.

Be ee We TODD caine sc vcccnvevecces 5

People v. Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 482, 579 N.E.2d

oo ee ee 5

Constitutional Provision

United States Constitution—Sixth Amendment ... 2

1

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioner, Joseph W. Hampton, respectfully prays that

a Writ of Certiorari issue to review the judgment and

order of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Judicial

District, which was entered on July 3, 1996.

OPINION BELOW

The modified Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 (unpub-

lished) order of the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second

District, on deniai of petitioner’s petition for rehearing

entered on July 3, 1996, is reproduced in the Appendix

to this Petition.

JURISDICTION

The order and judgment of the Appellate Court of

Illinois, Second Judicial District, was entered on July 3,

1996. On October 2, 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court

denied a Petition for Leave to Appeal. This Petition for

Writ of Certiorari is filed within 90 days of that date.

United States Supreme Court Rule 13(1). The decision of

the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Judicial District

was in contravention of federal constitutional law, in

particular the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution. Accordingly, the jurisdiction of this Court

is invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

United States Constitution - Sixth Amendment

“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy

the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial

jury .. .[,] to be informed of the nature and cause of the

accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against

him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses

in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for

his de‘ense.”

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On August 20, 1991, petitioner Joseph W. Hampton,

pleaded guilty to two counts of Attempted Murder, two

counts of Armed Robbery and two counts of Aggravated

Battery. (C. 49). Following sentencing defendant made a

motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and to vacate the

judgments of convictions which was denied. Mr. Hamp-

ton appealed to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Second

District, and that court reversed and remanded the case

finding the trial court did not properly admonish defen-

dant pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 402.

People v. Hampton, 249 Ill. App. 3d 873, 620 N.E.2d 3

(2nd Dist. 1993).

Upon remand the case proceeded to a bench trial. A

Motion to Suppress Evidence was also heard simulta-

neous to the trial. The evidence at trial was that on

August 24, 1990, Michael Lichter and his eleven-year-old

daughter went outside for a walk. As they walked they

were attacked and robbed by two men and both were

seriously injured. The investigation led to Mr. Hampton

who ultimately gave a written statement.

3

In his statement, Mr. Hampton said that he and his

co-defendant, Jayme Sebers, were at Hampton’s house

drinking when they started to drive around. They saw a

man and a girl walking and Sebers said they should hit

the man with the car in order to rob him. Sebers drove

the car and struck the man and Sebers and Mr. Hamp-

ton then got out of the vehicle. Sebers robbed the man as

Hampton struck the girl on the head with an axe handle

because she was crying. The two men continued to beat

the victims and then left. Mr. Hampton’s car was found

with blood on it which could have matched the victims’.

Following the testimony regarding the evidence about

the crime, Terry Tichava, Chief Deputy of the Kendall

County Sheriff’s Office, testified regarding the arrest of

Mr. Hampton for the Motion to Quash and Suppress.

Tichava testified he was voluntarily allowed into Hamp-

ton’s home while Hampton’s mother testified that

Tichava walked in uninvited.

The court found that Mr. Hampton’s confession was

voluntary and not the fruit of an unlawful arrest or

search of his car. The court found there was no expecta-

tion of privacy in the car and overruled objections to Mr.

Hampton’s confession on the basis of chain of custody.

The court then immediately found Mr. Hampton guilty

of the attempted murder of Michael Lichter, the at-

tempted murder of Lauren Lichter, armed robbery and

two counts of aggravated battery. Following a hearing

the court sentenced Mr. Hampton to 30 years for each

attempted murder to run consecutive to each other and

to the armed robbery sentence of 30 years for a total of

90 years, and a concurrent term of 10 years for aggra-

vated battery.

4

REASON FOR GRANTING THE

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

I.

THE ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT IN THIS CASE

HAS DEPRIVED MR. HAMPTON OF HIS RIGHT TO

THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS

GUARANTEED UNDER THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO

THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION BY FINDING

THAT THIS COURT'S OPINION IN HERRING v. NEW

YORK, 422 U.S. 853, 45 L.Ed.2d 593, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (1975),

ALLOWS FOR WAIVER OF THE FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHT TO PRESENT CLOSING ARGUMENT MERELY

BECAUSE THE OPINION DOES NOT EXPLICITLY RE-

JECT WAIVER. ADDITIONALLY EVEN IF THIS FUN-

DAMENTAL RIGHT CAN BE WAIVED, WAIVER WAS

WRONGLY APPLIED TO THIS CASE.

The Appellate Court of Illinois, Second Judicial Dis-

trict, incorrectly interpreted and applied this Court’s

opinion in Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 45 L.Ed.2d

593, 95 S.Ct. 2550 (1975), and the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution. It found that because

Herring did not explicitly reject waiver in its opinion, a

defendant’s fundamental right to present closing argu-

ment can be waived by actions or inaction on the part of

counsel.

In reaching its decision in People v. Hampton, No. 2-95-

0123 (filed July 3, 1996), the Appellate Court, Second

District, stated:

“Because we do not believe that Herring stands for

the proposition tliat the right to present closing

argument is unwaivable, we hold that defense coun-

sel waived the right to closing argument.”

Hampton, No. 2-95-0123, p. 3. However the court failed

to address the question of whether Herring allows for the

a

5

waiver of this fundamental right. Although two Illinois

cases relied upon by the Hampton court cite Herring for

the proposition that the right to closing argument can be

waived by the failure of counsel to seek closing argument

(People v. Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 482, 494, 579 N.E.2d

1008 (1st Dist. 1991); People v. Coleman, 212 Ill. App. 3d

997, 1004, 571 N.E.2d 1035 (1st Dist. 1991)), a clear

reading of Herring reveals that nowhere in the decision

does this Court state that this fundamental right can be

waived.

Additionally, even if the right to present closing argu-

ment can be waived it clearly was not in this case.

Where the trial court improperly curtails a defense coun-

sel’s closing argument, thereby denying him the full

benefit of his constitutional right to effective assistance

of counsel, reversal of that conviction is proper. In this

case the trial court ruled on a motion to suppress and

several evidentiary issues and then immediately declared

defendant guilty. No opportunity was afforded counsel to

present argument. The Appellate Court, Second District,

stated:

“Defense counsel did not attempt, at trial, to seek

closing argument. Defense counsel did not object at

the time the trial court began to make findings nor

did he request to make closing argument.”

However, the trial court never “began” to make findings,

it simply declared defendant guilty. At that point any

opportunity for closing argument was gone.

By finding waiver in this case, the Appellate Court,

Second District, has effectively placed in the hands of the

trial court the decision of whether to hear or not to hear

closing argument. If the court declares defendant guilty

6

before argument, it is waived. Such a holding is impossi-

ble to reconcile with this Court’s decisions placing the

burden on the State in a criminal case of establishing a

valid waiver of a fundamental right. See, e.g., Michigan

v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1409, 89

L.Ed.2d 631 (1986). Since this Court has not expressly

stated that the right to present closing argument can be

waived, or in what manner a waiver can occur, the peti-

tioner respectfully asks this Court to give its guidance on

this important issue.

CONCLUSION

For all the reasons discussed herein, a Writ of Cer-

tiorari should issue to review the decision of the Illinois

Appellate Court, Second District.

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID E. CAMIC

Counsel of Record

MARVIN BLOOM

CAMIC, JOHNSON, WILSON

& BLOOM, P.C.

546 West Galena Boulevard

Aurora, Illinois 60506

(630) 859-0135

Counsel for Petitioner

APPENDIX

App. 1

[Filed July 3, 1996]

THIS ORDER IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND Is Not To BE CITED

2-95-0123

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE ) Appeal from the

STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of

) Kendall County,

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

) No.: 90 CF 91

v. ) 90 CF 92

) 90 CF 93

) 91 CF 20

JOSEPH W. HAMPTON, ) Honcrable

) James L. Wilson,

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

MODIFIED RULE 23 ORDER ON DENIAL

OF PETITION FOR REHEARING

On August 20, 1991, Joseph W. Hampton (defendant),

along with Jayme P. Sebers, pleaded guilty to two counts

of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and

two counts of aggravated battery. Defendant’s motion to

withdraw guilty pleas and to vacate judgments of con-

victions and defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence

were denied. Defendant appealed. On September 2, 1993,

this court reversed, finding the trial court failed to prop-

erly admonish defendant pursuant to Supreme Court

Rule 402.

App. 2

On October 27, 1994, after a bench trial, the tria! court

found defendant guilty of two counts of attempted mur-

der, two counts of aggravated battery, and armed rob-

bery. Defendant was sentenced to consecutive prison

terms of 30 years for each count of attempted murder

and for the armed robbery count for a total of 90 years’

imprisonment with a concurrent term of 10 years’ im-

prisonment for aggravated battery. Defendant appeals.

On appeal, defendant argues: (1) he was denied his

right to defend against the charges against him when the

trial judge declared him guilty without affording him an

opportunity to present closing argument; (2) the trial

court erred when it (a) denied him the opportunity to

impeach a State’s witness for purposes of his motion to

quash arrest and suppress evidence, (b) admitted irrele-

vant and incompetent evidence, and ( c ) determined that

defendant’s sentence for armed robbery must be served

consecutively to his sentences for attempted murder; and

(4) the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him

to consecutive extended term sentences totalling 90

years’ imprisonment where the court failed to consider

mitigating factors. We disagree and we affirm.

First, defendant argues that he was denied his right to

defend against the charges against him when the trial

judge declared him guilty without affording him an op-

portunity to present closing argument.

“The right to present closing argument at trial is of

constitutional magnitude, regardless of whether the trial

is before a judge or jury or whether the defendant is

represented by counsel of represent himself.” People v.

Smith, 249 Ill. App. 3d 460, 465 (1993), citing Herring v.

New York, 422 U.S. 853, 45 L. Ed. 2d 593, 95 S. Ct. 2550

lesaemmeindniaetiininemiieaiaciiniaiiaiasisiiaiiaeiiii

App. 3

(1975). Therefore, where the trial court improperly cur-

tails “defense counsel’s closing argument, thereby deny-

ing him the full benefit of his constitutional right to

effective assistance of counsel,” reversal is compelled.

People v. Smith, 205 Ill. App. 3d 153, 156 (1990). Never-

theless, “[tJhe right to closing argument can be waived.”

People v. Riley, 219 Ill. App. 3d 482, 494 (1991).

We determine that the trial court did not improperly

curtail defense counsel's closing argument. Defense coun-

sel made no attempt, at trial, to seek closing argument.

Defense counsel did not object at the time the trial court

began to make findings nor did he request to make clos-

ing argument. Although defendant did raise the issue in

his post-trial motion, it cannot be said that defense coun-

sel was denied the opportunity to make closing argu-

ment. See People v. Coleman, 212 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1004

(1991). Because we do not believe that Herring stands for

the proposition that the right to present closing argu-

ment is unwaivable, we hold that defense counsel waived

the right to closing argument.

Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in

denying him the opportunity to impeach a State’s wit-

ness for purposes of his motion to quash arrest and sup-

press evidence. Specifically, defendant contends that it

was error for the trial court to not allow into evidence a

University of Illinois State Water Survey (Survey) at-

tempting to impeach Officer Tichava’s (Tichava) testi-

mony that it “started to rain” or “started to sprinkle” on

the date in question.

It is well established that

“where a witness’ credibility is crucial, the trial court

should permit the parties wide latitude in impeach-

App. 4

ing and rehabilitating the witness’ credibility so that

the jury can gain access to all necessary information

and impressions in order to evaluate credibility. '

[Citation.] Matters of impeachment are within the

trial court’s sound discretion, and a reviewing court

should not interfere unless there has been a clear

abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to

the defendant.” People v. Morando, 169 Ill. App. 3d

716, 730 (1988).

It has recently been stated that “a defendant has the

right to question a prosecution witness regarding any

matter which goes to explain, modify, or discredit the

witness’ testimony ***.” People v. Harris, 262 Ill. App. 3d

35, 45 (1994).

However, “[t]he purpose of impeaching evidence is to

destroy the credibility of a witness, not to establish the

truth of the impeaching evidence.” People v. Redd, 135

Ill. 2d 252, 316-17 (1990). “The exclusion of evidence is

neither prejudicial nor grounds for reversal where the

same or substantially the same evidence is admitted at

some stage of the trial.” People v. Campbell, 126 Il. App.

3d 1028, 1052 (1984).

We determine that the trial court did not err when it

denied defendant the opportunity to impeach Tichava for

purposes of defendant’s motion to ouash arrest and sup-

press evidence. First, it is arguable that the proposed

evidence is irrelevant. The proposed evidence declared

that there was no precipitation on the date in question

at the reporting station at Aurora College. However, de-

fendant was attempting to prove that it did not rain at

his home in Boulder Hill, Illinois. Furthermore, it can be

argued that the issue of whether it was raining on the

date in question is a collateral matter and may not be

a ee enn aT ee

App. 5

impeached. See People v. Breton, 237 Ill. App. 3d 355,

364 (1992).

Second, any error that may have resulted from the

exclusion of the Survey from evidence must be viewed as

harmless. Testimony which was substantially similar to

the Survey was admitted at trial. Specifically, Officer

Harris testified that on the date in question the weather

was “clear.” Defendant’s mother testified that on the date

in question, the weather was “pleasant.” The Survey can

only be viewed as cumulative evidence and its admission

would not have changed the result of the motion to

quash arrest and suppress evidence. We conclude that

the exclusion of the Survey from evidence was neither

prejudicial to defendant nor does it constitute grounds

for reversal. See Campbell, 126 Ill. App. 3d at 1052.

Defendant also argues that the trial court erred by

admitting irrelevant and incompetent evidence.

“Real evidence is admissible when an adequate foun-

dation is laid to establish that the item is the one in-

volved in the alleged offense and is substantially un-

changed since its seizure by authorities. [Citation.]

When the evidence is not readily identifiable or is

susceptible to alteration, the State must show a

chain of custody of sufficient completeness to render

it improbable that the item has been tampered, ex-

changed, or contaminated.” People v. Slaughter, 149

Ill. App. 3d 183, 186 (1986).

However, “[wJhen the competent evidence in the record

establishes the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt and it can be concluded that retrial without the

erroneous admission of the challenged evidence would

produce no different result, the conviction may be af-

firmed.” People v. Arman, 131 Ill. 2d 115, 124 (1989).

App. 6

After reviewing the record, we find it unnecessary to

determine whether the trial court improperly admitted

the following into evidence: (1) testimony regarding Offi-

cer Harris’ search for a one hundred dollar bill at de-

fendant’s home; and (2) testimony regarding the gym

shoe found at the scene. This is true because we de-

termine that even without the admission of the alleged

improper evidence, overwhelming evidence exists that

proves defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In

other words, even if the trial court improperly admitted

the evidence, we determine that “retrial without the er-

roneous admission of the challenged evidence would pro-

duce no different result.” Arman, 131 Ill. 2d at 124.

Therefore, we may affirm defendant’s conviction. See

Arman, 131 Ill. 2d at 124. |

Defendant further argues that the trial court erred

when it determined that his sentence for armed robbery

must be served consecutively to his sentences for at-

tempted murder. The relevant statute states:

“The court shall not impose consecutive sentences for

offenses which were committed as part of a single

course of conduct during which there was no substan-

tial change in the nature of the criminal objective,

unless, one of the offenses for which defendant was

convicted was a Class X or Class 1 felony and the

defendant inflicted severe bodily injury, ***, in which

event the court shall enter sentences to run consecu-

tively.” 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (West 1994).

“In determining whether the defendant’s actions consti-

tuted a single course of conduct, courts will often exam-

ine the motivations behind those actions.” People v.

Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d 140, 146 (1992). “Thus, in im-

posing consecutive sentences, the court in Stokes [People

eR

App. 7

uv. Stokes, 172 Ill. App. 3d 534, 537 (1988)] examined the

record for the existence of separate and distinct acts and

then sought to determine whether separate motivations

existed behind those acts.” Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d at

146. Nevertheless, “[nJot all crimes involving multiple

acts are deemed to be the result of independent motiva-

tions.” Morris, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 146. Furthermore, “we

note that there is no need to object to a sentencing error

in order to preserve the error for review.” People v. Allen,

268 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951 (1994).

The relevant part of the sentencing order states:

“4, that the Class X offenses of Armed Robbery ***

and the two (2) separate offenses of Attempt Murder

*** were committed by the defendant as part of a

single course of conduct during which there was no

substantial change in the nature of the defendant’s

criminal objective AND that the defendant inflicted

severe bodily injury upon both victims.” (Emphasis in

original.)

Defendant argues that at the sentencing hearing the

trial court did not make appropriate determinations re-

garding course of conduct, motivation, and bodily injury.

However, the plain language of the sentencing order

demonstrates otherwise. Furthermore, the trial court

made an explicit finding that defendant inflicted severe

bodily injury upon both victims. Therefore, the consecu-

tive sentencing provision was mandatory.

We find defendant’s reliance on the case of People v.

Bole, 155 Ill. 2d 188 (1993), to be misplaced. In that case,

the defendant’s convictions stemmed from three counts

of criminal sexual assault which occurred on three sepa-

rate dates. The Bole court found the defendant’s acts

were committed in separate courses of conduct thereby

App. 8

precluding application of section 5-8-4(a). Bole, 155 Ill. 2d

at 199. After a careful review of the entire record and the

case law, we determine that the trial court did not err

when it determined defendant’s sentence for armed rob-

bery must be served consecutively to the similarly con-

secutive sentences for attempted murder.

Furthermore, Defendant argues that under People uv.

Ivey, 267 Ill. App. 3d 310 (1994), his consecutive sen-

tences were improper. However, we find Ivey to be dis-

tinguishable from the case at bar. In Ivey at page 312,

the court held that were the defendant has been convict-

ed of multiple offenses committed as part of a single

course of conduct, including one which triggers the

mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of section

5-8-4, the sentence for every offense need not be consecu-

tive to every other offense arising from that course of

conduct, even where only-one is a “triggering” offense. In

other words, section 5-8-4 (a) mandates consecutive sen-

tencing only for the triggering offence. In this case, each

offense constitutes a triggering offense. Therefore, under

the plain language of the statute, the trial court had the

authority to impose consecutive sentences for each of-

fense.

Last, defendant argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in sentencing him to consecutive extended

term sentences totaling 90 years’ imprisonment where

the court failed to consider mitigating factors. Specifical-

ly, defendant argues that the trial court failed to consid-

er that (1) he completed his high school education while

in jail despite a learning disability; (2) he expressed re-

morse; and (3) he had been an exemplary prisoner while

in the penitentiary.

App. 9

“(Ojur decisions have firmly established that the im-

position of a sentence is a matter of judicial discretion

and that, absent an abuse of this discretion, the sentence

of the trial court may not be altered upon review.” People

v. Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d 149, 153 (1977).

“This court will not disturb a sentence imposed by

the trial court unless it clearly appears that the pen-

alty constitutes a great departure from the funda-

mental law and its spirit and purpose. [Citation.] In

this State, the spirit and purpose of the law are up-

held when a sentence reflects the seriousness of the

offense and gives adequate coiisideration to the re-

habilitative potential of the defendant.” People uv.

Heflin, 71 Ill. 2d 525, 545 (1978).

Furthermore,

“[w]Jhen a reviewing court is requested to exercise its

power to reduce a sentence, that power must be ex-

ercised cautiously and the court will not engage in

mere judicial clemency. [Citation.] A reviewing court

cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court simply because it would have balanced the

factors differently.” People v. Green, 233 Ill. App. 3d

298, 303 (1992).

This is true because,

“[a] trial judge is in a far better position than an

appellate court to fashion an appropriate sentence,

because such judge can make a reasoned judgment

based upon firsthand consideration of such factors as

‘the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral

character, mentality, social environment, habits, and

age’ [citations]; whereas the appellate court has to

rely entirely on the record [citation].” People v. Streit,

142 Ill. 2d 13, 19 (1991), quoting Perruquet, 68 Ill. 2d

at 154.

App. 10

Finally, a trial judge’s sentencing decision is presumed

to be based on proper legal reasoning “unless there is

some statement in the record, aside from the sentence

imposed, which would tend to indicate otherwise.” People

v. Goodman, 116 Ill. App. 3d 125, 128 (1983).

Defendant’s argument relies almost entirely on the fol-

lowing statement made by the trial court. “That the only

possible mitigating factor as to the defendant Hampton

who was only 19 years of age at the time of the present

crimes is that he has no history of a prior delinquency or

criminal activity.” A careful review of the record indi-

cates that the trial court considered defendant’s potential

for rehabilitation before making this statement.

Furthermore, the plain language of the sentencing

order demonstrates that the trial court properly consid-

ered mitigating factors in sentencing defendant. The rele-

vant portion of the sentencing order states:

“2. That the Court has considered all the relevant

factors in aggravation, *** as well as having consid-

ered the relevant factors in mitigation, including but

not limited to the defendant’s age (19 at the time of

these offenses) and the lack of a history of prior

delinquency or criminal activity.”

The order states that the mitigating factors are not lim-

ited to the ones enumerated in the order. Therefore, it

cannot be stated that the trial court failed to consider

other mitigating factors. Defendant’s argument must fail.

In terms of the actual sentence imposed, it must be

remembered that it is not this court’s function to reweigh

the relevant sentencing factors. Nevertheless based on

the facts of the present case, we determine that it was

eminently reasonable for the trial court to sentence de-

App. 11

fendant to consecutive extended term sentences totalling

90 years’ imprisonment. The mitigating factors defendant

discusses all have one thing in common: They all oc-

curred after the commission of a particularly brutal and

heinous crime. It is not out of the realm of possibility

that the sole impetus for defendant’s “exemplary” be-

havior was the desire to receive a favorable sentence. In

light of the great deference bestowed upon a trial court’s

sentencing decision, we conclude that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit

court of Kendall County is affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, J., with DOYLE and THOMAS, JJ.,

concurring.

App. 12

(Letterhead of)

ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT

JULEANN HORNYAK, CLERK

SUPREME COURT BUILDING

SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS 62701

(217) 782-2035

October 2, 1996

Mr. David E. Camic

Camic, Johnson, Wilson & Bloom, P.C.

546 West Galena Boulevard

Aurora, IL 60506

No. 81494 — People State of Illinois, respondent, v.

Joseph W. Hampton, petitioner. Leave to

appeal, Appellate Court, Second District.

The Supreme Court today DENIED the petition for

leave to appeal in the above entitled cause.

The mandate of this Court will issue to the Appeilate

Court on October 24, 1996.