Opposition Brief — Castriotta v. Nevada

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Supreme Court, U.S.

@ FILED

JUN 9 1995

No. 94-1853

OFFICE OF THE CLéxK

In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

PAUL DAVID FINI CASTRIOTTA, Petitioner,

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STEWART L. BELL

Clark County District Attorney

JAMES N. TUFTELAND*

Chief Deputy District Attorney

Clark County Courthouse

200 South Third Street, Suite 701

Las Vegas, Nevada 89155

(702) 455-4711

Counsel for Respondent

*Counsel of Record

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QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United

States Constitution require that a sister state give res judicata

effect to prior extradition proceedings?

2. Did the Nevada district court properly apply this Court’s

holding in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978)?

K 3 Was the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada required

to determine whether the Petitioner was tried in absentia?

UMNTCIEOMOENTID:. ak es.

Teer Aes witw# ii

PE os: ssc Be !

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED 3

I ONLY THREE OF THE SIX

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ARE

PROPERLY RAISED BY THE

WE ie a 4

II THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT

CLAUSE DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT

EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS BE

GIVEN RES JUDICATA EFFECT ..... 6

Il] THE NEVADA DISTRICT

COURT PROPERLY APPLIED

THIS COURT’S HOLDING IN

MICHIGAN V. DORAN ............ 1]

IV THE NEVADA SUPREME

COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED

TO DETERMINE WHETHER

THE PETITIONER WAS TRIED

ss ng ss i Oe es 14

EN Sb otc eee a ar th, 17

-ii-

Cases: Page:

Ahrens v. Clark,

ee ees Se CE oko a ce ee ee 14, 15

Appleyard v. Massachusetts,

De tis BO A 2 Ne ewe ee 13

Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police,

BaP a SEE 6 Ceca ee Pe eee $2, 33

Braden v. Circuit Court,

S10 Us Gee eee 0 ee bee ESS ee ee 14, 15

California v. Superior Court,

Ee 0, SPREE 6 6 ONS AES Ee ewe 13

Castriotta v. State,

888 P.2d 927 (Nev. 1995) ..... 3, 5, 6, Hi, 12, 14

Charlton v. Kelly,

yr. BUR OS vet 5 | ee ee are ee ere ee 10

Collins v. Loisel,

Dek Ses Ieee 6 6 ee Se eS 7, 9-11

Durfee v. Duke,

Fee UCN CUTE SEES oe ek Ra eee 4

Hogan v. O’Neill,

Soe ee i 8 eh eee eee 12

-iii-

Hooker v. Klein,

$73 F.26 1360 (mh Car 1978) 2 cw ee eS. 9, 10

In re Russell,

ee cae Re en PPO a he a bs cakes s 11

In re Tampa Suburban R.R.,

Se See Oe NE 6 bh aos Rake ee ee 16

Kyles v. Whitley,

— U.S. —, 1135S. Ct. 1955 (1995) ......... 18

Lucas v. Sheriff,

SOG Fue ae cree, FOP ek. SO HIRSH ee 15

Martinez v. Sheriff,

er ee eee Lees B8te) ie EO SR 14

McNichols v. Pease,

Bee ee ek 6 Ne ee OR ee 12

Michigan v. Doran,

gh TY * 28 2) | Seamer a aur 1, 3, 6; 11, 16

Munsey v. Clough,

See RE en PE if a ow os 6 Webb eke 13

New York v. Uplinger,

OO Ae 5 IS. CEE VN 5

Roberts v. Reiley,

Peet ROOD 66s ibn eg os Sie ee whee eee 13

Sheriff v. Randono,

wae Boe ae? Cl Te 14

-fy-

ici‘

Stone v. State,

hE ES BRE ete ore Gane 11

Statutes and Rules: Page:

Es Us SN 8 oi 0.5 3d bo ae 4 2 O04 eee 16

-\V-

No. 94-1853

In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

PAUL DAVID FINI CASTRIOTTA, Petitioner.

THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

The Respondent, the State of Nevada. respectfully

requests that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

seeking review of the Nevada Supreme Court opinion in this

case. That opinion is reported at 888 P.2d 927 (Nev. 1995).

STATEMENT

On October 10, 1992, the Petitioner, Paul David Fini

Castriotta, was arrested in Florida as a fugitive from justice

based upon outstanding warrants from Arizona. Arizona

demanded that the Petitioner be extradited back to that state.

The Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

arguing that Arizona’s requisitioning documents were not in

order and that he was not a fugitive from justice. The Florida

court agreed and the Petitioner was released.

Based upon the same Arizona warrants, the Petitioner was

subsequently arrested in Las Vegas, Nevada, on June 16, 1994.

Arizona, again, demanded that the Petitioner be extradited back

to that state and he, again, filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus. However, the Nevada district court denied the petition.

The Petitioner then appealed this ruling to the Supreme

Court of the State of Nevada, arguing that (1) the principle of res

judicata required the Nevada court to give conclusive effect to

the Florida court’s finding that the Petitioner was not a fugitive

from justice; (2) Nevada and Arizona acted in bad faith; and (3)

the Petitioner was convicted in Arizona in absentia.

As to these issues, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded

that extradition proceedings do not carry res judicata effect.

i DEAR RC a 8

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eC Pee ae on ea

Castriotta v. State, 888 P.2d 927, 928 (Nev. 1995). It was also

concluded that Nevada and Arizona did not act in bad faith and

that the Nevada district court properly applied this Court’s

holding in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978). Id. at 928-

29. Specifically, the Nevada Supreme Court determined that the

Nevada district court properly declined consideration of evidence

showing that the Petitioner was not in Arizona when the crimes

charged were committed. Jd. at 928 n.1. Finally, the Nevada

Supreme Court refused to reach the issue of whether the

Petitioner was tried in absentia, concluding that that issue was

best raised before the courts of Arizona. Jd. at 929.

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

The Petitioner presents six constitutional issues he claims

were raised by way of the decision of the Supreme Court of the

State of Nevada. (Pet. at ii-iv.) In fact, only three of the cited

issues raised by that court’s opinion are properly presented by

the Petitioner. Moreover, the decision of the Nevada Supreme

Court was sound, leaving no constitutional infirmities for this

Honorable Court to cure.

ONLY THREE OF THE SIX QUESTIONS

PRESENTED ARE PROPERLY RAISED BY

THE PETITIONER

The Petitioner states as his first question presented

whether a sister state must give full faith and credit to a final

judgment in a habeas corpus action in which it was decided that

the Petitioner was not a fugitive from justice. (Pet. at ii.) The

second question presented is whether the Nevada Supreme Court

erred in refusing to give res judicata effect to the prior Florida

court ruling in which it was determined that the Petitioner was

not a fugitive from justice. (Pet. at ii.) Since the doctrine uf res

judicata is predicated upon the Full Faith and Credit Clause, see

Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1968) ("Full faith and credit

... generally requires every State to give a judgment at least the

res judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the

State which rendered it."), the Petitioner has essentially stated

the same issue in two different ways. As such, the State will

address in this Brief in Opposition the single issue of whether the

Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution

requires that a sister state give res judicata effect to prior

extradition proceedings.

RTE a CO PRY So.

As his third issue, the Petitioner asks whether a

demanding state is barred from issuing additional requisition

applications by virtue of the doctrine of res judicata once a court

determines that the detainee is not a fugitive from justice. (Pet.

oh at Sit Ai AW TCI BL hie AEN seca VS

28)

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interstate travel was violated by information placed in the

National Crime Information Center computer. (Pet. at iii.) The

Nevada court decided that the Petitioner’s "other arguments as

to the bad faith of Nevada and Arizona have been considered and

are without merit." Castriotta, 888 P.2d at 929. Because of this

cursory determination, these issues were not sufficiently ruled

) upon in the opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court to warrant

discussion here. Cf. New York v. Uplinger, 467 U.S. 246, 248-

49 (1984) (dismissing improvidently granted writ of certiorari,

in part, because the opinion of the lower court was "fairly

subject to varying interpretations, leaving us uncertain as to the

precise federal constitutional issue the court decided.” (footnote

omitted)). Consequently, this Court cannot now consider these

issues.

As his fifth question presented, the Petitioner states the

valid issue of whether the Nevada district court properly applied

this Court’s holding in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282 (1978).

(Pet. at ili.)

Finally, the Petitioner asks this Court to find error with

the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada in declining to

determine whether he was tried in absentia. (Pet. at iii-iv.)

THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE

DOES NOT REQUIRE THAT EXTRADITION

PROCEEDINGS BE GIVEN RES JUDICATA

EFFECT

In its opinion, the Nevada Supreme Court held that

extradition proceedings are not entitled to res judicata effect.

Castriotta, 888 P.2d at 928. The issue of whether extradition

proceedings carry res judicata effect was addressed by this Court

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many years ago. In Collins v. Loisel, 262 U.S. 426, 427 (1923),

the petitioner tried to prevent his extradition to British India

through habeas petitions. He was charged with three counts of

obtaining property by false pretenses as to three different

victims. See id. Relief was denied as to one court, but the

district court discharged the petitioner as to the other two counts

since the prosecution on those counts had been abandoned and

new charges had been filed. Jd. at 427-28.

While the petitioner was being held for the charge in

count one, affidavits with regard to the other two counts were

again filed and the petitioner was again held to await extradition.

Id. at 428. However, a warrant of extradition was not issued

since the proceedings as to the first count were still in progress.

Id. Finaily, a third set of affidavits for the other two charges

were filed against the petitioner. Jd. These affidavits were in

form and substance identical to those which had been previously

dismissed. Jd. After an unsuccessful motion to quash these

charges and a failed bid at habeas corpus relief, the petitioner

appealed to this Court.

The petitioner argued that since the original order of

extradition had been discharged on habeas corpus, the new set of

affidavits recharging the two other counts were barred by the

doctrine of res judicata. Jd. This Court concluded, however,

that a "fugitive from justice may be arrested in extradition

proceedings a second time upon a new complaint charging the

same crime, where he was discharged by the magistrate on the

first complaint or the complaint was withdrawn." Jd. at 429

(footnote omitted). It also held that "[t]he discharge of [the

petitioner] on the first petition . . . does not operate as res

judicata. Jd. at 430. The Court continued, "the judgment is res

judicata only that [the petitioner] was at the time illegally in

custody, and of the issues of law and fact necessarily involved in

that result." Jd. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Finally,

the Court elaborated on its reasoning:

The discharge here in question did not go to the

right to have [the petitioner] held for extradition.

It was granted because the proceedings on which

he was then held had been irregular and the

British consul general, instead of undertaking to

correct them, had concluded to abandon them, and

to file anew by another set of affidavits.

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Id.

More than fifty years later, in Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d

1360 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932 (1978), the

Ninth Circuit considered the analysis in Collins. Focusing on the

passage just quoted, that court found that the "seeming limitation

on the Court’s holding leaves unsettled the question of whether

an original denial of extradition on the merits should have any

effect on subsequent extradition proceedings on the same

charges." Jd. at 1366 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The

court then undertook an extensive analysis of the applicability of _

the doctrine of res judicata in extradition proceedings.

The Ninth Circuit first set forth the necessary elements

for the application of res judicata: (1) a valid, final judgment;

(2) on the merits; (3) a subsequent proceeding involving the same

parties or those in privity with them: and (4) based upon the

Same cause of action or claim. Jd. at 1367.

Then, the court determined that extradition proceedings

defy easy classification in that "[t]he function of an extraditing

court is not to decide the guilt or innocence of the fugitive at

-9-

law, but rather to determine whether there is ‘competent legal

evidence which . . . would justify his apprehension and

commitment for trial if the crime had been committed in [the

forum] state.’" Jd. (quoting Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315

(1922) (modification in Hooker). The court also reasoned that

the finding of extradition marks the start, not the conclusion, of

the determination of the fugitive’s guilt or innocence. Jd. The

determination of extradition is an interlocutory order similar to

a preliminary hearing on criminal charges. Jd. Since the

extraditing court does not rule on the guilt or innocence of the

fugitive, it could not be said that an order of extradition

constitutes a final judgment for res judicata purposes. Jd. at

1367-68.

Nor is an extradition proceeding decided "on the merits."

The merits of a fugitive’s guilt or innocence are not explored.

Id. at 1368. The extraditing court is only to consider whether

there is sufficient evidence to justify the extradition of the

fugitive. /d. There are, likewise, limitations as to the evidence

allowed. See id. (citing Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 456

-10-

iS Da i ld Bit ON cA area Ee: OR:

Pee OR eT ree SY

(1913)). As such, an order of extradition does not entail a

consideration of all the merits of the case. /d.

The Ninth Circuit, building on Collins, concluded that "it

is wholly inappropriate to apply res judicata concepts to the

findings resulting from extradition proceedings." Jd. This was

precisely the holding of the Supreme Court of the State of

Nevada. Cf. Castriotta, 888 P.2d at 928 (citing Stone v. State,

450 P.2d 136 (Nev. 1969); In re Russell, 524 P.2d 1295 (Cal. |

1974)) ("We conclude that an extradition proceeding is not res

judicata as to subsequent proceedings."). Indeed, no error can

be found with this conclusion.

THE NEVADA DISTRICT COURT

PROPERLY APPLIED THIS COURT’S

HOLDING IN MICHIGAN V. DORAN

In Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1979), this

Court limited permissible inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings

when challenging extradition to four issues: (1) whether the

extradition documents are in order; (2) whether the petitioner is

2A:

charged with a crime in the demanding state; (3) whether the

person named in the extradition documents is in fact the

petitioner; and (4) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.

The Petitioner argues that the courts of Nevada did not

allow him to prove that he was not a fugitive. Specifically, he

argues that the Nevada district court would not consider evidence

showing that he was absent from Arizona when the crimes with

which he was charged were committed. (Pet. at 8-9, 48.) The

Nevada Supreme Court concluded that this evidence was

properly raised before the courts of Arizona. Castriotta, 888

P.2d at 928. It was also concluded that the Nevada district court

heard ample evidence showing that the Petitioner was a fugitive

from justice. /d. at 928-29.

To be regarded as a fugitive from justice, it must be

shown that a person committed an act in a state which, under its

laws, is a crime, and then departed from its jurisdiction and,

when sought to be prosecuted, was found in another state.

Hogan v. O'Neill, 255 U.S. 52, 56 (1921) (citing Biddinger v.

Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128, 133 (1917); McNichols

o} 2.

v. Pease, 207 U.S. 100, 108 (1907): Appleyard vy.

Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 228 ( 1906); Munsey v. Clough,

196 U.S. 364, 372-75 (1905); Roberts v. Reiley, 116 U.S. 80,

95-97 (1885)). The evidence the Petitioner sought to have

admitted was irrelevant as to this inquiry.

In putting forth evidence tending to show that he was not

in Arizona when the crimes were committed, the Petitioner

sought to demonstrate his ultimate innocence. As this Court has

made clear, "extradition proceedings are ‘to be kept within

narrow bounds’; they are ‘emphatically’ not the appropriate time

or place for entertaining defenses or determining the guilt or

innocence of the charged party." California v. Superior Court,

482 U.S. 400, 407-08 (1987) (quoting Biddinger, 245 U.S. at

135) (additional citations omitted). The Court continued:

“Those inquiries are left to the prosecutorial authorities and

courts of the demanding State... ." Jd. at 408 (citations

omitted). Consequently, no error can be found in the opinion of

the Nevada Supreme Court.

THE NEVADA SUPREME COURT WAS NOT

REQUIRED TO DETERMINE WHETHER

THE PETITIONER WAS TRIED _ IN

ABSENTIA

In its opinion, the Nevada court concluded "that the

contention that [the Petitioner] has already been convicted in

absentia should more properly be raised before the courts of

Arizona." Castriotta, 888 P.2d at 929 (citation omitted). The

gravamen of the Petitioner’s argument is that this Court's

overruling of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), in Braden

v. Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), invalidates such action.

(Pet. at 55-57.) However, there is no basis for this conclusion.

In this case, the decision of the Supreme Court of the

State of Nevada was premised upon three prior Nevada

precedents: Martinez v. Sheriff, 527 P.2d 1200, 1200-01 (Nev.

1974) (an asylum state cannot inquire into the efficacy of the

indictment in the demanding state); Sheriff v. Randono, 515 P.2d

1267, 1268 (Nev. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 956 (1974) (a

trial judge is not required to anticipate a potential constitutional

-14-

violation resulting from extradition of a fugitive to a demanding

state); and Lucas v. Sheriff, 466 P.2d 659, 660 (Nev. 1970) (the

question of whether returning a fugitive to the demanding state

would result in a trial violative of his right against double

jeopardy was best decided by the courts of the demanding state).

This line of reasoning is not even remotely that used by this

Court in overruling Ahrens.

Ahrens held that habeas corpus petitions could be brought

only in the district of the petitioner’s confinement. Ahrens, 335

U.S. at 191-93. It is true that Ahrens was subsequently

overruled. See Braden v. Circuit Court, 410 U.S. at 500-01

(". . . we can no longer view [Ahrens] as establishing an

inflexible jurisdictional rule, dictating the choice of an

inconvenient forum even in a class of cases which could not have

been foreseen at the time of our decision."). However, this

reasoning has no place in the discussion of the present case. The

petition giving rise to this action was brought in Nevada, the

place of the Petitioner’s confinement, making Ahrens and Braden

wholly irrelevant. In addition, the Nevada court did not

determine that it was without jurisdiction to hear the petition.

The present action is evidence of that fact. The Nevada court

rather determined that the courts of Arizona provided a more

suitable venue to pursue the trial-in-absentia claim. As such, no

error can be assigned to the decision of the Supreme Court of the

State of Nevada.

The Petitioner asks that his petition be granted "if for no

other reason” (Pet. at 55) than to remedy his alleged trial in

absentia. On the contrary, this Court has long ago held that a

writ of certiorari will not issue upon a claim for which an

adequate remedy otherwise exists. Jn re Tampa Suburban R.R..,

168 U.S. 583, 588 (1897). In this case, the Petitioner is surely

able to pursue this alleged constitutional infirmity in the courts

of Arizona. It would also appear, consistent with this Court’s

holding in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. at 289, limiting those

issues properly considered by an extraditing state, that this issue

must be pursued in Arizona.

Finally, consistent with Sup. Ct. R. 15.1 in addressing

misstatements of fact, the Respondent notes that the Petitioner

«36.

was charged with several additional crimes in Arizona though he

does not make reference to these charges in his petition. The

Petitioner was charged with fraudulent scheme and artifice in

Case No. CR-18937. He failed to appear and was then further

charged with theft of a credit card, theft by control and burglary

in the second degree. He is also charged with fraudulent scheme

and artifice and theft of a credit card in Case No. CR-19973.

Though the record is unclear, it seems certain that the Petitioner

was not tried in absentia for all of the charges associated with

Case No. CR-18927 and never tried in Case No. CR-19973.

Assuming, arguendo, that the Petitioner was tried in absentia as

to some of the charges against him, this potential infirmity does

not exist with regard to the host of other charges pending against

him.

CONCLUSION

Indeed, the Nevada Supreme Court unquestionably

applied the correct rules of law and did not unquestionably err.

This is, precisely, the type of case in which this Court is most

«t%

inclined to deny certiorari. See Kyles v. Whitley, — U.S. —,

115 S. Ct. 1555, 1578 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis

in original). For these reasons, the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

Dated June 7, 1995.

Respectfully submitted,