Petition for ReHearing — Patridge v. United States (No. 07-1045)

2

a\ 07-1045

OFFI

FILED

APR 17 2008

CE OF THE CLERK

SUPREME COURT, U.S.

In the

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Denny R. Patridge

Petitioner,

UNITED STATES

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari

to the United States Court of Appea

the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Denny R. Patridge

c/o Inmate # 14267-026

P.O. Box 206

Strasburg, lilinois 62465

(217)644-3108

ls for

(812)238-1531 (prison phone)

CONCLUSION

CERTIFICATE OF PETITIONER

-|- page #

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .

Article Ill, Section 2, Clause 3 says the “irial”

of all “crimes” committed with any State

shall be held in that State unless the crime

alleged was not alleged to have been

committed within any State and then

Congress shall provide the place for such

trial. .

A Judgment is by person and not judge if

there is no territorial jurisdiction for the

United States to stand in adjudication of

any crime committed within the territorial

jurisdiction of a State pursuant to Article Ill,

SOCTION 2 Skuse 3. oa eee 13

-\i- page #

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES -continued

Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., Marin

Gouriy, 475 U.S. 604 606 (1990) 2... wc cece cen 14

EEOC v. Arab Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,(1991) 12

Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281,{1949}) 12

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) ..... 8

Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19 (1852) ........ 8

Ngiraingas v. Sanches, 495 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)11

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878) ...... 11,14

Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 512 (1956) 8

Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94(1940) 8.9

Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) ....... 7

ws. ¥. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) ......... 8

U.S. v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 836 (1984) ....... 2

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

E. Pomeroy, The Territories and the United States

1861-1890, Studies in Colonial Administration 51

INTRODUCTION

Thus far Petitioner has been indicted by a

United States of America “Grand Jury” sitting in

the United States Central District for the United

States District of Illinois. That indictment

amended by the District Court without any Grand

Jury knowing it. Purportedily given a “trial”

wherein the key defense witness was an attorney

who the Chief Judge assigned to the case was

the key witness in a criminal! complaint filed

against this defense witness but nobody knew this

but the prosecutor and the Judge. Because of

the other witnesses, as attorneys, were threatened

with being investigated, the U.S. Attorney

successfully prevented any of the people

Petitioner relied upon from testifying as to

Petifioner’s reliance in good faith on those

attorneys. Then, Petitioner was prevented by the

District Court, same Chief Judge who both began

the criminal case against a key defense witness

and who prevented the same witness from

]

testifying because of such investigation without

disclosing that such Chief Judge was the reason

for such investigation, from presenting this

evidence inhis defense to the charges. Petitioner

was denied key jury instructions involving federal

law which were sanctioned by words from this

very Court such as Cheek, Bryan and Ratzlaf.

Petitioner was denied the jury being given the

meaning to “evade and avoid" when asked.

Petitioner, found guilty by this United States of

America jury, was then delayed for 15 months

from “sentencing” so the tax loss could be

determined for judge found fact sentencing,

even though the Grand Jury alleged a much

smailer amount of fax loss only to be struck by the

same Chief Judge. Let us not forget that the ©

facts found by the Jury provided fora deprivation

of liberty no more than 12 months and the facts

found by the District Court extended such to 5

times that or 5 years.

Then there was the appeal to the 7" Circuit

2

which every indication was given to Petition he

had a “right” to do. See FRAP 3 and 4

Petitioner's attorney raised 18 out of 30 possible

issues on appeal, to which each issue was

determined “frivolous” even though each issue

was well supported by decisions by this Court,

numerous laws, and even decisions from the 7"

Circuit. Rejecting each of them, the 7™ Circuit

threatened, in a published decision, to disbar

Petitioner’s attorney, and further penalize him

$10,000 for appealing the numerous and

erroneous decisions by the Circuit Judges.

After showing cause why he should not be

threatened, the 7™ Circuit, faced with having to

go on the record with a hearing under Rule 46 of

the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and

knowing issues would come up as to why Counsel

was wrong for relying on specific words of this

Court, discharged that part of the rule to show

cause, and instituted a $ 10,000 penalty under

Rule 38 without explaining how much of the

ie

J

penalty was for what part of the claim of

impropriety made by the 7™ Circuit for the first

time in their decision on the merits. This penalty

was ordered to be paid to the Court itself.

Petition calls this sandbagging.

Next, Petitioner Petitions to this Court called

a “writ of certiorari” and even files for a stay

because it was so biatantly clear Petitioner was

currently incarcerated entirely upon the advice

of attorneys, or decisions made by attorneys, or

because Petitioner is not an attorney. All of

which, save Mr. Barringer, not one of those

“attorneys” was willing to stand good for any of

there advice by remaining silent or previous

decisions they had authored for this Court.

For instance, the attorneys Petitioner relied

upon were prohibited under the Fifth Amendment

and Sixth Amendment from giving testimony as to

the advice they gave Petitioner. Certainly, such

testimony would have demonstrated reliance

Petitioner intended. That was not allowed to

4

happen.

Then there is the attorneys, as Judges,

Petitioner is led to believe will right a wrong made

by lower Court Judges, that happened to be an

attorney. That did not happen.

Then there is Petitioner's attorney being

able to explain why he should not be disbarred

after the 7™ Circuit libel and slandered him for no

good reason. That was not allowed to happen.

Then finally, Petitioner gets to this Court and

presents the learned words of Justice Stevens in

the Bryan decision at 194, Justice Ginsberg in the

Ratzlaf decision at 141, and Petitioner is certain

each Justice of the Supreme Court is aware of

Justice White's “Cheek” decision at 200-202.

Yet, no Justice, not even one, voted to

consider orreview all the above even though it is

overwhelming that the Constitutional Rights

violations levied upon Petitioner and his liberty by

the United States and its attorneys, in what ever

official position, seems to be the standard and

5

not the exception of expectation.

Petitioner even thought about asking for

review of the 7" Circuit's decision by explaining

how wonderful it was fo enjoy the confidence the

United States tenders every time it writes

something in this criminal tax case. And that is

the issue. A Criminal Tax Case for violating laws

written by Congress.

¥; Article ill, Section 2, Clause 3 says the “trial”

of all “crimes” committed with any State

shall be held in that State unless the crime

alleged was not alleged to have been

committed within any State and then

Congress shall provide the place for such

trial.

Article lll, Section 2, Clause 3, mandates the

“trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of

Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial

shall be held in the State where the said Crimes

shall have been committed: but when not

committed within any State, the Trial shail be at

such Place or Place as the Congress may by law

have directed."

The Crimes alleged in the “superceding

indictment" were each allicged to have been

committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the

United States and in Illinois or flowing out of Illinois

but never in the territorial jurisdiction of the United

States. “We begin with the axiom that, under our

federal system, the States possess sovereignty

concurrent with that of the Federal Government

subject only to limitations imposed by the

Supremacy Clause.” Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455

458 (1990)

Title 18, Section 3231 provides

“The district courts of the United States

shall have original jurisdiction,

exclusive of the courts of the States,

of all offenses against the laws of the

United States.

"Nothing in this title shall be held to

take away or impair the jurisdiction of

the courts of the several States under

the laws thereof.

“The office of the second sentence is

merely to limit the effect of the jurisdictional grant

of the firstsentence.” Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350

U.S. 497, 512 (1956) “ The dual sovereignty

doctrine its founded on the common law

conception of crime as an offense against the

sovereignty of the government.” Heath v.

Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985)

“When a defendant ina single act violates

the ‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by

breaking the laws of each, he has committed two

distinct ‘offences.’ United States v. Lanza, 260 U:S.

377, 382 (1922).”" Id. As the Court explained in

Moore v. illinois, 14 How. 13, 19 (1852), "[a]n

offence. in its legal signification, means the

transgression of a law.” Consequently, when the

same act transgresses the laws of two sovereigns,

“it cannot be truly averred that the offender has

been twice punished for the same offence: but

only that by one act he has committed two

offences, for each of which he is_ justly

punishable.” Id., at 20.

In Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94,

100 (1940)this Court explained “After this statute

was held inapplicable to claims under state

workmen's compensation acts further legislation

undertook to extend the provisions of those acts

to the places under federal sovereignty. With

growing frequency the federal government

leaves largely unimpaired the civil and criminal

authority of the state over nationalreservations or

properties.”

“While exciusive federal jurisdiction

attaches, state courts are without power to

punish for crimes committed on federal property.”

This has made necessary the legislation which

gives federal courts jurisdiction over these crimes.

The tendency toward a uniformity between the

federal and surrounding state territory has caused

a series of congressional acts adopting the state

criminallaws. Through these concessions our dual

system of government works cooperatively

towards harmonious adjustment. ld. at 10]

9

Congress had no authority to provide for

the trial in this case within the territorial jurisdiction

of the United States. Certainly, Congress had the |

commerce clause authority to regulate interstate

activity and provide the element of an interstate

nexus for such legislation to attach to certain

conduct. But this does not mean that such

alleged conduct took place outside any State

thus placing the territorial jurisdiction under Article

Ill for such Trial to be where Congress authorizes.

The Constitution only authorized the Trial of

each of the alleged acts in the Superceding

Indictment to be tried in the State, Illinois, and

within Illinois territorial jurisdiction.

"Under the organic acts, each territory had

three justices appointed by the president for

four-year terms. Sitting together, they constituted

asupreme court; sitting separately, they acted as

district judges. In both capacities they had

jurisdiction over cases arising under United States

or territorial law." E. Pomeroy, The Territories and

10

the United States 1861-1890, Studies in Colonial

Administration 51 (1947). Thus, unlike the state

courts, over which the Federal Government had

no control, the territorial courts were created by

Acts of Congress, with judges appointed by the

President, and were under the general control of

the Federal Government. Ngiraingas v. Sanches,

495 U.S. 182, 189 (1990)

There is no question Petitioner was not tried

in the State, Illinois. As far back as Pennoyer v.

Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878), this Court drew a clear

distinction between a court's “competence” and

its jurisdiction over the parties:

‘To give such proceedings any

validity, there must be a tribunal

competent by its constitution - that is,

by the law of its creation - to pass

upon the subject-matter of the suit:

and, if that involves merely a

determination of the personal liability

of the defendant, he must be brought

within its jurisdiction by service of

process within the State, or his

voluntary appearance.’ Id., at 733.

1]

U.S. v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 836 (1984)

"It is a longstanding principle of American

law thatlegisiation of Congress, unless a contrary

intent appears, is meant to apply only within the

territorial jurisdiction of the United States." EEOC

v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248

(1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S.

281, 285 (1949)).

There is no doubt Petitioner was given a

criminal trial in the United States District Court for

the Central District of Illinois. The case number

itself proves that. There is no doubt this trial was

based upon 18 US.C. § 3231 office of the United

States. Equally, there can be no place in the

United States District Court for the Central District

of Illinois to which the sovereignty of the State,

ilinois attaches. The United States and the State,

Illinois, are sovereign unto themselves. A United

States District and Illinois share no_ territorial

jurisdiction.

The only constitutional place forthe alleged

crimes Committed in the superceding indictment

was to be in the State Illinois where they each

were alleged to have been committed.

Because the criminal trial violated Article III.

Section 2, Clause 3, the Judgment of the United

States District Court for the Central District of

Illinois, and the entire Judgment by the United

States Court of Appeals for the 7™ Circuit should

be vacated for the same reason. |

2. A Judgment is by person and not judge if

there is no territorial jurisdiction for the

United States to stand in adjudication of

any crime committed within the territorial

jurisdiction of a State pursuant to Article Ill,

Section 2, Clause 3

The proposition that the judgment of a

courtlacking jurisdiction is void traces back to the

English Year Books, see Bowser v. Collins, Y. B.

Mich. 22 Edw. IV, f. 30, pl. 11, 145 Eng. Rep. 97 (Ex.

Ch. 1482), and was made settled law by Lord

Coke in Case of the Marshalsea, 10 Coke Rep.

is

68b, 77a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027, 1041 (K. B. 1612).

Traditionally that proposition was embodied in the

phrase coram non judice, "before a person nota

judge" - meaning, in effect, that the proceeding

in question was not a judicial proceeding

because lawful judicial authority was not present,

and could therefore not yield a judgment.

American courts invalidated. or denied

recognition to, judgments that violated this

common-law principle long before the

Fourteenth Amendment was adopted. See, e.g..

Grumon v. Raymond, 1 Conn. 40 (1814); Picquet

v. Swan, 19 F. Cas. 609 (No. 11,134) (CC Mass.

1828); Dunn v. Dunn, 4 Paige 425 (N. Y. Ch. 1834);

Evans v. Instine, 7 Ohio 273 (1835); Steel v. Smith,

7 Watts & Serg. 447 (Pa. 1844); Boswell's Lessee v.

Otis, 9 How. 336, 350 (1850). In Pennoyer v. Neff,

95 U.S.714, 732 (1878), this Court announced that

the judgment of a court lacking personal

jurisdiction violated the Due Process Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment as well. Burnham gv.

14

Superior Court of Cal., Marin County, 495 U.S. 604

608 (1990)

Petitioner has reconciled with’ the

appearance the Constitution of the United States

written in 1789, along with the Bill of Rights in 1791,

simply have no meaning in a Court created by

Congress sitting in a_ territorial jurisdiction

capacity. This is why Congress is instructed in

Article lll, Section 2, Clause 3, to Constitutionally

establish the place or places a trial foran alleged

crime is to be held when not alleged to have

been committed within any one of the 50 State of

the Union.

Because none of the Acts allegedly

committed in violation of certain federal laws in

this case were not alleged to have occurred

outside of the territorial jurisdiction of any State,

and because all Crimes are to be tried in the

State where said Crime is alleged to have been

committed, the Judgment by the Chief Judge for

the United States District Court for the Centra!

15

District of fllinois, and the Panel of Judges at the

United States Court of Appeals for the 7" Circuit,

are not judgments atall. Because each lacked

territorial jurisdiction over the acts alleged to have

violated laws of Congress regulating interstate

commerce and interstate taxes, each judgment

is of a person and not any judge.

CONCLUSION

Denny R. Patridge, respecfifully requests this

Court sitting in its appellate jurisdiction, origina!

jurisdiction, or under its authority to render

Judgments void according to the Constitution

and Article itll, Section 2, Clause 3, grant this

Petition to Rehear this case setting the judgment

of both the United States District Court for the 7™

Circuit and United States District Court for the

Central District of Illinois aside and directing the

deprivation of Petitioner's liberty be ceased at

once.

Respectfully Submitted

4.10.08 /s/ Denny R. Patridge

16

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

The undersigned certifies that this Petition

for Rehearing is presented in good faith and not

for the purpose of any delay, whatsoever, and is

limited to substantial and controlling issues

involving Article Ill, Section 2, Clause 3, which

requires the trial of all crimes to be tried in the

State wherein the acts violating laws of Congress

were allegedly committed.

/s/Denny R. Patridge

17

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 06-3635

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

V.

DENNY R. PATRIDGE,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of Illinois.

No. 04-20031-001—-Michael P. McCuskey, Chief

Judge.

No. 06-3785

DENNY R. PATRIDGE and JUDY PATRIDGE,

Petifioners-Appellants,

V.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States Tax Court

No. 1551-06L—Peter J. Panuthos, Judge.

Add.39

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 5, 2007—DECIDED NOVEMBER

14, 2007

Nos. 06-3635 & 06-3785

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and WOOD

and EVANS, Circuit Judges.

EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge. Denny Patridge,

who owned an insurance agency, decided to make

life hard for the revenooers by transferring his income

to an offshore trust and then pretending that he had

no income.

The first trust in line, located in Antigua,

transferred everything to a second trust, in Belize. The

second trust transferred the money to a third trust

(also in Belize}, which “loaned” it back to Patridge,

who conveniently never paid interest orrepaid any of

the “debt.” When applying for credit, Patridge

treated the proceeds from Trust #3 as income and

claimed to have no debts. Trust #1 and Trust #2 filed

tax returns, each claiming to have expenses exactly

equal to its income. Trust #3 never filed a tax return.

Patridge himself filed returns in some years, though

notin others, and claimed to have negligible income.

After an audit, the IRS concluded that

Add.40

Patridge’s income was significant and that he owed

$74,279 in taxes for 1996 and $49,836 for 1997.

Penalties took the total to $130,736 (plus interest) for

1996 and $88,675 (plus interest) for 1997. Patridge

refused to cooperate with the audit and did not

contest the deficiency determination and assessment

until learning that a criminal investigation was under

way—and by then it was too late. But when the IRS

tried to levy on his assets, Patridge demanded a

hearing under 26 U.S.C. §6330, which allows taxpayers

to contest the time and manner of payment on a tax

debt. Instead of presenting arguments about how

and when the debt would be paid, however,

Patridge tried to dispute his liability, a subject that

Congress placed off limits to avoid a collateral attack

on matters already resolved. 26 U.S.C. §6330(c) (2) (B).

Told that he could obtain review exclusively in

the Tax Court, Patridge (represented by counsel)

instead filed suit in the United States District Court for

the Central District of Illinois. When, as wasinevitable,

that suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, see

Patridge v. Internal Revenue Service, No. 06-1155

(Nov.13, 2006) (unpublished order), he turned at last

Add.41

to the Tax Court, where his action was doomed by

§ 6330(c}{2) (B).

Meanwhile Patridge had been indicted for tax

evasion, money laundering, and wire fraud. Still

represented by the same lawyer, he dragged out the

jury trial for 13 days but was convicted. He has been

sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment, fined

$100,000, and ordered to pay his back taxes and

accumulated penalties.

Patridge's brief in the criminal appeal presents

19 issues, all frivolous. Many are in the style of tax-

protest arguments that we might expect from a

layman representing himself but do not expect to see

in a brief filed by a member of the bar. For example,

although counsel concedes that a person who earns

income cannot avoid taxes by appointing it to a third

party—-here, by remitting the income to Trust #1—he

insists that the maneuver may be penalized only if the

taxpayer knows that 26 U.S.C. §7201 is the section of

the Internal Revenue Code that makes the dodge

unlawful.

Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991),

holds that a peison may be convicted of tax offenses

Add.42

only if he knows that the Code requires him to pay.

The jury was so instructed, and its verdict shows that it

found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Patridge

knew that he had to pay taxes on what he made

from his business. If is scarcely possible to imagine

otherwise: the system of offshore trusts, and the fictive

“loans,” show that Patridge was trying to hide income

that he knew to be taxable. Why else all this folderol?

Yet Patridge, in common with many other people

who know what the law requires, could not say just

which provisions of the Code make income taxable

and prevent evasion.

For that matter, many tax lawyers (and most

judges) could not rattle off the citations without

glancing at a book. This shortcoming of memory

(perhaps, for Patridge, a deliberate avoidance of

knowledge) prevents criminal punishment, counsel

insists.

But why would this be so? No statute says it; no

opinion holds it. Cheek derived its knowledge-of-law

requirement from the fact that §7201 makes only

“willful” tax evasion criminal. An act is willful for the

purpose of tax law, the Court concluded, when the

Add.43

taxpayer knows what the Code requires yet sets out

to foil the system. Knowledge of the law’s demands

does not depend on knowing the citation any more

than ability to watch a program on TV depends on

knowing the frequency on which the signal is

broadcast.

Patridge insists that the indictment was

premature, and the conviction invalid, because he

was pursuing relief under §6330. This

argument—which like others in counsel's brief lacks

the benefit of either statutory support or any judicial

decision—supposes that the crime of tax evasion is

not complete until the IRS is unable to collect. That's

nonsense. Patridge’s crime entailed the use of three

trusts to conceal his income. It was complete when

these acts were performed and the tax year passed

without payment. Patridge’'s resort to §3660 in an

effort to string out the process may be an

aggravating factor in sentencing but does not

undermine the conviction.

The last of the issues we address is Patridge’s

contention that the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980,

44 U.S.C. §§ 3501-21, forecloses his conviction. This

Add.44

contention is as weak as the other 18, but it has been

raised in several recent appeals—despite the fact

that it was considered and rejected in Salberg v.

United States, 969 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1992)—so we take

this occasion to hold that the 1995 amendments to

the Act do not alter Salberg's conclusion.

Section 3507 provides that an agency needs

the approval of the Office of Management and

Budget to collect information, and §3512(a)(1) adds

that ‘no person shall be subject to any penalty for

failing to comply with a collection of information that

is subject to this subchapter” unless OMB's approval

is evinced by a “valid control number” on the

agency’s demand for information. Per §3507(g), OMB

“may not approve a collection of information for a

period in excess of 3 years.” Patridge observes that

the IRS's Form 1040 has displayed the same control

number since 1981 and argues that it must therefore

represent an approval lasting for more than 3 years.

Moreover, he asserts that the IRS did not obtain a

new approval between the 1995 amendments and

the adoption of forms for tax years 1996 and 1997, so

these forms must be (in counsel's words) “outlaw and

Add.45

bootleg.”

Finally, Patridge contends that all IRS forms are

invalid because they do not tell taxpayers that the

lack of a valid control number means that they need

not supply any information. How any of this could

block a conviction for tax evasion is a mystery.

Patridge evaded taxes by shuffling his income among

trusts in an attempt to conceal it from the IRS. That

crime does not depend on the conients of any form.

Evading one’s taxes is illegal independent of the

information one does or does not supply. Consider

another example: the Clean Air Act requires

businesses to curtail certain emissions using the best

available technology, and to report on those

emissions to the EPA. An error in the EPA's forms might

spare the business any penalties for bad information

but would not license it to emit pollution without limit.

The Paperwork Reduction Act does not change

any substantive obligation. Anyway, as we held in

Salberg, the obligation to file a tax return stems from

26 U.S.C. §7203, not from any agency’s demand. The

Paperwork Reduction Act does not repeal §7203.

Repeal by implication depends oninconsistency that

Add.46

makes it impossible to comply with the newer law

while still honoring the old one, see Branch v. Smith,

538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003); J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v.

Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 141-44

(2001), and there is no such inconsistency between

§7203 and the Paperwork Reduction Act. One reason

for this is that §7203 requires a “return” but does not

define that word or require anyone to use Form 1040,

or any “official” form at all. All that is required is a

complete and candid report of income.

Finally, we have no doubt that the IRS has

complied with the Paperwork Reduction Act. Form

1040 bears a control number from OMB, as do the

other forms the IRS commonly distributes to taxpayers.

That this number has been constant since 1981 does

not imply that OMB has shirked its duty. Section 3507

requires periodic review, not a periodic change in

control numbers. Patridge offers us no reason to think

that the necessary review has not been conducted.

The contro! number on Form 1040 appears on OMB's

web site as a current, valid number; if this is wrong, it

takes more than a lawyer’s say-so to establish the

proposition. That OMB didn't re-review Form 1040

Add.47

between the 1995 and 1996 tax year is irrelevant;

nothing in the 1995 amendments says that all existing

approvals become invalid or that all forms must be

resubmitted.

None of the remaining 16 arguments in the

criminal appeal requires comment. The appeal from

the Tax Court is equally frivolous. Section 6330(c} (2) (B)

says point blank that a request for a hearing on the

details of collection does not require (or even permit)

the IRS fo reconsider the taxpayer's substantive

obligations. Patridge could have cooperated with the

audit butrefused; he could have sought review of the

assessment in the Tax Court but failed to do so. The

current proceeding is nothing but obstructionism.

Jeroid W. Barringer represented Patridge at trial,

in the Tax Court, and during the three appeals to this

court. He has performed below the standard of a pro

se litigant; we have serious doubt about his fitness to

practice law. The problem is not simply his inability to

distinguish between plausible and preposterous

arguments. It is his disdain for the norms of legal

practice (19 issues indeed!) and the rules of

procedure. Take, for example, Fed. R. App. P.

Add.48

28(a)(7), which requires every appellant's brief to

contain “a statement of facts relevant to the issues

submitted for review with appropriate references to

the record”. Circuit Rule 28(c) adds: “The statement

of facts required by Fed. R. App. P. 28(a}(7) shall be a

fair summary without argument or comment. No fact

shall be stated in this part of the brief unless it is

supported by a reference to the page or pages of

the record or the appendix where that fact appears.”

So what did Barringer write as a “fair summary without

argument or comment”? Here is the complete text of

his “STATEMENT OF THE FACTS":

This case is about due process and the

Fifth and Sixth. The indictment was

defective and revolved around a theory

of law section 7201 cannot support. The

term “willful” cannot support. There was

no evidence of willfulness regarding

knowledge of the facts and there is no

evidence of willfulness regarding

knowledge of the law required to be

alleged in the indictment and proved

beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. The

Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 forbid

the indictment from being returned.

There was no fraud in any wire and there

was no laundering of any money from

Add.49

an illegal source. The jury was clearly

confused by the Court's usage of evade

and avoid interchangeably. The District

Court relied upon the wrong Sentencing

Guidelines and found facts to give

Appellant 60 months in prison when the

sentence should have been probation.

This contains not a single fact and verges on

illiteracy. One might think that Barringer had confused

the “Statement of Facts” section with the “Summary

of Argument" required by Rule 28(a)(8), except that

this passage does not contain any argument [it is

argument free. though full of assertion) and is

immediately followed by a six-page long “SUMMARY

OF APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS".

Noncompliance with Rule 28(a)(7) is not an

isolated problem. To avoid tedious length, we'll limit

ourselves to one more example. Circuit Rule 30(q)

provides: “The appeliant shal! submit, bound with the

main brief, an appendix containing the judgment or

order under review and any opinion, memorandum

of decision, findings of fact and conclusions of law, or

oral statement of reasons delivered by the trial court

or administrative agency upon the rendering of that

judgment, decree, or order."

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Circuit Rule 30(6)(1) adds that the appendix

also must contain “[c]opies of any other opinions,

orders, or oral rulings in the case that address the

issues sought to be raised. If the appellant's brief

challenges any oral ruling, the portion of the transcript

containing the judge’s rationale for that ruling must

be included in the appendix.” To make sure that

counsel are aware of these requirements, we require

every appellate lawyer to certify in writing that the

brief complies with these rules. Circuit Rule 30(d).

Lack of a statement under Rule 30(d)} tells the

clerk's office that counsel is unaware of the rule, and

the brief will be rejected; but a brief with the required

statement will be accepted, because our staff is not

able to look behind the certificate to determine

whether all of the essential materials have been

included—and they really are “essential,” because

without knowing why the district court did what it did,

we can't assess claims that the court erred.

Barringer’s brief contains this statement: “I,

Jerold Barringer, certify by my signature above | have

included all of the materials required by parts (a) and

(bo) of Circuit Rule 30 in the appendix for the

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Appellant.” The brief was accepted. Bui the

representation is false—whether deliberately so, or as

aresult of Barringer’s inability to comprehend Rule 30,

we cannot know. The only document “bound with

the main brief” is the judgment of conviction.

None of the district court's opinions and other

explanations is attached to the brief. We eventually

tracked down three that should have been included.

Two concern Barringer's motions to dismiss the

indictment; one denies a motion for a judgment of

acquittal. The district judge’s oral statement of

reasons for the 60-month sentence should have been

transcribed and included but was not. These

omissions Complicated our task of review.

This court regularly fines lawyers who violate

Circuit Rule 30 yet falsely certify compliance under

Circuit Rule 30(d). E.g., United States v. White, 472 F.3d

458, 465-66 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Evans, 131

F.3d 1192 (7" Cir. 1997); In re Galvan, 92 F.3d 582 (7th

Cir. 1996). We also regularly penalize unrepresented

litigants who advance frivolous tax-protest-style

arguments. E.g., Szopa v. United States, 453 F.3d 455,

after reconsideration, 460 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 2006)

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(setting $4,000 as the presumptive sanction for

frivolous tax appeals, doubled for repeat offenders).

Members of the bar must be held to standards at

least as high as those of unrepresented litigants.

Barringer is a recidivist; he ignored our 2006

decision reminding him that taxpayers cannot use a

request for a collection hearing to contest their

substantive liability. We therefore give Barringer 14

days to show cause why he should not be fined

$10,000 for his frivolous arguments and

noncompliance with the Rules, and why he should

not be suspended from practice until he

demonstrates an ability to litigate an appeal

competently and responsibly. See Fed. R. App. P. 38,

46(b), (c}.

AFFIRMED; ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ISSUED

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

USCA-02-C 0072—1 1-14-07

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