Opposition Brief — Mississippi v. Duplantis

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RECEIVED

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES APR 2 41995

OCTOBER TERM 1994

ay OFFiGE OF THE CLERK

No. 94-1293 SUPREME GOURT, U.S,

er EARN eee

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

APR 2 1 1995

OFFICE OF jHE ae

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Petitioner

Vv.

DAVID W. DUPLANTIS

Respondent

eee eee ee ee

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

Dannye L. Hunter, Esq.

Suite 205-F

2001 Airport Road

Jackson, Mississippi 39208

(601) 932-1364

Julie Ann Epps *

P.O. Box 510

\ Jackson, Mississippi 39205

(601) 352-0784

PrN RRR RE ee

Attorneys for Mr. Duplantis

* Counsel of Record

June

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TERI ee Fy A cae ee ce 1

THE REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED... 2

1. Since another issue in this case would

require reversal of the conviction, there

probably exists another adequate ground for

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other state courts of last resort ........ 3

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Arizona v. Roberson,

c 486 U.S. 675, 108 S. Ct.

704 (1988) r :

Brown Transportation Corp.

2093, 100 L. Ed. 2d

v. Atkon,

439 U.S. 1014, 99 S. Ct.

(1987) 2

Duplantis v. State,

644 So. 2d 1235 (Miss. 1

Goggins v. State,

529 So. 2d 649 (Miss. 19

Jean v. Nelson,

472 U.S. 846, 105 S. Ct.

664 (1985)

McFadden v. Commonwealth,

225 Va. 103, 300 8.E.24d

Minnick v. Mississippi,

496 U.S. 146, 111 8S. Ct.

489 (1990) : ‘

Minnick v. State,

551 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 198

Mississippi, 498 U.S. 14

Ohio v. Huertas,

498 U.S. Mea ee Oe, Fy

837 (1991)

People v. Young,

453 Ili. 2G 383, 180 Til.

123 (1992), cert. denied

L. Ed. 2d 64 (1993)

State v. Abadie,

612 So. 2d 1 (La. 1993)

State v. Cornethan,

38 Wash. App. 231, 684 P

1984)

State v. Dampier,

328 N.C.294, 323 8.8. 23

State v. Willie,

410 So. 2d 1019 (La. 198

626, 58 L. Ed. 2d 687

994) . . : ‘ :

88)

2992, 86 L. Ed. 2d

924 (1983)

486, 112 L. Ed. 2d

8), rev. Minnick v.

6 (1990)

» £412 Db. BS. 2A

Dec. 229, 607 N.E.2d

» ean Gs 4S. BT, 326

.2d 1355 (Wash.App.

0 (1985)

2) ‘ ‘ ‘ . ‘ x

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1994

No. 94-1293

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

Petitioner

Vv.

DAVID W. DUPLANTIS

Respondent

ee ee ee ee ee ee

OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI

COMES NOW, DAVID W. DUPLANTIS, and respectfully files the

following opposition to the State of Mississippi’s Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Mississippi (hereinafter

"Petition").

A. INTRODUCTION.

On direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, that

court reviewed "[w]hether Duplantis’ statement and waiver of

extradition should have been suppressed because obtained in

violation of the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the

United States Constitution and Sections fourteen and twenty-six of

Article Three of the Mississippi Constitution." Duplantis v.

State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1240 (Miss. 1994). Relying on both state

and federal precedents to answer this question the Supreme Court of

Mississippi reversed Respondent’s conviction for capital murder and

sentence of death. Id. at 1242-44. In reaching this decision the

State court found that Mississippi law enforcement officers re-

initiated questioning of Duplantis after he had asserted his right

to counsel; stating further that "[t]his appears to be a case of

police perseverance paying off, contrary to the tenets of Edwards."

Id. at 1243.

Petitioner, the State of Mississippi, now seeks review by this

Court. There are a number of reasons why the petition for

certiorari should not be granted.

B. REASONS WHY CERTIORARI SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED.

1. Since another issue in this case would require reversal of

the conviction, there probably exists another adequate

ground for this decision.

There is an "adequate and independent state law ground" for

reversing this case in that there exist another reason why the

conviction would be reversed, rendering the state court ruling on

this particular issue unnecessary to the ultimate decision. See,

Ohio v. Huertas, 498 U.S. s £22 B08. , 112 L.Ed.2d 837

(1991) (declining to review the continuing vitality of Booth v.

Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987)).

"If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in

the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not

to pass on questions of constitutionality . . . unless such

adjudication is unavoidable." Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854,

105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985) (quoting Spector Motor Co. v.

McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 664 (1944)).

The prosecution, over defense objection, peremptorily struck

five minority jurors. Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d at 1245.

Although the trial court did not make an on the record

determination that Duplantis had established a prima facie case, it

did require the state to provide non-discriminatory reasons for its

strikes. Id. at 1246. The prosecution offered no reason for one

of the challenged jurors, stating only "[wle just wanted to excuse

her." Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court, in a word of caution to

prosecutors, declared

[a]Jssuming the satisfaction of all other

Batson prongs, the State’s failure to provide

a race-neutral reason for its challenge to a

minority venire member would require reversal

and remand for a new trial. Goggins v. State,

529 So.2d 649, 652 (Miss. 1988).

Id. Thus this Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case may

well prove futile.

or There exists no conflict with decisions of other state

courts of last resort.

In an effort to fabricate a conflict in the lower courts,

Petitioner cites decisions from five state supreme courts.’

Petitioner claims "[(t]hese courts have all held that circumstances

such as those found at kar do not constitute re-initiation of

interrogation by law enforcement officials." (Petition for Writ

of Certiorari at 11) This claim can be dismissed with only passing

scrutiny of the cases.

The first problem confronting Petitioner is that four of the

7

4

People v. Young, 153 I11.2d 383, 180 Ill. Dec. 229, 607

N.E.2d 123 (1992), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 97, 126 L.Ed.2d 64

(1993); State v. Dampier, 314 N.C.292, 333 S.E. 230 (1985); State

v. Cornethan, 38 Wash.App. 231, 684 P.2d 1355 (Wash.App. 1984);

McFadden v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 103, 300 S.E.2d 924 (1983); State

v. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019 (La. 1982).

3

five cases relied on were decided before this Courts decisions in

Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704

(1988) and Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112

L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). See State v. Dampier, 333 S.E. 230 (1985);

State v. Cornethan, 684 P.2d 1355 (Wash.App. 1984); McFadden v.

Commonwealth, 300 S.E.2d 924-.(1983); State v. Willie, 410 So.2d

1019 (La. 1982). In Roberson this Court made clear that once a

suspect invokes the Miranda right to counsel for interrogation

regarding one offense, he may not be re-approached regarding any

offense unless counsel is present. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 678.

The Roberson Court further held that there was

* no significance to the fact that the officer who

conducted the second interrogation did not know that

respondent had made a request for counsel. In addition

to the fact that Edwards focuses on the state of mind of

the suspect and not of the _ police, custodial

interrogation must be conducted pursuant to established

procedures, and those procedures in turn must enable an

officer who proposes to initiate an interrogation to

determine whether the suspect has previously requested

counsel.

Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687. Thus, regardless of a difference in

offenses or interrogating officers at a subsequent interrogation,

the prior request for Miranda counsel is valid and enforceable.

Minnick further clarifies this issue. Minnick v. Mississippi,

498 So.2d 146. Minnick was incarcerated in the San Diego

(California) jail. He was first interrogated by agents from the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. During this interrogation he

requested Miranda counsel. Two days later a deputy sheriff from

Mississippi came to the San Diego jail and questioned Minnick

without counsel being present. Id. at 149-50. While the Minnick

4

Court only had before it the limited question of whether Edwards

protection ceased at the first consultation with an attorney, it

implicitly held that the knowledge of an assertion of right to

counsel could be imputed to officers from a foreign jurisdiction.

See Minnick v. State, 551 So.2d 77, 102 (Miss. 1988) (Robertson,

J., dissenting), rev. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990).

Returning to the cases relied on by Petitioner, his "house of

cards" quickly collapses. In McFadden, the court relies on two

factors in distinguishing Edwards: (a) the inculpatory statement

related to an offense separate from the one he sought counsel on;

and (b) the inculpatory statement was given to an officer from a

different jurisdiction than the officer McFadden had made his

request to. McFadden, 300 S.E.2d at 927. Dampier, relying on

McFadden, reached the same conclusion. Dampier 333 So.2d 234.

Clearly under Roberson and Minnick these holdings would not stand.

The lack of conflict with the Willie case and the Cornethan is

even more apparent. In Willie the Louisiana Supreme Court found

that Edwards did not apply because Willie "himself initiated

further communications with both federal and state law enforcement

officials. Willie, 410 So.2d 1019, 1029. In Cornethan the Court

of Appeais of Washington found that "Cornethan invoked only his

right to remain silent." Cornethan, 684 P.2d at 1358.

The lone post-Roberson case cited by Petitioner is far from

the mark. In Young the [Illinois Supreme Court factually

distinguished Young’s claim from Roberson. Young, 607 N.E. 129.

A review of this factual comparison and the facts of the case sub

judice demonstrate that Duplantis is far more like Roberson than

Young.

Because Young was only being held in Wisconsin pending

extradition and not on separate charges, as in Roberson and the

case sub judice, the Illinois court held that the Chicago police

officers had no reason to believe that the defendant had been

questioned by Wisconsin authorities concerning the crime nor was it

reasonable for them to expect Young would have requested counsel.

Young, 607 N.E. 129. Had Young faced criminal charges in

Wisconsin, as did Duplantis in Tennessee, the Illinois Supreme

Court, like that of Mississippi, would have applied Edwards clear

and unequivocal rule.

Petitioner’s second argument is merely a request to re-

litigate the facts. The Mississippi Supreme Court as final arbiter

of the facts found that officer "Knight initiated this encounter,

then Duplantis re-directed it. This appears to be a case of police

perseverance paying off, contrary to the tenets of Edwards." Id.

at 1243. This finding is consistent with other state supreme

courts. See State v. Abadie, 612 So.2d 1 (La. 1993).

This Court does not have the time or the resources merely to

mollify dissatisfied litigants who feel -- perhaps wrongly -- that

a state court erroneously decided an issue; certiorari must be

reserved for the "conflict[] among jurisdictions over an issue

which imperatively demand[s] a single uniform rule [and therefore]

commands this Court’s immediate attention." Brown Transportation

Corp. v. Atkon, 439 U.S. 1014, 99 S.Ct. 626, 58 L.Ed.2d 687 (1987)

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No. 94-1293 | RECEIVED

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES APR 2 4 1995

OFFICE OF THE CLE

R

October Term 1994 r SUPREME courr, an

THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,

Petitioner

Vv.

DAVID DUPLANTIS,

Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Julie Ann Epps, as a member of the bar of this Court, do hereby certify that I have this

date personally deposited in a United States mailbox, first class postage pre-paid, a true and

correct copy of Duplantis’ response to the Petition for Writ of Certiorari to:

1. The Clerk of this Court at 1 First Street, N.E.: Washington. D.C. 20543:

2. Counsel for Appellee, Marvin L. White, Jr., Assistant Attorney General for the State of

Mississippi; Post Office Box 220; Jackson, Mississippi 39205; Telephone: (601) 359-3680.

I do hereby certify that all parties required to be served have been served.

This, the HM ~ day of (21. ¢ _ 1995.

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JULIE ANNEPPS) ~ °

Julie Ann Epps, MSB#5234

The Missississippi Capital Defense Resource Center

123 East Griffith Street

Post Office Box 510

Jackson, Mississippi 39205-0510

Voice: (601) 352-0784

Facsimile: (601) 352-0612

Counsel of Record for Respondent, David Duplantis