Amicus Curiae Brief — Textron Inc. v. Massachusetts Commissioner of Revenue

No. 01-1083

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

TEXTRON INC., ef ai.,

Petitioners,

Ve

COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

COUNCIL ON STATE TAXATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

DIANN L. SMITH

General Counsel

DOUGLAS L. LINDHOLM *

President/Executive Director

STEPHEN P.B. KRANZ

Tax Counsel

WILLIAM D. PELTZ

BOBBY L. BURGNER

J. HUGH MCKINNON

Chair, Vice Chair, and Of Counsel

Lawyers’ Coordinating

Subcommittee

COUNCIL ON STATE TAXATION

122 C Street, N.W.

Suite 330

Washington, D.C. 20001

* Counsel of Record (202) 484-5222

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WILSON-EPES PRINTING CO., INC. — (202) 789-0096 — WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........:c:sccssseeserseeeeeseeneeneees ii

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE ......-:0:sss0seeee00e l

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION............ 3

ARGUMENT. .......cccecsscessccssccssseceeseeesnessenssceeeeneesaceneeens 3

Under The Due Process Clause Of The United

States Constitution, The Massachusetts Commis-

sioner Of Revenue Has _ Unconstitutionally

Deprived The Petitioners Of Their Property When

The State Taxing Authority Failed To Provide The

Petitioners With The Statutorily Mandated Remedy,

And Instead Substituted A New, Unforeseen, And

Inferior Remedy ...........:csscscseesesesesssereensnnenensesneessenes 3

CONCLUSION .........ccccsssccsssssssesseecsrseseecesneseeeseenncennenss 14

(i)

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Arizona Department of Revenue v. Canyoneers,

Fo We Ee GE Diinitcinistiannerniiceinianiinnmaiiaiin 10

Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. O’Conner, 223 U.S.

ey ee CEE ittivriciccassienecgiannvaenmeanininen 4

California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S.

BITE iiiterieinidcnmistivennanaaipiandiats 12

City of New York v. State of New York, 94

Bie ae PE Fr ctcensacichncnetiseinsnionninteieenbannesiias 10

Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of

Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945) .......eeeeeeeees 12

General Motors Corporation v. City and Cty. of

San Francisco, 69 Cal. App. 4th 448 (1999)... 11

Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation, 509

i 5 RARE eatin tS Dene 4

McKesson Corporation v. Division of Alcoholic

Beverage & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39n 22

ELF U TT isons cahincsnisinotcaniccianiapshaiaiaucacieieaienosnminaapiiateinia 4,5

Newsweek, Inc. v. Florida Department of

Revenue, 522 U.S. 422, 444 (1998) ..............0 12

Perini Corporation, et al. v. Commissioner of

Revenue, 419 Mass 763, 647 N.E. 2d 52 (1995)... d

Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994) ............. ee 9

W.R. Grace & Co. and Chrysler Motors Cor-

poration v. State of Washington, Department

of Revenue, 973 P2d 1011, cert. denied, 528

BF rive veiinusccictnnecttueteieahiephntdabiegsbamdineataanss 11

STATUTES AND UNITED STATES

CONSTITUTIONS

General Laws Of The Commonwealth Of

Massachusetts, Ch. 63, Section 52.............:00008 2

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, §1................. 3

U.S. Constitution Amendment XI1.....................0000 11

yp Gee Sf ot | k | a i 11

id

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Anited States

No. 01-1083

TEXTRON INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

¥e

COMMISSIONER OF REVENUE,

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

COUNCIL ON STATE TAXATION

IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS

INTEREST OF THE AMICUS CURIAE

This brief is submitted by the Council On State Taxation

(COST) as amicus curiae in support of the Petitioners in the

above captioned matter.' COST is a non-profit trade asso-

ciation whose membership consists of over 540 multistate

corporations involved in interstate and _ international

commerce. COST was organized in 1969 as an advisory

committee to the Council of State Chambers of Com-

merce and was separately incorporated on January 1, 1992.

COST’s objective is to preserve and promote equitable and

' No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no

person or entity, other than amicus curiae, has made a monetary

contribution to the preparation or submission of this brief. Written

consents of the Petitioners and Respondent have been obtained and filed

with the Clerk of the Court.

2

nondiscriminatory state and local taxation of multi-

jurisdictional business entities. COST pursues this objec-

tive through legislative and judicial educational and

advocacy campaigns.

One of the issues” raised by the Petitioners involves

whether a state taxing agency, when confronted with the need

to remedy a tax ruled unconstitutional, may contravene the

specific substantive statutory remedy provided by its

legislature and instead substitute a new and different

administrative remedy (which, as a result of its unexpected

creation, may not be a remedy at all). The Massachusetts’

decision at issue directly and negatively affects COST’s

members by unconstitutionally restricting the remedies for an

invalid tax. The decision concerns COST members because,

as large, multijurisdictional corporations, they are frequently

involved in issues related to the validity of a particular state

tax, including Massachusetts taxes. State legislators and tax

administrators also commonly consult COST and its members

for recommendations on crafting appropriate tax legislation.

COST’s members look to the certainty and clarity of the

available remedy in determining whether to recommend to a

legislature certain tax provisions. Such reliance on an

available remedy provides certainty to both taxpayers and the

state. As such, COST’s members are directly affected by the

rejection of such certainty in this case and, thus, have a strong

interest in its outcome.

? The Petitioners have raised several issues in their Petition, including a

challenge to the Massachusetts corporate tax law as discriminating against

interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause, a challenge to

the finding of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that the

Petitioners lacked standing to bring the challenge to the tax, and a

challenge to the determination that an administrative remedy may

constitutionally replace a statutory remedy. COST supports Petitioners’

positions on each of these points but submits additional discussion only on

the remedy issue because Petitioners have fully briefed any arguments

COST would offer regarding the other issues.

3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

COST is submitting this brief because a conflict is

appearing between the states as to whether a state tax agency

must follow a legislatively mandated remedy for a tax found

unconstitutional. A serious difference of opinion exists

between taxpayers and many state taxing authorities on this

issue and this Court represents the only national forum

available for addressing this conflict. COST believes that the

constitutionally appropriate remedy for an invalid state tax is

one of the most pressing issues this Court faces in the state

and local tax area. Because of the confusion surrounding the

remedy issue and its prominence, COST and its members

request this Court to overturn the Massachusetts Supreme

Judicial Court’s upholding of the Massachusetts Commis-

sioner of Revenue’s Directive substituting a different admin-

istrative remedy for the statutorily mandated remedy because

this decision violates the Due Process rights of the Petitioners

and threatens the expectations of all taxpayers involved in

state tax challenges, today and in the future.

ARGUMENT

Under The Due Process Clause Of The United States

Constitution, The Massachusetts Commissioner Of

Revenue Has Unconstitutionally Deprived The Peti-

tioners Of Their Property When The State Taxing

Authority Failed To Provide The Petitioners With The

Statutorily Mandated Remedy, And Instead Substituted

A New, Unforeseen, And Inferior Remedy.

Due Process Remedy Rules in State Tax Cases

A remedy for a state tax declared unconstitutional must

comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause of

the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.’

> “(Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law ... .” U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1.

4

Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100

(1992). Under the Due Process Clause, a remedy is

constitutional only if it meets two tests: 1) the remedy must

provide either a predeprivation remedy or “meaningful

backward looking relief,” id.; and 2) the remedy must be

“clear and certain,” Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. O’Conner,

223 U.S. 280, 285 (1912); McKesson Corp. v. Division of

Alcoholic Bev. & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39 n. 22 (1990).

Massachusetts’ Remedy Design and Application

Massachusetts, during the years at issue (and continuing by

statute today), imposes an excise tax for the privilege of

doing business in the state on domestic and foreign

corporations. The corporation excise tax was enacted by Ch.

355, Acts 1919, effective January 1, 1920, and replaced a

franchise tax levied on the value of capital stock. The tax base

is measured in part by net income and in part by tangible

property or net worth.

In 1995, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ruled

that in two instances the corporate excise statute was

unconstitutional because it discriminated against interstate

commerce in violation of the United States Constitution.

Perini Corporation, et al. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 419

Mass 763, 647 N.E. 2d 52 (1995). The provisions at issue in

Perini dealt with two differences in the formulas used by

foreign corporations and domestic corporations in

determining their tax liability. Domestic corporations were

allowed to use formulas that provided tax benefits unavailable

to foreign corporations.’ In their brief, Petitioners have

demonstrated that several other elements of the tax base

* The specific discriminatory provisions were: (i) the determination of

a corporation’s status as a tangible or intangible property corporation, and

(ii) the calculation of net worth for intangible property corporations.

—_ i=

5

calculation also continue to discriminate against non-

Massachusetts corporations.

Once the Massachusetts courts declared the corporation

excise tax unconstitutional, Massachusetts was under a

constitutional obligation to provide an appropriate remedy.”

The tax statute itself provides the remedy. Chapter 63,

Section 52 of the Massachusetts statute regarding “taxation of

corporations” is entitled “Unconstitutionality of excise tax

law; effect; revival of former act”. This remedy provision

states (emphasis and omissions to enhance readability):

If the provisions of . . . [the current] excise on foreign

corporations . . . are declared unconstitutional . . . by

any such final judgment . . . such portion of the law...

shall be null and void, and such portion of said law...

shall become inapplicable .... In such event, all laws

applicable to foreign corporations, which were repealed

or were made inoperative as to, or inapplicable to, such

corporations . . . shall thereupon be revived and become

operative . . . and shall be continued in full force and

effect from the first day of January antedating by five

years the first day of January of the calendar year in

which such final judgment . . . [declaring the current tax

unconstitutional] is entered, to the same extent as if...

[the current tax] had not been enacted. The

* The remedy issue encompasses two distinct elements—procedural

and substantive. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Bev. &

Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39 n. 22 (1990). A constitutionally adequate

procedural remedy provides a method and a forum for a taxpayer to

~ challefige a suspect tax. A constitutionally adequate substantive remedy

fixes the infirmity of a tax once it is found unconstitutional. Here, the tax

was ruled unconstitutional in an earlier case, but Petitioners have not been

provided an adequate substantive remedy. Further, as noted in the

Petitioners’ brief, due to the improper finding of the Massachusetts court

that most of the Petitioners lacked standing, they have not been afforded

even a constitutionally adequate procedural remedy.

6

commissioner and the local assessors shi!l . . . assess all

taxes for which liability has been incurred under the

laws revived . . . by the foregoing provisions . . .. Excises

declared invalid by reason of the foregoing premises,

which were assessed on or after the date when the laws

repealed or made inoperative or inapplicable by . . . [the

current tax] are revived, made operative or applicable or

continued in force as herein provided, shall, to the extent

that such excises have been paid and are unrefunded, be

credited against the taxes assessed for the same period

under the laws revived and again made operative,

applicable and continued in force; provided, that if such

credit exceeds the taxes due, the excess shall

be refunded.

What does this language mean? It means that, by statute, if

the current Massachusetts excise tax on corporations is ruled

unconstitutional, the current tax disappears and the tax in

existence before the current one becomes effective. This is

the absolute rule enacted by the state legislature.

The statutory scheme in place before the current excise tax

imposed a tax based on the capitalization of authorized stock

of a foreign corporation. This statutory scheme was put in

place in 1909 and was replaced by the current, now

invalidated, system. There is no argument that that is what the

statute provides.

The determination in Perini (and the other elements

detailed in the Petitioners’ brief) that the tax is

unconstitutional should have triggered this statutory

provision, to wit: the excise tax should cease to exist, and the

tax on corporations must now to be calculated under the prior

statutory scheme. However, the Massachusetts Department of

Revenue did not impose the previous tax scheme. Instead, it

created an entirely different remedy for injured taxpayers. In

January of 1999 (four years after the tax was - found

unconstitutional by Massachusetts’ highest court) the

r

7

Department of Revenue issued Directive 99-1 purportedly

detailing the sole remedy for the unconstitutional excise tax

on foreign corporations. That remedy allows taxpayers, both

in-state-and out-of-state, to choose which statutory formulas

to use in calculating their excise tax. Thus, under the

Directive, foreign corporations could now use the calculations

formerly allowed only for domestic corporations.

The Directive (if actually enforced) may have eliminated

the constitutional discrimination problem in Perini, but it

failed to provide a constitutional remedy because it retro-

actively replaced the guaranteed statutory remedy. While it is

pure conjecture as to why the Department had developed such

a fondness for their current system, amicus is suspicious that

the revenue implications of instituting the statutory remedy

had something to do with the decision. Amicus understands,

and in fact supports, states’ efforts to address revenue issues

prudently and conservatively, particularly in these uncertain

economic times. However, what amicus cannot support

is the complete replacement of an explicit, substantive,

legislatively mandated remedy by an administrative, non-

binding directive.

Massachusetts’ Retroactive Substitution of A Non-Binding

Administrative Remedy for a Clear, Substantive Legislative

Remedy Violates the Due Process Clause

Due Process requires a remedy for an unconstitutional tax

to be “clear and certain.” A “clear and certain” remedy is a

remedy that the taxpayer was aware of at the time it chose to

protest the tax. The terms “clear and certain” imply that a

taxpayer knows what its options are—that the remedial

options are specifically defined and guaranteed. Absent such

simple notice, a remedy cannot be “clear and certain.”

Massachusetts’ statutes provided a clear, substantive

remedy for the situation in which the current corporate excise

tax was found unconstitutional. The law provides that if the

8

current corporate excise tax is ruled unconstitutional, that law

disappears and the prior capital stock tax becomes effective.

The current corporate excise tax was in fact found

unconstitutional but the Department of Revenue has

prevented Petitioners from calculating their tax under the

prior capital stock provisions.° Instead, the Department has

substituted a new, retroactive, completely different, and

financially inferior remedy for the statutory guarantee. At no

point during the litigation over the constitutionality of the

excise tax on foreign corporations was such a remedy

contemplated. The legislature has never blessed such an

administrative remedy. No taxpayer could have anticipated

that given the clear, long-standing, legislative pronouncement

regarding the legally required remedy that a different remedy

would be adopted by the taxing agency after the litigation was

lost by the state. Such a retroactive substitution by an

administrative body of a legislative remedy is not “clear and

certain” —it is confusing and unexpected—and thus cannot be

constitutional.

This discussion over the administrative versus the

legislative remedy is not an academic exercise—the state has

kept money required to be refunded to the Petitioners under

the legislatively mandated remedy. The difference between

the remedy offered to the Petitioners under the

Commissioner’s calculation and what the taxpayer should

receive under the statutory scheme is the due process

violation. The Legislature promised the taxpayers a certain

tax calculation, and the tax agency should not be allowed to

take it away. A more quintessential taking of property

without due process is hard to imagine.

° The Department has never argued, and in fact no argument exists, that

the statutory remedy provision is not relevant to the sections of the excise

tax found unconstitutional.

es

9

Finally, as the Petitioners point out, the remedy provided

by Massachusetts actually violates one of the clear standards

already articulated by this Court—a state may not “bait and

switch” in applying a remedy. Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106

(1994). In Reich v. Collins, the taxpayer challenged the

constitutionality of a state tax under a statitory refund

provision. /d. The state tax code provided for both

predeprivation challenges (protests) and post-deprivation

challenges (refund suits). After the tax was ruled

unconstitutional, the state tried to avoid paying the refund by

arguing that since the taxpayer could have challenged the tax

before paying the tax, the taxpayer had paid the tax

voluntarily and no refund was due. /d. at 110. This Court

soundly rejected this argument. Jd. at 111. “Bait and switch”

in the consumer protection world occurs when a company

advertises a product, such as a television, for a very low price

in order to entice a customer to enter the store. Once in the

store, the customer is told that the store does not have that

product but is offered a similar but different product for a

more expensive price. Frequently, because the customer is

already at the store and is prepared to make a purchase, the

customer will buy the substitute and the store will make a

higher profit than it would have made on the advertised

product. This is just what Massachusetts did here: it offered

the statutory remedy of reversion to the prior law if the

current tax was found invalid, but when the Petitioners came

to court to obtain the advertised remedy, the state basically

said—we won’t provide the statutory relief, but what we can

offer you are these new, costly calculations. The Petitioners

came to court expecting refunds under the statutory remedy

scheme; the refunds were mandated by statute. Therefore, the

Petitioners are owed the statutory relief originally provided.

-*

10

States’ Interpretations of the “Clear and Certain” Remedy

Rule Are In Conflict

This Court’s involvement in the remedy issue is

particularly pressing because of a conflict that is arising

among the states that have been confronted with the issue.

For example, confronted by a situation similar to the current

case, the Court of Appeals of New York held that the taxing

agency must follow the statutory remedy, even though the

remedy crafted by the taxing agency would otherwise have

also fixed the invalidity of the tax. City of New York v. State

of New York, 94 N.Y.2d 577 (2000). In this case, a commuter

tax by New York City imposed only on residents of states

other than New York was determined by the Court of Appeals

to violate the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and

Immunities Clause. In the statute applying the tax only to

non-New Yorkers, the legislature had specifically provided

that if the tax was found to be unconstitutional, then the tax

was to be repealed in its entirety. The tax was ultimately

ruled unconstitutional, and the City of New York proposed

that the appropriate remedy would be to apply the tax to both

non-residents and residents. This proposed remedy would

have fixed the unconstitutional discrimination, but it was not

the remedy provided for in the statute. Thus, the New York

Court of Appeals rejected this remedy and followed the

statutory requirement repealing the entire tax. The New York

approach is not isolated. The Court of Appeals of Arizona

has similariy held that the Department of Revenue did not

have authority to add additional conditions to a tax refund,

not found in the statute. Arizona Dep't of Revenue v.

Canyoneers, 23 P.3d 684 (2001). The decisions in New York

and Arizona are directly contrary to the decision in

Massachusetts at issue here.

In fact, confusion abounds in general about when a new,

different, unexpected remedy for an invalid tax may be

imposed retroactively. Some states take the high road and

11

some states fight to the death to keep the ill-gotten gains. In

W.R. Grace & Co. and Chrysler Motors Corp. v. State of

Washington, Department of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1011, cert.

denied, 528 U.S. 950 (1999), the Washington Supreme Court

approved the retroactive application of a conditional credit as

the sole remedy for the unconstitutional tax. In General

Motors Corp. v. City and Cty. of San Francisco, 69 Cal. App.

4th 448 (1999), the California Court of Appeal came to the

opposite conclusion (involving an almost identical tax) and

mandated full refunds rather than the taxing authority’s

proffered conditional, partial refunds. Recently, following the

finding in Jn the Matter of Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Co.

et al., Kan. Supreme Ct., No. 86,277 (2002), that a tax benefit

was illegally withheld, the state of Kansas announced plans to

refund $25 million to the affected taxpayers. One of Kansas’

State representatives recognized a fact that Massachusetts

seems to have failed to internalize: Senate Minority Leader

Anthony Hensley (D-Topeka) commented that: "I'm not sure

we have any other option at this point . . .. We lost the suit.”

Massachusetts, like Kansas, lost the suit and therefore has no

other option — it needs to pay up. Obviously, the disparity in

the results demonstrated by these cases demonstrates a need

for guidance and the role of providing such guidance falls

squarely on this Court.

Procedural Reason for Accepting the Case for Review

An unequivocal definition of the requirements of a

constitutional remedy for an unconstitutional tax and a

mandate that the states provide this relief is also necessary

because of the limited forums available to taxpayers to pursue

the available remedies. A taxpayer generally cannot

challenge the constitutionality of a state or local tax in the

lower federal courts. U.S. Const. Amend. XI; 28 U.S.C.

12

§ 1341. The Eleventh Amendment’ prohibits suits for

monetary damages against a state in federal court and thus

prevents all suits for state tax refunds. Ford Motor Co. v.

Dep’t of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 462 (1945). The

Tax Injunction Act, as interpreted, prohibits taxpayers from

bringing any action in federal court if there is a “plain,

speedy, or efficient” remedy at state law. Newsweek, Inc. v.

Florida Dep't of Revenue, 522 U.S. 422, 444 (1998). Most of

the cases interpreting the Tax Injunction Act have determined

that state refund or protest systems are plain, speedy, and

efficient and thus jurisdiction in the federal courts is generally

prohibited. See, e.g., id.; California v. Grace Brethren

Church, 457 U.S. 393 (1982). While this Court has accepted

several state tax remedy cases in the past, review by this

Court is anything but guaranteed. Thus, taxpayers are usually

‘limited to a state court as the final arbiter of what is an

adequate remedy. In order to ensure that these state courts

provide a constitutionally sufficient remedy, COST

respectfully requests this Court to accept this case for review.

Remedy Issue Is Of Significant Importance

Finally, we note why we are so exercised about this case. It

is not hyperbole to state that the issue of remedies for

unconstitutional taxes is one of the single most important

issues® in state and local tax today. Time and again over the

past several years, taxpayers have been denied a

constitutional remedy by state courts. This is real money

being lost by real taxpayers. With the loss of this money, a

certain amount of faith in the system is also lost. Taxpayers’

only recourse is to appeal to this Court. States continue to

” “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit . .. commenced or prosecuted against one of the United

States by citizens of another state .. ..” U.S. amend. XI.

* The other pressing issues being nexus concerns and discriminatory

taxes.

13

impose unconstitutional taxes and when a court ultimately

invalidates these taxes, many states nevertheless refuse to

provide the taxpayer with constitutionally sufficient relief.

This situation is a source of significant frustration’ to

taxpayers and this Court is the only forum in which a solution

is available. In fact, over the past year the issue of remedies

has reached such significance in the state and local tax

community that the topic has been a feature of at least three

of the major state tax conferences. '° Perhaps, if the states are

forced to confront the true costs of providing a con-

stitutionally adequate remedy, the legislatures will be more

mindful in crafting their tax statutes to begin with and will be

quicker to fix a constitutional problem when it comes to light.

If this Court clearly exhibits its intent to enforce the

Constitution’s remedy rules on the states, states like Alabama

(unconstitutional franchise tax) and California (unconstitu-

tional dividends received deduction) may decide in the future

not to keep their clearly unconstitutional taxes on their books

for a lengthy and ultimately costly fight. Such a result will

save the states, taxpayers, and ultimately this Court unnec-

essary and repetitive litigation. COST and its members hope

that this Court will again add light to this important issue.

* The lack of adequate remedies has become somewhat of a depvessing

joke at taxpayer gatherings. Some taxpayers, after years of ultimately

successful litigation challenging a tax have taken to cynically waving a

dollar bill in the air and commenting that they have not received even one

dollar in refunds from the suit. This is a sad commentary on the current

system.

'° Paul J. Hartman (Vanderbilt) State & Local Tax Forum 2001, New

York University State and Local Tax Institute 2001, Georgetown SALT

Institute 2002.

—

14

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, and because this tax scheme

is one confronted and challenged by taxpayers in several

states, COST respectfully requests the Court to accept this

case for review.

Respectfully submitted,

DIANN L. SMITH

General Counsel

DOUGLAS L. LINDHOLM *

President/Executive Director

STEPHEN P.B. KRANZ

Tax Counsel

WILLIAM D. PELTZ

BOBBY L. BURGNER

J. HUGH MCKINNON

Chair, Vice Chair, and Of Counsel

Lawyers’ Coordinating

Subcommittee

COUNCIL ON STATE TAXATION

122 C Street, N.W.

Suite 330

Washington, D.C. 20001

* Counsel of Record (202) 484-5222