Appendix b — Leal v. Sun Exploration & Production Co.

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CSSD EDEN Dias a DE) OR RMA ee mL PHS BD PEON LI BIS ABEL LON ES tee MEISE REL AS MES onl ss vs CEN MSR EA ATS BIA TARR PRR WR RES Malis Nii ANSI iil NDI pice

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

LEOPOLDO LEAL. As Executor

to the Estate of his Mother,

Manuricia B. Leal

Plaintiff, CIVIL ACTION NO. C-01-230

VS.

SUN EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION

COMPANY, ORYX ENERGY COMPANY,

AND AFFILIATES

Defendants

aie . ——_ORDER DISMISSING CASE

On this day came to be considered Plaintiff Leopoldo Leal's

(the Plaintiff’) claims in the above styled action. Upon reviewing

the Complaint, Motions, and transcript of the Initial Pretrial

Conference held before the Honorable B. Janice Ellington on

August 15, 2-001, the Court FINDS it must DISMISS the action

18.

for the reasons stated herein.

Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit in the United States District

Court for the Southern District of Texas, Corpus Christi Division,

on May 18, 2001. On October 29, 2001, the case was transferred

to this Court from the docket of the Honorable Hayden W. Head,

Jr. Though this Court recognizes that plaintiff is pro se and, there-

fore, has given Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt at every tum and

indulged every inference in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court comes

to the inescapable conclusion that Plaintiff's claims and allegations

are unintelligible. Further, even if the Court were to find that

plaintiff had asserted an intelligible claim, that claim would be

barred by res judicata.

At the initial Pretrial Conference, the magistrate tried labor-

iously to get Plaintiff to explain his case and clarify his causes of

action. This Plaintiff was unable or unwilling to do. Instead,

Plaintiff asserted fanciful and virtually unintelligle claims lacking

any kind of support. For example, when asked to explain what

claims he was raising other than claims he had already raised

in an earlier 1988 claim with the Texas Railroad Commission,

Mr. Leal stated:

a I claim that a foreign alien had come into this country

and taken the inheritance of these American citizens, my

inheritance, and turned over title to oil conglomerates, an alien

who had no rights, based especially on his criminal background,

19.

a man who could not vote, could not apply for citizenship, that

these partitions were obtained by the defendant through fraud

and concealment, and that this Mexican citizen--everything

appears legitimate? They used a Mexican alien,*

*This "Mexican illegal alien” was apparently one Esteban

Garcia, a man allegedly brought to the United States from

Mexico to further Defendant's scheme. (PL's Amended Compl.

pp 7-9.). plaintiff explains: ,the "state court [in a partition action

in the 92nd State District Court between 1936 and 1941]

partitioned the lands asnd awarded title to Mexican criminal

who had murdered the Mexican Chief of Police, a national hero

to whom a street is named after in Reynosa, Mexico, General

Heron Ramirez....(Pl's. Response in Opposition to Defendant's

Motion for Summary Judgement p. 5.) Mr. Garcia also

apparently murdered "an unarmed crippled man named Santos

Rivera in Rio Grande City, Texas” in 1923, though it is unclear

whether that fact has anything to do with Plaintiffs claims. (PI.

Amended Compl. p. 7.) they brought him from Monterrey,

Mexico, him and his mom, mother, to come to Texas and claim

that they owned South Texas, and that the American citizen,

native American citizen who was protected by the United

States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, the Texas land

patent,and the Spanish land grant. The Spanish land grant was

issued to residents who were residing north of the Rio Grande

20.

back then 300 years or whatever, and not for people who

were in what is now Mexico. We cannot go over there and

claim their lands, because they'll shoot us, but neither can they

also come across the river, as the defendant claimed, and come

over here and dispossess the American citizen from his or her

inheritance.(Transcript, Initial Pretrial Conference, 25:18-25,

26: 1-13.) From Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement

based on the various Statutes of Limitation issues, Defendant

explains what it believes to be the issue: Plaintiff asserts title to

three porciones in Starr County, Texas, based upon Spanish

land grants and Texas land patents from the 1700's and 1800's

claiming that Defendants fraudulently obtained land in partition

actions in atime period between 1936 and 1941, (Def's Motion

for Summary Judgement p. 3.) it is settled that "(i)t is the litigant'’s

role to present their case to court, not vice versa.” Carpenter v.

Vaughn 888 F. Supp. 635, 648 (M.D.. Pa. 1994). Moreover,

when a party presents an issue in Opaque terms, it is not

necessary for the Court to address that issue. See Enplanar v.

Marsh, 11 F. 3d 1284. 1297 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied, 11 s.Ct

312 (1994).Plaintiff has not met these basdeline requirements

for bringing (and sustaining) a lawsuit in this Court

Furthermore, as indicated, infra, even assuming, arguando,

that Plaintiff had asserted intelligible claims, they would be

completedly barred by res judicata, as Plaintiff has brought

identical claims against the san:c Defendant in an earlier case

ale

is

that .was filed in the Southern District of Texas and those claims

were dismissed. In order for res judicata to apply: (1) the parties

must be the same in both suits; (2) the prior judgement must have

been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. ; (3) there

must be a final judgement on the merits.; and (4) the same

cause of action must be involved in both cases. See United

States | : 860

F.Supp, 370 (S.D. Tex. 1994). Dismissal with prejudice at any

stage of a judicial proceeding normally constitutes a final

judgement on the merits which bars later suit on the same

action. icio Li 74 F. 3d 567

( 5th Cir. 1996);

Corp., 405 F. 2d 958. 960 (5th Cir. 1968).

On August 1, 1990, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the United

States District Court for the Southern District of Texas,

McAllen Division, Cause Number M-90-145 against Sun

Oil Company, Oryx Energy Company, the State of Texas,

the 92nd Judicial District, and Other Unknown Persons. A true

-2. Inthe 1990, Plaintiffs included "Rev. Leopoldo Leal, individually and

as attorney in fact for Adelmira Rios, Rev. Santana Leal, Amparo

McGuire, Adelfa Hernandez, Rev. Onofre Leal, Rev. Jose Leal, and Rev.

Oscar Leal, as (* ici

22.

[(*) This statement by the Federal District Judge

Janis Graham Jack is an outright lie, and sanctions

should be imposed on the judge for her prejudicial

intentional misconduct.].

and correct copy of that Complaint is attached as Tab. A. On

_ October 14, 1991, the Honorable Ricardo H. Hinojosa granted

Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant 92nd Judicial District

Court, Defendant the State of Texas, and Defendant Oryx

Energy Company on behalf of Sun Oil Company. A true and

correct copy of the Order of Dismissal is attached as Tab B.

Such dismissals are assumed to have been with prejudice

unless otherwise indicated. See

127 F. 3d 478 n. 8 (Sth Cir. 1997) citing 2 JAMES WM,

MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.34

[6] [a] (3d ed. 1997) ("A dismissal for failure to state a claim...

[is] presumed to be with prejudice..."); see also Fernandez -

ied Pi ‘n, 987 F. 2d 278. 284n. 8

(Sth Cir 1993) (" I)t is well established that a dismissal is

presumed to be with prejudice unless the order explicitly states

otherwise.” (citing ; iti

452 U.S. 394, 399 n. 3,101 S. Ct. 2424 .. 2428 n 3, 69 L.

Ed. 2d 103 (1981); Weissinger v. United States.423 F. 2d 795,

798 n. 4 (Sth Cir. 1970) (en banc); Lambert v. Conrad, 536

F. 2d 1183 (7th Cir. 1976) Moreover. the corporate Defendants’

a3.

Motion to Dismiss in that case was based upon a claim that

Plaintiff's causes of action were barred by applicable statutes of

limitations, the same claim made by Defendant in the instant case

regarding the same allegations by Plaintiff Leal. Plaintiff may not

engaga in a year-long forum shopping expedition throughout the

Southern District.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff's

Complaint be DISMISSED.

SIGNED and ENTERRED this 20th of November, 2001.

JANIS GRAHAM JACK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

24.

| PETITIONER'S RESPONSE TO THE

DISTRICT'S COURT'S ORDER FOR

DISMISSAL OF CASE

The allegation by the district judge is not

founded on facts, and her zeal to dismiss the

suit shows her prejudice towards the petitioner.

It needs to be understood that this judge had

never taken any participation in any of the

court proceedings, nor had she ever called for

a hearing and/or conference with the plaintiff

to familiarize herself with the issues at hand.

Her allegations in the dismissal order are not

true. Said allegations are nonsense, a foolish

assumption, an intentional untruth to circumvent

the rights of the plaintiff.

The present cause is based on the interests of

the late Mrs. Mauricia B. Leal, and such suit had never \

been filed in any court of the land prior to the filing of

the present suit. Previously, the defendant did make a

settlement in the form of a substantial bribe to the

counsel for the class action court action herein mentioned

mentioned by the judge, in which case was dismissed

by a district judge who had a conflict of interest, and who

was directly profiting from the defendant's partition

ce

action of the lands at issue.

No judicial processing was ever taken on that suit

since judge Hinojosa took pains to kill the suit. The

pretending that that court processed the case was jor

sake of the res judicata argument, that is, to deny the

Constitutional process by the injured party. That

mentioned case never had anything to do with Mrs.

Mauricia B. Leal, and in fact, it was the scheme of the

interested parties who were profitting from the partition,

_who utilized the counsel for the plaintiffs to have them

lake a court action in an effort to later obtain a quiet

Gille to the lands at issue. Judge Hinojosa was part of

that conspiracy. The said judge docketted the case,

had the counsels for the plaintiffs bribed, and then,

threw out the case. The thus mentioned is a criminal

conspiracy in itself

No judicial process was ever exercised in the case,

and the judge never granted the motion for Specific

Jindings to ascertain for the purpose to appeal. Maybe

things are done in this manner in the courts of Mexico,

but in the United States of America, itis unconstitutional

and unlawful, and sanctions and impeachment may be

warrantied.

Literally, that case never went to court. To make such

an irresponsible claim is unamerican, and violates the

B.

United States Constitution; on due process, and equal

protection of the laws. the name of Mrs. Mauricia 8. Leal

never appeared tn the caption of the mentioned suit, and

lo compare her claims in the instant suit to that suilis a

Jraud.

The whole crux of this court action, rests on the

conduct of the district judge, who irresponsibly took

an action, disregarding ethical conduct guideknes,

and without any intelligible reasoning, committed

the grievious ERROR of granting the untimely

dismissal of the suit. The court became aware that

the preponderance of the evidence was against the

defendant, so based on the element of misconduct,

the judge committed an unintelligible act after it had

been reached by the defendant, and threw the suit

out to protect the defendant from a jury verdict.

The district judge claims it cannot understand the

claims of the petitioner, yet with scissor sharp

precision, she tears through the suit. Her reasoning

is what is unintelligible.

THE PETITIONER, recognizing that each appeal

presented to the Supreme Court of the land. has its

umique characteristics, and assuming that each Justice

of the said Court has a moral and a spiritual love and

obligation to protect and defend the United States

Constitution, its treaties,and the rights of its citizens,

out of necessity, herein responds to the aforementioned

order.

1. The district judge had never taken an active role

in the processing of the court action, prior to her

untimely dismissal. The said judge had ample time and

opportunity to call for a hearing, and/or conference, to

inquire of the mentioned case in which she brings into

the scenario the case in the district court of judge

Hinojosa. The now petitioner had a constitutional nght

to defend himself against the unfounded allegations that

the instant case was the same as the prior case.

2. The said judge had an obligation to investigate the

ex-parte information from the defendant, as to the

alledged res judicata, wherein it would have been brought

to light as an established fact, that no effective judicial

processing of the prior cause ever occurred, because

of the unethical conduct of the district judge's conflict

of interest, and the business dealings between judge and

defendant, as pertaining to the lands at issue. It also would

have been revealed, that the then defendant paid an

enormous bribe to the plaintiff's counsel, so that the

case would not be appeal. This established facts show

that the now petitioner has a constitutional right to

file this separate and different court action, based on

p.

the rights and claims of the late Mrs. Mauricia B. Leal

The petitioner never attempted to hide from the prior

suit, which did not contain the claims of the petitioner's

mother, and even such, based on the criminal conspiracy

of the McAllen judge, and the defendant's Attorneys, and

the bribed counsel for the plaintiff. the petitioner now

has the guarantees of the United States Constitution and

the involved treaties, to finally come before:the Superior

Court of the land, and ask the Honorable Court for

Justice in this matter.

3. The parties who claim ownership of the disputed

lands are now identified as (Mexican Americans) and

their claims are based on the Sun Oil financed court

partitioning of said lands, and the said Judge Hinojosa

is part of that party. It would have constituted a monetary

loss for said judge to strike down the unconstitutional

partition order, for reasons stated. It is an established

fact, that a common hatred and jealosy exists between

the Mexican Americans who came from Mexico, towards

the native born Spanish American citizen who owns the

inheritance nghts to the lands herein mentioned.

4. A realistic manner to describe the treatment which

the now petitioner endured in the courts for the Southern

District, Corpus Christi Division, was that though the suit

re

was scheduled for trial, it became a practice of the

judges to toy with the plaintiff, and bounce him from

court to court, and to attempt to intimidate the plaintiff

with threats of sanctions, so that the plaintiff would

abandon the case. The defendant defaulted in the

answering the complaint within the twenty day period,

as specified by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

yet the court ignored the request and entry for default

in favor of the plaintiff. Instead, it attempted to terrorize

the plaintiff into abandoning the suit. The whole matter

was a criminal conspiracy against the plaintiff.

The court warrants sanctions for their unethical

misconduct.

Respectfully Submitted,

#. .s {?

Seng ol fp ue au

Leopoldo Leal

Petitioner

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