Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Tucker v. United States

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Pe aNOD. RVING WAT BAS ANWR AR RAY eae ail ethan Sh beg DMMGLING AALS

FILED

I< -64 JUL 9 1992

THE CLERA

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

LARRY A. TUCKER,

Pe titioner,

¥.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

HAMILTON P. Fox, III

(Counsel of Record)

WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL

THOMAS M. DUGARD

SUTHERLAND, ASBILL & BRENNAN

1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 383-0100

Counsel for Petitioner

PRESS OF BYRON S. ADAMS, WASHINGTON, D.C. (202) 347-8203

ne - wu Neen aad a tea eS, eh ee hE CTA LT ee

So eM ha A RS thay 229 a sins le thea eral

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether a potential use of hearsay that was speci-

fically contemplated and consciously rejected in the design

of the Federal Rules of Evidence may be resurrected and

made admissible by the residual exception of Rule 804(b\X5).

2. Whether the admission at trial of hearsay testimony

of a deceased accomplice given before a grand jury pur-

Suant to an immunity agreement violated the Confronta-

tion Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

3. Whether Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b\(5) author-

izes the admission at trial of hearsay testimony of a de-

ceased accomplice given before a grand jury pursuant to

an immunity agreement.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page

Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974) ...

Barker v. Morris, 761 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).

cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1063 (1986) ..........0.000... 17

Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 185 (1945) .......00000... 10

California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) «2.000.000... 9.27

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) ....... 1]

Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) ........ 20

Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139

aN chalet tins ash sNnch ghey chsivsaduvaxssracaa 9-10,12,27-28

Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899) ........... 1]

Lee v. fenorws, 476 U.S. 530 (1986) .......c..ccccccccccccs Lhee

Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 287 (1895) ....... 12

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ............... 15

Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980) ....2......0.00.000e. 12

Pennsylvania vu. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) ......... 1]

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) .............00.... 10-12

Radzanower U. Touche, Ross & Co., 426 Ope 148

i 1d

Tolbert v. Jago, 607 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1979) ....... 24

United States v. Bailey, 581 F.2d 341 (3d Cir.

1978) ....... MN IAU Ate Na Uaa bh eas oun cahahaauatikainasTadats venice 10,18

United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir.

1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977) ........ 23

United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) ........ 26

United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944 (7th Cir.

see Soa Da EIT So Go ge A 10,19-20,28

United States v. Donlon, 909 F.2d 650 (1st Cir.

saa TEE Reif ep pl Or 10,19,23

[ Ai

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

ited States v. Ellis, 951 F.2d 580 (4th Cir 1992),

cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3873 (U.S. June 30.

By GENO, DUT GGRY cass cccceescanacceecescoce.e-,...-....... BB Wy |

ited States Feldman, 761 F.2d 380 (7th Ci

SR ena a ene na OS te Ree STE 17-18

ited States v. Fernandez. 892 F.2d 976 (llth Ci

1989). CeTT dism ssed g ih nom Re Carey

United States, 495 U.S. 944 (1990) ........ 20.22. 24 95

ted State s Furst. RRG F Id 558 (3d Cir 1989).

cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1062 (1990) ................. 14

ited States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.).

cert. denied. 439 U.S. BIO CLBTB) covccccaccccceceass 23

ited States a (some 2-Lemos. 939 F.2d 326 (6th

Rd SPE 6th pecocade ctieeees ea nese 18-19 23-24

ited States v. Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir.

Lg | SRR SRRR IRENE ORE er art eee ane ny ar ne ee TEE 24-25

ited States Hitsman, 604 F.2d 448 (5th Cir

EE ican ck ec ne ee roe: Pe 14-15

ited States v. Lang, 904 F.2d 618 (11th Cir.).

cert. denied. 111 S. Ct. 305 ‘$) Seger 20,22,29

ited States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 pyr + Gee As)

United States v. McCall. 740 F.2d 301 (4th Cir

Co) eu RAE TOC EMM stn Anas MANNA eA 23

ited States v. Mitchell, 777 F.2d 248 (5th Cir.

1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1184 (1986) ...... 25

United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir.

MEE Haken inisncaasehnecllwecceses teen ae 23

ited States v. Owens. 484 U.S. 904 (1988)

ited States v. Salerno, 60 U.S.L.W. 4650 (U.S.

June 19, 1992) (No. 91-872) ...ccccccccccceee oo.

United States v. Snyder, 872 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.

Table of Authorities Continued

Page

United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.

PNG) cacowisd nee eee 18

United States v. Thomas. 919 F.2d 495 (Sth Cir.

1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2837 (1991) .... 5

United States v. Vernor, 902 F.2d 1182 (Sth Cir.).

cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 301 (1990) ................. 19

United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499 (D.N.J.

1987), aff'd without pub. op., 807 F.2d 1467

ee OS esheets ee 15,25

United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir.

SOE antler 17.23.28

United States v. Williams. 112 S. Ct. 1735

GEE “dn siktuncacaccersnisamrmtene eee a ee 26

United States v. Workman, 860 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1078 (1989) ....... 17

United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.). cert.

denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990) .........c.ccccc cee 10,19,29

Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 841 (1981) ............. )

White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992) ................ 8 29

Statutes:

RS USB TBS CED vane cones coeseevveecne

is Use. 8 368) (19RR 2 ounce 4

1B Uo. © Bs CIOS we eee 4

Hobbs Act.

18 U.S.C. § 1951(D M2) (1988) .......ccccococccoccceess. 23

SO UAL. B TMT) CG ovo vcacdvccacacdccetcece l

Constitutions and Rules:

U.S. Const. amend. VI ................. anesnieedigiae canes passim

POG. M.S We kite eee )

POG. Fi: SVG: Bee us ee ee ee 10

Table of Authorities Continued

{ { y mr

] SU 4 10,\ ( O-¢ é

m() 4 ]

{ }

] Lil iT] |

4 | , ”

] StI )

Table of Authorities Continued

Stacey J. Moritz and Marcy R. Harris, Cross-er-

amining the Accomplice | Witne SS, 14 | It]

Lo OR Se See SOReE tls es 18,2]

Note. Accomplice Testimony Under ¢ ‘ontinage nt Plea

Agreements. 12 Cornel] L. Rev. 800 (Mav

1987) | 18

William L.. Osterhouat. Re presenting a Grand Jury

Witness, 16 Litig. No. 2, at 6 (Jan. 1990) .. 18,21-22

Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution. 9 Litig. No.

©, Mt 1S CUP UCOT FIGS). coivsiccivcceacnceedckscvnccckeccen 24

Thomas P. Sullivan and Robert D. Nachman. /f /t

Ain't Broke, Don’t Fir It Why The Grand Ju-

ry s Accusatory Funeti y Should Not Re

Changed, 75 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1047

CVV SCOR LEY oicvcssccsecacavdccusxassceuceacccasces Nee A 24

Glen Weissenberger, The Admissibility of Grand

Jury Transcripts: Avoiding the Constitutional

Issue, 59 Tul. L. Rev. 335 (1984) ................... 16

) John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Commo?

A aN 9OcrYy 19 ¢ 1, 7 % 4 4 ]

Law §§ 13862, 1367 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) 9,10

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

i Lvl, IIL

Pe fitioner,

Tr) )

hesponde net.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

’ ay , , : “ + “ ‘, -, + . + . ‘ ‘ aie - > are Vuyrna wy

Larry A. Tucker hereby petitions for a writ of certiorari

+ “ a | r + 71? + © ; , , +} " © +

to review the judgment and opinion of the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals (App. infra. la-6a)

is not repe rted.

JURISDICTION

}

The judgment of the Court of Appeals as to which re-

view is sought was entered on March 11, 1992. On May

22, 1992, the Chief Justice granted an extension of time

to and including July 9, 1992, within which to file a petition

for a writ of certiorari. The jurisdiction of this Court is

invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1988).

CONSTITI

TIONAL PROVISION AND FEDERAL

OF EVIDENCE INVOLVED

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statemen I { agence

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STATEMENT

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Petitio l¢ IS a Danke ana forme? ves roi!

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t information charging a violation of the Hobbs Act.

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Lidl ACT Allies Ut WVOEUIAL MAECTIL al it LuILUlt | (

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iical Re v < Lut (4 ae oe 2 ©, ood ys } I if {

+ > + + y tor . 1 hy rant Litt sand

SILK DeETIT nterviewed Dy Agen Atlie ana

ant | y tan N+ + \ tt yy 1 OY ‘Sat, ’ mat

ant Miveag Otates Attorney) approximate

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CCaS mS i{ S LTT) - +05} rie O° 11eaqa pewrore ‘

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a +}, . -_ re +} ~~ SC na toctin .

A blige Lit ( Ul ot t iif ¥ it i | Coscuilll \

» ——— , } 1 ot} ~ i han FAP RIVAN Nnaimente

One WaS aSKed € € \¢ laa ecelVead PDaVIne

Y)\ Cc reo y Dani 1) an Troyvry y In@gm i? \rY rr T

aliy \ Al - Mai LiL UIidal | bila Liige Aili iid SLO

: ~ nant matlaatan ~ be ae r ~—e \

were not retiected on his come tax return. (U.A

220.AR I , RKPonliiod +} + vy _ ye ~piVoaN fron 7117?

ODI-45) Ie epiiead (nal ali Money rece ea [rom nurs

hnamo intor . ’ rotlortoan ry h } POt1IYN f lor

Ome interestS Was reltie ea On NIs return ederal

Tc ‘ ve) y TT \r) y yr IIT rTHoa Wrepa | QA Y?T y

LS alSO aSKea petitioner about tl source anda anne}

. . . : tT _

nA can + rena lOrtarir hiycinecec Yoh LE earn e .

MilUusS anoctu \ ic Way Celcalill WUSLIICS Ut LS IP ilia@lly

+ ,+? ve. y rT Tt) y al , r Tr a nar ‘ares yr } y

Littl aSACQ PeLLLONer whnetnel NiaQd eCnvaved I

mnre r Tinanc francact nec +c } eo1siator ther

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Lit ALLO A MAMA EI he) iit LLVUUUS & LU 4 Giz<t

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it e"} ‘ s tA s ' “= * a »Ab > —

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t e alte e plea he Hot A nargé

Yr ry ani nomar ,? rt ? y ’ , rt ?} ts tr try yr *

if VOYvaAa a VESLILPA ‘ it LaA Call lit

rranrr franca ne y ta, »} y tit y yr had nart rat }

LLalill Lali a I . Wt Lit aut Val LICIPaleUu

NIIP CINnNG | =~ + T, Nnortin? trate b +} >

AL SILLY if COcS Alii UCULITICULIOT Wil LI1¢

“tf y ?} , YY) YY ry? ry\t 1y va! ? Tiry rt -,y vy

ation, tne vernmen Otained testimony [ro UU

+h . y .. + +} y .. " - h ry . ~\) + y

iS Une Writ Ir Une Irsing nome con ul

nNTriy nr H ‘ Tt} yr y ’ mart ynNant y +

Continentai Heaith Care and a participant in a se

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ansaCvllions tna vere a [focus Ol]

toctit ) | -_ rrang — eo y

CocLILIC A Wt Tt a ei cai 4 “i \ P|

Sea ie) S t Lt Cu \ all

— S| tho | niton t+ nto ttarnoar

sS 1¢ nitea States Attorne\

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, verse p , « , aDpendix h¢ , ed

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y y ) +} ry , tryry 1 y ly ‘ ¢

U Ap! Le, Loe e grand ry returned a na

ry r+ } y , tix — 4 . \ bay +} ly + Yr? Re

\ al S 4 VV ‘ ULlILS 4 V if i 4 C Lice al LC

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f le Code ne ¢ lY making a Tfaise Statement a

— ax na . w ¢ fs eee \ Apr 7 \

tla i 'r\ alliu OTIC CUUTIL Ul Wt ury (( fi... AVP 1)

. } + + . y+ . yy 9) eT

Superseding Indictment was returned on June 21, 1990

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WE Cnargead wne Same [our COUNTS aS the earier 1Inal¢

. .

4 +1 . + 4 + : .

ment, aS well aS two counts of obstruction of justice. Or

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lexi ()¢ tho " +wint . Yet crrant + not) y y YY + ,

JUIV 2/4, LyUJYU, tne aiStrict cou granted petitioner §s Oth

T ~mYTY) ) yt. an ANNO ‘\T ry) \ ¢ JQ (ry ) tani NY 1 lic

f COmpel perlormance r niS plea agreement and Qi

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missed the two tax counts. (C.A. App. 85) A second

\w y Sas Vabbales ] ’ TY Sari y y T Tino , } Y)) | \

supersedaing naictmeé € tating tne wusmissea tax

— ~~ TT + " . — } . \

unts was returned Dy another grand jury on October I(

} Qi ma TN?) | Y yr) tf + Tat, ldat wor t} Tirct

LYYU, and tnis ldictment Was consolidated witn tne firs

- ’ Indict t me ] ) t!

rI)VY rc ) mmoer vY) ie YY) Tr) pa Y\Y oT & ) . y¢ ly

OUVETSCQUIIY PhUIULITIC Til. (( Y. 2 AY W). 1) ( nce avalyn, LLit

Loft riapt > he ans +) YY) ) “Onl ala’ x1 té« , ’ rmnre +h .«

qgistrict Court aismissead tne two tax counts on tne Same

) .

ry; mena +} y - 4WCrY, A \ QQ | >

proundas as tne earlier dismissal. (C.A. Ppp SI-9zZ) ¢

YY tter then Nroceed Wdoto ao nr trial \a December j 1]QQ()

matter tnen proceeded to a jury UPriai On ecembder 4, Llu.

TT} + +} £ + | \ ]

. 3270 urT|ACc ONYS . 1 sseith 11, mNniante: 1 \ aking a

i K€ ury Was presented WI1tN Tour Counts: (1) Making a

kK YY sabi *, swore (3r 1 ] yey ~ 7) iat) y ;

raise Statement tO a Fredera mana rv, In V1l0latlo

| } ) 1 ¢ ‘) +» -) + Y

id [ >. Y L025 (LYS): { } Obstri ClLIOI Ul JUSLICE I

| y ,* 2) * y 9"

+ 7 ‘ 4 ( ’ } 37727" y at y

a } VU Ld ( 4 ~ Lou ) (1933) (oO) eriu \ il ViIOla

; 1701 7

+ x ) ( : y | 4 + ye) + + ] +

Ze [ s.4 RY L021 (LUS3): al 1 (+4) Ups ruc O! Wi AS

’ ied

Y ‘ ft y . ~~ | ~ | | (2 (19s)

¥ GALI A s » < Ae

ly th ryt “ry ( N] } } ‘. | end ( )y I) y ~ TaQs)

2% ’ .

Tr ro)\ ry) ry Sane Tv) iy \ } > ft ry 1 ly Tyr

une gpovernment lead a .NowvIcCe OF intent to il Mauce WN

‘NOIS ora ne mr stIMOy? wre) \ ked B i i

Lill . siai | ui ¥y € ALiiMVLLY pursuant u\ icu \. 4vitu

804(bK5). (C.A. App. 31) On July 6, counsel for petitioner

+, ’ 9 +, 1h , ,% “2 ahate a ay ,r\1* + ’ “oa +

filed a Motion in Limine seeking to prohibit the use of

tah i ae Eh ot t + —+5 . ~ uP ac ~iNncte . . . ot

Nichols prandg jury testimony as substantive evidence a

tri] " Q ‘ nixr PQ hear) . “11

trial. (C.A. App. 81-83) At a July 23 hearing on pretria!

motions, the court deferred ruing on the government's

request to use Nichols’ grand jury testimony. (C.A. App

85) On November 26, the first day of trial, the court rule

that Nichols’ grand jury testimony was presumptively ad-

missible subject to a showing by the government that the

- . : a ~ ] . . 5 : » - , . | ++

contents were more probative on the point for which it

was offered than any other evidence that the government

could reasonably produce. (C.A. App. 89) No evidentiar

hearing was held to establish independently that Nichols

grand jury testimony was reliable. The court made 1

ruling regarding the reliability of the grand jury testimor

(C.A. App. 89, 107-12)

over the objection of defense counsel. The government

made no showing of reliability (C.A. App. 138-39, 148-55)

and the court noted only that testimony ‘before the grand

jury has a degree of trustworthiness and reliability

because it was under oath and being examined by a grar

jury” (CA. App. 1D0).

The admitted testimony contradicted petitioner’s defens«

in connection with a transaction involving petitioner, Ni

chols, Continental Health Care, and a company called

Fricks, Inc. Continental

real estate broker, to assist it in locating property sites

for a nursing home that Continental intended to construct.

(C.A. App. 71, 261-63) Petitioner had also become an em

ployee of Fricks, through which he intended to render

services to Continental and receive compensation as a

method for sheltering his income. (C.A. App. 282-85) In

December of 1983, Nichols delivered to petitioner a check

drawn on Continental’s account in the amount of $75,000,

— both sepeage-d and Continental Srasseded as a loan.

>.A. App. ) In February or March of 1984, Continental

hired witiiiccaiee as a consultant. (C.A. App. 261-63) On

April 12, 1984, petitioner delivered to Nichols a personal

check payable to Continental in the amount of pha as

repayment of the loan. (C.A. App. 320) On that day, he

also presented Nichols with an invoice from Fricks in the

amount of $100,000 for services rendered by petitioner,

and Continental paid $75,000 in partial payment thereof

(C.A. App. 321) Petitioner testified that he believed in

good faith that this arrangement was in compliance with

the tax laws and testified before the grand jury that all

had hired petitioner, a licensed

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. . ¢ - cin = OVa tt ~ Nh te TH bf - © =

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7 “ats ~_ “ pt . re ~ ~ ~ a + _ i f ad 5 ~ - ‘ ~ _ mde

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the time of the grand jury proceedings, and Ni

chols was afforded the opportunity to confer with

his attorney at any point during his testimony,

y J

Nichols, no doubt, understood from the nature of

tne grand proceedings that the informatior

contained in his testimony would be the subject

of further investigation. The United States

Attorney could have revoked Nichols’ grant of

Immunity were it discovered that Nichols testified

falsely. Because Nichols’ statements before the

grand jury were under oath, false testimony could

have subjected Nichols to prosecution under 1&

U.S.C. 8 1623

App. da

‘ation for an extension of time within which t

yn for a writ of certiorari was timely filed (se

Application No. A-886), and on May 22, 1992, the Chief

Justice signed an order extending the time to and including

Q 7 Q¢

July

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

‘hh } ,Aiirert An caopant|!\ von vevat aa +h . ° ont ++ *t

This Court has recentiy reyecred tne government S error

‘ + , +» +-\+* ( beyd} Array , , . Qc - “tpi pt

ead tne Controntation ULlause narrowly So as to restrict

, - , " " ,¢ . , > © Y «CC " \ 4 ace ~“*. ' »%

its role In controlling the admission of nearsay testimony,

The fundamental rght protected by the Confrontation

Clause, under even the most restrictive interpretation ot

the Sixth Amendment, is to prohibit the admission of a

hearsay statement “‘where the statement sought to be ad

mitted was in the character of an er parte affidavit, i.

where tne circumstances surrounaing tne out-ot-court

Statement s utterance suggest that the statement has bee!

made tor the principal purpose of accusing or incriminating

the defendant.” White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 740-41

7TQQ") That Oy - > ta] “+ ni + } ¢ . } + “ t . 1) ] ry

fivvas nat Tundamental rignt Nas Deen grotesquely) V10-

+ | 1, F > oY ‘or ’ + . . IT > Tt ad ‘ .

ated DV the government S prosecution of petitioner based

so + , , > > fT . Q “te > . tf . ‘ ‘ , :

n the admission of hearsay statements of a dead witness

In contrast to the Jurisprudence of the bulk of the other

in the Fourth Circuit a person can be convicted

on the basis of testimony given by an immunized co-con-

spirator, under the guidance -f the prosecutor, before a

grand jury, with no opportunity for the defendant to cross

jury to make a cred-

by the Fourth Cir

cult to be badges of reliability—a grant of immunity and

testimony before a grand jury under oath—have not been

viewed as indicators of credibility by other circuits. Other

circuits have more properly viewed the grant of immunity

and the grand jury setting as undermining credibility, and

have found the presence of an oath irrelevant to the de-

termination of credibility. A witness who seeks immunity

has a motive to fabricate in order to curry favor with the

prosecutor. The grand jury is an accusatory body con-

trolled by the petitioner’s adversary, the prosecutor, who

has no interest or obligation to expose weaknesses in his

her case. Basically, the Fourth Circuit takes the position

)

examine his accuser or for the petit }

inility assessment. The factors deemed

tinat n

+ + . « >

tnat not only ado dead men

tell no lies, but that dead men

told no hes while tney were alive, provided that they were

immunized grand jury witnesses.

circuits. It con S with the principles enunciated recently,

by this Court in United States v. Salerno, 60 U.S.L.W.

4650 (U.S. June 19, 1992) (No. 91-872). And it conflicts

. . : . : : fs . . ‘)

woth th Yr) ¢ tal STE aval io + tho : +} tat, | 1? ’

W1tn tne lundamenta! principles OT tne ( ONTrontvavlon ( ldUst

‘ “‘nrete hy thj urt. If the ntrontat laijce

as interpre ted Vy tnis ( Ourt L LULit ( ONnTrontvaticn ( laut

, .

‘ ‘ ‘ sir? } - ? | - y * ? oT yy ] mH] ? an) tr « y .

means anytning, Il MuUSt Mean CTNat Crucial testimony Can

+ } nttoar thrnricr +} APC. tanto + t YT

no be otTereda tnroug! ne nearsay StatementS OI dead

: . : . . . .

‘ , > . ‘ +? > ‘ . ‘ + “ ‘

Witnesses wnom tne dagefendagant never nad the opportunity

+ . fy + » +) , . a

LO CONIrONt nor ne jury to see

1. The admission int EF Naeem en eee —

A Lit admission 1LiL’ CViIUe}ice eB | MULT"ULITCUUI SLALO

tf + , ] | . ha “+* + y ? >

ne , } AVa1IA ) ne , 9 ) )

mentsS OI an unavalilabie witness deprives a defendan

: ig 2p 1 os over .

t CT + TITS warn Tt; ‘ ‘mort ary Troitr { ae r

tne most errTe; LIV ¢ Way LO aSCertain Lructn. Wy UTALMNS

. , [LO ™ .

‘ ( S04 9 4¢ 7 ¢ 7 .

Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 349 (1981); see also 5 John H.

Wigmore, BE “dence in Trials it Common La i § 1367 at

32 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) (“‘[Cross examination] is beyond

any douot the greatest legal engine ever invented for the

discovery of truth.’’). In the present case, petitioner w:

deprived of his right to cross-examine a crucial witness

aihdil

}

against him. Un-cross-examined statements are usually

admissible under the Federal

bition against hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 802.

The hearsay rules are ‘‘generally designed t

similar values’ as the Confrontation Clause—that is. a

—

defendant’s right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Cal

fornia v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1970). The primary

justification for the general statutory rule prohibiting hear-

say is the danger resulting from the litigant’s lack of op-

portunity to test the trustworthiness and accuracy of

statements of an absent declarant by cross-examination.

Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974). Un-

derlying the prohibition of hearsay is the theory that ‘‘the

many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness

which may lie underneath the bare untested assertion of

197 U.S. 805, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990) (quoting Wig

more, supra § 1420, at 251); Wigmore. supra § 1362. at

oO (Nearsay rule is ‘‘a rule rejecting assertions. offered tes

timonially which nave not Deen In Some Wavy subiected to

the test of cross-examination’’); see also Bridges v. Wiro

26 U.S. 185 7¢ (1945) (‘the theory o the Hearsay rule

S tnat in extrajyudica Statement Ss re ected because

was made ut of Court | in absent person not subier

{ Cross-examinat !

Hearsay is admissible on] rcumstances whe the

testimony meets stringent tests of trustworthiness. Ex

ceptions to tne hearsa\ rules are provided for hearsa\ tna

is of such a “‘specified quality’’ that its admission is pref

erable to complete OSS oft the Witness evidence See Ked

R. Evid. 804 advisory committee's note. These special] cat

egories of hearsay are enumerated in Rules 803 and 804

The “‘eatch-all”” or “residual’’ hearsay exception found ir

Rule 804(bX5) allows the admission of hearsa\ only if it

constitutes “‘a statemen {that 1S} not specifically covered

Oy any of the [other] exceptions but ha[s] comparable cir

cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.’ See lU'y/ted

States Donlon. 909 F 2d 650, 654 (1st Cir 1990): United

otal

494

944, 954 (7th

341. 346 (3d

Ss (l)

US.

to potn elvi

(

1082

IIT

ULL

’

qaoes

Pid)

895

(1990):

}

also governed by the

Amendment.

> \tr

COnrTro

—

)

7S x ae .

( iause

M1LAllOl

_—" ¢ , a

urt statemen

+t }] ,Qt

IOHMOW Nat

e Federal Ru

‘onfrontation

} t }

i A

les of Evidence appl)

1d criminal cases, only criminal cases are

Clause <

]

fundament

adml

SSifr

Sol

}

tne

ss)

x A

nearsay\

xth

* } } 9

sential to a fair tnal in a eriminal prosecution Pointer

Te Las, ‘2 () Spo 400. 404 (1965): Nt ¢ alsa Kirby Be Tinited

States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56 (1899) (mght of confrontation is

‘one of the fundamental guarantees of life and tiberty

and ‘‘a right long deemed so essential for the due pro

tection of hfe and liberty that it is guarded against leg

slative and judicial action by provisions in the Constitution

of the United States and in the Constitutions of most, if

not of all, the States composing the Union’’). This Court

has observed that ‘“(tlhere are few subjects, pernaps, upor!

which this Court and other courts have been more near

mInanim . t+h- 1 thea sv : : f holhiof that tha

unanimous than in the expressions of belief that the

}

rieorn?t

of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and

fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial whict

Is this countrys constitutional goal.” Lee Illinois, 476

1 | S 530. 540 (1986) (q li ting Pow tor T TUS 380) | S

100. 405 (1965))

The Confrontation Clause contains a specific righ

a o . P . ) ) oh

cross-examination. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie. 480

39, 51 (1987) (“The Confrontation Clause provides

types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right

physically to face those who testify against him, and the

right to conduct cross-examination.”’); United States v. Ow-

ens, 484 U.S. 554, 557 (1988) (“‘[Right to confrontation

has long been read as securing an adequate opportunity

to cross-examine adverse witnesses.’’); Pointer wv. Teras.

380 U.S. 400, 406-07 (1965) (‘‘a major reason underlying

)

the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant

charged with crime an opportunity to cross-examine the

witnesses against

es ]

}

is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure.

implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation.

helps assure the ‘accuracy of the truth-determining

]

um’’). This right of cross-examination

It is

L ae

proc-

ess.’ It is, indeed, ‘an essential and fundamental require-

ment for the kind of fair trial which is this country’s

constitutional goal.’’’ Chambers v. Mississippi, 410

284, 295 (1978) (citations omitted).

U.S.

‘While a literal interpretation of the Confrontatior

Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statement

when the declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejecte

that view as ‘unintended and too extreme.’ Idaho

Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3145 (1990) (quoting Bourjaily

United States 483 U:S. 171i, 182 (1987)); see also Pointer

Teras, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (reve rsing state court

decision to ad:nit un-cross-examined preliminary hearing

testimony of unavailable witness); Mattor v. United Stat

156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (affirming admission at trial of

testimony of two deceased witnesses given at prior trial).

Ohio 1 Robe rvs 14% U S 56, 65-66 (1980) Sets forth a

“general approach” for determining in criminal cases

whether hearsay admissible under the Federal Rules of

Evidence also meets the requirements of the Confrontation

Ciause. An absent declarant’s statement is admissible

only if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability

Reliability can be inferred without more in a case

where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted

nearsa\ exception In other Case the e\ idenc

must be excluded, at least absent a showing of

particularized guarantees of trustworthin«

148 U.S. at 66 (citations omitted): accord Idaho Wright

110 S. Ct. at 3146. An absent declarant’s Statement that

does not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception

“presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confron

tation Clause purposes."’ Jd. at 3148 (quoting Le |

nois, 476 U.S. 5380, 543 (1986)).

It is particularly ironic that, in this case, the government

vouches for Nichols’ credibility pecause his testimony was

~ + a« ,yetr Ircrlie t ‘ ( ae \+ +

given before the grand jury and pursuant to a grant ol

if } >a) = + — , - ‘ \ ‘

Wright held that Rule & 4(bX5) is not a firmly r ted hearsay e)

ception, and therefore, any hearsay admitted under that rule must bear

“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” to pass constitutiona

+ . | ‘ Ys 4 ") wd \" . e : )

muster.’ 110 8. at 3147-48. Nichols’ testimony was admitted unde:

Rule 804(b\5)

Immunity. The very testimony of petitioner that gave rise

to his false statement conviction was likewise given before

the grand jury and pursuant to a plea agreement. Although

the government contends petitioner’s testimony was false.

by the standards it defends, this same testimony would be

admissible hearsay in another case if petitioner had been

unavailable.‘ Indeed, if petitioner had predeceased Nichols,

petiticner’s grand jury testimony, which provided the basis

for his false statement conviction, would have beer

nissible hearsay, presumptively reliable as a matter of law.

as proof that Nichols had committed perjury.

2. The Fourth Circuit’s holding in the instant case is

Inconsistent with the logic of this Court’s recent decision

in United States v. Salerno. 60 U.S.L7W. 4650 (U.S. June

19, 1992) (No. 91-87

of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b\(1), which provides for

the admission of prior testimony of an unavailable witness

only if the party against whom the testimony is offered

at trial had an opportunity and motive to develop the

testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination. In Sa/

2). Salerno involved the construction

erno, two immunized witnesses testified before a grand

jury and exculpated the defendants. At trial the witnesses

were deemed unavailable because of their assertion of the

privilege against self-incrimination. The defense sought to

offer their grand jury testimony. Although the government

had been afforded the opportunity to examine the wit-

nesses before the grand jury, the Court ruled that the

testimony could not be admitted under Rule 804(b\(1) un-

less the defense first proved that the prosecution had a

similar motive before the grand jury as it had at trial. 60

U.S.L.W. at 4651-52. The Court remanded for consider-

ation of the question of motive.

‘The Fourth Circuit’s rationale for ruling that Nichols’ hearsay state-

ment was admissible is quoted supra page 7. Everything the court said

about Nichols’ testimony is equally applicable to petitioner's grand jury

testimony. Indeed, if one were to substitute petitioner's name for Nj

cnols name in the quotation, the statemerit would be equally Valld

strictly, this Court recognized that Congress had generall:

prohibited the admission of hearsay and had ‘‘made a care

ful judgment as to what hearsay may come into evidence

and what may not. To respect 1tS determination, we n

YIICF

mt YAO th 11" ee | tT} if y ve! Thi s IPT mY)? ¢

eniorece Lit words Lilia L \ CllaC ved, 1s OUT | CalllloO

) ) ,°

alt 17 mNntiarr 17110 , , " 1¢ ee . orht

aiter evidaentlar rules merely bDecause litigants mignt prs

fer 1iff rent Y’1} ) 1?’ ¢ T an ae 291 y P| ) ‘ Id f

€ CIiLié Clit Uslces i a Wal licCuld LIAGSS U Cancts d A

407-4

4HD 1]

r > bs +’ }} ? ? sé ] + £ + |

[This Court’s adherence to ne literal terms oO! tne nea

4 , RO . . — awl 7 + ye + + +} , “\Q t +

say exceptions 1S 1n Stark contrast to the approach of th

. 4 4 4

Fourth Circuit. Ordinarily, the admission of prior tes

. *) 1} . } a } Re

mony of unavailable witnesses, such as Nichols, would have

, , 1 hy 14] } ' “t< + ‘ } .

been governed by Rule 804(b)\(1). In the instant case, how

ever, the government could not have offered Nichols’ tes

timony under that rule, for petitioner had had n

Opportunity to examine Nichols.° Instead, disregarding

Congress’ ‘‘careful judgment”’ as to the elements necessar'

for the admission of prior testimony, the Fourth Circuit’

use of the catchall provision of Rule 804(b\5) circumvent

tule S04(b)(1).

[he Fourth Circuit's approach finds both support and

rejection in the law of other circuit Compare Unite

States v. Furst, 886 F.2d 558, 573 (3d Cir. 1989) (th

residual exception ‘‘is not limited in availability as to type

of evidence not addressed in the other exceptior

also available when the proponent fails to meet the stand

ards set forth in the other exceptions.”’), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 1062 (1990), and United States v. Hitsman. 604 F.2d

443, 447 (5th Cir. 1979) (document which could not be

} }

properly admitted under business record exception because

Moreover, had it been petitioner, and not the government. who had

sought to offer Nichols’ grand jury testimony, it is not even clear that

It would be admissible nder Salerno, the district court would have

to have found that the prosecution’s motive in questioning Nic}

before the grand jury was similar to its motive at tria

of unavailability of custodian of records was nonetheless

properly admitted under residual exception), with United

States v. Thomas, 919 F.2d 495, 498 (8th Cir. 1990) (Rul

804(b\5) ‘does not come into play unless the proferred

statement is ‘not specifically covered by any of the fore

going exceptions.’ ’’), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2837 (1991)

All of these decisions predated Salerno, however; a con-

sistent treatment of hearsay testimony requires strict ad

herence to Rule 804(b\ 1)

As a matter of interpretation, a residual rule should not

be construed in a manner that swallows the elements of

a more precise rule. As this Court wrote in Morto

Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51 (1974), ‘‘[w]Jhere there is

no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be

controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the

priority of enactment.” Cr. Radzanower v. Touche, Ross &

Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976) (“It is a basic principle of

statutory construction that a statute dealing with a nar

" - 1 1 |

row, precise and specific subject Is not submerged by

later enacted statute covering a more generalized pec

trum.)

[hose courts that would admit grand jury testimony

under Rule 804(b)(5) not — subvert the purpose of Rul

804(b\1), but te by C

In Rule 805(b\5)'s emp hand

also usurp judgment made

amir ie circumstantial guarantees of trustwor

thiness. As one commentator asks: ‘if another section

of rule 804(b) expressly states that the requisite guar-

antee of trustworthiness for former testimony is tl

opportunity for cross-examination, how can prior tes-

timony not so tested ever be cole as sufficiently

trustworthy?” Burstein, Admission of an Unavailabl

Witness’ Grand Jury Testimony: Can It Be Justified ?,

4 Cardozo L. Rev. 263, 269 (1983).

United States v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499, 1505 n.7 (D.N.J

1987). aff'd uithout pub. Op., R57 F.8d 1467 (3d Cir. 1YSS8).

ee ee -———— A Se — —

}

) “ y

L iit | U

testifying

Yall Ss mm

Nfates

1am iSsion

. ? vy

Laust a

esrath r)

Wilil DiCad

| )

y ) «

Jvune sv,

F >] 172]

rane © | s s i |

rrann 1}

4 Gai A Al

, TerestT iy

y > NwN

wart Lilli

“OY +

reports }

‘ 740

L4U, 1406

Was

) é |

Th >

+} . rl ‘ ‘ . -

‘ L1reu nas nsister Vy neiad Nat a W 1eSS

y ,» » + + - + + YY) YY y Tt. Yr ) Yr) > ? ee a

WUlSUd a or} i Ui i wy” ‘ a Wicd Va

. ,?

PO ‘ Thor y + + ae + 1+ tyr hye 4 J

re Inst \ \ al Plt LU Lesull\ Li ULIILUIIY Oe€ { ¢

he if > | 2 Pie =< } — “2 1+} Yi» a tf; “ry no

Ellis, 95] 2d 3580, 583 (4th Cir.) (affirming

.+ > .¢ “C91 tatomant + va ‘ va. , y ,

OI nearsa\ tatementS OF aeceasedad W eSS Dé

7 Tr? yy TT? y y TaTreary nT ry ; 1Y > reoya?r

ny ne! I) ys SLALETTIE LS laGe acCCOTraad ICt

“ys + ; J ‘ Le Os 2) - c) T

agreement) €? fenied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3873 (U.S

7 ) y QO? 7 2) as 1” P mm 4

719° 4+} ‘ . 1O"? a tt5 yy —" ae , tT

Lidsd (4Ul ( I 191d) (altirming aam isSsion Ol

. + + . 4 1D } ++ } 91} ae |

y testimony Or aqeceasead witness vecause S

ramnce rQ\ . + >t 1a fro yrth ‘a ; ric nmNont

1 Palning favors avoid Turtner imprisonment

»\ Yr ’ ry T 1" ) } ) Treary \ PIIrTATA } ry)

every incentive O De extremely accurate 1n Nis

Set Lis Unite otates Workma? 860 F.2d

4+} . \ + } + + + +

{ ) ad y ) ad > > ‘ YY) Y) )

$6 (4th ¢ LYSS) (tape-recorded statement ol

ge LOTS (1989)

mr) \ . 2° .

ino mrTrh IPI he ala N11

. £he swNINtN LUlTCult NaS aiSo Salk

mmunity makes hearsay more reliable. Barke

, 761 F.2d 13896, 1401 (9th Cir. 1985) (fact that

sel at preliminary he reminded witness that his

of immunity did not cover perjury added to reliability

+ . itr rn,r nmmmnarr } QYr??Y 1 rToactiry rt . abrala wre ‘

I witness preliminary nearing testimony, whnicn was aad

ry +f ’ +f try Tor no * 1trY hon 1; 1 : ha ¥ ¥

nittead at trial arte le@ WiltnesSS Nad aled), cert. denied,

a" A . 7 ~~ 1Q RA+h +} x, >t} } N +}, % oa

, LO mY ann iY } re}

tit | ». LU0DS ee So) Bi Ll LLit OUTIL alld ‘ biivil ( if VLUl

PIC) Selene: Tt Tinat Th Tale nat , ICY tT fT Te YY

geciSlons Suggest that tnose courts vdelleve tnat since !

YY mort ANT Y ) qr TY) YT} y° y1}1¥° Tr? > wT, . eT

UNnILY ana plea agpreeme s require tne witness to testiIr\

ter rthFt ] y a Y) MIWINGE tT TImMonNn Yr Tar ry ) T Y y

ULIILULIY, VEeErSOTIIS YPivilly ico m i\ U statements WU

I I

} bane T “eH ocr ryyNean?r YY) "© | 1 r > Trc#ry \y

suan LO SUuUCNnN agreements more ilKely to De TrUuSTW

+} -, y +O - + ' Sale +} ss} .Y Fh 4 + thy i. a }

( \ LO iCal Ul IUSTTY Cfit VEeTI©@Llit OL LUDell lal Pall

. ~~? . > + , i ¥ + >? ~. wr Kr ) Y ,~*?} ‘

Contrary t ne holdings of the Fourth and Ninth Cir

. .

The he * y* + +} t > y er ++ ‘, Th + Tio ’

CUlLS, SECVETai OL OUNe! IrCult laVe nat tne ex

+ va! + 9 rrant rm rmyrnit Yr 9 « hHarcvrain ‘Sa at .

stence OI a grant OI immunity or a piea Dargain indicates

, y ] } s+. + +} + Tiry mn ssf lh Y) ¥ + ]

sammalseahsis: ~— ; ’ Than 7 — , lan

UlLITClMIaVIIILY Ul LLi¢ LE SULITTIOTLY SiLice iW Li©€ 1] Immunity. piea

‘ Yraoo soOonte y 1? Yr) NIYFKrINNES TOU y: wth th beaut vale"

agreements or even currying favor witn tne law enforce-

mart TT mNaAIC I< bo th Oe TO Tnearea I< >1)} ~T« YTial like r |

ment oOTmielaiS 18S invoiveda, tnere 1S subdStantial IKEINOOa

hat the ctatement ic celf-cervinge ’’ ] nited at , F J

Lllal LII© SLALECINICIIU Is Seili-sel vill} ( eu LLES €tid-

= 4 , Oe. ) 2) ") + . | ~ )

» 1 4 2 bh y 1 ¢ rOITaArCcINnae -« —

na? (Ol F.Z2G4 3O6U, 35d ((TN ( ivdso) (reversing: admis

and jury es NOonY); Crniled states riley, D8] F 2d

»4 I- Yow 1 ¢ ye aC % ‘ ) —— “y * . +-—+

O41, JDU (6d Ul LY (3) (reversing admission of prior State

+ - ) + 4 " , vy ~+ ‘ > 1; ’ +], at 2"

ment to government). These courts have implicitly re

7O +} Qt " P " ) ty - ] 19 ¢ ry > LOnt ‘

Opnizead tna In an immunity or plea agreement, a

ay Valbhi - ’ ‘ata lls se} 177 , , + 4 + , + ,Y

prosecutor essentiall\ UUYS tne witness testimony afte)

~) ‘ Ti9St) ‘ + ) + Qtr « 1O )

a series OI negotiations, and the price tnat a witness is

} + >We + tTOr thy tocty) i 7 on . tho son hater 4

ie *O eXact Tor this testimony depends on the quality of

the “produ tnat ne can deliver nus, the witness has

> - Y y > > +> + | v< ] : y ay } , t

a strong enuive to improve the quality of his product

y y , .% } . ‘) ‘ *)(

DV embe sning nis testimony." See The is, 665 F.2d at oP Ay

+ . . P by -} + rye } WIP toc > ’ Wn ] .

(noting lat grand jury testimony given under a

‘ . + + y y ) a lorh + } " Nragwoa « _ . + se + s]

grant Of immunity mignt encourage a witness to ‘‘embhe!]

'2) - . ¢-] o- , 7

} } ct . ‘ 4 : “\, that

WSn his Story), Bailey, 581 F.2d at 350 (observing tha

" an ae tha . > SL . - + ¢ ; f "07>

since tne Statement was made auring hegyotiations for re

ee '

| + ? Jak ° > 7 iat. ‘Toh , + , . it

GUuUCLION OI Cnarges, it was less reilabdie),. Because tne wit

, Hele t h afte < tie t the "911)e t 1<

ness beheves tnat his fate jis ulead to tne value of his

Tir rt ry? WF nNreara h re she dq > Ya T | »¢

LeStimony mS s€ii-incverest, nis perceiver needa to please

: I

$ + } } ¢ } ; 1}

¥ ) ad . 7 ad ‘ ,) ) > a ,} , TT ‘ i 77 ‘a \) ‘ "

Li11¢ prosec ULOY and iliS NOpe LUI lenien¢ . all undermine

nis credipiity oee Gomez-Lemos. 939 F.2d at 550 (OD

Son y Y nor tr 7 mAIICO th ) trvty “co nan aw "0

serving tnat y VECause tne witnesses had entered

B t

ttirming

Ahi LLL

plea agreements prior to their grand jury testimony ‘‘does

t lessen the likelihood that they would want to curry

favor with the government, avenge themselves, or spread

the blame by implicating [the] defendant’’); Snyder, 872

F.2d at 1356 (observing that ‘‘[t]estimony obtained throug}

currving favor with the law enforcement officials’ ma‘

indeed be self-serving and potentially unreliable’).

Several courts have similarly held that the absence

a grant of immunity or plea agreement makes a hearsa\

statement more reliable. See United States v. Donlon, 909

F.2d 650, 654 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming admission of nor

immunized grand jury testimony and observing that ths

fact that witness did not testify under a grant of immunit

adds to the reliability of the testimony); United States

Vernor, 902 F.2d 1182, 1188 (Sth Cir.) (affirming admission

of accomplice’s statement to authorities and observing

the fact that witness did not enter into plea bargaining

and did not give statements pursuant to a plea a

added to reliability of statements), cert. denied, 1

301 (1990); United States v. Zannino. 895 F.2d 1. 7 (lst

Cir.) (affirming admission of previous trial testimony of

deceased witness and observing that the fact that witness

appeared without the protection of immunity added to r

liability of testimony), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1082 (1990)

United States v. Doerr, 886 F.2d 944, 956 (7th Cir. 1989)

(affirming admission of grand jury testimony and observing

"In the present case, Nichols actually testified before the g

twice, the first time without immunity, and the second time )

to an immunity agreement. The tenor of his testimony noticeal

a 5 .

changed from his first to his second appearance. Notably, his se

testimony contradicts his first testimony in key areas, the second beir

much more favorable to the prosecutor's case. For example, Nich

February 1 explanation of the petitioner-Continental Health Care-Frick

transaction and relationship (C.A. App. 72-75) was markedly different

than his January 9 explanation (C.A. App. 57-64). In his January tes

timony, Nichols testified that Tucker did not work for any of Nichols

entities besides Continental (C.A. App. 56), but in February he direct

contradicted that position (C.A. App. 76)

mony Of unavailable witness), cert. denied, 111 S. (

est) \ | ‘

Q07)5 19390 B eC911Se the witn -c¢ «6UhadA 1Ot heen rrant

OUD (LYYQ) 2eCause tne witness nad not been orante

> 1? 1 +} ) . yt > . ) / that ) { -— . . C

mMmmunity, the court conciuded tnat he had more reas

LO exaggerate the role Ol tne defendant in the Crime al

lay his own. Jd.

tnat [the witness] testified under a grant of immunity

Suggests that his testimony is no more trustworthy tha

ordinary inadmissible grand-jury testimony.” United States

Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976. 983 (11th Cir. 1989) (finding

admission of grand jury testimony was reversible error)

"ert. Aismissed sub non Recars y United States. 495 U.S

944 (1990).

This Court has itself reco snized that an agreement

regard to future prosecution may engender unreliability i

estimony (7lg United States 105 U.S 150 154-52

(1972) (because evidence of any understanding or agree

ment as to future prosecution would be relevant to wit

ness credibility sucn evidence must be disclosed { tne

jury)

Most pattern and model jur instructions provide for

speciai Instruction that cautions jurors to examine immu-

nized testimony “with greater care than the testimony of

an ordinary witness [and to] consider whether the tes-

timony may be colored in such a Way as to further the

witness's own interest, for a witness who realizes that he

may procure his own freedom by incriminating another

Nas a motive to falsify.” 1 Edward J. Devitt and Charles

re}

val

OND « = . 2 >

al 020-24. Only ten months before

; Vit , 11 th. ‘ah, fant

Ircult found that tne fact

Blackmar. Feds ri] day ry Practice and Instructions

§ 17.04, at 529 (8d ed. 1977); see Committee on Pattern

Jury Instructions, District Judges Ass'n of the Sixth Cir-

cult, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Instruction 7.07,

at 152 (1991 ed.) Gury should consider immunized testi-

mony ‘‘with more caution than the testimony of other wit-

notre Committee on Model Jury Instructions, Ninth

Circuit, Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instructions for

the Ninth Circuit, Instruction 4.09, at 59 (1992 ed.) (jury

should consider whether immunized testimony ‘‘may have

been influenced by the government’s promise of immunity

given in exchange for it, and ... should consider that

testimony with greater = than that of ordinary wit-

nesses’’); Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions, Distric

Judges Ass’n, Fifth Circuit, Pattern Jury Instructions—

Criminal Cases, sirighrcat 1.15, at 26 (1990 ed.) (test

mony of immunized witness ‘‘must always be examined

and weighed by the jury with greater care and caution

than the testimony of ordinary witnesses’’); Federal Ju-

ese Center Committee to Study Criminal Jury Instruc

ions. Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Instruction 24.

at 39 (1982) (immunized testimony should be considered

with more caution than other testimony, as immunized

witness may have had reason to fabricate stories or ex-

aggerate the conduct of others in order to strike a fa-

vorable bargain with the government for his case): see also

Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions Within th

Eighth Circuit, Manual of Model Criminal Jury fate.

trons for the District Courts of the Eighth Circu it, Instruc-

tion 4.04, at 88 (1989 rev. ed.) (whether immuni: be

testimony was influenced by government’s promise is for

jury to decide).:

‘Practitioners also recognize the inherent unreliability of immunized

testimony and indicate that such testimony is particularly vulnerable

to damaging cross-examination. See Moritz and Harris, supra, 14 Litig

No. 1, at 32 (immunity and cooperation agreements are ‘‘grist for the

Yr FhC re .ah) . ean” } nha sn. : ; if 9 ‘ rm. .

cross-examiner's mill’’); Osterhoudt, supra, 16 Litig. No. 2, at 9 (‘Tac

The Courts of Appeals have seized upon two conflicting

views of the practical realities of the Immunity and plea

bargaining processes in developing their contradictory ap-

proaches to the trustworthiness issue. The Fourth, Ninth,

and Eleventh (Lang) Circuits have determined that since

provisions in immunity and plea agreements require the

witness, aS a condition to the immunity or leniency, to

provide truthful information or testimony, the witness is

less likely to be untruthful for fear of losing the benefit

for which he bargained. Thus. they conclude that the ex-

istence of an Immunity or plea agreement adds to the

trustworthiness of the testimony or statements. In con-

trast, the First, Third, Fifth, Sixth. Seventh, and Eleventh

(Fernandez) Circuits have determined that a witness who

is testifying or being interviewed pursuant to an immunity

or plea agreement is less concerned with telling the truth

than with providing information that he believes will please

the prosecutor. Thus, these circuits have concluded that

the existence of an immunity or plea agreement renders

testimony or statements less trustworthy. The Court should

grant certiorari to resolve this disagreement among the

circuits. Prosecutors rely heavily on testimony obtained

pursuant to immunity and plea agreements. and the ad-

mission of this type of hearsay testimony implicates the

fundamental rights to confrontation and cross-examination

under the Sixth Amendment.

4. The circuits are also divided on whether testimony

is more likely to be trustworthy if it is given before a

grand jury and under oath. The Fourth Circuit held that

Nichols’ testimony was reliable because it was given before

a grand jury and under oath. The First and Eighth Circuits

have similarly held that such testimony is more likely to

be trustworthy than other testimony. However, these de-

tically, prosecutors prefer that their trial witnesses testify without an\

favors or inducements, such as immunity at the grand jury stage’,

since such favors make the witness more vulnerable to cross-exami

renee See ssessssasneenpeesnsiaisesssnsnstenses ee

nation)

cisions conflict with other Courts of Appeals’ decisions

holding that testimony is no more likely to be trustworthy

if given voluntarily before a grand jury and under oat!

Further, the Fourth Circuit’s decision flies in the face of

conventional wisdom that grand jury testimony, by its na

+ 1c + roeccarilty: . ir than } ~ . f

ture, 1S not necesSsaruy more reliable than otner out-o!-

court Statements

In United States v. McCall, the Fourth Circuit found

that ‘‘ ‘accouterments’ of grand jury proceedings, bolstered

by corroborative trial evidence ... can perform an equally

protective role for the truth-finding process as dc con-

frontation procedures.’ 740 F.2d 1331, 1342 (4th Cir. 1984)

(reversing decision to admit at trial affidavit of unavailable

witness). The Fourth Circuit stated that in three of

prior decisions the fact that the hearsay involved had been

secnreed i In a gre nd jury preceeding, rather ha n some less

; a] . }; Thenced olrt’c h th: ,

formal proceeding, iniluenced the court’s hold ling (nat the

. . . 2 % . — ¢ }

testimony was admissible under the Sixth Amendment.

oe Pe eee eos a gen w

McCall, 740 F.2d at 1341 (citing United States v. Murphy,

696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982), United States v. Garner, 574

F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 489 U.S. 9386 (1978)

The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Carlson held that

the unavailable witness’ grand jury testimony possessed

‘strong indication{s] of reliability’’ because it was given

under oath. 547 F.2d 1346, 135 8th Cir. 1976), cert.

denied. 431 U.S. 914 (1977). In United States v. Donlon,

the First Circuit similarly included the fact that grand jury

testimony was given under oath as one of the factors that

indicated the reliability of the testimony. 909 F.2d 650,

654 (1st Cir. 1990) (affirming admission at trial of grand

jury testimony of unavailable witness).

Several other Courts of Appeals have held that the fact

that a witness gives testimony under oath in the “rela-

tively solemn setting’’ of a grand jury does not guarantee

the trustworthiness of their statements implicating a

defendant. United States v. Gomez-Lemos, 939 F.2d 326,

7 qv y * } ~

Q9 OA - ( ] 1+} a ( OQ) 7 eer ne ] —

892 F.2d 976, 981 (11th Cir. 1989) (ordinary grand ju

t + rt + r ic +} ] > 1? »Y NT rhs 1]

estimony not admMmIsSSIDIe€ under LaLlLUllall

+} ; ] t tT T +}

q ‘ay y ) P ] ¢ x(117¢ > ( ) T

as oath alone is inadequate to meet the

. PI1t7A | , 7 > t« +305) ( \« ary f

equivalent circumstantial ouarantees Ul

Toh ag ] An Aas Ee | Me ¥

Tol )P7 Jad HW ; F.2d (0d (oo (ot!

T } » | -"

Cir. J., concurring’) (merely because

‘ +} y st 7 ‘ ran ] i ih an Oi | > + nr > + ih

Oatn Low & re a oranda 1u y UUGDS not pio l€ ni

+ y > 17 +1, a+ * ed , + yer? "

antee of trustworthiness’’). Because jury is an

er parte nonaaversarilai proceeding control ol

> y " + + + + 1< + y att, - , > -

ne prose O} tne daeftendant 1s not atioraea an oppor

+ 7 + ~ + } + + +}

lY ity ) co any W') ness Y nis LY stwortniness OY al \

: ; — :

; to } + ’ «2 tryithti C Pr aera j ? a 4

S LLC r € nN )Y iLO LCrutniuine ~ Or Al ( uracy nited Pe it

. - pe wh), 5" S) 19O£ Sore Pr? » | - 1¢ ( th at —

Snyder, 872 F.2d 1351, 1855 (7th Cir. 1989) (that evi

ie ‘oO ws OV RT ays "a ¢ ‘ ang 1% ¢ as Wie fT TS

Uc ict “ a> — VeT) Wt Ore a prand jury ad 1s LITTIE LU AL.

. rahiliti mro n 51th 1 fo 1. ba ) Qn" ) ,} ' }

reilabl i y DSIilICe 1i€ ltne! dé it ndant nor anyone on his OeCNall

‘ + +} rye ee 2h - > , as \¢ +h ro <1"

was present at the grand jury proceedings, there was n

croSs-examination, and ordinary rules of evidence did not

AQY\Y . tr " at ion ¥ + y 9 read): mmnhan, , ] rpAlial li+

appi\ Une Oati Wa fn marKkediy ennance ne reiabdlicty

f +} + +i ry rt y +} nr rt 7 ATi ph ] + +)y y

OI wne testimony). mune present Case, .NiIcnois tesStimon

Was Only tested in those instances when the prosecutor

’ }] } > -, ,t = + . ¢ — ~— a< } + “— -

mnavenged testimony tnat was unlavorabie to the govern-

~ + bs A hy 4

ment. (C.A. App. 57-64)

Witnesses are keenly aware of what testimony the pros

Hebe Sabato + aes” a a a ee ae ‘ .

ecutor WantS to near, and so tney are under enormous

~~ ' + TY ” by y } j by a ; . A |

pressure to conform. See United States Gonzalez, 559

97 127] 1979 C+h on 1977 ——- = ’ = £4 _

F.2d 127i, 1273 (5th Cir. 1977) (given prosecutor’s offe:

eo: : +} ? ee ; Iebsye4

‘ YVIPIIE UL? ve" Th Fad bh Oa * mrimin« 1« x

it Immunity, the only civil or eriminal liability

> , ‘ Oo , ++ vo" , . + + a 2 oa +inrx0 ‘1 > 3 > + |

CUOUIC lace id ii ne ala not Lesuly LIIUS, wnetner ne LOIG

’ vy. £6 ‘ > v 4 r PD - 7 +

es JvCLlirIcy { ic Re 5 ] 4 ] E *¢ I Jat 4 4 lt | {y

\’ 7 e oc ) _ ] 7 « a,’

‘Oo. 1, at 26, 31 (Fall 1989): Thomas P. § tobert D. Nacl

¢ . > j _" ” | *} Tr} ¥ ” 4 ~ Tm -

man, /f It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It Why The fzrand Jury s Accusatory

: f : he , ‘ e ; ‘ ‘iS i

F inctior Should Not Be Changed io J Crin L aw riminoiogy 104%

OA‘ int ( 4 1} * Pp _ 7 “ » } y it} ]

1049 (Winter 1984); Faust F. Rossi, The Silent Revolution. 9 Litig. Ne

9 ‘ 12 lw Q

2, at 13, 18 (Winter 1983)

One grand juror briefly questioned Nichols, but did not cha leng

any or nis testimony. (C.A. App. 64)

oe)

—

hat would happen t

him if he did not savy someth

) 7

26, 31 (Fall 1989). Since the formal rules of evidence

do not apply to grand jury proceedings, prosecutors ma}

ng): see also Jeffrey Cole,

Residual E reeptions to the Hearsay Rule ‘ 16 Litig¢. No. i

p &:

} ° } } . .

employ leading and compound questions whiecn often con-

use tne wit ieS5 and qaistort the trutn. See

' oo Qr- ’ } ee

F.2d at 1355; Gonzalez, 559 F.2d at

v. Vigoa, 656 F. Supp. 1499, 1506-07 (D.N.J. 1987) (sugges

tiveness of leading questions undermines the reliability of

grand jury testimony), affd without pub. op., 857 F.2d

}

(3d Cir. 1988): See also Fe rnande o. &G? F.2d at 983

rr,

(fact that witness responded to ‘“‘pregnant”’ questions put

by the prosecutor suggested that his testimony was no

more trustworthy than ordinary inadmissible grand jury

estimony). Not only is the witness not cross-examined.

put ireq uently nis testimony is carefull, scripted by the

prosecutor. One prosecutorial tecnnique is having the wit-

: . . : .

* . « € 5 ro > > + 2 r 24 — ") ~~ + +7 - mneor

ness re aqa prepared . Stat ement anda aliirm 1tS frutn under!

) ’ , ’ ’ 7 = + }

Oatn. ee, 6... [ nited States - Mite hell. a F.2d 248,

OL4 +) ‘) ( = #5 . —Otr > 1) nig

£63 (otn Cir. 1985) (affirming propriety of prosecutor s

awn witnoccoa an sar hof “O P .17°% }

LAL LIL Ul ay Ing WITNE SsS€ES appeal DeTOre orand ury anda

It ;

} t T t

’ y , ¢ “17/ > -

simply adopt portions of a Drug Enforcement Age re-

. ‘

: i , -

“ haa tia + lear + “ty ~ir > +f 4

Ort ratner than present live testimony), cert. denied. 4/6

124 (190R4 ther ce hav } ‘

.»». 1184 (1986). Anothe technique IS Naving the prose-

] | } . }

cutor ask only leading questions, so that the prosecutor

elfectively testifies, with the witness assenting to the pros-

ete sic 2PTtIP ic ¢ ] ran a+ .

ecutor’s statements. This tactic is employed so that the

witness will not make a must ake.”’ In the present case,

the eekeuon frequently utilized leading questions during

Nichols’ second grand jury testimony, eliciting mo stly yes-

or-no answers from Nichols throughout the proceeding.

C.A. App. 71-79)

If the testimony of a government witness has ‘‘problem

areas,’ a prosecutor will shape his examination to steer

clear of those problems, if possible. Alternatively, the pros-

ecutor may make the testimony so fuzzy that credibility

Sn yder. 872

foe

t 1273: United States

By its reliance on the fact that Nichols’ testimony was

given before a grand jury under oath as an indicator of

reliability, the Fourth Circuit espouses an approach that

contradicts the holdings of other Courts of Appeals and

ignores the realities of the grand jury system. The Court

should grant certiorari] to resolve the conflict between th«

Fourth Circuit and the other circuits concerning the effect

of the grand jury dynamics on the reliability of testimony

5. Though ‘‘the hearsay rules and the Confrontation

Clause are generally designed to protect similar values,’

the two are not precisely congruent, and this Court has

found on more than one occasion a violation of confron

tation values even though the statements were arguabl\

admissible under a hearsay exception. California v. Green,

399 U.S. 149, 155-57 (1970) (citing Barber v. Page, 390

U.S. 719 (1968) and Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965))

However, neither this Court, nor any of the Courts of

Appeals has ever clearly outlined the distinction between

the factors providing ‘‘circumstantial guarantees of trust

worthiness’’—the Rule 804(b)(5) test—and factors providing

‘‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’’—the Con

frontation Clause test

This Court has twice addressed the meaning of ‘“‘par

ticularized guarantees of trustworthiness” in the conte

of statements admitted under Rule 804(byW5). Idaho

Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990); Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.

930 (1986). In both cases, the Court determined that state

ments which were admissible under Rule 804(b\5) lacked

the ‘“‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ re

quired by the Confrontation Clause. Lee stated that the

‘‘truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause is

uniquely threatened when an accomplice’s confession is

sought to be introduced against a criminal defendant with

out the benefit of cross-examination.” 476 U.S. at 541.

Wright further explained that “ ‘particularized guarantees

of trustworthiness’ must be shown from the totality of the

circumstances, but we think the relevant circumstances

y TOL ’ t >) ‘ t> if lr? 1! | may’ ry \ ns ) ‘ ‘

rye’? f i! (] of, if reer fer? rye 1¢ y i] f | inf ] i? 1 yt } ‘

benef LIQ S. Ct. at 3148. In these case the Court or

examined. the tatement for Controntation | e pi

Pose Oller me? NO { nt nt [ A eal fact } lerery ryi?

idn bilit inder SOd(bM5) might. differ

several Court { Appe have ddressed the adn

if ()] nea? | ‘ jery ‘ l! }e°7 t? rrys¢ SCP atT MS) y

Cumstantial guarantee tandard and the Confrontation

{ 1US¢ particularize ruarantes tandarad [hie reuit

, " ‘ t) lIrreqd i! } ? ’ ? a t > if ry j oo ’ heft A’ gage? Try

tv tandards and have nsidered the same factors fo:

hot } t « ‘ ly ] ) ty / S/ of, [) wer? m Se | 46 G44 Cy

{ (,ft? { y 1}OG8&G) tf hy¢ Ne ent ( y lit (\¢ a rmine | tf) t

the pvrand jur testimony at} le Nad the requisite Cir

lly | i] t aai {7 4 ira! lee ay t? i (wort! eé tT ] Va por |

erly admitted under Rule SO4(b\5). though the court

1utioned that the evidence may st olate the Sixt!

Amendment. However, in its Confrontation Clause dete)

mination, the court summarily concluded that the requir

ment for particularized guarantees of trustworthine

va atisfied nee the Rule 804(b\M5) test wa atisfied

/ at Yns The Fourth Cireuilt. in Toya te / State Ws f

014 F.2d 1131, 1136 (4th Cir. 1978). likewise found that

grand Jury testimony was admissible under Rule &04(b)(5)

Dut noted that It was required to make a separate deter

mination of admissibility focusing upon the Confrontatior

Clause. When it addressed the reliability of testimony ur

der the Confrontation Clause, though, it stated that the

considerations had been ‘‘canvassed’’ in the 804(b\5) dj

cussion, and It merely discussed the same factors. Jd. at

1137-38. Other courts have simply stated outright that

) ’ ’ . ; , "

though the standards are distinct and though reliability

may not be inferred under a Sixth Amendment analvsi

} Tae

nerely because the prior testimony 1s admissible under

Rule 804(b\5), the factors to be considered in assessing

and the Confrontation Clause are

*y ; 75) ; De 224 : 2 A FS

‘ nyder, O14 I 2M 1) ] Lead boos

Linited State ) Land, G04 F.2d 61*

reasons that led court to find lack

purposes of Rule ®04(byW5) indica

dicla of rehabilitv for Confrontati

denied, 110 S. Ct. 305 (1990): United

Hable under Confrontation Clau

a i : Poesia - »

Diity under Rule ®O4(b\D) expre

ther tho ¢ t | .

Whether the VO andard Lré

admissible under Rule &04(b)W5) mz

+}, . "we ¢+,+ r11 +

tne Confrontation Clause ] ] mM

ithe +h) y SS ae - + , +

either this ( QUIT or the ( Our Q

11 1 | r ‘ (ry ,

Would di] IngvgUuIsn an aami Ib)i€

f : tat nt

rom an inadm! Mie avemerl

11 : Cinra oan :

Clause.'* Since most cases involvin

ae ry nero } , re { yr

ay evidence lni¢ i AINE yrand Ai ¥

} t 2 i(} a ¢ { + > ¢

both Rule 804(b\5) and the Confr

¢ + . + ¢ + wie 4 +

NOUId grant certiorar! to claril

* +

petween tne adm 1O11) test 1!

an OF hile [ Lid ~ t io

pe tnat tr ( irt s ases unnecessar [

tne reiationsr [ nertrweer ne nstitut r

+} b r r ¢ {or "T'} r

ic lca sday Ales ee at t A 4

CONCLUSION ‘

ory? ’ , é . 4

4 _

’ ry ,

| <

H wn [|

( QC f fre

} >

a uw Buow

| * 7 y

i TAS NI |) |

: 4 2)

S i AS wv 6D

APPENDIX

United States Court of Appeals,

Fourth Circuit

4iiil

bond

A. TUCKER

+ a > ¥ le

Defendant-Appellan

Argued: Feb. 6, 1992

Decided: Mar. 11, 1992

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

~ } . . . , v* . +? 1) }

Southern District of West Virginia. at Charleston. ( harles

H. Haden, II, Chief District Judge. (CR-90-82-2)

Arthur T. Ciccarello, Sr., Charleston, W. Va.. argued

(Michael J. Del Guidice and Thomas G. Casto, Charleston.

W. Va., on the brief), for appellant.

Joseph F. Savage, Jr., Asst. U.S. Atty., Charleston, W.

Va., argued (Michael W. Cary, U.S. Atty., Charleston, W.

Va., on the brief), for appellee.

Before RUSSELL and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and

BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this

circuit. See I.0.P. 36.5 and 36.6.

OPINION

‘

PER CURIAM:

Larry A. Tucker appeals his convictions under 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1503, 1623 (1988), contending that the district court

rred in admitting the grand jury testimony of a deceased

witness at Tucker’s trial.! Finding no error, we affirm the

aistrict court judgement.

Appellant Larry A. Tucker is a real estate broker and

former President of the West Virginia Senate who pled

guilty on September 11, 1989 to extortion under color of

office in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 195(b2\ 1988). The terms of Tucker’s plea agreement

required Tucker to cooperate with investigative authorities

by testify:ng truthfully before a federal grand jury and by

providing truthful information about his prior financial

dealings to Special Agent Charles Little of the Internal

Revenue Service

Tucker, however, testified falsely before the grand jury,

and falsely represented to Special Agent Little, that he

had properly reported on prior tax returns all the income

that he had previously earned, including any income which

he received from nursing home interests. Cecil Nichols, a

principal of Continental Health Care (‘‘CHC’’), testified

before a subsequent grand jury on January 9, 1990 that

CHC paid Tucker $100,000 in 1984 as compensation for

locating suitable sites in West Virginia for the construction

of nursing homes. Through a ruse involving the deposit

Tucker raised other grounds for appeal in his brief. However. at

oral argument, Tucker’s counsel elected to confine the appeal solely to

the issue of the district court’s admission at trial of a deceased witness’

grand jury testimony. We shall do likewise, and do not here consider

the other issues raised in Appellant’s brief. We are confirmed in this

course by the opinion that none of the unargued issues has any merit.

of this $100,000 into an account ostensibly maintained by

Fricks, Inc., an unprofitable business operated by one of

Tucker’s business associates, Tucker sought to conceal most

of this $100,000 in income from the I.R.S. and to avoid

payment of income tax thereon. Nichols testified before

the grand jury that, at Tucker’s request, CHC executed

checks totalling $100,000 to Fricks. Inc.—rather than to

Tucker personally—as payment for Tucker’s services in

locating sites for CHC nursing homes.

On June 21, 1990, Tucker was indicted for obstruction

of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503, and making

false declarations before a grand jury in violation of 18

U.S.C. § 1623. Since Nichols was deceased by the time of

Tucker’s trial, the district court admitted Nichols’ testi-

mony before the grand jury regarding CHC’s payments by

check to Fricks, Inc. for Tucker’s benefit. Tucker was

convicted of both offenses on December 10. 1990.

Tucker argues that the district court violated his rights

under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause by ad-

mitting Nichols’ grand jury testimony at Tucker’s trial.

Tucker correctly observes that Nichols’ Statements before

the grand jury are hearsay, which the district court ad-

mitted under the exception to the hearsay rule provided

in Fed. R. Evid. 804(b\5).:

‘Fed. R. Evid. 804(bX5) permits admission of hearsat statements

where the declarant is unavailable, the statement exhibit. circumstantial

guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those des<ribed in 804(b\ 1)

to -(b\4), and

the court determines that (A) the statement is offered

as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is

more probative on the point for which it is offered

than any other evidence which the proponent can pro-

cure through reasonable efforts: and (C) the general

purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will

be best served by admission of the statement into

evidence.

As this court recently observed in United States v. Ellis,

‘“A two-part test determines whether ‘incriminating state-

ments admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule

also meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.’”’

Nos. 90-5726, 91-5771, 1991 WL 260433, at *2 (4th Cir.

Jan. 7, 1992) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139,

3146 [1990]). The prosecution must first show that the

declarant was unavailable. Jd. The prosecution must then

show that the statements exhibit the requisite indicia of

reliability. Jd. The Supreme Court instructs that the re-

liability of the statements may be shown “‘in one of two

ways: either by showing that the statements ‘fall[] within

a firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or by showing that the

statements bear sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.”’

Ellis, Nos. 90-5726, 91-5771, 1991 WL 260433, at *2 (4th

Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct.

3139, 3147 [1990)]).

Nichols was deceased by the time of Tucker’s trial, and

therefore unquestionably was unavailable to testify. We are

left with the determination of the second part of the test

recited in Jdaho, 110 S. Ct. at 3147, 7.e., whether Nichols’

statements exhibited indicia of reliability sufficient for pur-

poses of the Confrontation Clause.

In United States v. Ellis, Nos. 90-5726, 91-5771, 1991

WL 260438, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992), this court found

sufficient guarantees of the trustworthiness of a deceased

witness’ statements based upon these facts.

First, [the witness] issued the statements vol-

untarily in the presence of two government

agents and both of his attorneys. Second, [the

witness] made the statements in accordance with

> Since Fed. R. Evid. 804(bX5) is not a traditional hearsay exception,

see, e.g., Ellis, Nos. 90-5726, 91-5771, 1991 WL 260433, at *5 n.1 (4th

Cir. Jan. 7, 1992), this issue is one of whether Nichols’ statements

showed sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness.

5a.

a plea agreement which required him to be truth.

ful with federal investigators. Third, the govern-

ment agents were taking notes in the presence

of [the witness] as the statements were made.

Fourth, [the witness] could be deemed to know,

in view of the plea agreement, that what he was

saying would be the subject of further investi-

gation—and confirmation—by the government.

Fifth, though the plea agreement did not require

him to do so, [the witness] agreed to record sub-

Sequent conversations with the individuals he had

implicated ... suggesting that he was wiling to

have the truthfulness of these statements tested.

Id.

We find that similar circumstances exist here, and that

Nichols’ statements exhibit indicia of trustworthiness suf-

ficient for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Nichols

testified before the grand jury pursuant to an immunity

agreement which he had voluntarily entered under advice

from his attorney and which required him to give truthful

statements regarding his dealings with Tucker. Nichols’

attorney was present outside the courtroom at the time

of the grand jury proceedings, and Nichols was afforded

the opportunity to confer with his attorney at any point

during his testimony. Nichols, no doubt, understood from

the nature of the grand jury proceedings that the infor-

mation contained in his testimony would be the subject of

further investigation. The United States Attorney could

have revoked Nichols’ grant of immunity were it discov-

ered that Nichols testified falsely. Because Nichols’ state-

ments before the grand jury were under oath, false

testimony could have subjected Nichols to prosecution un-

der 18 U.S.C. § 1628.

We conclude for these reasons that Nichols’ statements

clearly met the requirements for trustworthiness adum-

brated in United States v. Ellis, Nos. 90-5726, 91-5771,

1a y oC A499 ‘ *o ‘iy nY é 17QQ9 ‘ x

1991 WL 260433, at *2 (4th Cir. Jan. 7. 1992). and we

4 “ ? »} } ' y > , 1Ir°T

accordingly altirm tne decision of the district court

AFFIRMED

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