Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Schultz v. United States

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the Huites States

October Term, 1994

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ,

Petitioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FEDERAL AVIATION

ADMINISTRATION,

Respondent

Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals For

The Tenth Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Charles A. Schultz

Pro Se Petitioner

P.O. Box 526382

Salt Lake City, Utah

84152-6382

Telephone: (801) 466-7308

S FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL

l. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT HAVE

JURISDICTION TO HEAR MR. SCHULTZ'S ATTACK ON THE VOID

JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

(HEREINAFTER, "THE FAA")?

4. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT COULD BE

GRANTED WHEN THE STATUTE UNDER WHICH MR. SCHULTZ WAS

PROSECUTED AND UNDER WHICH FAA SEEKS TO RECOVER, HAS

EXPIRED OF ITS OWN TERMS AND CONDITIONS?

3. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT COULD BE

GRANTED, WHEN FEDERAL AVIATION RULES UNDER WHICH MR.

SCHULTZ WAS PROSECUTED WERE UNCONSTITUTIONALLY

ENACTED AND INVALIDLY PROMULGATED?

4. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT MR. SCHULTZ’S DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

WERE NOT VIOLATED BY HIS PROSECUTION UNDER

UNCONSTITUTIONALLY ENACTED AND INVALIDLY PROMULGATED

FAA RULES?

5. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT 49 U.S.C.A. § 1486(a) APPLIES TO

PERSONS OTHER THAN THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION?

6. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST MR.

SCHULTZ DID NOT EXPIRE AT THE TIME THE STATUTE UNDER

WHICH HE WAS PROSECUTED EXPIRED OF ITS OWN TERMS AND

CONDITIONS?

7. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN CONCLUDING THAT THE FAA'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY

JUDGMENT WAS FILED WITHIN THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF

LIMITATIONS?

. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS ERR, AS A MATTER OF

LAW, IN EXTENDING THE HOLDING OF U.S. V, MCBRIDE, 788 F.2D

1429, (10TH CIR, 1986) TO INCLUDE VOID JUDGMENTS AND EXPIRED

STATUTES WITHIN ITS HOLDING?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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Public Law No.

iil

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, TREATIES,

STA ORDINANCES AND REGULATION

U.S.C. § 1291

U.S.C. § 1354

U.S.C. § 1355

U.S.C.A. § 1471 (d)

U.S.C.A. § 1473

U.S.C.A. § 1475

U.S.C.A. § 1486

CFR § 13.208

CFR § 107.21 (a)

100-233,

Public Law No. 101-236,

Public Law No.

101-281,

101-370,

Public Law No. 102-345,

§ 204, 101 Stat.

103 Stat. 2060

104 Stat. 164

104 Stat. 451

§ 2(b), 106 Stat.

1519

925

PARTIES TO THE APPEAL

The parties to this appeal are Charles

A. Schultz, the Petitioner/Appellant/

Defendant and the United States of America,

Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter,

"the FAA").

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURTS

The FAA filed a complaint against

Charles A. Schultz on November 16, 1992. Mr.

Schultz was served with a summons and

complaint January 26, 1993. Mr. Schultz

filed an answer on February 16, 1993. The

FAA filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on

July 30, 1993. Mr. Schultz filed a

Memorandum in Opposition to the FAA's Motion

for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Summary

Judgment on September 2, 1993. Both parties

motions were argued January 3, 1994. At the

Close of the hearing the Honorable Judge

Bruce Jenkins granted summary judgment in

favor of the FAA and against Mr. Schultz,

declaring that Mr. Schultz had a very good

argument, but that the court did not have the

authority to grant Mr. Schultz's request.

The judgment was entered on January 6, 1994.

Mr. Schultz appealed the Judgment on February

8, 1994. On February 28, 1995, the Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued an

opinion affirming the decision of the

District Court.

JURISDICTION

The United States Supreme Court has

jurisdiction of this Petition pursuant to the

provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

A. DATE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT:

The Judgment of the Court of Appeals was

entered on February 28, 1995.

B. STATUTORY JURISDICTION OF THE

SUPREME COURT:

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1254(1) the Supreme Court has jurisdiction

to here this Petition for review of the

decision of the Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit.

vil

BASIS OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The FAA asserted that the trial court

had jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to

the provisions of 903 and 905 of Title 49

U.S.C.A. App. 1473 and 1475 as well as 28

U.S.C.A. § 1354 and § 1355. Jurisdiction was

vested in the Court of Appeals pursuant to

the provisions 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.

Vill

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from a Judgment of the

Court of Appeals affirming a grant of Summary

Judgment by the District Court in favor of

the FAA and against Mr. Schultz based on a

judgment and order issued and entered against

Mr. Schultz by the FAA's administrative law

judge (hereinafter, "ALJ") in an

administrative proceeding conducted,

litigated, and decided by the FAA.

In December 1987, Congress enacted a

series of amendments to the Federal

Administration Act with respect to civil

penalties. See Public Law No. 100-233, §

204, 101 Stat. 1519 (codified in scattered

sections of 49 U.S.C.A.). One of the

purposes of the amendments was to establish a

"demonstration program" to prosecute and

adjudicate administrative penalty actions

less than $50,000. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1475

(Supp. V 1987).

Under the express terms of the

amendments, the FAA was granted authority to

assess administrative penalties for a two (2)

year period beginning on December 30, 1987.

“4

See 49 U.S.C.A. § 1475(d) (4).

On December 15, 1989, the Congress

enacted Public Law 101-236, 103 Stat. 2060,

changing the duration of the "demonstration

program" of § 1475(d) (4) from two (2) years

to 28 months.

On May 4, 1990, Congress passed Public

Law 101-281, 104 Stat. 164, changing the

duration of the "demonstration program" of §

1475(d) (4) from 28 months to 31 months. On

August 15, 1991, the Congress enacted Public

Law 101-370, 104 Stat. 451, changing the

duration of the "demonstration program" of §$

1475(d) (4) from 31 months to "the period

beginning on the date of enactment of this

section and ending on August l, 1992".

49 U.S.C.A. § 1475 expired of its own

terms at midnight on July 31, 1990. From

midnight July 31, 1990, to August 15, 1990,

there was no § 1475(d) (4) of 49 U.S.C.A. in

effect.

Mr. Schultz was accused by the FAA of

violating the provisions of § 107.21(a) of

the Federal Aviation Regulations,

14 CFR 107.21(a) and § 901(d) of the Federal

Aviation Act, as amended, U.S.C.A. 1471(d),

and on Juiy 25, 1989, a hearing was held

before an FAA ALJ on the FAA's allegations.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ

orally imposed a $2,000.00 fine on Mr.

Schultz for the alleged violations.

Mr. Schultz appealed the ALJ's decision

to the FAA Administrator on August 3, 1989,

and on September 9, 1989, the FAA

Administrator issued a "Decision and Order"

affirming the ALJ's decision.

On April 13, 1990, the United States

Court of Appeals, District of Columbia

Circuit issued a decision wherein it ruled

that the sections of the Federal

Administration Act, under which Mr. Schultz

had been prosecuted, had been improperly

enacted and could not be enforced. Pursuant

to the Court of Appeals decision in Air

Transport of America v. Dept. of Transp.,

900 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir 1990), the FAA ceased

institution of prosecutions under the

referenced sections and held in abeyance all

pending prosecutions. In the summer of 1990,

pursuant to the decision in Air Transport,

the FAA sent a "Notice" to all persons

prosecuted under the referenced sections that

their cases were being "held in abeyance".

At midnight on July 31, 1990, §

1475(d) (4) of 49 U.S.C.A. lapsed of its own

terms, without any savings clause. From

midnight July 31, 1990, to August 15, 1990,

there was no § 1475(d) (4) of 49 U.S.C, and

the 1987 version of § 1475, with all of its

extensions, contained no savings clause

permitting continued prosecution of cases

initiated under the lapsed version of 49

U.S.C.A. § 14795.

Pursuant to the decision in Air

Transport, the FAA substantially modified the

provisions of the FAA rules for imposing

penalties in civil actions. Those new |

provisions became effective August 2, 1990.

See 14 CFR Part 13, Vol 55, No. 128, Docket

No. 25690, Amdt. No. 13-21. On August 15,

1990, Congress enacted a new version of 49

U.S.C § 1475 which permitted the FAA to

continue the "demonstration program" under

the revised and validly promulgated FAA

rules.

The civil prosecution of Mr. Schultz had

concluded and the FAA Administrator had

issued his "Decision and Order" affirming the

ALJ's imposition of a $2,000.00 penalty

against Mr. Schultz prior to the time the

ruling in Air Transport. Unlike those whose

cases that were "held in abeyance” Mr.

Schultz was never prosecuted under the new

version of the FAA rules, authorized by the

August 15, 1990 version of 49 U.S.C.A. §

1475, which empowered the FAA to continue the

"demonstration program,” in accordance with

the new FAA rules modified in accordance with

the decision of the Air Transport ruling. On

August 26, 1992, the August 15, 1990 version

of 49. U.S.C.A. § 1475 was repealed in total.

See Public Law 102-345, § 2(b), 106 Stat.

925.

On November 13, 1992, after 49. U.S.C.A.

$ 1475 was repealed, the FAA filed the

instant action, seeking to collect the sum of

$2,000.00 plus interest, penalties and

administrative fees from Mr. Schultz pursuant

to the July 25, 1989 decision, of the ALJ and

pursuant to the November 9, 1989 "Decision

and Order", of the FAA Administrator. Mr.

Schultz answered the FAA's complaint

asserting that: 1) the judgment entered by

the ALJ was void under the decision of the

Air Transport decision; 2) the judgment of

the ALJ was void because the version of 49

U.S.C.A. 1475 under which Mr. Schultz had

been prosecuted had lapsed of its own terms

prior to the time the FAA initiated this

collection action; 3) the FAA's complaint had

not been filed within the appropriate statute

of limitations.

The FAA moved for summary judgment on

its complaint, asserting that the District

Court did not have jurisdiction to hear Mr.

Schultz's challenge to the validity of the

judgment rendered by the ALJ. Mr. Schultz

responded to the FAA's Motion for Summary

Judgment and filed a cross Motion for Summary

Judgment. The District Court concluded that

it did not have jurisdiction to hear Mr.

Schultz's challenge to the validity of the

FAA's judgment and order and granted the

FAA's Motion for Summary Judgment. On

appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the

Judgment of the District Court declaring that

the case was controlled by its decision in

U.S. V. Mcbride, 788 F.2d 1429, (10th Cir,

1986).

ARGUMENT

This matter should be reviewed by the

United States Supreme Court for the following

reasons:

» The District Court's decision and

the Court of Appeals affirmation of the

District Court's decision holding that the

District Court lacked jurisdiction to hear

Mr. Schultz's attack on the validity of the

Judgment entered by the ALJ is in direct

opposition to this Court's holding in Abbott

Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)

declaring that judicial review of final

agency action "will not be cut off unless

there is persuasive reason to believe that

[this] was the intention of Congress," and

that such Congressional intent to preclude

review had to be demonstrated by "clear and

convincing evidence." [It is also in

Opposition *o this Court's decision in

Johnson v. Robinson, 415 U.S. 361 (1974).

y The District Court's decision and

the Court of Appeals affirmation of the

District Court's decision holding that 49

U.S.C.A. § 1486 applies to persons other than

the Secretary of Transportation, as

specifically specified in § 1486, is an

improper and unlawful drafting of legislation

and usurpation of Congressional authority on

the part of the federal courts.

ae The District Court's decision and

the Court of Appeals affirmation of the

District Court's decision holding that the

FAA could collect on a Judgment entered by an

ALJ acting in accordance with rules that were

unconstitutionally enacted and invalidly

promulgated, is in direct opposition to the

decision of the Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia in Air Transport Assn of

America v. Department of Transportation, 900

F.2d 369 (1990).

4. The District Court's decision and

the Court of Appeals affirmation of the

District Court's decision holding that the

FAA could collect on a Judgment based on a

statute that expired of its own terms,

without any savings clause, is such a

departure of well established law that those

decision mandate review by this Court.

De The District Court's decision and

the Court of Appeals affirmation of the

District Court's decision holding that the

prosecution of Mr. Schultz under rules that

were unconstitutionally enacted and invalidly

promulgated, is such a departure of well

established and fundamental law that those

decision mandate review by this Court.

CONCLUSION

The FAA was not entitled to Summary

Judgment as a matter of fact or law. The FAA

is attempting to recover moneys from Mr.

Schultz based on a void judgment that was

obtained pursuant to rules, procedures and

processes that were invalidly and

unconstitutionally enacted and invalidly

unconstitutionally promulgated and based on a

statute, which even if valid, expired of its

own terms, thus becoming a void judgment.

The District Court erred as a matter of law

in granting the FAA's Motion for Summary

Judgment, and the Court of Appeals for the

Tenth Circuit erred as a matter of law.in

affirming the District Court's judgment.

Both the District Court and the Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ignored well-

established and controlling law, established

by this Court, in rendering their decisions.

Therefore, this Court should grant Mr.

Schultz's Petition for Certiorari and reverse

the District Court's grant of summary

judgment in favor of the FAA and remand this

case to the district court with instructions

to enter judgment in favor of Mr. Schultz.

Respectfully submitted this / (hig of

May 1995.

INNS

Charles A~Schultz (Pro Se)

Decision of Tenth Circuit

Order of Summary Judgment

28 U.S.C. § 1291

28 U.S.C. § 1351

28 U.S.C. § 1355

49 U.S.C.A. § 1471(d)

49 U.S.C.A. § 1475

49 U.S.C.A. § 1486

14 CFR § 13.208

14 CFR § 107.21(a)

Public Law No. 100-233, § 204, 101 Stat. 1520

Public Law 101-236, 103 Stat. 2060

Public Law 101-281, 104 Stat. 164

Public Law 101-370, 104 Stat. 451

Public Law 102-345, § 2(b), 106 Stat. 925

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

v. ) No.94-4047

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ, ) (D.C. No. 92-CV-974) .

Defendant-Appellant. ) @. Utah)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before TACHA, BRORBY and EBEL, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially

assist the determination of this appeal. See Red. R. App. P. 34(a);

10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered submitted

without oral argument.

This appeal is from an order of the district court

granting the United States motion for summary

judgment and denying the pro se defendant's motion for summary

judgment. Defendant appeals on the grounds that the district court

erred in granting the government's motion for summary judgment

because the judgment upon which the complaint was based was

void and because the statute under which petitioner was prosecuted

was invalid and further on the grounds that the government filed its

complaint outside the applicable statute of limitations. We affirm.

*This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavor

the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be

cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General Order filed November

29, 1993. 151 F.R.D. 470.

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo applying the

same legal standard as that applied by the district court to

determine whether any genuine issue of material fact is in dispute

and whether the substantive law was correctly applied. Ash Creek

Min. Co. V. Lujan, 969 F. 2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992). Defendant was

a ticketed passenger on an airline flight when security personnel

discovered a loaded revolver in his carry on luggage. The FAA

assessed a civil penalty against him for violations of the Federal

Aviation Regulations and § 901 (d) of the Federal Aviation Act.

Defendant received a full hearing before an administrative law judge |

(ALJ) who assessed a civil penalty of $2000. The ALJ's |

determination was appealed to the administrator of the FAA who

affirmed the ALJ's initial decision. The United States filed this

action to reduce to judgement the civil penalty against the

defendant by the FAA. Defendant's here attempts to collaterally

attack the validity of the FAA order. The district court correctly

determined that it was without jurisdiction to consider the collateral

attack and granted summary judgment in favor of the United States.

We agree with the district court that there are no genuine issues of

material fact to dispute in this case and that the law is clear that the

district court has no jurisdiction to consider a collateral attack on

the FAA order. This case is controlled by U.S. v. McBride, 788

F.2d 1429, 1432 (10th Cir. 1986).

AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

Deanell Reece Tacha

Circuit Judge

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

Plaintiff, : Civil No. 92-C 974J

VS. ; ORDER

CHARLES A. SCHULTZ,

Defendant.

The above-entitled matter came before the court on Monday

January 3, 1994 at 1:30 p.m. for a hearing on the parties’ cross

motions for summary judgment. Carlie Christensen, Assistant

United States Attorney, appeared for the United States of America.

Defendant, Charles A. Schultz appeared on his own behalf.

The court having heard the arguments of counsel and having

reviewed the authorities submitted by the parties,

HEREBY ORDERS as follows:

1. The United States' motion for summary judgment is

granted and defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied;

2. Judgment shall be entered in favor of the United States and

against the defendant, Charles A. Schultz, as follows:

Principal $2,000.00

Accrued interest to $ 664.99

date of judgment

Administrative Charges $ 228.00

Cost of Service $ 40.00

Penalty Charges $ 180.00

Statutory Surcharge $_ 270.50

TOTAL JUDGMENT $3,383.49

with interest on the total judgment to accrue as provided by 28

U.S.C. § 1961 from the date of judgment until paid.

DATED this 5th day of January, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

Hon. Bruce S. Jenkins

United States District Court

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28 U.S.C.A. § 1291

§1291 Final decisions of district courts

The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for

the Federal circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions

of the district courts of the United States, the United States District Court

for the District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam,, and the

District Court of the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be

had in the Supreme Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described

in section 1292 (c) and (d) and 1295 of this title.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1351

§ 1351 Consuls, vice consuls, and members of a diplomatic mission

as defendant

The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the

courts of the States, of all civil actions and proceedings against--

(1) consuls or vice consuls of foreign states; or

(2) members f a mission or members of their families (as such terms are

defined in section 2 of the Diplomatic Relations Act).

(As amended May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 80(c), 63 State. 101; Sept. 30, 1978,

Pub.L. 95-393, § 8(a)(1), 92 Stat. $10.)

28 U.S.C.A. § 1355

§ 1355 Fine, penalty or forfeiture

(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the

courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or

enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or other wise,

incurred under any Act of Congress, except matters within the jurisdiction

of the Court of International Trade under section 1582 of this title.

(b)(1) A forfeiture action or proceeding may be brought in--

(A) the district court for the district in which any of the acts or omissions

giving rise to the forfeiture occurred, or

(2) Whenever property subject to forfeiture under the laws of the United

States is located in a foreign country, or has been detained or seized

pursuant to legal process or competent authority of a foreign government,

an action or proceeding for forfeiture may be brought as provided in

paragraph (1), or in the United States District court for the District of

Columbia.

forfeiture action or proceeding is appealed, removal of the property by the

prevailing party shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction. Upon motion of

the appealing party, the district court or the court of appeals shall issue any

order necessary to preserve the right of the appealing party to the full value

of the property at issue, including a stay of the judgment of the district court

pending appeal or requiring the prevailing party to post an appeal bond.

(d) Any court with jurisdiction over a forfeiture action pursuant to

subsection(b) may issue and cause to be served in any other district such

process as may be required to bring before the court the property that is the

subject of the forfeiture action.

(As amended Oct. 10, 1980, Pub. L. 96-417, Title V, § 507, 94 Stat. 1743;

oct. 28, 1992, Pub. L. 102-550, Title XV, V4,6

1521, 106 Stat. 4062.)

US.C. § 1471 (d)

§. 1471 (d). Civil penalties; notice and hearing; compromise; liens

Except for law enforcement officers of any municipal or State government

or officers or employees of the Federal Government, who are authorized or

required within their official capacities to carry arms, or other persons who

may be so authorized under regulations issued by the Administrator,

whoever while aboard, or while attempting to board, any aircraft in, or

intended for operation in, air transportation or intrastate air transportation,

has on or about his person or his property a concealed deadly or dangerous

weapon, which is, or would be, accessible to such person in flight shall be

subject to a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 which shall be

recoverable in a civil action brought in the name of the United States.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1475

§. 1475. Civil penalty assessment demonstration program

(a) Civil penalty

The Administrator, or his delegate, may assess a civil penalty for a

violation arising under this chapter or a rule, regulation, or order issued

thereunder, upon written notice and finding of violation by the

Administrator.

(b) No reexamination of liability or amount

In the case of a civil penalty assessed by the Administrator in

accordance with this section, the issue of liability or amount of civil penalty

shall not be reexamined in any subsequent suit for collection of such civil

penalty.

Not withstanding subsection (a) of this section, the United States

district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil penalty action

initiated by the Administrator (1) which involves an amount in controversy

in excess of $50,000; (2) which is an in rem action or in which an in rem

action based on the same violation has been brought; (3) regarding which

an aircraft subject to lien has been seized by the United States; and (4) in

which a suit for injunctive relief based on the violation giving rise to the

civil penalty has also been brought.

(d) Limitations

(1) hearing

A civil penalty may be assessed under this section only after notice and

opportunity for a hearing on the record in accordance with section 554 of

Title 5.

(2) Violations

This section only applies to civil penalties initiated by the Administrator

after December 30, 1987.

(3) Maximun. amount

The maximum amount of a civil penalty which may be assessed

under this section in any case may not exceed $50,000.

(4) Effective period

The provisions of this section shall only be in effect for the period

beginning on December 30, 1987 and ending on August 1, 1992.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1486

§ 1486 Judicial review

(a) Orders subject to review; petition for review. any order affirmative of

negative, issued by the Board or Administrator [Secretary of

Transportation] under this Act, except any order in respect of any foreign

air carrier subject to the approval of the President as provided in section

801 of this Act [49 USCS Appx § 1461] shall be subject to review by the

courts of appeals of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals

for the District of Columbia upon petition, and within sixty day s after the

entry of such order, by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such

order. After the expiration of said sixty days a petition may be filed only by

leave of the court upon a showing of reasonable grounds for failure to file

the petition theretofore.

14 CFR § 13.208

§ 13.208 Complaints.

(a) Filing. The agency attorney shall file the original and one copy of

the complaint with the hearing docket clerk, or may file a written motion

pursuant to § 13.218(f)(2)(i) of this subpart instead of filing a complaint,

not later than 20 days after receipt by the agency attorney of a request for

hearing.

The agency attorney should suggest a location for the hearing when

filing the complaint.

(b) Service. An agency attorney shall personally deliver or mail a copy

of the complaint on the respondent, the president of the corporation or

company named as a respondent, or a person designated by the respondent

to accept service of documents in the civil penalty action.

regulation allegedly violated by the respondent, and the proposed civil

penalty in sufficient detail to provide notice of any factual of legal

allegation and proposed civil penalty.

(d) Motion to dismiss allegations or complaint. Instead of filing an

answer to the complaint, a respondent may move to dismiss the complaint,

or that part of the complaint, alleging a violation that occurred more than 2

years before an agency attorney issued a notice of proposed civil penalty to

the respondent.

(1) An administrative law judge may not grant the motion and

dismiss the complaint or part of the complaint if the administrative law

judge finds that the agency has shown good cause for any delay in issuing

the notice of proposed civil penalty.

(2) If the agency fails to show good cause for any delay, an

administrative law judge may dismiss the complaint, or that part of the

complaint, alleging a violation that occurred more than 2 years before an

agency attorney issued the notice of Proposed civil penalty to the

respondent.

(3) A party may appeal the administrative law judge's ruling on the

motion to dismiss the complaint or any part of the complaint in accordance

with § 13.219(b) of this subpart.

14 CFR § 107.21(a)

§ 107.21(a) Carriage of an explosive, incendiary, or deadly or

dangerous weapon.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, no person may

have an explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon on or about

the individual's person o accessible property--

(1) When performance has begun of the inspection of the individual's

person or accessible property before entering a sterile area; and

(2) When entering or in a sterile area.

(b) The provisions of this section with respect to firearms do not apply

to the following;

(1) Law enforcement officers required to carry a firearm by this part

while on duty on the airport.

(2) Person authorized to carry a firearm in accordance with § 108.11

or § 129.27.

(3) Persons authorized to carry a firearm in a sterile area under an

approved security program or a security program issued in accordance with

§ 129. 25

Public Law No. 100-233, & 204, 101 Stat. 1520

"SEC. 905. CIVIL PENALTY ASSESSMENT DEMONSTRATION

PROGRAM.

"(a) CIVIL PENALTY .- The Administrator, or his delegate, may assess a

civil penalty for a violation arising under this Act or a rule, regulation, or

order issued thereunder, upon written notice and finding of violation by the

Administrator.

"(b) NO REEXAMINATION OF LIABILITY OR AMOUNT.- In the

case of a civil penalty assessed by the Administrator in accordance with this

section, the issue of liability or amount of civil penalty shall not be

reexamined in any subsequent suit for collection of such civil penalty.

"(c) CONTINUING JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS.-

Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, the United States district

courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of any civil penalty action initiated

by the Administrator (1) which involves an amount in controversy in excess

of $50,000; (2) which is an in s\rem action or in which an in rem action

nen

based on the same violation has been brought; (3) regarding which an

aircraft subject to lien has been seized by the united States; and (4) in which

a suit for injunctive relief based on he violation giving rise to the civil

penalty has also been brought.

"(d) LIMITATIONS.-

"(1) HEARING.- A civil penalty may be assessed under this section

only after notice and opportunity for a hearing on the record in accordance

with section 554 of title 5, Untied States Code.

"(2) VIOLATIONS.- This section only applies to civil penalties

initiated by the Administrator after the date of the

enactment of this section.

Public Law 101-236-Dec. 15, 1989

EXTENSION OF PROGRAM,-Section 905(d) of the Federal Aviation Act

of 1958 (49 U.S.C. App. 1475(d)(4) is amended by striking "2-year" and

inserting "28 month".

Public Law 101-281 [S. 2533); May 4, 1990

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the United

States of America in Congress assembled,

Section 1.(a) Section 905(d)(4) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49

U.S.C. App. 1475(d)(4) is amended by striking "28 month" and inserting in

lieu thereof "31 month".

Public Law 101-370 [S. 2533); August 15, 1990

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the United

States of America in Congress assembled,

Section 1.(a) Section 905(d)(4) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49

U.S.C. App. 1475(d)(4) is amended by striking "31 month period beginning

on the date of the enactment of this section" and inserting “the period

beginning on the date of the enactment of this section and ending on August

1, 1992".

Public Law 103-345 [H.R. 5481); August 26, 1992

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representative of the United

States of America in Congress assembled,

(b) REPEAL OF DEMONSTRATION PROGRAM.-Section 905 of such

Act (49 U.S.C. App. 1475) is repealed.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.