Amicus Curiae Brief — Miller v. Johnson

Supreme Court brief1995

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

MOTION Fi: oO (@ (4)

FEB y) 3 1986 Nos. 94-631, 94-797, 94-929

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

ZELL MILLER, ET AL.,

“ Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

‘ Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR., ET AL.,

: Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Georgia

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational

Fund, National Asian Pacific American Legal

Consortium, National Association for the

Advancement of Colored People, National

Organization for Women, National Organization

for Women Legal Defense Fund, National Urban

League, People For The American Way, Women’s

Legal Defense Fund, IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF

AMICI CURIAE

Charisse R. Lillie* BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS &

Rodger D. Citron INGERSOLL

E. Thom Rumberger, Jr. 1735 Market Street, 51st Floor

Barry E. Gosin Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599

Michael D. Mabry (215) 665-8500

*Counsel of Record

Attorneys for Amici Curiae

Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, National Asian

Pacific American Legal Consortium, National Association for the Advance-

ment of Colored People, National Organization for Women, National Orga-

nization for Women Legal Defense Fund, National Urban League, People

For The American Way, Women’s Legal Defense Fund

PACKARD PRESS® / APPELLATE DIVISION, 1617 JFK BOULEVARD, PHILA, PA 19103 (215) 563-9000

FST AVAILABLE COPY ©

ee. Ste Se RY FP he OD te PP Bets eee ae Vez

aR ea PRS ecled yh des eee

Of Counsel:

Anthony Chavez

Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational Fund

to eae Sans

213-629-8016

Margaret Fi

Karen N:

National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium

1629 K Street, NW

sae eS

Nasional Oenaiee ization for Wi Legal Def d

a tion for Women ense an

Education Fund

99 Hudson Street

New York, NY 10013

212-925-6635

New York, NY 10021

212-310-9000

"BEST AVAILABLE COPY

= Oe

Nos. 94-631, 94-797, 94-929

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

ZELL MILLER, ET AL.,

Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

. Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR., ET AL.,

Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Georgia

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF

AMICI CURIAE

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF

AMICI CURIAE

Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37, the Mexican Ameri-

can Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Asian

Pacific American Legal Consortium, the National Association

for the Advancement of Colored People, the National Orga-

nization for Women, the National Organization for Women

Legal Defense Fund, the National Urban League, People For

The American Way and Women’s Legal Defense Fund,

respectfully move the Court for leave to file the attached brief

as amici curiae in support of the appellants. The appellants

have consented to the filing of this brief. Appellees have

refused to grant consent.

The Mexican American Legal Defense and Educational

Fund (“MALDEF”) is a nonprofit, national civil rights orga-

nization headquartered in Los Angeles. Its principal objective

is to secure, through litigation and education, the civil rights of

Hispanics living in the United States. Because of the impor-

tance of the fundamental right to vote, MALDEF has repre-

sented Hispanic voters in numerous voting rights cases, includ-

ing City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125 (1983),

Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D. Cal.),

aff'd, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1028

(1991), and Hastert v. State Bd.:of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634

(N.D. Ill. 1991) (three-judge court).

The National Asian Pacific American Legal Consortium

(“NAPALC”) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose

mission is to advance the legal and civil rights of Asian and

Pacific Americans through a national collaborative structure

that pursues litigation, advocacy, education, and public policy

development. The NAPALC is composed of three organiza-

tions based in major urban areas with significant Asian and

Pacific Islander populations: the Asian American Legal

Defense and Education Fund (New York), the Asian Law

Caucus, Inc. (San Francisco), and the Asian Pacific American

Legal Center of Southern California (Los Angeles). The

enforcement of the Voting Rights Act as a means for provid-

ing Asian Pacific Americans with meaningful access to the

electoral process is one of NAPALC’s top priority programs.

NTU LITE: OREN MR RE ty EOTEE CORR Tie ates

FELT Rem eo

The National Association for the Advancement of Col-

ored People (“NAACP”) is a private membership organiza-

tion of 500,000 members nationwide. It is the nation’s oldest

and largest civil rights organization. The NAACP was active

in the effort to win passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965

and the subsequent amendments enacted thereto. The

NAACP has frequently provided representation, to minorities

in voting rights cases and has participated in litigation before

this Court, including NAACP v. Hampton County Election

Comm’n, 470 U.S. 166 (1985), and Statewide Reapportionment

Advisory Comm. v. Theodore, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993).

The National Organization for Women (“NOW”) is the

nation’s largest feminist organization devoted to the advance-

ment of women’s rights, with over 280,000 members and more

than 600 chapters in all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

NOW has, since its inception, advocated the full and complete

political participation of all people, particularly women and

racial and ethnic minorities. Specifically, NOW and NOW’s

political action committee has a project called “Elect Women

For a Change,” that supports the election of women to public

office. - |

The NOW Legal Defense and — Fund (“NOW

LDEF”) is a leading national non-profit civil rights organiza-

tion that performs a broad range of legal and educational ser-

vices in support of women’s efforts to secure equal rights and

to eliminate sex-based discrimination. NOW LDEF was

founded as an independent organization in 1970 by leaders of

the National Organization for Women. A major focus of

NOW LDEF’s work is to promote civil rights for women,

including equal electoral participation.

The National Urban League (“League”), founded in

1910, is the premier social service and civil rights organization

in America. The League is a nonprofit, nonpartisan

community-based organization headquartered in New York

City, with 113 affiliates in 34 states and the District of Colum-

bia. The mission of the League is to assist African Americans

in the achievement of social and economic equality. The

League implements its mission through advocacy, bridge

building, program services, and research.

People For The American Way (“People For”) is a non-

partisan, education-oriented citizens organization established

to promote and protect civil and constitutional rights.

Founded in 1980 by a group of religious, civic and educational

leaders devoted to our Nation’s heritage of tolerance, plural-

ism and liberty, People For now has over 300,000 members

nationwide. People For has been actively involved in efforts to

combat discrimination and its effects and to promote meaning-

ful and effective voter participation by all citizens. These

efforts have included conducting nationally recognized voter

education and registration programs, participating in legisla-

tive advocacy on these issues, and serving as counsel or as

amicus curiae in important cases before this Court and courts

across the country.

The Women’s Legal Defense Fund (“WLDF”), founded

in 1971, is a national advocacy organization working at federal

and state levels to promote policies that help women achieve

equal opportunity, quality health care, and economic security

for themselves and their families. WLDF has long advocated

broad application of the constitutional and statutory guaran-

tees of civil rights under the law.

All of these organizations advocate on behalf of voters

who are concerned with maintaining complete openness and

diversity in the electoral process. The issue of how congres-

sional boundaries are drawn affects them and their constituen-

cies of minorities and women, and voters around the country.

The resolution of the issues in this case will have an

impact on the interests of women and minority voters gener-

ally as well as on the particular parties before the Court. This

amicus brief focuses on the issues before the Court in light of

the historical development and expansion of the constitutional

right to vote. Amici thus offer a broader perspective regarding

the potential impact and importance of this case, as well as a

more expansive analysis of the public policy issues in question,

than that which is likely to be provided by the particular par-

ties to this case. This brief therefore presents arguments that

complement rather than duplicate those of the appellants.

Amici represent several broad-based constituencies who

will be directly affected by the decision herein. Amici also

offer arguments and analysis complementary to the briefs filed

by Appellants. Amici therefore respectfully request that the

motion be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

Charisse R. Lillie* -

BALLARD SPAHR ANDREWS &

INGERSOLL

1735 Market Street, 51st Floor

Philadelphia, PA 19103-7599

(215) 665-8500

*Counsel of Record

for Amici Curiae

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES... ....0..ccccccccccccccs il

gs 1

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...................... 2

PAG Lash 545s 053 68605 Kn cehondchsaces 5

la ek eo eke ce eae eae 5

I. Amendments to the Constitution Have Resulted

in an Increasingly Diverse and Representative

ee oe eo 6

Il. The Voting Rights Act and its Amendments

Demonstrate the Commitment of Congress to

Enforcing the Constitutional Guarantee of

Equal Political Opportunity.................. 13

III. The History of Voting Rights Litigation in the

Supreme Court Shows the Court’s Commitment

to Expanding the Right to Vote .............. 24

ee Oe EOE Peet eee ee ee 29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) . 23, 24

Baker v. Carr, 368 U.S. 106 C1962)... ccc cccccccccees 9, 26

Breedlove v. Suttle, 302 U.S. 277 (1937). ............45. 12

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)...... 2

Cady v. State, 31 S.E. 2d 38 (Ga.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.

PE Seo cicaty Sn ha bo bearer een een sos os 12

Castro v. State of California, 466 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1970)... 19

Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991)................ 24

City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) ......... a, 22

Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991) ................. 24

Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1965) ..............4. 23

Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298 (C.D.

Cal.), aff'd, 918 F.2d-763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

Oe Re SDs oi v sade nnuddeiysensces 18, 19, 20

Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973)........... a

Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) ............ 9, 26

Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) ..... 22. ccccees 10

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).............. 9, 26, 27

Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215 (1971)...... 20

Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) ............ 25

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663

Chooses 00k bbe R ewes La eae eae 2, 28

Hawthorne v. Turkey Creek School District, 134 S.E. 103

re ee er errr ye rere 12

Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ........ 21

Houston Lawyers’ Association v. Attorney General, 501

Bi ED 5 5 0 'rh sia Led aysvndbt necks ekewuvnes 24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Continued)

Cases: Page

Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647 (1994)........... 24

Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)......... 21

League of United Latin American Citizens v. Midland

Independent School District, 812 F.2d 1494 (Sth Cir.),

vacated on other grounds en banc, 829 F.2d 546 (Sth

hs SO ae et ib brea aa cena Rada eer oaee donk, 18

Louisiana v. Hayes, No. 94-627 (probable jurisdiction

noted and appeal pending) ...................... 4

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). ........ccccceess 10

Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749 (Va.), vacated, 350 U.S. 891

RUE ee Re ge ee na ee oe ee on 10

NAACP v. Hampton County Elections Commission, 470

ET eee Tee ee Tere 23

Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).............. 28, 29

Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987) .... 24

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)................ 10

Powers v. State, 157 S.E. 195 (Ga. 1931) ............... 12

Prewitt v. Wilson, 46 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1932)..... 14

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)............. 9, 13, 28

Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) ............... passim

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) .............. 25, 26

South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).... 14, 15

Stephens v. Ball Ground School District, 113 S.E. 85 (Ga.

co RR eae yy ee ak renee He por ares aan 12

Takao Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 173 (1922)...... 21

Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) ............0 eee 26

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986) ............ 23, 24

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Continued)

Cases: Page

United States v. Hayes, No. 94-558 (probable jurisdiction

noted and appeal pending) ..........scesccsesees 4

Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).......... hy ty Ol, ae

Westminster School District v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th

| ree ee oe ee ee ee 10

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) ............0005 16

Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1896) .............. 2

Constitution and Statutes:

United States Constitution:

Fo TN ae ee eee ere ee eae 7

Therteenth Amendment ...... ccc ccccccccesscces 8

FOurtecnth AMCNGMER ... 2.06. ccc ccesceseces passim

Fifteenth Amendment ................ 9, 10, 11, 13, 25

sevemteemtin AMOnGMent............cccscccevess 11

Nineteenth Amendment....................... ak, 4a

Twenty-Fourth Amendment ..................... 12

Twenty-Sixth Amendment ..................... 12, i3

Statutes:

National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-

31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-1 et

RR Se ore kone is ee a ee eres 13

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79

Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973

| eS eT en re passim

The Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No.

91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994))................ 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Continued)

Statutes: Page

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 Amendments, Pub. L. No.

94-73, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994))...............6.8. passim

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, § 3, Pub. L. No.

97-205, 96 Stat. 131, 134 (codified as amended at 42

SP SoM SR) eee Te eee eee 22

Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1992, § 2, Pub. L. No.

102-344, 106 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42

ERs © BPTOIER) CISTI hans sc ecscvceseecesess 22

Miscellaneous:

George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of

the United States: A Commentary, 23 Loy. U. Chi.

ie EE cnc nW aes th oa nsee hs Laseecesa cans 8, 13

Karen McGill Arrington, The Struggle to Gain the Right

to Vote: 1787-1965, in Voting Rights in America:

Continuing the Quest for Full Participation 34

(Karen McGill Arrington & William L. Taylor eds.,

Seer eer er een rrr rere errr sre Ey ere 21

Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief His-

tory, in Controversies in Minority Voting 7 (Bernard

Grofman & R. Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) ..... 7,8

Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting

Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success,

2 ee ks.) ree ee 6

Eugene Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases — A

Disaster, 54 Yale L.J. 489 (1945). .............606. 21

The Voting Rights Act Extension, H. Rep. No. 196, 94th

Cong., 1st Sess. 16, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 1975 ...

17, 18, 20

The Voting Rights Act of 1965 Extension, S. Rep. No.

295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975), reprinted in 1975

ib at oe hae error rear nT ye ree 17, 18, 20, 21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Continued)

Miscellaneous: Page

Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and

the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103

ae Be EE oboe kh oeaanesdd 4260 eke rees 11

J. Morgan Kousser, The Voting Rights Act and the Two

Reconstructions, in Controversies in Minority Voting

135 (Bernard Grofman & R. Chandler Davidson

ig Pee ho ha bo oh ha Keehn haa eas een: 10

Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the

SOM FOP TINE CAPT: 0 cdcccctcerebsersctecies 14

The Southwest Voter Registration Education Project,

RE, Dee eets 5 cee eek atone ds cheeakeduaarseues 20

National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed

Officials Education Fund — 1993 National Roster of

Hispanic Elected Officials (1993) ............... 19, 20

The Voting Rights Act Language Assistance Amendments

of 1992, S. Rep. No. 315, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.

Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings

Before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights

of the Committee on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d

i I 005 bs Ceoh aes chads reediaakasdes 15, 16

US. Civil Rights Commission, Civil Rights Issues Facing

Asian Americans in the 1990s (1992).............. 21

U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act:

rer rrr re rer errr 17

United States Senate, Subcommittee on Constitutional

Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Extension

of Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407,

S. 903, S. 1509 and S. 1443, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

CIPOE 5 edd dndeweareskOcidadsenraretscateie® acs 17

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—(Continued)

Miscellaneous: Page

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, S. Rep. No.

417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, 1982

Ca BEF CO 6s 06 vedere a nes ch see’ iy 22

White House Press Release (June 29, 1992)............ 23

Vii

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1994

ZELL MILLER, ET AL.,

- Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

. Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

LUCIOUS ABRAMS, JR., ET AL..,

“ Appellants,

DAVIDA JOHNSON, ET AL.,

Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Georgia

BRIEF OF AMICI CURIAE

IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A BRIEF

AMICI CURIAE

INTEREST OF AMICI

Amici, Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-

tional Fund, National Asian Pacific American Legal Consor-

tium, National Association for the Advancement of Colored

People, National Organization for Women, National Organi-

zation for Women Legal Defense Fund, National Urban

League, People for the American Way and Women’s Legal

Defense Fund have extensive experience in advocacy on vot-

ing rights issues and/or in voting rights litigation, and share the

goal of preventing any retrenchment by the Courts and Con-

gress of statutes and decisional law which have expanded the

right to vote and resulted in the creation of a more inclusive

democracy.!

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Since Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),

the country has made steady progress in eliminating the

effects of its unfortunate history of segregation and discrimi-

nation against African Americans. As a result of the enact-

ment and enforcement of the Voting Rights Act of 19652 and

the amendments to the statute, the longstanding exclusion of

minority groups from a voice in governance has begun to

change. In the last decade, the perception of the United States

as a country governed only by whites (or Anglos) has begun

to change. This change in the perception and the reality has

provided an avenue of hope for Americans of all colors and

backgrounds, and has fostered a sense of inclusion and partici-

pation that for so long was nonexistent.

The steady progress which this country has made in

expanding the franchise is threatened by the litigation result-

ing from this Court’s decision in Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816

(1993). Through its history our nation has demonstrated an

interest in expanding the franchise and fostering participation

by different parts of society. The decisions of the courts below

and other cases signal a retrenchment which should be

avoided. Amici urge this Court, when ruling on the merits of

these appeals, to consider this case in its historical and legal

context.

The Supreme Court has recognized that “the political

franchise of voting is a ‘fundamental political right, because [it

is] preservative of all rights.’” Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-

tions, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins,

118 U.S. 356, 370 (1896) (recognizing that the right to vote “is

preservative of all rights”). Nevertheless, for many years after

1. Each organization is described fully in the preceding Motion for

Leave to File, which is incorporated by reference herein.

2. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437

(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq. (1994)).

the founding of this nation, the fundamental right to vote was

denied to all except white male property owners.

The nation continues to make its gradual advance toward

the achievement of a universal right to suffrage for all adult

citizens of the United States, without regard to wealth, race,

previous condition of servitude, color, gender, national origin,

language minority status, or age. As a result, the “fundamen-

tal political right” to vote is no longer the province of a small

minority of the citizenry. Rather, it is a right enjoyed and cher-

ished by millions of Americans whose lives are affected by the

decisions made by their elected representatives.

Amici are committed to ensuring that the right to vote

and to participate equally in the electoral process receive this

Court’s most esteemed recognition, fervent protection and

reaffirmation. These appeals, which arise from a decision

invalidating one of the districts of the post-1990 Census con-

gressional redistricting plan for the state of Georgia (the Elev-

enth Congressional District, currently represented by Con-

gresswoman Cynthia McKinney), present issues of great

concern to Amici and their members and constituents, all of

whom are concerned with ensuring that constitutional and

statutory provisions prohibiting race-, gender-, wealth-,

English literacy- and age-based restrictions upon the right to

vote are fully enforced.

Amici believe that the right to equal participation in the

election of members of the United States Congress is among

the most cherished rights of citizens of the United States. Jus-

tice Hugo Black wrote that the “Constitution’s plain objective

of making equal representation for equal numbers of people

[was] the fundamental goal for the House of Representatives

... [and] the high standard of justice and common sense which

the Founders set for us.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 US. 1, 18

(1964).

Constitutional amendments and congressional enactments

since the Civil War have expanded the right of suffrage, con-

sistent with this “plain objective” of the United States Consti-

tution. Racial, ethnic and language minorities and women in

America continue to suffér discrimination in employment,

housing and other circumstances, despite the progress which

has been made. Amendments to the Constitution, coupled

with federal legislation, have been instrumental to the efforts

to remedy the effects of discrimination against minorities and

women.

The vitality of both the constitutional amendments

extending the franchise, as well as the body of laws enacted by

Congress to enforce these amendments, are at issue in the

appeals now before the Court. Amici join the Appellants in

urging the Court to reverse the decision below, which seriously

conflicts with the fundamental message of the numerous deci-

sions of this Court recognizing the importance of the right to

vote. These decisions, acknowledging the damaging and per-

sistent effects of the varied means of disenfranchising large

segments of the citizenry of the United States, and remedying

the impact of decades of exclusion from the political process

that is the legacy of many members of the modern electorate,

should not be disturbed.

Our society and the federal courts, including the United

States Supreme Court, have struggled in this era with the

appropriate limits on explicit consideration of race, national

origin and sex. It is important to recognize that congressional

enactments such as the Voting Rights Act represent a signifi-

cant and proper balancing of the interests and concerns at

stake.

Amici urge the Court to maintain that balance and to

reject the unwarranted expansion and misreading of Shaw that

has spawned these appeals, and similar lawsuits,* against post-

1990 Congressional and state legislative districts. It would be

a national tragedy if Shaw was interpreted and followed with

finality in such a manner that it would adversely and unneces-

sarily cause a sudden and drastic reduction of African Ameri-

can and other minority citizens’ political participation and rep-

resentation at this critical time in this still-evolving history of

our democracy. This country’s commitment to democracy, plu-

3. See, e.g., United States v. Hays, No. 94-558 (prob. jur. noted and

appeal pending); Louisiana v. Hays, No. 94-627 (prob. jur. noted and appeal

pending).

ralism and diversity, which insures and safeguards the rights of

all of our citizens to equal participation in our electoral pro-

cess, requires no less.

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTION

Appellees are a group of black and white registered vot-

ers and residents of Georgia’s Eleventh Congressional District

who have successfully challenged Georgia’s 1990 congressional

redistricting on constitutional grounds. Appellees alleged in

their complaint that the configuration of the Eleventh Con-

gressional District amounted to unconstitutional racial gerry-

mandering in violation of Shaw.

A majority of the district court held that Georgia’s Elev-

enth Congressional District violated the Equal Protection

Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and permanently

enjoined further elections in the district. Amici urge this Court

to review constitutional history, the legislative history of the

Voting Rights Act of 1965 (the “Act”) and the case law inter-

preting the Act as it considers the questions presented in these

appeals. Shaw acknowledges that race-conscious redistricting

may violate the rights of white citizens under some circum-

stances. But Shaw does not require the result reached in the

court below. Amici urge reversal of the decision below. Con-

stitutional history, legislative history of the Act and its amend-

ments, and the case law interpreting the Act reveal an overall

benefit to all citizens — both whites and members of minority

groups — when expansions of the right to vote are under-

taken. The actions of the State of Georgia and the United

States Attorney General are legal and constitutional, and the

Eleventh Congressional District should be preserved.

Appellees below have failed to prove any harm suffered

by them. They have also failed to prove that Georgia’s Elev-

enth Congressional District is so bizarre or irrational on its

face that the only conclusion that could be reached by the

Court is that it was created solely on the basis of race. Amici

urge the Court to resist this attempt to expand the reach of

Shaw. Some gradual progress has been made in opening up

the American political system to minorities and women. Any

retraction of this progress will have a deleterious effect on the

political process and the political landscape.

The central underpinning of a free and democratic system

of government is the right to vote. The struggle to guarantee

that every citizen has an equal voice in government has long

commanded the attention and the emotions of this Nation.

The expansion of the right to vote is a sign of — and ensures

the promotion of — the vitality of democracy in the United

States. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., once said:

Give us the ballot, and we will no longer have to worry

the federal government about our basic rights. . . . Give us

the ballot and we will fill our legislative halls with men of

good will. ... Give us the ballot and we will help bring

this nation to a new society based on justice and dedica-

tion to peace.

In his remarks, Dr. King asserted that the protection, availabil-

ity and opportunity to use the franchise guarantees the integ-

rity of the political process and strengthens the society served

by that process.

Efforts to ensure that the right to vote is one available to

all have been accomplished on several different levels.

Through constitutional amendments, through legislative

enactments and through the courts, our system has continually

protected and broadened this fundamental right.

I. AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION HAVE

RESULTED IN AN INCREASINGLY DIVERSE AND

REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORATE

The nation’s interest in promoting participation in the

political process is evident in the expanding protections of the

right to vote in our Constitution. In its original form, the Con-

stitution recognized this right. Several amendments to it have

expanded this right to all persons: first to African Americans,

4. Quoted in Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting

Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 1077,

1082 n.14 (1991).

next to women, and later to those between the ages of 18 and

21. The Constitution and its amendments demonstrate the

vital national interest in promoting the participation and

involvement of all segments of our population in the electoral

process.

Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides that

members of the United States House of Representatives

shall be chosen “by the People of the several States” and

shall “be apportioned among the several States ...

according to their respective Numbers.” U.S. Const. art.

I, § 2. In his majority opinion in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376

U.S. 1, Justice Black reviewed the debate among the del-

egates of the Constitutional Convention over whether

election should be by the people. According to Justice

Black, “[o]ne principle was uppermost in the minds of

many delegates: that ... ‘equal numbers of people ought

to have an equal number of representatives. ...’” Id. at

10-11 (citation omitted).

African Americans were regarded as property for

taxation purposes, and as such, were not allowed to share

in having this equal voice, this immutable right. The

drafters of the Constitution, in fact, agreed that each

slave would be counted as three-fifths of a free person.

For the first two hundred and fifty years after America

was colonized, most African Americans were enslaved

and unable to vote. No woman of any color, race or

national origin could vote. By the eve of the Civil War,

African Americans, whether “free” or not, were denied

the suffrage in most States.

Nevertheless, what can only be described as a deep-

rooted drive for equality in this country persisted. The

Constitution had recognized and embodied the “ancient

‘right of the people to participate in their legislative

5. African Americans were denied the franchise everywhere except

New York and the New England states (excluding Connecticut where they

were denied the right to vote). Moreover, in New York, African Americans,

but not whites, were required to have $250 worth of property to vote. Chan-

dler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in Controversies in

Minority Voting 7 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).

council.” This, in turn, had been recognized as deriving

from “the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the

English constitution, and the several charters or com-

pacts” in the Declaration and Resolves of the First Con-

tinental Congress of October 14, 1774.° In several of the

amendments that followed, the movement toward univer-

sal suffrage, a natural extension of the idea of equality,

would be advanced. Gradually the right to vote was

extended beyond educated, wealthy, white, male citizens

who owned property.

The night of universal suffrage rose to the forefront

of the American political agenda during the Civil War,

and thereafter. The enactment of various amendments

enlarging the reach of the franchise reflected this coun-

try’s commitment to its original promise of equality

under law for all its citizens regardless of race, color or

heritage.

The Thirteenth Amendment formally abolished the

institution of slavery. U.S. Const. amend. XIII. This

amendment began the process of curing the single great-

est failure of the Constitution of 1787, assuring all

Americans, including African Americans, a semblance of

citizenship.

The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment in Sec-

tion 2 addressed the issue of the nght of suffrage by

penalizing States that deny voting rights.” In Section 1,

although not explicitly mentioning race, all citizens are

guaranteed their ‘privileges and immunities’, in addition

to the equal protection and due process of the laws.

Minorities were now provided with a sword with which

they would battle the historical vestiges of discrimina-

tion. The battle, however, was yet to come.’

6. See George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United

States: A Commentary, 23 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 631, 833 (1992).

7. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 2. It is no secret that this part of the

Amendment was overlooked as the franchise for African Americans was

eroded some years later. Davidson, supra note 4, at 9.

8. With respect to right of suffrage, the Fourteenth Amendment did not

serve as a source of authority until the early vote dilution cases. See, e.g.,

The Fifteenth Amendment was enacted by Congress

in 1870, less than a year after ratification of the Four-

teenth Amendment and was directed toward the imme-

diate goal of securing and protecting minority voting

rights. It provided, “The right of citizens of the United

States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the

United States or by any State on account of race, color

or previous condition of servitude. The Congress shall

have the power to enforce this by appropriate legisla-

tion.” U.S. Const. amend. XV. Despite the clear language

of this provision, contrivances by southern States, along

with often violent white southern resistance to African

American suffrage, created the need for further congres-

sional action to fully enforce its guarantees.°

Congress made repeated attempts to protect the

right of suffrage of African Americans, principally in the

Military Reconstruction Acts, the various enforcement

acts, Ku Klux Klan acts (to execute the dictates of the

Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments) and the 1875

Civil Rights Act. But white southern intransigence

proved to be a powerful force. African American politi-

cal power, albeit in its nascency, was suffocated by a vari-

ety of means, from the insidious voting fraud and use of

gerrymandering and at-large elections with white only

primaries, to outright statutory suffrage restrictions,

replacement of local elections with appointments and, of

course, with intimidation and violence.?°

Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (Equal Protection Clause requires that,

once a geographical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is desig-

nated, all who participate in the election must have an equal vote regardless

of race or sex); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Reynolds v. Sims, 377

U.S. 533 (1964); see also Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (Whit-

taker, J., concurring) (noting that the Fourteenth Amendment, in addition to

the Fifteenth Amendment, might provide a source of authority in voting

rights cases).

9. Ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment did not alter the exclusion

of women of color from the United States’ electorate. The right to vote was

not extended to women until 50 years later, with the ratification of the

Nineteenth Amendment.

10. For a detailed analysis of the legal and extralegal means by which

Most African Americans effectively lost the right to

vote by the end of the nineteenth century. Voters enfran-

chised during Reconstruction were purged from the rolls.

The nation lapsed back into pre-abolition times. African

American children were consigned to a separate and

often tangibly inferior education. The separate but equal

doctrine served to justify further institutional racism,

supported and enforced through governmental action.

Nationwide, enforced separation in public accommoda-

tions and most aspects of social life was common.!! All

this persisted despite the guarantee of racially impartial

suffrage set forth in the Fifteenth Amendment, and the

guarantee of equal protection under law provided for in

the Fourteenth Amendment.

Just as the door was closing on the struggle for Afri-

can American suffrage, the drive for women’s suffrage

was gaining momentum. The Civil War Amendments

clearly served as an example and defined the objective

NOTES (Continued)

African American political power was diluted and African Americans were

disenfranchised after the Reconstruction era, see J. Morgan Kousser, The

Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in Controversies in Minority

Voting 135 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).

11. See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). African

Americans were not the only minority group subjected to such state-

enforced segregation. Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute, invalidated by

this Court in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) was also applied to sanc-

tion a Chinese man and white woman who married in North Carolina and

returned to Virginia to live. See Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E. 2d 749 (Va.), vacated,

350 U.S. 891 (1955). The law made “any white person and colored person

... [leaving the] State, for the purpose of being married . . . with the inten-

tion of returning . . . [and] cohabiting as man and wife” subject to one to five

years imprisonment, if convicted. Loving, 388 U.S. at 4-5. Asian- and Mexi-

can American children, like African American children, were required to

attend segregated schools for a substantial part of this century. See, e.g.,

Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (holding that exclusion of child of

Chinese ancestry from white schools was constitutionally permissible); West-

minster Sch. Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1947) (challenging seg-

regation of Mexican-American children in public school system).

for the movement to amend the Constitution to eliminate

gender-based restrictions on the right to vote.

_ The next series of voting rights related amendments,

the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, were

enacted during the Progressive era in the first quarter of

this century. The latter had a goal patently similar to that

of the Fifteenth Amendment — expanding the franchise,

in this case to include women. The former’s extension of

popular election for Senators was another important

milestone in the development of the right to vote. }%

The Nineteenth Amendment, echoing the simple

text of the Fifteenth Amendment, provides, “The right of

citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied

or abridged by the United States or by any State on

account of sex.” U.S. Const. amend. XIX, § 1. The Nine-

teenth Amendment, as in every other amendment of sig-

nificance to the right to vote, including the Fourteenth,

the Fifteenth, the Twenty-Fourth and the Twenty-Sixth,

includes a provision granting Congress the power “to

enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” See, e.g.,

U.S. Const. amend. XIX, § 2.

With the enactment of the Nineteenth Amendment,

the movement toward universal suffrage in the United

States made further strides. The inclusion of women, who

once were excluded from the political process purely on

the basis of sex, was a watershed event in American his-

tory. Women’s suffrage and the ratification of the Nine-

teenth Amendment continued the process of actualiza-

tion of the principle of equality upon which the nation

was founded.'4

12. Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seven-

teenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 Yale L.J. 1971, 1980 (1994).

13. The Seventeenth Amendment provides that: “The Senate of the

United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected

by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.

The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors

of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.” U.S. Const. amend.

XVII.

14. In some parts of the country, women, like the emancipated African

The movement toward universal suffrage continued

‘with the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments.

The Twenty-Fourth Amendment disallowed the use of a

poll tax as a means of withholding the right to vote in

presidential and congressional elections.15 The Twenty-

NOTES (Continued)

American males who preceded them in suffrage, found that even an unam-

biguous constitutional amendment could not ensure full incorporation into

political life. In Georgia, for example, ballots cast by newly enfranchised

women voters were targeted in disqualification petitions. See, e.g., Haw-

thorne v. Turkey Creek Sch. Dist., 134 S.E. 103 (Ga. 1926); Stephens v. Ball

Ground Sch. Dist., 113 S.E. 85 (Ga. 1922). Within one year after the ratifi-

cation of the Nineteenth Amendment, the Georgia legislature enacted laws

extending the poll tax (which was originally enacted after the ratification of

the Fifteenth Amendment) to women registrants. Hawthorne, 134 S.E. at

106-07. The poll tax applied somewhat differently to women than to men,

however. Women, unlike men, were relieved of the obligation of paying any

tax (at the rate of one dollar per year) for years after they became legally

eligible to register (i.e., age 21) but declined to do so. Nolen R. Breedlove,

a 28 year old white man who was unable to demonstrate that he had paid

poll taxes during the seven years in which he was legally eligible to register,

was not allowed to register to vote after refusing to pay his “back” poll

taxes. Breedlove v. Suttle, 302 U.S. 277, 280 (1937). Breedlove challenged the

denial of registration on the ground that it violated the Nineteenth Amend-

ment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This

Court rejected Breedlove’s arguments, holding that “women may be

exempted [from payment of accrued poll taxes] on the basis of . . . [the] bur-

dens necessarily borne by them for the preservation of the race,” and

because “[t]he laws of Georgia declare the husband to be the head of the

family and the wife subject to him. .. . [Therefore, t]o subject her to the levy

would be to add to his burden.” Jd. at 282.

In the year after the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, the

Georgia legislature also passed a law which provided “that ‘females’ shall

not be liable to discharge any military, jury, police, patrol or road duty.’”

Powers v. State, 157 S.E. 195 (Ga. 1931). The Georgia Supreme Court held

that this law was “not obnoxious to the Nineteenth Amendment,” id., and

reaffirmed the Powers holding more than a decade later in Cady v. State, 31

S.E. 2d 38, 42 (Ga.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 676 (1944).

Finally, Georgia was not among the states responsible for the ratifica-

tion of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. In fact, the Georgia Legislature

did not ratify the amendment until February 20, 1970. U.S. Const., amend.

XIX (West U.S.C.A. 1987) at 983.

15. U.S. Const. amend. XXIV, § 1.

Fourth Amendment, “testifies to the now prevalent opin-

ion that financial considerations or economic interests

should not bear upon one’s eligibility or power to

vote.”16

The Twenty-Sixth Amendment provides, “The right

of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years

of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged

by the United States or by any State on account of age.”

U.S. Const. amend. XXVI. This most recent amendment

to the Constitution removed yet another great barrier to

participation in the political process. The inclusion of

younger people contributed immensely to the further

expansion of the franchise.

This history of amendments to the Constitution

reveals the devotion to expansion and broadening of the

right to vote for all Americans. This history also provides

a framework for the following discussion of congres-

sional enactments to enforce these constitutional guaran-

tees, and the decisions of this Court that have reaffirmed

them.

Il. THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND ITS AMEND-

MENTS DEMONSTRATE THE COMMITMENT OF

CONGRESS TO ENFORCING THE CONSTITU-

TIONAL GUARANTEE OF EQUAL POLITICAL

OPPORTUNITY

In Reynolds v. Sims, this Court recognized that “to the

extent ... a citizen’s right to vote is debased, he is that much

less a citizen.” 377 U.S. at 567. One year after Reynolds was

decided, Congress exercised its power under Section 2 of the

Fifteenth Amendment to pass the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

An analysis of the legislative history of the Act provides fur-

ther evidence of the importance of inclusiveness as a funda-

mental principle of a fair and democratic government.

16. Anastaplo, supra note 6, at 836. See also National Voter Registra-

tion Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (codified at 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973gg-1 et seq. (1994)) (enhancing access to voter registration and pro-

viding, inter alia, for voter registration to be conducted at public assistance

agencies).

President Lyndon Johnson’s comments upon signing

the Act into law reveal the aspirations of those who

fought for the Act’s passage:

The vote is the most powerful instrument ever devised by

man for breaking down injustice and destroying the ter-

rible walls which imprison men because they are different

from other men.!’

The Act represented a major contribution to the promotion of

fairness and participation in the political process by a coordi-

nate branch of government.

In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), the

Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act. Under the Act,

literacy tests were suspended in states which had a history of

discrimination in voting.'® The Court upheld this provision of

the Act, explaining that the Act employed this remedy in

response [to] the feeling that States and political subdivi-

sions which had been allowing white illiterates to vote for

years could not sincerely complain about ‘dilution’ of

their electorates through the registration of Negro illiter-

ates. Congress knew that continuance of the tests and

devices in use at the present time, no matter how fairly

administered in the future, would freeze the effect of past

discrimination in favor of unqualified white registrants.

Id. at 334.

At the conclusion of its opinion in Katzenbach, the Court

stated that the Act is “a valid means for carrying out the com-

mands of the Fifteenth Amendment. Hopefully, millions of

17. Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South, 1944-

1969 at 3-4 (1976) (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson).

18. While the use of literacy tests as a device for disenfranchising racial

and language minorities is well known, in at least one state an attempt was

made to invalidate ballots cast by women — but not men — on the ground

of illiteracy. See Prewitt v. Wilson, 46 S.W.2d 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 1932). The

court labelled the disqualification effort “specious” and held that “male vot-

ers [we]re not required to meet the same test . . . [so] it is therefore discrimi-

natory against [women].” Jd. at 92.

non-white Americans will now be able to participate for the

first time on an equal basis in the government under which

they live.” Jd. at 337.

Since its enactment in 1965, the Act has been amended

four times. Each set of amendments reflects the inexorable

movement toward a more inclusive broad-based democracy.

The first set of amendments, enacted as the Voting Rights Act

Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codi-

fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994)),

broadened the franchise by expanding the Act’s coverage to

include many jurisdictions, especially those outside the deep

South, that were exempt from the Act as originally enacted.

The amendments also expanded the franchise by granting

eighteen-year-old citizens the right to vote. Jd. The desire for

full inclusion of all American citizens in the political process

was at the core of Congress’ decision to amend the Act. Sena-

tor Barry Goldwater, one of the sponsors of the 1970 amend-

ments, testified:

Being members of the same political community, it is my

view that all citizens possess the same inherent right to

have a voice in the selection of the leaders who will guide

their government.

Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings before

the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on

the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1970) (statement of

Hon. Barry Goldwater). The statement of Attorney General

John N. Mitchell also illustrates the spirit underlying the hear-

ings:

The right of each citizen to participate in the electoral

process is fundamental in our system of Government. If

that system is to function honestly, there must be no arbi-

trary or discriminatory denial of the voting franchise. .. .

We have come to the conclusion that voting rights is... a

national concern for every American. ... Our commit-

ment must be to offer as many of our citizens as possible

the opportunity to express their views at the polls on the

issues and candidates of the day.

Id. at 182-83 (statement of Hon. John N. Mitchell).

White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), unanimously held

that multimember state House of Representative districts in

two Texas counties violated the constitutional rights of Afri-

can Americans and Mexican Americans, in violation of the

Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, by “cancel|[ling]

out or minimiz[ing] the[ir] voting strength,” Jd. at 765. This

Court specifically noted the district court’s findings that

despite the substantial African American population in Dallas,

“since Reconstruction ... there ha[d] been only two Negroes

in the Dallas County delegation to the Texas House of Repre-

sentatives;” that a “white-dominated organization” in Dallas

County controlled Democratic Party candidate slating; and

that “racial campaign tactics ... [targeting white voters were

used] to defeat candidates who had the overwhelming support

of the black community.” Jd. at 766-67.

Similarly, this Court noted in White that San Antonio’s

Hispanic community, “along with other Mexican-Americans in

Texas, had long suffered from, and continue[d] to suffer from,

the results and effect of invidious discrimination and treat-

ment in the fields of education, employment, economics,

health . . . [and] politics.” Jd. at 768. The Court also noted that

although Mexican-Americans comprised nearly 30 percent of

the total population of the county, “only five Mexican-

Americans since 1880 ha[d] served in the Texas legislature

from Bexar County.” Jd. at 768-79. These factors, among oth-

ers, influenced this Court’s decision to affirm the district

court’s holding that “the multimember district, as designed

and operated in Bexar County, invidiously excluded Mexican-

Americans from effective participation in political liege, spe-

cifically in the election of the representative to the Texas

House of Representatives.” Jd. at 769. In response to these

circumstances, “[s]ingle-member districts were ... required to

remedy the effects of past and present discrimination against

Mexican-Americans’ . . . and bring the community into the full

stream of political life of the county and State.” Jd.

Two years after the White decision, “the minority lan-

guage provisions were added to the Act upon determination

by the Congress that ‘voting discrimination against [language

minority] citizens ... is pervasive and national in scope.’ ”

Congress found that because of the denial of equal educa-

tional opportunities by State and local governments, language

minorities experienced severe disabilities and illiteracy in the

English language that, together with English-only elections,

excluded them from participation in the electoral process.19

The legislative history accompanying the language minor-

ity provisions added to the Voting Rights Act in 1975 (42

U.S.C. §1973b(f)(1)) documents a pattern of discrimination

against language minorities which has interfered with their

exercise of the fundamental right to vote. See, e.g., Voting

Rights Act Extension, H. Rep. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

1975; Voting Rights Act of 1965 — Extension, S. Rep. No. 295,

94th Cong, Ist Sess. 1975, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774.

Congress found that “[l]anguage minorities, like blacks

throughout the South, must overcome the effects of discrimi-

nation as well as efforts to minimize the impact of their politi-

cal participation.” H.R. Rep. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1975) at 16-17.

Congress recognized that by broadening the prohibition

of “discriminatory tests or devices” so as to preclude English-

only ballots, non-English-speaking citizens were more likely to

realize a meaningful franchise. Jd. As in 1965 and 1970, broad-

ening the franchise was, again, at the core of the debate:

In the quest for the right to vote, Spanish-speaking citi-

zens have had many experiences which were similar to

those of blacks. It is time for the nation to end discrimi-

nation which is based on national origin. Just as the Vot-

ing Rights Act has brought about progress among blacks

and whites in the South, it can_be an instrument of

progress for all people in those areas where there are

Spanish-speaking communities.

19. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, The Voting Rights Act: Unfulfilled

Goals 77 (1981), quoting United States Senate, Subcommittee on Constitu-

tional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, Extension of the Voting

Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S.407, S.903, $.1509, and S.1443, 94th Cong.,

ist Sess. (1975).

Hearings on the Voting Rights Act Amendments Before the

‘ Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Senate

Judiciary Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1975) (testi-

mony of Hon. Andrew Young).

Some of the barriers to political participation that lan-

guage minorities have faced are identical to those used to

impede African American voter participation and dilute Afri-

can American voting strength. They include imposition of the

poll tax, erection of barriers to voter registration by hostile

election officials, and the manipulation of election district

boundaries to dilute political support for their preferred can-

didates and ensure control of elections by white voting blocs.

H. Rep. No. 196, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), at 16-20; S. Rep.

No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), at 26; see also H. Rep.

No. 94-196 at 22 (noting federal court finding that state of

Texas has “a history pockmarked by a pattern of racial dis-

crimination that has stunted the electoral and economic par-

ticipation of the black and brown communities in the life of

the state”). More recently, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit, in League of United Latin American Citi-

zens v. Midland Independent Sch. Dist., 812 F.2d 1494 (Sth

Cir.), vacated on other grounds en banc, 829 F.2d 546 (Sth Cir.

1987), recognized that African American and Hispanic Texans

“share[d] common experiences in past discriminatory prac-

tices.” Id. at 1500.

At the beginning of this decade, a federal court found

that Los Angeles, California’s Hispanic community “has borne

the effects of a history of discrimination in the areas of educa-

tion, housing, employment, and other socioeconomic areas.”

Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 756 F. Supp. 1298, 1339-40

(C.D. Cal.), aff’d, 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 1028 (1991). For a decade “in the aftermath of the

Depression, some 200,000 to 300,000 Mexican-Americans

returned to their ‘country of origin a part of a program insti-

tuted by the Justice Department. ... [MJany legal resident

aliens and American citizens of Mexican descent were

[thereby] forced or coerced out of the county.’ ” Jd. The court

noted that Mexican-Americans in Los Angeles were blatantly

discriminated against in public accommodations and education

throughout the first half of this century:

School officials required Mexican children to have sepa-

rate graduation ceremonies from Anglos attending the

same school. . . . California maintained segregated schools

for Hispanics in Los Angeles until 1947 when the Califor-

nia Supreme Court struck down such segregation. ...

However, ... schools desegregation litigation involving

[Los Angeles County school] districts ... continued until

1989. ... [I]t was common during the first decade of this

century, for access to public swimming pools to be

restricted for Mexican-Americans and blacks, usually to

the day before the pool was to be cleaned.

Id. at 1340. It was not until 1970 that the California Supreme

Court invalidated a California constitutional provision “condi-

tioning the right of persons otherwise qualified to vote upon

the ability to read the English language.” Jd. (citing Castro v.

State of California, 466 P.2d 244 (Cal. 1970)).

The Garza court also found that Esteban Torres a His-

panic candidate for the United States House of Representa-

tives, “encountered racial appeals by his opponents in the

form of statements that Mr. Torres catered only to Hispanics

and in the use of his photograph in opponents’ campaign lit-

erature.” Jd. at 1331, 1341. In Torres’ race, like all but a hand-

ful of the elections analyzed by plaintiffs’ experts, non-

Hispanic voters overwhelmingly rejected the Hispanic

candidate. Jd. at 1336-37.

Since the extension of the Act in 1975 to cover language

minorities, the number of Hispanic elected officials has

increased dramatically. In 1973, the six states with the largest

Hispanic populations had 1,280 Hispanic elected officials.

Twenty years later this number had jumped to 3,999.20

20. 1993 National Roster of Hispanic Elected Officials at vii (1993)

(Table 18: Hispanic Elected Officials by Selected States, 1984-1993). Pre-

1980 data is available only for the following six states: Arizona, California,

Florida, New Mexico, New York, and Texas. Nationwide data is available

Starting in 1984. In that year the total number of Hispanic elected officials

was 3,128; in 1993 it was 4,420. This number excludes 750 local school coun-

Unquestionably, the creation of districts which afford Hispanic

‘voters a realistic opportunity to elect candidates of their

choice has contributed to these gains. Since the extension of

the Act, the Hispanic population has also achieved substantial

gains in its participation in the political process. The number

of Hispanic registered voters nearly doubled from 1972 to

1988, increasing from 2.495 million to 4.573 million.?! This

increased registration manifested itself in higher Hispanic

voter turnout, as well.2? Despite these gains, although Hispan-

ics constitute nine percent of the total population of the

United States, they account for only slightly more than one

percent of the publicly-elected officials in the nation.2> The

work started by the passage of the Act is not yet complete.

The result herein must not create an environment in which the

progress which has been made will be reversed.

The experience of Asian Americans in many respects par-

allels the experience of Mexican Americans described by the

Garza court. “[U]ntil 1947, a California statute authorized

local school districts to maintain separate schools for children

of Asian descent.” S. Rep. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1975) at 28 (citing Guey Heung Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215

NOTES (Continued)

cil members in the Chicago area, positions which were not included in the

1984 count.

21. The Southwest Voter Registration Education Project, Legacy: 1974-

1990, at 2. During this period the number of Hispanic registered voters

increased by 83 percent. This number's true significance becomes apparent

only after comparable rates are considered for other segments of the popu-

lation. From 1972 to 1988 the number of white registered voters increased

by 17 percent and that of African Americans by only 44 percent. Jd.

22. For five southwestern states (Arizona, California, Colorado, New

Mexico and Texas), votes cast by Hispanics increased 60.9 percent, from

1.016 million in 1976 to 1.634 million in 1988. Legacy, supra note 21, at 2.

Comparison data is available for the period 1984 to 1988. During this time

Hispanic turnout increased 20 percent; for the nation as a whole, it increased

0.3 percent. Id.

23. 5,170 Hispanics (including the Chicago school officials) held

publicly-elected offices in 1993, as compared to 504,404 publicly-elected

offices nationwide (1.0 percent). 1993 National Roster of Hispanic Elected

Officials at viii.

(1971)). Hostility toward Asian immigrants led to strict regu-

lation of entry to the United States and bans on naturalization.

Persons of Japanese ancestry were once completely denied the

opportunity to become naturalized citizens. Takao Ozawa v.

United States, 260 U.S. 173 (1922). “Filipinos, who were sub-

jects of the United States .. . [were nevertheless] ineligible for

citizenship unless they served three years in the U.S. Navy....

[and] Chinese immigrants were not allowed to gain citizenship

until 1943.”24 Japanese Americans were removed from their

homes and confined to internment camps during World War

II. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943); Kore-

matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).25 Regrettably, as

Congress noted in the legislative history accompanying the

1975 amendments to the Act, “[dJiscrimination against Asian

Americans is a well-known and sordid part of our history.” S.

Rep. No. 94-295 at 28 n.21.

Limited English proficiency has remained a serious bar-

rier to effective political participation for many Asian-

Americans in the United States. See The Voting Rights Act

Language Assistance Amendments of 1992, S. Rep. No. 315, at

5-6, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Although Asian-Americans

comprise almost 10% of California’s population, only one

Asian American, elected in 1992, is serving in the California

state legislature. And in New York City, which has an Asian-

American population of over 512,000, no Asian-American has

ever been elected to the New York City Council or the New

York state legislature. See U.S. Civil Rights Comm’n, Civil

Rights Issues Facing Asian Americans in the 1990s 157 (1992).

The most recent amendments to the Act were passed with

broad bipartisan support in August 1992, affecting over

200,000 Asian Americans with limited English proficiency

across the nation. The Voting Rights Language Assistance Act

of 1992 expanded the minority language requirements of Sec-

tion 203 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §1973aa-1la, to require multilin-

24. Karen McGill Arrington, The Struggle to Gain the Right to Vote:

1787-1965, in Voting Rights in America: Continuing the Quest for Full Par-

ticipation (Karen McGill Arrington and William L. Taylor, eds., 1992) at 34.

25. See also Eugene Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases — A Disas-

ter, 54 Yale L.J. 489 (1945).

gual voting materials and assistance in jurisdictions with at

‘least 10,000 voting age citizens of a single language minority

group. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1992, § 2, Pub. L.

No. 102-344, 106 Stat. 921 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §

1973aa-la (1994)). These amendments enable the Asian

American community to participate more effectively in the

political process.

The 1982 amendments to the Act, promulgated shortly

after (and in response to) this Court’s decision in City of

Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), reflect Congress’ contin-

ued determination to refine the Act so as to expand and

amplify the right to vote and, thereby, prevent vote dilution.

In 1982, Congress rejected an intent-based standard in favor

of a test that focused on the “effect” of a challenged practice.

Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, S. Rep. No. 417, 97th

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 191.

Thus, these amendments fostered access to the political pro-

cess by, inter alia, prohibiting voting practices that “result[] in

a denial or abridgment of the right .. . to vote.” Voting Rights

Act Amendments of 1982, § 3, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat.

131, 134 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)). These

amendments were enacted to redress the more subtle forms of

discrimination that had emerged during the seventeen year

period since the Act was first passed.

The Senate Report accompanying the 1982 amendments

reveals that, no less than in 1965, expanding the franchise

remains inextricably intertwined with Congress’ intent to

ensure electoral equality in an inclusive democracy:

The Committee bill will extend the essential protection of

the historic Voting Rights Act. It will insure that the hard-

won progress of the past is preserved and that the effort

to achieve full participation for all Americans in our

democracy will continue in the future.

Seventeen years ago, Americans of all races and creeds

joined to persuade the Nation to confront its conscience

and fulfill the guarantee of the Constitution. ...

As a result of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, hundreds of

hated es

thousands of Americans can now vote and, equally impor-

tant, have their vote count as fully as do the votes of their

fellow citizens.

See S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), at 214.

On June 29, 1982, President Reagan signed the Voting

Rights Act Amendments of 1982 into law, announcing: “As

I’ve said before, the right to vote is the crown jewel of Ameri-

can liberties, and we will not see its luster diminished.”26

In the almost thirty years since the enactment of the Act,

the Court has generally endorsed its application and exten-

sion. In 1969, the Court held that minority citizens could assert

a claim for “vote dilution” under the Act. Allen v. State Board

of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (at-large or multimem-

ber elections could nullify minority voters’ “ability to elect the

candidate of their choice just as would prohibiting some of

them from voting.”).?’ It therefore gave a broad reading to the

preclearance provisions of Section 5 of the Act.78

In 1986, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1982

amendments to the Act and eased the evidentiary require-

ments for asserting a claim of minority vote dilution by elimi-

nating the requirement of proof of discriminatory intent.

Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).

In subsequent decisions, the Court approved expanding

the application of Section 5’s preclearance requirement and

invigorated the remedy available to enforce Section 5. The

Court held that Section 5 covered municipal annexation deci-

26. White House Press Release (June 29, 1982).

27. Cf. Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (multimember dis-

tricting plan that “designedly or otherwise, ... operate[d] to minimize or

cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting

population” would violate the Equal Protection Clause); Mobile, 446 U.S. at

126 (“The Court has long understood that the right to vote encompasses

protection against vote dilution. ‘[T]he right to have one’s vote counted’ is

of the same importance as ‘the right to put a ballot in a box.’ ”) (Marshall,

J. dissenting).

28. See also NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm’n, 470 U.S.

166, 175-76 (1985); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973) (holding

that Section 5 must be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial pur-

pose).

sions motivated by an improper purpose. Pleasant Grove v.

‘United States, 479 U.S. 462 (1987). It then held that a district

court has the authority to enjoin elections if the challenged

voting statutes have not been precleared under Section 5S.

Clark v. Roemer, 500 U.S. 646 (1991).

The Court recently extended the reach of Section 2 to

elected state judiciaries, stating that the Act “should be inter-

preted in a manner that provides ‘the broadest possible scope’

in combatting racial discrimination.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501

U.S. 380, 403 (1991) (quoting Allen, 393 U.S. at 567); see also

Houston Lawyers’ Ass’n v. Attorney General, 501 U.S. 419

(1991).

Finally, last term in Johnson v. DeGrandy, 114 S. Ct. 2647

(1994), the Court reaffirmed the Gingles framework for ana-

lyzing Section 2 claims and noted that “society’s racial and

ethnic cleavages sometimes necessitate majority-minority dis-

tricts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity.” Jd.

at 2661.

Amendments to the Act have resulted in a dramatic

increase in the numbers of African American and Hispanic

Officials across the country. These minority groups have also

greatly increased their participation in the political process.

The Act, as amended, has contributed greatly to making the

constitutional guarantees of the right to vote meaningful for

the nation’s racial, ethnic, and language minority citizens. The

decision below jeopardizes the benefits to minority citizens,

and indeed to the entire body politic, that have resulted from

the vigorous enforcement of the Act. Amici therefore urge the

Court to reverse the decision below.

lil. THE HISTORY OF VOTING RIGHTS LITIGATION

IN THE SUPREME COURT SHOWS THE COURT’S

COMMITMENT TO EXPANDING THE RIGHT TO

VOTE

The history of Supreme Court case law of voting rights

can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, from early

in the twentieth century until 1960, the Court invalidated dis-

criminatory measures designed to prevent minorities from vot-

ing. During the second phase, which began in 1960 and lasted

until 1966, the Court promoted the idea of one-person, one-

vote. This phase coincided with the Court’s continued efforts

to remove obstacles intended to prevent minorities from vot-

ing. In the third phase, which began in 1966 (as discussed in

Section IT), the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act,

and expanded the application of the Act to promote the effi-

cacy and fairness of the political process.

As early as 1915, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma

Statute that included a grandfather clause excusing

whites from taking the state’s literacy test. Guinn v.

United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). Although the statute

did not mention race, it included an exception for per-

sons able to vote on January 1, 1866 — before the adop-

tion of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. The

Court nullified the statute even though it imposed the lit-

eracy test in a superficially neutral manner. Jd. at 364-65.

The white primary represented another discrimina-

tory measure employed by the white majority in the

South to exclude minorities from the political process.

The Court considered numerous challenges to the white

primary in Texas before finally declaring the practice

unconstitutional in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649

(1944).

In Smith, the Court held that Texas statutes excluding

African-Americans from voting in a Democratic primary to

select nominees for a general election violated the Fifteenth

Amendment. The Court explained, “it may now be taken as a

postulate that the right to vote in such a primary for the nomi-

nation of candidates without discrimination by the State, like

the right to vote in a general election, is a right secured by the

Constitution. By the terms of the Fifteenth Amendment that

right may not be abridged by any State on account of race.”

Id. at 661-62 (citations omitted).

Texas argued that participation in the primaries was

determined by private organizations rather than the State, and

that the Constitution did not reach the conduct of those orga-

nizations. The Smith decision demonstrates the Court’s com-

mitment to preserving the integrity of the democratic process

by assuring equal electoral opportunity for all:

The United States is a constitutional democracy. Its

organic law grants to all citizens a right to participate in

the choice of elected officials without restriction by any

State because of race. This grant to the people of the

opportunity for choice is not to be nullified by a State

through casting its electoral process in a form which per-

mits a private organization to practice racial discrimina-

tion in the election. Constitutional rights would be of

little value if they could be thus indirectly denied.

Id. at 664.

Fort Bend County in Texas was undeterred by this admo-

nition. In that county, an association that dominated the

Democratic Party employed a white “pre-primary.” The Court

invalidated this practice in Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461

(1953), explaining that “the effect of the whole procedure ...

is to do precisely that which the Fifteenth Amendment forbids

— strip Negroes of every vestige of influence in selecting the

officials who control the local county matters that intimately

touch the daily lives of citizens.” Id. at 469-70.

In Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court

held that an Act of the Alabama Legislature changing the

boundaries of the City of Tuskegee was unconstitutional

because the Act eliminated nearly all of its African American

voters from the City without eliminating any white voters.

Shortly after Gomillion, the Court confronted the question of

whether to review political measures that did not exclude

minorities from the political process but instead diluted the

value of their votes.

The seminal case, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), held

that the question of whether reapportionment in Tennessee —

_ which legislators refused to do in a manner corresponding to

actual population concentrations — presented a justiciable

case. Id. at 209.

Georgia’s county unit system as a basis for counting votes

was the subject of a constitutional challenge in Gray v. Sand-

ers, 372 U.S. 368. Under the county unit system, the vote of

ttt

each citizen in Georgia counted for less as the population of

the county increased. “Georgia gives every qualified voter one

vote in a statewide election; but in counting those votes she

employs the county unit system which in end result weights

the rural vote more heavily than the urban vote and weights

some small rural counties heavier than other larger rural coun-

ties.” Id. at 379. '

Because the county unit system diluted the vote of some

state residents, the Court upheld the district court decision

enjoining the use of the county unit system. The Court

explained:

The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying

or abridging a Negro’s right to vote. The Nineteenth

Amendment does the same for women. If a State in a

statewide election weighted the male vote more heavily

than the female vote or the white vote more heavily than

the Negro; none could successfully contend that discrimi-

nation was allowable. ... Once the geographical unit for

which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all

who participate in the election are to have an equal vote

— whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their

occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their

home may be in that geographical unit. This is required

by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment.... The conception of political equality

from the Declaration of Independence to Lincoln’s Get-

tysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nine-

teenth Amendments can mean only one thing — one per-

son, one vote.

Id. at 379-81 (citations omitted).

Subsequently, another Georgia electoral practice was the

subject of Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, in which the Court

held that the State’s failure to align its congressional districts

in a way that reflected the population violated the Constitu-

tion. Under the 1931 Georgia Apportionment Statute, one

Congressman represented “two times as many Fifth District

voters as are represented by each of the Congressmen from

the other Georgia congressional districts.” Jd. at 7.

Wesberry may be viewed as a companion case to Reynolds

. v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, in which the Court articulated the one-

person, one-vote standard that is the foundation of voting

rights jurisprudence. In Reynolds, the Court held that the

Equal Protection Clause requires substantially equal legisla-

tive representation for all citizens in a state regardless of their

residence. Discussing the right to vote, the Court stated:

Undeniably the Constitution of the United States protects

the right of all qualified citizens to vote, in state as well as

in federal elections. A consistent line of decisions by this

Court in cases involving attempts to deny or restrict the

right of suffrage has made this indelibly clear... . [H]is-

tory has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of the

right of suffrage in this country. The right to vote freely

for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a

democratic society, and any restrictions on that right

strike at the heart of representative government. And the

right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilu-

tion of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as

wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.

Id. 554-55 (citations omitted).

At the same time this Court established the one-person,

one-vote principle, it continued to review the political process

to remove barriers impeding participation in the process. In

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, the Court

held that a poll tax is unconstitutional because it conditions

the night to vote on the payment of a fee and therefore vio-

lates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment. The Court concluded that “wealth or fee paying has, in

our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right to vote

is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or condi-

tioned.” Jd. at 670.

The Supreme Court upheld Congress’ decision to enfran-

chise 18-year old citizens in national elections. Oregon v.

Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). In the same case, the Court

upheld Congress’s prohibition of using literacy tests to dis-

criminate against voters on account of their race in both state

and federal elections.?9

These cases represent a vision of inclusiveness and an

expansion of the right to the franchise to young people,

women, language minorities and other people of color, that

has been nurtured and made explicit by this Court. The broad

and expansive view of Shaw v. Reno urged by Appellees

herein will have the effect of retrenching and retracting rights

which are firmly established in the case law of this Court. For

these reasons, the decision below should be reversed.

CONCLUSION

This Court has been instrumental in giving life to a vision

of an America that is diverse and inclusive. In a representative

democracy, legislative bodies must be elected with input from

all segments of the citizenry to be — in fact and perception —

genuinely representative. The decisions of this Court and the

Laws enacted by Congress (such as the Voting Rights Act),

which implement the constitutional guarantees of the right to

equal political participation, have consistently reinforced this

principle.

The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, ensures that

racial and language minority voters are afforded the same

opportunity as white citizens to participate in the political pro-

cess and elect candidates of their choice. The terrible legacy of

governmentally-enforced exclusion of these groups from full

political participation has necessitated reliance on measures,

including majority-minority electoral districts, which mitigate

the deleterious, continuing effects of such exclusion and coun-

teract the persistent phenomenon of racially polarized voting.

As a result of such measures, racial and language minori-

ties in many parts of the country, including Georgia, now

29. Discussing the right to vote, Justice Douglas stated: “the right to

vote is a civil right deeply embedded in the Constitution.... Voting con-

cerns ‘political’ matters; but the right is not ‘political’ in the constitutional

sense. Interference with it has given rise to a long and consistent line of

decisions by the court; and the claim has always been upheld as justiciable.”

Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 138-39 (citation omitted).

enjoy unprecedented opportunities to participate fully in the

. electoral process and have an equal opportunity to elect can-

didates of their choice to office. Thus, elected bodies, includ-

ing the United States Congress, have begun to reflect the

diversity of backgrounds, perspectives, interests and values of

the nation as a whole, rather than a select subset of the popu-

lation. This promotes the legitimacy of our political process

and ensures that the interests of all citizens are considered and

protected.

The modest gains which have been made in the American

political landscape by minorities and women are fragile and

should not be dismantled. At this critical point in American

history, thirty years after initial passage of the Voting Rights

Act and seventy-five years after the enfranchisement of

women, Amici urge this Court to continue its legacy of vigor-

ously protecting the voting rights of all citizens and fully

enforcing the constitutional and statutory provisions that have

outlawed discriminatory barriers to full political participation

by racial, ethnic and language minority citizens and women in

the political process. The decision below should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted,

Charisse R. Lillie*

Rodger D. Citron

E. Thom. Rumberger, Jr.

Barry E. Gosin

Michael D. Mabry

Counsel for Amici Curiae

*Counsel of Record

Of Counsel: Kim Gandy

Anthony Chavez National Organization for Women

Mexican American Legal borah Elli

Defense and Educational Fund National Ie ization for Women

Margaret Fun Legal Defense and Education Fund

Karen N i

- ; ; Rodney G. Gregory

National Asian Pacific -

American Legal Consortium National Urban League

Wade Henderson Elliot Mincberg

Dennis Courtland Hayes People For The American Way

National Association for the Donna R. Lenhoff

Advancement of Colored People Women's Legal Defense Fund

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.