Appendix b — Leal v. Sun Exploration & Production Co.
Supreme Court brief2002
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
CSSD EDEN Dias a DE) OR RMA ee mL PHS BD PEON LI BIS ABEL LON ES tee MEISE REL AS MES onl ss vs CEN MSR EA ATS BIA TARR PRR WR RES Malis Nii ANSI iil NDI pice
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION
LEOPOLDO LEAL. As Executor
to the Estate of his Mother,
Manuricia B. Leal
Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. C-01-230
VS.
SUN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION
COMPANY, ORYX ENERGY COMPANY,
AND AFFILIATES
Defendants
aie . ——_ORDER DISMISSING CASE
On this day came to be considered Plaintiff Leopoldo Leal's
(the Plaintiff’) claims in the above styled action. Upon reviewing
the Complaint, Motions, and transcript of the Initial Pretrial
Conference held before the Honorable B. Janice Ellington on
August 15, 2-001, the Court FINDS it must DISMISS the action
18.
for the reasons stated herein.
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division,
on May 18, 2001. On October 29, 2001, the case was transferred
to this Court from the docket of the Honorable Hayden W. Head,
Jr. Though this Court recognizes that plaintiff is pro se and, there-
fore, has given Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt at every tum and
indulged every inference in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court comes
to the inescapable conclusion that Plaintiff's claims and allegations
are unintelligible. Further, even if the Court were to find that
plaintiff had asserted an intelligible claim, that claim would be
barred by res judicata.
At the initial Pretrial Conference, the magistrate tried labor-
iously to get Plaintiff to explain his case and clarify his causes of
action. This Plaintiff was unable or unwilling to do. Instead,
Plaintiff asserted fanciful and virtually unintelligle claims lacking
any kind of support. For example, when asked to explain what
claims he was raising other than claims he had already raised
in an earlier 1988 claim with the Texas Railroad Commission,
Mr. Leal stated:
a I claim that a foreign alien had come into this country
and taken the inheritance of these American citizens, my
inheritance, and turned over title to oil conglomerates, an alien
who had no rights, based especially on his criminal background,
19.
a man who could not vote, could not apply for citizenship, that
these partitions were obtained by the defendant through fraud
and concealment, and that this Mexican citizen--everything
appears legitimate? They used a Mexican alien,*
*This "Mexican illegal alien” was apparently one Esteban
Garcia, a man allegedly brought to the United States from
Mexico to further Defendant's scheme. (PL's Amended Compl.
pp 7-9.). plaintiff explains: ,the "state court [in a partition action
in the 92nd State District Court between 1936 and 1941]
partitioned the lands asnd awarded title to Mexican criminal
who had murdered the Mexican Chief of Police, a national hero
to whom a street is named after in Reynosa, Mexico, General
Heron Ramirez....(Pl's. Response in Opposition to Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgement p. 5.) Mr. Garcia also
apparently murdered "an unarmed crippled man named Santos
Rivera in Rio Grande City, Texas” in 1923, though it is unclear
whether that fact has anything to do with Plaintiffs claims. (PI.
Amended Compl. p. 7.) they brought him from Monterrey,
Mexico, him and his mom, mother, to come to Texas and claim
that they owned South Texas, and that the American citizen,
native American citizen who was protected by the United
States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, the Texas land
patent,and the Spanish land grant. The Spanish land grant was
issued to residents who were residing north of the Rio Grande
20.
back then 300 years or whatever, and not for people who
were in what is now Mexico. We cannot go over there and
claim their lands, because they'll shoot us, but neither can they
also come across the river, as the defendant claimed, and come
over here and dispossess the American citizen from his or her
inheritance.(Transcript, Initial Pretrial Conference, 25:18-25,
26: 1-13.) From Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement
based on the various Statutes of Limitation issues, Defendant
explains what it believes to be the issue: Plaintiff asserts title to
three porciones in Starr County, Texas, based upon Spanish
land grants and Texas land patents from the 1700's and 1800's
claiming that Defendants fraudulently obtained land in partition
actions in atime period between 1936 and 1941, (Def's Motion
for Summary Judgement p. 3.) it is settled that "(i)t is the litigant'’s
role to present their case to court, not vice versa.” Carpenter v.
Vaughn 888 F. Supp. 635, 648 (M.D.. Pa. 1994). Moreover,
when a party presents an issue in Opaque terms, it is not
necessary for the Court to address that issue. See Enplanar v.
Marsh, 11 F. 3d 1284. 1297 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 11 s.Ct
312 (1994).Plaintiff has not met these basdeline requirements
for bringing (and sustaining) a lawsuit in this Court
Furthermore, as indicated, infra, even assuming, arguando,
that Plaintiff had asserted intelligible claims, they would be
completedly barred by res judicata, as Plaintiff has brought
identical claims against the san:c Defendant in an earlier case
ale
is
that .was filed in the Southern District of Texas and those claims
were dismissed. In order for res judicata to apply: (1) the parties
must be the same in both suits; (2) the prior judgement must have
been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. ; (3) there
must be a final judgement on the merits.; and (4) the same
cause of action must be involved in both cases. See United
States | : 860
F.Supp, 370 (S.D. Tex. 1994). Dismissal with prejudice at any
stage of a judicial proceeding normally constitutes a final
judgement on the merits which bars later suit on the same
action. icio Li 74 F. 3d 567
( 5th Cir. 1996);
Corp., 405 F. 2d 958. 960 (5th Cir. 1968).
On August 1, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
McAllen Division, Cause Number M-90-145 against Sun
Oil Company, Oryx Energy Company, the State of Texas,
the 92nd Judicial District, and Other Unknown Persons. A true
-2. Inthe 1990, Plaintiffs included "Rev. Leopoldo Leal, individually and
as attorney in fact for Adelmira Rios, Rev. Santana Leal, Amparo
McGuire, Adelfa Hernandez, Rev. Onofre Leal, Rev. Jose Leal, and Rev.
Oscar Leal, as (* ici
22.
[(*) This statement by the Federal District Judge
Janis Graham Jack is an outright lie, and sanctions
should be imposed on the judge for her prejudicial
intentional misconduct.].
and correct copy of that Complaint is attached as Tab. A. On
_ October 14, 1991, the Honorable Ricardo H. Hinojosa granted
Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant 92nd Judicial District
Court, Defendant the State of Texas, and Defendant Oryx
Energy Company on behalf of Sun Oil Company. A true and
correct copy of the Order of Dismissal is attached as Tab B.
Such dismissals are assumed to have been with prejudice
unless otherwise indicated. See
127 F. 3d 478 n. 8 (Sth Cir. 1997) citing 2 JAMES WM,
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.34
[6] [a] (3d ed. 1997) ("A dismissal for failure to state a claim...
[is] presumed to be with prejudice..."); see also Fernandez -
ied Pi ‘n, 987 F. 2d 278. 284n. 8
(Sth Cir 1993) (" I)t is well established that a dismissal is
presumed to be with prejudice unless the order explicitly states
otherwise.” (citing ; iti
452 U.S. 394, 399 n. 3,101 S. Ct. 2424 .. 2428 n 3, 69 L.
Ed. 2d 103 (1981); Weissinger v. United States.423 F. 2d 795,
798 n. 4 (Sth Cir. 1970) (en banc); Lambert v. Conrad, 536
F. 2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1976) Moreover. the corporate Defendants’
a3.
Motion to Dismiss in that case was based upon a claim that
Plaintiff's causes of action were barred by applicable statutes of
limitations, the same claim made by Defendant in the instant case
regarding the same allegations by Plaintiff Leal. Plaintiff may not
engaga in a year-long forum shopping expedition throughout the
Southern District.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff's
Complaint be DISMISSED.
SIGNED and ENTERRED this 20th of November, 2001.
JANIS GRAHAM JACK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
24.
| PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO THE
DISTRICT'S COURT'S ORDER FOR
DISMISSAL OF CASE
The allegation by the district judge is not
founded on facts, and her zeal to dismiss the
suit shows her prejudice towards the petitioner.
It needs to be understood that this judge had
never taken any participation in any of the
court proceedings, nor had she ever called for
a hearing and/or conference with the plaintiff
to familiarize herself with the issues at hand.
Her allegations in the dismissal order are not
true. Said allegations are nonsense, a foolish
assumption, an intentional untruth to circumvent
the rights of the plaintiff.
The present cause is based on the interests of
the late Mrs. Mauricia B. Leal, and such suit had never \
been filed in any court of the land prior to the filing of
the present suit. Previously, the defendant did make a
settlement in the form of a substantial bribe to the
counsel for the class action court action herein mentioned
mentioned by the judge, in which case was dismissed
by a district judge who had a conflict of interest, and who
was directly profiting from the defendant's partition
ce
action of the lands at issue.
No judicial processing was ever taken on that suit
since judge Hinojosa took pains to kill the suit. The
pretending that that court processed the case was jor
sake of the res judicata argument, that is, to deny the
Constitutional process by the injured party. That
mentioned case never had anything to do with Mrs.
Mauricia B. Leal, and in fact, it was the scheme of the
interested parties who were profitting from the partition,
_who utilized the counsel for the plaintiffs to have them
lake a court action in an effort to later obtain a quiet
Gille to the lands at issue. Judge Hinojosa was part of
that conspiracy. The said judge docketted the case,
had the counsels for the plaintiffs bribed, and then,
threw out the case. The thus mentioned is a criminal
conspiracy in itself
No judicial process was ever exercised in the case,
and the judge never granted the motion for Specific
Jindings to ascertain for the purpose to appeal. Maybe
things are done in this manner in the courts of Mexico,
but in the United States of America, itis unconstitutional
and unlawful, and sanctions and impeachment may be
warrantied.
Literally, that case never went to court. To make such
an irresponsible claim is unamerican, and violates the
B.
United States Constitution; on due process, and equal
protection of the laws. the name of Mrs. Mauricia 8. Leal
never appeared tn the caption of the mentioned suit, and
lo compare her claims in the instant suit to that suilis a
Jraud.
The whole crux of this court action, rests on the
conduct of the district judge, who irresponsibly took
an action, disregarding ethical conduct guideknes,
and without any intelligible reasoning, committed
the grievious ERROR of granting the untimely
dismissal of the suit. The court became aware that
the preponderance of the evidence was against the
defendant, so based on the element of misconduct,
the judge committed an unintelligible act after it had
been reached by the defendant, and threw the suit
out to protect the defendant from a jury verdict.
The district judge claims it cannot understand the
claims of the petitioner, yet with scissor sharp
precision, she tears through the suit. Her reasoning
is what is unintelligible.
THE PETITIONER, recognizing that each appeal
presented to the Supreme Court of the land. has its
umique characteristics, and assuming that each Justice
of the said Court has a moral and a spiritual love and
obligation to protect and defend the United States
Constitution, its treaties,and the rights of its citizens,
out of necessity, herein responds to the aforementioned
order.
1. The district judge had never taken an active role
in the processing of the court action, prior to her
untimely dismissal. The said judge had ample time and
opportunity to call for a hearing, and/or conference, to
inquire of the mentioned case in which she brings into
the scenario the case in the district court of judge
Hinojosa. The now petitioner had a constitutional nght
to defend himself against the unfounded allegations that
the instant case was the same as the prior case.
2. The said judge had an obligation to investigate the
ex-parte information from the defendant, as to the
alledged res judicata, wherein it would have been brought
to light as an established fact, that no effective judicial
processing of the prior cause ever occurred, because
of the unethical conduct of the district judge's conflict
of interest, and the business dealings between judge and
defendant, as pertaining to the lands at issue. It also would
have been revealed, that the then defendant paid an
enormous bribe to the plaintiff's counsel, so that the
case would not be appeal. This established facts show
that the now petitioner has a constitutional right to
file this separate and different court action, based on
p.
the rights and claims of the late Mrs. Mauricia B. Leal
The petitioner never attempted to hide from the prior
suit, which did not contain the claims of the petitioner's
mother, and even such, based on the criminal conspiracy
of the McAllen judge, and the defendant's Attorneys, and
the bribed counsel for the plaintiff. the petitioner now
has the guarantees of the United States Constitution and
the involved treaties, to finally come before:the Superior
Court of the land, and ask the Honorable Court for
Justice in this matter.
3. The parties who claim ownership of the disputed
lands are now identified as (Mexican Americans) and
their claims are based on the Sun Oil financed court
partitioning of said lands, and the said Judge Hinojosa
is part of that party. It would have constituted a monetary
loss for said judge to strike down the unconstitutional
partition order, for reasons stated. It is an established
fact, that a common hatred and jealosy exists between
the Mexican Americans who came from Mexico, towards
the native born Spanish American citizen who owns the
inheritance nghts to the lands herein mentioned.
4. A realistic manner to describe the treatment which
the now petitioner endured in the courts for the Southern
District, Corpus Christi Division, was that though the suit
re
was scheduled for trial, it became a practice of the
judges to toy with the plaintiff, and bounce him from
court to court, and to attempt to intimidate the plaintiff
with threats of sanctions, so that the plaintiff would
abandon the case. The defendant defaulted in the
answering the complaint within the twenty day period,
as specified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
yet the court ignored the request and entry for default
in favor of the plaintiff. Instead, it attempted to terrorize
the plaintiff into abandoning the suit. The whole matter
was a criminal conspiracy against the plaintiff.
The court warrants sanctions for their unethical
misconduct.
Respectfully Submitted,
#. .s {?
Seng ol fp ue au
Leopoldo Leal
Petitioner
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.