Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Collard, In re (No. 07-1077)

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No. ® GRRE OF THE CLERK

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

IN RE MARY LYNN COLLARD,

Defendant-Relator.

(from STATE OF TEXAS v. COLLARD)

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

TO THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF RECORD,

CITY OF RICHARDSON,

DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS

FIRST AMENDED

ORIGINAL PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

WITH APPENDIX A

MARY LYNN COLLARD

1615 UNIVERSITY DRIVE

RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75081

Questions Presented for Mandamus

STATUTORY CHALLENGES

Does RICHARDSON, § 1-8 violate Due Process?

Does RICHARDSON, § 6-327 violate Due Process?

Does RICHARDSON, § 21-57 violate Due Process?

4. Does Art. 42.07 violate Due Process?

5. Are the relevant municipal ordinances

legislative enactments?

6. Does GOVT CODE § 25.0594(n) violate Separation

of Powers or Due Process?

7. Does Art. 45.019 foster a horrific conflict of

interest?

8. Does Art. 45.018(b) violate Due Process?

Examples of the Federal Questions to be protected

9. What meaningful Notice is due per Art.

45.018(b)?

10. Has Collard been denied a meaningful

opportunity to be heard?

11. Did CITY/STATE wait too long to serve these

“complaints?”

12. Did CITY/STATE wait too long to start trial?

13. Should the deferred disposition ever have been

revoked?

14. Is Collard a “class of one?”

15. Has CITY/STATE violated the ADA by depriving

Collard of her reading glasses?

16. Did NOAH ever have subject matter

jurisdiction?

Mandamus

17. Does mandamus apply?

18. Is KIERCE’s duty to prepare the Transcript for

the accelerated Bond appeal clear and non-

discretionary?

19. Is NOAH’s duty to dismiss clear and non-

discretionary?

20. May mandamus to the municipal court proceed

without a ruling from the county appellate

court?

Parties

The mandamus sought is directed to NOAH, with the

Municipal Court of Record, City of Richardson,

Texas, and/or to KIERCE, its Court Administrator,

in the trial matters where the parties are as follows:

Municipal Court of (public) Record

RAYMOND D. NOAH (“judge”)

KIMBERLY (KIM) KIERCE (Clerk, Court

Administrator)

Parties Plaintiff

STATE OF TEXAS

CITY OF RICHARDSON, TEXAS

PETER G. (“PETE”) SMITH,

JOE GORFIDA,

KAREN NELSON, '

with NICHOLS, JACKSON, DILLARD, HAGER &

SMITH, L.L.P. ”

Party Defendant

MARY LYNN COLLARD

1 NELSON participated in the Fifth Circuit appeal, No. 06-

10358, where (A) they obtained an extension of time by adding a

name that then made no appearance in the Brief, leaving the

Fifth Circuit out in the cold, and (B) they lost the Record on

appeal, supplying a non-clerk-certified PACER printout,

instead. Their Bricf is a humdinger, too.

* <http://www.njdhs.com/about.php>.

ill

Table of Contents

Questions Presented for Mandamus. ........................008 i

III indicus isnuasdsunttecucatesasiacnicudicnssnadukréozemnnseneminaites il

Tene OF Cited Arutiwities .....2..6..00..ccssccscessesessccssensses ix

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus .....................0.0.0..... 1

Citations to decisions below ..................cssccsccesscsscsscseee l

eee ca enduneees 1

Non-Argument Calendar Preferred ........................... 2

ROE Or SI CO isin enssicsspicn cn cnncnccincoicatensctnannsen 2

When Federal Questions Were Raised................. 2

When participation was first allowed.............. 2

In Removal by Next Friend..............00.......00..06 2

Additional details in the related cases ................. 2

Selective enforcement—5 issues; 2 years; 101

| _ eR RNP ITER SOME CSET FET AACE Ree ie mene one 2

State failed to give timely Notice—Art. 45.018(b) 3

Denial of access to the trial court ...................00008 3

No access to the Hecotd. ............2.0cs.ssscecssseeneses 3

No reading glasses—flagrant violation of ADA.

chains ACchdbit Neies& baa Ginlcbedig aad enka its cadena aaa aea 4

Progen ott OF pre-trial ooo... cicccsicctcessncnssasencvanss 4

Conscience-shocking invasion of work product.

sncmaiihecadhasubbskapaaaaedsateddabanmasonsacmaaien cadena tiler 4

De facto denial of preparation of any defense. 5

Disenfranchisement—residents v. inhabitants.... 5

Undefined scope of Municipal Code—“citizen” .... 5

Flagrant conflict of interest—clerks as

I nc nidenicctancciccedaadetrncnersacamenvessas 5

RUIN 25s cesarean teesaeuaetanah abiaiancsuanasennaiane 5

Denial of ragnt to AMOCULC .............0..cccreseeeseressionces 6

Retaliation and denial of access to appellate

| FER a ee ee a ee Ei near 7

Deferred Disposition, appeal, retaliation,

I Sik cndcendin Pacman cubed teasatpiieaeyiaen 7

Accelerated Bond appeal never left muni.

WIN i Sinead eee pans Pecks vee eae ane 12

Denial of access is thematic ...................0...c.csss00. 12

Criminal enforcement of a purely commercial

NE ii asta eG aoe 12

Richardson embraces the Fourth Reich........ 12

This is a purely commercial matter ............. 13

... therefore, no municipal court has

TR og hicisnieds hited te cau clanatadesshaastninkicen 13

No evidence of any “prohibited” conduct....... 13

Collard jailed 18 days, and for what?............ 14

Post-judgment motion to dismiss and

accompanying motion for stay...................... 14

Mandamus/stay and the state appellate courts. 15

County appellate court refuses to file/open

Uy aici skcackdaashesenuvedscoeie anaes 15

State appellate court files/opens case, twice! 15

Court of criminal appeals files/opens case. ... 16

(Unsigned?) Warrant for arrest issued............... 16

I eae ash iad lia se ciatati ni ce caidboabndbaohonabechenes 16

STATUTORY CHALLENGES ..........................226- 16

1. Does RICHARDSON, § 1-8 violate Due Process? ... 16

2. Does RICHARDSON, § 6-327 violate Due Process? 16

3. Does RICHARDSON, § 21-57 violate Due Process? 16

4. Does Art. 42.07 violate Due Process’?.................. 17

5. Are the relevant municipal ordinances legislative

I ir auakevailaivasnaaneaea 18

ee me 18

i neanbalenen 18

Entire municipal legislative process is

SMI diahentcsdentuicnddephg Wosudasesccsaiestebliensansiaete 18

6. Does Gov't CODF § 25.0594(n) violate Separation

GE I OIE EIN FINE i vnnsn xc cencedestinsesecssncses,, 18

Depriving appellate court of inherent

REE tea aes Senor Olas hE 18

Another view—presumption of validity. ....... 19

Another view-——nature of the cases................ 19

7. Does Art. 45.019 foster a horrific conflict of

| RE RSA. ASS ONO AOR RRS Ri CaO eA 20

I en WII so. stcanoncesaenbannsimsmnieie 20

COTTE GG COMRIRRIINM-OU TD. oniocc cen cicscicccecasnscsccsnens 20

8. Does Art. 45.018(b) violate Due Process? ........... 20

I a 20

Application of the statute. ...............0.......cccee. 21

Examples of the Federal Questions to be

I isacde dondtacinasdovkdcctbapidionianiamaudastonlabaldnee 22

9. What meaningful Notice is due per Art. 45.018(b)?

naiacisdinehdalcdislei dain aaa tata ddaaakadaadeacaiaead eae 22

Does the “complaint” have to be served?....... 22

Is an “arraignment” “any proceeding?” ......... 23

What constitutes waiver? .................c.cceeeeeeees 24

10.Has Collard been denied a meaningful

opportunity to be heard? ..................ccccsssecsscseceees 24

No access to the court--Boddie in berserk

Is cerca siiahredatussleseciacunadisndndpaasichactanebasahe 24

11.Did CITY/STATE wait too long to serve these

IEEE spinakicincieeniancncnatiacavacisiadasaddcesnenonkaaa 25

12.Did CITY/STATE wait too long to start trial? ... 25

13.Should the deferred disposition ever have been

AROS AEN LD Se RE AN SOBRE ON POLY eS 25

5 Oe 6 er ee 25

Equal Protection—Irrational governmental

No cisssndcecthwedcndccantnccad naaccavndantcusnemadbates 25

15.Has CITY/STATE violated the ADA by depriving

Collard of her reading glasses? ..............02....2e0000- 26

16. Did NOAH ever have subject matter jurisdiction?

sshictaisinsiaitaddedad dinars cclidteadeginiai asta 26

Failure in the institution of the prosecution. 26

Rencipaepnnt: Wi iia ios oscsansndecndeneeaenanens 26

IG issih sicvisiscconicsbataconcsaninnpnich sedasiateeacane 27

17. EGG TING CUIIG TE oa iciiinnessncesstnnnatenasrsccanincann 27

No alternative avenue of relief. ..................... 27

Clear and indieputable. ...............00..sc.scsesseseeee 27

Discretionary determination of

PGI iss iccssincisnian ncinaniscgncennicianes 28

18. Is KIERCE’s duty to prepare the Transcript for

the accelerated Bond appeal clear and non-

CORI, cs issnnrancicratiintannicastepnieganicaniaaiaionee 28

19. Is NOAH’s duty to dismiss clear and non-

CCRT ois Sic skes cintickiaecisimsbattatgaaiamates 28

Clean hands doctrine—abuse of discretion... 28

No crimes, thus no municipal! court

Sen, 5 c\ 5. ins a ten braver aeusente aoa 29

No evidence of “prohibited” conduct. ............. 29

20.May mandamus to the municipal court proceed

without a ruling from the county appellate court?.

PROTA REET re ‘tihnnannsagdliigns bekniasiiasenadiaceeteue aa

emhCO TICINO viii isteecicecesnssscidncnseee 30

VERN so iainsss sccsicnsvnspsacdsssasnnntide eee 32

Appendix A, Table of Contents......................::2.0eeee A-i

Vill

Table of Cited Authorities

Cases

Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965). .............. 23

Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379

| se EE ee oe ome Cee ER 29

Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971)............. 24

Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).

i le een id eiiaat 17

Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991). .......... 23

Collard v. Texas. US. (cert. denied 16 Jan

i iT RED, oss s sescesenevnseastuensenessuseses 2

Dillehey v. Texas, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App.

ain lar elias Gunbeanaiinaliak 7

Dixon v. United States, US 126 S. Ct. 2437

I a ha | .... 26

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). ................ 17

Ex Parte Fahey. 332 U.S. 258 (1947)...................022.. 29

Felter v. Southern Pacific Co., 359 U.S. 326 (1959). 17

Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)...................... 23

Gonzalez v. Carhart, U.S. __ (No. 05-380) (Apr. 18,

Be 1) CCAP IGTE). occcccccccncccceccsescosees ae 13, 16, 18, 26

Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). . 13,

16, 18

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)................. 23

Harris v. Hardeman, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 334 (1852). 22

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)................. 24

In re Collard, __ U.S. __ (mand. denied 2 Oct 2006)

is I Se ee 2

Intl Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310,

322 (1945) (opinion by Black, J.)......................... 23

Jones v. Flowers, _ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 1708 (2006).

sinha elisa ia Ne ae a 23

Kerr v. United States Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal.,

CE GE ee i siiaicnntiddscntceatce ities satan 27

Lioyd v. Alexander, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 365 (18083).... 22

Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940). ............. 22, 23

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306

EAU iis csten cerssinienelettadbeesibmnssscmalininiagtteinitbadasidetaa nsdn incre iat iea 23

Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc.,

ee ik ee rice csnncennniciindntidaiabaneidtcntinn 22

N. Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601

CBF ii eicicettacsinssinnsscitaninsiakenssbétitiadsemmpiamaaiieeae 23

Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447 (1978).

eiinbinchlaaiadaianeaeneaanall salaindintndbeébanaaaedudaiaicgaaaan aaa 24

Peralta v. Heights Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80 (1988).

Smith v. Commercial Equip. Leasing Co., 678 S.W.2d

917 (Tex. 1984) (Commercial Equip.). ................ 22

Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337

Pe iiiiacsssiticdnnsinidsaiiutsionnnisssssditiniestateionthdiclaaasen aan 23

United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971) (Bass)... 18

Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000).

socsitiandaitbatankaichunbasetisaseaniaieadaialadsguaaeaamaael musta 25

Statutes

42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12134, 12181-12182, 12188,

12201-12203 and 12209 (West 2005) (“ADA”).... 26

TEX. GOv’T CODE ANN. § 25.0003(a), (c) (West 2004).

scsi daleen siuivcanétetinainuiasdeinpiaanaacuaimailileaseiaenkite 19

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0004(a) (West 2004)..... 19

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 25.0594(n) (West 2004). .. 18,

shsclisalememntiniidesa aapnat leaatinsak brisbdtastinienstiasaelsbiibaienaieaa Maiden cuales 19

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 29.003 (West 2004)........... 13

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 30.00005 (West 2004)....... 13

TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 30.00014(c) (West 2004)..... 8

TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 30.00015(a) (West 2004)..... 8

TEX. GOv’T CODE ANN. § 30.00020-30.00022 (West

ia sidatericindehinndbnusnainnedpipunaiiasimanackadddudinsivanioaeine 10

UCC § 1-103 (generic) (undue influence)................. 17

Rules of Criminal Procedure

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 17.151 (West Supp.

BOE-BOOG) COArt. Ps .ccccccesccccoccscascncssssncssnacsoness 25

Se IE thcthotiekcakassticincsuienennans shesnmuaatiied>ppewiatalancaaaane ee

SI Eck itcenddccndaccuintcseencsuninenive’ sehuiuainsed dsntceauios 5 Be

SNE II Ta atsliine cicadd oaths est sada enandceneaainaondiaaeiedanielaliane 8

ao pncanneehasibaseGadinamnenenlee 8

a HII sasinsicasecndeienssieiiainast dap atiadanabiccancndutiedesamamoudasaeatds 21

Se IIIS sure dcssadebiadss cablasaediouiansstebcndans 3, 21, 22, 23

Art. 46.019 ............ RAIDEN yey POLE Pree MARIE HP 20

EET Re SO Oe TC Re MRR ST Ae 2 20

I fincas tin Je ccaSeccles skisisitakalcduatcksanacsasdiebats 21

I i Sideral iin Sucicchaabebsanssedaaae 7

Rules of Appellate Procedure

i ed os such evancennnddaciasavicsauiocaenins 12

2 SS ce 2 SS RR ee et a na an oP we 12, 28

I sc suaiah eakachanaawidundiucees 15

Richardson Municipal Code

RICHARDSON, TEX., ORDINANCES § 1.01 (2007)

I To igs scayiisthinadanniaebealniaree a, 10

BE NG occ ccancnsantanckdsctanneseccenaganars 16

RII, Se BNO ia snc chen scenconsenaneinocaniadsnansed 16

Ree, We ERIN vi siink'ccsccccccddcdsccandsndacscescdcchaane 16

I OE nD breenwic asad sspadaecinsasspecnansietics 13

RP FE Fh BN oni no cccincevncnsndcnaveccnendscvabscaasous 8

I, TP RUIN, ica sinccntronecsnsciesnadvaneanasuapiudunse 8

BEICTIAMOIION, BF 1G). cise csnccncececsssvaceserstseccsnanssns 8

PERC TEAM, BTID, vivcscccsncnceacascciecccsscacestnenesesn 7

en 0, vu coidensdieunckueepumenenses 5, 18

I I ic sash rdeidincciusindicn esatbmtunniaibe matchens 13

PEEUUATEEIIE, Gee TD, ook nsec nossvenesndencinnceannecaienceans 16

RUPEE, hk ROWE Soca paca tecucdccaposesnuchasacccensscons 13, 17

‘Treatises

1 PAGE, THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 5.7, 15.11 (rev. 2003).

sp dnenuacadbadepaes celal nsusiviadasandadasabeie elude aateleameeiaie 17

GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR

BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 42

at 434, 44 at 452 and n.16 (rev. 2d. ed. 1984). ... 17

X111

Petition for a Writ of Mandamus

Collard petitions for a writ of mandamus to the

Municipal Court of Record as follows:

Citations to decisions below

None

Jurisdiction

G) Date Orders Were Entered

Original order triggering mandamus:

“Collections” Show Cause entered 20 Sep 2007.

‘Ten-day extension of 16 October.

Supplemental Orders:

Municipal Court—

Post-judgment motion to dismiss denied 5 Nov.

Motion for stay denied 5 Nov.

County Criminal Court of Appeals—

Petition for mandamus submitted 6 & 7 Nov.;

case was never opened, or ruled on, by court.

Motion for stay submitted 6 & 7 Nov.; case never

opened, or ruled on, by court.

State appellate court—

Petition for mandamus to county appellate court

to open case; denied 19 Dec. and again 4 Jan.

State court of criminal appeals—

Petition for mandamus, as supplemented, to

county appellate court to open case; no ruling yet.

(ii) Extensions Yes, at least two.

Gul) Rule 12.5 N/A

(iv) Statutes, Jurisdiction

28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).

(v) Regarding notice of statutory challenge, Rule

29.4(b)

28 U.S.C. § 2403(b) may apply.

Non-Argument Calendar Preferred

Oral argument is not expected to aid in the

resolution of these issues.

Statement of the Case

When Federal Questions Were Raised

When participation was first allowed.

Collard wasn’t allowed access to the trial court

until the day of trial. So, the federal questions were

formally documented post-judgment.

In Removal by Next Friend.

Reference to several federal questions was made

at various times throughout the proceedings, in

particular during the time of Removal to federal

court. °

Additional details in the related cases

In re Collard (No. 05-1445) (mand. denied).

Collard v. Texas (No. 06-733) (cert. denied).

Selective enforcement—5 issues; 2 years; 101

“tickets”

City cited Collard 101 times during a two-year

period regarding five alleged problems. No

“complaints” were served; no case was taken to trial.

City simply wrote tickets. Collard knows of no other

3 STATE v. COLLARD, No. 3:06-CV-317-M (N.D. Tex. Dal.

Div.) Filed 21 February. Remanded 28 February. No. 06-10358

(5% Cir.), cert. denied, No. 06-733. Key item learned: a

pleading is not required.

case that even comes close to 101 “tickets.”

State failed to give timely Notice—Art.

45.018(b)

O 13 Feb 2006—traffic stop; arrest on warrants for

101 “housing code” “citations.”

QO 14 Feb—first “arraignment.”

This violated Art. 45.018(b) from the outset; the

“complaint” must be served at least one day before

“any proceeding.” Collard didn’t waive Notice or

plead.

QO 20 Feb—delivery of “magistrate warnings”

setting Bond.

O Same—second “arraignment.”

This also violated Art. 45.018(b). The “magistrate

warning’ and order setting Bond is not a “complaint.”

Collard didn’t waive Notice or plead.

Oo 23 Feb—hearing on something about “financial

status” as requested by State.

Nothing served. No waiver; no pleading.

QO 1 Mar—voir dire

Q Same—third “arraignment” and “trial.”

“Complaints” delivered to Collard at start of trial

proceeding. Third “arraignment” right there in front

of the advisory panel at the start of trial. Collard did

plead (Not Guilty) to all of the “citations.” Even if

such constitutes waiver for that proceeding, there are

still at least two prior “proceedings” conducted in

violation of Art. 45.018(b).

Denial of access to the trial court

No access to the Record.

QO 17 Feb (Fri.)—Collard asked for a copy of the

Record. The Clerk indicated they'd get started on

it. See No. 06-733, Mot. Contempt, R.31.

0 20 Feb (Mon.)—Collard asked again and was told

she’d get no copies of the public Record without

prior approval of State’s AG’s Office. Id. at 31-32.

Oo 27 Feb—Letter requesting guidance mailed to

Austin but faxed to one of the cc: recipients. Jd. at

41-43.

QO 1 Mar (day of trial)—State delivered

“complaints.”

No reading glasses—flagrant violation of ADA.

As is the case with many, Collard can’t read 12-

point print without her glasses. She was denied her

reading glasses during the entirety of her pre-trial

incarceration. Even if paperwork had been delivered

to her, meaningful participation was rendered

impossible. No. 06-733, R.58-59.

Frozen out of pre-trial.

Between having no glasses, or pens, or paper, or

anything but access to an exorbitantly priced phone

line and the court’s rocket-docket timing, Collard was

completely frozen out of any meaningful pre-trial

participation. No motions, no discovery, no

preparation time. The Notice of Removal was

activated using Next Friend capacity.

Conscience-shocking invasion of work product.

Since Collard’s entire pre-trial had been

prevented, under color, Collard’s husband prepared a

trial notebook for her. On the first effort to get that

to her, City’s attorney demanded access to it and full

disclosure of its contents, as did NOAH (the “judge’”).

Rather than disclose the trial strategy, the notebook

was not delivered to Collard. On the second effort,

NOAH prohibited Collard from having “work

product” (NOAH’s exact words). Both times, Collard

was not permitted to have her trial notebook.

De facto denial of preparation of any defense.

Where the judge has pre-decided the guilt of the

accused, the defendant doesn’t need lawful Notice,

access to the Record, glasses, meaningful

participation in pre-trial, or even a trial notebook.

That may work in Russia, China, or Nazi Germany,

but the law of this state hasn’t quite reached that

level of “enlightenment.” In the backwoods, barbaric

place known as America, the accused is still

supposed to have a meaningful opportunity to

prepare a defense.

Disenfranchisement—residents v. inhabitants

The inhabitants organized the entity.

RICHARDSON, § 1.01. But only residents may

participate. RICHARDSON, § 4.04 (officers, voters,

residents).

Undefined scope of Municipal Code—“citizen”

The term “citizen” is nowhere defined. Cf. U.S.

CONST. amend. 14.

Flagrant conflict of interest—clerks as

complainants

The municipal court’s clerks serve both as (A)

sworn “complainants” and as (B) custodians of those

very same Records. No. 06-733, R.48-50. 4

Undue delay

The “complaints” were filed in 2004, 2005, but not

4 What was served on 20 February were not the actual

“complaints,” but only the “magistrate warnings” with the Bond

amounts. The “complaints” weren’t served until 1 March, the

day of trial.

lod

served until the day of trial, 1 March 2006. That’s

too long. Art. 28.061.

Denial of right to allocute

o 2 Mar—denial of allocution

PROCEEDINGS [3]

(Tape 3-004-06, Side A)

> MS. COLLARD: -- go with the city of

Richardson. Many people in the community have

come forward --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. COLLARD: -- to help, and that's who we wish

to deal with. &

THE COURT: Here's what we'll do then. I think

this will suffice.

For each of the citations that you have, your fine

is going to be $200, including --

MS. COLLARD: Excuse me.

THE COURT: Excuse me. Excuse me, ma'am.

MS. COLLARD: I want to allocute.

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

MS. COLLARD: | want to allocute.

THE COURT: You want to what?

MS. COLLARD: Allocute.

THE COURT: What's that?

MS. COLLARD: Allocution.

THE COURT: You want allocution?

MS. COLLARD: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: What is allocution, ma'am?

5 Line numbers are omitted. Bold emphasis is added.

6 Practically every segment of the “official” transcript starts

well after the proceeding was underway. The issue here is

whether City was going to compel agreements with City or

allow Collard to choose contractors.

[4]

MS. COLLARD: It's what everybody gets before

sentencing.

THE COURT: Everybody gets before what?

MS. COLLARD: Sentencing.

THE COURT: Well, we'll [we’re?] just going

to go forward. I don't know what allocution is.

If you don't mind, let me finish.

Your fine on this is --

MS. COLLARD: Are you giving me --

THE COURT: Excuse me, ma'am.

MS. COLLARD: Are you giving me sentencing

now?

THE COURT: Ma'am, do you want to be

cited?

MS. COLLARD: No.

THE COURT: Be quiet until I finish your —

your sentence. Okay? Just be quiet until I

deliver your sentence. ?

Your fine will be -- look at me, please. You leave

those people in the -- I'll clear the courtroom. Your

attention is to be here, not to somebody back there in

the audience. ...

Retaliation and denial of access to appellate

court(s)

Deferred Disposition, appeal, retaliation,

‘Sudgment.”

O 2 Mar—Deferred Disposition. No. 06-733, R.53.

This is appealable. Art. 102.071, et. seq.

(convicted for purposes of costs); RICHARDSON, § 2-

198(c)(3); Dillehey, 815 S.W.2d at 626 (regarding

? But cf. Art. 42.07. Collard challenges Art. 42.07 as too

restrictive.

deferred adjudication) (thus, see RICHARDSON, § 2-

198(c)(2) ).

The first step in the appellate process is the

Motion for New Trial. Gov’r CODE § 30.00014(c). It

must be filed within “10 days” (two calendar weeks)

after the judgment to be appealed is rendered. Id.;

RICHARDSON, § 2-189(c). Then, Bond is filed within

“10 days” after that motion is denied. GOV'T CODE

§ 30.00015(a); RICHARDSON, § 2-190(a). Where a

proposed Bond is disapproved, an updated Bond

needs to be filed as directed. See Arts. 44.15, 44.16. 8

There are three different lines of appeal, here: (1)

the deferred disposition, (2) the final judgment, and

(3) the Bond. Asa brief look ahead, none of these

appeals ever really started. Not one of them. Zero.

Nada. Goose egg.

QO 6 Mar—Collard’s Motion for New Trial and

Motions to Dismiss. No. 06-733, R.57-84.

Same—hearing set for 14 March.

13 Mar—Collard’s Analysis of the Charging

Instruments, Speedy Trial Violation Notice, and

Motion to Dismiss. No. 06-733, R.45-51.

QO 14 Mar—NOAH, not aware (?) of the 1991 rule

change (15 years prior) allowing appeal of

“deferred,” threatened to violate Collard: if she

wanted to appeal, he’d revoke the “deferred

disposition” and enter a “final judgment.” Sole

basis for revocation?—Collard’s Motion for New

Trial regarding “deferred.” Key, no ruling was

8 See also http://www. 1l4thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/Case/

Opinions/052500/990090f.PDF (unpublished dissent discusses

legislative history); Art. 44.07 (right to appeal shall not be

abridged).

entered on the Motion for New Trial. Not

knowing instantly how to respond to NOAH’s

shocking and monstrous criminal conduct from

the bench, Collard left to reflect on the options.

Oo Same—Collard filed formal DEMAND FOR

RULING regarding her motion. No. 06-733,

R.100-14. Formal assertion of criminal conduct

by NOAH, among others. Service of DEMAND on

law enforcement personnel.

QO Same—Clerk’s Notice of sua sponte extension to

file motions for new trial regarding the two traffic

cases. 9 No. 05-1445, App. A.

Qo 20 Mar—First Supplemental Motion for New

Trial and Motions to Dismiss regarding the two

“traffic ticket” cases (responsive to sua sponte

extension).

G 21 Mar—Letter Notice of Orders (A) denying

motion for new trial and (B) revoking deferred

disposition and entering Judgment, without

any cause, reason, or basis other than

Collard’s having activated the appellate

process for “deferred.” This letter refers to the

101 Ordinance matters, so it’s an error to say that

the related motion for new trial was filed on 20

March; that one was filed on 6 March and had the

hearing on the 14th. Cf. next Letters, referring to

20 March motions for the “traffic ticket” matters.

10 No. 05-1445, App. A.

Oo Same—Letter Notice of Order denying motion for

% Due date asserted, Fri., 24 March, counts 10 calendar days,

which is too short; proper is on or about Tues. 28 March.

10 Due date asserted, Fri., 31 March, counts 10 calendar days,

which is too short; proper is on or about Tues., 4 April.

new trial, filed 20 March, regarding one of the

“traffic ticket” matters. '! No. 05-1445, App. A.

OQ Same—Letter Notice of Order denying motion for

new trial, filed 20 March, regarding the other

“traffic ticket” matter. '? No. 05-1445, App. A.

OQ 24 Mar—Collard’s Confirmation of her Notice of

Appeal—*“Deferred Adjudication.”

Q Same—Collard’s Motion for New Trial Regarding

the Final Judgment(s) and Bond and her Motions

to Dismiss.

0 Same—Collard’s Confirmation of her Notice of

Appeal—“Final Judgment.”

0 Same—Collard’s Confirmation of her Notice of

Appeal—Bond.

O Same—Collard’s Section 2-191 Instructions

Regarding Appeal of the “Final Judgment.”

oO Same—Collard’s Section 2-191 Instructions

Regarding Appeal of Bond.

QO 10 Apr—Entry date of “order” signed 3 April that

effectively denies access to the appellate court. '’

No. 05-1445, App. A.

0 12 Apr—Collard’s Confirmation of the Appellate

Timetable (Subtitle: Even More Confirmation

That NOAH Should Have Self-Recused)

QO 18 Apr—Collard’s Appeal Bond, Versions 1

(Personal Recognizance) and 2 ($20,686) (both

11 Due date asserted, Fri., 31 March, counts 10 calendar days,

which is too short; proper is on or about Tues., 4 April

12 Due date asserted, Fri., 31 March, counts 10 calendar days,

which is too short; proper is on or about Tues., 4 April.

13 They may be mutually exclusive provisions, but denial of

the motion isn’t necessarily the last word. See GOV'T CODE

§§ 30.00020-30.00022.

designed to allow NOAH to renounce).

OQ 26 Apr—Collard’s Conditional Request for a

Certificate of Right to Appeal

Oo 26 May—DTPA Demand Letter sent to Fuller &

Assocs. for failure to produce the full consolidated

Record as contracted for. Tortious interference by

municipal court personnel regarding content of

Statement of Facts.

0 27 May—tTrial Record sent to county court of

appeals.

° 7 Jul—County court of appeals, without even

opening a case on appeal, reviewed the Record,

found no Bond that it considered suitable, and

returned the case to the municipal court. Where

there is not even a Case No., much less an order,

Collard has nothing to appeal up to a higher

court. The game that the municipal court was

playing was this. Collard paid the $25 fee for the

appeal, but the municipal court wanted $25 per

case number, or 103 x $25, or $2,575.

Therefore, the municipal court prepared only one

case for appeal, and there was no Bond submitted

for just one case. Bottom line, the county court of

appeals didn't want to touch it, which is

understand-able, but without even a Case No.,

much less an order, Collard could appeal no

farther. From one view, it’s just one more layer of

denial of access. From Collard’s view, it was

strong encouragement to renounce and to dismiss!

This is the sole mention of approval or

disapproval of any Bond. No Case No.; no order;

purely administrative.

GO 21 Jul (2006)—Collard’s Appeal Bond—Versions

3 ($41,372) (detailed facts) and 4 ($41,372) (brief

facts).

0 20 Sep (2007)—NOAH’s Show Cause “order,”

saying (A) that all appeals have been denied, and

(B) that all fines for all offenses are now due and

payable.

Accelerated Bond appeal never left muni. court!

Collard appealed the Bond. It’s an accelerated

appeal. '* Tex. R. App. P. 31. It was already late

when No. 05-1445 was filed. The law doesn’t matter;

no one with that trial court had any intention of

preparing a consolidated Transcript.

Denial of access is thematic

Thus, Collard was denied access to the Record of

her own cases, a public Record, maintained in one of

State’s few and select municipal courts of (public)

Record, from start (Notice of Removal) to finish

(appeal of Bond).

Criminal enforcement of a purely commercial

matter

Richardson embraces the Fourth Reich.

As illustrated in the Appendix, City has no

problem with the idea of issuing dictatorial

mandates—‘“thou shalt’s.” City also has no problem

criminalizing the act of declining to kiss the

jackboots, i.e., of “disobeying” the “thou shalt’s.”

Since it’s safe to presume that City has heard of

Normandy (Omaha; Utah), it follows that City spits

on a LOT of graves!

‘4 The clerk must send the clerk's record and the court

reporter must send the reporter's record to the appellate court

within 15 days after the notice of appeal is filed (matures, takes

effect). TEX. R. APP. P. 31.1.

This is a purely commercial matter ...

A “thou shalt” might very well be or become part

of an enforceable commercial agreement.

Mandamus may exist. But criminalizing the act of

not complying with a “thou shalt,” outside the

context of a fiduciary obligation, rather screamingly

violates the entire point of the criminal system. So,

(A) where’s a valid trust agreement (no such thing

was offered into evidence)? or (B) where’s the

prohibited conduct (no such thing in these

ordinances)? Cf. Carhart (citing Grayned, 408 U.S.

at 108).

... therefore, no municipal court has jurisdiction.

Municipal courts (of (public) Record) have

jurisdiction over criminal matters only. GOVT CODE

§§ 29.003, 30.00005 (option to include civil);

RICHARDSON, § 2-180 (civil option not activated).

No evidence of any “prohibited” conduct.

Four of the five areas are “thou shalt” matters.

One, however, namely fence construction without a

permit, at least reads as a “thou shalt not.”

RICHARDSON, § 6-201. But, even if it were humanly

conceivable to criminalize putting up or working on

a fence on one’s own property, there’s still no

evidence that Collard, at any time, ever, in the

entirety of the relevant time period, or before that

time period, or even to this very day, did any fence

construction of any type, kind, or nature, with or

without any permit! !§6 Thus, that one is nothing but

'S Not here, though, due to adhesion. See RICHARDSON, § 21-

57.

16 There are two ways to address this. One involves a Stay at

least long enough to allow State to respond (with silence, for

a malicious prosccution from the outset, as well.

Collard jailed 18 days, and for what?

Since the reason(s) for the arrest were the i101

“housing code” “citation” warrants, Collard wasn’t

merely threatened with criminal sanctions in City’s

effort to attempt to collect on a commercial matter.

She was kidnapped, held for ransom, extorted from

via use of the mail, maliciously prosecuted, denied

access to the courts, and violated in her rights of

property and lberty, generally, all by a “judge” that

never had the jurisdiction he thought he had.

Post-judgment motion to dismiss and

accompanying motion for stay

Collard filed her post-judgment motions to

dismiss and for stay on 29 Oct. in the municipal court

of (public) Record. The document containing both

motions consists of 22 Points and is 47 pages,

including Table of Contents and Table of Authorities.

Notice for hearing was dated 1 Nov. Hearing was

held on 5 Nov., and NOAH denied both motions.

Perhaps some people just read very quickly.

there is no evidence). That’s the time and cost efficient process.

Alternatively, where a full Statement of Facts may be needed in

order to verify this “no evidence” point, what Collard has is in

8.5x11, but booklet format can certainly be produced. Since

State, through its officers and agents, has gone to so much

trouble to prevent the review of this matter in the normal

course, Collard has no problem considering that, alone, as proof

of her “no evidence” position. In short, even if Notice 1s

somehow rendered irrelevant, and if denial of access, both at

trial and on appeal, is somehow rendered irrelevant, thus, that

jurisdiction existed in a municipal court for those “charges,”

those charges should be dismissed due to “no evidence.”

Mandamus/stay and the state appellate courts

County appellate court refuses to file/open case.

Collard submitted her petition for mandamus and

her motion for stay to the county criminal court of

appeals in person on 6 Nov. The clerk refused to file

it. Collard then mailed it that same day. Her

petition, verified on 4 Nov., consists of 25 Points and

is 68 pages, including Table of Contents, Index of

Authorities, and listing of the contents of the

Appendix. The Appendix consists of 20 documents,

including prior rulings and first pages of relevant

appellate time-table motions, and another document

containing the relevant statutes and ordinances of

focus, a total of 42 pages. The complete petition is

110 pages. The motion for stay is three pages.

Neither the mandamus nor the stay has even been

filed as of the date this supplement is being printed.

State appellate court files/opens case, twice!

The state appellate court (1) acted according to

law, TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1, but (2) hasn’t made the

county appellate (not trial) court do the same. On

the one hand, upon submission of the mandamus

petition, the state appellate court filed the petition

and opened a case. On the other, in No. 05-07-01613-

CV, they subtly suggest that this case raises an issue

of first impression. Even if that were basis to deny

this mandamus, they refused to address the issue!

Thus, it’s still an issue of first impression!

That was the first panel. The second panel

completely missed the boat by subtly suggesting that

Collard needed to present an order to be reviewed via

mandamus. See No. 05-07-01760-CV.

Court of criminal appeals files/opens case.

Compelled to do so, Collard filed a mandamus

with the court of criminal appeals. If 01613 is right,

there won’t be any mandamus to the county court; if

mandamus follows, a filing is still not a ruling!

(Unsigned?) Warrant for arrest issued

The municipal court now demands Collard pay

more than $28,000, immediately, or else go to jail.

But no warrant Notice delivered to Collard is signed.

Argument

STATUTORY CHALLENGES

1. Does RICHARDSON, § 1-8 violate Due

Process?

RICHARDSON, § 1-8(a)(1) looks to prohibitions.

This is consistent with Carhart (Grayned).

However §§ 1-8(a)(2) and (3) criminalize an

alleged failure to comply with the equivalent of a

legislative mandate. There is no definition of any

prohibited conduct. “Do what we tell you to do, or

go to jail!” This is flagrantly inconsistent with

Carhart.

2. Does RICHARDSON, § 6-327 violate Due

Process?

Since RICHARDSON, § 6-327(a) incorporates § 1-8,

§ 6-327 also violates Due Process. Carhart.

3. Does RICHARDSON, § 21-57 violate Due

Process?

The Statement of Facts includes voir dire about

“home owners associations.” There is no known

agreement signed by Collard regarding any such

association, and none was introduced into evidence.

Therefore, if that concept applies, at all, it’ll be

because someone thinks that participation in a

“home owners association” can be legislatively

mandated, 1.e., that RICHARDSON, § 21-57 is valid.

No compelled agreement is valid. Burger King,

471 U.S. at 486. Cf. Social Security cannot be

compelled; use of “funny money” cannot be

compelled; wills cannot be compelled; see 1 PAGE,

THE LAW OF WILLS §§ 5.7, 15.11; trusts cannot be

compelled; BOGERT & BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS

AND TRUSTEES §§ 42 at 434, 44 at 452 and n.16;

commercial agreements cannot be compelled; see

UCC, typically § 1-103 (regarding the defense of

undue influence). See also Felter (recognizing a

statutory right to be free from compelled consent

regarding an agreement). In sum, no evidence of any

type, kind, or nature, is relevant or competent where

there’s compelled consent. See Escobedo v. Illinois

and Miranda.

Thus, § 21-57 is facially void as violating public

policy.

4. Does Art. 42.07 violate Due Process?

The entire point of allocution is to raise all

reasons why sentencing should not proceed. The

instant all legal remedies have been exhausted, the

doors to equity fly wide open. To limit that discussion

at that time multiplies the proceeding by compelling

an appeal that might not otherwise be needed.

Thus, Art. 42.07 is unduly restrictive.

5. Are the relevant municipal ordinances

legislative enactments?

Where's the legislature?

See Bass, 404 U.S. at 347-48 (rule of lenity—(1)

common language (2) legislatively enacted). Since

there is no lawful legislative enactment, here, these

ordinances violate Equal Protection and Due Process.

Disenfranchisement.

ENTIRE MUNICIPAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IS

FLAWED.

The “incorporation” provisions in the Municipal

Code, City of Richardson, state that the inhabitants

comprise the body politic. See RICHARDSON, § 1.01.

However, only residents are allowed (1) to vote and

(2) to hold (legislative, etc.) office. See e.g.

RICHARDSON, § 4.04 (officers, voters, residents). This

instantly amounts to “taxation without

representation,” among other non-representation

problems, which renders the entire Municipal Code

for City of Richardson invalid on its face.

Where the inhabitants are facially excluded, as an

entire class, then, if the process, here, is legislative at

all, it is entirely defeated, meaning that there is not

one word of the Municipal Code, City of Richardson,

that provides Notice of any proscribed conduct. Cf.

Carhart (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108).

6. Does GOv’T CODE § 25.0594(n) violate

Separation of Powers or Due Process?

Depriving appellate court of inherent authority.

In the event Texas is not the only jurisdiction

dealing with this, it may be valuable to address this

statute. GOv’T CODE § 25.0594(n) says this:

(n) Sections 25.0003(a) and (c) do not apply to a

county criminal court of appeals in Dallas County.

By depriving this appellate court, generally, of its

civil authority, this language appears to deprive the

court of its mandamus authority, in particular.

No legislature may deprive an appellate court of

that court’s inherent authority to protect its

appellate authority. Therefore, this statute appears

to violate Separation of Powers and Due Process.

Another view—presumption of validity.

Presuming the statute valid, and reading it in a

way that would render it valid, another way to read

this limitation comes from understanding that the

general language for county courts grants them both

civil and criminal jurisdiction. GOVT CODE

§ 25.0003(a), (c). Therefore, if the purpose of

§ 25.0594(n) is to distinguish civil from criminal,

then the statute, as so construed, accomplishes that

purpose, in a rather cryptic and confusing manner.

Gov't CODE § 25.0004(a) supports the conclusion

that, despite § 25.0594(n), the county criminal court

of appeals has mandamus authority.

Another view—nature of the cases.

Another way the statute might be just fine and

the county criminal appellate court still not have

jurisdiction to address mandamus is where the

underlying case is simply not a criminal case. The

one case originally prepped by the municipal court

for appeal was one of the housing code cases, namely

N101355A. The county court of appeals never

opened a case and simply returned the “Record” to

the municipal court, making reference to the Bond.

7. Does Art. 45.019 foster a horrific conflict of

interest?

Clerks as verify-ers.

Art. 45.019 allows the clerks to verify complaints.

(e) A complaint in municipal court may be sworn

to before:

(1) the municipal judge;

(2) the clerk of the court or a deputy clerk;

(3) the city secretary; or

(4) the city attorney or a deputy city attorney.

Art. 45.019(e)(2).

Clerks as complain-ers.

It does not authorize the clerks also to be a/the

hearsay complainant. There’s nothing about Art.

45.019 that even remotely contemplates that the

clerks will also serve as non-witness complainants.

Where the complainant is also a custodian of the

public Record, there arises a rather blatant conflict.

All cases in which clerks are both custodians of

Record and non-witness complainants should be

dismissed on their face. In the future, verifying and

complaining should be strictly separated, or screened

(as is done within large organizations to avoid

conflict/privilege issues). Otherwise, this statute

needs to be modified to prevent the temptation of

doing both the verifying and the complaining.

8. Does Art. 45.018(b) violate Due Process?

The statute, itself.

Art. 45.018. Complaint [Municipal Court}

(a) For purposes of this chapter, a complaint is a

sworn allegation charging the accused with the

commission of an offense.

(b) A defendant is entitled to notice of a

complaint against the defendant not later

than the day before the date of any

proceeding in the prosecution of the defendant

under the complaint. The defendant may waive

the right to notice granted by this subsection.

Art. 45.018 (emphasis added).

If read literally, this purports to dispense with

Notice altogether. How does anyone plead to a

“complaint” unless and until that “complaint” is both

filed and served? Obviously, a party may waive

Notice, at least the timing aspect. But, where the

party does not waive Notice, in any aspect, this

language appears to allow “no Notice,” anyway, at

least in terms of timing.

Application of the statute.

If the statute is not the problem, then the focus

becomes the application of it. Where there is no

waiver, and where the statute requires both filing

and serving timely the “complaint,” then the

widespread practice defies the statute. Key in the

application here is whether an “arraignment”

constitutes “any proceeding.” Per Art. 45.0215(a),

which deals with cases against minors, there’s no

question that the “arraignment” is a “proceeding” for

purposes of Art. 45.018(b). Thus, where there’s (A)

an “arraignment,” (B) no waiver of Notice, which

waiver surely has to be “of Record,” somehow, and

best is “in writing,” whether it’s a court “of Record” or

not, cf. TEX. R. Civ. Evib. 509 (physician-patient

privilege can’t be waived without signed writing), and

that “arraignment,” then there is no Notice, thus a

void judgment. Harris, 55 U.S. at 339 (cited in

Commercial Equip., 678 S.W.2d at 918; Milliken;

Peralta; Lloyd, 5 U.S. at 366 (“A citation not served is

as no citation.”).

Examples of the Federal Questions to be

protected

9. What meaningful Notice is due per Art.

45.018(b)?

Does the “complaint” have to be served?

See Art. 45.018(b). See also Murphy Bros., Inc.;

Lloyd, 5 U.S. at 366 (“A citation not served is as no

citation.”). All that was served on Collard was

“notice” that a “complaint” existed. That came via

the “magistrate warning” that included a setting of

(pre-trial) Bond.

That is one way to read Art. 45.018(b). But,

where “notice of a complaint” doesn’t mean “the

actual complaint, itself,” then where’s the Notice?

Not one of the “magistrate warnings” even identifies

a statute allegedly violated, much less how.

{Hypothetically:] “A criminal charge has been filed

against you. How do you plead?” “Io what?” “l'o the

criminal charge?” “What is the charge?” “Do you

want to be charged with contempt, too?” “No.”

“Then, how do you plead?” “To what?” “OK! You’re

now cited for contempt! You sit in jail until you

decide how you’re going to plead!”

If “complaints” don’t ever have to be served, then

why did State even bother delivering them on the

day of trial? If the “ticket” is sufficient, or if the

“magistrate warning” is sufficient, then why ever

serve the “complaint?”

In other words, the system cannot willfully and

blatantly run roughshod over its own rules in

manifest bad faith. Therefore, since it’s clear that

the “complaint” must be served, the focus is simply a

matter of timing.

a> 4

Is an “arraignment” “any proceeding?”

Why serve the “complaint?” Meaningful Notice;

meaningful opportunity to be heard. Milliken (Notice,

opportunity to be heard, fair play, substantial

justice); Int? Shoe (Notice, opportunity to be heard);

Mullane (Notice, opportunity to be heard);

Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552 (Notice, meaningful time,

meaningful manner); Sniadach (Notice, opportunity

to be heard); Fuentes v. Shevin (Notice, meaningful

time); N. Gu. Finishing (Notice, opportunity to be

heard, even for corporations (i.e., the shareholders));

Burns (Notice, opportunity to be heard, on upward

departure); Hamdi (denial of access and of

opportunity to be heard); Jones (Notice, opportunity

to be heard).

Where the “complaint” has to be served, not a

“ticket,” not a “magistrate warning,” but the

“complaint,” itself, then it’s impossible to say that

State ever gave Collard Notice of anything at least

“the day before” any relevant proceeding.

Since the “complaints” weren’t served until the

day of trial, NOAH’s first “arraignment,” NOAH’s

second “arraignment,” and even NOAH’s third

“arraignment,” right there in front of the panel, were

all conducted in violation of Art. 45.018(b). Collard

received copies of the “complaints,” some of which

had been filed two years prior, at trial.

So, State willfully never complhed with Art.

45.018(b).

What constitutes waiver?

Obviously, Notice may be waived. Entering a plea

without demanding delivery of the “complaint”

reasonably constitutes waiver. Entering a plea

without demanding timely delivery of the

“complaint” might also.

NOAH conducted two “arraignments” during

Collard’s 17-day (pre-trial) incarceration. Is that

excused where Collard enters pleas at trial, i.e., at

the third “arraignment,” and not to any “complaints

but only to the “citations?” Did Collard waive Notice

nunc pro tunc by pleading at that third

“arraignment?” How many swings at the pinata does

a court get? Cf. Ohralik (limiting “in person”

solicitation; thus, limiting duress, coercion, and

undue influence as engaged in by the legal

profession). Does that horse really go back into that

barn? Is there no “bank robbery” where the “money”

is returned?

”

10. Has Collard been denied a meaningful

opportunity to be heard?

No access to the court—Boddie in berserk

extreme.

Boddie (denial of access to the court). No glasses.

No pre-trial motions or discovery. No Record for

trial. No trial notebook—horrific, conscience-

shocking violation of Hickman v. Taylor. Total

prevention of preparation of any defense. No

allocution allowed, under threat of “citation”

(“contempt”). Retaliation for appealing the “deferred

disposition,” via revocation of “deferred” without one

ounce of justification and entering “final judgment.”

No Record for any of the three lines of appeal,

especially the accelerated Bond appeal. Then, the

county court of appeals never even opened a case or

entered any ruling but just made an oblique

reference to Bond in a letter and sent it all back to

the municipal court.

11. Did CITY/STATE wait too long to serve

these “complaints?”

What process is due? The complaints were filed

in 2004, 2005, but not served until the day of trial, 1

March 2006. That’s too long. Art. 28.061.

12. Did CITY/STATE wait too long to start

trial?

What process is due? CITY/STATE arrested

Collard on 13 Feb., but didn’t start trial until

1 March. Art. 17.151 § 1(4) allows only five days

(effectively one calendar week) between the arrest

and the trial where the accused is incarcerated the

entire time. Thus, 17 days is too long.

13. Should the deferred disposition ever have

been revoked?

What process is due? The sole reason NOAH

revoked the deferred disposition was Collard’s appeal

of that ruling. Retaliation is not a lawful reason to

revoke “deferred” or to enter “judgment.”

14. is Collard a “class of one?

Equal Protection—Irrational governmental

activity.

See Village of Willowbrook (“class of one” fully

recognized where intentional, irrational, reproducible

governmental action is involved).

15. Has CITY/STATE violated the ADA by

depriving Collard of her reading glasses?

As is the case with many, Collard can see just

fine, but can’t read without her glasses. NOAH never

allowed her to have them until trial. In addition to

denial of access, this may violate the ADA.

16. Did NOAH ever have subject matter

jurisdiction?

Failure in the institution of the prosecution.

Highly selective enforcement. No Notice. No

opportunity to be heard. Denial of access. Malicious

prosecution.

Incompetent statutes.

All of the statutes address what is, at best, a

purely commercial matter. City’s “complaints” may

be filed in a court of civil jurisdiction, not of

“criminal only” jurisdiction.

The one statute that even pretends to prohibit

something (no fence construction without a permit)

has no evidence to support the charge. But, even if

the evidence existed, it’s difficult to see the

commercial nexus justifying a criminal charge. So,

even if the analysis survived the failure in the

institution of the prosecution, this one would still be

a jurisdictional question, not merely a matter of

proving a defense, see Dixon, which NOAH totally

prevented Collard from doing.

The other statutes prohibit nothing, which

renders them void for purposes of criminal

enforcement. Cf. Carhart.

Mandamus

17. Does mandamus apply?

No alternative avenue of relief.

Reviewing Kerr, 426 U.S. at 403, Collard is

satisfied that no other alternative exists. By reciting

that “All appeals have been denied,” knowing full

good and well that they never got out of the starting

gate, NOAH confirms his intent to prevent all

appeals. To be sure, it’s not that Collard hasn’t bent

over backwards, double, fourteen ways from Sunday,

to activate the appellate process. Thus, :«’s not that

the appellate process isn’t theoretically available.

It’s that she’s been thwarted, opposed, even violated,

at every turn. Thus, it’s manifest misstaisment of

fact to say, “All appeals have been denied.” What’s

true and correct is that all Collard’s “efforts at

appeal” have been denied and rejected and even

abused.

So, this isn’t a substitute for appeal. It’s the

blasting cap for it. If appeal is even still available,

it’s going to take a mandamus lv serve as the super-

hydraulics-driven, diamond-tipped, down-hole drill

bit to crack the granite encasement in which NOAH

has buried this entire appellate effort, “with a little

help from his friends,” of course.

Clear and indisputable.

It’s interesting that it’s easier to obtain an arrest

warrant than a mandamus! Maybe it should be that

way, but it is a fascinating contrast in this fact

pattern. Collard was arrested because someone

thought some wood needed some paint, but to

convince an appellate Court to exercise mandamus

requires Collard to establish a “clear and

indisputable” position. Seems backwards, somehow,

but here we are.

Collard is satisfied that the verified facts in this

petition and in all the available Records, all of which

are subject to Judicial Notice, more than satisfy the

“clear and indisputable” element. State’s silence in

response will more than confirm this, as well.

Discretionary determination of appropriateness.

If this is a “blood pressure” test or a “smell” test,

Collard is confident that the facts in this case more

than suffice.

18. Is KIERCE’s duty to prepare the Transcript

for the accelerated Bond appeal clear and

non-discretionary?

Collard sure reads it that way! See TEx. R. APP.

P. 31.1. Resolution of the Bond amount issue would

substantially encourage NOAH at least to address

the Bond issue, if not also assuage the county court

of appeal’s concerns.

19. Is NOAH’s duty to dismiss clear and non-

discretionary?

Clean hands doctrine—abuse of discretion.

As a place to start, regardless of the validity of

the issues for the appeal, while Collard isn’t trying to

promote dismissal out of the trial court as a

substitute for the appeal, where the trial court goes

to so much trouble to prevent the appeal, mandated

dismissal seems fully in order. Per a “clean hands”

doctrine analogy, City/State cannot be heard to

benefit from its manifest bad faith and lawlessness

in the matter. If this is the example of how State

encourages its agents to treat people, State should be

dismissed out in every case of this type that.exists.

Cf. Ex Parte Fahey (mandamus is reserved for the

extreme cases); Will, 389 U.S. at 95 (mandamus

appropriate to address “usurpation of power’);

Bankers Life, 346 U.S. at 383 (mandamus

appropriate to address “clear abuse of discretion”).

Fundamentally, per the statutory analysis alone,

NOAH should have dismissed this one out before it

ever got started. Instead, he drooled over getting to

sign all those “magistrate warnings” with the Bond

(money, money, money) amounts.

No crimes, thus no municipal court jurisdiction.

Either these matters are criminal or they aren’t.

A “home owners’ association” dispute, if that’s what

this is, is a commercial, not a criminal, matter. Such

matters have no business being filed in a court of

“criminal case only” jurisdiction. Thus, dismissal

here is non-discretionary.

No evidence of “prohibited” conduct.

There is no evidence of any violation of the only

statute that even comes close to defining a

prohibition. Therefore, dismissal] is non-

discretionary.

20.May mandamus to the municipal court

proceed without a ruling from the county

appellate court?

Where the county appellate court refuses to act,

what else can a frozen-out party do?

Remedies Requested

Collard requests

That this Court assert its supervisory authority in

aid of its appellate jurisdiction, and, if time is

needed for complete review, issue a Stay of any

and all further proceedings in the Municipal

Court of Record regarding these 103 matters, in

particular the “hearing” set for 16 October (two

weeks hence);

That this Court issue a writ of certiorari to the

Municipal Court of Record in the event that

confirmation of what is and what is not of Record,

e.g., for the “no evidence” point, need be

established in that manner;

. That this Court allow her to submit any

additional information or documents that the

Court finds necessary;

That this Court give City/State and all interested

parties the opportunity to respond to this verified

petition, so that the shame of their silence may be

heard from sea to shining sea;

. That this Court supply supervisory guidance, and

if necessary, issue a writ of mandamus;

. That the guidance or mandamus encourage

dismissal, or, if that’s jumping too far ahead, then

encourage preparation of the accelerated Bond

appeal;

As much discussion on the issues presented and

necessarily included as this case may allow;

. The opportunity to brief any additional issues the

Court may identify;

9. The non-argument calendar. Oral argument is

not expected to aid in the resolution of these

issues;

10.That costs be taxed to NOAH, and then perhaps

also to City and State, jointly and severally; and

11.Any and all other relief at law, in equity or sui

generis to which she may show herself justly

entitled.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Mary Lynn Collard

Mary Lynn Collard

I reserve all my rights

1615 University Drive

Richardson, Texas 75081

Verification

Per 28 U.S.C. § 1746, under the penalty of

perjury, I, Mary Lynn Collard, depose and declare (or

certify, verify or state), that I am at least 21 years of

age, that I am competent to make this Affidavit, that

I have personal knowledge of these facts, and that

these facts are true and correct.

The facts stated in this First Amended Petition

for a Writ of Mandamus are true and correct.

Further, Declarant sayeth not.

_ 4 the |

Executed on this the ¥ —— of February, 2008

/s/ Mary Lynn Collard

Mary Lynn Collard, Declarant

Appendix A

Table of Contents

Rule 14.1(i)(i)—Appellate Opinion ......................... A-1

Original appellate effort—None..................0....5 A-1

2006 July 7 Letter (appeal not even filed) ....... A-1

Current mandamus effort—None..................0065 A-2

Rule 14.1(4)(1i)—Additional Orders......................... A-3

I NN ig cise iad os sc esac paeeen amends A-3

2007 Sep 20—“Collections” Show Cause

PUI cia archers ta ah latch intetti Seatac anghal clas A-3

2007 Oct 16—Extension, with threat of arrest .

REAR ae OMEN IER ARE eR DIONE ena ARE HM ROR A-5

2006 Mar 2—Deferred Disposition .............. A-6

2006 Mar 2—Extension Agreement (one traffic

I circa tac sckea intel eres teaakaciainacnmaiainn cece A-6

2006 Mar 2——Application for Driver Safety

Course (the other traffic case)................. A-6

2006 Mar 14—Extensions of Time regarding

I ae iueectadedad A-7

2006 Mar 20 and 21—Rulingg...................... A-7

2006 Apr 10—Ruling denying mandamus... A-7

2007 Dec 18 State appellate court didn’t order

county appellate court to file/open case............. A-7

OI NS anti AY SOE RTI A-7

RI oh hci eras Core chiia a Weleda tancieaed A-9

A-l

2008 Jan 4 Second state appellate panel’s ruling

Rh A I i seins eicsscesatacccinteniesaepaierinee A-10

RI detiicrashixsskesNanesdaaacdeaeatcenicaetaasanenal A-10

BIE 5 ct eeicaiccsctiaamtadeceneen ee A-11

2007 Dec 28 State court of criminal appeals files

BOUIEION, GRINS GIOD. kisiiscdccdinccsinmnnnaedsdas A-13

Postcard Notice of filing/opening case ..A-13

Rule 14.1()(iii)—Rehearing, or other extension ..A-14

Most recent-—-14 December ...................cecceceeees A-14

Rule 14.1(0)(iv)—Judgment of different date........ A-14

Judgment(s) of 2006 Mar 20 and 21................ A-14

Rule 14.1()(v)—Statutes and Rules .............0....... A-14

Richardson Municipal Code.......................22000 A-14

Nowhere defined——“citizen.” ..............000.02... A-14

Sec. 1-9. Severability of parts of Code........ A-14

Sec. 1-8. General penalty; continuing

| aS RTD ARTE NoPE OCR MEO A-15

Re A I rise dsnssckcce ncn A-16

ete. a1 Ei BI aie ics on dca nccenssccccenen A-17

Sec. 6-356. Responsibilities of occupant.....A-17

Sec. 6-367. Structural standards................ A-18

Sec. 6-201. Permit required. ....................08. A-19

Sec. 6-202. Inspection and maintenance.... A-19

A-il

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. ANN................ccceeeceees A-24

Art. 42.07. [773] [860-861] Reasons to Prevent

RE Ee oe Sete Pen OOM EAS A-24

Art. 45.018. Complaint [Municipal Court]. A-25

Art. 45.0215. Plea by Minor and Appearance of

ha a a A-26

Art. 17.151. RELEASE BECAUSE OF

I ene oe eo A-26

I CI, CD soci cvvckecn dakcdndecnacackecetes A-28

RN ARIE INA oO DoS res A-28

Rule 14.1(i)(vi)—Additional Essential Materials. A-29

Case Nos. for the 103 complaints.................... A-29

Example of the “magistrate warning” and pre-

oii tins d Concladnmicusgnd sasuubieonniesaneubheniens A-29

A-11

Appendix A

Rule 14.1(i)(i}—Appellate Opinion

Original appellate effort—None

No appellate case number; no order. Just the letter.

2006 July 7 Letter (appeal not even filed)

(SEAL OF THE COUNTY OF DALLAS STATE OF

TEXAS)

DALLAS COUNTY

County Clerk

Cynthia Figueroa Calhoun

July 7, 2006

Richardson Municipal Court

P.O. Box 830978

Richardson, TX 75083-0978

RE: State of Texas vs. MARY LYNN COLLARD

Cause No. N101355A

FAILURE TO MAINTAIN BUILDING

Enclosed you will find a case that was sent to County

Criminal Court of Appeals No. 1 to file as an appeal

on a Court of Records case.

This case is unable to be filed because there isn’t a

correct appeal bond in the file.

If you have any questions, please contact me at (214)

653-5702.

SINCERELY,

A-1

/s/ Tania Robinson

TANIA ROBINSON

CHIEF CLERK

COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT OF APPEALS NO. 1

ce: Mary Lynn Collard

Frank Crowley Courts Building 133 N. Industrial

Blvd. Dallas Texas 75207-4313 (214) 653-5700

Current mandamus effort—None

A-2

Rule 14.1(i)(ii}—Additional Orders

Municipal Court

2007 Sep 20—“Collections” Show Cause “order”

CAUSE NO. (See Attachment A) '

THE STATE OF TEXAS §_ IN THE

§ MUNICIPAL COURT

VS. § FORTHE CITY OF

§ RICHARDSON

MARY LYNN COLLARD§ DALLAS COUNTY,

TEXAS

NOTICE TO APPEAR

You, the Defendant named above, are hereby notified

to personally appear before the Richardson

Municipal Court located at 2100 East Campbell

Road, Richardson, Texas 75081 for an Indigency and

Show Cause Hearing on:

OCTOBER 16, 2007 at 8:00 A.M.

before said court regarding two (2) traffic violations

and the City Ordinance Violations at 1615 University

Dr as setout in Exhibit A attached hereto.

You are hereby notified that

1. All appeals have been denied,

2. All fine(s) for all offenses are now due

and payable,

3. You must personally appear for the Hearing

stated above,

4. At the Hearing set forth above, Judgment

entered in your cases and time served credit

will be reviewed as well as indigency status,

1 See No. 05-1445, App. A. Additional Essential Materials

A-3

and

5. Failure to Appear for the Hearing will result

in the issuance of a Capias Pro Fine Warrant

for your arrest thereby incurring additional

warrant fee per case.

ANY AND ALL MOTIONS must be filed in writing

at least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled court

date for consideration by the Municipal Judge.

WITNESS my official signature, this September 20,

2007

/s/ RD Noah

Presiding Judge, Richardson Municipal Court

City of Richardson, Dallas County, Texas

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This document was served on the Defendant by

mailing to Defendant's last known address on

September 20, 2007.

/s/ Kim D Kierce

Court Clerk, Municipal Court

City of Richardson, Dallas County, Texas

(SEAL MUNICIPAL COURT RICHARDSON

TEXAS)

Mary L Collard

1615 University Dr

Richardson, 75081 *

¢ As such 1n the original.

A-4

2007 Oct 16—Extension, with threat of arrest

CAUSE NO. (See Attachment A) 2

THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN THE MUNICIPAL

COURT

VS. § FOR THE CITY OF

RICHARDSON

MARY L COLLARD § DALLAS COUNTY,

TEXAS

ORDER

The Defendant in the above numbered and entitled

cause(s), having been FOUND GUILTY at Jury Trial

for the offense of: See Attachment A is hereby

ordered to pay the Judgment rendered in this matter

as set forth below.

Total Fine and Cost Assessed $20,686

Payment Due Date October 26, 2007

Defendant is hereby advised that, pursuant to Sec.

51.921, Government Code, an additional $25.00 time-

payment fee (per ease) will be added if the fine and

cost assessed is not paid by the due date stated

above.

Failure to pay the total amount stated above by the

due date will result in additional fees and the

issuance of a Capias Pro Fine WARRANT for the

Defendant's arrest.

3 See No. 05-1445, App. A. Additional Essential Materials.

The difference here is that each item has a judgment amount of

$200.00, except for the “traffic” tickets, which are $283.00, each,

for the total of $20,686, in this “order.”

A-5

10-16-07 _._/s/ RD Noah

Presiding Judge

Richardson Municipal Court

A true and correct copy of this Order was served on

the Defendant by:

[_] Mailing to Defendant's last known address

[{X] In person/hand delivery

[_] Mailing to Defendant's attorney of record [ ]

WITNESS my official signature, this 10-16-07

/s/ Kim D Kierce

Court Clerk, Municipal Court

City of Richardson, Dallas County, Texas

Richardson Municipal Court (www.cor.net) P.O. Box

830978 Richardson, TX 75083-0978 phone: (972) 744-

4500 fax: (972) 744-5800

2006 Mar 2—Deferred Disposition

See No. 05-1445, App. A.

2006 Mar 2—Extension Agreement (one traffic

case)

See No. 05-1445, App. A.

2006 Mar 2—Application for Driver Safety

Course (the other traffic case)

See No. 05-1445, App. A.

A-6

2006 Mar 14—Extensions of Time regarding

traffic cases

See No. 05-1445, App. A.

2006 Mar 20 and 21—Rulings

See No. 05-1445, App. A. (“Housing Code” (101);

Traffic (one); Traffic (the other)).

2006 Apr 10—Ruling denying mandamus

See No. 05-1445, App. A.

2007 Dec 18 State appellate court didn’t order

county appellate court to file/open case.

Order

Order issued December 18, 2007

(Seal of THE STATE OF TEXAS)

In the

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-07-01613-CV

IN RE MARY LYNN COLLARD,

Relator

Original Proceeding from the

County Court of Criminal Appeals‘ No. 1 5

Dallas County, Texas

ORDER

Before Justices Whittington, FitzGerald,

and Lang-Miers

Based on the Court's opinion of this date, we

DENY relator's petition for writ of mandamus. We

ORDER that relator Mary Lynn Collard bear the

costs of this original proceeding

/s/ Mark Whittington

MARK WHITTINGTON

JUSTICE

4(1N.B. But see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 25.0591(c)(1) (County

Criminal Court of Appeals, not County Court of Criminal

Appeals). MLC]

°{N.B. Nosuch court. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 25.0591(c)(1)

creates “County Criminal Court of Appeals of Dallas County;”

§ 25.0591(c)(2), “County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 2 of

Dallas County.” (emphasis added). But, there is no County

Court of Criminal Appeals of Dallas County of any “No.,” and

there is no County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 1 of Dallas

County. See, infra, p.A-31. MLC]

A-8

Opinion

Writ of Mandamus Denied; Opinion Issued

December 18, 2007

(Seal of THE STATE OF TEXAS)

In the

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-07-01613-CV

IN RE MARY LYNN COLLARD,

Relator

Original Proceeding from the

County Court of Criminal Appeals No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Betore Justices Whittington, FitzGerald,

and Lang-Miers

Opinion by Justice Whittington

Relator complains the trial judge ® has not taken

action on her mandamus petition or ruled on her

“motion for stay.” Based on the record presented,

relator has not shown that she is entitled to relief.

See TEX. R. App. P. 52.8 (a): State ex rel. Hill v. Court

6 [N.B. trial judge? Cf. e.g, nn.1, 2, supra. MLC]

A-9

of Appeals for Fifth Dist., 34 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2001). 7 Accordingly, relator's petition for

mandamus is DENIED.

/s/ Mark Whittington

MARK WHITTINGTON

JUSTICE

071613F.P05

2008 Jan 4 Second state appellate panel’s ruling

on same petition.

Order

Order issued January 4 , 2008

(Seal of THE STATE OF TEXAS)

In the

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

No. 05-07-01760-CV

IN RE MARY LYNN COLLARD,

Relator

‘(N.B. This suggests that Collard has raised an issue of first

impression. So, while mandamus may not follow, this ruling

leaves the issue of first impression totally unresolved. MLC]

A-10

Original Proceeding from the

County Court of Criminal Appeals ® No. 1 °

Dallas County, Texas

ORDER

Before Justices Wright, O'Neill, and Lang

Based on the Court's opinion of this date, we

DENY relator's petition for writ of mandamus. We

ORDER that relator Mary Lynn Collard bear the

costs of this original proceeding.

/s/ Carolyn Wright

CAROLYN WRIGHT

JUSTICE

Opinion

Writ of Mandamus Denied; Opinion Issued

January 4, 2008

(Seal of THE STATE OF TEXAS)

In the

Court of Appeals

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas

8(N.B. Seen.1, supra. MLC]

9(N.B. See n.2, supra. MLC]

A-11

No. 05-07-01760-CV

IN RE MARY LYNN COLLARD,

Relator

Original Proceeding from the

County Court of Criminal Appeals No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Justices Wright, O'Neill, and Lang

Opinion by Justice Wright

Relator complains the county court judge has not

taken action on her mandamus or ruled on her

motion for stay. Relator has failed to comply with

the requirements for filing a petition for writ of

mandamus. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3 and 52.7(a). '°

Accordingly, relator's petition for writ of mandamus

is DENIED. See TEx. R. App. P. 52.8 (a).

10(N.B. This suggests that Collard has to have an order from

the county appellate court for the state appellate court to

review, see ‘TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3G)(1){A), in order that Collard

seek relief for the county appellate court’s refusal to abide by

TEX. R. APP. P. 52.1. Thus, the first panel at least addressed

the Point raised, while remarkably leaving open what they

consider to be an issue of first impression. However, this

second panel even more remarkably doesn’t even come close to

addressing the Point raised. MLC]

A-12

/s/ Carolyn Wright

CAROLYN WRIGHT

JUSTICE

2007 Dec 28 State court of criminal appeals

files petition, opens case.

Postcard Notice of filing/opening case

OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL

APPEALS OF TEXAS

P.O. BOX 12308, CAPITOL STATION, AUSTIN,

TEXAS 78711

RE: Writ No. WR-64,490-02

STYLE: COLLARD, MARY LYNN

TRIAL CT NO: {blank in original]

12/28/2007

I have this day received and presented to the

Court the original application for writ of mandamus.

Louise Pearson, Clerk

MARY LYNN COLLARD

1615 UNIVERSITY DR.

Richardson, TX 75081

Pitney Bowes meter information:

0004236449 JAN 04 2008

MAILED FROM ZIP CODE 78701

Oo S

A-13

Rule 14.1(i)(iii)—Rehearing, or other extension

Most recent—14 December

o, “>

Rule 14.1(i)(iv)—Judgment of different date

Judgment(s) of 2006 Mar 20 and 21

See No. 05-1445, App. A.

> >

Rule 14.1(i)(v)—Statutes and Rules

Richardson Municipal Code

All bold emphasis is added. Jtalics are in the

original.

Nowhere defined—“citizen.”

As was finally conspicuous around the time of the

“14th Amendment,” it matters that the term “citizen”

be defined. This code doesn’t define “citizen.”

Sec. 1-9. Severability of parts of Code.

It is hereby declared to be the intention of the city

council that the sections, paragraphs, sentences,

clauses and phrases of this Code are severable and, if

any phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph or section of

this Code shall be declared unconstitutional by the

A-14

valid judgment or decree of any court of competent

jurisdiction, such unconstitutionality shall not affect

any of the remaining phrases, clauses, sentences,

paragraphs and sections of this Code, since the same

would have been enacted by the city council without

the incorporation in this Code of any such

unconstitutional phrase, clause, sentence, paragraph

or section.

(Code 1966, § 1-6)

Sec. 1-8. General penalty; continuing violations.

(a) In this section "violation of this Code" means:

(1) Doing an act that is prohibited or made or

declared unlawful, an offense or a misdemeanor by

ordinance or by rule or regulation authorized by

ordinance;

(2) Failure to perform an act that is

required to be performed by ordinance or by

rule or regulation authorized by ordinance; or

(3) Failure to perform an act if the failure

is declared a misdemeanor or an offense or

unlawful by ordinance or by rule or regulation

authorized by ordinance.

(b) In this section "violation of this Code" does not

include the failure of a city officer or city employee to

perform an official duty unless it is provided that

failure to perform the duty is to be punished as

provided in this section.

of a violation of this Code shall be punished by a fine

not exceeding $500.00, except that a fine not

exceeding $2,000.00 shall be imposed for violation of

provisions that govern fire safety, zoning, or public

A-15

health and sanitation, including dumping of refuse.

The penalty imposed for a violation of this Code shall

not exceed or be less than the penalty prescribed by

state law for the same offense under state law. With

respect to violations of this Code that are continuous

with respect to time, each day the violation continues

is a separate offense.

(d) The imposition of a penalty does not prevent

revocation or suspension of a license, permit or

franchise.

(e) Violations of this Code that are continuous with

respect to time may be abated by injunctive or other

equitable relief. The imposition of a penalty does not

prevent equitable relief or civil or quasi-judicial

enforcement of a violation of this Code.

(Code 1966, § 1-5)

State law references: Penalties for ordinance

violations, V.T.C.A., Local Government Code § 54.001

et seq.

Sec. 6-327. Penalty.

(a) Except as stated otherwise, violations of this

article are punishable as provided in section 1-8.

(b) In addition to im,osing a criminal penalty

described in subsection (a) of this section, the city

may, in accordance with V.T.C.A., Local Government

Code ch. 54, subch. B [§ 54.011 et seq.], bring a civil

action against a person violating a provision of this

article. The civil action may include, but is not

limited to, a suit to recover a civil penalty not to

exceed $1,000.00 for each day or portion of a day

during which the violation is continued or committed.

A-16

(b) of this section are in addition to any other

enforcement remedies that the city may have under

city ordinances and state law.

(Code 1966, § 5-129)

See also Sec. 6-326 (talks about “search warrants,”

thus the policy and intent to engage the criminal

process).

Sec. 6-311. Definitions.

Occupant means any individual living or sleeping in

a building, or having possession of a space within a

building. (emphasis in original).

Owner means a person claiming, or in whom is

vested, the ownership of, dominion over or title to

real property, including but not limited to:

(1) A holder of fee simple title.

(2) The holder of a life estate.

(3) The holder of a leaschold estate for an initial

term of five years or more.

(4) The buyer in a contract for deed.

(5) The mortgagee, receiver, executor or trustee in

control of real property; but not including the holder

of a leasehold estate or tenancy for initial term of

less than five years.

(emphasis in original).

Sec. 6-356. Responsibilities of occupant.

An occupant shall be responsible for the following: ...

(9) Dispose of all his garbage and any other

A-17

organic waste which might provide food for

rodents and all rubbish in a clean and sanitary

manner by placing it in the garbage disposal

facilities or garbage or rubbish storage

containers.

(Code 1966, § 5-135)

Sec. 6-367. Structural standards.

An owner shall:

(1) Protect the exterior surfaces of a structure

which are subject to decay by application of

paint or other coating.

(18) Provide every exterior wall be free of holes,

breaks, loose or rotting boards or timbers, and any

other conditions which might admit rain, or

dampness to the interior portions of the walls or to

the occupied spaces of the building. All siding

material shall be kept in repair.

(20) Provide and maintain all portions, additions or

sections of a roof including, but not limited to: fascia,

eaves, soffit, sheathing, rafter tails, barge rafter,

vent screening, gutters, downspouts, roof jacks and

lead or metal flashing. They shall be complete with

all trim strips, moldings, brackets, braces and

supports in accordance with common building

practices. No item shall display signs of

deterioration, abuse or improper installation that

could be construed to affect the purpose of that item

or cause damage to the immediate area or roof

structure, that could allow dampness or admit rain to

the interior of that building.

(32) Provide that all exterior wood surfaces, other

A-18

than decay resistant woods, be protected from the

elements and decay by painting or other protective

covering or treatment. All siding shall be weather

resistant and watertight. All masonry joints shall be

sufficiently tuck pointed to insure water and air

tightness.

(33) Provide and maintain garages, storage

buildings and all other accessory structures in good

repair and sound structural condition.

Sec. 6-201. Permit required.

It shall be unlawful for any person to construct a

fence over 2 1/2 feet in height on any lot without

having first obtained a fence permit therefor from the

building inspection department. Adequate plans and

specifications, as determined by the chief building

official, must accompany each application for a

permit.

(Code 1966, § 5-49)

Sec. 6-202. Inspection and maintenance.

When any fence is completed, it must be inspected.

The building inspection department shall be notified

upon completion of the fence. The chief building

official will issue a card of acceptance if the fence

complies with the provisions of this article, or it will

be rejected. All fences constructed under the

provisions of this article shall be maintained so

as to comply with the requirements of this

article at all times. Fences shall be maintained

‘by the owner or person in charge of the

A-19

property in as near as possible the condition of

such fence when installed and accepted as

provided herein, and shall be maintained as

follows:

(1) Such fence shall not be out of vertical

alignment more than 20 percent.

(2) All damaged, removed or missing portions

of such fence shall be replaced or repaired with

comparable materials of a comparable color to

the remaining portion of such fence.

(Code 1966, § 5-58; Ord. No. 3285-A, § 1, 5-8-00)

Sec. 21-57. Mandatory property owners'

association.

(a) When a subdivision contains streets, sewers,

sewage treatment facilities, water supply systems,

drainage systems or structures, parks, landscaping

systems or features, irrigation systems, screening

walls, living screens, buffering systems, subdivision

entryway features (including monuments or other

signage), or other physical facilities or grounds held

in common that are not to be maintained by the city,

the city may require the establishment and creation

of a mandatory property owners' association to

assume and be responsible for the continuous and

perpetual operation, maintenance and supervision of

such facilities or grounds.

(b) The city is not responsible for enforcing any

private deed restrictions or for the supervision of any

property owners’ association.

established and created to assume and be responsible

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for the continuous and perpetual operation,

maintenance and supervision of landscape systems,

features or elements located in parkways, common

areas between screening walls or living screens and

adjacent curbs or street pavement edges, areas

adjacent to drainage ways or drainage structures or

at subdivision entryways, open space, common areas

or properties including but not limited to: landscape

features and irrigation systems, subdivision

entryway features and monuments, private amenity

center, playgrounds, pavilions, ponds, detention

ponds, off-street parking for a private amenity

center, swimming pool, exercise trail, private

neighborhood park and related amenities.

Subdivision entryway treatments or features shall

not be allowed unless a mandatory property owners’

association as required herein is established and

created.

(d) All open space and common properties or areas,

facilities, structures, improvements, systems, or

other property that are to be operated, maintained

and/or supervised by the property owners’ association

shall be dedicated by easement or deeded in fee

simple ownership interest to the property owners

association after construction and installation as

applicable by the owner and shall be clearly

identified on the record final plat of the property.

(e) A copy of the agreements, covenants and

restrictions establishing and creating the property

owners' association must be approved by the city

attorney prior to the approval of the final plat of the

subdivision and must be filed of record with said

final plat in the plat records of the county. The plat.

shall clearly identify all common areas or grounds

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that are to be operated, maintained and/or

supervised by the property owners' association.

(f) Ata minimum, the agreements, covenants and

restrictions establishing and creating the property

owners' association required herein shall contain

and/or provide for the following:

(1) Definitions of terms contained therein;

(2) Provisions acceptable to the city attorney for

the establishment and organization of the mandatory

property owners’ association and the adoption of

bylaws for said property owners' association,

including provisions requiring that the owner(s) of

any lot or lots within the applicable subdivision and

any successive purchaser(s) shall automatically and

mandatorily become a member of the property

owners’ association;

(3) The initial term of the agreement, covenants

and restrictions establishing and creating the

property owners' association shall be for a 25-year

period and shall automatically renew for successive

ten-year periods, and the property owners’

association may not be dissolved without the prior

written consent of the city;

(4) Provisions acceptable to the city attorney to

ensure the continuous and perpetual use, operation,

maintenance and/or supervision of all facilities,

structures, improvements, systems, open space or

common areas that are the responsibility of the

property owners' association and to establish a

reserve fund for such purposes;

(5) Provisions prohibiting the amendment of any

portion of the property owners' association's

agreements, covenants or restrictions pertaining to

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the use, operation, maintenance and/or supervision

of any facilities, structures, improvements, systems,

area or grounds that are the responsibility of the

property owners’ association without the prior

written consent of the city;

(6) The nght and ability of the city or its lawful

agents, after due notice to the property owners'

association, to maintain the common areas, to

remove any landscape systems, features or elements

that cease to be maintained by the property owners’

association; to perform the responsibilities of the

property owners’ association and its board of

directors if the property owners' association fails to

do so in compliance with any provisions of the

agreements, covenants or restrictions of the property

owners' association or of any applicable city codes or

regulations; to assess the property owners'

association for all costs incurred by the city in

performing said responsibilities if the property

owners’ association fails to do so; and/or to avail itself

of any other enforcement actions available to the city

pursuant to state law or city codes or regulations;

and

(7) Provisions indemnifying and holding the city

harmless from any and all costs, expenses, suits,

demands, liabilities or damages including attorney

fees and costs of suit, incurred or resulting from the

city's maintenance of the common areas and/or

removal of any landscape systems, features or

elements that cease to be maintained by the property

owners’ association.

(g) Builders are required to post notice in a

prominent place in all model homes and sales offices

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stating that a property owners’ association has been

established and membership is mandatory for all

property owners. The notice shall state ata

minimum that the builder shall provide any person

upon their request the association documents and a

five-year projection of dues, income and association

expenses.

(h) Prior to the transfer of the control of the

property owners’ association to the lot owners, the

developer must provide a reserve fund equivalent to

two months' dues based on full property owners'

association membership.

G) Concurrent with the transfer of the property

owners’ association, the developer must transfer to

the property owners’ association control over all

utilities related to property and amenities to be

owned by the property owners' association. The

developer must also disclose to the property owners'

association the total cost to date related to the

operation and maintenance of common property and

amenities.

(Ord. No. 3599, § 1, 3-26-07)

TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE. ANN.

Art. 42.07. [773] [860-861] Reasons to Prevent

Sentence.

Before pronouncing sentence, the defendant shall be

asked whether he has anything to say why the

sentence should not be pronounced against him. The

only reasons which can be shown, on account

of which sentence cannot be pronounced, are:

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1. That the defendant has received a pardon from

the proper authority, on the presentation of which,

legally authenticated, he shall be discharged.

2. That the defendant is incompetent to stand

trial; and if evidence be shown to support a finding

of incompetency to stand trial, no sentence shall be

pronounced, and the court shall proceed under

Chapter 46B; and

3. When a person who has been convicted escapes

after conviction and before sentence and an

individual supposed to be the same has been arrested

he may before sentence is pronounced, deny that he

is the person convicted, and an issue be accordingly

tried before a jury, or before the court if a jury is

waived, as to his identity.

Acts 1965, 59th Leg., vol. 2, p. 317, ch. 722.

Amended by Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 1102, ch. 415,

Sec. 3, eff. June 19, 1975. Amended by Acts 1981,

67th Leg., p. 810, ch. 291, Sec. 115, eff. Sept. 1, 1981;

Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 35, Sec. 3, eff. Jan. 1, 2004.

Art. 42.07 (West 2005) (emphasis added).

Art. 45.018. Complaint [Municipal Court]

(a) For purposes of this chapter, a complaint is a

sworn allegation charging the accused with the

commission of an offense.

(b) A defendant is entitled to notice ofa

complaint against the defendant not later than

the day before the date of any proceeding in the

prosecution of the defendant under the complaint.

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The defendant may waive the right to notice granted

by this subsection.

Art. 45.018 (West Supp. 2004-2005).

Art. 45.0215. Plea by Minor and Appearance of

Parent

(a) If a defendant is younger than 17 years of age and

has not had the disabilities of minority removed, the

judge or justice:

(1) must take the defendant’s plea in open court;

and

(2) shall issue a summons to compel the

defendant’s parent, guardian, or managing

conservator to be present during:

(A) the taking of the defendant’s plea; and

(B) all other proceedings relating to the

case.

Art. 45.0215(a) (West Supp. 2004-2005) (emphasis

added) (not directly applicable, here, but this clearly

illustrates and confirms the fact that the

“arraignment” is a “proceeding” for purposes of Art.

45.018(b)).

Art. 17.151. RELEASE BECAUSE OF DELAY.

Sec. 1. A defendant who is detained in jail pending

trial of an accusation against him must be released

either on personal bond or by reducing the amount of

bail required, if the state is not ready for trial of the

criminal action for which he is being detained within:

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(1) 96 days from the commencement of his

detention if he is accused of a felony;

(2) 30 days from the commencement of his

detention if he is accused of a misdemeanor

punishable by a sentence of imprisonment in jail for

more than 180 days;

(3) 15 days from the commencement of his

detention if he is accused of a misdemeanor

punishable by a sentence of imprisonment for 180

days or less; or

(4) five days from the commencement of his

detention if he is accused of a misdemeanor

punishable by a fine only.

Sec. 2. The provisions of this article do not apply to a

defendant who is:

(1) serving a sentence of imprisonment for

another offense while the defendant is serving that

sentence;

(2) being detained pending trial of another

accusation against the defendant as to which the

applicable period has not yet elapsed;

(3) incompetent to stand trial, during the period

of the defendant's incompetence; or

(4) being detained for a violation of the conditions

of a previous release related to the safety of a victim

of the alleged offense or to the safety of the

community under this article.

Sec. 3. Repealed by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 110,

Sec. 2.

Added by Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 1972, ch. 787, Sec.

2, eff. July 1, 1978.

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Sec. 2 amended by Acts 2005, 79th Leg., ch. 110, Sec.

1, eff. Sept. 1, 2005; Sec. 3 repealed by Acts 2005,

79th Leg., ch. 110, Sec. 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2005.

Texas Government Code

§ 25.0591

courts of appeals:

(1) County Criminal Court of Appeals of Dailas

County, Texas; and

(2) County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 2 of

Dallas County, Texas.

O Oo

Rule 14.1(i)(vi}—Additional Essential Materials

Case Nos. for the 103 complaints

See No. 05-1445, App. A.

Example of the “magistrate warning” and pre-

trial Bond.

02/14/2006 11:08 FAX 9727445833 MC JUDGE

- RFD JAIL ARRAIGN [p] 001/024

S.0.P.4.04.24-001

2/06

SERVICE# 06-103854

ID# 221995

STATE OF TEXAS

ARRESTING OFFICER 00798

COUNTY OF DALLAS

DATE OF ARREST 02/13/2006

I, the undersigned, a judge of the Municipal Court of

the City of Richardson, sitting as a magistrate, do

hereby certify that:

(NAME) COLLARD MARY LYNN

(RACE) W (SEX) F (AGE) 66 (DATE OF BIRTH)

02/03/1940

(ADDRESS) 1615 UNVERSITY "' DR.

RICHARDSON (STATE) TX

appeared before me 1000 (AM) '? (PM) on the

14th_ day of February _ ,2006

1! As such in the original.

12 This is circled in the original. Bold emphasis used as a

substitute.

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at the Richardson Police Department, 140 N.

Greenville, at the Richardson Municipal Court, 2100

East Campbell Rd., Richardson, Dallas County,

Texas, and at the time I warned the above named

person of the following accusation against him, to

wit:

BUILDING VIOLATION - EXTERIOR

PROTECTIVE COAT - CITY — 8200 - MC

wRt # NIO1355A

and of the affidavit filed in support thereof and gave

the following warning:

"YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO RETAIN LEGAL

COUNSEL AND TO HAVE LEGAL COUNSEL

PRESENT AND WITH YOU DURING ANY

INTERVIEW WITH A PEACE OFFICER OR

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING THE STATE. YOU

HAVE RIGHT (sic) TO HAVE LEGAL COUNCEL ®

APPOINTED IF YOU ARE AN INDIGENT PERSON

UNABLE TO AFFORD LEGAL COUNSEL AND

YOUR OFFENSE IS GREATER THAN A CLASS C

MISDEMEANOR. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO

REMAIN SILENT, (sic) YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED

TO MAKE A STATEMENT. ANY STATEMENT

MADE BY YOU CAN BE USED AGAINST YOU IN

COURT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO STOP AN

INTERVIEW OR QUESTIONING AT ANY TIME.

IF YOUR OFFENSE IS A FELONY, YOU HAVE

YOU ARE A NON-CITIZEN, A CONVICTION OF

13 As such in the original.

14 As such in the original.

15 As such in the original.

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THIS OFFENSE COULD RESULT IN THE

INTERVENTION OF AND YOUR POSSIBLE

DEPORTATION BY THE U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND

IMMIGRATION SERVICES. * IF YOU AREA

NON-CITIZEN, YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO

CONTACT YOUR CONSULAR OFFICIAL - A

PROCEDURE FOR THAT PURPOSE WILL BE

MADE AVAILABLE TO YOU AT THE

CONCLUSION OF THIS ARRAIGNMENT

PROCESS."

After being by me duly warned, the above named

person is remanded to the custody of the Richardson

Police Department and bond set at

$ 600 250-00 100.00

In witness whereof, | hereto subscribed my name:

/s/ RD Noah

Judge of the Municipal C Court

City of Richardson, Texas

Magistrate

Plea NG __ Servedat$ —_ per 12 hours served:

Fine Amt. $ __ Commencing on ___ ,20 |

16 [N.B. “Citizenship and Immigration” used to be just

Canadian. Formerly the INS, under DOJ, “Citizenship and

Immigration” is a new department under “Homeland Security.”

MLC|

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.