Amicus Curiae Brief — Hensler v. City of Glendale
Supreme Court brief1995
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No. 94-1124
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Gnited States
OCTOBER TERM, 1994
R.R. HENSLER,
Petitioner,
V.
CITY OF GLENDALE,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
to the California Supreme Court
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME
BUILDERS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE AND BRIEF AMICUS
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
GLEN FRANKLIN KOONTZ
1201 Fifteenth Street, N.W..
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 822-0359 .
Counsel for Amicus Curiae
The National Association of
Home Builders
PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. 1-800-347-8208
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
October Term, 1994
No. 94-1124
R.R. HENSLER,
Petitioner,
V.
CITY OF GLENDALE,
Respondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari
To The California Supreme Court
THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF HOME
BUILDERS' MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE A BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE
The National Association of Home Builders
("NAHB") moves this Court for leave to file this
accompanying brief amicus curiae in support of petitioner.
The NAHB has received the written consent of petitioner and
has filed the letter of consent with the Clerk of this Court.
The respondent City of Glendale has declined NAHB’s -
request for consent to file a brief in support of the Petition.
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The NAHB represents 180,000 builder and associate
members organized in approximately 850 affiliated state and
local associations in all fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and Puerto Rico. Its members include not only people and
firms that construct and supply single-family homes but also
apartment, condominium, commercial and industrial builders,
as well as land developers and remodelers. It is the voice of
the American shelter industry.
The NAHB has been before this Court either as an
amicus curiae in support of, or as of counsel on behalf of, the
property owner in prior "takings" cases involving
governments’ land use decisions. Dolan v. City of Tigard,
114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido,
112 S.Ct. 1522 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Commn.,
483 U.S. 825 (1987);' First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo,
477 U.S. 340, reh’g denied, 478 U.S. 1035 (1986);
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission _v.
'The NAHB brief was cited approvingly in this Court’s Nollan
opinion, 483 U.S. at 840.
2
a alitek BE ct ori Nai via” Neil? Se
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985); San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego. 450 U.S. 621 (1981);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
The just compensation clause serves as a vital shield
against oppressive governmental land use regulation. It is of
paramount importance to this amicus and its members. The
actual, as opposed to merely theoretical, availability of an
appropriate constitutional remedy for the governmental action
that results in a taking is critical to the livelihood of private
landowners who either 1) have lost all reasonable economic
use of their property solely in order to -serve the broader
public (i.e., governmental) interests, or 2) are otherwise faced
with overreaching governmental requirements that fail to
substantially advance legitimate governmental interests. In
this action, the California Supreme Court has erected a
senseless procedural roadblock to property owners presenting
federal Fifth Amendment claims which wil] have the effect
of preventing the pursuit of these claims. In so doing, the
California Supreme Court has so departed from this Court’s
prior takings jurisprudence that this Court’s intervention is
necessary.
The NAHB’s interest lies in seeing that the law in this
field remains consistent, fair, and cognizant of the need to
protect the rights of the individual when confronted with
well-meaning government officials whose actions to achieve
a public good may impinge on constitutional guarantees. As
Justice Brandeis insightfully admonished:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard
to protect liberty when .government’s purposes are
beneficent . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning
but without understanding.’
The NAHB sincerely believes that the accompanying
brief will assist the Court in making its decision whether to
grant plenary review of the issues presented in the Petition.
The NAHB’s concerns are much broader than those of
petitioner since its members are faced with countless
regulatory decisions on a daily basis across the nation that
affect the use of privately held land. The vast majority of
these decisions come from local governments and, as pointed
out in the accompanying brief. some of these decisions do
not respect the constitutionally protected property rights of
individuals. While petitioner focuses his arguments on the
harm the City of Glendale inflicts on his concerns, the
NAHB ’s brief addressess the broader public policy reasons
why plenary review should be granted.
\
*Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)(Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
For the above reasons, this Motion should be granted.
Respectfully submitted.
/s/_ Glen Franklin Koontz
Glen Franklin Koontz
1201 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-822-0359
Counsel for Amicus Curiae,
The National Association of
Home Builders
January 20, 1995 :
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES il
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE l
SUMMARY OF THE REASONS
FOR GRANTING THE WRIT l
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT l
CONCLUSION 5
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 264 (1981)
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)
Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95 (1932)
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312 (1893)
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
483 U.S. 825 (1987)
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York,
438 U.S. 104 (1978)
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,
260 U.S. 393 (1922)
ms
1,2,4
1,4
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1893)
:
i)
Nn N @
Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526 (1963)
Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank,
473 U.S. 172 (1985) 1,4
United States Constitution
Amendment Five assim
-iii-
SPAN itl Part elk Win cet it ia Oe
etre
INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
The interest of the amicus curiae is set forth in the
preceding motion for leave to file this brief.
SUMMARY OF THE REASONS FOR GRANTING
THE WRIT
The California Supreme Court’s decision constructs a
senseless procedural roadblock in the paths of property
owners seeking to enforce their federal Fifth Amendment
rights. This decision so radically departs from this Court’s
prior takings jurisprudence that this Court’s intervention is
necessary sO as to ensure the proper, fair and consistent
administration of federal Fifth Amendment rights in the State
of California.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The Fifth Amendment necessarily presumes that
public property may be lawfully appropriated by government
for public use. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
112 S.Ct. 2886, 2890 (1992); Nollan v. California Coastal
Commn., 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 314-315 (1987); Williamson County
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S.
172, 194 (1985); Hodel_v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 297, n. 40 (1981);
Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U.S. 95, 104 (1932); Monongahela
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893);
United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883). The Fifth
Amendment is clearly "designed not to limit the
governmental interference with property rights per se, but
rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise
proper interference amounting to a taking." First English,
482 U.S. at 315. Thus, given the clarity of this Court’s
jurisprudence with respect to this issue, the California
Supreme Court’s requirement that a property owner challenge
the validity of a city ordinance before seeking compensation
for an inverse condemnation is inexplicable.
The petitioner filed his action pursuant to, inter alia,
the United States Constitution, Amendment Five, seeking
damages from the City of Glendale ("City") due to a
regulatory taking of approximately 40% of his property.’
Petitioner did not challenge the validity of the City’s actions;
rather, petitioner conceded lawfullness.* In so doing,
petitioner proceeded exactly as did David Lucas.‘ The
California Supreme Court, however, denied petitioner’s claim
on the basis that petitioner failed to challenge the validity of
the City’s ordinance. As stated in the opinion:
'See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix A at A31-32.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3-4. The value of this portion
of petitioner’s property is approximately ten million dollars
($10,000,000.00). Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix A
at A20, fn. 8.
*Id.
“See Lucas, 112 S.Ct. at 2890.
2
The gravamen of plaintiff's cause of action is
therefore a claim that the Glendale ordinance is
invalid on its face or as applied . . . Plaintiff
cannot transform the action into one which does not
challenge the validity of the ordinance, regulations,
and administrative actions by acquiescing in the
taking, assuming the validity of those actions,
and seeking only damages.°
This decision erects a senseless procedural roadblock in
petitioner’s path. More importantly, it is likely to seriously
erode the constitutional protections afforded by the Fifth
Amendment to the citizens of California. Indeed, it defies
common sense.
The California Supreme Court’s reasoning is as
suspect as its result. First, the California Supreme Court
claims--without any supporting authority--that a property
owner, prior to asserting a federal Fifth Amendment claim,
must first:
[A]fford the state the opportunity to rescind the
ordinance or regulation or to exempt the property
from the allegedly invalid development restriction
*See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix A at A3 1-32 (emphasis
added).
°A roadblock which is fatal to petitioner’s case since the statute of
limitations for challenging the City’s ordinance is 120 days.
Presumably, this is why the City was so eager to claim that
petitioner was obligated to chaHenge the ordinance’s validity. It
is not clear why the California Supreme Court would
countenance such an argument.
3
once it has been judicially determined that the
proposed application of the ordinance to the property
will constitute a compensable taking.’
Presumably, the California Supreme Court gleaned this idea
from this Court’s First English and Lucas decisions.* These
decisions do not, however, support the California Supreme
Court’s holding. Indeed, contrary to the California Supreme
Court’s claim, these decisions upon which petitioner relied
"do . . . support his thesis that the only precondition to a suit
for compensation’ is administrative application of the
ordinance restricting development of his property." * See also
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186.
Second, the California Supreme Court arrogantly
proclaims--again without any supporting authority--that the
"procedural requirements to which plaintiff objects do no
more than ensure to the state its right to a prepayment
judicial determination that the ordinance or regulation is
excessive and will constitute a taking... .""° The NAHB
respectfully submits that states do not have "rights"; rather,
individuals have rights. Indeed, a careful examination of the
United States Constitution fails to uncover any instance of the
granting of "rights" to a government. Assuming arguendo,
’See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix A at A12.
*See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix A at A8-10.
"See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix A at A10.
'°See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Appendix A at A20 (emphasis
added).
that states do have rights, the California Supreme Court
declined to identify its authority for this asserted right,
perhaps because there is no authority for this proposition.
Third, and finally, the California Supreme Court
reasons that this procedural requirement is necessary because
"[flew local governments could afford the financial impact of
a decision that a widely applicable zoning or regulatory
ordinance brought about a taking of all affected property."!!
This rationale is without merit. A municipality must obey
the United States Constitution irrespective of its financial
condition. See Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526, 537
(1963). See also Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 152-153 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting, citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393, 416 (1922)). Indeed, as petitioner so astutely points out,
"{iJf the harm so inflicted is economically burdensome to
cities, it is a fortiori devastating to the individual victims.’
The NAHB submits that the Fifth Amendment is clear as to
upon whom should fall this economic burden.
CONCLUSION
If the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause means
anything, this decision cannot stand. The procedural
roadblock that the California Supreme Court has placed in the
path of property owners seeking compensation pursuant to the
Fifth Amendment runs contrary to the Constitution’s plain
"Id.
"See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17.
5
meaning, as well as the totality of this Court’s takings
jurisprudence. Therefore, for the reasons stated above and in
the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the NAHB prays that this
Court issue a writ of certiorari to-review the judgment and
opinion of the California Supreme Court.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN FRANKLIN KOONTZ
1201 Fifteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20005
202-822-0359
Counsel for Amicus Curiae,
The National Association of
Home Builders
January 20, 1995
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