Opposition Brief — Bressler v. Fortune Magazine
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No. 92-1210
FER
IN THE
Supreme Court of the Wnited States
2 TERM, 1992
IT OF CERTIORARI TO TIHII
\PPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUTI
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT FORTUNE MAGAZINE
IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR
\ WRIT OF CERTIORARI
FLOYD ABRAMS
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QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the court below correctly held, based on its review
of the entire record, including substantial evidence provided by
a variety of mutually corroborative sources, that plaintiff, a
public official, failed to demonstrate that the challenged por-
tion of the article was published with actual knowledge of its
falsity or serious doubts as to its truth.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
CFUFEEE AREY SPR EIOURINEE hen obaccscnvascnuvawekanatdaness i
SAAR Ge PARP OP TRE Bs 8 066d Svcs Geneeedeébendsb ences lil
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE...........0000 2
ASR Se CRUAPEMNEE isk ne insu nbdn eke caecavennes 14
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT.................. 16
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF
ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
IN THIS DEFAMATION ACTION IN ACCORDANCE
WITH PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT RAISES
NO ISSUE WORTHY OF THIS COURT'S CON-
ARN TET os ike bd cndnunvankewksendwhedsceesdeeinn’s 16
A. The Majority Opinion Below Properly Considered
the “Gist” or “Sting” of the Article with Respect
0 FORE SR hss. 0'6ha whee Un eeunebasikecsess 17
B. The Majority Opinion Below Reviewed the
Record in Accordance with This Court’s
Precedents and Properly Concluded, Based
on Substantial Documentary Evidence, that
Plaintiff Had Failed To Demonstrate Fortune’s
Actual Knowledge of Falsity or Serious
Doubts as to the Truth of the Article............ 21
(APO APURINY 5 00500 65600ns 054000065 sen ekmen URE ees 24
iil
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases PAGE
Anderson v. Cramlet, 789 F.2d 840 (10th Cir. 1986)...... 18
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.,
EE, CE RUED sco ccccessvesedsvecuseesess 15, 16, 21
Clyburn v. News World Communications, Inc., 903 F.2d
UE cap escbsevscndcaceneccesersevseess 22
Edwards v. Bell, 130 Eng. Rep. 162 (1824) .............-. 18
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,
SD CRUD scone ccccscvcsasscvcssvsccesces passim
Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838 F.2d 1287
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 825 (1988)....... 18
Lothschuetz v. Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200 (6th Cir. 1990). 16
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S.Ct. 2419
ese e ee Sie hcabsseeccrescensacesse iS, 17, 19
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ..21, 22
Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108 (6th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979)............0.22005. 18
Constitutional Provisions
SO I IE, Be cc waccnccccccccsesscccsecesccsccee passim
Rules and Regulations
Supreme Court Rules
eT ks casa ensscusdesanrensveesvesecers 2
re dee ek pane ase tones sessseccuesnccecsancs n.1
iV
PAGE
Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n Rules
Fe ain ls is CU OF CED an pb kc dcbuckcicancnibeons 4-5
Other Authorities
W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts (Sth ed.
PRLS Sb otukedeSal baer caecheheoSUENs oh ecea in enaeeenss 18
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1992
No. 92-1210
_>
MARCUS N. BRESSLER,
Petitioner,
FORTUNE MAGAZINE, A DIVISION OF TIME INC.,
Respondent
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
>
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT FORTUNE MAGAZINE
IN OPPOSITION TO
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Respondent Fortune Magazine (“‘Fortune”’)' respectfully sub-
mits that a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit should not
issue because that judgment is not in conflict—nor even said to
be in conflict—with that of any other circuit, because no ques-
tion worthy of the exercise of the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction
is presented and because, in any event, the decision below is in
all respects correct.
l Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.1, Fortune advises the
Court that it is a division of Time Inc., a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Time Warner Inc. A list of all other affiliated compa-
nies, including all other subsidiaries (except wholly-owned
subsidiaries) of Time Warner Inc. is attached as an appendix to
this brief.
COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Petition misstates certain significant facts and omits
mention of the documentary evidence in the record reflecting
Fortune’s extensive investigation and its reliance on a number
of mutually corroborative sources for the article at issue. The
Petition also wholly fails to note that Petitioner refused to
speak with Fortune when its reporter sought to interview him.
These and other omissions and misstatements necessitate this
counter-statement. See Supreme Court Rule 15.1.”
The Article
The October 27, 1986 Fortune article at issue, “Nuclear
Scandal Shakes The TVA,” was primarily devoted to a dis-
cussion of the nine non-operating nuclear power plants owned
by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) and to an investiga-
tion concerning allegations of conflict of interest on the part of
the TVA’s chief of nuclear operations. Seven paragraphs of the
article (at 40, 44) reported on federal and private investigators’
“allegations about an attempted cover-up of safety questions at
the Watts Bar plant” and the involvement therein of Marcus
Bressler, the TVA specialist on nuclear engineering quality and
safety standards.
The article reported that a number of welds in pipes carrying
water and steam into and out of the reactor containment area at
that nuclear power plant had not been inspected in accordance
with the governing engineering code requirements. (/d. at 44)
Investigators had found evidence, the article reported, that an
independent inspector employed by the Hartford Steam Boiler
Inspection and Insurance Company (“Hartford’’) under a con-
2 We have also submitted for lodging with the Court a photo-
copy of the article at issue, which appeared in the record below
(Joint Exhibit (“Ex. J”) 23-29; Joint Appendix (“JA”)
251-52, 1687), since the Petition provides only edited excerpts.
(Compare Petition (“Pet.’’) at 3-5 with article at pp. 44, 48.)
as
3
tract with TVA had objected to the use of such pipe welds “as
is” but that he had been directed by his superiors to accede to
such use. (/d. at 44) The article stated that TVA’s own inves-
tigators (identified by name) found evidence that “pressure”
was brought to bear by TVA “to cover up the safety violation”
and it reported that the Hartford incident was confirmed in a
draft report by the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(“NRC”). (/d. at 48) Petitioner Marcus Bressler, of TVA’s engi-
neering code compliance group, was said to have been named
by investigators as having “exerted” “pressure” “to cover up
the breach of safety standards” and to have “warned” Hartford
“to get its inspectors in line” or face the loss of renewal of its
inspection contract. (/d. at 48) The article also reported that
two of the internal TVA investigators who had looked into this
and other allegations of safety violations had complained that
they had themselves been “harassed and intimidated by TVA
management” for their investigative efforts. (/d. at 48) Their
claims of harassment, the article pointed out, were upheld by
the United States Department of Labor. (/d.)
Several months after the Fortune article appeared, the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the federal agency with over-
sight responsibility for TVA nuclear plants (and which con-
ducted one of the investigations reported upon by Fortune),
issued a formal Report of Investigation. The NRC Report con-
cluded that
a preponderance of testimonial, documentary, and cir-
cumstantial evidence established that four of nine ANIs
{Authorized Nuclear Inspectors] were either coerced,
pressured, harassed, intimidated, and/or threatened by
HSBII [Hartford] management. This included one ANI
who was directed by his management to accept the dis-
position of an NCR [nonconforming condition, or non-
conformance, report] which did not meet code
requirements. Furthermore, it appears that responsible
TVA managers searched for avenues to avoid the delay of
fuel loading and the expense of inspecting the hidden
welds, and may have pressured HSBII [Hartford] man-
agement to accept the disposition of this NCR that vio-
lated code requirements.’
The only “TVA personnel,” management or otherwise, referred
to in the conclusion section of the Report were Bressler and
two colleagues in the Office of Code Administration, which he
headed.‘
* * *
In 1986, as today, the role of nuclear power, the safety and
reliability of nuclear power plants, and the procedures that
safeguard them were of intense public interest, controversy,
and concern.
TVA is (and was) responsible for meeting “quality assurance
requirements for the design, construction, and operation of
[nuclear power plant] structures, systems, and components. . .
[and for] all activities affecting the safety-related functions of
those structures, systems, and components” at each of its power
plants. 10 C.F.R. Pt. 50, App. B, at 772 (1992). The applicable
regulations permitted TVA to delegate these “quality assurance”
functions to “independent” contractors. /d. at 772-73. TVA was
required, however, to ensure that the individuals who performed
3 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Report of
Investigation: Watts Bar Nuclear Power Plant—Alleged Coercion
of Authorized Nuclear Inspectors (ANI) by ANI Management
Through TVA Management (Nov. 20, 1986) (“NRC Report”) at 2
(Ex. J-37; JA 341-42, 1693).
4 See NRC Report at 34-36. Although the Petition asserts that
the “final [NRC] report did not even mention Bressler, much less
any of Fortune’s serious allegations about him”’ (Pet. 9), Bressler
was explicitly mentioned in the Report by name as the subject of
allegations to the effect that he had told Hartford management
that the conduct of their inspectors might cause their company to
lose its inspection contract with TVA. (NRC Report at 13, 26, 35)
The Petition’s statement in this crucial respect is flatly at variance
with the record.
these important “quality assurance” functions “shall have suf-
ficient authority and organizational freedom to identify quality
problems; to initiate, recommend, or provide solutions; and to
verify implementation of solutions.” /d. at 773.
TVA contracted with Hartford to perform inspections at
TVA’s Watts Bar nuclear power plant so as to identify any such
problems during the construction of that facility. On-site
inspections of Watts Bar were performed by Hartford person-
nel known as Authorized Nuclear Inspectors (“ANIs”), each of
whom received substantial training before attaining such sta-
tus. The ANIs inspected nuclear plant construction to deter-
mine, inter alia, if such construction satisfied the requirements
of the Code promulgated by the American Society of Mechan-
ical Engineers (ASME) for such construction.
The Fortune statements concerning Petitioner Bressler
related to the role he played in the treatment of a “noncon-
forming condition report” (NCR) concerning an acknowledged
departure from that Code and pressure that was brought to bear
on individual ANIs through their employer Hartford in con-
nection with the handling of that report.
In the spring of 1984, a Hartford inspector named Howard
Haston learned from a TVA employee that certain welds on
pipes contained within the “penetration assemblies” at the
Watts Bar plant, then under construction by TVA, had not been
visually inspected for possible leakage as part of certain
required testing. The piping in question, as one of plaintiff's
experts testified at trial, “penetrate[d]” the “steel containment
vessel” which contains “the reactor vessel” as well as “the pri-
mary reactor coolant piping, which is what contains the more
critical nuclear fuel, the radiated water, fluids, and poses the
greatest danger” in the event of an accident. The ASME Code
requires that the welds on all such pipes be tested under water
pressure and visually observed as part of this test to detect any
leakage (“hydrostatically tested”). No leakage whatsoever is
permitted under the ASME Code. At least one internal weld in
each of the approximately 50 penetration assemblies at issue in
Unit One at Watts Bar had not been visually inspected. These
welds were, as both plaintiff and plaintiff's expert conceded,
“safety-related welds”.°
Some time after inspector Haston prepared a preliminary
“monitoring report” on the uninspected welds, TVA personnel
prepared a nonconforming condition report describing the fail-
ure to meet the Code requirements. A TVA engineer reviewed
the report and, after consulting with plaintiff Bressler, decided
that no further action was required to deal with the lack of
inspection. The engineer prepared a disposition recommenda-
tion for “use as is”. He acknowledged that Bressler was “instru-
mental in suggesting the disposition and the rationale” set forth
in his recommendation memo.
Inspector Haston’s signature was required on the report to
approve the use of the welded pipes, notwithstanding the non-
conforming condition. In its absence, TVA would have been
obliged to seek approval from the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission, an approval process that Bressler and others at TVA
feared might delay scheduled fuel loading. (NRC Report at 35)
But inspector Haston was unwilling to “certify that to the best
of my knowledge all code requirements have been met” for the
simple reason that they had not—the safety-related welds had
not been visually inspected for leakage as part of the hydro-
Static testing. (Testimony of Howard Haston, JA 628)
Bressler contacted Haston on April 20, 1984, after Haston
had “identified the problem” but before the “use as is” dispo-
sition was prepared. Haston continued to insist that there was
a Code violation. He reported the violation first orally and then
in writing to his Hartford superiors. Although denying that any
improper pressure was exerted, Bressler, Haston and two of
5 A safety-related weld is one that would “prevent or mitigate”
the consequences of an accident. (TVA, ASME Section III Quai-
ity Assurance Manual, at 9) (Defendant's Exhibit (“Ex. D’’) 24;
JA 587-88, 1767)
7
Haston’s superiors, Harold Robison and William Higgin-
botham, all acknowledged that during this period Bressler dis-
cussed the matter directly with them.
Robison thereafter wrote a memorandum to Haston telling
him that Hartford management had concluded that the TVA’s
resolution was acceptable. The memo was based on the
assumption that Haston’s objection was only that he or another
ANI personally had not visually inspected the welds as part of
the tests. But as Haston explicitly observed in his written
response and in his conversations with Robison, his concern
was that no one had visually inspected the welds for leakage.
Despite Haston’s remonstrations and notwithstanding the Code
requirements, Haston’s Hartford superiors directed him, against
his will, to sign the report approving the welds.
After receiving that direction, Haston did sign the report, but
only after placing on it an explicit notation that he did so “per
written and verbal direction of H.L. Robison”. Higginbotham
acknowledged that Haston did “sign against his will”, that a
sign-off accompanied by a notation such as Haston’s was with-
out precedent in his experience, and that in retrospect, the “use
as is” disposition in the report at issue represented “a poor
judgment call”. Bressler himself later acknowledged that the
welds in question did not satisfy the Code. (NRC Report at 33)
In February, 1985, TVA certified to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission that Watts Bar was ready for an operating license.
By the next month, however, the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigation of the House Committee on Commerce and
Energy had assigned an investigator to look into “employee
concern having to do with allegations there was collusion
between TVA and Hartford Steam Boiler of Atlanta to the
effect their on-site nuclear inspectors were being intimidated
or forced to sign off on systems that they felt were not safe.”
The TVA Board of Directors was advised in April, 1985 by an
engineer on TVA’s Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) that
Towards the end of January 1984 through February 1984
a series of anonymous Calls started to come in pouring out
their hearts on structural welding and piping welding
(ASME). . . . Most of these calls centered on two sub-
jects, NCR [nonconformance report] 2111 from Watts Bar
and the ANIs (Authorized Nuclear Inspectors). . . . The
stories on the ANIs were horrendous. They came in two
versions, one that they had been “bought off”, the other
was that they had been told to back off by their employers
as a result of “TVA pressure”. (Ex. J-10 at 6; JA 242-43,
1266)
The TVA Board hired an independent contractor, the Quality
Technology Corporation (QTC), to investigate those concerns.
Mansour Guity, an investigator for the NSRS, was later also
assigned by TVA to look into the underlying claims of collu-
sion or coercion. After interviewing Hartford ANIs and review-
ing Hartford documents, Guity reported to his TVA superiors
that he had gathered evidence demonstrating, inter alia, col-
lusion between TVA managers and Hartford managers in pres-
suring inspectors to accept nonconforming items. Guity himself
told TVA’s Assistant General Counsel that Bressler played a
central role in the apparent “collusion”, by “using his position
on various national code committees to cause Hartford to take
positions on TVA Code technical issues they wouldn’t other-
wise take”.
At a meeting involving Hartford personnel and Bressler, held
during a period in which QTC investigators were making
inquiries of TVA personnel and TVA was considering a renewal
of the Hartford contract with TVA, Bressler complained about
communications between Hartford inspectors and the very QTC
investigators whom TVA had hired to look into employees’
safety concerns. (Testimony of Marcus Bressler, JA 766-67) In
part as a result of Bressler’s complaints, Hartford issued new
regulations restricting communications between its inspectors
and outside investigators, regulations requiring that all code or
quality issues be cleared with Hartford management by indi-
9
vidual ANIs before they discussed them with the investigators.
(Ex. D-45, JA 423, 1785)
In October 1985, Guity resigned from the still uncompleted
NSRS investigation into the alleged “collusion”, on the ground
that his TVA superiors were exerting “undue pressure” on him
during the investigation.®
In November 1985, the NRC Office of Investigation began
yet another investigation into the safety concerns. On Novem-
ber 20, 1986, about a month after Fortune's article was pub-
lished, the NRC released its final report. The Report, entitled
“Watts Bar Nuclear Plant: Alleged Coercion of Authorized
Nuclear Inspectors (ANI) by ANI Management Through TVA
Management,” specifically confirmed that ANI Haston was
among those “coerced, pressured, harassed, threatened and/or
intimidated by Higginbotham [or] Robison . . . .” (NRC
Report at 34) Bressler specifically admitted to the NRC that
“the ASME Code was violated when the inaccessible welds
were not examined for leakage during the system hydrostatic
testing” and that “the planned schedules for fuel loading were
also a factor in not inspecting the welds.” (/d. at 35)
The NRC Report quoted Hartford ANIs who stated that they
had been pressured by the TVA, through Hartford management.
One of the ANIs, Henry Best (who had replaced Haston at
Watts Bar in the early fall of 1985), told the NRC that his
supervisor, Higginbotham, had named Bressler as the source of
a warning that Best might cause Hartford to “los[e its] contract
with TVA.” (NRC Report at 13) The NRC Report also quoted
6 Guity filed a retaliation claim against TVA in December 1985
before the Department of Labor, asserting that he had been pres-
sured because of his investigation’s preliminary findings. So did
the engineer who had advised TVA'’s Board about “TVA pres-
sure’’. After the Department of Labor ruled in favor of both
claimants, and prior to the hearing of its appeal, TVA settled the
cases, agreeing to provide back pay, attorneys’ fees, and rein-
statement as part of the settlement.
10
Higginbotham’s acknowledgment that “he has had calls from
. Bressler and Joest of CSM [Codes, Standards and Mate-
rials], complaining about activities of the ANIs” and confirmed
Haston’s quotation to a Fortune reporter of Higginbotham’s
comment, “Woe be to any inspector that costs us a contract”.
Hartford inspector George Deaton, a colleague of Best's at
Watts Bar, told the NRC investigators that Higginbotham had
informed him in October of 1985 that if Deaton pursued his
questioning (first raised by Haston in the spring of the previ-
ous year) of the “use as is” disposition of the welds covered by
Report 5609, Higginbotham would receive a phone call from
TVA managers. While noting Bressler’s denial that he had
applied pressure on ANIs to accept “rejectable work”’, the NRC
Report also concluded that “[t]here is testimonial evidence to
support that TVA, through [Hartford], attempted to discourage
the site ANIs from talking to QTC and NSRS personnel”. (/d.
at 35)
After summarizing the evidence, the NRC Report stated as
its “Agents’ Conclusion” that Hartford personnel “failed, either
inadvertently or by design” to deal with Haston’s concer from
a “technical or potential safety standpoint” and that this dis-
position may have been “influenced by discussions” between
“TVA personnel” and Hartford and fear that other actions could
“jeopardize” its TVA contract. (/d.)
The Record as to Fortune’s Reporting
Extensive documentary evidence in the record revealed that
in researching the statements about Bressler, the Fortune
reporters interviewed a TVA investigator, a TVA engineer, two
private investigators hired by TVA, a Congressional aide, and
an authorized nuclear inspector (ANI), and reviewed sworn
deposition testimony of TVA’s Assistant General Counsel, a top
TVA investigator, and a Congressional investigator. The inves-
tigative sources collectively confirmed that the ANI, Haston,
had been forced, as a result of pressure from TVA’s Bressler
1]
through the ANI’s employer, to sign a report certifying con-
struction code compliance of certain welds in water and steam
pipes at the Watts Bar nuclear power plant when the ANI
believed (correctly) that no such compliance existed.
Documentary evidence also demonstrated that Fortune had
learned in its interview and research process that four separate
investigations—by the QTC, the House Committee on Com-
merce and Energy, the NSRS and the NRC—had turned up
evidence of undue pressure by TVA, through Hartford manage-
ment, on nuclear plant inspectors not to communicate their
safety concerns to investigators. In the record at trial were the
Fortune reporters’ interview notes, and the swom deposition
testimony of a TVA investigator, a Congressional subcom-
mittee investigator, and a TVA attorney also contained in For-
tune’s files, all of which provided consistent summaries of this
evidence. The notes show that three of the reporters’ sources
named Bressler specifically as the source of pressure on Hart-
ford: and two of the three named Bressler as the individual at
TVA who pressured a Hartford inspector with respect to his
refusal to approve the uninspected welds in April 1984. The
Fortune article writer testified that a fourth source identified
Bressler as the source of a specific threat, documented in his
interview notes, that TVA would not renew Hartford’s contract
if Hartford did not “play ball”.
In the course of the Fortune research in September 1986 into
investigators’ allegations that pressure had been exerted on
nuclear inspectors not to voice their safety concerns, Owen
Thero, a former QTC investigator, told the writer, Brian
Dumaine, that Bressler had cautioned Hartford management,
“If you don’t play ball—Hartford could lose [its] contract” with
the TVA. Dumaine subsequently interviewed Guity, a former
investigator for TVA’s Nuclear Safety Review Staff, and Jerry
Smith, a former NSRS engineer, in Tennessee. Dumaine’s notes
indicate that Guity told Dumaine that “the TVA management
and Hartford managers forced (other) Hartford managers to
sign off on pipes despite objections of Hartford inspectors”.
12
Brett Fromson, another Fortune reporter, interviewed Guity
on three subsequent occasions in September 1986. Fromson’s
notes on Guity’s statements about the Haston incident reflect
that TVA had “pressured” Hartford “to accept the work”; that
there had been “apparent collusion between the Hartford
regional managers and TVA managers to persuade the ANI to
approve penetration welds which were not hydrostatically
tested”; and that Bressler was “the head man in the welds area
at Watts Bar”.
The reporters knew that Guity’s statements to Fortune had
been confirmed by the swom testimony (which the reporters
reviewed prior to publication) of the former chief of investi-
gation of the NSRS and of a former assistant general counsel to
TVA. The TVA’s Assistant General Counsel, William Mason,
had testified that there “was a serious question, whether there
was an improper T.V.A. link that was defeating the purpose of
the [Hartford inspection] contract and that independent nuclear
inspector”. His sworn testimony confirmed that Michael Kidd
(then the NSRS chief of investigation) had advised Mason in
early October, 1985 that Guity “had talked to some ANI’s and
had developed some information which he thought supported
a conclusion that there was some collusion or improper pres-
sure on communication between TVA and Hartford Steam
Boiler”. Specifically, Guity had learned that “Mark Bressler
. . who is in the Office of Engineering in the Code Section,
was using his position on various national code committees to
cause Hartford to take positions on T.V.A. code technical issues
that they wouldn’t otherwise take”. Guity himself had informed
Mason that
Bressler would talk to somebody in the Hartford office in
Atlanta about Code issues raised at the nuclear plant sites,
. . . Hartford Atlanta would then call the T.V.A. plant site
and explain away or order the resolution of the Code
issues at the plant site despite the fact that the Code or the
required engineering and substitution for the Code may
not have been in fact done.
Kidd’s testimony confirmed Mason’s account.
13
Fromson also learned in September, 1986 that Guity’s find-
ings had been confirmed by the preliminary results of an inves-
tigation by the NRC. A science adviser to the House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations named Henry
Myers, who had been briefed by the NRC on its investigation,
told Fromson (as reflected in notes admitted at trial) that the
NRC had
found evidence supporting most of the NSRS allegations.
That there was a violation of the ASME Code. That
Bressler at TVA pressured Higginbotham . . . That Higg
told Robison to pressure Haston. That Robison did so.
Bressler is the guy who pressured Hartford in Atlanta.
Fromson subsequently interviewed a second former QTC
investigator, William Kemp, who also identified Bressler as a
source of TVA pressure on Hartford, specifically in the Haston
incident. Kemp told Fromson, as the reporter's notes indicate,
that
Since Hasten [sic] refused to sign the April 1984 NCR
[nonconformance report], Bressler at TVA called Hig-
ginbotham at Hartford in Atlanta, the regional manager.
“Hey your guy is raising hell.” Higg tells . . . Robison,
to tell Haston to sign the NCR. So in May, Haston signs
the NCR per request of Robison.
Kemp described this incident, according to the Fortune notes,
as an example of the “implicit threat” presented by TVA to its
outside inspection contractors that TVA would find another
inspection company if its current inspectors did not “back off”.
Fromson reached Haston himself by telephone at his home in
Texas in late September 1986. Fromson’s notes on the inter-
view reveal that Haston told him that before he had signed, at
the direction of his supervisor Robison, the nonconformance
report, the Hartford Regional Manager, Higginbotham,
was getting calls from Bressler, the guy in charge of
ASME codes and standards . . . I don’t think Bressler
ever directly threatened Higginbotham to pull the con-
14
tract, but the fear that it might be pulled was always there
for Hartford. Higginbotham had a saying, “Woe to the
inspector who costs us a contract.”
Although the Petition does not refer to it, Bressler himself
acknowledged at trial that he had received at least one tele-
phone message from a Fortune reporter in late September, 1986
seeking his comment in connection with the forthcoming arti-
Cle, and that he did not return the reporter’s call. (Bressler Tes-
timony, JA 756-58) It was undisputed that, as reported in the
article, a spokesperson for TVA also declined comment and
that Hartford was only willing to tell the reporters that it “has
done nothing wrong”.
Bressler and Fortune reporters Dumaine and Fromson testi-
fied at the trial in this action. Neither side called the various
sources relied upon, apart from Haston, but the reporters’ notes
of the interviews they had conducted and the materials they had
reviewed were introduced into evidence by the plaintiff and
admitted, without objection or limitation as to their use, as joint
trial exhibits.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A review of the record in this case demonstrates that the
majority opinion below is not in conflict with that of any other
7 At trial Haston acknowledged that he had told Fortune that his
Hartford supervisors had consulted with TVA before they
instructed Haston to approve TVA’s proposed “use as is”’ dis-
position and thus certify that welds were in compliance with the
Code when they were not. He denied knowledge of what pres-
sure, if any, was brought to bear by TVA, noting that while he
knew that Bressler spoke with Higginbotham of Hartford in April
and May of 1984, Haston had not been preseni at those discus-
sions. Thus the Petition’s suggestion (at 9) that Haston had
“direct knowledge of any conversations between Bressler and
Haston’s superiors at Hartford”’ is not supported by Haston’s own
testimony.
15
Circuit or the highest court of any state. Nor is it even argued
to be. Nor did the Sixth Circuit’s ruling depart from this
Court’s determinations in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), or Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, Inc.,___ U.S. ____, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
Petitioner’s contention that the majority opinion deviated
from this Court’s decision in Masson by focusing on the rep-
utational impact, or “gist”, of the challenged article can only be
sustained by ignoring (as the Petition does) both the reasoning
of Masson itself and a line of libel decisions extending back for
generations which relies on the “gist” concept. Petitioner’s
argument also requires him to ignore, as well, the allegations
in his own Amended Complaint (§ 12), which are strikingly
similar to the “gist” analyzed in the majority opinion and now
attacked by the Petition.
Petitioner misstates the record and the holding below in
asserting that the majority opinion departed from this Court’s
standard of review, as set forth in Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984), and Harte-
Hanks v. Connaughton, supra, “(bly failing to give due def-
erence to the jury’s credibility determinations”. (Pet. 22)
Petitioner offers but a single instance in which he alleges that
a credibility judgment was ignored—and in that instance, as
explained below, the Court explicitly adopted Petitioner’s view
of the disputed fact, thus giving effect to the very credibility
assessment he claims was ignored.
The decision of the Court of Appeals was based on a thor-
ough review of the entire record—a review commanded by this
Court’s decisions. Petitioner wholly fails to deal with what the
majority opinion below determined were “consistent statements
from multiple reliable sources” (Petition Appendix (“App.”) at
14), all of which were documented in the reporters’ extensive
written notes and in sworn deposition testimony in their files
and admitted into evidence at trial in this action without objec-
tion or limitation. Petitioner’s selective omission of these sig-
16
nificant aspects of the record further emphasizes the unwor-
thiness of this case for review by the Court.
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF ESTAB-
LISHED CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN THIS
DEFAMATION ACTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH
PRECEDENTS OF THIS COURT RAISES NO ISSUE
WORTHY OF THIS COURT’S CONSIDERATION
The Court below concluded that plaintiff Bressler had failed
to demonstrate by the requisite clear and convincing evidence
that Fortune published statements about plaintiff with “actual
malice,” that is, with actual subjective knowledge of the falsity
of such statements or serious doubts as to their truth. (App. 2)*
Before so concluding, and in accordance with precedents of this
Court, it engaged in an examination of the “entire record” to
assure that the First Amendment protections established by law
were given their full intended effect. (App. 5) See Harte-Hanks
v. Connaughton, supra, 491 U.S. at 688-89; Bose v. Consumers
Union, supra, 466 U.S. at 505, 510-11; see also Lothschuetz v.
Carpenter, 898 F.2d 1200, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing Harte-
Hanks and Bose). The Court below held:
Based on our review of the entire record—the several
sources on which the Fortune reporters relied, the sub-
stance of those sources’ statements, and the content of the
8 Fortune had also urged on appeal that the judgment at trial in
plaintiff’s favor should be reversed because plaintiff had failed
to carry his burden of proving the requisite falsity of the article
and because the district court had failed to charge that such fal-
sity had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. The
majority noted that while its “conclusion regarding actual malice
in this case necessarily suggests that the gist of the article was
substantially true, we do not reach this issue.” (App. 6) The
majority also did not reach the issue of the proper standard of
proof of falsity. (/d.)
17
various documents consulted in preparing the article—we
believe the evidence could not have supported a finding of
actual malice under the “clear and convincing” standard.
(App. 6)
One judge dissented. No judge of the Court of Appeals voted
to grant en banc review.
A. The Majority Opinion Below Properly Considered the
“Gist” or “Sting” of the Article with Respect to Plain-
tiff Bressler
The majority opinion focused on the “gist” of the challenged
portion of the article relating to Bressler in evaluating both
truth (in the context of “actual malice”) and actual malice
itself. As described by the majority opinion,
The “gist” of the contested portion of the Fortune article
was that plaintiff Bressler allegedly played a lead role in
pressuring an independent inspector to certify, contrary to
fact, that certain safety-related welds in the Watts Bar plant
met the engineering code requirements, and that Bressler
also attempted to cover up that safety violation. (App. 6)
The Petition (and the dissenting opinion below, on which it
relies heavily) challenge this approach, insisting that only the
actual words used in the article may be employed in the anal-
ysis without regard to the impact of the statements taken as a
whole.
Petitioner is compelled to acknowledge that this Court itself,
in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., ___ a i. Cae
S. Ct. 2419 (1991), reiterated the long-established principle
“that as long as ‘the substance, [the] gist, the sting’ of a state-
ment is substantially true, its author should not be liable for
minor inaccuracies.” (Pet. 20)? Indeed, this Court expressly
9 Strikingly, the dissenting judge below dismissed this Court’s
use of the word “gist”’ as “unfortunate”’ and “almost certain to
generate . . . confusion and difficulty in application’”’.
(App. 22) The dissent made no reference to the long history of
the use of this term in libel jurisprudence.
18
held that reviewing courts were to look at the gist of the
alleged statements and compare them to the truth in assessing
both truth and actual malice. 111 S. Ct. at 2432-33. The reason
for this analysis, as the Court explained, is that the law of libel
“overlooks minor inaccuracies and concentrates upon sub-
stantial truth”, because it exists to protect against injury to rep-
utation, not to correct every inaccuracy as such. /d. This Court
expressly concluded, “[oJur definition of actual malice relies
upon this historical understanding”. /d. at 2433.
As the Court’s use of the term “historical” denotes, reliance
on the gist of a statement is not some recent innovation, but has
been utilized in analyzing claims of libel for well over a cen-
tury. See, e.g., Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 838
F.2d 1287, 1296 (D.C. Cir.) (Bork, J.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
825 (1988); Anderson v. Cramlet, 789 F.2d 840, 843 (10th Cir.
1986); Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1112 (6th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1979); B.Sanford, Libel and
Privacy § 6.4, at 216-18 (2d ed. 1991); W. Keeton et ali.,
Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 116, at 842 (Sth ed. 1984); and
see Edwards v. Bell, 130 Eng. Rep. 162, 164, 165 (C.P. 1824).
Petitioner’s challenge is not really a conceptual challenge to
the use of a “gist” to summarize the meaning of extended pas-
sages. Rather, the real challenge is to the particular “gist”
which the majority opinion below determined to be the repu-
tational impact of the article. This is demonstrated by the Peti-
tioner’s Own recourse to a summary of the article’s statements
about him. (Pet. 5) Petitioner asserts that, unlike his own sum-
mary, the majority opinion below rests “on an homogenized
version of the statements at issue” (Pet. 19) which “substan-
tially recharacterizes the charges levied against Petitioner by
Respondent.” (Pet. 17) This challenge to the majority’s deter-
mination as to the particular substance of the article at issue in
this case does not raise an issue of sufficient significance to
other litigants to merit review by this Court. It is, in any event,
wrong, as Petitioner’s own pleadings, let alone even a cursory
review Of the article at issue, make plain.
19
The Amended Complaint on which the case was tried itself
contends that the article misstated the asserted truth that
Bressler’s
relationship with representatives of Hartford Steam Boiler
was always proper and professional. He never exerted
pressure upon Hartford to cover up safety violations.
(Amended Complaint, ¢ 12) (JA 25) This statement in plain-
tiff’s pleading (nowhere referred to in either the Petition or the
dissenting opinion below) focused on denials of “pressure” and
a “cover-up” of “safety violations”. It precisely paralleled the
“gist” relied on by the majority. (See App. 6)’ This is the
meaning which Petitioner understood the article put at issue
and which he challenged at trial.
The majority opinion thus engaged in no “rewriting”
(App. 19) but rather, in accordance with this Court’s opinion in
Masson and scores of opinions of other courts, focused on the
substance of the charge as pled by Petitioner to determine
whether it was “ ‘proved true, irrespective of slight inaccuracy
in the details.’ " Masson v. New Yorker Magazine Inc., supra,
111 S. Ct. at 2433.
In any event, the gist relied on by the Court below reflects a
sound basis for analyzing the evidence of actual malice. A
comparison of it with the Petition’s own summary (Pet. 5) and
the article itself suggests that each would have a similar impact
on the reader. The Petition’s efforts to suggest that while
(apparently concededly) such actual malice did not exist as to
10 ‘It also paralleled the trial judge’s summary in his jury charge
that
The plaintiff claims that in this article, he was accused of illegal,
unethical and unprofessional conduct including exertion of pres-
sure on Hartford Steam Boiler personnel to cover up breaches of
safety standards.
The Pretrial Order (at par. II(d)) in this action, dated August 5, 1988,
which was discussed and approved for entry by counsel for Petitioner
and Respondent, also contained almost identical language.
20
the “gist” it did exist as to specific allegations in the article is
based on misstatements and distortions of the record.
Thus the Petition asserts, for example, that Fortune acted
with malice in reporting a “cover-up” and “suppress[ion]” of
safety documents because the “purpose” of the nonconfor-
mance report “was to disclose, not to hide, a deviation dis-
covered by a utility company during construction of its plant.”
(Pet. 16) And it asserts that Fortune knew that “the purpose of
all such reports was to disclose rather than to suppress evidence
of deviations from code”. (/d.) This is, simply put, legal
sophistry, as the Petition itself reveals. Because the ANI finally
agreed (at the “written and verbal direction” of his superior) to
sign the nonconformance report providing for a “use as is” dis-
position of the welds in question, the NCR was indeed filed.
But, as the Petition acknowledges in a footnote, where the ANI
agrees with TVA, “no further action is necessary, other than
maintaining the NCR as a document”. (Pet. 6, n.3) As the Peti-
tion also recognizes, however, had the inspector and TVA not
agreed, the NCR would have been “dispatched to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission” for a decision as to the appropriate
disposition. (/d.) This public discussion of the “use as is”
disposition—a disposition which Hartford itself later came to
recognize was a “poor judgment call’”—and the attendant fuel-
loading delay Bressler and others said they feared (NRC Report
at 35) was just what the pressure on ANI Haston was designed
to avoid. To laud this treatment of the NCR as a “disclosure”
Says much about the Petition."
11 Perhaps even more striking is the Petition’s insistence that a
greater defamatory impact was conveyed by the article’s state-
ment that certain welds were “untested” (Pet. 5, 6-7) as opposed
to the asserted reality, as described in the Petition, that “the Code
deviation disclosed in NCR 5609 involved only the omission to
visually inspect the welds during the hydrostatic testing proce-
dure.’ (Pet. 7) (emphasis added) In other words, Petitioner con-
tends that the “hydrostatic” test—running water at pressure
through the pipes in question—was conducted although he con-
21
B. The Majority Opinion Below Reviewed the Entire
Record in Accordance with This Court’s Precedents
and Properly Concluded, Based on Substantial Docu-
mentary Evidence, that Plaintiff Had Failed To
Demonstrate Fortune’s Actual Knowledge of Falsity or
Serious Doubts as to the Truth of the Article
The Petition (and the dissenting opinion below) also cast
their disagreement with the majority opinion in terms of an
asserted difference as to the application of the standard of
appellate review required by cases ranging from New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), through Bose Corp.
v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485
(1984), to Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,
491 U.S. 657 (1989), aff’ g 842 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1988). The
Petition argues that the majority opinion below deviated from
the appropriate review standard “[b]y failing to give due def-
erence to the jury’s credibility determinations”. (Pet. 22) This
contention is simply inaccurate. First, the majority opinion
never even suggests that it is declining to accept the jury's
credibility assessments. This is not surprising, for its analysis
is premised on uncontradicted documentary evidence. And in
the only instance pointed to by the Petitioner in which con-
troverted oral testimony is at issue, the Court (contrary to the
Petitioner's assertion) explicitly relied upon the version sup-
porting Petitioner's position.
The single example offered by the Petition involves the fail-
ure of the Fortune reporters to interview Harry Jackson, an
expert on engineering codes who was described as a “straight
shooter” and “Mr. Codes and Standards”. The Petition correctly
notes that reporter Fromson testified that he had tried to reach
Jackson and been unsuccessful. (Pet. 24) It also notes that the
jury could have disbelieved the reporter. (/d.) What it does not
cedes that no one at all observed its results (i.e., whether or not
any water had actually leaked out of the pipes through the welds).
Conducting a “test’’ without determining its results is, of course,
a meaningless exercise.
— ——E
note is that the Court of Appeals explicitly accepts Petitioner’s
version of this occurrence (i.e., that Fortune made a “decision
not to gain additional comment from Harry Jackson”) and,
assuming this to be the case, held that the decision did not
amount to the purposeful avoidance of the truth of the sort pre-
sent in Harte-Hanks. (App. 15) This holding was plainly cor-
rect.'*? But even more importantly, this example reflects the
inaccuracy of Petitioner’s central contention; contrary to Peti-
tioner’s claim, the Court below did not reject or ignore the
jury's credibility determination. There is no issue presented on
this point.
In an effort to create a standard of review issue, the Petition
completely discounts the numerous and consistent investigative
sources on whom the reporters relied as having no “first-hand”
knowledge and no “direct knowledge”. (Pet. 9; see also
App. 55) But there is no requirement that journalists rely on
only legally admissible, non-hearsay evidence. As this Court
recognized in New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, one of the
reasons behind the adoption of the actual malice rule was to
avoid the chilling of speech inherent in requiring a reporter to
“adduc([e] legal proofs” of the charge. 376 U.S. at 279; and see
Clyburn v. News World Communications, Inc., 903 F.2d 29, 34
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (“Reporters cannot be expected to insist on
Statements that would be admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence ... .”). It is hard to imagine that many reports
about cover-ups or conspiracies could ever be written if only
“direct” testimony by participants in the scheme could support
a defense against a charge of actual malice. The Petition cites
no authority for eliminating such sources from a court’s con-
sideration.
Finally, the Petition seeks to rely heavily on this Court’s
opinion in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton,
12 Jackson was not identified by anyone as having any specific
knowledge about the handling of the NCR at issue here or the
other facts as reported by Fortune.
23
supra. (Pet. 24-25) In Harte-Hanks, however, the article at
issue was based on a single source (Thompson) although six
witnesses had “consistently and categorically” denied her
account. 491 U.S. at 683. Yet the newspaper purposefully
avoided interviewing the single witness (Stephens) and review-
ing the one audiotape which could have provided dispositive
evidence of falsity. In contrast, documentary evidence in the
record here demonstrates that the Fortune reporters based their
article on a large number of official sources, each of whom
consistently supported the account ultimately published.’
While in Harte-Hanks the newspaper staff consciously avoided
interviewing the single witness who could have confirmed
Thompson’s story, here it was Petitioner who avoided Fortune,
admitting at trial that he refused to return a telephone request
from Fortune for comment. The contrast with Harte-Hanks
could not be clearer.
None of the source materials on which the majority opinion
based its determination raises an issue of credibility. The
majority opinion below, in accordance with the precedents of
this Court, properly concluded that the reporters had substan-
tial materials before them which plainly rebutted any sugges-
tion, let alone any finding by clear and convincing evidence,
that their article was published with knowledge of falsity or
serious doubts as to the truth of charges which, only a month
later, were formally reflected in the official findings of a final
report of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
13 The Petition points to only one source relied on by the
reporters (Haston) whose account arguably differed from theirs
not as to the facts, which were agreed upon by all sources, but as
to the relative significance of the problem at issue. (Pet. 9) This
does not begin to provide adequate support for a finding of actual
malice.
CONCLUSION
The Petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
February 16, 1993
Of Counsel:
HARRY M. JOHNSTON, III
ROBIN BIERSTEDT
TIME INC.
Time & Life Building
Rockefeller Center
New York, New York 10020
(212) 522-3217
Respectfully submitted,
FLOYD ABRAMS
Counsel of Record
DEAN I. RINGEL
AMY GLICKMAN
CAHILL GORDON & REINDEL
(a partnership including
a professional corporation)
80 Pine Street
New York, New York 10005
(212) 701-3000
R. LOUIS CROSSLEY, JR.
LONG, RAGSDALE
& WATERS, P.C.
190 Market Place Blvd.
Knoxville, Tennessee 37922
(615) 690-2144
Attorneys for Respondent
APPENDIX
la
Supreme Court Rule 29.1 Statement
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29.1, the Court is advised that Time
Wamer Inc. has no parent company and that its affiliated companies, includ-
ing non-wholly owned subsidiaries and their non-wholly owned sub-
Sidiaries, are listed here:
A.P. Schmidt Company
Aberbach (Wien) Gesellschaft
m.b.H.
Abigail Music London Ltd.
Abril Livros Ltda.
Acapulco 37, S.A. de C.V.
Atram Films Inc.
Akoursberga Vision AB
Alpha Theatres, Inc.
American Cablevision of Kansas
City, Inc.
American Cablevision of
Monroeville, Inc.
American Communications
Corporation
American Digital
Communications, Inc.
American Family Publishers
(a partnership)
American Heritage Cablevision,
Inc.
American Lawyer Media L.P.
American Motion Picture Export
Company, Inc.
American Television and
Communications Corporation
American Television of California,
Inc.
Amicus Television Pty, Ltd.
Anfel-Kabelkorn Kabel-
kommunikacios Kft
Anthracite-Lorimer: Dallas the
Early Years
Anxious Records Ltd.
Anyway Music S.r.I.
ARP 113, Inc.
ARP Partnership
Arrow Music Corp.
Ascherberg Hopwood & Crew Ltd.
Asiaweek Limited
Atari Corporation
Atari Far East Limited
Atari Games Corporation
Atari International (Hong Kong)
Ltd.
Atari- Wong Company
ATC Cablevision of San Marino,
Inc.
ATC Cablevision of South
Pasadena, Inc.
ATC Holdings, Inc.
ATC Holdings II, Inc.
ATC Satellite, Inc.
ATC-PPY, Inc.
Australian Multiplex Joint Venture
Babel Music N.V.
Bennie Benjamin Music, Inc.
Bernie Brilstein Productions, Inc.
Black Entertainment Television
Inc.
Boston Ventures Limited Partner-
ship II
Boston Ventures Limited Partner-
ship III
Bountiful Co. Limited
Bozell Inc.
Brae Company
Brookfield CATV
Bubbles Music Ltd.
Burlington Music Company Ltd.
Cafe Americana Inc.
Canciones Del Mundo S.A.
Capital Cablevision Systems, Inc.
Capriccio Musikverlag GmbH
Carolina Network Corporation
CAT Partnership
Central Pennsylvania Cable AdNet
(GP)
Century Venture Corporation
Century Colorado Corp.
Chameleon Music Group
Chappell Music Company, Inc.
Chappell Music Ltd.
Chappell Nordiska, AB
Chappell Theatrical Rights Ltd.
Chappell & Co. GmbH
Chappell & Co. (Australia) Pty.
Ltd.
Chappell & Intersong Music
Group (Australia) Ltd.
Chappell & Intersong Music
Group (Germany) Ltd.
Chappell-Morris Ltd.
Chappell-Styne Inc.
Chatham Music Corporation
Cinamerica Theatres L.P.
Cinema Data Service S.r.L.
Classics FM Limited
COGEDEP
2a
Collection Inc.
Collins Licensing L.P.
Colorado Invesco, Inc.
Colorado Springs Cablevision,
Inc.
Colorado Springs Citizens Cable,
Inc.
Columbia House Company
Columbia-Cannon- Warmer Bros.
Distributors Ltd.
Columbia TriStar & Warner Filmes
de Portugal, Lda.
Comedy Partners
Compagnia Generale del Disco
S.p.A.
Cosmos Soccer Club, Inc.
Courtroom Television Network
Crimson Satellite Associates
Curci de Espana S.L.
CV of Viera
Dagmar Teatret I/S
Dash Inc.
DC Comics
DC Comics Inc.
Def America Records
Delfont Music Ltd.
DF/ATC Communications
Management Venture (GP)
Dolmatch Publications, Inc.
Dorella Music Inc.
Dubey-Karr Corp.
East West Records GmbH
Ediciones Musicales Sagitario
S.A.
Ediciones Musicales Sympathy
S.A.
Edition Autarc GmbH
Editions Chappell SARL
Editions et Productions Theatrales
Chappell S.A.
Editoria de Musica WEA, S.A. de
C.v
Editorial Musical America Toda
SL
Editorial Musical Korn Intersong
SAIC
Edizioni Chappell S.r.I.
Eldorado Musikverlag GmbH
Erato Disques S.A.
Erie Telecommunications, Inc.
Exeter Distributing Inc.
Express Music Ltd.
E.C. Creations, Inc.
E.C. Publications, Inc.
E/A Music, Inc.
E! Entertainment Television, Inc.
Fanch/ATC Communications
Management Venture (GP)
FCI/ATC Communications
Management Joint Venture
Finvision AB
Foreign Press Distributors Ltd.
Fortissimo Gruppo Editoriale S.r.I.
Fortune Italia, S.p.a.
Foster Frees Music, Inc.
Franklin Mint Company
Geffen Film Company
GHK Partners, L.P.
Giant Merchandising
Giant Records
Girl Group Company
Gliro Music, Inc.
Gloria Musikverlag Kommandit-
gesellschaft
Gulf Coast Cable Television
GWWR Acquisition Company L.P.
Hajdu-Kabelkom Kabelkommuni-
kacios Kft
Halnstad Kabelvision AB
Hankook Ilbo Time-Life Ltd.
Hank Snow Music Inc.
Hanks Music Inc.
Hanseatic Musikverlag GmbH
Happy Musikverlag GmbH
Happy Musikverlag GmbH & Co.
KG
Harmonie Verlagsgesellschaft fur
Literatur und Kunst GmbH
Harry Gray, Mel Klein & Partners,
mo
HBO Asia, C.V.
HBO Enterprises UK Lid.
HBO Film Management, Inc.
HBO Ole
HBO Ole Distribution 1 A.V.V.
HBO Ole International Sales
Company Ltd.
HBO Ole Services S.A.
HBO Ole Producciones S.A.
HBO Satellite Services, Inc.
HBO Turkey Holdings I Inc.
HBO Turkey Holdings II Inc.
Hermann Schneider Musikalien
und Buehnenverlags Komman-
ditgesellschaft
Hippocrates Partners
HKP Partners of New Zealand
Hobby Films Limited
Home Box Office, Inc.
Home Box Office, Inc.
Home Box Office (Singapore) Pts.
Lid.
Houston Cable TY, Inc.
Initial Group
Interice Corporation
International Music Publications
Ltd.
Interscope Records
Interscope/T VT Joint Ventures
(Nine Inch Nails)
Intersong Hellas Ltd.
Intersong Music Ltd.
Intersong Musikverlag GmbH
Intersong Primavera S.A.
Intersong Pty. Ltd.
Intersong U.S.A., Inc.
Intersong-Basart Publishing Group
B.V.
Intersong-Forlagen AB
Inverness/ATC Joint Venture
IPH-TLA Kumial
Jader Music Corporation
Japan Records Distribution
System, Inc.
Japanese Visitor Network
Jewel Music Publishing Company
Ltd.
Jonathan Music (Australia) Pty.
Ltd.
Jubilee Music Inc.
Kabeldatakom Szamitastechnikai
Kft
Kabelkom Management Co.
Kabekom Holding Co.
Kabelkom Kabeltelevizio Kft
Kabelvision KB
Kabelkom-Dunaujvaros Kabel-
kommunikacios Kft
Kabelkom-Kelenfold Kabel-
televizio Kft
Kabelkom-Nagykanizsa Kabel-
televizio Kft
Kabelkom-Nyiregyhaza Kabel-
kommunikacios Kft
Kabelkom-Szehesfehvar Kabel-
kommunikacios Kft
Kabelkom-Veszprem Kabel-
kommunikacios Kft
Kansas City Cable Partners
Kay Holdings Limited
Kirshner Warner Bros. Music Ltd.
Kremlin Productions, Inc.
Laurel Cablevision, Inc.
LEM America, Inc.
Litton Musikverlag GmbH
Little Reata Music Inc.
Living In America Inc.
Lombardo Music, Inc.
Lorimer Canada, Inc.
Lorimer Distribution International
(Canada) Corp.
Lorimer Film Partners
Lorimer International Italia S.R.L.
Lorimer Motion Picture
Management, Inc.
Lorimer Music A Corp.
Lorimer Music Bee Corp.
Lorimer Music Publishing, Inc.
Lorimer-Hauck “Valerie” Joint
Venture
Lorimer-Telepictures International
Limited
Lorimer-Telepictures Magazines,
Inc.
Lorimer-Telepictures Pty. Limited
Love & War Associates
Low Country Cablevision L.P.
Lower Bucks Cablevision, Inc.
Lu-Jac Music Inc.
L.D.C.A. of Maryland, Inc.
Magnet Music Ltd.
Marmaiade Music Ltd.
Maverick Recording Company,
A
Medical Sciences International
Ltd.
Medai Editora Medica e Cientifica
Memphis CATV, Inc.
Metro Cable Marketing Co-op,
Inc.
Metrocolor Laboratories (U.K.)
Limited
Metrocolor London Limited
Microband Pacific Corporation
Miie Hi Cablevision, Inc.
Mile Hi Cablevision Associates,
Ltd.
Milwaukee Entertainment
Television, Inc.
Motion Picture Export Association
of America, Inc.
Movieworld Enterprises
Partnership
Movieworld Holdings Partnership
MSC, Music Service Center
Tontragervertriebs GmbH
Musicom S.A.
Musik unserer Zeit Verlag GmbH
Musikverlag Intersong GmbH
Muzickuitgeverij Artemis B.V.
n-tv Nachrichtenfernschen GmbH
& Co. KG
Nabland Ltd.
National Cable Advertising, L.P.
Neue Velt Musikverlag GmbH
New Chappell Inc.
New Kary S.r.L.
New World Music Company (Ltd.)
Night Owl Club, Inc.
NPP Music Corp.
Notservice AB
Nova-Net Communications, Inc.
Nucable Resources Corporation
Nuova Carisch S.p.A.
Offsetdruckerei Rotapress Warner
Chappell Musikverlag
Gesellschaft mbH & Co. KG
Olive Avenue Distributing Inc.
Paisley Park Records
Palace Music Company Ltd.
Palm Springs Communications
Corporation
Pamela Music Inc.
Paragon Communications
Patricia Music Ltd.
Pay-Per-View Network, Inc.
Pendulum Records
Pepamar Music Corp.
Peoples Cable Corporation
Pesci Kabeltelevizio Kft
Philadelphia Community Antenna
Television Company
Played Like a Stepsun Music, Inc.
Polaris Partners I, L.P.
Potential Music, Inc.
PPVN Holding Company
President Incorporated
PriCellular
PRIMESTAR Partners L.P.
Productions et Editions Cinema-
tographiques Francaises SARL
Productions et Editions Musicales
Baboo SARL
Public Cable Company
Publishers Express Inc.
Publishers (Georgia) Express Inc.
Putnam Music Inc.
Qweens Inner Unity Cable System
Quincy Jones Entertainment
Company L.P.
Quinn Martin Warner FBI Stories
Quinn Martin Warner Productions
QVC Network, Inc.
Rainbowcheer Ltd.
Rainmaker Productions Limited
RCF/ATC Communications
Management Joint Venture
RCF Michigan/ATC
Communications Management
Joint Venture
Reata Publishing Inc.
Record Service Benelux V.O.F.
Rhino Entertainment Company
Rick's Music Inc.
Rightsong Music Inc.
Riverside Avenue Distributing Inc.
Rodart Music Corporation
Rogli Music Inc.
Rondo- Verlag GmbH
rooArt Pty. Limited
Rosemeadow Publishing Corp.
Running Mates, Inc.
R.S.Q. Publishing B.V.
Sahara Music Inc.
Sari Lodge Pty. Limited
Savoy Pictures Entertainment Inc.
Scala Biograferne I/S
SCD Finans AB
SCD Holdings AB
SCD Kabel TV AB
Sea Chime Music, Inc.
Sea World Aviation Partnership
Sea World Enterprises Partnership
Sea World Management Pty.
Limited
Sea World Nara Equipment
Company Pty. Limited
Sea World Nara Resort Hotel Pty.
Limited
Sea World Property Trust
Select Records
Sevin Rosen Bayless & Borovoy
Sevin Rosen Fund IV
SF Holdings Inc.
SHE AB
Shows, Inc.
Shubert Music Publishing
Corporation
Sifta Milwaukee Cable Corp.
Simba Productions, Inc.
Sire Records Ltd.
Six Flags Entertainment
Corporation
Six Flags Theme Parks Inc.
SKY Network Television Limited
SMSG, Inc.
Soccer Camps of America, Inc.
Specchio Inc.
SRB Partners Fund L.P.
SR/MDM Venture Inc.
St. Louis Interconnect Company
Steinbruch Musikverlag GmbH
Stepsun Music Entertainment Co.,
LP.
Summy-Birchard, Inc.
Sunshine Network, Inc.
Sunshine Network of Florida, Ltd.
(LP)
Swedish Dish and Cable AB
SCD Invest AB
TA Milwaukee Cable Co., Inc.
TCW Americas Development ~
Association L.P.
Teldec Classics International
GmbH
Teldec Press Tontrager GmbH &
Co. KG
Teldec Press Tontrager
Verwaltungs GmbH
Telestar-Kabelkom Kabel-
kommunikacios Kft
The Atrium Development Co.
The Ladd Corporation
The Miss Saigon Company L.P.
The Music Sound Exchange
Company
The Sunshine Network Joint
Venture
The Track Marketing Company
The Travel Channel, Inc.
Throat Music Ltd.
Time Australia Magazine Pty. Ltd.
Time Distribution Services
Time Warner Cable Inc.
Time Warner Cable New Zealand
Ltd.
7a
Time Warner City Cable
Advertising
Time Warner Entertainment
Australia Pty. Ltd.
Time Warner Entertainment
Company, L.P.
Time Warner Entertainment GmbH
Time Warner Entertainment Japan
Inc.
Time Warner Entertainment UK
Limited
Time Warner Entertainment
Limited
Time Warner Inc.
Time Warner Merchandising
Canada Inc.
Time Warner Pay-Per-View
Distribution Inc.
Time Warner Stage Productions
Ltd.
Time-Hachette Japan, Inc.
Time-T.I. Communications Co.
Ltd.
Tonika Musikverlag Horst Bussow
KG
Torremodo Limited
Tri-Chappell Music Inc.
Tri-County Cable Television
Company
Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc.
Turner/HBO Ltd. Purpose Joint
Venture
TV 1000 Sverige AB
TWE Finance Limited
Twins Ediciones Musicales, S.A.
Unichappell Music Inc.
Vernon Music Corporation
Victory Film Productions, Limited
Viewer’s Edge Partnership
W Cinemas Inc.
W Cinemas Holding Inc.
W.B.M. Music Corp.
WAC Productions, Inc.
Wallaby Music Pty. Ltd.
Warner Air Inc.
Warner Bros. Belgium S.A./N.V.
Warner Bros. Beteiligungs
Gesellschaft mbH
Warner Bros. Canada Inc.
Warner Bros. Consumer Products
(UK) Ltd.
Warner Bros. Deutschland PAY TV
GmbH
Warner Bros. Distributing
(Canada) Limited
Warner Bros. Distributors Ltd.
Warner Bros. Film GmbH
Warner Bros. Film GmbH Kino-
bertriebe
Warner Bros. Film Ve Video
Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S.
Warner Bros. Holdings Sweden
AB
Warner Bros. Inc.
Warner Bros. Investments
(Pilsworth) Limited
Warner Bros. Italia S.p.A.
Warner Bros. Licensing Espanola
S.A.
Warner Bros. Music Australia Pty.
Ltd.
Warner Bros. Music GmbH
Germany
Warner Bros. Music Holland BV
8a
Warner Bros.
Inc.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Music International
Music (Italy) S.r.l.
Pictures, Inc.
Productions Limited
Properties Australia
Pty. Limited
Warner Bros. Publications Inc.
Warner Bros. Singapore Pts. Ltd.
Warner Bros. Theatres Advertising
Agency Limited
Warner Bros. Theatres Equipment
Supply Limited
Warner Bros. Theatres Ltd.
Warner Bros. Theatres (Australia)
Pty Limited
Warner Bros. Theatres (Holland)
B.V.
Warner Bros. Theatres (UK) Ltd.
Warner Bros. Twelve Star
Distributing Co. (GP)
Warner Bros. Video Pty. Limited
Warner Bros. /S 1984-1985
Television Co. (GP)
Warner Bros. (Africa) Pty. Ltd.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
Warner Bros.
(Australia) Pty. Ltd.
(D) A/S
(Finland) OY (OLD)
(Finland) OY (NEW)
(F.E.) Inc.
(Holland) B.V.
(Japan) Inc.
(Korea) Inc.
(Mexico) S.A.
(Norway) A/S
(N.Z.) Limited
(South) Inc.
(Sweden) AB
(Transatlantic) Inc.
Warner Cable Communications
Company
Warner Cable Communications
Company of Greater Cincinnati
Warner Cable Communications
Inc.
Warner Cable Communications of
Cincinnati, Inc.
Warner Cable Communications
Operating Corp.
Warner Cable Communications
Operating, Ltd.
Warner Cable of Brookfield, Inc.
Warner Cable of New Jersey, Inc.
Warner Cable of New York, Inc.
Warner Cable of Vermont, Inc.
Warner Cable Operating Inc.
Warner Cable SSD Inc.
Warner Chappell Music France
S.A.
Warner Chappell Music GmbH
Germany
Warner Chappell Music Group
(Netherlands) B.V.
Warner Chappell Music Holland
B.V.
Warner Chappell Music Italiana
S.p.A.
Warner Chappell Musikverlag
Gesellschaft mbH
Warner Custom Music Corp.
Warner Dagmar A/S
Warner Entertainment Italia S.r.L.
Warner Films Consolidated Inc.
Warner Holdings Australia Pty.
Limited
Warner Home Video Espanola S.A.
Warner Home Video France S.A.
9a
Warner Home Video GmbH
Warner Home Video Limited
Warner Home Video Portugal Lda.
Warner Home Video Pty. Limited
Warner Home Video spol s.r.o.
Warner Home Video (Canada) Ltd.
Warner Home Video (Ireland) Ltd.
Warner Home Video (Nederland)
B.V.
Warner Home Video (Sweden) AB
Warner Home Video (U.K.) Ltd.
Warner Leisure, Inc.
Warner Morgan Creek Multiplex
Cinemas
Warner Music Argentina SRL
Warner Music Brasil Ltda.
Warner Music Chile S.A.
Warner Music Exports Ltd.
Warner Music Finland OY
Warner Music Germany GmbH
Warner Music Japan Inc.
Warner Music Manufacturing
Europe GmbH
Warner Music (Northern Ireland)
Limited
Warner Mycal Corporation
Warner Scala A/S
Warner Sea World Aviation Pty.
Limited
Warner Sea World Investments
Pty. Limited
Warner Sea World Operations Pty.
Limited
Warner Sea World Units Pty.
Limited
Warner World Australia Pty.
Limited
Warner & Metronome Films ApS
Warner-Elektra-Atlantic
Development Corp.
Warner-Lusomundo Sociedade
Iberica de Cinemas Ltda.
Warner-Tamerlane Publishing
Corp.
Warner/Chappell Edicoes
Musicalis Ltda.
Warner/Chappell Music Belgium
N.V.
Warner/Chappeli Music Canada
Limited
Warner/Chappell Music Denmark
A/S
Warner/Chappell Music Japan KK
Warner/Chappell Music Mexico
S.A. de C.V.
Warner/Chappell Music Norway
A/S
Warner/Chappell Music
Scandinavia AB
Warner/Chappell Music
(Services), Inc.
Warner/Chappell Music Note-
service A/S
Warner/Elektra/Asylum Music Inc.
Warner/Noreale Music Inc.
Warner/Refuge Music Inc.
WB Gold Music Corp.
WB Music Corp.
WBM/House of Gold Music, Inc.
Wenatchee Mountain, Inc.
Wheatley Music Pty. Ltd.
Wheatley Music Publishing Pty.
Ltd.
Whittle Communications, L.P.
Whittle Schools L.P.
White River Cablevision L.P.
Wide Music, Inc.
WLE Acquisition Company L.P.
Working Woman Inc.
WSW Partners, L.P.
WWT Partnership
ZTT Records Limited
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