Opposition Brief — Hagen v. United States
Supreme Court brief2002
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Nos. 01-1113 and 01-8356!
AE LENE PIO LAO LINE OE AN 0 RR RRC IN oO NRE
Jn the Supreme Court of the Uniten Stites
JOEL HAGEN, PETITIONER
).
UNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA
TREVOR BJORKMAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS
Y.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
MICHAEL CHERTOFF
Assistant Attorney General
JOSEPH C. WYDERKO
Attorney
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether petitioners’ sentences violate Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because they were
based on drug quantities that were not alleged in the
indictment.
2. Whether, in enhancing petitioner Hagen’s offense
level under Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) for pos-
session of firearms, the district court correctly held that
petitioner bears the burden of proving that it was
clearly improbable that the firearms were connected
with the offense.
(I)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Apprendi vy. New Jerse}, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) .....ccccccecceees 6,7
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991) 2. 10
United States v. Betz, 82 F.3d 205 (8th Cir. 1996) ........... g
United States v. Bost, 968 F.2d 729 (8th Cir.
a y
United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724 (1st Cir.
| 8
United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62 (11th Cir. 1995) ........... 8
United States v. Marmolejo, 106 F.3d 1213 (5th
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1056 (1988)... x
United States v. McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095 (6th Cir.
ee 8
United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711 (3d Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1023 (1995) .........ccscccreerserseeeeeenees )
United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir.
a 8
United States v. Richmond, 37 F.3d 418 (8th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1178 (1995) .......cceceeeeeeeneees i)
United States v. Roberts, 980 F.2d 645 (10th Cir.
0 sdiibetinaicniainanenaneminnmeniaees 8
Statutes and regulations:
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21 U.S.C. 853 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) ceccecscssscccseceesssseeesenneseee D
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IV
Regulations—Continued: Page
United States Sentencing Guidelines:
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Jn the Supreme Court of the Anited States
No. 01-1118
JOEL HAGEN, PETITIONER
VU.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
No. 01-8356
TREVOR BJORKMAN, ET AL., PETITIONERS
VU.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
ON PETITIONS FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. Al-
A31)' is reported at 270 F.3d 482.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on
October 30, 2001. The petition for a writ of certiorari in
' References to “Pet. App.” refer to the appendix to the peti-
tion in No. 01-1113.
(1)
»
No. 01-1113 was filed on January 28, 2002, and the
petition in No. 01-8356 was filed on January 25, 2002.
The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28
U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
After entering guilty pleas in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin,
petitioners were each convicted of conspiracy to pos-
sess marijuana with intent to distribute it, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. 841(a) and 846° Petitioner Hagen was
sentenced to 155 months’ imprisonment and fined
$40,000, petitioner Bjorkman to 146 months’ imprison-
ment, petitioner Paul Gunderson to 148 months’ impris-
onment, petitioner Fearing to 105 months’ imprison-
ment, and petitioner Dennis Gunderson to 125 months’
imprisonment. All five petitioners were also sentenced
to five years of supervised release following their terms
of imprisonment. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet.
App. Al-A31.
1. In 1996, petitioners Hagen and Paul Gunderson
became partners in a drug operation that bought mari-
juana from Mexican sources through contacts in
Arizona and then transported it to Minnesota. Peti-
tioners Dennis Gunderson, Bjorkman, and Fearing
were drivers who transported 100-pound loads of mari-
juana from Arizona to Hagen’s and Paul Gunderson’s
residences, where the marijuana was repackaged and
then sold to customers. Pet. App. Al-A2; Gov’t C.A.
Br. 11-12.
In early 1997, Hagen and Paul Gunderson ended their
partnership. Thereafter, Paul and Dennis Gunderson
* Petitioner Hagen also pleaded guilty to criminal forfeiture of
$286,900 pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 853 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
3
continued to obtain marijuana from their Mexican
sources in Arizona, using a new set of drivers. After a
search warrant was executed at his residence in June
1997, Paul Gunderson sold the operation to Dennis and
another individual. Meanwhile, Hagen and co-defen-
dant Scot Hendricks used couriers, included Fearing, to
obtain marijuana from Arizona throughout the summer
of 1998. The marijuana was repackaged at Hagen’s
residence before it was divided for sale by Hagen and
co-defendant Hendricks. Pet. App. A2-A3; Gov’t C.A.
Br. 12-13.
In August 1998, search warrants were executed at
various locations in Minnesota and Wisconsin. During a
search of Hagen’s Minnesota residence, law enforce-
ment agents found $122,640, two handguns, a clip
loaded with hollow-point bullets, a scale, and drug
packaging materials. The two handguns were found
together with $12,000 in cash in a basement safe. Pet.
App. A3, Al2-A13; Gov't C.A. Br. 14, 23-24.
2. Petitioners and two co-defendants were charged
in a multi-count superseding indictment. Count One
charged that petitioners and the two co-defendants
conspired to possess marijuana with intent to distribute
it, and to distribute “marijuana, a Schedule I controlled
substance * * *.” Superseding Indictment 1.
Pursuant to written plea agreements, petitioners
each pleaded guilty to this count. The plea agreement
for each petitioner provided that he was subject to a
mandatory minimum five-year sentence and a maxi-
mum 40-year sentence, and the district court recon-
firmed those penalties at each petitioner’s plea hearing.
In addition, the plea agreements of petitioners
Bjorkman, Paul Gunderson, and Fearing set forth the
quantities of marijuana that the government believed
to be properly attributable to each. Pet. App. A3-A5;
Gov't C.A. Br. 6-8.
3. At sentencing, the district court found that peti-
tioner Hagen was responsible under the Sentencing
Guidelines for between 700 and 1000 kilograms of mari-
juana, resulting in a base offense level of 30 under
Guidelines § 2D1.1(¢c)(5). Hagen Judgment 7. The court
increased the offense level by two levels under
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of firearms, finding that it
was “not clearly improbable” that the two handguns
found in the basement safe in Hagen’s residence were
connected with the offense.’ Jbid. Before sentencing,
Hagen had submitted affidavits from two individuals
who stated that they owned the handguns and had
stored them at Hagen’s residence. Pet. App. Al3. The
district court found that it did not matter who owned
the handguns because there was “substantially more
than a preponderance of the evidence * * * that Joel
Hagen was in possession of the firearm which was
located in the basement where marijuana processing
was performed, where indeed the safe was held, where
there was money in the safe attributable to the drug.”
Sentencing Tr. 22-23. Accordingly, the court concluded
that Hagen had not carried his burden of showing that
it was clearly improbable that the handguns were
connected with the offense. Jd. at 23.
After making other adjustments to the offense level,
the court determined that Hagen’s Guidelines’ range
was 168-210 months’ imprisonment, based on a total
3 Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) requires a two-level enhancement of
the offense level “[{i!f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)
was possessed[.]” Application note 3 in the commentary to
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that “[t]he adjustment should be applied if
the weapon was present, unless it is clearly improbable that the
weapon was connected with the offense.”
D
offense level of 33 and a criminal history category of
Ill. Hagen Judgment 7. Granting the government’s
motion for a downward departure pursuant to Guide-
lines § 5K1.1, the court sentenced Hagen to 155 months’
imprisonment. /d. at 2, 7.
The district court found that petitioner Bjorkman
was responsible under the Sentencing Guidelines for
163.6 kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a base offense
level of 26 under Guidelines § 2D1.1(¢c)(7). Bjorkman
Judgment 7. After reducing the offense level under
Guidelines § 3E1.1 for acceptance of responsibility, the
court determined that Bjorkman’s Guidelines’ range
was 92-115 months’ imprisonment, based on a total
offense level of 23 and a criminal history category of VI.
Ibid. The court decided to depart upward from the
Guidelines’ range because Bjorkman’s criminal history
category did not adequately reflect the likelihood that
he would engage in future criminal conduct. Id. at 8.
Accordingly, the court sentenced Bjorkman to 146
months’ imprisonment. /d. at 2.
The district court found that petitioner Paul
Gunderson was responsible under the Sentencing
Guidelines for 862 kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a
base offense level of 30 under Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(5).
P. Gunderson Judgment 7. After making adjustments
to the base offense level, the court determined that
Gunderson’s Guidelines’ range was 168-210 months’
imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 33 and a
criminal history category of III. Jbid. The court
granted the government’s motion for a downward de-
parture pursuant to Guidelines § 5K1.1 and sentenced
Gunderson to 148 months’ imprisonment. Jd. at 2, 7.
The district court found that petitioner Fearing was
responsible under the Sentencing Guidelines for 386
kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a base offense level
6
of 26 under Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(7). Fearing Judgment
7. After making adjustments to the base offense level,
the court determined that Fearing’s Guidelines’ range
was 84-105 months’ imprisonment, based on a total
offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of IV.
Ibid. The court sentenced Fearing to 105 months’
imprisonment. /d. at 2.
The district court found that petitioner Dennis
Gunderson was responsible under the Sentencing
Guidelines for 808 kilograms of marijuana, resulting in a
base offense level of 30 under Guidelines § 2D1.1(c)(5).
D. Gunderson Judgment 7. After making adjustments
to the base offense level, the court determined that
Gunderson’s Guidelines’ range was 121-151 months’
imprisonment, based on a total offense level of 30 and a
criminal history category of III. Jbid. The court
sentenced Gunderson to 125 months’ imprisonment. /d.
at 2.
4. On appeal, petitioners argued, for the first time,
that their sentences were imposed in violation of Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because they
exceeded the otherwise applicable statutory maximum
based on a fact, drug quantity, that was not alleged in
the indictment. Pet. C.A. Br. 16-28.
The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. Al-A31. It
rejected petitioners’ argument that Apprendi required
automatic reversal of their sentences because the
superseding indictment failed to allege drug quantity.
Id. at A5-A10. Relying on circuit precedent, the court
ruled that “[i]f the indictment does not include type or
quantity, and the defendant does not object, then
review is for plain error * * *, and not for any
different standard (such as lack of jurisdiction or failure
to state an offense).” Jd. at Al0. Because “[nJone of the
[petitioners] even assert/ed] that he was responsible
7
for less than 100 kilograms of marijuana,” the court
concluded that “no injustice has been done and the
requirements for reversal on plain-error review have
not been met.” Jbid.
The court of appeals also upheld the district court’s
enhancement of petitioner Hagen’s offense level under
Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of
the two handguns. Pet. App. Al0-Al4. Based on
circuit precedent, the court rejected Hagen’s claim that
the government, rather than the defendant, bears the
burden of proving that it was not clearly improbable
that the weapons were connected to the offense. Jd. at
A10-A12. The court also rejected Hagen’s claim that he
had met this burden. /d. at Al2-A13. The court ex-
plained that “[gliven that the guns were found in a
residence where drugs were delivered and handled,
that they were found in close proximity to the proceeds
from the crime, and that drug paraphernalia was also
found in the house, the [district] court did not clearly
err in awarding the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement to
Hagen.” Jd. at A13.‘
DISCUSSION
1. Petitioners renew their contention (01-1113 Pet. 9;
01-8356 Pet. 6-11) that their sentences violate Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because they exceed
the statutory maximum sentences to which they were
subject based on an indictment charging a marijuana
offense without specifying the drug quantities that
were involved in the offense. That claim, which was not
raised in the district court, is essentially the same claim
as is before the Court in United States v. Cotton, No.
* The court of appeals rejected several other claims raised by
individual petitioners, which they do not renew here.
8
01-687 (argued Apr. 15, 2002). Accordingly, the peti-
tions in this case should be held pending the decision in
Cotton and then disposed of as appropriate in light of
that decision.
2. Petitioner Hagen (01-1113 Pet. 9-13) contends
that his offense level was improperly enhanced under
Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1) for possession of
the two handguns found during the search of his
residence. He argues that the courts below erred in
placing the burden on him to prove that it was clearly
improbable that the weapons were connected with the
offense.
Petitioner’s contention turns on the interpretation of
application note 3 in the commentary to Guidelines
§ 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides that the two-level
enhancement for possession of a dangerous weapon
“should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it
is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected
with the offense.” Like the Seventh Circuit, the
majority of the other courts of appeals have interpreted
the application note to mean that, although the
government initially bears the burden of proving that a
defendant possessed a weapon in a place where drugs
were present, the defendant must then show that it is
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with
the offense in order not to be subject to the enhance-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Marmolejo, 106 F.3d
1213, 1216 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1056
(1998); United States v. Hall, 46 F.3d 62, 63 (11th Cir.
1995); United States v. Roberts, 980 F.2d 645, 647 (10th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724,
727-728 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Restrepo, 884
F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.
McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095, 1097-1099 (6th Cir. 1989). The
Eighth Circuit, on the other hand, has held that “in
9
order for § 2D1.1(b)(1) to apply, the government has to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is not
clearly improbable that the weapon had a nexus with
the criminal activity.” United States v. Richmond, 37
F.3d 418, 419 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1178
(1995); see also United States v. Bost, 968 F.2d 729, 732
(8th Cir. 1992).°
Notwithstanding this conflict among the circuits,
further review by this Court is unwarranted. To begin
with, the conflict is not implicated in this case, since
application of the Eighth Circuit’s standard likely
would not have produced a different outcome. The
government proved that petitioner Hagen possessed
the two handguns in his residence during the conspir-
acy, that marijuana had been delivered to the residence
and repackaged in the basement, that the handguns had
been stored together with $12,000 in drug proceeds in
the basement safe, and that drug paraphernalia was
present in the residence simultaneously with the
handguns. Pet. App. A138; Gov’t C.A. Br. 24-25. Such
overwhelming evidence of a probable nexus between
the handguns and the drug conspiracy would be
sufficient to show that it was not clearly improbable
that the firearms were connected with the marijuana
conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Betz, 82 F.3d 205, 210-
211 & n.4 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that enhancements
imposed under § 2D1.1(b)(1) have been upheld by the
Kighth Circuit in a number of cases with facts similar to
those found here).
® The Third Circuit has not taken a position either way. In
United States v. Price, 13 F.3d 711, 733 (1994), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1023 (1995), the Third Circuit assumed without deciding that
the government bears the burden of proof for purposes of deciding
that case.
10
In any event, a conflict over a question of Guidelines
interpretation would best be left for resolution by the
Sentencing Commission, rather than by this Court. See
Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991).
Accordingly, petitioner Hagen’s individual sentencing
claim merits no further review.
CONCLUSION
With respect to petitioners’ claim that their enhanced
sentences are unconstitutional, the petitions for a writ
of certiorari should be held pending the decision in
United States v. Cotton, No. 01-687, and then disposed
of as appropriate in light of that decision. In all other
respects, the petitions should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
THEODORE B. OLSON
Solicitor General
MICHAEL CHERTOFF
Assistant Attorney General
JOSEPH C. WYDERKO
Attorney
APRIL 2002
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