Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Great Dane Trailers, Inc. v. Ruffin

Bupreme Court, U.S

FILED

NOV 12 1968

GE TH& CLERM

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

GREAT DANE TRAILERS, INC.

Petitioner,

versus

RONALD RUFFIN,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

James B. Spears, Jr.

Counsel of Record

HAYNSWORTH, BALDWIN.

JOHNSON & GREAVES, P.A.

901 West Trade Street

Suite 1050

Charlotte, NC 28202

(704) 342-2588

October 1992

N

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Where a trial court orders only a very limited

injunction after a Title VII trial in which a plaintiff

sought across-the-board injunctive and monetary

relief for numerous claims of employment

discrimination, is the plaintiff a "prevailing party”

within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and this

Court's decision in Garland?*

Where only a very limited injunction has been

ordered, does the fact that it may later be enforced

in a contempt proceeding satisfy this Court's

requirement for a “material alteration" of the

litigants’ legal relationship within the meaning of

this Court's decision in Garland?

Is an employer's failure to appeal a trial court's

limited injunction, its findings of fact or legal

conclusions an appropriate factor for reversing a

trial court's decision to deny an attorneys’ fee

award?

“Texas State Teachers Ass'n v, Garland. 489 US. 782

(1989)

OPINIONS BELOW

JURISDICTION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI:

a

tN

ww

CONCLUSION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Appeals Court Failed

To Apply The Standards Set

Forth In Garland,

SGP US. 762 (1969) .................

The Eleventh Circuit's

Application of Garland

Conflicts With Other Appeals

Courts Decisioms ...................

This Court's Decision To

Grant Certiorari In Estate

of Farrar v. Hobbey,

941 F.2d 1311 (Sth Cir. 1991),

cert. granted, US. _,

112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), Confirms

The Importance Of Resolving

This Case Under A Proper

Interpretation Of Garland ............

eee er ee Oe Ce ee es ee ee hs

7.8.6 @. 2) 6 SSD 6 bd eS. OS

2S OS) SS «6S -& eae

ee ee ee Se! Ss eee ee be Se we eS

20

24

APPENDICES:

l.

5

Plaintiffs Complaint ................. A-1

District Court's Findings

of Facts and Conclusions of

MN <5 ERRS aan eee eee oe ee A-8

District Court's Judgment .............. A-35

Eleventh Circuit's Opinion ............. A-37

Statutory Provisions .................. A-59

- ill -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

-ASE PAGE(S)

Christopher P. v. Marcus,

915 F.2d 794 (2nd Cir. 1990),

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1081

5 Se a oa ee

Estate of Farrar v. Cain,

941 F.2d 1311 (Sth Cir. 1991),

cert. granted, uo.

Se oe Ef).

Hanrahan v. Hampton,

446 U.S. 754 (1980) .....................

Hensley v, Eckerhart,

461 U.S. 424 (1983) .......-...... 12, 15,

Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755

19,

(ROID oko ees kk ad dckccces 13, 14, 16, 19, 23,

Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d

ome (ist Cir, 1991) 2... ccc.

Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d

949 (Ist Cir. 1991) .................. Sere

Nadeau v. Helgemoe,

581 F.2d 275 (1st Cir. 1978) ...............

21

24

YB 5

| ie

ao

21

~

13

CASES

New York City Unemployed &

Welfare Council v. Brezenoff,

677 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1982) ...

New York Ci nemploye

Welfare Council v. Brezenoff,

742 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1984) ...

Northbrook Excess & Surplus

Ins. Co. v. Proctor &

Gamble Co,, 924 F.2d 633

(7th Cir. 1991) .............

Rhodes v. Stewart,

CST. ae

Slade v. United States Postal

Service, 952 F.2d 357

(10th Cir. 1991) ............

Tex tate Teacher 'n

Vv land In ndent

School Dist., 489 U.S. 782

|, Dep ete

PAGE(S)

STATUTES PAGE(S)

Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ;

FP eas coc dea ee deel. 2

Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.

I ooo eee 2

Civil Rights Attorney's Fees

Awards Act of 1976,

Pe a ES rs, 2 ae ee ee ee 2

oe

OPINIONS BELOW

Ronald Ruffin sued his employer claiming

numerous instances of race discrimination in_ his

employment. (Pet. App. A-1 - A-7). Finding only a very

limited entitlement to relief, the Trial Court denied an

attorneys’ fee award. (Pet. App. A-33 - A-34). Ruffin

appealed only the denial of attorneys’ fees. (Pet. App.

A-38). The Eleventh Circuit reversed the Trial Court's

denial of attorneys’ fees and rejected Petitioner's argument

that the Trial Court's nominal injunctive relief was only a

technical or de minimis victory. (Pet. App. A-37 - A-58).

The Appeals Court's theory was that any court-ordered

relief that could subsequently be enforced through a

contempt proceeding constitutes the necessary material

alteration mandated by this Court in Texas State Teachers

Ass'n v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989).

There, the Supreme Court made clear that a party must

achieve more than merely a technical or de minimis

victory before an attorneys’ fee is Statutorily authorized.

eT

The Appeals Court concluded Ruffin met the Statutory

requirements for a fee award.

JURISDICTION

The opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals

was entered on August 20, 1992. (Pet. App. A-37 - A-58).

This petition for certiorari was filed in less than 90 days

and is timely. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

This case arises under the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5k and the Civil Rights

Attorneys Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Pet.

App. A-59 - A-61).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

At the time of trial, Ruffin was a mechanic in

Petitioner's tractor trailer repair shop. In his Title VII

bho

Complaint he alleged that he had been repeatedly

discriminated against because of his race, black. by

management's failure to grant him various promotions,

several wage increases, and more desirable job

assignments. He also claimed he had suffered numerous

instances of discriminatory discipline and racial

harassment from coworkers "without any corrective action

being taken [by management]" (emphasis added). (Pet.

App. A-3 - A-S). Ruffin's claims covered the years 1987,

1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991.

Following a two-day trial, the Honorable Sam C.

Pointer, Jr. ruled in favor of Defendant on all of Plaintiff's

claims for discriminatory promotions, wage increases,

discipline and job assignments. The Trial Court awarded

no monetary damages; it did not require the employer to

promote him, change his job classification, alter his job

assignments, give him additional seniority, increase his

pay, benefits, pension, or, remove or modify any discipline

ce a

against him.' Similarly, the court did not grant the

additional across-the-boara injunction sought in Ruffin's

Complaint. (Pet. App. A-6, Prayer for Relief, paragraph

2).

The Court expressed concern about an isolated

coworker harassment incident "back during that period of

time [1987]." (Pet. App. A-26). The Trial Court's

description of the 1987 incident reveals the isolated nature

of this incident:

There is an incident that occurred in

or around the close of the year 1987

certainly as to which this Court would be

concerned and is concerned. An incident in

‘Plaintiffs Complaint sought numerous injunctive and

monetary remedies including a court order:

requiring the defendant to make the

plaintiff whole by awarding him the position

he would have [sic] occupied in the absence

of race discrimination, back pay (plus

interest), compensatory damages, lost

seniority, benefits and loss of pension.

Pet. App. A-6.

which a noose was prepared using heavy

rope by white mechanics and ultimately the

noose was put around Mr. Ruffin's neck by

one of these white mechanics. These are

coworkers and not supervisors.

Mr. Ruffin made a complaint to

management about what had occurred and

management did immediately make an

inquiry investigation into it. Management

got conflicting stories with the whites who

were involved having indicated that, number

one, it had not originally been prepared in

any way as something directed to Mr. Ruffin

and that in any event it was a matter simply

of a joke and no offense taken in the eyes

of the whites and that Mr. Ruffin, himself,

had engaged in some horseplay or joking

use of the noose at the same time. Mr.

Ruffin's version, of course, was different as

to what happened and it has been different

in this trial.

Management, confronted with the

two different stories, without making a

decision as to which story or which version

to believe, said that certainly an apology

was due to Mr. Ruffin from the whites who

were involved and indeed that apology was

iven, far as management was aware.

that had satisfied Mr. Ruffin. Obviously it

did not satisfy him, but at least in terms of

responding later to management, he did not

indicate that he was still unhappy with what

had occurred or what action management

Sn a ee

had taken or failed to take of a more severe

nature.

(Pet. App. A-26 - A-27)(emphasis added). The Trial

Court emphasized that since 1987, the Company had taken

Steps designed to eliminate such incidents:

Since that incident in late 1987 it's clear to

the Court that management has taken a

more active role in reducing the amount of

perm egg and — that had been

in ri hat time

Management has taken disciplinary action

since that time with respect to individuals,

where it was reported to management, that

these things had occurred. [I]t is clear to

the Court based on the evidence presented

that management does view that as

inappropriate behavior and is Prepared to

impose appropriate discipline when called

to its attention.

(Pet. App. A-27 - A-28)(emphasis added). Although

Ruffin presented the Court with other harassment claims

allegedly directed toward him after the 1987 noose

incident, the Trial Court did not find any Title VII

violations regarding any of these occurrences. For

example, the Trial Court rejected Ruffin's racial claim that

his coworkers frequently referred to him as "Rondo." (Pet.

App. A-25 - A-26).

The Trial Court issued a very narrow injunction

requiring only that the employer be "more affirmative and

more aggressive” in its efforts to create a non-offensive

work environment in its shop area. The Court made clear

the limited scope of its injunction:

implement any new policy or procedure.

[ am going to enjoin the company to take

active steps to reduce and eliminate the

racial joking and siurs and episodes in the

shop area. The wording of an injunction of

this sort is very difficult. And it is, as I say,

clear to me that the company has attempted

Or started in that area, has undertaken from

time to time disciplinary action. But I think

the Court is essentially requiring now, given

this evidence, the company to be more

affirmative and more aggressive in its efforts

to correct that situation, that environment in

the shop.

(Pet. App. A-32 - A-33)(emphasis added). Significantly,

this nominal injunction did pot require Defendant to

It did not

require management to do any specific act regarding

Ruffin or to change anything it had already done to

address any coworker harassment incident. It only

required the Company to make more aggressive efforts to

create a non-offensive work environment.

The Trial Court denied Ruffin'’s request for

attorneys’ fees and summarized its decision as follows:

The plaintiff, I'm sure must feel like he has

lost in the case. I think it is fair to say in

general he has lost in this case even though

the Court does find on this area an

entitlement to relief.

(Pet. App. A-33). Ruffin appealed only the trial court's

denial of attorneys’ fees. The Eleventh Circuit decided

Judge Pointer had applied the correct legal standard in

evaluating Ruffin's request for attorneys’ fees;

nevertheless, it concluded the Trial Court had abused its

discretion in denying an attorneys’ fee award. (Pet. App.

A-5S8).

Garland standards for an attorneys’ fee award simply by

obtaining some injunctive relief.

The Appeals Court decided Ruffin had met the

outlined its analysis as follows:

(Pet.

omitted). Thus, the Appeals Court concluded that where

a remedial obligation exist vel non, a plaintiff qualifies for

By virtue of the court's grant of injunctive

relief, Great Dane is now under a legal

obligation to correct the racist behavior at

its jobsite. Accordingly, Ruffin may now

protect his rights through a civil contempt

proceeding in the event that Great Dane's

compliance with the court's injunction is not

forthcoming. Given the alteration of

Ruffin's legal rights and Great Dane's legal

obligations that resulted from the court's

grant of injunctive relief, there is no

Question that Ruffin prevailed on this issue

before the district court, or that,

consequently, he satisfied the Garland

standard and is entitled to an award of

attorneys’ fees.

App. A-S0-A-S1)(emphasis added)(citations

an award of attorneys’ fees.

The Appeals Court

The Appeals Court's analysis omits the key inquiry

under Garland: Does the judicial relief materially alter the

parties’ legal relationship? By failing to address this

question, the Appeals Court ignored a_ primary

requirement in Garland; i.e,, that a material alteration of

the litigants’ legal relationship result from the litigation.

The Appeals Court decision reflects an erroneous

interpretation of Garland that any remedial order at all,

regardless of how little it impacts the parties’ conduct

toward each other, constitutes a "material alteration.”

The Appeals Court decision was not premised

solely on a restricted view of the Garland requirements.

The Appeals Court further explained its decision by

holding that the Petitioner's failure to appeal the Trial

Court's factual findings, legal conclusions or remedy

somehow confirmed that the narrow injunction here

constituted a "material alteration" under Garland. The

Appeals Court explained:

10

Appellee [employer] does not challenge the

award of injunctive relief, nor does jt

Suggest that the court's finding that Great

Dane has failed to address adequately the

problem of jobsite racism is clearly

erroneous. Given the district court's

unchallenged findings, we cannot hold that

the court's injunction did not materially

alter the relationship... .

(Pet. App. A-57)(emphasis added). This purported

justification provides no relevant consideration for

evaluating whether a material alteration has occurred.

Carried to its logical end, this backward reasoning

penalizes a party for not appealing the merits of a case in

which it scored a substantial victory if there is any minor

injunctive relief ordered by a court. Such a result could

generate appeals even where a trial court's injunction in

no meaningful way changes the parties’ relationship,

notwithstanding the fact that a defendant really was the

‘prevailing party" in the case. In such circumstances,

compliance with a nominal injunction is a far easier thing

to bear rather than the costs of a protracted appeal.

REASONS FOR GRANTING CERTIORARI

l. The Appeals Court Failed To Apply The

Standards Set Forth In Garland, 489 U.S.

782 (1989).

A plaintiff has crossed the statutory threshold to a

fee award only when he has succeeded ". . . ‘on any

significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the

benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit’ . .

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983) (quoting

Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir. 1978))

(emphasis added). However, to achieve success on "any

Significant issue" means more than simply a_ judicial

determination that a violation has occurred. A plaintiff

must obtain "some relief on the merits," Garland, 489 U.S.

at 790 (citing Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757

(1980))(emphasis added). Under Garland, such "relief"

must not only "change the legal relationship between the

plaintiff and the defendant. . . ." (489 U.S. at 792); it must

also be a material change in their relationship:

| F

The touchstone of the prevailing party

inquiry must be the material alteration of

the legal relationship of the parties in a

manner which Congress sought to promote

in the fee statute.

489 U.S. at 792-93 (emphasis added). Thus, where there

has been no legal relationship change or, where only a

minor or de minimis alteration of the parties’ relationship

would result, an attorneys’ fee is not authorized under

Title VII or § 1988.

A remedy which is only technical or de minimis

would fail to satisfy even the "generous formulation"

adopted in Garland:

[A] technical victory may be so insignificant,

and may be so near the situations addressed

in Hewitt and Rhodes, as to be insufficient

to support prevailing party status .

Where the plaintiff's success on a legal

claim can be characterized as purely

technical or de minimis, a district court

would be justified in concluding that even

the "generous formulation" we adopt today

has not been satisfied. (quoting Nadeau v.

Helgemoe, 581 F.2d at 279, n.3).

13

489 U.S. at 792 (emphasis added). To be "so near the

situations” represented by Hewitt and Rhodes’ cannot be

limited only to cases where plaintiffs receive absolutely no

benefit from litigation. In Ruffin, the Eleventh Circuit has

failed to apply this part of Garland by its misdirected

focus upon the mere availability of an enforcement

mechanism.°

Many cases, like the present one, qualify as de

inimis or technical victories. District Judge Pointer was

*Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 107 S.Ct. 2672 (1987):

Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 202 (1988).

*The Eleventh Circuit's underlying rationale in Ruffin

ignores the analytical principles required by Garland, even

while purporting to follow Garland's analytical framework.

The Supreme Court in Garland focused on how w a remedy

impacts the parties’ relationship, not what couid happen if

a party elects to ignore the remedy. The Eleventh

Circuit's decision that Ruffin should be a prevailing party

simply because injunctive relief could later be enforced

through a contempt proceeding does not begin to address

the correct question. Any remedy, injunctive or otherwise,

would certainly satisfy the Eleventh Circuit's elementary

test.

14

certainly correct, in light of the nominal relief ordered in

this case, in finding that Ruffin did not qualify as a

prevailing party. The court's conclusion that Plaintiff had

‘lost in this case" (Pet. App. A-35), is entirely consistent

with Garland's standards for denying an attorneys’ fee.

Although a minimal injunction was ordered in this case,

the limited scope of the injunction fully supports the Trial

Court's decision that an attorneys’ fee was not

appropriate. Compared with the laundry list of injunctive

and monetary remedies Ruffin actually sought in this

litigation (Pet. App. A-6- A-7), the court's minimal

injunction clearly constitutes, at most, only a minor change

in the Company's relationship with him.

On the other hand, the Eleventh Circuit's

misdirected analysis is inconsistent with the Supreme

Court's rationale in Hensley. There, this Court noted:

The result is what matters .... Congress

has not authorized an award of fees

whenever it was reasonable for a plaintiff to

—"

WN

bring a lawsuit or whenever conscientious

counsel tried the case with devotion and

skill. Again, the most critical factor is the

degree of success obtained.

461 U.S. at 435-436 (emphasis added). Clearly, this

Court's recognition of "degree[s] of success" confirms that

the specific circumstances of Hewitt and Rhodes do not

represent the only two examples of technical or de

minimis victories in which Congress expected trial courts

to deny attorneys’ fees.

In Garland, this Court demonstrated the analysis ‘t

now requires before an attorneys’ fee is allowed. This

Court cited with approval examples of purely technical or

de minimis successes which failed to qualify a plaintiff as

a prevailing party. Each example represents a judicial

result greater than those achieved in Hewitt and Rhodes.

In fact, in each case, the plaintiff achieved a materially

more significant victory than resulted in this case. For

example, in Garland itself, the trial court invalidated a

16

school district's rule requiring a school principal's approval

in advance of teachers’ meetings on school grounds after

regular school hours. 489 U.S. at 786-87. The plaintiffs

clearly succeeded in getting judicial relief requiring the

defendants to stop using this rule. Nevertheless. this

Court recognized that this example of a limited judicial

victory would have been insufficient to recognize them as

prevailing parties for purposes of an attorneys’ fee. "If this

had been petitioners’ only success in the litigation, we

think it clear that this alone would not have rendered

them ‘prevailing parties’ within the meaning of § 1988."

489 U.S. at 786-87.

Here, Judge Pointer's narrow injunction did not

require Petitioner to stop doing anything at all; in fact, it

only required Petitioner to increase the types of things

which, on its own initiative, it had already begun doing to

reduce incidents of coworker harassment. It is significant

that the injunction here requires no particular steps or any

17

new policy from management. Clearly, the court believed

that this very mild injunction was sufficient in light of the

factual findings and legal conclusions it had made.

Additionally, however, it also demonstrates how little

success Ruffin can claim in this case, especially when the

narrow injunction is compared to the numerous injunctive

and monetary remedies Ruffin sought through this

litigation. (Pet. App. A-5 - A-6).

Next, the Supreme Court in Garland also cited with

approval New York City Unemployed & Welfare Council

v. Brezenoff, 742 F.2d 718 (2d Cir. 1984)(Brezenoff I1)*,

as another example that every victory by a plaintiff does

not justify "prevailing party" status. In that case, plaintiffs

obtained a court order requiring defendants to modify one

out of four regulations challenged by the iawsuit. Se

——

“See also, New York City Unemployed and Welfare

Council v. Brezenoff, 677 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1982)

(Brezenoff I).

18

ee

Brezenoff_ I, 677 F.2d at 235. This court-ordered

modification of defendants’ regulation achieved one of the

goals for the litigation; it allowed plaintiffs’ greater access

to welfare patients. Nevertheless, this Court endorsed the

Second Circuit's holding that "[t]he district court's denial

of attorney's fees in this instance is reasonable in relation

to the results obtained." 742 F.2d at 724, n.4 (quoting

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 438, 103 S. Ct. at 1942.);

Garland, 489 U.S. at 792.

Clearly, as shown by Bresenoff II, every judicial

"remedy" does not justify an attorneys’ fee. The plaintiffs,

like Ruffin here, had unsuccessfully sought far more

remedies through the litigation. However, their limited

judicial "success" resulted in only a minor or nominal

change. Thus, while Hewitt and Rhodes may represent

the clearest examples, they do not represent the exclusive

remedial circumstances where an attorneys’ fee should be

denied. The Eleventh Circuit decision in Ruffin

19

necessarily rejects both principles from Court's Garland

decision.

A The Eleventh Circuit's Application _of

Garland Conflicts With Other Appeals

Courts’ Decisions.

In Ruffin, the existence of a defendant's remedial

obligation vel non, satisfied the Appeals Court's

interpretation of Garland's requirement for a material

alteration. In contrast, other appeals courts have correctly

applied Garland to reject certain plaintiffs as prevailing

parties where their victories were found to be only

technical or de minimis under Garland.

Examples of correctly decided decisions include

notable damage awards which, when juxtaposed with the

actual remedial goals each plaintiff sought through

litigation, were judged to be insufficient under Garland.

For example, in Northbrook Excess & Surplus Ins. Co. v.

Proctor & Gamble Co., 924 F.2d 633, 641-42 n.11 (7th Cir.

1991), a piaintiffs recovery of $45,000 was held to be de

minimis in light of his claim for more than $5 million.

Similarly, the First Circuit in Lewis v. Kendrick, 944 F.2d

949, 954-56 (Ist Cir. 1991), recognized that a jury verdict

of $1,000 was only a technical and de minimis victory

because the plaintiff had sought $300,000. Likewise, the

Fifth Circuit recognized that nominal damages of $1.00

was insufficient under Garland to qualify a plaintiff as a

prevailing party where 17 million dollars had been sought.

Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d 1311 (Sth Cir. 1991),

cert. granted, U.S. __, 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992).

Other circuit courts have similarly denied prevailing

party status in cases not involving monetary awards. For

example, in Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794 (2nd

Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1081 (1991), the

plaintiff obtained temporary injunctive relief which

effectively placed him back in the school which was a

primary goal of his lawsuit. However, after analyzing the

Garland requirements, the plaintiff was found not to be a

21

—

"prevailing party.” Id. at 805. Similarly, in Slade v. United

States Postal Service, 952 F.2d 357, 361-62 (10th Cir.

1991), the Tenth Circuit concluded that plaintiff was not

a prevailing party although he had obtained the important

right to be evaluated in his employment based on

nondiscriminatory criteria.

The First Circuit has also demonstrated the proper

application of Garland by rejecting an attorneys’ fee for a

plaintiff who had "won" only nominal nonmonetary relief.

In Langton v. Johnston, 928 F.2d 1206, 1226 (ist Cir.

1991), the plaintiff had failed on many issues in a case

involving prisoner rights. However, he had achieved

success On a single issue involving the defendants’ practice

of "double bunking" inmates. The appeals court held he

should not be awarded an attorneys’ fee if that issue was

of only minor significance:

And if, indeed, the double-bunking point

was of "minor significance" given the scope

and tenor of the litigation as a whole, legal

services rendered in respect to it would not

be compensable. See Texas Teachers, 489

U.S. at 792, 109 S. Ct. at 1493.

These other appeals courts have properly concluded

that certain judicial remedies, although greater than the

unique situations represented by Hewitt and Rhodes, did

not materially alter the litigants’ relationships as required

by Garland. The Eleventh Circuit's Ruffin decision stands

in stark contrast to this array Of appeals court decisions

which have properly applied Garland to deny attorneys’

fees to plaintiffs who succeeded only in a minor or

technical sense.

The Eleventh Circuit's departure from the results

in these comparable cases is Significant beyond the

inconsistency itself. Garland's requirements cannot be

reduced to a mechanical determination of whether or not

an enforcement proceeding is available. Indeed, if the

Eleventh Circuit's cursory analysis is allowed to determine

23

prevailing party status, this Court's consistent analysis in

Hensley, Hewitt, Rhodes, and particularly Garland, was

unnecessary for resolving attorneys’ fee disputes. This

Court should resolve the Ruffin decision's conflict with

other circuit courts' proper application of Garland.

k This Court's Decision To Grant Certiorari

In Estate of Farrar v. Hobbey, 941 F.2d

1311 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, yaad

U.S. 112 S. Ct. 1159 (1992), Confirms

The Importance Of Resolving This Case

Under A Proper Interpretation Of Garland.

Granting this Petition provides this Court with an

excellent opportunity to fully clarify Garland's proper

application when a trial court orders only nominal relief.

This case presents essentially the same issue accepted for

review in the Hobbey decision; i.e., whether a plaintiff's

success in litigation which results in only a minimal

remedy justifies an award of an attorneys’ fee. In Hobbey

the sole relief obtained was a monetary judgment for

nominal damages; here, the sole relief obtained was a

a

nominal injunction. The judicial character of the relief

should not alter the critical determination of whether any

minimal judicial relief constitutes a technical or de

minimis victory under Garland. Thus, this case should be

reviewed along with Hobbey.

Here the Trial Court correctly determined that its

nominal injunction failed to qualify Ruffin for an

attorneys’ fee award. The Eleventh Circuit's mechanical

reasoning for reversing the lower court represents a

misguided approach which should not remain unresolved

by this Court. The Eleventh Circuit's erroneous analysis

in this case, not present in Hobbey, Strongly supports a

need to fully clarify this Court's Garland criteria so that

lower courts can properly resolve attorneys’ fee disputes

when only nominal injunctive relief is awarded.

ho

WN

0 ee

CONCLUSION

The decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Ruffin

represents an erroneous and distorted application of

Garland which should be reviewed and reversed by this

Court.

Respectfully submitted,

By: . .

ames B. Spears, Jr/ ]

AYNSWORTH, BALDWI!

JOHNSON & GREAVES. P.A.

910 W. Trade Street

Suite 1050

Charlotte, NC 28210

(704) 342-2588

November 1992